Reply Brief — Getty Oil Co. v. Tax Commission
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SEP 17 1977
RODAK, JR, CLERK
Yuthe Supreme Gourtof the Wiited States
OcTOBER TERM, 1977
No. 77-125
GETTY OIL COMPANY,
Appellant,
VERSUS
OKLAHOMA TAX COMMISSION,
Appellee.
ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA
REPLY BRIEF
Bruce H. JOHNSON
*L. E. STRINGER
RANDALL D. Mock
STEVEN L. BARGHOLS
1700 Liberty Tower—100 Broadway
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73102
Counsel for Appellant
September, 1977
* Counsel upon whom service is to be made.
——_ OL OL
UTTERBACK TYPESETTING Co... S19 W. CALIF... OKLAHOMA CiTY. PH. 235-0030
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
ARGUMENTS:
A. A substantial federal question was both timely
and properly raised in the Supreme Court of
Oklahoma
B. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma recognized
the substantial federal question raised and de-
two
cided it adversely to Getty | ae 3
C. The federal question is substantial . 6
CONCLUSION ; RAE ae
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
-_----- -—
CASES:
Avien, Inc., In re, 390 F.Supp. 1335 (E.D. New York
1975), aff'd, 532 F.2d 273 (2d Cir. 1976) 7,8
Charleston Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Alder-
son, 324 U.S. 182 (1945) a 4
F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412
(1920) ia oy iaiiate 11
Getty Oil Company v. Oklahoma Tax Commission,
563 P.2d 627 (Okla. 1977) 4
Graham v. State Tax Commission, 369 N.Y.S.2d 863,
aff'd, 389 N.Y.S.2d 362, 357 N.E.2d 1017 (1975) - 4-5
Grossman v. Baumgartner, 17 N.Y.2d 345, 271 N.Y.S.
2d 195 (N.Y. App. 1966)
Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423 (1959)
5
4
Saltonstall v. Saltonstall, 276 U.S. 260 (1928) 4
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) 8
2
Wilson v. Cook, 327 U.S. 474 (1946)
AUTHORITIES CONTINUED ot PAGE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION:
Equal Protection Clause, Fourteenth Amend-
ment aoe aera S|
STATE STATUTES:
63 O.S. 1971, § 2358(A) (3)
68 O.S. 1971, § 2358(A) (3) (d)
I
In the
Supreme Court of the United States
OcToBEeR TERM, 1977
No. 77-125
GETTY OIL COMPANY,
Appellant,
VERSUS
OKLAHOMA TAX COMMISSION,
Appellee.
ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA
REPLY BRIEF
Appellant, referred to in its Jurisdictional Statement
and hereinafter as “Getty,” asks the Court to grant its
appeal and overrule the Motion to Dismiss or Affirm filed
by Appellee, hereinafter referred to as Tax Commission,
for the reason that the Jurisdictional Statement filed by
Getty as well as the record below clearly manifest the fact
that Getty timely and properly raised and presented a sub-
stantial federal question to the Supreme Court of Oklahoma
upon which federal question that court rendered a decision
adverse to Getty by sustaining the validity of a state taxa-
tion statute attacked on the ground of its being repugnant
to the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution.
a
A. A SUBSTANTIAL FEDERAL QUESTION WAS
BOTH TIMELY AND PROPERLY RAISED IN
THE SUPREME COURT OF OKLAHOMA.
Getty’s Jurisdictional Statement outlines and develops
at length the fact that the record of the proceedings below
is replete with instances in which the validity of the state
statute in question was attacked on the ground of its being
repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment. That the validity
of the state taxation statute itself rather than simply the
assessment of the additional tax liability was challenged
by Getty renders inapposite to the instant facts Tax Com-
mission’s reliance on Wilson v. Cook, 327 U.S. 474, 66 S.Ct.
663, 90 L.Ed. 794 (1946). The record below demonstrates on
its face that Getty raised and argued the substantial federal
question at every procedural opportunity available to it
during the course of those proceedings.
It is not denied by Getty that other issues in addition
to that federal question were raised and arguments pre-
sented by Getty during the course of those proceedings.
It is axiomatic that any court should carefully avoid basing
a decision on constitutional grounds when there exist any
other reasonable bases upon which its decision may rest.
Getty urged the Supreme Court of Oklahoma to decide the
case below as a matter of statutory construction. In its Brief
to the Supreme Court of Oklahome, Getty suggested the
proper manner of construing the various provisions of the
state statute in question so as to arrive at a fair and equi-
table result treating uniformly all Oklahoma taxpayers
similarly situated. Such a statutory construction would
have avoided the constitutional issue here involved. How-
ever, Getty’s arguments were rejected.
ee ree oe
oo
Getty further argued before the Supreme Court of
Oklahoma that the state statute in question, if applied as
Tax Commission sought, discriminated in an invidious man-
ner against taxpayers engaging in multi-state business
operations which have incurred net operating losses in
Oklahoma business activities but which have realized suffi-
cient income from operations in other states to absorb those
Oklahoma losses. Getty was persistent in raising the federal
question and in asserting that denial of the deduction under
the facts presented was unreasonable, arbitrary and dis-
criminatory, and constituted a denial of equal protection of
the Jaws under the Fourteenth Amendment.
B. THE SUPREME COURT OF OKLAHOMA
RECOGNIZED THE SUBSTANTIAL FEDERAL
QUESTION RAISED AND DECIDED IT AD-
VERSELY TO GETTY.
In its Motion to Dismiss or Affirm, Tax Commission
concedes the point raised by Getty in its Jurisdictional
Statement that an appeal lies from a state court of last resort
of a decision sustaining the validity of a state statute drawn
in question on the ground of its being repugnant to the Fed-
eral Constitution if that question is either presented to that
state court or decided by it. Thus, as Tax Commission must
necessarily further concede, demonstration that the Su-
preme Court of Oklahoma did in fact base its decision on
its interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment renders
moot Tax Commission’s first argument raised in its Motion
to Dismiss or Affirm that the federal question herein as-
serted by Getty was neither timely nor properly raised.
per eal
This Court has consistently held that when it appears
from the opinion of the state court of last resort that a state
statute was drawn in question on the ground of its being
repugnant to the Federal Constitution, and ihe decision of
that court sustains the validity of that state statute, this
Court has jurisdiction on appeal and need not inquire as to
the manner in which such question was raised below. See
Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 436, 79 S.Ct. 1257, 3 L.Ed.2d
1344 (1959); Charleston Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v.
Alderson, 324 U.S. 182, 185, 186, 65 S.Ct. 624, 89 L.Ed. 857
(1945). Stated differently, any alleged deficiency in the
manner in which a federal question is presented is effec-
tively cured if the highest state court assumes that such
question is properly before it and proceeds to consider and
determine that issue. In such an event, this Court has here-
tofore refused to make inquiry into the precise manner of
presentation of the federal question in the court below.
Saltonstall v. Saltonstall, 276 U.S. 260, 267, 268, 48 S.Ct. 225,
72 L.Ed. 565 (1928).
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma decided the federal
question raised and asserted by Getty. In its opinion, that
court expressly denied that the state statute attacked by
Getty “creates unconstitutionally arbitrary discrimination
against non-resident taxpayers in the position of Getty... .”
Getty Oil Company v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 563 P.2d
627, 631 (Okla. 1977). In so ruling, the Supreme Court of
Oklahoma, as does Tax Commission in its Motion to Dismiss
or Affirm, ignored the multi-state /single-state classification
challenged by Getty, and purported to distinguish on factual
grounds the decision of the Supreme Court of New York
(Appellate Division, Third Judicial District) in Graham v.
a
State Tax Commission, 369 N.Y.S.2d 863, aff'd, 389 N.Y-S.
362, 357 N.E.2d 1017 (1975), cited by Getty as highly per-
suasive authority. In distinguishing the Graham decision,
the Supreme Court of Oklahoma created a “strawman”
resident/non-resident distinction upon which to support its
reasoning. However, in so doing, the Supreme Court of
Oklahoma necessarily recognized and rejected Getty’s con-
tention that its claim for relief from inception has been
grounded on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The New York Graham decision deals with
a factual situation remarkably similar to that at issue,
wherein the New York court struck down the validity of
a state taxation statute closely resembling the Oklahoma
taxation statute in question and granted relief under the
Fourteenth Amendment to an aggrieved taxpayer for the
reason that the state taxation statute was “unreasonable,
arbitrary or capricious and, therefore, invalid,” citing the
earlier decision of that court in Grossman v. Bat mgartner,
17 N.Y.2d 345, 271 N.Y.S.2d 195 (N.Y. App. 1966). The
Grossmon decision carefully analyzes and expressly rests
on a long line of United States Supreme Court decisions
construing the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Thus, the fact that the Supreme Court of
Oklahoma expressly passed on the federal question raised
by Getty cannot be controverted.
C. THE FEDERAL QUESTION IS SUBSTANTIAL.
Tax Commission argues that the state taxation statute
in question does not discriminate against Getty and other
Oklahoma taxpayers similarly situated on the basis of citi-
zenship or residence. That such an argument is asserted by
Tax Commission at this late stage in the proceedings is
manifest evidence of Tax Commission’s resolute refusal to
confront the very issue central to Getty’s appeal. Getty
further notes that the Supreme Court of Oxlahoma based
its decision on an express finding that the challenged statute
treats residents and non-residents in a like manner. Getty
has never argued that the discriminatory effect of that stat-
ute rests on the basis of a citizenship or residency classifica-
tion. The “Question Presented” in Getty’s Jurisdictional
Statement accurately reflects the federal question raised.
Neither Tax Commission nor the Supreme Court of
Oklahoma has denied that a distinction has been drawn in
the class of taxpayers doing business within Oklahoma
which have ‘Incurred net operating losses between those
taxpayers which do business exclusively in Oklahoma and
those taxpayers which also do business outside the State.
No explanation for the resulting disparity in treatment for
taxation purposes has been adduced during the course of
these proceedings to date. Both Tax Commission ard the
Supreme Court of Oklahoma have failed and refused to
respond to the contention of Getty that the multi-state ’
single-state classification drawn by the construction of the
taxation statute in question is arbitrary and discriminatory
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
dias
Apparently in an attempt to respond to Getty’s argu-
ment raised in its Jurisdictional Statement that Tax Com-
mission has failed to justify the discriminatory distinction
drawn between taxpayers engaged in multi-state business
operations and those engaged in business operations in
Oklahoma only, Tax Commission now suggests for the first
time that the challenged Oklahoma taxation statute permits
the Oklahoma Tax Commission to dispense with the need
for auditing state income tax returns filed by Oklahoma
taxpayers. Tax Commission speculates that some perceived
notion of “administrative convenience” was the avowed
purpose underlying enactment by the Oklahoma Legisla-
ture of that statute. As discussed at length by Getty in its
Petition for Rehearing (Appendix “F”, Jurisdictional State-
ment) filed with the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, it is
highly significant that the only other courts which have
considered the “administrative convenience” justification
raised in defense of the validity of another very similar
state taxation statute have flatly rejected that argument
as being an unreasonable basis for a discriminatory classifi-
cation between two taxpayers similarly situated. See In re
Avien, Inc., 390 F.Supp. 1335 (E.D. New York 1975), aff'd,
532 F.2d 273 (2d Cir. 1976).
In defense of the sustention of validity of the Oklahoma
taxation statute by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, Tax
Commission would argue that in order to achieve such “ad-
ministrative convenience,” numerical conformity between a
taxpayer’s federal and Oklahoma income tax returns is
required by the statute in question. However, when Section
2358(A)(3)(d) of the Oklahoma Income Tax Act is rele-
gated to serving only the purpose of administrative
=
convenience and numerical conformity, the arbitrary and
unreasonable nature of the distinction drawn between
multi-state taxpayers and taxpayers engaged in business
operations only in Oklahoma becomes blatant. First, strict
numerical conformity between state and federal income tax
returns filed by the two classes of taxpayers is simply im-
possible because the multi-state business taxpayer’s federal
income tax return will reflect Oklahoma as well as outside-
Oklahoma income while both returns filed by the taxpayer
engaged in business operations only in Oklahoma will of
course reflect only Oklahoma income. Moreover, as sug-
gested by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit in its decision in In re Avien, Inc., 532 F.2d 273 (2d
Cir. 1976), a test involving “procedural conformity” in
arriving at permissible computation procedures used to
calculate deductions is reasonable as opposed to a strict
“numerical-figure conformity” test such as that applied
by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in the case below.
To require strict conformity of numbers between a
taxpayer’s federal and Oklahoma income tax returns, rather
than conformity of procedures used to calculate those num-
bers, not only produces an unreasonable and impossible
result in the instant case, but also is squarely inconsistent
with the mandate of the Oklahoma Income Tax Act which
compels a taxpayer tu employ 4he separate allocation ac-
counting method of reporting income and losses by allocat-
ing all income and losses produced to the individual states
in which the multi-state taxpayer has operated during the
taxable year. 68 O.S. 1971, § 2358(A)(3). As this Court
stated in Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656, 92 S.Ct. 1208,
31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972), “. . . the Constitution recognizes
higher values than speed and efficiency.” The “administra-
tive convenience” argument presented by Tax Commissior
is so attenuated as to be unworthy of recognition by this
Court.
Tax Commission makes no attempt to distinguish the
cases cited by Getty substantiating the contention that the
federal question involved is substantial other than to ob-
serve, as Getty said in its Jurisdictional Statement, that
those cases deal with statutory tax exemptions, and not
deductions. Such a purported distinction is entirely un-
respc ‘tive and devoid of merit. It is noteworthy that Tax
Commission does not deny that, while the nature of the tax
benefits withheld from the various litigant-taxpayers in the
cases cited are somewhat different from that denied Getty,
the adverse and arbitrary result to Getty and other tax-
payers similarly situated is no less burdensome or inequi-
table, nor is the underlying rationale any more defensible.
Again in this vein, the reluctance, unwillingness or inability
of Tax Commission to discuss or suggest reasons supporting
the challenged multi-state/single-state classification con-
firms the weakness of its Motion to Dismiss or Affirm.
Tax Commission asserts that it was the intent of the
Oklahoma Legislature to deny the tax deduction in question
to taxpayers in the position of Getty. If this Court concludes
that the statute challenged by Getty is in fact arbitrary,
discriminatory and in violation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, and, hence, void, then even if the Oklahoma Legisla-
ture intended that result, this certainly cannot be considered
redemptive.
Tax Commission also suggests that the Oklahoma
Legislature “could” have based the challenged multi-state /
_
single-state classification on the “ability of a class [of tax-
payers] to pay.” Tax Commission argues that simply be-
cause Getty was able to absorb its net operating losses in
Oklahoma from its operations conducted outside Oklahoma
and reflect net operating income for federal income tax
purposes that the deduction in question should be withheld
from Getty, but allowed to an Oklahoma taxpayer reflecting
net operating losses on both its federal and Oklahoma in-
come tax returns. Because it was that income generated
from its operations conducted outside Oklahoma which
absorbed the Oklahoma net operating losses so as to pre-
clude Getty from claiming a net operating loss carry-over
deduction on its federal income tax return, it is blatantly
contradictory for Tax Commission to simultaneously main-
tain that denial of that deduction to Getty is not “an indirect
tax on income from sources outside of Oklahoma.” Further-
more, Tax Commission disregards the fact that an Okla-
homa taxpayer’s ability to pay income tax is taken into
account in determining, first, whether that taxpayer did
in fact realize income from its operations in Oklahoma, and,
second, in determining how much income was realized
therefrom. Obviously, the more income an Oklahoma tax-
payer realizes from its operations in Oklahoma, the more
dollars in taxes it will pay to the State of Oklahoma. In
this manner, every Oklahoma taxpayer bears its eq:itable
share of the tax burden. Such a taxation scheme is emi-
nently more reasonable than penalizing a taxpayer engaged
in multi-state operations by denying the claimed deduction
for the sole and invidious reason that its operations outside
Oklahoma proved to be more profitable than its operations
within the State.
ee
=
To permit a single-state taxpayer to offset its operating
losses against its operating income while requiring a multi-
state taxpayer to report only its income within the taxing
state, in that instance in which income from its operations
outside Oklahoma absorbed a loss which might otherwise
have been claimed as a net operating loss carry-over deduc-
tion on its federal income tax return, denies the multi-state
taxpayer equal protection of the laws in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The discriminatory classification
resulting from that difference in treatment does not “rest
upon some ground or difference having a fair and substan-
tial relation to the object of the legislation.” F. S. Royster
Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415, 40 S.Ct. 560, 64
L.Ed. 989 (1920).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons Tax Commission’s Motion to
Dismiss or Affirm should be refused, and Getty’s appeal
from the opinion and judgment below should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
Bruce H. JOHNSON
*L,. E. STRINGER
RANDALL D. Mock
STEVEN L. BARGHOLS
1700 Liberty Tower—100 Broadway
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73102
Counsel for Appellant
September, 1977
* Counsel upon whom service is to be made.
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