Petition — Thompson v. Supreme Court

Supreme Court brief1976

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In the

Supreme Court of the United States

Octoser Term, 1975

RALPH B. THOMPSON AND MARGARET E. THOMPSON,

Petitioners,

No. 48236 Vs.

THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

et al., etc.

Respondents.

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE PETITION FOR WRIT

OF MANDAMUS TO THE SUPREME COURT FOR

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

and

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

RALPH B. THOMPSON, and

MARGARET E. THOMPSON,

Box 133

Hinsdale, Illinois 60521

(312) 323-3381

Petitioners, Pro Se

SSIS SCT SS LS ESS

UNITED STATES LAW PRINTING CO., CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60618 (312) 525-6581

Supreme Court. U

INDEX

PAGE

Motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus 1

Petition for writ of mandamus ............0............sc2:--e000000+- 2

ITD Ur TIO... stteocceastnestindetpsabendnanaemagalaniens 2

Reasons for granting the writ:

The Llinois Supreme Court is ultra vires its au-

thority in refusing to rule on a petition as a matter

of right and thus deprived petitioners of a right

to a direct appeal to this court ~...000.0000......2.....---- 21

The Lilinois Supreme Court is also depriving peti-

tioners of the right to be heard by the federal dis-

trict court under 42 U.S.C. 1983 by denying the

records for a removal to that court under 28

Gi eeeitie SUID. sssantsssacectnesralieissiemnsiaeeieesaeaasinadansenseianianadaaiioos 21

The Illinois Supreme Court is further ultra vires

its authority in refusing to determine its jursdic-

tion and ignoring Section 718 and deprives the

petitioner of a right to a summary judgment in

their favor granting the damages and injunctive

IE GN © wiccneteccinconseschebevnncdcuetiacientoneetiapeeiensaintilanioniabies 21

The Illinois Supreme Court decision ignores the

absolute right of petitioners to a decision as to

freedom of speech, due process and equal protec-

tion, to remove the ineumbrances from their prop-

erty and terminate the litigation 000.0... 23

I a ae ee 25

a ae cated

. | ii

P PAGE PAGE

A ix A—

pendix _ Letter from Appellate Clerk, dated May 17, 1976,

Record in Illinois Supreme Court .............2.2...-2...0+-. App. 1 attempting explanation of Illinois Supreme

Petition as a Matter of Right ....2.0..c.ccccesesseeeeeeeeeee App. 1 Court second issuance of mandate in 73-1890

Appendix to Petition, Opinion of Appellate Court App. 13 Om JULY 28, ITS a.neneneneeeneeeneeeenerensernnereneenne App. 44

} Letter from Illinois Supreme Court that mandate

. Oe IE cen steatencmainene-aiiadad App. 22

aes of Aggate _— PP of 73-1890 had issued to the Appellate Court

Final Order of Appellate Court, undated .............. App. 23 of Illinois, Sccond District on December 30,

Certificate of Appellate Clerk on Final Order ....App. 25 VOTE .nn-nnnnnessovereneencssonerenseenseevsenossccsunecenssnocsesssnsconseens App. 50

Letter from Appellate Clerk refusing to prepare Order of Illinois Supreme Court recalling its man-

Sp OSS ET AT IT App. 25 date issued on February 22, 1974 for appeal

ici: Miceneeiiin detsme Witaseilhe | to this court in 73-1890, wherein the order is

*P stamped, assigned to Third Distriet —............. App. 45

Order of the Cireuit Court denying consolidation ; op ere ee ,

‘th P ne Wien | Board C dal Final order of Ilinois Supreme Court in record

he: Ee ee ee ee rene eee prepared for this petition, unsigned ................ App. 47

denying appointment of Special Prosecutor .App. 27

Certificate of Supreme Court Clerk on record sub-

NES II setcciernstnntitciscnviinnsniiiipaanaaa App. 49

Certiticate of Circuit Clerk on records prepared

for appeal on 73-1890, as taken from Excerpts

Order of Cireuit Court appealed ........00..00...222........-- App. 28

Notice to Illinois Supreme Court of intimidation

by Cireuit Court dated March 2, 1976 regarding

CASE M0. 73-1890... -nenanenseeeeeesennnneeceesennssceeeeeenes App. 31 from Record in Lllinois Supreme Court, cer-

Letter addressed to Cireuit judge, attached to . tified as ‘‘a certain cause lately in said court’’ App. 51

above notice dated February 19, 1976 ............ App. 33

Letter from State’s Attorney sent by certified a >

mail with return receipt requested and Circuit | Record in Du Page Circuit Court uncertified and

Court Order dated February 13, 1976 .............. App. 30 ‘fas is’’ from petitioners records... App. 52

Threatening letter from {Illinois Supreme Court Complaint, filed September 26, 1975 _........... App. 52

Clerk over petitioners insistence on a certified Notice of Motion to set a date for the case to

copy of that courts final judgment. .................... App. 37 continue, dated September 22, 1975 ...00000000....... App. 65

Printed copy of the Original Mandate of the LIli- Motion to set a date for case to continue pursuant

nois Supreme Court, dated April 30, 1976, tv i TIN cccccetocnc ee App. 66

(petitioners have original) ......0..0..00.0..0.....0+ App. 38

Order of October 2, 1975, giving State’s Attorney

to October 23, 1975 to respond .............2.......-- App. 71

Answer to the Chief Judge’s ex parte pleadings,

allegations, arguments, evidence and proposi-

tion to change the venue in the above numbered

ease (omitted) Proposed court order _............ App. 72

Cireuit Court Order entered on October 16, 1975,

on above answer wherein the Chief Judge

recuses himself and transferred the case to

Senior Circuit Judge, Philip Locke ................ App. 74

Order entered October 16, 1975 by judge Locke,

leaving the October 2, 1975 order standing, (the

case now is before two judges, two court rooms

for 9:30 October 23, 1975) . ..............-...cecsereceereees App. 75

State’s Attorney’s Motion to Strike and Dismiss

is omitted

Order entered by Chief Judge on October 23, 1975,

Judge Locke was removed from the bench on

October 22, 1975 for six months for ruling in a

ease that he had once disqualified himself in,

again assigning the case to Judge Norgle ....App. 76

Order of Judge Norgle on October 23, 1975, find-

ing that petitioner was not present before the

EE REREE SES rts a ae ne App. 77

Petitioners ‘tion to Transfer to Federal Dis-

trict Cou:., dled instanter on October 30, 1975

omitted, Order entered by Judge Norgle on

October 30, 1975, granting time for response App. 78

‘*Response to Petitioner’s Motion for a transfer

to the Federal District Court or in the Alter-

native to Notify the United States Attorney

General’’, filed on December 15, 1975, is omitted

PAGE

Order entered December 19, 1975 giving petition-

ers time to respond to above response ............ App. 79

Motion to Strike and Dismiss ‘‘above response’’

with prejudice and bar the defendants from

further pleading, filed January 22, 1976, is also

omitted,

Order, January 26, 1976 continuing the case until

January 30, 1976 for plaintiff to supply list

of records and documents @2.0.....2......--.2-:ceceeceeee-e- App. 80

Order of January 30, 1976 continuing the case

until February 13, 1976, (missing from file on

ET TE CEUNEED duiisashSiininsitententsinstionsnisitinienmatinionionial App. 81

Order of February 13, 1976, Appendix A above ...App. 30

Letter of February 19, 1976, Appendix A ............ App. 33

IIIT sicusttessnnetininsnlenteiantsiceenictibiinitinamanteead App. 82

AUTHORITIES CITED

Cases

Butz v. City of Muscatine, 19 L. Ed. 490 000. 22

Dambrowski v. Pfister, 38 U.S. 479 ooo 23

Faretta v. California, —— U.S. —— none 9

Hill v. Gautreaux, —— U.S. —— on neeecececcccceeeeeeeeeeeeee 15

Hill v. Gautreaux, 448 F.2d 731, 739, 740 000 .. 23

Huffman v. Pursue, 420 U.S. 592 0.2... cece ceeeeee 22

Thermtron Products Inc. v. Hermandorfer —— U.S.

STITT. carci lieniisilbhinabaneieiailalaciadebinieiniaiaialdsian 22

OG RS 23

PAGE

Reference

A Special Interest, Leonard Greenbaum, Ann Arbor,

U. of Michigan Press, 1971, Library of Congress

Tae, FO ceccesescreserncessnneneennenmnnintnnmneemmmmnsssematain 14

Statutes

Ill.Rev.Stat. Chapter 120, Sections 592.1, 592.4, 675,

675a, 716, 718 and 804; Chapter 53, Sections 28 and

31; Chapter 110A, Sections 315, 317, 368, 381 and

382; Chapter 127, Sections 46.1, et seq.. and 47.2

fT 4, 7, 8, 10, 12, 13, 18, 19, 20

15 U.S.C. Section 1351, et seq.; 28 U.S.C. 1446, 1257-

VOSTE £3 2 21, 23, 25

Constitutions

First Amendment, U.S. Constitution (Freedom of

OT ccceccccrnecsssvecenssesenssnennaienemianasenannanrmnenmsnntiastsannienete 9

Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. Constitution .................. 23

1970 Constitution of Illinois, Article VI, Sections

GO Gok, GOR GR GRD ereccetetccrectiscintinctntennintianinniinion 11

Iu the

Supreme Court of the United States

Octower Term, 1975

No.

RALPH B. THOMPSON AND MARGARET E. THOMPSON,

Petitioners,

No. 48236 vs.

THE SUPREMz COURT FOR THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

et al., etc.

Respondents.

MOTION

FOR LEAVE TO FILE PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

The petitioners move the court for leave to file the peti-

tion for writ of mandamus, hereto annexed, under Section

1651 of Title 28 of the United States Code, and further

move that an order and rule be eatered and issued direct-

ing the Honorable Lilinois Supreme Court to show cause

why a writ of mandamus should not be issued against

such Supreme Court in accordance with the prayer of

said petition and why the petitioners should not have such

other and further relief in the premises that may be just

and meet.

Ratew B. Tompson and

Marcaret E. THompson,

Petitioners.

Iu the

Supreme Court of the United States

Octoser TERM, 1975

No.

RALPH B. THOMPSON AND MARGARET E. THOMPSON,

Petitioners,

No. 48236 vs

THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

et al. etc.

Respondents.

PETITION

FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS TO THE SUPREME

COURT OF ILLINOIS

STATEMENT OF CASE

Petitioners, Ralph B. Thompson and Margaret E.

Thompson, his wife, pray that a writ of mandamus issue,

to the Supreme Court for the State of Illinois, to show

cause on a day to be fixed by this court, directing the

aforesaid Illinois Supreme Court to vacate an order deny-

ing leave to appeal, on a petition as a matter of right to

review the judgment of the Appellate Court of Illinois,

Second District, Second Division, affirming the judgment

of the Cireuit Court of the 18th Judicial Circuit, DuPage

County, 'llinois, against petitioners’ property in favor of

the People of the State of Illinois, for taxes due and un-

paid thereon, in Illinois Supreme Court case number

48236,

PT Ge ee

People of the State of Illinois ex rel. Ralph B.

Thompson, et al., Petitioners vs. James H. Clark,

County Collector, et al., ete., Respondents,

entered on March 25, 1976, as furnished to petitioners by

the Clerk of the Illinois Supreme Court, Appendix, Infra,

PP. 38, 47.

The Appellate Court opinion is published ....... App.

3rd, and is in the Appendix, infra, P. 13, entered on

December 3, 1975, as corrected December 17, 1975.

There was no petition for a rehearing in the Illinois

Supreme Court.

The final judgment of the Cireuit Court appealed, Ap-

pendix, infra, P. 28 was entered as of September 10,

1973, nune pro tune March 2, 1973, (the order is mis-dated;

it was entered on September 11).

As shown by the Petition as a Matter of Right, filed on

January 28, 1976, in the Illinois Supreme Court, and ap-

pended, the effect of the Llinois Supreme Court denial of

leave to appeal on a petition as a matter of right taken

pursuant to Article VI, Section 4 (c), 1970 Illinois Con-

stitution, and Chapter 110A, Section 317, Ill. Rev. Stat.

(Rule 317) being to deny the petitioners the right to the

Illinois Supreme Court to determine the constitutional

questions raised as a result of the Appellate Court action

as to the violation of petitioners’ civil rights under the

color of state law, affirming judgment against petitioners’

property for an undetermined amount of unpaid taxes

when the taxes are fully paid; and the discrimination

against petitioners’ right to due process and equal pro-

tection of the law guaranteed by state and federal con-

stitutions, splintering the cause, denying a termination

of the litigation, confiscation of petitioner’s property, the

right to relief in any state court, and as shown below, the

right to remove the case to a federal district court under

28 U.S.C. 1446 or appeal to the United States Supreme

Court under 28 U.S.C. Section 1257(2) or (3), also denying

the petitioners the right to a summary judgment in their

favor for the damages and injunctive relief sought to which

they are entitled.

As asserted in the petition, the case came forth on peti-

tioners’ complaint pursuant to Ch, 120, Sec. 804, Ill. Rev.

Stat. wherein the consent of the sovereign is given to any

person right to complain in any court of competent juris-

diction in the name of the People of the State of Illinois

against any officer who connives at any evasion of the

provisions of the Revenue Act, the penalty is for double

damages or losses and a possible removal from office.

For the Circuit Court to enter judgment against peti-

tioners’ property in favor of the People of the State of

Illinois on petitioner’s complaint wherein they were the

relators for the People is in itself an obstruction of jus-

tice. But for the Appellate Court to twist the facts and

say that these petitioners are ignorant, that the cause did

not come forth on their complaint, making an already

malicious judgment operative, making the judgment one

that came forth on the application of the collector for

taxes due and unpaid when the collector has never at any

time filed an application, not only confiscates petitioners’

property, but, subjects the Appellate Court of Illinois,

Second District, to the penalties of Section 804, supra.

The Petitioners have the right to a determination by the

Illinois Supreme Court, or in the alternative, by a federal

district court.

Ee FR Te Be

The petition also states, that the same court order, rul-

ing on consolidation of the case at bar with 74-1347,’ and

appointment of a special prosecutor, was entered in both

eases on July 30, 1973. App., infra, p. 27.

As stated in the petition, the complaint in 74-1347, which

is appended to the jurisdictional statement in this court,

was completely incorporated in the case at bar by refer-

ence, both cases were filed on October 13, 1972 in the trial

court, both are on 1971 taxes, the issues were finally de-

termined by the Circuit Court in this case on March 2,

1973, 74-1347 was determined on April 12, 1973. The trial

court could not hear both cases.

The trial court transcript shows, March 2, 1973, (Ree.

Doe. 2, Vol. 2, pp. 59, 60):

1RELATED CASES

1. Thompson, ct ux. v. Clark, etc., et al., No. 73-1890 in the

United States Supreme Court, judgment issued December 23, 1974,

to Illinois Supreme Court. Notice that Illinois Supreme Court man-

date issued to A»pellate Court of Illinois, Second District, Decem-

ber 30, 1974. Mandate of Illinois Supreme Court issued July

28, 1975.

2. Thompson, et ux. v. Property Tax Appeal Board, State of

Illinois, etc., et al., United States Supreme Court No. 74-1437,

judgment issued July 15, 1975, to the Appellate Court of Illinois,

Second District.

Illinois Supreme Court mandate issued, July 28, 1975. Peti-

tioners, upon information and belief, think the United States Su-

preme Court judgment issued to the Appellate Court of Illinois,

Second District, is in the Illinois Supreme Court, having been credi-

bly so informed by the Appellate Clerk by telephone, as is the like

judgment in the case below.

3. Thompson v. County Board of School Trustees of Du Page

County, Illinois, et al., No. 74-1526, judgment issued by the United

States Supreme Court to the Appellate Court of Illinois, Second

District, November 4, 1975.

illinois Supreme Court mandate issued November 18, 1975 as

well as 71-234 and 71-398 on petitions for Writs for Certiorari.

‘*Ms. Thompson: . . . Now, number four I would

like to hold over because of the Property Tax Ap-

peal Board case... .

The Court: Well, we are not going \. hold four

over, or paragraph four. If you want to discuss it

or testify to it or make some proof on that point, do

it, because today is the day we are concluding this

case.

Ms. Thompson: All right. I have evidence that

my property is the same as the abutting property.

It is all grown up in shrubs. It is vacant because [

am in two and a half acre zoning—I mean, two acre

zoning, and I own four acres of land; that the abut-

ting property was assessed at 314% of the value es-

tablished in the Fairfield-Miller case.

Actually, it is worth a great deal more than that in

1971 because that was established in 1969.

That the Board of Review lowered the assessments

on the abutting property on the basis that it was

classified as farm land.

Part of this property was rezoned to commercial

in 1970, and it is still being taxed at $500.00 an acre,

and the Board of Review, on their publications on

what they do, left this—omitted it from the publica-

tion and they didn’t have a public hearing denying

anybody from going in and contesting it. They say

if valuations are not satisfactory call for a hearing

within ten days. (These documents are in 74-1347 in

the mvtion to appoint a special prosecutor.)

This was not done in the public, and taxes are sup-

posed to be 50% of the actual value, and when some-

body else can be taxed at 314% of actual value, then |

deserve the same treatment.

You know that that is not what I asked, but that

is all you said you can give me. J think it should be

re-assessed.

Now, in the Property Tax Appeal Board case are

all of those figures. Now, am I going to be present-

ing them again in the other case?

The Court: I don’t know what you mean.

SLE NII TR Se

. —

en a

Te ee

Ms. Thompson: Well, are you going to hear both

cases?

The Court: The case you just had the order en-

tered on before this case, hasn’t the hearing com-

menced?

Ms. Thompson: Yes, it is on assessments.

The Court: Certainly.

Ms. Thompson: You are going to hear it? Well

then, that is all I am going to say here, because I am

giving my arguments away for the other case.’’?

The law providing access to the courts from the board

of review Ch. 120, Sec. 592.1, Ill. Rev. Stat., has since been

amended. If appeal is taken to the Property Tax Appeal

Board only administrative review may be had and relief

may not be sought in the court against the Board of Re-

view. If no such appeal is taken relief may be sought in

the court against the Board of Review.

Assessments in Illinois are considered legislative action.

The above statute is not only contrary to the doctrine of

exhausting administrative remedies before access can be

1The Property Tax Appeal Board case was in no way heard.

The defendants made no denials or even oral arguments, the judge

announced from the bench that he had read the case and that the

evidence did not support petitioners’ contentions. Not one allegation

was heard.

The law establishing the rate of actual market value has since

been amended to 3314% of market value and the total assess-

ments of the counties has been frozen at the prior level. The effect

of this in Du Page County has been enormous. For example a house

that was assessed in 1971 at $18,000 was selling in 1975 for around

$50,000, based on the assessor’s figure that it was worth $36,000.

None of the residential assessments went down on the 1975 re-

assessment based on the lower percent, so now the house has the

market value of $54,000 and prices on these houses has jumped to

$60,000, or 20% in the last six months.

had in the courts, it sets up conflicting court decisions in

other respects, in that in direct court action against the

Board of Review the courts have held that it is necessary

to prove constructive fraud; in Section 592.4 ‘‘such deci-

sion shall be based upon equity and the weight of evidence

and not upon constructive fraud.’’ The assessments are

either administrative decisions or they are legislative,

they cannot be legislative for the Board of Review and

administrative for the property tax appeal board and

petitioners have the right to have the Illinois Supreme

Court hear and determine their rights.

As asserted in the petition, the Illinois Supreme Court

mandate issued to the Appellate Court of Illinois, Second

District on December 30, 1974, in 73-1890, supra, and as

also asserted, the case is in the Cireuit Court with a com-

plaint filed, where jurisdiction has not been taken and

probably could not be taken because of the Appellate

Court mandate. On May 8, 1976 the petitioners learned

what the courts already knew, that there was something

wrong with the mandate issued on December 30, 1974; as

shown on the court order recalling the mandate from the

Second District for appeal to this court in Febru-

ary of 1974, Appendix, infra, P. 45, the case was

assigned to the Third District, Petitioners can only guess

that the original mandate went to the Third District;

petitioners have the constitutional right to appeal to the

Appellate Court in their own district.

Petitioners submit that if the Second District could not

give a fair hearing on 73-1890, the reason given for as-

signing the case to the Third District, that it was estopped

from hearing the next three cases, being 74-1347, 74-1526

and the present case at bar.

The title of 73-1890 (it did not have a valid title before

because the collector never filed an initial or other plead-

ing) is now People ex rel. Margaret E. Thompson, Rela-

tor, Petitioner-Plaintiff vs. The Cireuit Court of the 18th

Judicial Cireuit, et al., ete., Respondents-Defendants; the

Complaint, appended hereto, was filed under the same

Section 804, supra.

Petitioners claim that the Appellate Court ruling that

the case at bar did not come forth on petitioners’ com-

plaint but on the collector’s application for judgment on

(lelinquent lands, was deliberately intended to nullify peti-

tioners’ complaint in the Cireuit Court.

As shown by the Cireuit Court records appended, the

records are evidence of outrageous discrimination, need

little explanation except that the petitioner did tell the

judge in court on the morning of February 13, 1976, that

she was not coming back; the mixed up records were

71-234, 71-398 and 73-1890, (U.S. Supreme Court Nos.)

The Complaint was filed September 26, 1975, and the filing

fee paid; as alleged in the complaint prior practice of

the Cireuit Clerk was not to collect fees on tax cases.

Dates of entry are missing on some of the orders but are

shown in the index; the trial judge Charles Norgle, Sr.,

would allow nothing to be corrected, he called it refusing

to make any rulings, making a farce out of this court’s

ruling in Faretta v. Calif,, ........ if a , 1975. Fora

court of original jurisdiction to refuse to determine issues

of law for non-lawyers is an effective denial of access to

the courts, and freedom of speech, necessitating a lawyer

for a mouthpiece, and for the Appellate Court to uphold

this practice, treating the issues of law as unproven facts

making original rulings from the cold record gives peti-

tioners the guaranteed right of review by the L[llinois Su-

preme Court.

As asserted in the petition and as stated by the appel-

late court opinion appended, petitioner, plaintiff below,

raised 24 issnes on appeal, claiming judgment appealed

is invalid and void as denying plaintiffs due process

rights guaranteed by the state and federal constitutions

and should be vacated.

In substance petitioners sought to have sections of the

Illinois Constitution of 1970, Sections of the Illinois Re-

vised Statutes, especially Chapter 120, Sections 675 (194),

675a (194a) and 716 (235), a myriad of tax levy ordi-

nances, budget and appropriation ordinances and the as-

sessed value on their real estate declared in violation of

fourteenth Amendment rights as to due process of law,

equal protection of the law and freedom from discrimina-

tion, in the court of first instance, which was the Circuit

Court of the 18th Judicial Cireuit, DuPage County, IIli-

nois, on a complaint filed on October 13, 1972, on 1971 real

estate taxes. The Circuit Court did not rule on the issues

of law except what evidence could be identified and ad-

mitted.

The appellate court ruled that the trial court was not

in error, citing Section 716, supra, then proceeded to treat

the issues as unproven facts instead of issues of law, arbi-

trarily exercised original jurisdiction which raises con-

stitutional questions giving the petitioners the constitu-

tional right to a determination by the Illinois Supreme

Court. The trial court record rebuttal as follows: (Excerpts

PP. 187-80) (Ree. 2, Vol. II)

‘‘Ms. Thompson: Well, I don’t think any law is

followed any place along the line in the Revenue Act,

and when it causes my taxes to go up 90 percent in

five years, and when the collector doesn’t follow any

laws, the State’s Attorney doesn’t make him, and the

court doesn’t make him and you can’t get the tax ob-

POT URE RRO

i ae) r

jections heard, that I think the entire tax is vitiated;

that I should get one hundred percent back, that be-

cause the collector has failed the law, and under sec-

tion 5U4, 1 get back not only one hundred per cent of the

tax, but I get double.

Mr. McLaren: Your Honor, I believe the protest

attached to the complaint only applies to 92 per cent.

I believe that she paid 8 per cent not under protest.

Ms. Thompson: Your Honor, we argued in here.

He withheld one hundred per cent. Now, if he is going

to withhold 100 per cent, he can give one hundred per

cent back. If he has only withheld 92 per cent, I would

agree with you, but you didn’t make him come back

in here and withhold only 92 per cent.

The Court: Well, that memorandum only relates

to the excessive accumulation doesn’t it?

Okay, anything else to be offered at this time?

All right.

Il am not going to take that memorandum, because

I don’t believe excessive accumulation is the prob-

lem.’’*

‘*Ms. Thompson: Well, they already did excessive

accumulations.

The Court: I don’t think it is proved by the evi-

dence. In fact, the evidence in my view doesn’t sup-

port your objection, Mrs. Thompson, and I rule

against you on your objections to dismiss your ob-

jection and complaint as to all defendants, and deny

you any relief whatsover.’’ (emphasis added)

In substance the petition secks to have a section of

the Illinois Constitution of 1970 declared in violation of

Fourteenth Amendment rights as to due process of law,

equal protection of the law and freedom from discrimina-

tion, such offending section of the 1970 Illinois Constitu-

tion being Article VI, Sections 4(a) and 6 reading:

1 (Petitioner had given the judge a memorandum of cases, both

pro and con, on accumulation of tax monies in relation to the Park

District levies. The memorandum was not relevant to the rebuttal.)

‘é

... exercise original jurisdiction when necessary to

the complete determination of any case on review.’

Also, in substance, seeking to have sections of the IIli-

nois Revised Statutes ceclared in violation of state and

federal constitutions protecting civil rights both personal

and property, such offending sections being Chapter 53,

sections 31 and 28, Chapter 120, Sections 675, 675a, and

716, Chapter 127, Sections 46 and 47, Chapter 110A, Sec-

tions 381, 382 and 368, reading:

Chapter 53, Section 28:

‘‘For making a complete record, copy of record, or

other papers in his office, for each 100 words 15 cents,

except that the clerk shall furnish without cost, par-

ties in interest or their attorneys of record, with

printed copies of opinions.’’

Section 31 (N):

‘*Preparation and certification of record on change

of venue or when original documents only are for-

warded on appeal, $5.

When by court order copies of some or all of the docu-

ments in the record are to be forwarded rather than

the originals the clerk may charge $.50 per page of

the origmal document copied for each of the first 25

pages of such authorized copies and $.25 per page of

the original document copied for each additional page

of authorized copies.’’

Section 31 (V)

‘‘For each paper containing one or more tax objec-

tions, whenever filed, $5.’’

Section 31, last paragraph:

‘‘No fee provided herein shall be charged to any unit

of local government or school district unless the court

orders another party to pay such fee on its behalf.’’

See Se Wat

Soe

As asserted in the petition the trial court did appoint

a special prosecutor by agreement between the State’s

Attorney and a DuPage group organized by a Saul Alin-

sky organizer, on October 24, 1975, when petitioners’ oral

motion in court on October 23, 1975 to appoint a special

prosecutor was alse denied. Petitioners claim that this is

extreme discrimination against them.

Further on that subject, the collector has now been

indicted for bribery, conspiracy and official misconduct in

office.

Further, petitioners notified Attorney General Scott in

September of 1974, that they were concerned about a pos-

sible leak in the Chicago Justice departments investiga-

tions in these matters which was posing a threat to them,

because of the Saul Alinsky organizers in DuPage County

had information that could only have come from the jus-

tice department. By appointing this special prosecutor

petitioners allege that dissent is being controlled in Du-

Page County. The collector cannot be investigated with-

out also investigating the court.

As asserted in the petition, all Illinois Courts are effec-

tively estopped from appointing a special prosecvtor, un-

less and until, the decision is vacated in 74-1347.

As further asserted in the petition the result of the

Appellate Court action raised the question ot the validity

of the Business and Economic Development Act, Chapter

127. See. 46.1 et seq., 47.2 et seq., Ill. Rev. Stat. and pos-

sibly the State Technical Services Act, 15 U.S.C. 1351 et

seq., especially sections 46.28 and 47.2, which authorizes

state, federal and local government cooperation with pri-

vate special interest and vested interest parties to the

damage of petitioners and their property wherein peti-

tioners are not only paying an undue burden of taxes by

the practices of the Illinois Courts and other defendants

below, petitioners’ property is encumbered by so many

violations of the Illinois Revenue Act that it is confiscated.

The evidence for this confiscation and the actions co-

operatively taken against petitioners runs throughout all

of petitioners’ cases that have come to this court, wherein

none of petitioners’ allegations have ever been denied.

Starting with a secret meeting, held in Hinsdale, IIli-

nois, on the first er second of September, 1966, which peti-

tioners believe was between Federal, State, local govern-

ments, developers, and others, as shown in the records

(71-235) plans were devised that would consume peti-

tioners’ property. The gist seemed to be planning caused

hy the National Laboratories in DuPage County, which

were managed by a tri-partite agreement between the Uni-

versity of Chicago, the now defunct Atomie Energy Com-

mission and thirty or forty other universities. As foot-

noted in A SPECIAL INTEREST, Leonard Greenbaum,

Ann Arbor, U. of Michigan Press, 1971, Library of Con-

gress No. 74-164042. P. 169, our present United States

Attorney General, Edward H. Levi, was the author of

the agreement.

One of the alleged planners, the Hinsdale High School

District, with the opinion in petitioners’ favor, that the

two school districts could not join together, hired a new

Superintendent who housed on land illegally subdivided

without platting which used Petitioners’ land as access.

In the case at bar, 74-1526 was objected to on the

grounds that the school board was paying the private

expenses of its members and also the private expenses

of the State’s Attorney out of public funds, in a way that

interfered with petitioners’ zoning and defeated Oak

Brook’s master plan.

Petitioners submit that the United States Supreme

Court ruling in Hill vy. Gautneaux also concerning housing

and sehool discrimination, is useless, wherein this court

contends that low income housing can be controlled to a

degree in Chicago's suburbs because of our laws on mas-

ter plans, unless, we can enforce these laws.

The Appcllate Court ruling on the constitutionality of

section 675a, supra, also turns an issue of law into one

of fact. ‘‘Plaintiffs have failed, however, to off: r compe-

tent evidence of any such agreements.’’

Ch. 110A, Section 133 (b), IL Rev. Stat. reads:

‘‘In pleading a judgment or order of any state or

federal court ..., it is sufficient to state the date

of its entry and describe its general nature and al-

lege generally that the judgment or decision was duly

given.’’

The allegation is in petitioners’ complaint with the case

number given. ‘The allegation was admitted in open court

by the assistant State’s Attorney, who had written the

orders agreed on and the same trial judge had signed

them. As shown in the last transcript, (Rec. 2, P. 63) peti-

tioner was presenting evidence that the court had given

money back to other taxpayers; and, had already ruled

on the issues of law citing the County of DuPage, pub-

lished Appropriation Ordinance and Tax levy Ordinances,

and supporting her point with the court’s own records.

As shown on Page 67

‘‘Ms. Thompson: . . . Cireuit Court of DuPage

County, Lllinois, on the Illinois Central Railroad tax

objections for 1969, ...

Mr. Murphy: (he never did file an appearance or

give an address) Is that an order of this court,

madam?

Ms. Thompson: There is an order of the court on

that.

Mr. Murphy: No, no, but I am saying, are you

reading from an order of the court or are you read-

ing from some other part of the document in the case?

Ms. Thompson: I am reading from the document,

but it shows that 50° was given back on that item.

Mr. Murphy: Well, now, I would object to that,

your Honor. I move to strike.

The Court: In other words, what you are reading

is what, a settlement of the prior year tax claim by

another party? Is that the idea?

Ms. Thompson: Yes, but I want to know who Mr.

Murphy is representing. Is he representing the pub-

lic or is he—

Mr. Murphy: I am representing District 86.

The Court: Let me see what you are reading from

Mrs. Thompson.

Ms. Thompson: This is the State’s Attorney’s

copy, and I don’t have the court order, but it shows

what the court did with it.

Mr. MeLaren: Your Honor, I don’t believe there

was a hearing on the merits insofar as that case is

concerned.’’?

The Court: Well, I am going to sustain Mr.

Murphy’s objection to what, in fact, is Mrs. Thomp-

son reading some other objector’s tax objection.

Ms. Thompson: I am showing the court that I

am being discriminated against that the tax levies

have been extended; they have been signed by the

State’s Attorney and the State’s Attorney has agreed

with other taxpayers that these could not be extended

without a referendum; I am being denied the right

to vote in the referendum to establish the tax. If I

don’t pay the tax, my property will be sold, and so,

that is extortionate as far as I am concerned.

1And this is how the Illinois Courts justify the discrimination.

If the State’s Attorney agrees with one tax payer it is not a ruling

on the merit, is binding on the parties, but is not binding on the

court.

The Court: I understand your position. You may

proceed.’’

The document was the State’s Attorney’s copy as al-

leged, showed that there was no conference held, that the

court had ruled on the merit and had ruled on each objec-

tion separately. Petitioners request that the United States

Supreme Court take judicial notice of the Appendix in

73-1890, supra, for other such orders, the practice is no-

torious, not only in DuPage County but in Cook. The

practice was not only proven, it was admitted, the Appel-

late Court could have judicially noticed its own record,

and petitioners are entitled to have the constitutionality

of the statute determined.

Also, the Appellate court ruling ‘‘In a tax objection

ease there is a presumption that the taxes assessed are

correct.’’ is not relevent when the Circuit Court found the

cause came forth on petitioners’ complaint, and, is in con-

travention of the intent of the legislature, Ch. 116, See. 1

et seq., Ill. Rev. Stat. with reference to court record (and,

the records were destroyed in this case) where in section

22, reads:

‘* . . it shall be necessary for the party relying on

any such deed or sale to show, affirmatively, that each

and all provisions of law, in respect to assessment,

levy, sale and deed of the lands affected’ or to be

affected by any such deed or sale as aforesaid, have

been in all respects complied with—-and no presump-

tion shall be indulged in favor of any such tax deed

or sale: and it shall not be sufficient to show a collec-

tor’s report, Notice, judgment, order of sale, sale no-

tice, notice of sale, tax affidavit, and deed, (anything)

in this law or any other law of this state to the con-

trary notwithstanding ’’

! Petitioners think this should read effected.

The Appellate Court also exercised original jurisdiction

on a cold record, offending petitioners’ constitutional

rights by its ruling:

‘*The plaintiffs intvoduced no evidence that the col-

lector was acting in a manner other than according to

the statute... .’’

Petitioners’ Exhibit 1 (1970) Final Distribution State-

ment... Village of Oak Brook. Item 1... Total Tax...

56,077.39 . . . Item 10... Taxes in litigation 16,436.19.

Petitioners’ exhibit 23 (1970) Final Distribution Statement,

. . » High School District 86, Item 1 Total Tax... 4,-

710,800.94 Item 10... Taxes in litigation, 196,074.39.

The above exhibits show that the collector is withholding

more than 1°. The law, Section 675, supra has now been

amended to read that the collector may withhold the

amount paid under protest or ‘‘one half’’ of the total

taxes collected. The exhibits show taxes in litigation,

which is false. Never has the collector accounted for

taxes to the court. It was petitioners’ contention that

the collector is the same as a common carrier, that he can

withhold no tax money without court order; that the stat-

ute is unconstitutional and, that pursuant to Chapter 116,

See. 27, Ill. Rev. Stat. the collector is subject to further

damages and a fine for refusing to provide the transcript

of the tax for our case.

On page 11 of last transcript of Ree. Doc. 2, Vol. II,

trial Court proceedings January 8, 1973:

Ms. Thompson: ... But the point I am making is,

the record does not show the amount of taxes paid

under protest. I am going to give you an example.

Mr. MeLaren: Your Honor, it is the position of

the County Collector that the amount of taxes paid

ander protest are 100° of the taxes paid under pro-

” ow &

test. When a person does come in to pay their taxes

and they protest, although they might onl, protest

d, 10, 15, 20 percent of what taxes are.

The Court: In other words your position is that

the tax bill is $100.00, the $100.00 is paid under pro-

test.

Mr. McLaren: Right.

Page 12.

Ms. Thompson: Let me tell you what happened.

Look at the Illinois Central. In 1969 they paid $40,-

000.00 worth of tax. They protested 5% of it. The

County Collector withheld $40,000.00,

Ms. Thompson: . . . Now, how much is he with-

holding? ... If he is withholding one per cent of the

tax, that can be over one million dollars (interest).

And if he is withholding one per cent of the tax for

three years, that can be four million dollars (inter-

est).

And on page 22:

Ms. Thompson: He is collecting interest—at least

we hope he is collecting interest—on all this tax

money that has been paid under protest since Sep-

tember. ...

and the argument continues on P. 25 and 26, the judge did

not rule.’

Petitioners have the right and the LIlinois Supreme

Court is mandated to enter judgment for the correct

amount of taxes pursuant to Ch. 120, See. 718, Ill. Rev.

Stat. Ch. 120, See. 781, Ill. Rev. Stat. provides that taxes

paid under protest be distributed as provided in Section

1It was after the above January 8, 1973 ar uments that the

County Collector obtained an opinion from the Illinois Attorney

General permitting him to deposit tax funds in interest-beari ig

bank accounts pending distribution to the county’s taxing bodies.

As asserted in the petition after three years the amount of interest

gained was $4,000,000.00.

675, supra (194), and that they not be held more than

three years. Section 782, of Ch. 120, Ill. Rev. Stat. pro-

vides that the Department of Local Government Affairs

take necessary action for any failure to settle, and that

the action be pursued by the Attorney General.

Further the Illinois Supreme Court is violating peti-

tioners’ federal constitutional rights under the color of

state law by making decisions that effect private rights

and privileges outside the arena of the formal court pro-

ceedings and allowing the lower courts to also make such

decisions; the decision on the availability of records; that

there would not be any records for the appeal in 73-1890;

violating petitioners’ constitutional right to appeal a final

judgment of the trial court to the appellate court in their

district by transferring 73-1890, supra to the Third Dis-

trict in Ottawa; by making two divisions of three judges

each out of four elected judges by calling back retired

judges who were not elected from their district; by send-

ing the court administrator to the cireuit court to advise

the chief judge to hire an administrator to clean up more

than 2000 tax objection cases instead of ruling on this

ease; in issuing its mandate a second time on July 28,

1975, in 73-1890 supra.

As asserted in the petition the Illinois Supreme Court

has the statutory mandate to enter judgment for the cor-

rect amount of money, Chapter 120, Section 718, Ill. Rev.

Stat. and that original jurisdiction is needed, Ch. 110A

Sections 381 and 382, Ill. Rev. Stat. are unconstitutional

under the Fourteenth Amendment in that original juris-

diction established in the Illinois Supreme Court in a

revenue related matter by the Illinois Constitution, is by

these statutes limited to questions of law. How much

money the collector is withholding is a question of fact.

The Solicitor General is being served pursuant to 28

U.S.C. 2403, Acts of Congress are involved.

Reasons for Granting the Writ

The Illinois Supreme Court is ultra vires its authority

in refusing to rule on a petition as a matter of right and

deprived petitioners of a right to a determination by it

of constitutional issues raised by action of the Appellate

Court or to a direct appeal to this Court. Section 1257(2)

requires that a notice of appeal be filed in the court pos-

sessed of the record and that the entire record be avail-

able for the appeal, but the court has refused to give a

construction to the statutes on preparation and certifica-

tion and transfer of the records, Ch. 53, See. 28, supra,

cud has gone even further than this, in 73-1890, in saying

there would be no records, and the posture of the four

eases is such that an appeal would not terminate the

litigation.

As shown by the record submitted herewith, some of

the transeript of this case are in 74-1347, supra, the tran-

scripts having been deliberately filed in the wrong case

by the trial judge.

Chapter 1IOA, Section 317, Ill. Rev. Stat. is jurisdie-

tional and mandatory, and in no way discretionary, and

a denial is tantamount to an affirmance of the appellate

court decision, giving the Illinois Supreme Court the

statutory mandate under Chapter 120, Section 718, II.

Rev. Stat. (1971) to enter judgment for the amount of

taxes and damages and terminate the litigation.

The Illinois Supreme Court is also depriving petitioners

of the right to be heard by the federal district court under

42 U.S.C. 1983 by denying the records for a removal to

that court under 28 U.S.C. 1446, wherein these petitioners

have already paid for the preparation of the records.

Under rule 322(b) of the Illinois Supreme Court, that

court can administratively order the entire original rec-

ord transmitted without a praecipe being filed. And, by

Rule 329, if the record is insufficient to present fully and

fairly the questions involved, the requisite portions may

be supplied at the cost of the appellant. Which cost under

Illinois law could not be more than five dollars plus post-

age on any one case. And, as the records show, they are

in such a condition in the Cireuit Court that the cireuit

clerk will only certify the records document by document.

It would be far more economical, whether the Illinois

Supreme Court ends up determining this case or whether

it is finally removed to a federal court, for the Illinois

Supreme Court to call up Appellate Court and Circuit

Court records and rule on its jurisdiction.

The Illinois Supreme Court cannot dismiss an appeal

for a want of jurisdiction if there is a court of competent

jurisdiction to hear it. Ch. 110, See. 8 (1), Ill. Rev. Stat.

Should the Illinois Supreme Court refuse jurisdiction,

which it has, then the case would go to the federal court

under 42 U.S.C. 1983.

Petitioners are supported in their contention that man-

damus is the appropriate relief to compel the Illinois Su-

preme Court to rule on its jurisdiction by Butz v. City of

Muscatine, 19 L.Ed. 490; Thermtron Products, Inc. v.

Hermansdorfer, ........ U.S. ........ PP. B582 and Bd83 of

1975 Supreme Court Bulletin.

‘*\ traditional use of the writ in aid of appellate

jurisdiction both at common law and in the federal

court has been to confine an inferior court to a lawful

exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it

to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so.’’

That the United States Supreme Court wants the

state courts to determine state matters is shown in Huff-

man v. Pursue, 420 U.S. 592; Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.

37; Dambrowski v. Pfister, 38 U.S. 479.

The Illinois Supreme Court is further ultra vires its

authority in refusing to determine its jurisdiction and

ignoring Section 718 wherein it is mandatory to enter

judgment for correct amount, and deprives the Petitioners

of a right to a summary judgment in their favor granting

the damages and injunctive relief asked. None of peti-

tioners’ allegations has ever been denied or answered;

petitioners’ civil rights have been violated repeatedly;

that they are entitled to a summary judgment is supported

by Hill v. Gautreaux, 448 F.2d 731, 739, 740.

The Illinois Supreme Court ignored the absolute right

to have it declare Chapter 120, Sections 675, 675a and 716,

Ill. Rev. Stat. violative of the First and Fourteenth

Amendments as to freedom of speech, due process and

equal protection, to remove the encumbrances from their

property and terminate the litigation.

By the action of the court not only are the Petitioners

deprived of the right to have the unconstitutional assess-

ments, rates and related laws determined, all of the resi-

dential taxpayers of DuPage County are deprived of the

right to have the matter determined, so that the citizens

of Illinois would know what their rights were as to the

excessive burden of taxation caused by DuPage County

underassessing vacant and developing land to encourage

economic development and eliminate the single family

resident, pirating business and industry from other coun-

ties, under the State Technical Services Act of 1965, Pub-

lie Law 89-182, 15 U.S.C. 1351 et seq., which cannot stand

when if Ch. 127, Section 47.2, Ill. Rev. Stat. is declared

invalid, Congress has no authority to delegate any such

legislative authority to the State of Illinois.

If this court does not issue its writ of mandamus, the

petitioners will be denied their right te the Lllinois Su-

preme Court, or to a direct appeal, or a petition for a writ

of certiorari, because 28 U.S.C. 1257 (2) requires that the

Notice of Appeal be filed in the court possessed of the

record; the records are in more than one court; peti-

tioners have the original mandate of the Illinois Supreme

Court; without the records there can be no direct appeal

nor even a removal to a federal district court and as the

appendix shows, petitioners have tendered the money for

these records,

Petitioner in the Appendix reproduces the Record in

the Illinois Supreme Court excepting the Excerpts from

Record which is a reproduction of Cireuit Court Records

as filed in the Appellate Court, and the record shows the

Petition as a matter of right with the Appellate Court

opinion, final judgment and letter of denial of records by

Appellate Clerk appended. And both final orders of the

court together with what it took to get that order.

Petitioner in the Appendix also reproduces the record

in the Cireuit Court of DuPage County from her own

records insofar as the Complaint and Motion that was

filed to reinstate the case (73-1890) and the court orders

that were entered, which is prima facie evidence of dis-

crimination, and also shows why the Cireuit Clerk cannot

certify the records which have been altered and re-altered.

The Clerk’s certificate for the appeal on 73-1890 is also

in the appendix.

CONCLU.iON

Wherefore, petitioners pray.

1. That a writ of mandamus issue from this court

directing the Honorable Supreme Court for the State of

illinois to show cause why mandamus should not issue

from this court directing it to vacate its judgments deny-

ing leave to appeal on petitions as a matter of right, and

remand the cause to said Illinois Supreme Court, with

directions to forthwith determine its jurisdiction; hear

and determine the cause or in the alternative to commence

the procedure of administratively calling up the records

for a removal to the federal district court under 42 U.S.C.

1993, and 28 U.S.C. 1446, and

2. That Petitioners have such additional relief and

process as may be necessary and appropriate in the

premises.

Respectfully submitted,

Ratpw B. Tompson

Marcaret EK. THompson,

Box 133

Hinsdale, Illinois 60521

Petitioners

APPENDIX

APPENDIX A

No. 48236

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS EX REL.

RALPH B. THOMPSON AND MARGARET E. THOMP-

SON AND RALPH B. THOMPSON AND MARGARET

E. THOMPSON, individually,

Petitioners

(Plaintiffs-Appellants)

JAMES H. CLARK, COUNTY COLLECTOR, JOHN

BOWMAN, STATE’S ATTORNEY, RAY MACDON-

ALD, COUNTY CLERK, COUNTY BOARD OF TAX

REVIEW, ALL IN DU PAGE COUNTY, ILLINOIS, IN

THE MATTER OF JUDGMENT FOR LOTS AND

LANDS D'UINQUENT IN PAYMENT OF TAXKS,

Respondents

(Defendants-A ppellees)

Appeal from the Appellate Court of Illinois,

Second District, Second Division,

No. 73-435 (T.C. No. C72-1074 Sub 112

PETITION FOR APPEAL AS A MATTER OR RIGHT

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

on the relation of Ralph B. Thompson

and Margaret E. Thompson and Ralph B.

Thompson and Margaret E. Thompson

individually,

Petitioners

Box 133

Hinsdale, [llinois 60521

323-3381

App. 2

PETITION FOR APPEAL AS A MATTER OF RIGHT

The petitioners, pursuant to Chapter 110A, Section 317,

Ill. Rev. Stat. and Article VI, Sec. 4(c), Illinois Constitu-

tion of 1970, file this their petition for appeal as a matter

of right as the basis upon which it is contended that the

Supreme Court of Illinois has jurisdiction to review the

final order of judgment for unpaid taxes against certain

property in question, and should exercise such jurisdiction

in this case.

OPINIONS AND JUDGMENTS BELOW

The opinion of the Appellate Court filed on December 3,

1975, Appendix, infra, Page 1.

The fiual order of the Appellate Court entered on De-

cember 3, 1975, Appendix, infra, Page 11.

Corrections ordered December 17, 1975, Appendix,

Page 12.

Appellate Clerk’s refusal to prepare and certify record,

Appendix, P. 13.

There was no petition for a rehearing.

POINTS RELIED UPON FOR A REVERSAL

Whether the trial court and the appellate court could

enter judgment against property for taxes when the taxes

were fully paid under protest and objections filed.

Whether the trial court and appellate court erred in

denying petitioner’s motion to appoint a special prosecu-

tor to prosecute the violations in the penalties of the Reve-

nue Act when none of the violations alleged was denied.

Whether judgment was entered against petitioner’s

property to confiscate it when defendants could not obtain

App. 3

the property any other way calling into question the va-

lidity of Chapter 127, Sec. 46 & 47, Ill. Rev. Stat. as deny-

ing due process and equal protection to petitioners as

guaranteed by state and federal constitutions.

Whether the appellate court erred in the trial courts

being required to hear and determine the questions of law.

Whether the appellate court erred in the application of

716 to petitioners’ tax objections.

That petitioners’ complaint under Section 804 of the

Revenue Act demanded an answer.

Whether the Appellate Court Opinion and Final Order

is null and void for declaring that the cause came forth

on the application of the Collector when the Trial Court

Order appealed declares that the cause came forth on the

Complaint of the Petitioners herein, and constitutes an

obstruction of justice as defined by 18 U.S.C. 1623.

Ill

Whether Plaintiffs were entitled to a Summary Judg-

ment in their favor where the cause came on upon their

Complaint, the allegations not being denied were admitted.

Whether Sections 675, 675a and 716 of the Illinois Reve-

nue Act are unconstitutional because they preclude an ad-

versary proceeding denying the plaintiffs the right to sue.

Whether the Collector could withhold 100% of Plain-

tiff’s taxes when only 92% was objected to and paid under

protest.

App. 4

Whether the Final Order of the Appellate Court is null

and void as being in contravention of Section 718, of the

Illinois Revenue Act, wherein the Clerk is required to cer-

tify the correct amount to the Collector, which is an ab-

surdity since the Trial Court did not take jurisdiction of

the money nor determine the correct amount.

vil

Whether a judgment against Petitioners’ property is

valid where the Collector did not file an application and

there are no unpaid taxes.

Vill

Whether the Appellate Court opinion is contrary to and

in conflict with its prior decisions and opinions on the same

issues between the same parties, is repugnant to the doc-

trines of stare decisis and res judicata and is null and void.

Whether Chapter 53, Section 28, Illinois Revised Stat-

utes is unconstitutional as being repugnant to the man-

dates of the Illinois Constitution, Section 16, Article VI,

requiring the Illinois Supreme Court to provide inexpen-

sive and efficient appeals.

».¢

Whether Article II, Section 2, of the 1970 Illinois Con-

stitution is unconstitutional as denying the sovereignty to

the people and preventing the Petitioners the right to sue

in Illinois courts.

Where the Appellate Court has the power to enter any

order the Trial Court should have entered may that Court

App. 5

rule that the Trial Court was not required to enter any

but a Summary Order and then proceed to enter ruling de

novo where the Trial Court did not; exercising original

jurisdiction without due process calling into question the

validity and constitutionality of Article VI, Sections 4(a)

and 6, Illinois Constitution of 1970, may exercise original

jurisdiction when necessary to the complete determination

of any case on review.

XII

Whether People ex rel. Thompson v. Property Tax Ap-

peal Board, et al., 22 Lil. App. 3d 316 (1974) is null and

void for the reason that the same issues were in the case

at bar which was disposed of first and the Trial Court was

estopped from ruling again.

XIII

Whether taxes can be levied and extended on rates that

have been held illegal by the Circuit Court.

XIV

Whether the Appellate Court erred in not ruling on the

excessive over assessment by the Board of Review as to

the real estate in question, placing an undue burden on

Petitioners.

Whether the Appellate Court ruled correctly on any of

the rates objected to by Petitioners.

XVI

Whether the trial court and the Appellate Court erred

on the collector’s being required to distribute taxes paid

under protest through the court.

App. 6

XVIII

The Appellate Court erred in not considering two cases

to be consolidated at the same time.

XIX

Whether the Trial Court and the Appellate Court erred

in the ruling that the judgment could be entered nunc pro

tune.

Whether the Appellate Court erred in there being a re-

hearing in the Trial Court.

XXI

Whether both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court

erred in that Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to Section

804 of the Revenue Act had to be answered.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The facts as set forth in the opinion are so inconsistent

to the degree that some of them are false by definition

constituting perjury on its face.

As shown by the order appealed from the trial court

decision declares that the cause came forth on the peti-

tioners complaint and says nothing about the application

of the collector.

The collector has never filed an initial pleading or other

pleading and is not a valid appellee or respondent in this

case.

There are no valid respondents, none having pleaded

in the trial court.

App. 7

ARGUMENTS

Where the Revenue Act provides for procedures to be

followed in assessing, levying taxes and for the taxpayer

to protest and object to the same, and none of the pro

cedures are followed; the collector failing in every year

since 1967 to file an application to determine the correct

amount of taxes paid under protest or for the sale of

lots and lands delinquent in the payment of taxes, and the

petitioners finally file a complaint as an action on the case

under Section 804 of the Revenue Act, it is absolutely in-

tolerable to have the Appellate Court of Illinois declare

that the petitioners are stupid idiots, and assume the col-

lector filed an application; Chapter 120, Section 675, 675a,

and 716, Llline’s Revised Statutes are vague and unwork-

able, are denying due process and equal protection of

the laws as to petitioners and must be held invalid and

unconstitutional. Both the trial court and the Appellate

Court refused to rule on the constitutionality of these

statutes.

Where the Revenue Act provides for a conference the

State’s Attorney makes out of court settlements with some

taxpayers. The agreements are never filed, only the

amount of refund. The rates that are agreed to be invalid

and void or extended again and again.

As shown by the record the collector is withholding more

than one per cent of the taxes and more than the amount

paid under protest; petitioners paid 92% under protest;

the state’s attorney argued that the collector was entitled

to withhold 100% regardless of how much was protested

in contravention of the provisions of the Revenue Act.

The collector made around four million in interest off of

withheld taxes in 1974, does not want to file a transcript

of the tax from his warrant books into petitioner’s case

App. 8

to the extent that judgment was obtained against peti-

tioner’s property when taxes are fully paid, for the rea-

son that if he accounted for petitioner’s money he would

be required to account for all of the money being with-

held. Even the Illinois Supreme Court cannot finally de-

cide this case without the collector disclosing the amount

of money being withheld. The judgment is required to be

for the correct amount of taxes paid under protest.

The Appellate Court decisions are so inconsistent that

none of them is valid. In case number 70-220, 43928 in

this court the Appellate Court dismissed petitioner’s ap-

peal on the motion of the collector that the cases were

numbers on his warrant books, in 72-73 the appellate court

dismissed the appeal declaring that they did not dismiss

petitioner’s appeal in case number 70-220, that the Illi-

nois Supreme Court did. The appellate court also refused

to rule on the judgment against delinquent lands appealed

by petitioners on the arguments that petitioner’s taxes

were fully paid; that therefore petitioners did not have

standing that judgment would never be entered against

the petitioner’s property. In the case at bar the appel-

late court affirms judgment against petitioner’s property

when the taxes are fully paid. In Thompson v. Board of

Commissioners, 132 Ill. App. 2d 178, the motion of the

defendant states the motion was by coulin couper individu-

ally, and also declares that the attorney is representing

the defendant which was the Park District. In 73-376,

47166 in this court the motion to dismiss declares in one

place that it is a motion to dismiss and in another that

it is a motion to grant petitioner’s prayer for relief. In

People ex rel. Thompson v. Property Tax Appeal Board,

22 Ill. App. 3d 316, the same order denies the appointment

of a special prosecutor as in the case at bar, the original

App. 9

is in the property tax appeal board case with only that

trial court number, the duplicate is in this case with two

trial court numbers; the appellate court ruled that peti-

tioner’s motion was impertinent and slanderous and should

have been denied on its merits whereas the trial court is

now estopped from appointing a special prosecutor to

investigate the collector while still denying the appoint-

ment of a special prosecutor to these petitioners on case

number 46352 wherein this court’s mandate issued on De-

cember 30, 1974, and to date is still not reinstated in the

trial court, the Chief Judge, presiding trial court judge

in this case after disqualifying himself as chief judge

signed an agreed on order that appointed a special prose-

eutor to have the collector investigated. That all of the

above actions constitute perjury and none of the appellate

court opinions against these petitioners is valid.

That the clerk of the appellate court’s grounds for de-

nying the records calls into question the validity of Chap-

ter 53, Section 28, Illinois Revised Statutes as being con-

trary to the constitutional rights of petitioners. That

the petitioners disagree with that clerk’s statement of a

misunderstanding, in case number 70-220 in that court the

clerk reproduced three copies of pleacigs filed in the

appellate court, did not include an index, inter alia, which

was willful malice against petitioners. Petitioners submit

that the clerk of the Illinois Supreme Court at no time

has made reproductions of pleadings but has prepared

and certified either the original or a duplicate original as

filed by petitioners. With tour copies of all pleadings filed

in the appellate court it is unreasonable for the clerk to

make reproductions. The statute needs to be given a

construction.

App. 10

The Illinois Supreme Court in case number 46352 did

order the records not transferred which is a flagrant viola-

tion of petitioner’s rights. That the last two appeals of

of petitioners to the United States Supreme Court were

denied in part because the records could not be obtained,

and because this case precedes the other two. Petitioners

submit that if the Lilinois Supreme Court is counting on

the United States Supreme Court doing nothing, that the

Illinois Supreme Court is on its own im that petitioners

conceded before the last two appeals were denied that they

would have come back down to the State Courts and back

up again to get the records. For the Appellate Uourt to

held the records and furnish only reproductions consti-

tutes a form of embezzlement.

That the petitioners are paying an undue burden of

taxes, that the records show overwhelming evidence of

violations of the Revenue Act wherein the defendants are

conniving to take petitioner’s property without due pro-

cess, calling into question the validity of Chapter 127,

Sections 46 and 47 and, 15 U.S.C. 1351 et seq., wherein

federal, state and local governments are cooperating but

have not been able to confiscate petitioner’s property. That

judgment against petitioner’s property when the taxes ar

fully paid has been done with malice.

Petitioners further submit that the appellate court

should have ruled on the falsely certified transcripts, the

destruction of transcripts, the filing by the trial judge of

the transcripts for this case in the property tax anpeal.

board case, so that the constitutional questions would not

be answered. That the question of the Judicial Inquiry

Board’s interference should have been ruled upon.

There can be no doubt that this case should have been

consolidated with the Property Tax Appeal Board case:

they are both on 1971 tax year; the complaint from the

App. 11

Property Tax case is fully incorporated in this case and

when this case has not been finally determined and was

ruled upon in the trial court before the Property Tax

case, the trial court was estopped in that case.

Petitioners submit that for this case to be finally deter-

mined they will need to file motions for original action to

compel the collector to account for the money being with-

held, to compel the appellate clerk to prepare and certify

and index the original records, to this court to the com-

plete determination of the case on review or in the alter-

native to transfer to a federal district court for violating

petitioners’ rights under color of state law.

Petitioners submit that case number 43928 and 46352 in

this court precede this case. That neither case has a valid

title in that the collector never filed an initial pleading.

It being the practice of the circuit clerk to transfer tax

objections to the collector’s office where they are tran-

scribed into the collector’s warrant books. That none of

these cases has been finally determined and are back in

the trial court on Petitioners’ complaint. That the trial

court to date has refused to take jurisdiction; that there

is every possibility that the trial court cannot take juris-

diction of a perjured appellate court mandate, compelling

the Illinois Supreme Court to recall its mandate.

The above cases are now working through motions to

transfer to the federal district court.

Petitioners submit that they now have exhausted any

possibility of relief in the Illinois Courts even this court

and cite ease numbers 43613, wherein petitioner’s tax case

was treated as a protest number and overruled, number

43928, same thing, number 44360 same cases dismissed

while on appeal for lack of jurisdiction, 46352 mandate

issued December 30, 1974, same thing the coilector never

filed a pleading and refused to account for the money.

App. 12

CONCLUSION

Wherefore it is respectfully submitted that the Illinois

Supreme Court has Jurisdiction of this appeal.

Respectfully submitted,

Ralph B. Thompson and,

Margaret E. Thompson

Petitioners

Box 133

Hinsdale, Illinois 60521

323-3381

App. 13

73-435

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

State of Illinois )

Appellate Court ) ss.

Second District )

At a session of the Appellate Court, begun and held at

Elgin, on the lst day of December, in the year of our Lord

one thousand nine hundred and seventy five, within and

for the Second District of Illinois:

SECOND DIVISION

Present—Honorable Thomas J. Moran, Presiding Justice

Honorable Walter Dixon, Justice

Honorable Albert E. Hallett, Justice

Loren J. Strotz, Clerk

William A. Klusak, Sheriff

BE IT REMEMBERED, that afterward, to wit: On

December 3, 1975 the Opinions of the Court was filed in the

Clerk’s office of said Court, in the words and figures fol-

lowing, viz:

No. 73 - 435 Filed 2nd Division, Dee. 3, 1975

Loren J. Strotz, Clerk

Appellate Court, 2nd District

(Publ. In Full)

App. 14

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT — SECOND DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS ex rel.

RALPH B. THOMPSON and MARGARET E. THOMP-

SON and RALPH B. THOMPSON and MARGARET E.

THOMPSON, individually,

Plaintiffs-A ppellants,

JAMES H. CLARK, COUNTY COLLECTOR, JOHN

BOWMAN, STATE’S ATTORNEY, RAY MAC DON-

ALD, COUNTY CLERK, COUNTY BOARD OF TAX

REVIEW, ALL OF DUPAGE COUNTY, ILLINOIS,

IN THE MATTER OF JUDGMENT FOR LOTS AND

LANDS DELINQUENT IN PAYMENT OF TAXES,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the Circuit Court of the Eighteenth Judicial

Cireuit, Du Page County, Llinois.

Justice THomas J. Moran delivered the opinion of the

court:

Plaintiffs appeal from a judgment rendered in favor of

the defendants against certain property owned by them.

The judgment is founded upon 1971 real property taxes.

In accordance with the statutory scheme, the plaintiffs paid

their taxes under protest. Thereafter, the county collec-

tor filed an application for judgment against their proper-

ty, the application accompanied by the required statutory

affidavit; in response, plaintiffs filed tax objections raising

various issues.

App. 15

The plaintiffs appeared pro se and, after a trial on the

merits, judgment against the property was entered on

March 13, 1973, nunc pro tunc as of March 2, 1973. On

June 30, 1973, the judgment was vacated and, upon re-

hearing, September 10, 1973, judgment was again entered

nunc pro tunc as of March 2, 1973. Plaintiffs raise 24 issues

on appeal; we have censolidated them into three categories.

It is claimed that the judgment appealed is invalid and

void as denying plaintiffs due process rights guaranteed

by the state and federal constitutions and therefore the

judgment should be vacated. Specifically, plaintiffs claim

that the court erred: (a) in entering the judgment nunc

pro tunc; (b) in not requiring written pleadings by the

defendants; and (c) in its interpretation of certain laws.

Plaintiffs claim the order entered September 10, nunc

pro tunc as of March 2, was invalid because no order was

rendered on March 2, 1973, and therefore a nunc pro tuuc

order cannot be entered to supply such omission. The cita-

tion which plaintiffs quote to support their contention be.

lies its applicability to the case at hand. It states, ‘‘where

there is no minute or memorial paper in the records to

show that the order was, in fact, made, it cannot *** be so

entered.” (People v. Rosenwald, 266 Ill. 548, 554 (1915).)

Here, the record reveals a ruling in the form of a minute

order dated March 2, 1973, indicating that a written order

was to come. The written order was entered on March 13,

nunc pro tunc as of March 2. At the time of rehearing, no

new matters of substance were introduced to modify or

alter the original order entered. Therefore, it was proper

for the court, upon denial of rehearing relief, to enter its

September 10, 1973 order munc pro tunc as of March 2,

1973.

App. 16

To discuss plaintiffs’ claim that the defendants were re-

quired to file written pleadings, we review the statutory

procedures in a tax objection case. Under Section 229 of

the Revenue Act of 1939 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 120,

§710) the county collector is directed to apply to the court,

during the month of October, for judgment and order of

sale for taxes on delinquent lands and for judgment fixing

the correct amount of any tax paid under protest. Such

application has been construed to be in the nature of a

complaint. (People ex rel. Raid v. Adkins, 48 Ill. 2d 402,

405 (1971). The list of lands on which taxes are delinquent

or paid under protest, together with the statutorily-re-

quired supplemental certificate (which insures the currency

of the list) and the collector’s affidavit, establishes the

evidence to be presented to the court on application for

judgment, and constitutes a prima facie case. (See People

ex rel. Brenza v. Anderson, 411 Ill. 252, 255 (1952).) The

court is instructed to examine the list, and if any specific

objection in writing is offered in defense, then the court

shall hear the matter in summary manner, without plead-

ings, and render judgment. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 120,

§716.) Thus, tax objections are, in the language of the

statute, defenses. Where no objections are filed, the tax-

payer, in essence, is guilty of failing to file an answer to

the collector’s complaint, and a tax judgment in this cir-

cumstance is equivalent to a default judgment. Reid,

supra, 405.

(The procedure for paying one’s real estate taxes under

protest, as provided in §716, is set out in Ill. Rev. Stat.

1971, ch. 120, $675,| ‘‘The procedure for paying one’s real

estate taxes under protest, as provided in section 235 of the

Revenue Act (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1971, ch. 120, sec. 716) is set

out in section 194 of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 120,

Sec. 716) which in turn provides that proceedings upon

App. 17

objections filed under this section are subject to [$675a]

194a. Under [§675a] 194a, the court is instructed to hold

a conference between the tax objector and the State’s At-

torney within 90 days of the filing of the objection unless

the matter is disposed of sooner. If a compromise agrece-

ment is reached, the agreement must be filed with the

clerk of the court. If no agreement is reached, the court

must, upon demand of either party, set a hearing date

within 90 days of the demand.

When the plaintiffs’ objections, which they characterize

as a ‘‘complaint’’, are viewed against this statutory pro-

cedure, it becomes clear that their ‘‘complaint’’ was, in

its true function, an answer to the collector’s complaint

for tax judgment. Thus, under [$716] 235, no additional

written pleadings on the part of defendants are required

since issue has been joined by the collector’s application

and the plaintiffs’ written tax objections. We have ex-

amined the record in this case at length, and find that the

proceedings herein did not deviate in any material way

from the statutory scheme outlined above.

Plaintiffs allege that ‘‘section 194a of the Revenue Act

of 1939” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 120, §675a] is unconsti-

tutional, it being a violation of equal protection. That sec-

tion, as discussed above, provides for a pretrial conference

wherein the tax objector and ‘lie State’s Attorney may

work out a compromise agreement on tax objections. Any

such agreement must be filed with the court. The plain-

tiffs in this case allege that no such agreement was reached

with the State’s Attorney, whereas compromise tax agree-

ments were reached with other taxpayers on the same tax

objections, and assert that this constitutes a violation of

equal protection. Plaintiffs have failed, however, to offer

competent evidence of any such agreements. Here, as

App. 18

elsewhere in their trial court presentation and brief, plain-

tiffs offer allegations, not proof. While we realize the

difficulties of a pro se presentation, especially in matters

as complex as taxation, and respect plaintiffs’ earnestness

in this matter, the allegations, unsupported by proof, can-

not form the basis for relief. In a tax objection case there

is a presumption that the taxes assessed are correct. The

burden is upon the objector to prove facts to sustain the

objection. (People ex rel. Brenza v. Fleetwood, 413 Ill.

530, 545 (1952).) A close reading of the entire record re-

veals that plaintiffs have not met this burden regarding

any of the objections raised by their pleadings.

Plaintiffs allege errors in the rulings of the trial court.

Some have been discussed above; others which merit dis-

cussion will be reviewed briefly.

(1) Plaintiffs claim that the trial court erred by ruling

that proper notice had been given to the taxing districts.

The record reveals that the required statutory notice was

given, therefore, no error occurred.

(2) Plaintiffs claim that the court erred in failing to

order the collector to make a full disclosure. While it is

not altogether clear from their brief, it appears that

plaintiffs are referring to disclosure of the amount of

total taxes withheld from distribution. Section 194 of the

Revenue Act of 1939’’ [Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 120, $675}

provides in part that ‘‘No protest shall prevent or be a

cause [of] delay in the distribution of tax collections

among the taxing bodies of any taxes collected which were

not paid under protest. The collector may withhold from

distribution the amounts paid under protest or 1% of the

total taxes collected, whichever is less.’’ The plaintiffs in-

troduced no evidence that the collector was acting in a

App. 19

manner other than according to the statute, therefore fail-

ure to order the collector to make such disclosure was not

error.

(3) Plaintiffs urge that the trial court erred in exclud-

ing proper evidence offered to support their case. Some

of the items to which plaintiffs apparently refer were never

presented to the court for identification, are not present in

the record on review, and are thus not reviewable. (See

Grier v. Barkley, 182 Hl. App. 541, 545-46 (1913).) The

plaintiffs did not adequately identify or ask the trial court

to take judicial notice of orders claimed to have been en-

tered in a previous case wherein plaintiffs were objecting

to their 1970 taxes. The record reveals that other rejected

items (to which plaintiffs refer generally) were clearly

not competent evidence. The items were newspaper atti-

cles, portions of other taxpayers’ tax objections, and docu:

ments dealing with prior years’ taxes, the relevance of

which was not adequately demonstrated. From our re-

view, we conclude that the trial court did not err by ex-

cluding evidence described by plaintiffs as proper.

(4) Plaintiffs allege that there was no pretrial con-

ference as provided for in section ‘‘194a of the Revenue

Act of 1939’’ 675a, supra. Since plaintiffs’ statements in

the record admit that a pretrial conference was held, the

nub of plaintiffs’ complaint seems to be that there was no

court reporter at the conference and, there being no record

of what occurred, the proceedings did not constitute a pre-

trial conference. This argument is without merit. The

above cited section of the Revenue Act does not require a

record of the proceedings to be made; neither is such ree-

ord required in pretrial conferences of civil cases accord-

ing to Supreme Court Rule. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 171, ch. 110A,

App. 20

§218.) The responsibility for having the pretrial pro-

ceedings recorded rests upon the party seeking the same.

(5) Plaintiffs assert that the trial court erred in deny-

ing a motion to amend their pleadings to include a count

for mandamus or a count for declaratory judgment. It is

argued that since the named defendants did not appear at

the March 2, 1973, hearing (although present by their at-

torneys) the court should have treated plaintiffs as the

cumplaining witnesses and allowed them to amend the

cause of action before the court. Plaintiffs cite no au-

thority to support the proposition; they arrive at their

conclusion through the misconceptjon that it was their

objections, rather than the collector’s application for

judgment, that initiated the action befure the court.

(6) Plaintiffs contend that the trial court committed

error in giving summary decision in this case. They argue

that because each of their objections raised different ques-

tions of law and fact, the court was bound to make detailed

findings of fact and conclusions of law on each objection

raised rather than to summarily dispose of all matters

as a group. Contrary to plaintiffs’ position, section [716

supra] *‘255 of the Revenue Act of 1939’’, provides that

the court ‘‘shall hear and determine the matter [tax ob-

jections] in a summary manner.”’

(7) A motion to consolidate this case with an earlier

ease (involving plaintiffs’ 1970 taxes) was correctly de-

nied on July 7, 1973, since plaintiffs had filed a notice of

appeal from rulings in that case on April 12, 1973. See

People ex rel. Thompson v. Property Tax Appeal Bd.,

22 Ill. App. 3d 316 (1974).

(8) The trial court did not err in ruling that plaintiffs’

evidence was insufficient to sustain their complaint against

the Oak Brook Park District appropriation ordinance. The

App. 21

plaintiffs introduced the Park District’s appropriation

ordinances for the years 1967-1972 to show accumulation

of funds. Such accumulations are alleged to be illegal by

the plaintiffs. The only authority cited for that proposi-

tion was an earlier case of plaintiffs’ wherein judgment

was entered on the defendant Park District’s motion to

dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint with prejudice. See Thomp-

son v. Board of Commissioners, 132 Ill. App. 2d 178 (1971).

(9) Plaintiffs claim that the trial court erred regard-

ing the validity of the education fund rate for School

District 53. It is argued that the rate increase was invalid

because the proposition was not clearly stated on the bal-

lot as required by statute. (lil. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 122,

§9-13.) However, this section requires only that the ‘‘sub-

stance’’ of such proposition appear. The sample ballot

introduced by defendants reveals that the substance of the

proposed rate increase did appear on the ballot. We find

no error in this regard.

(10) Plaintiffs claim that the court erred by not ruling

on the question of whether, without referendum, two or

more school districts may join together to form a single

area vocational education district. Testimony of the busi-

ness manager of the school district established that such

referendum was held. The document offered by plain-

tiffs (the sole support of their contention) revealed that

School District 86 held a referendum to levy a tax to

build a vocational school. Such document, however, does

not establish that only that referendum was held. Clearly,

another referendum could have been held which authorized

the school district’s participation in the DuPage Area

Vocational Association.

App. 22

(11) On July 30, 1973, the court found plaintiffs were

not notified of the date and time of entry of the March 13

order. It therefore vacated the order and set September

11 for a rehearing on the entry of a new order. Plaintiffs

claim that the rehearing never occurred. The claim is con-

tradicted by the record. An order entered on September

11 disposes of plaintiffs’ objections after first reciting

the presence of the plaintiffs.

Judgment affirmed

Hautett, Dixon, J.J., concur

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

State of Illinois, )

Appellate Court, ) ss.

Second District, )

I, LOREN J. STROTZ, Clerk of the Appellate Court, in

and for said Second Judicial District of the State of Illi-

nois, and the keeper of the Records and Seal thereof, do

hereby certify that the foregoing is a true, full and com-

plete copy of the Opinion of the said Appellate Court in

the above entitled cause of record in my said office.

IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have set my hand and

affixed the seal of the said Appellate Court, in Elgin, in

said State, this 3rd day of December, A.D. 1975.

/s/ Loren J. Strotz

Clerk Appellate Court,

Second District.

App. 23

State of Illinois )

Appellate Court ) ss.

Second District )

Present—Hon. Tuomas J. Moran, Presiding Justice; Hon.

Wa ter Dixon, Justice; Hon. Ausert E.

Hauuett, Justice. Loren J. Srrorz, Clerk—

Wititum A. Kuusak, Sheriff

People of the State of Illinois, Ex Rel. Ralph B. Thompson

and Margaret E. Thompson and Ralph B. Thompson and

Margaret E. Thompson, Individually,

Appellant,

73-435 v.

James H. Clark, County Collector, John Bowman, State’s

Attorney, Ray MacDonald, County Clerk, County Board

of Tax Review, All of DuPage County, Illinois in the Mat-

ter of Judgment for Lots and Lands Delinquent in Pay-

ment of Taxes,

Appellees.

Appeal from the Cireuit Court of DuPage County

Trial Court No. C72-1074 Sub. 112

Copy

MANDATE

BE IT REMEMBERED, that, to-wit: On the 3rd day

of December, A.D. 1975, an Opinion of the aforementioned

Court was entered of record and in accordance with the

views expressed in the attached opinion the judgment of

the trial court is affirmed.

In accordance with Supreme Court rule 368, this man-

date is issued.

App. 24

Costs to be taxed in accordance with the law.

(Date)

CERTIFICATE

I, LOREN J. STROTZ, Clerk of the Appellate Court,

Second District of the State of Illinois, and keeper of the

records, files and Seal thereof, do hereby certify that the

foregoing is a true copy of the final order of the said Ap-

pellate Court in the above entitled cause of record in my

said office.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto subscribed

my name and affixed the Seal of said Court this ........... ’

EE snus

Clerk Appellate Court,

Second District

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

State of Illinois, )

Appellate Court, ) ss.

Second District, )

73-435

I, LOREN J. STROTZ, Clerk of the Appellate Court, in

and for said Second Judicial District of the State of Illi-

nons, and the keeper of the Records and Seal thereof, do

hereby certify that the foregoing is a true, full and com-

plete Copy of the unissued Mandate of this Court in Gen.

No. 73-435—People, ete. ex rel. Ralph B. Thompson, et al.

v. James H. Clark, County Collector, et al. ete. of the said

Appellate Court in the above-entitled cause of record in my

said office.

App. 25

IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have set my hand and

affixed the seal of the said Appellate Court, in Elgin, in

said State, this 10th day of December, A.D. 1975.

/s/ Loren J. Strotz

Clerk Appellate Court,

Second District.

STATE OF ILLINOIS

APPELLATE COURT SECOND DISTRICT

ELGIN

(Seal)

60120

December 31, 1975

Mrs. Margaret E. Thompson

Box 133

Hinsdale, IL. 60521

Office of the Clerk

312-695-3750

Dear Mrs. Thompson:

We have filed your Affidavit of Intent to Appeal to the

Supreme Court of Lilinois in Gen. No. 73-435.

We are also in receipt of your letter to ‘‘ Appellate Court

of Illinois, Second District, Second Division’’, in which

you relate many matters concerning the legal issues of

your appeal in our case Gen. No. 73-435. We gather that

in the body of this letter you are ordering the reprodue-

tion of the complete Appellate Court record. However,

because we have had a misunderstanding in the past con-

cerning the cost of an Appellate Court record, I would like

App. 26

to bring to your attention Chapter 37, Section 27; Chapter

53, Section 28 and Chapter 53, Section 31 of the Illinois

Revised Statutes and point out that Chapter 53, Section

31, only applies to Cireuit Court Clerks.

The Clerk of the Illinois Supreme Court has informed this

office that it is not desirable to send the Appellate Court

record to the Supreme Court at the time a petition for

leave to appeal is filed in that court, but the petitioner

should wait until the appeal is acted upon. You might

wish to verify this with the Hon. Clell Woods, Clerk of the

Supreme Court— (217-782-2035)

Because the reproduction of the entire Appellate Court

record would come to, perhaps, an unnecessary expense to

you, I would suggest, in the event you wish the record, that

you inform us as to what papers you feel are necessary to

be reproduced so we can spare you any needless expense.

We are, therefore, returning you tendered check #899 in

th amount of $5.

Very truly yours,

/s/ Loren J. Strotz

Loren J. Strotz, Clerk

—_— SF

App. 27

IN THE EIGHTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT,

DU PAGE COUNTY,

WHEATON, ILLINOIS

People ex rel. Thompson

Property Tax Appeal Board, et al.

No. C72-1074 sub. 112

72-2952-G

ORDER

This cause coming on to be heard on Motion of Plain-

tilfs, and Margaret Thompson appearing pro se and Rob-

ert D. MeLaren, Assistant State’s Attorney, appearing on

behalf of John J. Bowman, State’s Attorney, the Board of

Review and the Supervisor of Assessments, and the Court

having heard arguments and being fully advised in the

premises doth find:

1. The issues of law and fact in case 72-2952-G and

C-72-1074 sub. 112 are not proper subjects of consoiida-

tion.

2. Notice of Appeal has been filed by Plaintiffs as of

April 13th, 1973.

3. Judgment was entered on March 13, 1973 in Case

C-72-1074- sub. 112.

App. 28

WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered and decreed that

Plaintiff’s motion for appointment of a special prosecutor

be denied and further Plaintiff’s motion for consolidation

of cases C-72-1074 sub. 112 and 72-2952-G be and is hereby

denied.

Dated: July 30, 1973.

/s/ George Unverzagt

Judge

J. J. Bowman Tiled

States Attorney fpr ,

240 E. Willow Jul 30 315 PM ’73 J

ge /s/ John W. Cockrell

Wheaton, Illinois Clerk of 18th Judicial Cireuit

682-7050 VuPage County Wheaton, Lllinois

IN THE EIGHTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT,

DU PAGE COUNTY,

WHEATON, ILLINOIS

People ex rel. Margaret Thompson, et al.

Plaintiffs, Objectors,

James Clark, County Collector, et al.,

Defendants.

No. C-72-1074 Sub. 112.

ORDER

This cause coming on to be heard this day on the Com-

plaint of the Plaintiffs for trial on the merits and the

Plaintiffs represented in open court by Margaret Thomp-

son, pro se, and the Defendants represented in open court

by William Murphy on behalf of School District +86, and ’

Robert D. McLaren, Assistant State’s Attorney on behalf

App. 29

of James Clark, County Collector, John J. Bowman,

State’s Attorney, Ray McDonald, County Clerk, and the

DuPage County Board of Review, and the Court having

heard sworn testimony, and having admitted exhibits and

having heard arguments on behalf of all parties; and

being fully advised in the premises:

The Court doth find that it has jurisdiction of the parties

and the subject matter, that due notice has been given to

the parties herein, that no suflicient defense has been made,

nor cause shown why judgment should not be entered

against said property of Plaintiff for taxes due thereon;

Therefore, it is ordered and decreed that judgment be

and is hereby entered against Plaintiff’s property herein

in favor of the People of the State of Illinois, for the sums

annexed, being the amount of taxes due thereon.

Entered this tenth day of September, 1973, nunc pro

tunc the second day of March, 1973.

/3/ George Unverzagt

Judge

Book 726 Page 767

John Bowman

State’s Atty. for DuPage County

240 E. Willow

Wheaton, Ill.

682-7050

P&D

Filed

Sep 11 248 PM ’73

/s/ John W. Cockrell

(jerk of the 18th Judicial Cireuit

Du Page County, Wheaton, Illinois

App. 30

Office of

Joun J. Bowman

State’s Attorney

DuPage County

207 S. Reber Street

Wheaton, Illinois 60187

General Number 312-682-7050

February 13, 1976

Margaret E. Thompson

Box 133

Hinsdale, Illinois .

Re: People ex rel. Thompson vs.

Circuit Court, et al., In the Matter

of the Application of Taxes.

Case No. C-71-604

Dear Mrs. Thompson:

Enclosed herein is a xerox copy of an Order entered to-

day by Judge Charles R. Norgle continuing the above cause

for a further hearing on your Motion to February 20,

1976.

Very truly yours,

/s/ Robert D. McLaren

Robert D. McLaren

Assistant State’s Attorney

RDMce:elp

Ene.

Via Certified Mail

Return Receipt Requested

App. 31

IN THE EIGHTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT,

DU PAGE COUNTY,

WHEATON, ILLINOIS

People ex rel. Thompson,

Vv.

Circuit Court et al. AKA In the Matter of the

Application of Taxes

No C-71-604

ORDER

This cause coming on to be heard and the plaintiff

Thompson having failed to appear pursuant to an order

of court for a continuation until 2:00 p.m. of the 13th of

Feb., 1976 this cause be and is hereby continued until

2-20-76 at 10:00 a.m. for further hearing on the motion

of Ms. Thompson without further notice to the parties.

Dated: Feb. 13, 1976.

J. J. Bowman

207 S. Reber

Wheaton, II.

682-7050

Box 133

Hinsdale, IL 60521

March 2, 1976

Hon. Clell Woods, Clerk

Illinois Supreme Court

Springfield, Dlinois 62706

Dear Mr. Woods:

I would like to notify the court that I will be out of town

until March 14, 1976.

App. 32

Further for my own safety, I am sending to you a copy

of my letter of February 19, 1976, to Associate Judge,

Charles Norgle, giving him 10 days to put the records back

to their Jaiuary 26, 1976 condition. This would be case

number 46352, 44360, 43928 in the Illinois Supreme Court.

Up until January 26, 1976, the circuit court records brought

into court consisted of my motion to reinstate the case, my

complaint for about nine million in partial damages and

a perpetual injunction against further harassment and

intimidation, the pleadings between me and Chief Judge

George Unverzagt on his disqualifying himself as chief

judge, a motion to dismiss my complaint, my motion for

a transfer to the federal district court, the state’s attor-

ney’s motion to deny my motion and my motion to strike

and dismiss the state’s attorneys motion, with court orders,

on January 26, 1976 I asked for the rest of the court rec-

ords as evidence.

On February 13, 1976 I tried to present a motion for the

records, only to find that the records before the court now

consisted of parts of the records in the above appeals and

original actions including both appellate court mandates

in Appellate Court numbers 70-220, and 72-73.

It was a very ugly scene. The court has not taken jurisdic-

tion nor reinstated the case, or so the judge claims. I con-

sider the alteration of the record and the threat by the

judge if I did specify individual documents that I would

have to pay for reproductions an outrageous injury to me.

To this date I have not heard from the judge. The mental

strain is to great, I must get away for a few days to regain

my perspective. I may file a motion for leave to file an

original action in this court when I return, but, right now

I just do not know.

App. 33

I call to your attention that this is not the first time that the

record has been altered, as shown in case number 48236

excerpts, R. C. 3, Par. 8, you might say that the question of

alteration of the trial court records has already been adju-

dicated.

I am afraid to go back to the circuit court in Wheaton. All

of these people are fighting with each other. The chief

judge has disqualified himself as to me and there is no

standing chief judge, the collector is sueing the state’s at-

torney and members of the county board, there is a special

prosecutor conducting a grand jury investigation of the

collector, etcetra, etcetra. And, I am caught in the mid-

dle. Thank you for listening. I feel better that someone

knows besides the state’s attorney.

Thank you,

Margaret E. Thompson

Box 133

Hinsdale, IL 60521

February 19, 1976

Hon. Charles Norgle Sr., Associate Judge

Circuit Court of the 18th Judicial District

201 Reber Street

Wheaton, IL 60187

Dear Judge Norgle:

IN RE: C 71-604

I received notice late on Feburary 18, 1976 that you had

continued the above case to 10:00 A.M. Friday, February

20, 1976, having learned earlier in the day by telephoning

the Circuit Clerk.

App. 34

It seems to me that we have reached an impasse in the

ease Judge. On January 26, 1976 when I alleged that I

needed records for evidence, I did not consider it unreason-

able that you should ask that the records be specified. But,

I did consider it unreasonable that you intended to censor

the documents bevore they came into Court.

At that time my Motion to strike the State’s Attorney’s

pleading was not in the record, or so the State’s Attor-

ney testified and I gave you a copy. I did not look at the

record but from a distance it appeared to be the same rec-

ord that had been brought into court every time since

October 2, 1975 and consisted of pleadings filed since Sep-

tember 26, 1975. I do not know if the State’s Attorney’s

Motion to deny my motion to transfer the case was in that

record.

On January 30, 1976 the record was in your chambers

and I did not see it although I asked the Clerk.

On February 13, 1976 the record was completely altered

containing many of the documents that I had suggested

on January 26, 1976 that 1 would need as evidence, now

filed as though they were pleadings before the court. Fur-

ther the Court refused to rule on the altered records; was

very abusive to me about being affluent and purchasing

reproductions, when the Cireuit Clerk has $18.00 of my

money for reproductions that he refused to certify as true

and correct; 31.00 of my money for other reproductions

that are not certified as true and correct and $42.00 of my

money for filing a tax objection that I asked to have filed

as a complaint. The tax objection pursuant to my receipt

from the circuit clerk is C 71 604 sub 191 it has no caption.

Mr. Cockrell should have all of the reproductions that I

have paid for. Now where are they?

rr ,

App. 35

I do not intend to come back under the circumstances.

The State’s Attorney filed his motion to deny my motion

to transfer in a case that was not before the court. It was

not fastened in the file on February 13, 1976. There is no

People ex rel. Thompson v. Circuit Court, Sub 190. The

record has been jazzed up to support the State’s Attorney’s

motion.

I will give you ten days judge to make the Circuit Clerk

put the record back the way it was on January 26, 1976 and

to send me, at his expense, a certified, itemized index of

what the record contains. Date of entry, date of “filing,

document title. And you must apologize to me for your

behavior. Otherwise I will seek relief where I ean else-

where.

/s/ Margaret E. Thompson

CC: States Atty.

(Letterhead of Office of Clerk Of The Supreme Court

Springfield)

April 9, 1976

Mrs. Margaret E. Thompson

P. O. Box 133

Hinsdale, Illinois 60521

In re: People ex rel. Ralph B. Thompson, et al.,

etc., petitioners, vs. James H. Clark,

County Collector, et al., ete., respondents.

No. 48236

Dear Mrs. Thompson:

This office has today received and filed your notice, mo-

tion and order entered by Justice Howard C. Ryan, order-

ing that the mandate of this Court be stayed pending final

determination of an appeal to the United States Supreme

Court concerning the above entitled cause.

App. 36

Since the statutory fee for a certified cony of the final

order is $1.00, we are returning your check No. 968 in the

amount of $5.00 A certified copy of such final order will

be forwarded to you on April 16, 1976, this being twenty-

one days from the date the petition was demed.

Very truly yours,

/s/ Clell L. Woods

Clerk of the Supreme Court

CLW :gn

ec—Hon. John J. Bowman

State’s Attorney

DuPage County

Your prompt attention is appreciated.

Thank you,

/s/ Margaret E. Thompson

(Letterhead of Office of Clerk Of The Supreme Court

Springfield)

April 22, 1976

Mrs. Margaret E. Thompson

P. O. Box 133

Hinsdale, Illinois 60521

In re: People ex rel. Ralph B. Thompson, et al.,

etc., petitioners, vs. James H. Clark,

County Collector, et al., etce., respondents.

No. 48236

Dear Mrs. Thompson:

Since the mandate of this Court has been stayed, upon

your motion for stay of mandate pending final determina-

tion of an appeal to the United States Supreme Court,

le atm a a me es a ate

App. 37

this office would be unable to furnish you with a certified

copy of the final order. However, we enclose an uncerti-

fied copy, for which there is no charge. We are returning

your check No. 980, in the amount of $1.00.

Very truly yours,

/s/ Clell L. Woods

Clerk of the Supreme Court

CLW :gn

encs

(Letterhead of Office of Clerk of the Supreme Court

Springfield)

April 30, 1976

Mrs. Margaret E. Thompson

P. O. Box 133

Hinsdale, Illinois 60521

In re: People ex rel. Ralph B. Thompson, et al.,

ete., petitioners, vs. James H. Clark,

County Collector, et al., ete., respondents.

No. 48236

Dear Mrs. Thompson:

Our reluctance to furnish you with a certified copy of

the mandate follows the procedure in this office prior to

Mr. Taft’s election as Clerk of the Supreme Court. Such

procedure has been reinstated since I became Clerk and

is designed to assure that, in those cases in which the

mandate has been stayed, no certified mandate will acci-

dentally or by design find its way into the lower court files.

A certified copy of the mandate is enclosed. The charge

is $1.00. The responsibility for this copy is wholly yours.

rarer a

}

App. 38

The balance of your charges and allegations do not merit

reply.

Very truly yours,

/s/ Clell L. Woods

Clerk of the Supreme Court

CLW :gn

enc

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

State of Illinois )

) ss.

Supreme Court )

AT A TERM OF THE SUPREME COURT, begun and

held in Springfield, on Monday, the eighth day of March

in the year of our Lord, one thousand nine hundred and

seventy-six, within and for the State of Illinois.

Present: DanteL P. Warp, Cuter JusTICE

Justice WaLTER V. SCHAEFER

Justice Tuomas E. Kiuczynsk1

Justice Howarp C. Ryan

Justice Ropert C. UNpERwoop

Justice JosepH H. GoLpENHERSH

Justice Caswett J. Cress

Wituiam J. Scort, Arrornry GENERAL

Louvre F. Dean, MarsHau

Artest: CLELL L. Woops, CLERK

ee ey ee ears

App. 39

BE IT REMEMBERED, that, to-wit: on the 25th day of

March 1976, the same being one of the days of the term of

Court aforesaid, the following proceedings were, by said

Court, had and entered of record, to-wit:

People ex rel., Ralph B. Thompson and Margaret E.

Thompson and Ralph B. Thompson and Margaret E.

Thompson, individually,

Petitioners,

No. 48236 vs.

James H. Clark, County Collector, John Bowman, State’s

Attorney, Ray MacDonald, County Clerk, County Board

of Tax Review, All In DuPage County, Lllinois, In The

Matter of Judgment for Lots and Lands Delinquent in

Payment of Taxes,

Respondents.

Petition for Leave to Appeai from

Appellate Court, Second District

73-435

C72-1074

And now on this day the Court having duiy considered

the Petition for Leave to Appeal herein and being now

fully advised of and concerning the premises, doth over-

rule the prayer of the petition and denies Leave to Appeal

herein.

I, Clell L. Woods, Clerk of the Supreme Court of the

State of Illinois and keeper of the records, files and Seal

thereof, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true

copy of the final order of the said Supreme Court in the

above entitled cause of record in my office.

App. 40

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto subscribed

my name and affixed the Seal of said Court this 30th day

of April, 1976.

(The embossed seal of the Illinois Supreme Court ap-

pears here)

/s/ Clell L. Woods

Clerk,

Supreme Court of the

State of Illinois.

Box 133

Hinsdale, Illinois 60521

May 8, 1976

Hon. Clell L. Woods, Clerk

Illinois Supreme Court

State of Illinois

Springfield, Illinois 62706

In Re: Peopl> ex rel. Thompson, et al., ete., Petition-

ers, vs. James H. Clark, County Collector, et.

al., ete., Respondents.

No. 48236

Dear Mr. Woods:

In answer to your letter of April 30, 1976, the ‘‘certified

mandate’’ is totally unacceptable.

The letter is considered threatening, and I accept no re-

sponsibility for the document being in my possession.

If the final order of the court was not signed, sealed and

dated before it was filed, the signature, seal and date can-

not be supplied later, unless it were done nune pro tune,

as of the correct date.

App. 41

On its face tne document appears to be a mis-dated

original, and again is substantially altered from what-

ever you have in the file. Are you telling me that a certi-

fied copy of a final judgment is an original mandate that

could be filed below? ....

.1 suggest that the document that you have in your iile

is void; that what I have is an original; that if you ever

do sign, seal and date the document in your file that there

would be two originals, one of which would be a forgery.

The court’s original documents cannot be sold; I refuse to

become a party to the action by paying for it....

Should I not receive notice by May 12, 1976, that posi-

tive action has been taken to give relief and comply with

Ch. 120 Sec. 718, Lil. Rev. Stat., 1 will seek instructions

from the United States Supreme Court as to the legality

of my using and reproducing the document.

It would give me a good feeling to know that the Lllinois

Courts were not going to self destruct but this does not

mean that I will accept any action that has any appearance

of another procedural maneuver.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Margaret E. Thompson

Margaret E. Thompson,

Petitioner

ec. Atty. Gen. Scott

State’s Atty. Bowman —

App. 42 .

(Letterhead of Office of Clerk Of The Supreme Court

Springfield)

May 10, 1976

Ms. Margaret KE. Thompson

Box 133

Hinsdale, [Illinois 60521

In re: People ex rel. Thompson, et al., ete., vs.

James H. Clark, County Collector, et al., ete.

No. 48236

Dear Ms. Thompson:

I regret the confusion which has arisen in connection

with your requests in this case. I fear much has been

caused by the terms ‘‘mandate,’’ ‘‘certified mandate’’ and

‘‘certitied copy of the Court’s final order.’’ Also by your

unawareness of the procedure followed by this office in

these matters. Whether 1 will ever be able to explain

them fully to you appears questionable.

Any order of this Court may, when appropriate, be

stayed. If such act does occur the order is drafted by this

office but it is not signed, sealed or dated at the bottum

until it is issued. I tried in a previous letter to explain our

reluctance to issue a certified copy of any order (mandate)

which had been stayed. In this we were seeking to further

protect your rights not to abuse them. May I assure you

that the first uncertified copy of the order denying your

petition for leave to appeal as well as the second certified

copy we furnished you are accepted by the Supreme Court

of the United States as evidencing the disposition of the

case in this Court.

We find no problem with duplicate originals but assure

you the original is in our files, though admittedly un-

signed, unsealed and undated.

OE 0 PR te aD

App. 43

The closing six paragraphs of your letter are matters

more fittingly presented to the Supreme Court in an ap-

propriate form and proceeding.

We have complied with your requests exactly as we

would anyone else. Whether any further extended corres-

pondence would be of benefit appears doubtful.

Very truly yours,

/s/ Clell L. Woods

Clerk of the Supreme Court

CLW/he

Box 133

Hinsdale, [Illinois 60521

May 15, 1976

Hon. Clell L. Woods, Clerk

Illinois Supreme Court

Springfield, Illinois 62706

In re: No. 48236

Dear Mr. Woods:

Any action of yours is an action of the Illinois Supreme

Court. When-actions are taken outside formal court pro-

ceedings that affect my private rights and privileges, J

am denied equal protection and due process of law.

A duplicate original is a carbon copy and is certainly

not what I have... .

Lastly, I am quite aware that you find no problem with

duplicate originals, and enclose a copy of one such for an

explanation from you. What happened to the mandate

issued by Justin Taft on December 30, 1974?

Thank you,

/s/ Margaret Thompson

ec. Scott & Bowman

App. 44

(Letterhead of State Of Illinois Appellate Court

Second District—Elgin)

° May 17, 1976

Ms. Margaret Thompson

Box 133

Hinsdale, IL. 60521

Re: Gen. No. 72-73—People, ex rel. James H. Clerk,

ete. v. Ralph Thompson, et al.

Gen. No. 72-376—People ex rel. Margaret E.

Thompson v. County Board of School Trustees,

ete., et al.

ien. No. 73-377—People, ex rel. Ralph B.

Thompson, et al. v. Property Tax Appeal

Board, ete. et al.

Dear Ms. Thompson:

The mandates forwarded you under date of May 7, 1976

are the identical reproductions, by Xerox process, of the

mandates received from the office of the Supreme Court

in the respective cases and attested to by the Supreme

Court Clerk’s certificate at the bottom of each such docu-

ment.

The documents in this office bear the Seal of the Supreme

Court embossed thereon and so noted by the typewritten

word ‘‘Seal’’ in lieu thereof on the copies sent you.

It will be noted that in Gen. No. 72-73 (C71-604) that a

mandate was issued by Justin Taft, the Clerk of the Su-

preme Court, under date of February 22, 1974 on the order

of Court entered on January 30, 1974. This mandate was

later recalled, per copy of said order of Justice Charles

H. Davis herewith enclosed. Mandate of the Supreme

Court was later issued under date of July 28, 1975. The

later mandate appears to be identical in effect to the

previously recalled final order. Thereafter, the mandate

of this court issued.

| ts eet

—

App. 45

We have retained in our files copies of the Supreme

Court mandates recently sent you and said copies all con-

tain the clerk’s certificate on the face thereof, at the bot-

tom of the page.

Very truly yours,

/s/ Loren J. Strotz

Loren J. Strotz, Clerk

No. 46352

PEOPLE EX REL. JAMES H. CLARK, COUNTY

TREASURER, ETC.,

Respondent,

vs.

RALPH B. THOMPSON, et al.,

Petitioners.

Appeal from the Appellate Court,

Second District

No. 72-73.

Copy

ORDER

(Filed March 4, 1974)

Motion has been filed to recall and stay the Mandate of

this Court issued on February 22, 1974, and upon con-

sideration of said motion,

IT IS ORDERED that the Mandate of this Court be

recalled and stayed until the pending motion for reconsid-

eration of denial of Petition for Leave to Appeal is acted

upon by this Court.

/s/ Charles H. Davis

Judge, Illinois Supreme Court

Entered: March 1, 1974.

Assigned to Third District.]

App. 46

(Letterhead of Office of Clerk of The Supreme Court

Springfield)

May 17, 1976

Mrs. Margaret E. Thompson

Box 133

Hinsdale, Illinois 60521

In re: People ex rel. Ralph B. Thompson, et al., ete.,

petitioners, vs. James H. Clark, County

Collector, et al., ete., respondents

No. 48236

Dear Mrs. Thompson:

In accordance with your request the transcript of rec-

ord of this Court concerning the above entitled cause is en-

closed.

I am returning your check No. 988 in the amount of $5.00,

as the cost of preparing said record is $2.15. Will you

please forward your check in the amount of $2.15.

Very truly yours,

/s/ Clell L. Woods

Clerk of the Supreme Court

CLW :er

Encs.

Check No. 988

App. 47

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

State of Illinois )

) ss.

Supreme Court )

AT A TERM OF THE SUPREME COURT, begun and

held in Springfield, on Monday, the eighth day of March

in the year of our Lord, one thousand nine hundred and

seventy-six, within and for the State of Illinois.

Present: Dante, P. Warp, Curer Justice

Justice Water V. SCHAEFER

Justice Tuomas EK. Kuvczynsx1

Justice Howarp C. Ryan

Justice Rospert C. UnpeRwoop

Justice JosepH H. GoLpENHERSH

Justice CasweLtL J. Cress

Wii J. Scott, Arrorney GENERAL

Lovie F. Dean, MarsHau

Attest: Cie, L. Woops, CLerK

a a aa aia i iene em me a i

App. 48

BE IT REMEMBERED, that, to-wit: on the 25th day

of March 1976, the same being one of the days of the term

of Court aforesaid, the following proceedings were, by said

Court, had and entered of record, to-wit:

People ex rel. Ralph B. Thompson and Margaret E.

Thompson and Ralph B. Thompson and Margaret E.

Thompson, individually,

Petitioners,

No. 48236 vs.

James H. Clark, County Collector, John Bowman, State’s

Attorney, Ray MacDonald, County Clerk, County Board

of Tax Review, All In DuPage County, Illinois, In The

Matter of Judgment for Lots and Lands Delinquent in

Payment of Taxes,

Respondents.

Petition for Leave to Appeal from

Appellate Court, Second District

73-435

C72-1074

And now on this day the Court having duly considered

the Petition for Leave to Appeal herein and being now

fully advised of and concerning the premises, doth over-

rule the prayer of the petition and denies Leave to Appeal

herein.

I, Clell L. Woods, Clerk of the Supreme Court of the

State of Illinois and keeper of the records, files and Seal

thereof, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy

of the final order of the said Supreme Court in the above

entitled cause of record in my office.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, f have hereunto subscribed

my name and affixed the Seal of said Court this ........ day

_ nas > =

Clerk,

Supreme Court of the

State of Illinois.

App. 49

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

State of Illinois )

) ss.

Supreme Court )

I, Clell L. Woods, Clerk of the Supreme Court of the

State of Illinois, and keeper of the records, files and Seal

thereof, do hereby certify the foregoing to be a true copy

of the record of this Court in a certain cause entitled:

People ex rel. Ralph B. Thompson and Margaret E.

Thompson and Ralph B. Thompson and Margaret F.

Thompson, individually,

Petitioners,

No. 48236 vs.

James H. Clark, County Collector, John Bowman, State’s

Attorney, Ray MacDonald, County Clerk, County Board

of Tax Review, All In DuPage County, Illinois, In The

Matter of Judgment for Lots and Lands Delinquent in

Payment of Taxes,

Respondents.

Petition for Leave to Appeal from

Appellate Court, Second District

73-435

C72-1074

filed in this office on the 28th day of January, A.D. 1976.

In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto subscribed my

name and affixed the Seal of said court this 17th day of

May, 1976.

/s/ Clell L. Woods

Clerk, Supreme Court of the

State of Illinois

App. 50

(Leterhead of Office of Clerk Of The Supreme Court

Springfield)

December 30, 1974

Mrs. Margaret E. Thompson

P. O. Box 133

Hinsdale, Illinois 60521

In re: People ex rel. James H. Clark, County Treas-

urer and Ex-Officio County Coilector of Du-

Page County, Lllinois, ete., respondent, vs.

Ralph B. Thompson, et al., petitioners.

No. 46352

Dear Mrs. Thompson:

You are hereby notified that the mandate of this Court

has today been issued to the Clerk of the Appellate Court,

Second District, upon denial of a petition for rehearing

in the Supreme Court of the United States on December

23, 1974, concerning the above entitled cause.

Very truly yours,

/s/ Justin Taft

Clerk of the Supreme Court

JT :gn

ec—Hon. John J. Bowman

State’s Attorney

DuPage County

App. 51

STATE OF ILLINOIS _)

) ss.

COUNTY OF DU PAGE)

I, Robert M. Haenisch, Clerk of the Eighteenth Judicial

Circuit in the State aforesaid, do hereby certify the above

and foregoing to be a true, perfect and complete transcript

of the record according to a certain praecipe filed in this

office on the 30th day of December A.D. 1971 and an addi-

tional praecipe filed in this office on the 28th day of Feb-

ruary A.D. 1972 in a certain cause lately in said court be-

ing People of the State of Illinois Ex Rel. James H. Clark,

County Treasurer and Ex Officio County Collector of

DuPage County, Illinois, In the Matter of Application for

Judgment against Delinquent Lands and Lots, ete. vs.

Ralph B. Thompson and Margaret E .Thompson.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and

affixed the seal of said court at Wheaton in said County

this 8th day of March, A.D. 1972.

/s/ Robert M. Haenisch

Clerk of the Eighteenth

Judicial Circuit, County

Division DuPage County,

Illinois

App. 52

APPENDIX B

STATE OF ILLINOIS )

) SS.

COUNTY OF DU PAGE )

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE 18TH

JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

DU PAGE COUNTY, ILLINOIS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS ON THE

RELATION OF MARGARET E. THOMPSON ON

BEHALF OF HERSELF, CITIZEN, RESIDENT AND

TAXPAYER OF DU PAGE COUNTY AND THE

STATE OF ILLINOIS,

Relator-Petitioner and Plaintiff,

vs.

CIRCUIT COURT OF THE 18TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT,

JOHN COCKRELL CLERK, GEORGE UNVERZAuT,

JUDGE, JOHN BOWMAN, STATE’S ATTORNEY,

DU PAGE COUNTY, JAMES H. CLARK, COLLECTOR

AND RAY MAC DONALD CLERK OF DU PAGE

COUNTY, GEORGE RUDOLPH, RECORDER DU

PAGE CUUNTY, BOARD OF REVIEW OF DU PAGE

COUNTY, A BODY POLITIC, IN THE MATTER OF

SALE OF LOTS AND LANDS DELINQUENT IN THE

PAYMENT OF TAXES AFFECTING THE TAXES

OF: THE COUNTY OF DU PAGE, DU PAGE FOREST

PRESERVE DISTRICT, TOWN OF YORK, VILLAGE

OF OAK BROOK, OAK BROOK PARK DISTRICT,

SCHOOL DISTRICTS 86, 53 and 502, and Parties Un-

known,

Respondents and Defendants.

County Division

No. C 71-604

(Nos. C-68-859-469; C-65-859-470; C-69-484-98 ;

C-69-484-99 ; C-70-695-51; C-71-604-189)

App. 53

COMPLAINT AND 1ST AMENDED OBJECTIONS

COUNT I -

The People of the State of Illinois, on the relation of

Margaret E. Thompson, with the consent of the People

pursuant to Ch. 12U, Sec. 804, Ill. Rev. Stat. and on behalf

of herself, complaining of defendants and for a cause of

action alleges as follows and objects:

1. This is an action brought with the consent of

the People of the State of Illinois by Margaret E. 'Thomp-

son, on behalf of the People of the State of Illinois and

on her own behalf as citizen resident and taxapyer, who

owns land in the County of DuPage and State of Illinois

subject to assessment, equalization and taxation.

2. That the Plaintiff, together with her husband, who

hold real property in joint tenancy have paid the taxes

assessed against said real property under protest, and

properly filed objections for the years 1967, 1968, 1969,

1970 and subsequent years which have not been properly

and finally adjudicated by the Cireuit Court of the 18th

Judicial Circuit as shown by the records on file in the office

of the Clerk.

3. That all cases have been appealed to the Appellate

Court of Illinois and been dismissed by that Court and

mandates of the Appellate Court filed in the Cireuit Court

wherein the cases should continue as if no appeal were

taken.

4. That in all cases orders have been entered by the

State's Attorney either on his own motion or on the motion

of the collector, without due notice to Plaintiff.

5. That at all times pertinent hereto the Circuit Court

of the 18th Judicial Circuit, DuPage County, Lllinois was

the duly constituted Court of proper original jurisdiction

App. 54

and Judge George Unverzagt or his predecessor the duly

elected or appointed presiding Judge and John Cvuvkrell

or his predecessor the duly elected or appointed Clerk;

John Bowman or his predecessor was the duly appointed

or elected State’s Attorney for DuPage County; James -

H. Clark or his predecessor the duly elected or appointed

Collector Ex-Officio for DuPage County; May MacDonald

the duly elected Clerk for DuPage County; Board of Re-

view duly appointed and acting as a body politic; George

Rudolph or his predecessor the duly elected recorder for

DuPage County; and the taxing districts whose taxes are

affected were, Count of DuPage, DuPage Forest Preserve

District, Town of York, Village of Oak Brook, Oak Brook

Park District, School Districts 502, 86 and 53, and parties

Unknown.

6. That the applicable Federal and Illinois Constitu-

tions and the laws of the State of Illinois in effect for all,

or any of the years in question established the principle

of uniformity of taxation for all classes of real and per-

sonal property and required the respondents, set forth in

paragraph five (5) above to assess, equalize all property

subject to taxation uniformly at 100% of its full fair cash

value or in the alternative to assess and equalize all prop-

erty subject to taxation in the County of DuPage and

State of Illinois uniformally at the same per centum of

full, fair cash value; to extend the taxes on said assess-

ment uniformly as to rate; to collect and pay over said

taxes in full to said taxing districts set forth in paragraph

live (5) above; to apply for judgment for sale of delin-

cuent lands and judgment to determine the correct amount

of tax-paid under protest; uniformly ete., as proxided in

the Revenue Act, Ch. 120, Section 482, et seq., Ill. Rev.

Stat. Illinois Constitution of 1870, Art. 9 Section 1, Thli-

nois Constitution of 1970, Art. 9, Sec. 4, and the Four-

App. 55

teenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution without

discriminatory treatment of any person or property and

that an intentional valuation and equalization of different

classes of taxable property at different percentum of full,

fair cash value; an intentional excessive deduction by the

collector; an intentional evasion of the provision of the

Revenue Act is unlawful and subjects the above cfficers

and taxing districts and Parties Unknown to penalty.

¢. That Section 804 of the Revenue Act (Ch. 120, Sec.

804, lll. Rev. Stat.) provides that every county clerk,

assessor, collector or other officer who shall in any case

refuse or knowingly neglect to perform any duty enjoined

upon him by the Revenue Act, or who shall consent to or

connive at any evasion of its provisions whereby any pro-

ceeding required by the Act shall be prevented or hindered

or whereby any property is entered upon the tax rolls at

less than its full, fair cash value shall be liable for double

the amount of the loss or damage caused thereby and may

be removed from their offices by any court having juris-

diction on complaint of any person in the name of the

People of the State of Illinois.

8. That the records of the Cireuit Court will show

that from the 1967 tax year through the 1970 tax year,

and subsequent years, it was, and still is the practice of

the Cireuit Court through its Clerk, John Cockrell and

cessor, to consent with and connive at an evasion of the

proceedings required by the Revenue Act with the respon-

dent County Collector, County Clerk and County State’s

Attorney preventing the proper adjudication of the re-

quired application of the Collector for Sale of Lots and

Lands Delinquent in the Payment of Taxes and determina-

tion of the correct amount of tax paid under protest caus-

ing permanent, irreparable and continuing damages to

App. 56

Plaintiff, her family and property and tremendous losses

to the People of the State of Illinois, the citizens, resi-

dents and taxpayers of DuPage County and the tax levy-

ing units in that:

(1) The Court consented to the Clerk of the Court

transferring the case numbers together with the index

number or real estate index number and legal description

of lots and lands where taxes have been paid under pro-

test and objections filed to the Collector, whereby the col-

lector transcribes the case number into his warrant books

and avoids and evades making and filing a written appli-

cation for judgment of Sale on delinquent lands and jndg-

metn for determination of correct amount of tax paid

under protest, or, accounting for amount of delinquent

tax or amount of tax paid under protest or the distribu-

tion of same through the Court completely obstructing the

judicial process.

(2) The County Clerk fails and refuses to notify the

taxing districts.

(3) The Collector refuses to transcribe the tax into

the Court case.

(4) The State’s Attorney enters orders refunding

taxes on illegal rates to some taxpayers and not to others

and the County Clerk continues to extend the illegal rates

year after year.

(5) The Collector accumulated an excessive amount

of taxes paid under protest, deducting a fee of 3% instead

of 1% allowed.

(6) The recorder of deeds continues to record deeds

on real property with metes and bounds legal descriptions

without proper platting.

App. 57

(7) That the respondents have consented to and con-

nived at the discriminatory practices against Plaintiff in

court procedures.

(8) That respondents have consented to and connived

at an intentional valuation of Plaintiff’s property at a

higher per centum of full, fair cash value than other

properties.

(9) That respondents have repeatedly included Plain-

tiff’s property in legal descriptions of other properties on

the assessment rolls permitting criminal trespass, extreme

hardship and damages to Plaintiff.

(10) That the defendants have knowingly consented

to and connived at evading the procedures required by

the Revenue Act and have acted fraudulently with intent

to compel Plaintiff to bear more than her just share of

taxes; with intent to take Plaintiff’s property without just

compensation or due process of law and have done so de-

liberately, intentionally, fraudulently and not by inadver-

tence, mistake or incompetence and have conducted court

in a discriminatory manner not only denying her the judi-

cial process but permanently injuring her and damaging

her property by the policies and practices described above.

9. That the above practices complained of have re-

sulted in actual damages to plaintiff and her property in

excess of an estimated $500,000; exemplary damages in

excess of an estimated 4,000,000 dollars for the tax years

in question to Plaintiff, and an undetermined but caleu-

lable loss to Plaintiffs taxing districts; that as a result of

the deliberate connniving to avoid and evade the provi-

sions of the Revenue Act by the practices complained of

Plaintiffs have been denied due process of law and access

to the courts; have had their property encumbered with

App. 58

laws that impair the obligations of contract, leaving the

property unmarketable for the use for which it is being

taxed; have had their environment destroyed; have been

belittled, intimidated, threatened, insulted; have had their

property placed in jeopardy of condemnation; have been

forced to share an unproportionate share of the tax bur-

den and that this damage is estimated to be in excess of

$4,500,000, and a loss in excess of $12,000; that the injuries

and threats are still continuing and that Section 804 of

the Revenue Act, (Chap. 120, See. 804, Ill. Rev. Stat.) pro-

vides for double the amount of loss or damages caused by

the acts complained of above or a total of $9,000,000 in

damages and $24,000 in losses in the way of a partial com-

pensation to Plaintiff; and a calculable but undetermined

loss to the taxing districts. .

10. That at no time has any taxing district in DuPage

County, Illinois tried to recover losses caused by the de-

liberate underassessing of real properties in general; ex-

cess deductions by the collector or in anyway tried to de-

fend the rates extended and held illegal, invalid and void

by this court (Cireuit Court of DuPage County) but have

continued in the practices described above and that Sec-

tion 804 of the Revenue Act, supra, provides that any

court that has jurisdiction, may in its discretion, remove

any county clerk, collector or other officer who knowingly

neglected to perform any duties enjoined upon him by the

Revenue Act whereby any property subject to taxation

was entered upon the tax list at less than fair, cash value

or where any proceeding required by the Act was know-

ingly prevented or hindered.

11. That in all tax objections and alleged applications

of the collector for the year 1967 and subsequent in al-

leged case numbers C-68-859-470, C-69-48499, C170-695-51

and (-71-604 the Clerk of the Cireuit Court has at all

App. 59

times failed and refused to assess the proper filing fees,

giving the case numbers to the collector without the col-

lector filing any pleading and transferring the cases to

be transcribed onto the collectors warrant books calling

into question the validity of this court’s jurisdiction and

the validity of actions taken by this court not qnly as to

tax objections but also as to sales of delinquent lands

where no taxes were paid and certificate of error. That

until filing fees are paid cases are not legally filed.

12. That this court ruled that it did have jurisdiction

in ease numbers C-70-695, C-69-484, C-68-859 while Plain-

tiff had them on appeal and dismissed them on May 20,

1971, nune pro tune from May 17, 1971, for lack of juris-

diction, as the court records will show without due notice

to Plaintiff and after the Court had ordered the cases

consolidated and set a date for a hearing so that when the

mandate of the Appellate Court was filed in the Cireuit

Court on November 19, 1971 this court ruled that it lacked

jurisdiction to continue the cases on November 22, 1971

even though the collector was still withholding Plaintiff’s

tax money; and on February ........ , 1972 this court ruled

the opposite; that it did not have jurisdiction while the

case Was on appeal but in May of 1972 this court did as-

sume jurisdiction and entered further orders contrary to

the court’s ruling that the application of the collector

could not be continued or stayed on November 22, 1971.

Now, that the Appellate Court’s mandate has again been

filed in this court, plaintiff has no way of knowing what

to expect; the State’s Attorney has not tried to reinstate

the case making it necessary for the Circuit Court to de-

termine just what its jurisdiction is.

13. That the Plaintiff is tendering to the Clerk of

the Cireuit Court herewith the sum of forty-two (42.00)

dollars as the filing fee for this complaint which is the

App. 60

only pleading filed as a petitioner or plaintiff, Plaintiff’s

prior pleadings all being in the nature of trying to get the

defendants to perform the duties enjoined upon them by

the Revenue Act other than C-72-1074 now on appeal in

the Appellate Court wherein no filing fee was paid, in

order that this court can determine which court has juris-

diction of this case.

14. That the above practices complained of are a vio-

lation of Plaintiff’s right under color of state law con-

trary to the 14th amendment to the United States Consti-

tution and a violation of the Acts of Congress made pur-

suant thereto wherein the federal district court has origi-

nal and exclusive jurisdiction.

15. That Plaintiff objector is entitled to a refund of

all taxes paid for the tax years 1967 through 1974 and

subsequent years, or in the alternative, retains the right

io make further objections to those already made and

filed and amended on April 30, 1971.

Wherefore, plaintiffs pray as follows:

1. For a determination of which court has proper juris-

diction.

2. For a judgment in the amount of $9,024,000 or such

other sum as might be finally determined by the proper

court against the defendants jointly.

3. For a judgment in the amount of loss determined

by the proper court against the defendants jointly; that

said sum be paid into this court to be redistributed to the

various taxing bodies for each tax year since 1967 on a

pro-rata basis, based upon the tax rate for each taxing

body in DuPage County for each tax year or in the alter-

native redistributed to the taxpayers.

App. 61

4. For a judgment restoring all lots and lands sold

for the collection of unpaid taxes which this court has

held illegal for each tax year since 1967 to the rightful

owner or in the alternative make restitution.

5. That the defendants and each of them be removed

from office.

6. For such other and further relief as the court may

deem necessary or proper and for costs of this suit, in-

cluding reasonable attorney’s fees.

COUNT II

Now come the petitioner, Margaret E. Thompson, pur-

suant to the Mandamus Act (Ch. 87, Sees. 1 et seq.) and

petitions this Honorable Court to issue a Writ of Manda-

mus compelling the respondent, John Bowman, the Du-

Page County State’s Attorney to perform certain duties,

alleging as follows:

1. That the petitioner Margaret E. Thompson is a resi-

dent, citizen and taxpayer residing in the County of

DuPage.

2. That John Bowman is the duly elected and acting

State’s Attorney of DuPage County.

3. That at all times pertinent hereto it yas, and still

is, the duty of the respondent as State’s Attorney, or his

predecessor, under the Illinois Revenue Act (Ch. 120, Sec.

807, lll. Rev. Stat.) tu prosecute all violations of the Reve-

nue Act.

4. That it was and is the duty of the defendant County

Clerk, Ray MacDonald, under the Illinois Revenue Act

(Ch. 120, Sees. 517 and 318, Ill. Rev. Stat.) to notify owners

who have divided parcels of land which require metes

and bounds legal descriptions to cause the land to be

App. 62

surveyea and platted pursuant to the Plat Act and if the

owner rev. “ses or negliects the county clerk has the duty

to cause a survey to be made in accordance with the Plat

Act and to cause the lots to be placed on the assessors

books in lieu of the acreage yet the County Clerk has failed

and refused to comply with the forementioned provisions.

5. That it was and still is the duty of the defendant

DuPage County Board of Review under Section 589 of

the Revenue Act to hear and determine complaints on as-

sessments or determine on its own motion that all prop-

erties are assessed at the same percentum of fair cash

value, yet the DuPage County Board of Review for the

tax years in question classified properties making variable

per centums of full, fair cash value and issuing certificates

of error in errors of judgment as to valuation in lieu of

hearing complaints which certificates of error are filed by

the County Clerk with the Clerk of this court and are pre-

determined de facto tax objections wherein the tax is

collected or paid.

6. That it was and still is the duty of the County Col-

lector, James H. Clark, or his predecessor, for the tax years

1967 through 1974 to collect and distribute the taxes

chargeable to him or to receive credit through the court

on judgment for sale of lands and lots where taxes are

unpaid and judgment to determine the correct amount

where taxes are paid under protest pursuant to the pro-

cedures set forth in the Revenue Act and to account for

the proper amount of tax chargeable to him yet, James

H. Clark, and his predecessor with the cooperation of the

State’s Attorney ,the Cireuit Court of the 18th Judicial

Cireuit, its Clerk and Judges, the County Clerk and Board

of Review failed to comply with the provisions of the

Revenue Act, and did in fact obstruct a hearing on Peti-

—- Gtieantins

App. 63

tioners consolidated 1967, 1968 and 1969 tax objections

as consolidated by the Circuit Court and failed and re-

fused to prepare for the courts examination the lists of

delinquent taxes and taxes paid under protest for the 1970

tax year.

7. That the Petitioner has demanded of the Respon-

dent State’s Attorney that he prosecute the DuPage Coun-

ty Collector, the DuPage County Board of Review, the

DuPage County Clerk and the Clerk of the Circuit Court

as well as asking the Court to appoint a special prosecu-

tor under section 804, supra under which the court has

authority as well as Sections 803 and 805, and 806 but the

respondent Circuit Court has refused to appoint a special

prosecutor and the respondent State’s Attorney has re-

fused and still refuses to commence prosecution.

Wherefore petitioner prays that there may issue against

the respondent, State’s Attorney, a Writ of Mandamus,

returnable within fourteen days (14) compelling the re-

spondent to commence prosecution of the DuPage County

Collector and the members of the Board of Review and

the County Clerk of DuPage County and the Clerk of the

Circuit Court of DuPage County and parties unknown

under the Illinois Revenue Act Ch. 120 Sees. 803, 804 and

805, and 806 or to show cause why he should not do so.

COUNT III

The Plaintiff, Margaret E. Thompson, petitions this

court to issue a Writ of injunction and for an alterative

cause of action, alleges as follows:

1. That plaintiff repeats and realleges the allegations

of paragraphs one (1) through fourteen (14) of count I

above.

App. 64

2. That this is a proceeding for a mandatory injunction

pursuant to Chapter 22, Sees. 1 et seq.

Wherefore the plaintiff prays that this court issue a

mandatory injunction directing the defendants to remove

the encumberances caused by violations of the Revenue

Act from her property by proper platting, assessing, levy-

ing and extending taxes; and, for the proper collection,

distribution and accounting for taxes.

Plaintiff further prays for a permanent and perpetual

injunction against the State of Illinois its agencies and

political subdivisions now or hereafter created for ever

again trying to take plaintiff’s real property by the right

of emminent domain or otherwise without her consent, the

consent of her heirs and assigns, including the rights that

pertain to the property such as, but not limited to, the

right to the water on and under the land; that plaintiff

have her costs and disbursements necessarily incurred

herein, including reasonable attorney’s fees and for such

other and further relief as to this court may seem just

and equitable.

/3/ Margaret E. Thompson

Margaret E. Thompson

Plaintiff-Petitioner

Box 133

Hinsdale, Ill. 60521

323-3381

App. 65

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE

18TH JUDICIAL COURT

DU PAGE COUNTY, ILLINOIS

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF

JAMES H. CLARK, COUNTY COLLECTOR, FOR

JUDGMENT AGAINST DELINQUENT LANDS AND

LOTS FOR TAXES, SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS, SPE-

CIAL TAXES, COSTS AND INTEREST DUE AND

UNPAID THEREON

COUNTY DIVISION

NQ. C-71-604

NOTICE OF MOTION TO SET A DATE FOR THE

CASE TO CONTINUE

TO: State’s Attorney’s Office, DuPage County, Wheaton,

Ill. 60187

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that on Thursday, the

2nd, of October, 1975, at 9:30 A.M., or as soon thereafter

as [ may be heard, I shall appear before the Honorable

George W. Unverzagt, judge, or any judge sitting in his

stead, in the Courtroom usually occupied by him in the

County Courthouse, Wheaton, Illinois, and then and there

present a Motion To Set a Date to Continue the Above

numbered cause pursuant to Rules, a copy of which is here-

with served upon you.

/s/ Margaret E. Thompson

Margaret E. Thompson,

Complainant

Mox 133

Hinsdale, Ill. 60521

323-3381

App. 66

PROOF OF SERVICE

STATE OF ILLINOIS )

) 8s.

COUNTY OF DU PAGE)

Margaret E. Thompson, being first duly sworn on oath,

deposes and says that she served a copy of the above No-

tice and attached Motion upon the party to whom it is di-

rected by depositing in the United States Post Office, Hins-

dale, Lil. 60521, postage prepaid on the 22nd day of Sep-

tember, 1975.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 22nd day of Sep-

tember, 1975.

Notary Public

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE

18TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

DU PAGE COUNTY, ILLINOIS

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF

JAMES ,H. CLARK COUNTY COLLECTOR, FOR

JUDGMENT AGAINST DELINQUENT LANDS AND

LOTS FOR TAXES, SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS, SPE-

CIAL TAXES, COSTS AND INTEREST DUE AND

UNPAID THEREON

COUNTY DIVISION

NO. C-71-604

MOTION TO SET A DATE FOR THE CASE TO

CONTINUE PURSUANT TO SUPREME COURT

RULE 369(b)

Now comes Margaret E. Thompson one of the com-

plainants and objectors in the above captioned and num-

bered case and move this Court to set a date to continue

the above case and to hear and determine the issues as

to the Courts jurisdiction. In support thereof complainant

says as follows:

App. 67

1. That the appeal in the above case was dismissed by

the Appellate Court, the Mandate has now been filed in

this Court wherein pursuant to Rule 369(b) of the Illinois

Supreme Court the case is to continue as though no appeal

had been taken.

2. That Objectors have a Motion before the Court to

correct the defects in the record or in the alternative the

County Collector (County Treasurer-Ex Officio Collector)

show cause why his office should not be declared vacant,

and that, contrary to the order of this Court that the rec-

ords should remain unchanged, further action has been

taken and the alleged application of the collector has been

continued necessitating further allegations of defects and

errors and a determination by this Court of its jurisdic-

tion.

3. That the United States Supreme Court has made no

ruling on the merit of either this case or objectors prior

cases, which have not been properly and finally disposed

of by this Court.

4. That this Court has never heard and determined its

jurisdiction as shown by the records of this Court, nor has

heard and determined correct procedures under the Reve-

nue Act.

Wherefore complainant prays that this Court set a date

for the case to continue and further prays that the Court

set a date to hear and determine its jurisdiction and the

correct procedures under the Revenue Act, Ch. 120, Sec.

481 it seq.

/s8/ Margaret E. Thompson

Margaret E. Thompson

Complainant and Objector

Box 133

Hinsdale, Ill. 60521

323-3381

App. 68

AFFIDAVIT

Margaret E. Thompson, being first duly sworn on oath,

deposes and says as follows:

1. That she is a citizen, resident and taxpayer in the

above numbered cause in this Court.

2. That the Mandate of the Appellate Court was filed

in this Court dismissing the appeal on or about July 3lst,

1975.

3. That two orders were entered in this Court on No-

vember 22, 1971, both of which affiant objected to on the

grounds that the collector did not bring the lists of delin-

quent taxes and taxes paid under protest into Court for

the Court to examine and did not account for the amount

of money involved; at the same time (November 19, 1971)

a like Mandate of the same Appellate Court was filed in

this Court on affiants 1967, 1968 and 1969 tax objections,

Case Numbers C-68-859-470, C-69-484-99, C-70-695-51,

wherein this Court had ordered consolidation and set a

date for a hearing, while the cases were on appeal, only

to allow the State’s Attorney to present motions in open

Court to dismiss the cases before the hearing for want of

this Court’s jurisdiction, without ordering the collector

to distribute the money.

4. That the Clerk of this Court was ordered to enter

the Motions and Orders ure pro tune on May 20, 1971 as

of May 17, 1971 on the Mo’ on of the State’s Attorney,

without any Notice to affian’

5. That as of November 22, 1971, the Collector still

had not distributed affiant’s taxes.

App. 69

6. That Affiant has repeatedly asked this Court to ex-

amine its practices with regard to tax sales and tax pro-

tests and the Court has repeatedly acted as though it were

going to and then reniged. |

7. That at all times since 1967 and successive years

the Clerk of this Court has connived with the Collector by

giving the case numbers of the first tax objection filed to

the Collector for his use without the Collector filing any

pleadings; and; has also helped the Collector to transcribe

the tax cases on to his Warrant Books by giving the Col-

lector a list of the tax objection case numbers together

with the real-estate Index number and legal description,

enabling the Collector to avoid and evade the provisions

of the Revenue Act in making a proper application for sale

of lits and lands delinquent in payment of taxes and a

proper petition to this Court to determine the correct

amount of tax paid under protest causing great injury to

affiants person and property.

8. That this Court has repeatedly refused to give a

clear ruling on the application of the Revenue Act; has

repeatedly given conflicting rulings as to the effect of var-

ious sections of the Revenue Act.

9. That affiant believes that she had a legitimate com-

plaint against this Court.

10. That it is necessary for this Court to determine

whether it can hear a complaint against itself before the

case can proceed.

11. That Affiant has repeatedly been threatened and is

still being threatened over the cause of this and prior and

subsequent tax cases.

12. That affiant’s Motion for the Collector to correct

the errors and defects in the judgment books and account

App. 70

for the money or in the alternative show cause why his

office should not be declared vacant, which could have been

accomplishe din February of 1972, in a civil case, has now

possibly gone beyond that point in that an amount of

money equivalent to affiants 1968 and 1969 taxes has been

distributed by the Colectors after appeal was taken, but

his office had no record out of which funds it was dis-

tributed when affiant asked, raising the question of official

misconduct which cannot be adjudicated in a civil case.

13. That affiant has learned from the press that the

Collector has a case in the federal courts wherein a special

attorney, possibly acting as a de facto State’s Attorney

for the County of DuPage, has been restrained from re-

moving or considering removing the collector from office,

while the case is pending raising the question as to whether

the same State’s Attorney can proceed in the State Courts

to represent the collector and defeat making the collector

account for the taxes collected or show cause why his office

should not be declared vacant, necessitating this Court

ruling on its jurisdiction. (The State’s Attorney has to

date not furnished this Affiant a copy of his letter to then

presiding Judge George Unverzagt wherein he claimed

that this Court lacked jurisdiction, date app. January 1972

as ordered by this Court on February 2, 1972).

/s/ Margaret E. Thompson

Margaret E. Thompson

Subscribed and swern to before me this 22nd

day of September, 1975

Notary Public

App. 71

' IN THE EIGHTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, DU PAGE COUNTY, WHEATON, ILLINOIS

Tnthe Motion & ity

A opiication ST Danes.

Crag =—s«S«. wo. C-2/-GO¥

ee ee ee ere

ORDER

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crt culimlan anc to enctrcus Purttront te

juthy aclrrscel im the Premincm dite fund :

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App. 72

STATE OF ILLINOIS )

) ss.

COUNTY OF DU PAGE)

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE

18TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

DU PAGE COUNTY, ILLINOIS

PEOPLE EX REL

MARGARET E. THOMPSON, etc.,

Petitioner-Plaintiff,

vs.

CIRCUIT COURT OF THE

18TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, et al,

Respondents and Defendants.

No. C 71-604

Sub 191

ORDER

This matter having come up for hearing on the notice

filed by complainant Margaret Thompson to appear before

Hon. George W. Unverzagt, Judge, or any judge sitting

in his stead, on October 2, 1975. And Administrative

Order 75-7, deted March 18, 1975, requiring County Divi-

sion matters to be assigned to Judge Hopf being then in

effect and further Judge Unverzagt having been engaged

in the call of the Jury Trial Calendar for October 14, 1975

through November 7, 1975 and having directed that the

captioned case be sent to Judge Hopf; and

App. 73

Further it appearing that Judge Hopf recused himself

from hearing this matter due to his having been State’s

Attorney at the time alleged herein;

THEREFORE IT IS ORDERED that the hearing on

the pending motions herein be and they are assigned to

Judge Norgle for disposition.

Enter nunc pro tune

October 2, 1975

ENTER:

/s/ George W. Unverzagt

George W. Unverzagt,

Chief Judge

APPROVED:

Margaret E. Thompson State’s Attorney

App. 74

IN THE EIGHTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, DU PAGE COUNTY, WREATON, ILLINOIS

7. & thea

tle Aoplicabion st Clo, k NO. C-71-GO4

wee ee Se ee

ORDER

Shia Camaee Crag mm ts le Roark aot’ -

the co byreler , Mearcarst Thor paow, Alstig. ye :

ely ctans leo che orn ea a % The Cue &*

Spe Ae Her Pee, andl Ua Cent Acing fpstheg oclareate(

im the eaten the Court det fw &: ;

zg. AL rn , LK, AN

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dkcrsee Po ay se Cami ee anck eal ty

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207_S. Kile

Attorney for

Litestom, CLL.

Cit .

Y 642-725 dD

- ‘Telephone ‘

JOHN W. COCKRELL, CLERK OF THE 18TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT

WHEATON, ILLINOIS .

App. 75

Geitecton Meats %, Aa prs nbel , ye hky 3 » Recon vane Chetan

| ne ¥

IN THE EIGHTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, DU PAGE COUNTY, WHEATON, ILLINOIS

du fin Metter kt Abe )

Appleton of Vanes

CiAKcR a

vs. W. €-11-CO0Y

ORDER ,

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App. 76

_ IN THE EIGHTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, DU PAGE COUNTY, WHEATON, ILLINOIS

The Fe, au es Thos pees

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ORDER

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yaad .

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a ENIER: LYALL

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JOHN W. COCKRELL, CLERK OF THE ISTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT

WHEATON, ILLINOIS

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App. 77

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IN THE EIGHTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, DU PAGE COUNTY, WHEATON, ILLINOIS

* De Comme ; ' “ae. -$rc.

. Comins om baton Swdee Chale, wongle’ Sa,

porsuart te an or din. stud ps Unvaza gt

anafeming the tause em Oct, 28; MIF end the

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the, placmts YM. ihe ura volt praent” Le oo

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mnstien te Crylivie the Carine

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’ LOCKRELL, CLERK OF THE 18TH JUDICIAL CIRC JIT COURT:

WHEATON, ILLINOIS

App. 78

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IN THE EIGHTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, DU PAGE COUNTY, WHEATON, ILLINOIS

vs. NO. 6591-604

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ORDER

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JOHN W. COCKRELL, CLERK OF THE 18TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT

WHEATON, ILLINOIS

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

App. 79

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ORDER

Tus “ASE Cdn OO FOR SETTING Ado Ms, Trimmed

pane PrestNT Berore WE CWLT HINO Rowext apiaken) Game |

PRE StNT Before THE codRT AWD Nik, THUNPSOAN ORLY ppoVING

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Twe PeriTiett'¢ Aprien Te STKKE = DisAiss Nee morier

To TRANSFERS FurTHeR THE CHUEE Ba yND t= HemBy |

Corin ttO TO WNVARY 2éE™, 1976 AT jJojou Aan BCFORT

TrOee MVRCCE WTMCOT FURTHER weTICE TO THE Parts,

Dare: December 10", 1925

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JOHN W. COCKRELL, CLERK OF THE 18TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT

WHEATON, ILLINOIS

App. 80

IN THE EIGHTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, DU PAGE COUNTY, WREATON, ILLINOIS

Peo Ge aif bal

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App. 81

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_ JOWN W. COCKRELL, CLFRK OF THE 4/1 JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT 7

WHEATON, ILLINOIS

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IN THE EIGHTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, DU PAGE COUNTY, WHEATON, ILLINOIS

fre pide x stella rigor ,

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JOHN W. COCKRELL, CLERK OF THE ISTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT

WHEATON, ILLINOIS

App. 82

STATE OF ILLINOIS )

) SS.

COUNTY OF DU PAGE )

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE

18TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

DU PAGE COUNTY, ILLINOIS

PEOPLE EX REL. MARGARET E. THOMPSON,

Petitioner, Realtor and Plaintiff,

vs.

CIRCUIT COURT OF THE 18TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT,

DU PAGE COUNTY, ILLINOIS, ET AL., ETC.,

Defendants.

COUNTY DIVISION

C 71-604, et al.

MOTION FOR RECORDS

Now comes Margaret E. Thompson, pursuant to an order

of the Circuit Court entered on January 26, 1976, continued

on January 30, 1976, and files instanter, this her specifica-

tion of records and documents necessary to complete the

records before the court and the necessary evidence to sup-

port her motion to strike and dismiss the responsive plead-

ing of the collector and in support thereof alleges as fol-

lows:

AFFIDAVIT

Margaret E. Thompson, being first duly sworn upon oath

deposes and says as follows:

1. That on January 26, 1976, her Motion to Strike and

Dismiss was not in the court file in front of the court where-

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ae ey

App. 83

upon she furnshed the court with a copy, that she does not

remember if the copy was signed by her and does not

know if the original motion as filed with the Circuit Clerk

is now in the file since the records were not in the court-

room on January 3, 1976.

2. That the court order by her prepared on January 26,

1976 and entered by the court on that date erroneously

states that the cause is continued to Friday, January 30,

1975, whereas it should be January 30, 1976.

3. That the cause was placed on the court call sheet

at 1:30 P.M. on January 30, 1976 without her knowledge.

4. That on October 2, 1975 and again on January 26,

1976 affiant has alleged that the record before the court

is not a true, correct and complete record and the court’s

ruling on the issue needs to be clarified; That either the

record before the court is true, complete and correct or

in the alternative the record is not true, complete and

correct, and the court should so order.

5. That in affiant’s presence on January 26, 1976, upon

being asked by the deputy clerk, if she should bring the

entire record into the court on January 30, 1976, the State’s

Attorney represented by the Assistant State’s Attorney,

Robert McLaren, advised the deputy clerk not to bring

the entire record into court; That the action exceeds the

duties of the State’s Attorney.

6. Tfliant says that there exists in the Circuit Court files

under Circuit Court, County Division, case numbers C 71-

604, C 70-695, C 69-484, and C 68-859 as well as case num-

bers for subsequent years, many documents and records

including two appeals by her as Appellate Number 70-220

and 72-73. Herein the Circuit Clerk did not prepare the

original documents in contravention of Supreme Court

App. 84

rules and Chapter 53, Section 31, Ill. Rev. Stat. and in

the appeal 70-220, the Circuit Clerk did not certify to the

collector the correct amount of the tax in contravention of

Chapter 120, Sec. 718, Ill. Rev. Stat., that many of the

documents have no title and there is no general all inclu-

sive index to the cases.

7. That affiant specifies that she needs an index by the

Circuit Clerk, on the above county division case numbers

as well as possibly others, and that these need to be pre-

sented to the court, including every paper, document,

pleading, scrap and shred, including receipts signed by the

State’s Attorney, County Clerk, Circuit Clerk, and Coun-

ty Colylector; including court orders, certificates of error,

notices of appeal, daily court call sheets, reproductions

certified for appeal with the original transcripts by court

reporters, and any other thing the circuit clerk might have

with the above county case numbers or the above numbers

with a combination of any other sub numbers. That is, the

entire files as the original primary, best and prima facie

evidence that the defendants have discriminated against

affiant under the color of State law and that she is entitled

to damages.

8. That, further, affiant deems necessary, all court

orders entered on April 13, 1971, by Associate Judge

George Borovic, some if not all of which were on railroads

and all were tax matters, entered in presence of affiant,

while some of the listed county division case numbers

were by her before the Court.

9. That affiant needs a copy of the ex parte letter of

the State’s Attorney to Judge George Unverzagt, dated

+ etal

App. 85

January, 1972, pursuant to case number C 71-604, wherein

the presiding judge ordered a copy given to affiant by

State’s Attorney and she has to date not received this.

10. That none of the above County Division cases has a

title by any defendant which would show that any defen-

dant initiated any of the cases.

11. That affiant may need other case records as evi-

dence; that she is entitled to the records of this court to

use at evidence.

12. That the above records specified as necessary does

not include the collector’s warrant books, judgment books,

nor does it include other public records of defendants who

have refused to certify their official actions as true, com-

plete and correct.

13. That afliant has been certified by the Appellate

Court for not sufliciently identifying the evidence being

excluded so that the reviewing court could determine the

relevancy and competency of the evidence; that for the

trial judge to prevent the records from being identified in

court is a suppression of the truth, a denial of freedom of

speech and when done before the court has taken jurisdic-

tion of a case that has been on appeal is sufficient reason

within itself for transferring the case to the federal dis-

trict court under 42 U.S.C. 1983, in that the above num-

bered court records will show that the court was required

to examine the lists of lots and lands wherein t

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