Amicus Brief — Kings County v. Santa Rosa Band of Indians

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In the Supreme Court of tip fours |

United States|/ uN 8 a. |

Octoser Term, 1975 | wicHatt RODAK, JR. CLERK

No. 75-1674

Kinecs Country et al.,

Petitioners

vs.

Santa Rosa Banp or Inprans et al,

Respondents

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Brief of Amici Curiae States of California, Alaska,

Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon and Washington

EveELLE J. YOUNGER Paut L. Doveias

Attorney General of the State Attorney General of Nebraska

of California State Capitol

Lincoln, Nebraska 68509

CarL BoronKAy

Assistant Attorney General Lee JOHNSON

Attorney General of Oregon

Ricuarp C. Jacoss

Deputy Attor wey General W. Micwae. GILLETTE

6000 State Building Solicitor General

San Francisco, Ualifornia State Office Building

94102 Salem, Oregon 97310

Tel: (415) 557-0285

— Siape Gorron

Avrum M. Gross Attorney General

Attorney General of Alaska of Washington

Pouch K, State Capitol Temple of Justice

Juneau, Alaska 99801 Olympia, Washington 98504

WarrEN SPANNAUS

Attorney General of

Minnesota

375 Centennial Office

Building

Saint Paul, Minnesota 55155

SORG PRINTING COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA, 346 FIRST STREET, SAN FRANCISCO 94105

SUBJECT INDEX

Page

es mma 1

Benbawent OF Cae Aamiel TAG OG .ncccecececccseccsnccccscccesccncsenecssnssces 1

I. Counties Are Political Subdivisions of a State,

and Their Ordinances Are Accordingly “Civil Laws

of [The] State... That Are of General Applica-

tion” Within the Meaning of Publie Law 280 _........ 3

Il. State Land Use and Environmental Regulations

Do Not Constitute Encumbrances Within the Mean-

ing of Public Law 280 .......... b: sieansatelineanabetionnteninanaiananitiiginn ll

TESA MA TOTO Te PEN TOR POT CY 14

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CasEs Pages

Beck v. Flournoy Live-Stock and Real Estate Co., 65

F. 30 (1894), app. dism. 163 U. S. 686 000.

Burger v. County of Mendocino, 45 Cal. App. 3d 212

SUPT wesseissebiniasipalizasacssensadlbpcdnniediateiisenesiesslMlscsinicibiaaimaininadanads

County of Inyo v. Yorty, 32 Cal. App. 3d 795 (1973) ....

County of Marin v. Superior Court, 53 Cal, 2d 633

SEIDUUTE . <ieccacshtendisntatuisecnensichenhsieaibddariaititidshampanieathdieniosidadetalieliansbdik

DeCoteau v. District Court, 420 U. S. 425 (1975) ........

Franek v. Butler County, 127 Neb. 852, 257 N. W. 235

SUNT * ssshslabesinasiasiidaetiadienddtaataieshaslasiiiahdemmimadpianisasedlamiagusansclaidie

Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors, 8 Cal.

Be ee MUITUIED eitabicsittiesinipacidatshrieiebnicnccisahabesaddadigitaaateilat

Hiteheock v. Sherburne County, 227 Minn. 132, 34

Sil: CURT ITII seciiiilh

Lykins v. McGrath, 184 U. 8S. 169 (1902) 002.

Moe v. Salish and Kootenai Tribes, ........ >. fee

SPUD. Wishlist tliat iihebinaaisimia ia iahil pi alti ialiiihe

People v. Rhodes, 12 Cal. App. 3d 720 (1970) -....000000.....

Powell Grove Cemetery Association v. Multnomah

County, 228 Ore. 597, 365 P. 2d 1058 (1961) -.00....

Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) 00

iii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings County, ........ F.

a RUD ccnscilastsanitinniehois vesniiandliaeiais 1

Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 (1948)... 11

Snohomish County v. Seattle Disposal Co., 70 Wash.

2d 668, 425 P. 2d 22 (1967), cert. den. 389 U. S. 1016

SUIT dessniincactsveecieeseetasciehassielemamnaseltnidiancecinaiiittdabiinacialiinttaii 12

State v. Mutter, 23 Wis. 2d 407, 127 N. W. 2d 15

CIID ceocinnscssthiinditeispimicibianadidapiceliatidhataeiinitinn. aaymasians 3

State ex. rel. Taylor v. Superior Court, 2 Wash. 2d

GR, Ge ar >. ee UI CE chccibeitincctiecterigerinnsccnnititntermonennins 3

United States v. Waller, 243 U. 8. 452 (1917) -............... 12

Statutes AND REGULATIONS

FEDERAL

28 U.S. C. § 1360 (Public Law 83-280) 0.0.2... In passim

ee a ta ee te Oe eteentttertcennentcttceeinsinsieeiniintnnnien 8

67 Stat. B132 (1953) ......................-.---- Teeiniaiacemaneds 9,12

SratTE

a Te, Fe virictininesacnanatitctiennicrniinianscinieiininiciiniia 5

Cal. Health and Safety Code § 17922 ..........................-. 6

§§ 24198 et seq. ................ 8

Cal. Government Code § 65300 ........... Soe ae Aa 5

SIT -cosisnicitchaieeontenddiaptiniibasaiie 5

§ 65860 ... 5

Cal. Public Resources Code §§ 21000 et seq. .................. 4

2. as va 7

§ 21151 7

$§ 27000 et seq. i)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iv

Pages

Cal. Water Code §§ 13000 et seq, -.............---cecccceceeeeeeees 8

20 Cal, Acdmpim. Coda § 27 onan nncccccseccseccccseccceeeseeces 6

CONGRESSIONAL

H, R. Rep. No. 848, 83d Cong. Ist Sess. (1953) ...00.00...... 9,11

S. Rep. No. 699, 83d Cong. Ist Sess. (1953) 0.200020... 12

House Concurrent Resolution No. 108 (1953) -.00000000... 12

OTHER

Annual Report of the Secretary of the Interior

SUMED siuidisinniusiansstccaiedatlchidintinnaticdadeiiticiaslisnidielaiaanasuihianisintite 12

Annual Report of the Secretary of the Interior

STINE: scpshsctiaesichbdiaibieelebianaeianiiiedaiceadinedgiscenbedaibtaeis 12

ey es CRN CI ssccetbessticcwnccerisscictcipeieesrnbitnettiioen 12

In the Supreme Court of the

United States

Octoser TERM, 1975

No. 75-1674

Kines Country et al.,

Petitioners

vs.

Santa Rosa Banp oF Inpians et al.,

Respondents

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Brief of Amici Curiae States of California, Alaska,

Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon and Washington

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§1254(1), Kings County has

petitioned this Honorable Court for a writ of certiorari to

review a decision of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit. This amicus curiae brief is respect-

fully submitted by the State of California, pursuant to

Rule 42(4) of this Honorable Court, joined in by the states

of Alaska, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon and Washington.

INTEREST OF THE AMICI STATES

The decision of the Court of Appeals, Santa Rosa Band

of Indians v. Kings County, ........ > fa (1975), deter-

mined two issues which substantially affect the ability of

the State of California, as well as the ability of the states

which have joined in this amicus brief, to carry out the

congressional mandate embodied in Public Law 83-280, 28

U.S.C. § 1360. First, the Court of Appeals concluded that

county ordinances were not “civil laws of [the] State...

that are of general application . . . within the State... .”

28 U.S.C. § 1360. Second, assuming that county ordinances

were applicable to the Santa Rosa Rancheria, it concluded

that the enforcement of the County’s zoning ordinances

and building codes would constitute an “encumbrance” of

the Indian reservation trust lands, contrary to the excep-

tion of Public Law 280 forbidding the “alienation, encum-

brance, or taxation of any real or personal property ...

belonging to any Indian or any Indian tribe, band, or com-

munity that is held in trust by the United States... .” 28

U.S.C. § 1360(b).

As we shall note below, the conclusion that county ordi-

nances are not within the congressional authority granted

to the states by Public Law 280 misconceives the nature of

the governmental relation between a state and its counties;

it also ignores the fact that counties, in large part, enact

zoning ordinances and building codes in response to a spe-

cific mandate imposed by state law, and that such ordi-

nances and codes accordingly become part of the body of

state law. Further, the interpretation of the “encumbrance”

provision of Public Law 280 seriously misinterprets the

congressional intention underlying Public Law 280. Both

interpretations have contributed to a result unintended by

Congress, one which prohibits the states from enforcing

regulatory schemes which form highly significant portions

of their attempts to protect the health and welfare of their

citizenry. For each of these reasons, these amici states,

each of which is subject to the provisions of Public Law

280, have a substantial and real interest in the outcome of

this litigation; California and the states of Alaska, Min-

nesota, Nebraska, Oregon and Washington accordingly file

this amici curiae brief in support of the position of the pe-

titioners.

1. Counties Are Political Subdivisions of a State, and Their

Ordinances Are Accordingly "Civil Laws of [The] State...

That Are of General Application" Within the Meaning of

Public Law 280

There can be no dispute to the proposition that counties

are political subdivisions of the state in which they are

located. As the California Supreme Court has stated:

“The county is merely a political subdivision of

state government, exercising only the powers of the

state granted by the state, created for the purpose of

advancing ‘the policy of the state at large, for pur-

poses of political organization and civil administra-

tion in matters of finance, of education, of provision

for the poor, of the means of travel and transport and

expressly for the general administration of justice.’ ”

County of Marin v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 2d 633,

638-639 (1960).

The courts of each of the other Public Law 280 states

which utilize a county system of government have recog-

nized a similar rule. State ex rel. Taylor v. Superior

- Court, 2 Wash.2d 575, 98 P.2d 985 (Wash. 1940); Franek

v. Butler County, 127 Neb. 852, 257 N.W. 235 (Neb. 1934) ;

Hitchcock v. Sherburne County, 227 Minn. 132, 34 N.W. 2d

342 (Minn. 1948); Powell Grove Cemetery Association v.

Multnomah County, 228 Ore. 597, 365 P.2d 1058 (Ore.

1961); State v. Mutter, 23 Wis. 2d 407, 127 N.W.2d 15

(Wis. 1964). This Court recently recognized the principle,

holding:

“Political subdivisions of states—counties, cities, or

whatever—never were and never have been considered

as sovereign entities. Rather, they have been tradi-

tionally regarded as subordinate governmental instru-

mentalities created by the State to assist in the carry-

ing out of state governmental functions. As stated by

tie Court in Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 US.

161, 178, these governmental units are ‘created as con-

venient agencies for exercising such of the govern-

mental powers of the State as may be entrusted to

them’... .” Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 575 (1964).

The relationship of a county to its parent state is even

more readily apparent when considered in light of the

ordinances involved in this action. Kings County zoned the

area on which the plaintiffs planned to use their mobile

homes, for general agricultural use. C. T. 126. The use of

the mobile homes within such an agricultural area is per-

missible under the zoning ordinance, so long as certain

approvals are received from the County. The County build-

ing ordinances further require permits for electrical and

plumbing hookups, and require payment of a fee for the

permits and for inspections by the County. C. T. 120-121.

Finally, the approvals required from the County must be

preceded by the preparation and consideration of an en-

vironmental impact report under the California Environ-

mental Quality Act, Cal. Public Resources Code §§ 21000

et seq. Before the County may grant such approvals, it

must prepare and consider the environmental impact re-

port and must act to mitigate any significant environmental

impacts which would be caused by carrying out the pro-

posed project. Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Super-

visors, 8 Cal.3d 247, 263 fn. 8 (1972); Burger v. County of

Mendocino, 45 Cal.App.3d 212 (1975). As we shall note

below, each of the above ordinances was enacted, however,

not as an exercise uf any inherent power of the County, but

in response to a direct obligation imposed by state law.

Thus, under these circumstances, it may fairly be said that

the County ordinances are, in fact, part and parcel of state

law, designed to localize a statewide policy expressed in

state statute.’

1. Since 1965, California law has required each County

to “adopt a comprehensive, long-term general plan for the

physical development of the county... .” Cal. Government

Code § 65300. As a part of that plan, each County has been

required to designate a “proposed general distribution and

general location and extent of the use of the land for hous-

ing, business, industry, open space, including agriculture,

natural resources, recreation, and enjoyment of scenic

beauty, education, public building and grounds, solid and

liquid waste disposal facilities, and other categories of

public and private uses of land.” Cal. Government Code

$ 65302. Since January 1974, all county zoning ordinances

have been required to be consistent with the duly adopted

general plan. Cal. Government Code § 65860. In addition,

California law has long sought to encourage the preserva- .

tion of the maximum amount of California’s agricultural

land, on the ground that it “is necessary not only to the

maintenance of the agricultural economy of the state, but

also for the assurance of adequate, healthful and nutritious

1. We have referred in this brief only to the pertinent Cali-

fornia statutes. Each of the signatory states to this brief, however,

has similar and analogous statutes designed to allow a local gov-

ernmental entity to conform state policy to the area under its

jurisdiction. Alaska, for example, requires its local boroughs to

engage in planning and zoning activities designed to localize its

state-wide policies. See, A. S. 29.33.070.

food for future residents of this state and nation.” Cal.

Government Code § 51220.

By these and other similar enactments, the California

legislature has attempted to guide the counties into a

systematic consideration of the possible uses of their land

resources, and to provide strong policy guidelines con-

cerning the maintenance of agricultural lands. Hence, it

is apparent that Kings County, by zoning the land here

involved as agricultural, is simply following one of the

basic policy mandates of state law; the County in no way

exercises a discretion unlimited by state law, but only acts

within the boundaries of established state policy to conform

that policy to the local area within its jurisdiction. In this

regard, then, the County exercises “only the powers of

the state .... for the purpose of advancing ‘the policy

of the state at large, for purposes of political organization

and civil administration.’” County of Marin v. Superior

Court, supra, 53 Cal.2d 633, 638-639.

The decision of the Ninth Cireuit, however, ignored this

fact in its conclusion that county ordinances were not

“civil laws of [the] state” within the meaning of Public

Law 280. By such a holding, the Court has effectively

eliminated any ability of California to include Indian

lands within its comprehensive land use planning mech-

anisms.

2. By state law, California has similarly required each

County to adopt the Uniform Building Code, promulgated

by the International Conference of Building Officials, as

its County Building Ordinance. Cal. Health and Safety Code

§ 17922; 25 Cal. Administrative Code § 1070. Hence, al-

though the approvals required from Kings County for the

respondents’ proposed mobile home uses are set forth in

county ordinances, and although the electrical and plumbing

permits and fees are likewise set forth in county ordinances,

those ordinances are explicitly required by state law to

conform to the Uniform Building Code. It is thus clear,

again, that the County is only enforcing an obligation

explicitly imposed upon it by state law; at the same time,

it is enforcing a state law of general application throughout

the state. d

3. California law further requires each public agency

which is considering approval of a proposed private “proj-

ect” to prepare and consider an environmental impact

report prior to approval of the project.* Cal. Public Re-

sources Code § 21151. Such a report must consider, inter

alia, the environmental impact of the proposed action,

adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided if

the proposal is implemented, alternatives to the proposed

project, and the growth-inducing aspects of the proposal.

Cal. Public Resources Code §§ 21151 and 21100, This re-

quirement of state law has been described as part of

California’s policy that “. . . highest priority shall be

given to environmental considerations.” County of Inyo v.

Yorty, 32 Cal.App.3d 795, 804 (1973).

Thus, again, like the requirements under the County

zoning ordinance and under the County building code, the

Kings County requirements regarding preparation and con-

sideration of an environmental impact report are explicitly

required by California law: they are not requirements

imposed only by the County, but requirements carried out

by the County under the mandate of California law. As

such, the County is only localizing one of the “civil laws

2. The term “project” encompasses both projects to be carried

out by a publie ageney, and private projects which require govern-

mental approval. Cal. Publie Resources Code § 21151; Friends of

Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors, supra, 8 Cal.3d 247.

of [the] State ... that [is] of general application . . .

within the State ....” and the ordinance should accordingly

be applicable to the Santa Rosa Rancheria.

4. California thus believes that the distinction drawn

by the Ninth Circuit between “state” and “county” laws

fails to reflect actual legislative practice, and prevents the

proper realization of state policy. As we have noted above,

the California counties play an indispensable role in enfore-

ing California law and policy; they fulfill the critical fune-

tion of adapting broad state policy to local conditions and

thereby assure the most practical and efficient means of

securing the ends mandated by the legislature. The Court, by

holding that “county” ordinances are not applicable on the

Santa Rosa Rancheria, has effectively prevented California

from utilizing counties to administer the policy of the state,

insofar as it applies to Indian lands; while disclaiming an

intent to prohibit the application of state laws to Indian

lands, the Court has achieved that very result. This conclu-

sion is even more apparent in the case of Alaska. Alaska,

unlike the other amici states, does not iave Indian trust

lands concentrated in easily defined reservations, but has

trust lands scattered throughout the state, including metro-

politan areas. The Ninth Circuit decision prevents the Alas-

kan boroughs from applying their land use control enact-

ments to these lands; the result is accordingly the “ ‘imprae-

tical pattern of checkerboard jurisdiction’” which this

Court has only recently again condemned. Moe v. Salish and

Kootenai Tribes, .... U.S. .... (April 27, 1976).

5. There is yet a further reason, moreover, for Cali-

fornia’s interest in the distinctions advanced by the Ninth

Circuit. As we shall note, a number of California’s signifi-

cant environmental laws are enforced not by the state or

counties, but by regional agencies. As part of their enforce-

ment activities, these regional agencies often adopt regula-

tory programs pursuant to state law which govern the

areas within their jurisdiction, but which, under the Ninth

Cireuit’s distinction between “state” and “county” laws,

cannot be termed as laws “of general application” under

Publie Law 280.

California’s water quality laws, for example, are enforced

by the California State Water Resources Control Board

and nine regional water quality control boards; each of the

regional boards has primary jurisdiction over a specific

geographical area of the state. Cal. Water Code §§ 13000

et seq. Under the analysis of the Ninth Cireuit, however,

the regional programs of the regional boards apparently

would not apply to activities on Indian lands resulting in

water pollution.

In addition, both federal law, Clean Air Act of 1970, 42

U.S.C. $§ 1857 et seq., and state law, Cal. Health and Safety

Code $$ 24198 et seq., require the development of air pollu-

tion control plans applicable only to specific geographical

areas because of air pollution problems specifically related

to the area; under the Ninth Cireuit analysis, however,

these plans would not appear to be applicable to Indian

lands, since they are not state laws of general application.

Further, the People of California established by initiative

an administrative agency structure designed to formulate

a plan for the future of the California coastline. Cal. Public

Resources Code §§ 27000 et seq. During the period allowed

bv the initiative for the preparation of such a plan, regional

coastal commissions are charged with the duty of enforcing

a permit system for development proposed along the Cali-

fornia coast. Jd. The jurisdiction of each of the regional

commissions does not extend throughout the state, however,

and, like the state regulation mentioned above, apparently

would not extend to activities on Indian lands.

As a result of the Ninth Circuit decision, it thus appears

that California may not utilize its regional mechanisms,

chosen as the most efficient means of realizing California

legislative policy, on Indian lands. That result is incon-

sistent with the congressional intent to terminate federal

responsibility over the Indian tribes within the Public Law

280 states, and, to a large part, to assimilate them into state

society. See, H.R. Rep. No. 848, 83rd Cong., Ist Sess. 3

(1953). As Congress expressed only two weeks prior to the

passage of Public Law 280:

“. . . [It] is the policy of Congress, as rapidly as

possibile to make the Indians within the territorial

limits of the United States subject to the same laws

and entitled to the same privileges and responsibilities

as are applicable to other citizens of the United States

“. . . [It] is declared to be the sense of Congress

that, at the earliest possible time, all the Indian tribes

and the individual members thereof located within the

State of California .... should be free from Federal

supervision and control... .” 67 Stat. B132 (1953).

The Ninth Circuit pointedly ignored these legislative ex-

pressions, however, and resolved any difficulties in the

statute by construing them not by the policy expressed by

Congress, but by a repeated canon of construction favorable

to Indian sovereignty. That course of action cannot stand

in light of the recent declaration of this Court:

“A canon of construction is not a license to disregard

clear expressions of tribal and congressional intent

. ... Some might wish they had spoken differently,

but we cannot remake history.” DeCoteau v. District

Court, 420 U.S, 425, 447-449 (1975).

California accordingly believes that the Kings County

ordinances, enacted in response to a specific mandate from

the California legislature, are “civil laws of [the] State

.... that are of general application . . . within the State

....? 28 U.S.C. § 1360. The phrase “of general application”

was not intended to prevent the application of county

ordinances to Indian lands, but only to ensure that such

ordinances be equally applicable to non-Indians as well as

Indians.

ll. State Land Use and Environmental Regulations Do Not Con-

stitute Encumbrances Within the Meaning of Public Law 280

As an alternative ground of decision, the Ninth Circuit

concluded that the Kings County ordinances constituted

“encumbrances” within the meaning of Public Law 280,

and hence were prohibited by the terms of the statute. As

we shall explain below, however, such an interpretation is

inconsistent with other language in Public Law 280; more-

over, it fails to reflect the congressional policy underlying

Public Law 280. As a result, the “encumbrance” language

of the statute should be interpreted as encompassing only

a property right which constitutes a burden on Indian

property; the term has no application, however, to state

laws and county ordinances regulating the use of property

which do not create property rights adverse to those of

the fee holder.

In the first instance, the interpretation of the Ninth Cir-

cuit is inconsistent with other language in Public Law

280: the statute expressly excepts Indian trust property

from a state’s “regulation of the use” if the regulation is

inconsistent with a federal treaty, agreement, statute or

regulation, Since Congress explicitly provided an excep-

tion to the state’s power to regulate use, the congressional

intention was without question to permit state regulation

of the use of Indian land. The Ninth Circuit’s interpreta-

tion of the “encumbrance” exception, however, would

totally preclude any land use regulation; thus, the two

exceptions would irreconcilably conflict, since the “encum-

brance” regulation would absolutely prohibit state regula-

tion, while the “treaty, agreement, statute or regulation”

exception would permit a broad range of state regulation.

Such a conclusion would, of course, fail to properly con-

strue the various parts of the statute harmoniously. See,

Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943).

More significantly, however, the Ninth Circuit misread

the congressional policy underlying Public Law 280,

and having so acted, interpreted the term “encumbrance”

in a manner wholly inconsistent with the result intended

by Congress.

As we noted above, the House Report accompanying

Public Law 280 considered termination of federal super-

vision of Indians to be a critical purpose of the statute.

H.R. Rep. No. 848, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1953). The

language used by the House of Representatives was incor-

porated by the Senate in its report on the statute. S. Rep.

No. 699, 83d Cong., Ist Sess. (1953). After its passage,

moreover, the Secretary of the Interior consistently re-

ferred to the purpose of the statute as being termination of

federal responsibility. See, Annual Report of the Secretary

of the Interior 34-37 (1953); Annual Report of the See-

retary of the Interior 227 (1954). As we also noted above,

only two weeks prior to the passage of Public Law 280, the

Senate passed. House Concurrent Resolution No. 108, which

declared it to he the policy of the United States govern-

ment to make Indians “subject to the same laws... as are

applicable to other citizens of the United States, to end

one So

a ne eh ey See

their status as wards of the United States and to grant

them all of the rights and prerogatives pertaining to

American citizenship.” 67 Stat. B132 (1953).

Where a word used in a statute is subject to equally rea-

sonable interpretations, it must, of course, be interpreted

to best achieve the end desired by Congress. Under this

view, then, the term “encumbrance” should be interpreted

narrowly, and should be applied only to bar the actual crea-

tion of an interest or right in the land, not to prohibit tradi-

tional state exercises of land use regulation. Accord:

People v. Rhodes, 12 Cal.App.3d 720 (1970); contra: Sno-

homish County v. Seattle Disposal Co., 70 Wash. 2d 668,

425 P.2d 22 (1967), cert. den. 389 U.S. 1016 (1967). Such

an interpretation is consistent with a long-standing federal

policy designed to prevent Indians from being divested of

their lands. See generally, United States v. Waller, 243 U.S.

452 (1917) ; Lykins v. McGrath, 184 U.S. 169, 171-172 (1902) ;

and Beck v. Flournoy Live-Stock and Real Estate Co., 65

F. 30 (1894), app. dism. 163 U.S. 686; see also Federal In-

dian Law (U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1958), 787-803.

CONCLUSION

For each of the above reasons, the amici states believe

that the Ninth Circuit improperly interpreted the meaning

of Public Law 280. Its decision misreads the congressional

policy underlying the statute, and, as a result, reaches a

conclusion wholly inconsistent with congressional intent.

The states of California, Alaska, Minnesota, Nebraska, Ore-

gon and Washington accordingly join with Kings County in

urging that the petition for a writ of certiorari be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

EvELLE J. YouNGER Paut L. Dovexas

Attorney General of the State Attorney General of Nebraska

of California State Capitol

Lineoln, Nebraska 68509

Cart BoronKay

Assistant Attorney General Ler Jonson

Attorney General of Oregon

Ricuarp C. Jacoss

Deputy Attorney General W. Micnar. Giuterre

.6000 State Building Solicitor General

San Francisco, California State Office Building