Petition — Perkal v. United States

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OcTOBER TERM, 1975

No. r 5 i5Y 4

STuaRT ALLEN PERKAL, Petitioner,

Vv.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

JOSEPH FORER

Forer & REIN

733 Fifteenth Street, N.W.

Washington, D. C. 20005

Attorneys for Petitioner

Press or Byron S. ADAMS PRINTING, INC., WASHINGTON, D. C.

’

’

ee

ee ee eee

~ A ee NL in el ae he ale

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

I cu divkdscedswaennnewadauss edbieeu 1

PED co douuwcduds 6c0n¥bnsendesesadheeke 2

NE TD occ esuncddnessahenabeteonkedan 2

EE I ot ds tiewacnecedakeswetanennsent ee 3

1. The Mail Fraud Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 ..... 3

2. The Aider and Abettor Statute, 18 U.S.C.§2.. 3

I Oe Fe GN i 6 ows hh ahd KkdKeenescednenun 4

1. Summary of the Proceedings Below .......... 4

2. The Schemes to Defraud .................... 5

Th NE un cwiteawetudteesecadianwkaees 9

4. The Instructions to the Jury ................ 11

o. The Affirmance on Appeal .................. 13

Reasons for Allowing the Writ ..................... 14

IED os whnnns ouéus on Onneansndeeenaseeees 19

Appendices:

Appendix A—Opinion Below .................. la

Appendix B—Judgment Below ................ 9a

Appendix C—Order Denying Petition for Rehear-

Mt si06s dante eedhddeseendewenn suena 10a

EL OF 6:9 sekcundusaeieanccetiesecnveeekes lla

Cases CITED

Abbott v. United States, 239 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1956).. 16

Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613 (1949) ... 15

Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1 (1954) ......... 14, 16

Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946) ...... 2,15

il Table of Contents Continued

Page

Pritchard v. United Siates, 386 F.2d 760 (Sth Cir. 1967) 17

United States v. Greer, 467 F.2d 1064 (7th Cir. 1972).. 18

United States v. Joyce, 499 F.2d 9 (7th Cir. 1974) .... 17

United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1938) ..17, 18

United States v. Wilson, 506 F.2d 1252 (7th Cir. 1974) 17

STATUTES

ee ae se due ia 3,4

i es ln da cediu ged ak euneecueway 3, 4

en cece eteenkentestauees’ 2

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OcTOBER TERM, 1975

No.

Stuart ALLEN PerKAL, Petitioner,

Vv.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

Stuart Allen Perkal petitions for a writ of certiorari

to review a judgment of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Fourth Circuit which affirmed a judg-

ment of the United States District Court for the Dis-

trict of Maryland convicting petitioner of violations

of the federal mail fraud statute.

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals has not yet been

reported. It is reproduced in Appendix A hereto.

2

JURISDICTION

The judgment sought to be reviewed (reproduced in

Appendix B hereto) was entered on January 30, 1976.

A timely petition for rehearing was denied on Mareh 1,

1976 (Appendix C hereto). On March 12, 1976, the

Chief Justice ordered that the time for filing a petition

for certiorari be extended to and including April 30,

1976 (No. A-773). The jurisdiction of the Court is con-

ferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether petitioner was properly held crimi-

nally liable for substantive violations of the mail fraud

statute on the basis of the derivative liability of a co-

conspirator established by Pinkerton v. United States,

328 U.S. 640 (1946), even though the factual issues in-

volved in the Pinkerton doctrine were not submitted

to the jury.

2. Whether a participant in a multi-party scheme

to defraud is ipso facto criminally liable under the

mail fraud statute for a mailing done or caused by

another participant in executing the scheme, even

though the scheme did not require or contemplate the

mailing and the accused did not direct, cause or abet

the mailing.

3. Whether the trial court’s instructions errone-

ously authorized the jury to convict petitioner of aid-

ing and abetting mailings incident to the execution of

a fraudulent scheme if it found that petitioner had

aided and abetted the fraud, even though he had not

aided and shetted the mailings.

4. Whet. « the record in this case supports the

imposition of . riminal liability on petitioner for the

mailings alieged in the indictment.

Se

3

STATUTES INVOLVED

1. The Mail Fraud Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341

§ 1341. Frauds and swindles

Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any

scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money

or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,

representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose of, loan,

exchange, alter, give away, distribute, supply, or fur-

nish or procure for unlawful use any counterfeit or

spurious coin, obligation, security, or other article, for

the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or at-

tempting so to do, places in any post office or author-

ized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing

whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service,

or takes or receives therefrom, any such matter or

thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail ae-

cording to the direction thereon, or at the place at

which it is directed to be delivered by the person to

whom it is addressed, any such matter or thing, shall

be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more

than five years, or both.

2. The Aider and Abettor Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2

§ 2. Principals

(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United

States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or

procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.

(b) Whoever wilfully causes an act to be done which

if directly performed by him or another would be an

offense against the United States, is punishable as a

principal.

4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1. Summary of the Proceedings Below

Petitioner was indicted in the District of Maryland in

45 counts, each alleging that in violation of the mail

fraud statute, 48 U.S.C. § 1341, and the aiding and abet-

ting statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2, he knowingly caused a letter

to be delivered by mail for the purpose of executing a

scheme to defraud insurance companies (A. 3-55).’ The

first count described the alleged scheme at length (A.

3-7), and each subsequent count incorporated the de-

scription by reference (A. 9-55). The essence of the

alleged scheme or schemes was that attorneys repre-

senting personal injury claimants in automobile acci-

dents would send their clients to petitioner, a physician,

with the understanding that he would furnish infiated

medical bills and reports for the attorneys to use to ob-

tain larger settlements from the insurance companies

than were warranted by the true facts.

Petitioner was tried by jury. A judgment of acquit-

tal was entered on counts 12 and 38, and guilty verdicts

were returned on the 46 remaining counts (A. 1, 2).

Petitioner was sentenced on each of the 46 counts to the

statutory maximum of five years’ imprisonment and a

fine of $1,000. The imprisonment sentences were con-

current, but the fines were cumulated, making an aggre-

gate sentence of five years’ imprisonment and $46,000 in

fines. (A. 91.)

The Court of Appeals affirmed, but remanded for a

correction of the judgment and sentence to eliminate

1** 4’? refers to the Appendix filed in the appeal below. ‘‘Tr.’’

refers to the trial transcript, with the immediately preceding num-

ber referring to the transcript volume. The transeript as a whole

is not consecutively paginated.

ee eee ee

5

multiple convictions and sentences for single mailings

(Appendix A, pp. 8a, 9a). If the decision of the Court

of Appeals stands, petitioner will have been convicted

on a total of 37 counts, involving an aggregate sentence

of five years’ imprisonment and $37,000 in fines.*

2. The Schemes To Defraud

During the relevant period, Dr. Perkal was a prac-

ticing physician in Baltimore. The bulk of his prac-

tice consisted of persons with personal injury claims

who were referred to Dr. Perkal by their lawyers (7 Tr.

72-73, 98, 149).

The 37 counts jp this case grew out of 18 accidents in

which seven Baltimore lawyers, representing a total of

28 claimants, negotiated claims over a three vear pe-

riod* with eight insurance companies. None of the

lawyers was associated or collaborated with any of the

others. One lawyer (Bomstein) represented the claim-

ants in nine of the accidents, resulting in 17 counts.

Another lawyer (Bernard Reamer) represented the

claimants in four of the aecidents, resulting in six

* Under the remand, the District Court is required to reduce the

convictions and sentences on thirteen of the counts to six, and to

determine whether the convictions and sentences on four other

counts should be reduced to two. The United States Attorney

has already informed the District Court and petitioner that the

government now concedes that the latter reduction should be

made. Accordingly, the counts which are alive for the purpose

of this petition are counts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15,

16 (into which 17 and 18 merge), 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24 (into which

26 merges), 25 (into which 27 me gen). 28 (into which 29 merges),

30 (into which 31 merges), 32 (into which 34 merges), 33 (into

which 35 merges), 26, 37, 39, 40, 41, 42 (into which 44 merges),

43, 45, 46, 47, 48

* From June 9, 1971 (Count 2, A.9) through July 1, 1974 (Count

40, A.47).

6

counts. Each of the five other lawyers represented a

claimant or claimants in a single accident, one resulting

in four counts, the others in two counts each. (See Ap-

pendix D hereto for record references. )

The record discloses the following pattern.

In order to obtain a large volume of settlements,

necessary to make his personal injury practice luera-

tive, the lawyer hired runners to bring to him as clients

persons involved in automobile accidents (8 Tr. 63-66,

69-71; 9 Tr. 10-18, 42-43, 240).* The lawyer’s fee was a

contingency of one-third of the recovery (8 Tr. 67;

9 Tr. 57). By a rule of thumb, used by the insurance

companies and the lawyers, personal injury cases were

by and large settled for about three times the total spe-

cial damages (8 Tr. 17-20, 24-26; 9 Tr. 56).

In order to obtain a larger settlement than the facts

warranted, the lawyer would send the claimant to a

physician with whom he had an arrangement whereby

the physician would supply a medical bill and report

which suited the lawyer’s purpose—that is, a bill which

exaggerated the medical expenses but commensurate

with the nature of the accident and within practical

settlement limitations, and a report of the injury and

treatment which adequately rationalized the bill (8 Tr.

99-31, 42-46, 69; 9 Tr. 16-17, 37-38, 61).

4In 11 of the 18 accidents, a runner materialized at the scene

of the accident and recruited the claimants before they left (5 Tr.

39-40, 65, 84-86, 195-96, 220-21, 288-90; 6 Tr. 15, 57, 138, 139,

207: G. Ex. 7). In a twelfth accident, the claimant got as far

as the hospital before he was approached (6 Tr. 157-59).

5In the few instances in which a claim was made under a

claimant’s own insurance policy covering him for medical ex-

penses, the settlement would be equal to the amount of the medi-

cal bills (8 Tr. 17, 20; 9 Tr. 55).

7

In the instances involved in the indictment, the law-

yer sent the claimant or claimants to Dr. Perkal,* but

sometimes the lawyer sent his clients to other physi-

cians with whom he had similar arrangements (8 Tr.

91, 162, 187; 9 Tr. 34, 181). As to each count the evi-

dence supports a finding, implicit in the verdict, that

Dr. Perkal furnished the lawyer with an inflated medi-

eal bill and report.’

In addition to the lawyer’s generalized knowledge

that Dr. Perkal’s bill and report would be inflated, the

lawyer sometimes knew of specific details of the falsi-

fication (8 Tr. 42, 95; 9 Tr. 25-26, 70-71, 75, 100), and

sometimes the lawver directed specifie falsifications, in-

eluding modifications of bills after they had been sub-

mitte.l and back-dating the claimant’s first visit to the

physician (8 Tr. 27, 61-63; 9 Tr. 78, 119-46). Sometimes

the lawyer, directly or through his runner, coached an

uninjured claimant to tell Dr, Perkal that he had been

injured (8 Tr. 46-50, 53-58; 9 Tr. 152-53).

The lawyer sent Dr. Perkal’s medical bill and report

to the insurance company along with evidence of other

special damages, including bills for orthopedic devices

and drugs prescribed by Dr. Perkal and the bills of

°3A Tr. 203-04; 5 Tr. 16, 105, 117-18, 221, 247, 269, 291; 6 Tr.

17, 74, 117, 139, 208, 242, 254. In a few instances the runner di-

rected the claimant to Dr. Perkal (5 Tr. 67-68; 6 Tr. 38, 159, 180)

but this was done for the convenience and with the authorization

of the lawyer (9 Tr. 43-44). In one instance a runner for lawver

Butler presented to two persons involved in the same accident a

list of physicians from whom the claimants could choose on the

basis of proximity. One claimant selected Dr. Perkal, thereby

eventually producting counts 36 and 37; the other selected an-

other physician. (6 Tr. 180.)

* This evidence came from testimony of the claimants. For

record references see Appendix D hereto.

8

consulting physicians (see Appendix D). The lawyer

then settled the claim with the insurance company,

venerally in line with the three-times special formula

mentioned above. From the proceeds of the settlement

the lawver would pay Dr. Perkal’s bill at a substantial

discount, the amount of the payment being in the law-

ver’s diseretion or at a flat rate (8 Tr. 77-80, 87-88 ; 9

Tr. 104-05). In addition to his one-third contingent

fee, the lawyer would often keep for himself the differ-

ence between the face amount of Dr, Perkal’s bill ani

the amount actually paid in satisfaction of the bill.

Thereby the lawyer considered that he was reimbursing

himself for his expenses for runners and other illegiti-

mate disbursements. (8 Tr. 67, 87; 9 Tr. 212.)

The lawyer also promoted fraudulent settlements by

bribing insurance company adjusters and lawyers (8

Tr. 174; 9 Tr. 213-39), and one lawyer threw an annual

swimming party for 500 to 600 adjusters at which he

would have 25 to 30 nude women (8 Tr. 177-78).

The indictment (A. 3-48) can readily be read as al-

leging that all the counts involved a single, over-all

scheme to defraud insurance companies, participated in

by Dr. Perkal and the various lawyers. The jury ver-

dict does not, however, imply a finding of such a single

scheme, * and the evidence shows that there were several

schemes. The lawyers were competitors, not collabo-

rators, and their business rivalry extended to obtaining

satisfactory physicians (& Tr. 86; 9 Tr. 180-81). The

only rational view of the evidence which we have just

recapitulated is that each lawyer independently devised

‘The jury was instructed to consider each count separately (A.

19, 28), that each separate use of the mails in furtherance of a

scheme to defraud is a separate offense (A. 25), and that Dr.

Perkal could be found guilty as an aider and abettor (A. 26-27).

eens

ee ed

9

and operated a scheme or schemes to defraud, and that

Dr. Perkal aided or abetted each lawyer ia the fraud by

supplying him with inflated medica] bills and reports.

The lawyer got the claimants by runners whom he paid.

The lawyer decided what physician to use; the physi-

cian did not select the lawyer. The physician produced

the kind of bill and report that the lawyer wanted, and

the lawyer sometimes gave specific directions respecting

the bill and report. The lawyer negotiated the settle-

ment without consulting the physician. The lawyer de-

cided how much the physician should be paid, not the

other way around. The lawyer accomplished the frauds

not only by using inflated medical bills and reports but

by bribing insurance adjusters and lawyers and by

throwing wild parties. The scheme was structured so

that the lawyer was the primary beneficiary of the

scheme, and he always received more than the physi-

cian, Under the conventional settlement formula of

three times the special damages (of which Dr, Perkal’s

bill was only part), the lawyer’s one-third contingent

fee increased in direct proportion to the extent of the

fraud ; in addition the lawyer would generally keep for

himself the amount he deducted from the physician’s

bill.

Accordingly, this case involves either seven or 18 sep-

arate, though similar, schemes to defrand, there being

either one scheme per lawyer or one scheme. per acci-

dent.

3. The Mailings

The letters which were mailed in execution of the

schemes to defraud fall into two classes. In class 1, re-

flected in 21 counts, ® were letters from the lawyers to

* Counts 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 14, 16, 20, 22, 24, 28, 32, 36, 37, 39,

41, 43, 45, 47.

10

the insurance companies which enclosed, along with

other documentation of special damages, Dr. Perkal s

itemized medical bills and reports relating to the claim-

ants.” In class 2, accounting for 16 counts, the letters

consisted of drafts in settlen.ent of the claims sent by

the insurance companies to the lawyers.’*

The government conceded throughout the trial ane

appeal that Dr. Perka! did not mail any of the letters

referred to in the indictment. Nor does the indictment

allege any mailing from Dr. Perkal toa lawyer or from

a lawyer to Dr. Perkal.

The lawyers usually transmitted medical bills and re-

ports to the insurance companies by mail and the com-

panies usually transmitted settlement drafts to the at-

tornevs by mail. However, the uncontradicted evi-

dence, supplied by government witnesses, was that it

was not uncommon for the bills, reports and settlement

drafts to be delivered by hand.“ There is no evidence

1 Sometimes the same bills and medical reports were sent to two

insurance companies, as When one company Was a liability insurer

and the other a medical loss insurer, or when two potential de-

fendants were insured by different companies.

11 Counts 4, 8 10, 11, 13, 15, 19, 21, 23, 25, 30, 33, 40, 42, 46,

48,

12 Both types of letters were contained in the insurance com-

panies’ case files, introduced in evidence as government exhibits.

See Exhibit D for the exhibit references.

13 One insurance company employee testified that lawyers fre-

quently came to the company’s office to pick up settlement cag oh

(3A Tr. 127). Another adjuster testified that . metimes he har

hand delivered settlement checks and sometimes the lawyers =

sonally picked up the checks. He also testified that the — s

transmitted by the lawyers ‘‘normally’’ came in by mail. (3 r.

44). One lawyer testified that mail was the “‘customary " means

for transmittal of the medical bills and reports and the settle-

ah

11

that Dr. Perkal ever directed or requested the use of

the mails, that it made any difference to him whether

the documents were delivered by mail or otherwise, or

that he knew about the method of delivery in any par-

ticular case."*

4. The Instructions to the Jury

Under the trial court’s instructions, the jury could

have found Dr. Perkal guilty as being either the prin-

cipal or an aider and abettor. The trial court did not

instruct the jury regarding the derivative liability of a

conspirator for substantative offenses committed by a

co-conspirator in furtherance and as part of the con-

spiracy (A. 56-89),

The trial court charged the jury that there were two

essential elements of the offenses, as follows (A. 73-74) :

Two essential elements are required to be proved

in order to establish each of the offenses cha reed in

the indictment:

ment drafts (8 Tr. 76-77). Bomstein, the lawyer involved in

half of the accidents and a large plurality of the counts, testified

that he sometimes delivered medical reports to insurance com-

pany adjusters by hand and that settlement drafts were some-

times delivered to him by hand (9 Tr. 83, 84, 90)

"The Court of Appeals cited testimony of a lawyer (Bomstein)

‘‘to the effect that the defendant’s purpose in submitting to him

[the lawyer] the bills and report was ‘so that I could mail them

to the insurance companies to discuss settlement.’ ”’ (Appendix

A, p. 5a). This is a misleading excerpt from Bomstein’s testimony

on the subject which reads as follows: ‘*Q. Did Mr. Perkal know

that you were mailing these bills and reports to insurance com-

panies? A, Yes. Q. How do you know he knew? A. We dis-

cussed it. We discussed that sometimes the adjuster came in

and I would give them the reports and most times they were

mailed out. That was the purpose of his sending me the reports

and bills, so that I could mail them to the insurance companies

to discuss settlement.’’ (9 Tr. 93.)

12

First: The act or acts of having devised, or hav-

ing intended to devise, a scheme or artifice with the

specific intent to defraud, or to attempt to defraud

certain insurance companies, associations and cor-

porations out of money or property by means of

false or fraudulent representations as to bills or

medical reports, as charged in the indictment.

And the second essential element: The act or acts

of knowingly and willfully causing to be delivered

by mail, according to the direction thereon, certain

letters, documents or other material to carry out

some essential step in the execution of said scheme

or artifice to defraud, or to attempt to do so, as

charged in the indictment.”’

On aiding and abetting the trial court instructed the

jury as follows (A, 80-81) :

The guilt of a Defendant may be established

without proof that the accused personally did every

act constituting the offense charged. ‘Title 18 of

the United States Code, Section 2 provides, and I

quote: ‘Whoever commits an offense against the

United States, or aids, abets, counsels, commands,

induces, or procures its commission, is punishable

as a principal.’

‘Whoever willfully causes an act to be done,

which if directly performed by him or another

would be an offense against the United States, is

punishable as a principal.’

In other words, every person who willfully par-

ticipates in the commission of a crime against the

laws. or under the laws of the United States may be

found guilty of that offense.

In order to aid and abet another to commit a

crime it is necessary that the aecused willfully as-

sociate himself in some way with the criminal ven-

ture, and willfully participate in it as he would

in something he wishes to bring about; that is to

ie ND pee. net E athe

13

say, that he willfully seeks by some act or omis-

sion on his part to m imi ure

ake the crim ‘

roel inal vent

* 7 * *

m

You of course may not find any Defendant guilty

unless you find beyond reasonable doubt that eve :

element of the offense, as I have defined those ele-

ments in these instructions, was committed by some

person or persons, and that the Defendant partici-

pated in the commission of that crime.

5. The Affirmance on Appeal

The Court of Appeals held that the evidence sup-

ported the conviction on the ground that, ‘‘It has td

been settled, contrary to the defendant 's snattmaiies

of the statute, that anyone who ‘knowingly and inten-

tionally’ participates in the execution of the fraudulent

scheme comes within the prohibition of the statute and

this is true whether the indictment charges a con-

spiracy or not”’ (Appendix A, pp. 3a-4a, footnotes omit-

ted). It noted authority in other Circuits for “opnlving

conspiracy principles to a multi-member mail fraud

scheme’ ’’ (Appendix A, p. 4a, n. 5). Thus the court be-

low affirmed the conviction on the one possible theor

which had not been submitted to the jury, the Poaarat

tive liability of a conspirator for a substantive ollenes

committed by a co-conspirator in furtherance and -

part of the conspiracy. The court ignored sutitidner's

arguments that this theory was not available because the

fact issues it involved had not been submitted to the

jury and because the evidence could not support a

finding that petitioner was a member of a conspirac

to violate the mail fraud statute as distinguished reiki

a conspiracy merely to commit a local fraud."

15 ¢* ‘ , ; i

: Contrary to the impression conveyed by the opinion below

oie ad never claimed that conspiracy principles could not be

utilized unless the indictment contained a conspiracy count

14

Petitioner had also argued below that the trial court’s

instruction on aiding and abetting erroneously author-

ized the jury to convict merely by finding that taveneet

er had abetted the fraud rather than a principa “

use of the mails to defraud. The Court of Agyee -

merely replied, ‘‘We have examined the charge an

find no error therein” (Appendix A, p. 7a). Of —

this conclusion inevitably follows from the prece -

holding that any one who knowingly and oe

participated in any way in the execution of 4 frav ;

ulent scheme was ipso facto a violator of the mal

fraud statute.”

REASONS FOR ALLOWING THE WRIT

1. The mail fraud statute prohibits using the —

“for the purpose of executing”’ a scheme to a

The mailing need only be ‘‘incident to an essentia pe

of the scheme’? and need not be contemplated by 1€

scheme nor essential to its execution, Pereira V.

United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8 (1954). It is ~-snenee

the statute, therefore, that a prosecution pager er

may, and usually does, center on a purely local : —

the perpetration of a private fraud. The noe nexus,

an incidental use of the mails, is often a casual happen-

stance.

16'The Court of Appeals made certain other he Al

: i sntions never advanced by peti ;

orted refutation of contentions neé -d

aitenae did not, of course, argue paseo Fg Agee er

i ae ‘‘eulpable under the s

iginators of the scheme’ can be eu nf

hameaiiie A, p. 3a) or that he ‘‘did not violate the sag

because he did not himself make the mail deposits sang 4 -

4a). Petitioner did argue below that his conviction coulc 7

“ affirmed on the ground that he was the principal viper e

did not originate the scheme and did not do or cause the mat “~*

Petitioner then went on to argue that for different ——s is

conviction should not be affirmed on the other two wen my :

of liability—aiding and abetting or the derivative lability

conspirator.

eh OSE eee

15

The court below, following the lead of a number of

other circuits, has extended this federal excursion into

the area of local crimes far beyond the bounds of the

statute and so as virtually to eliminate any demareca-

tion between federal and state jurisdiction in fraud

cases. This result follows from the court’s holding that

‘anyone who ‘knowingly and intentionally’ partici-

pates in the execution of the fraudulent scheme comes

within the prohibition of the [mail fraud] statute’’

(Appendix A, p. 3a). By this theory the statute ap-

plies, and it was so applied in this case, to an accessory

to a local fraud even though he is not an aider and

abettor of, or a co-conspirator in, the federal offense of

using the mails to execute the fraud. Under the court’s

theory, the mail fraud statute would also apply to such

other abettors of the local frauds in this case as the

lawyers’ runners and, in many instances, the claimants

whom the lawyers represented.

2. The court below based its holding on principles of

conspiracy law. Of course, a multi-party scheme to de-

fraud is obviously a conspiracy to defraud. And it is

settled that a conspirator is derivatively liable for sub-

stantive offenses committed by a co-conspirator in fur-

therance of and as part of the conspiracy. Pinkerton

v. United States, 382 U.S. 640 (1946).

There are, however, limitations on the application of

the Pinkerton doctrine, and these the court below jet-

tisoned. The doctrine can be used to affirm a conviction

only if the factual issues involved were submitted to

the jury. The Court said in Nye & Nissen v. United

States, 336 U.S. 613, 618 (1949) (emphasis supplied) :

“We held [in Pinkerton v. United States] that

a conspirator could be held guilty of the substan-

tive offense even though he did no more than join

the conspiracy, provided that the substantive of-

16

fense was committed in furtherance of the conspi-

racy and as part of it. A verdict on that theory

requires submission of those fact issues to the

jury.”

This prerequisite to Pinkerton was specifically held

applicable to mail fraud cases in Pereira v. United

States, supra. There the Court stated (347 U.S. at 10,

n. 1, emphasis supplied) :

The Government argues that Brading’s convie-

tion on the substantive offenses can be affirmed on

the basis of Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S.

640, 90 L. ed. 1489, 66 S. Ct. 1180, since the record

demonstrates that he conspired to defraud Mrs.

Joyce and the acts charged in the substantive

offenses were acts in furtherance of that design.

The Pinkerton case, however, is inapplicable here

since the jury was not instructed in terms of that

theory. Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S.

613, 93 L. ed. 919, 69 S. Ct. 766.

In the instant case, as we have seen, the jury was

not instructed in terms of the Pinkerton theory. More-

over, the evidence could not support a finding, essential

to invoking Pinkerton, that petitioner was a member

of a conspiracy to violate the mail fraud statute. As

Pereira pointed out (347 U.S. at 11): “The essence

of the conspiracy charge [in a mail fraud case] is an

agreement to use the mails to defraud .... In con-

trast, the scheme to defraud required for the sub-

stantive offense need not contemplate use of the mails.”’

See also Abbott v. United States, 239 F.2d 310, 314

(5th Cir. 1956). Petitioner was not a party to such

an agreement because it was of no consequence to him

whether the lawyer used the mails or other methods

to correspond with the insurance companies; the use

of the mails for the type of correspondence involved

was neither inevitable nor universal; and he did not

Met ot

ee

17

authorize, write or participate in the mail uses. See

ante, pp. 10-11. Cf, United States y. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401

(2d Cir. 1938).

It has become a commonplace in mail fraud eases for

courts of appeal to disregard the instructional prere-

quisite to the invocation of the Pinkerton doctrine, See

cases cited in the opinion below, Appendix A, pp. 3a-4a,

n. 4 and n. 5, conspicuously including United States v.

Joyce, 499 F.2d 9, 16-17 (7th Cir. 1974) ; United States

v. Wilson, 506 F.2d 1252, 1257 (7th Cir. 1974); and

Pritchard vy, United States, 386 F.2d 760, 764 ( Sth Cir

1967). It is important that this Court rectify this

spreading error at the earliest feasible occasion, and

that occasion is presented by this case.

3. The court below also distorted the principles gov-

erning the liability of aiders and abettors, and this dis-

tortion creates another avenue for an extraordinary ex-

tension of the mail fraud statute. ,

The evidence sustained a finding that petitioner aided

and abetted the frauds perpetrated by the lawyers."

'' Petitioner could not be a principal in the violations charged

for two reasons, nor did the court below hold that he was a

principal. Under the statute, the principal is the one who. having

devised a scheme to defraud, does or causes a mailing in execu-

tion of the scheme. As shown in our Statement of the Case the

record would not support a finding (1) that petitioner devised

the schemes or (2) that he did or caused the mailings alleg ad

in the indictment. The mailings were done or caused by ‘the guilty

lawyers. Pereira held that where a guilty person induces a mail-

ing by an innocent person, he causes the use of the ma‘'s. But

that principle does not apply where the mailing was done or

caused by a guilty person without the direction of the aceused

Pereira obviously did not intend to provide a novel basis of Tia-

bility for an aider and abettor, and Pereira itself used orthodox

aider and abettor principles when dealing with Percira’s accessory

Braden.

18

But it does not necessarily follow that thereby he aided

and abetted the mailings perpetrated by the lawyers in

execution of the fraud. This is shown by the discussion

in the majority and minority opinions in Pereira Vv.

l'nited States, supra, respecting Pereira’s co-defend-

ant, Brading. See also United States v. Greer, 467 F.2d

1064 (7th Cir. 1972), holding that the aider and abettor

of a theft was not ipso facto an accessory to the inter-

state transportation of the stolen property. For pe-

titioner to be an aider and abettor of the mail frauds,

he would have to have a ‘‘purposive attitude’’ toward

the illegal mailings; that is, he must have ‘‘wished to

bring about’’ the mailings. And the fact that the mail-

ing was a natural and probable consequence of his an-

tecedent participation in a local fraud would not be

enough to establish these prerequisites so long as he did

not know that the mails would actually be used in the

particular instance instead of some other method of

transmission and so long as the use of the mails was not

inevitable. Cf. United States v. Peoni, supra; United

States v. Greer, supra. For the same reasons that pe-

titioner was not a member of a conspiracy to violate

the mail fraud statute (ante, pp. 16-17), he was not an

aider and abettor of the violations.

The trial court’s instructions to the jury (ante, pp.

11-13) unmistakably authorized the return of a guilty

verdict on a finding that petitioner participated in, had

a purposive attitude toward, and sought to make sue-

ceed the fraud, so long as somebody else wilfully did or

caused a mailing in execution of the fraud. The in-

structions did not require, and the evidence would not

have permitted, a finding that petitioner had a pur-

posive attitude toward the use of the mails. By affirm-

ing this instruction the Court of Appeals approved an-

POM Re RIO SE Titel! CR as SON Es

19

other way of convicting an accused for violating the

mail fraud statute solely on the basis of an antecedent

participation in a local fraud.

CONCLUSION

Certiorari should be granted and the jud t

should be reversed. spigot

Respectfully submitted,

JOSEPH ForER

Forer & Rein

733 Fifteenth Street, N.W.

Washington, D. C. 20005

Attorneys for Petitioner

April, 1976

APPENDIX

shai dy SA ooh Sere arc si aia

la

APPENDIX A

Opinion Below

(Filed Jan. 30, 1976)

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 75-1435

Unrrep States or America, Appellee,

-versus-

Sruart Auten Perxar, Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

District of Maryland, at Baltimore. C. Stanley Blair,

District Judge.

Argued: December 1, 1975. Decided: Jan. 30, 1976

Before Russe.x, Fietp and Wmener, Circuii Judges.

Joseph Forer for Appellant; James M. Kramon, Special

Assistant United States Attorney (Jervis S, Finney,

United States Attorney, and Parker B. Smith, Assist-

ant United States Attorney, on brief) for Appellee.

Russet, Circuit Judge:

Convicted of violation of the federal mail fraud statute,'

and of aiding and abetting the violation thereof,” the de-

fendant has appealed. In essence, he contests the suffi-

ciency of the evidence. We find the evidence sufficient to

support the conviction and affirm, except for correction of

sentence, as hereinafter provided for.

118 U.S.C. § 1341 (1970).

218 U.S.C. § 2 (1970).

2a

The defendant does not deny the existence of a fraud-

ulent scheme and practice or his participation in it. It is

his contention on appeal that his connection with the scheme

was not such as to bring his conduct within the mail fraud

statute. The object of the scheme was the bilking of lia-

bility insurance carriers through the submission of inflated

and false claims of disability and medical expense on be-

half of personal injury claims arising out of automobile

accidents. These claims were used as a basis for making

settlements with the insurance carriers. Normally, it seems

to have been the practice in the Baltimore area to base such

settlements on a multiple of the medical bills as submitted.

Accordingly, by inflating the medical bills with statements

of fictitious or exaggerated services the parties to the

scheme inflated the settlement.

The execution of the scheme involved three parties: The

‘“runner’? who contacted the injured party and_ steered

him to either the doctor or the lawyer; the doctor who

examined the claimant, prepared a report of the claimant’s

alleged injuries and submitted a bill for medical Services ;

and the lawyer, who represented as attorney the claimant,

submitted to the insurance carriers the exaggerated med-

ical bills and reports, made scttlement on the basis of such

inflated bills and reports, and then divided the proceeds

among the claimants and the three parties to the scheme.

All the participants, including the defendant, depended on

the receipt of the settlement drafts for their profit from

the scheme and all, in their separate roles, were vital and

essential cogs in the conduct of the fraudulent scheme.

As we have already indicated, the defendant admits that

the scheme was a fraudulent one which fleeced the insu-

anee companies of substantial sums and furnished him in

turn with a handsome income, It is his contention, how-

ever, that despite his participation and profit from the

fraudulent scheme, he was immune from prosecution under

the mail fraud statute either as principal or as an aider and

abettor. We disagree.

oe ee ne

nen

3a

‘§ 1341, 18 U.S.C., declares that ‘‘{[W]hoever having de-

vised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to de-

fraud,’’ uses the mails ‘‘for the purpose of executing such

scheme or artifice’’ violates such statute. While conced-

ing that the elements of a mail fraud violation of the stat-

ute are (1) a fraudulent scheme and (2) the use e* the

mails in furtherance of that scheme,’ the defendant asserts

that the statute limits its application to “ [ W ]hoever, hav-

ing devised or intending to devise’’ the fraudulent scheme

and by so doing makes only the actual originator of the

scheme culpable under the statute. Assuming this con-

struction, he contends that the lawyer in the scheme in-

volved here, and not the defendant, was the obvieuas orig-

inator of the scheme. Under this theory, the defendant

even though an essential and active participant in the f rand.

ulent scheme, it is argued, would not be punishable under

the statute. Without deciding whether the record will

justify the defendant’s assumption that the lawyer was the

originator of the scheme, it is clear that the defendant’s

contention as to the scope of the statute is erroneous. It

has long been settled, contrary to the defendant’s construe-

tion of the statute, that anyone who ‘‘knowingly and in-

tentionally’’ participates in the execution of the fraudulent

scheme comes within the prohibition of the statute* and

this is true whether the indictment charges a conspiracy or

*United States v. Grow (4th Cir. 1968) 394 P2 —

cert. denied 393 U.S. 840 (1968). ) 2d 182, 205,

* United States v. Wilson (7th Cir. 1974) 506 F.2d 1252. 1257:

U nited States v. Joyce (7th Cir. 1974) 499 F.2d 9 16-17 cort.

denied 419 U.S. 1031 (1974); Pritchard y. United States (8th

Cir. 1967) 386 F.2d 760, 764, eert. denied 390 U.S. 1004 (1968) ;

Babson v. United States (9th Cir. 1964) 330 F.2d 662. 665 cert.

denied 377 US. 993 (1964) ; Issacs v. United States (8th Cir, 1962)

301 F.2d 706, 726, cert. denied 371 U.S. 818 (1962) ; United States

v. Dukow (W.D. Pa. 1971) 330 F. Supp. 360, 364, aff. 465 F.2d

688; Utd States v. Schall (W.D. Pa. 1974) 371 F. Supp. 912

928, aff. 503 F.2d 1400, cert. denied 420 U.S. 9! 4), reh. den.

481 US. 978 (1975). 20 U.S. 993 (1974), reh. den.

4a

not.» This is made plain in Reistroffer v. United States

(Sth Cir. 1958) 258 F.2d 379, 395, cert. denied 308 U.S. 927

(1959), reh. denied 361 U.S. 856 (1959), and has often

been reiterated in subsequent cases. In answering an argu-

ment similar to that advanced by the defendant, the Court

in Reistroffer said:

‘The members of this Court are unanimously of the

opinion that the evidence adduced against defendant

Norris was sufficient to constitute a prima facie case

and to support the verdict and judgment against him.

If believed, it established that the gist of the scheme to

defraud was brought to his knowledge and that he

joined in with the principal schemers to accomplish

their purposes. It is not necessary for the govern-

ment to prove that he was one of those who originally

devised the scheme. When he joined in the selling and

the misrepresentations and deceptions, although in

comparatively few instances, he brought himself with-

in the provisions of the statute.”

The defendant urges that, though he may have been a

participant in the scheme, he did not place in any post

office or authorized depository for mail matter the fraud-

ulent doctors’ bills and reports in execution of the scheme

and thus did not violate the statute. However, it was o-

elared years ago by Judge Learned Hand the terms ‘* place

- United States vy. Grow, supra, 394 F.2d at 203; United States

v. Wilson, supra, 506 F.2d at 1257; United States v. Joyce, supra,

499 F.2d at 17.

In United States v. Wilson, supra, the Court said:

“Tt is not essential that the indictment contain a separate

count charging conspiracy in order to take advantage 0: the

doctrines peculiar to conspiracy.”

Again, in United States v. Joyce, supre it 1s stated :

<#* * * We therefore have no hesitation in joining at least

six other circuits in applying conspiracy principles to a

multi-member mail fraud scheme. The nature of .~ —.

activity is the same whether or not a conspiracy is charged.

See! ee

4

.

j

i eee

da

and ‘‘cause to be placed’’ in the statute did not mean that

a defendant, to violate the statute, must personally deposit

the critical matter in the mails or ‘‘must specifically au-

thorize its deposit, it is enough if he knows that in the exe-

cution of the scheme letters are likely to be mailed, and if

in fact they are mailed.’’ United States v. Cohen (2d Cir.

1944) 145 F.2d 82, 90, cert. denied 323 U.S. 799 (1944).

This construction has recently been restated in United

States v. Shepherd (5th Cir, 1975) 511 F.2d 119, 121, where

the Court said that ‘‘it is not necessary that the defendant

himself place the matter into a mail depository, only that

he have a reasonable basis to foresee that the mails will be

used ;’’ it is, also, in conformity with the rulings of the

Supreme Court in both Pereira v. United States ( 1954) 347

U.S. 1, 8-9, and United States v. Maze (1974) 414 U.S.

395, 399.

There was testimony in this case from a lawyer associated

in the scheme with the defendant to the effect that the de-

fendant’s purpose in submitting to him [the lawyer] the

bills and reports was ‘‘so I could mail them to the insurance

companies to discuss settlement.’? It cannot be gain said,

in the light of this testimony, that the defendant knew that

the fraudulent bills and reports were likely to be mailed

and that the use of the mails in the submission of those

bills and reports could ‘‘reasonably be foreseen.’’* It is

of no moment that in some instances other than those in-

cluded in the separate counts of the indictment the bills

may have been handed directly to the insurance adjuster

and not mailed or that, as the defendant argues, all the

bills and reports could have been so handed without the

use of the mails. The fact of the matter is that the mails

were normally used in the execution of the scheme and

were admittedly used in all the cases specified in the indict-

ment. That is sufficient to bring ‘‘the activity in question

within federal criminal jurisdiction.’’ See United States

® See United States v. Maze, supra, 414 U.S. at 399.

6a

v. Flaxman (7th Cir. 1974) 495 F.2d 344, 348, cert. denied

419 U.S. 1031 (1974).

Of course, it is true, that the mailings must be ‘‘suffi-

ciently closely related’’* to, or ‘‘inecident to an essential

part of the scheme’’ * in order to bring the case within the

statute. But there can be no question in this case that the

mailings were crucial to the execution of the fraud. The

material ineluded in the mailings represented the essential

basis on which the parties rested their fraudulent claim

and ‘‘played a significant part in enabling the defendant’’

and his fellow participants to execute their scheme.” The

mailings preceded and were essential to the true object of

the scheme, i.e., the settlement of the inflated claim. As the

Court said in United States v. Kenofskey (1917) 243 US.

440, 443, when these mailings were made, ‘*{T]he most vital

element in the transaction * * * remained yet to become

an actuality, i.e., the payment and receipt of the money.’’

This case is quite different from Kann v. United States

(1944) 323 U.S. 88, Parr v. United States (1960) 363 U.S.

970 and United States v. Maze, supra, in which the mail-

ings occurred after the object of the fraud had been ac-

complished and were ‘‘irrelevant to the scheme.’’ See

United States v. Kelem (9th Cir. 1969) 416 F.2d 346, 349-

50, 9 A.L.R. Fed. 885, 890-1, cert. denied 397 U.S. 952

(1969) ; United States v. Sampson (1962) 371 U.S. 75, 80.

Factually, this case is similar to United States v. Reicin

(7th Cir. 1974) 497 F.2d 563, at 565, cert. denied 419 US.

996 (1974) and United States v. Sternback (7th Cir. 1968)

402 F.2d 353, cert. denied 393 U.S. 1082 (1968). Like the

situation here, both of those cases involved schemes, par-

ticipated in by lawyers and doctors, ‘‘to defraud insurance

and other companies in personal injury cases by preparing

7 United States v. Maze, supra, 414 US. at 399.

8 Pereira ¥. United States, supra, 347 U.S. at 8.

® See United States v. Mace, supra, 414 U.S. at 401.

© Ewe a ah eR ett aie

7a

and submitting false and exaggerated medical reports and

bills i ti © In Sternback, it was the doctor whe had

been indicted and convicted under the mail fraud warare

and in Reicin, it was the lawyer. The defendant would dis-

tinguish Sternback because, as he contends, the lawyer wh

submitted the bills there was an innocent ntoareagd ‘the

scheme, whereas, in this case, the lawyer was an to a

knowing participant. We do not read Sternback as sue-

gesting-that the lawyer who submitted the bills was on in

nocent participant in the scheme; indeed. we think the CO

trary to be the necessary inference from the opinion Tn

any event, we do not see why the fact that both the law er

and the doctor in this case were knowing partici sung

the fraudulent scheme should provide in Gectaptiendions

with immunity. So far as Reicin is concerned. the defend

ant dismisses it as disclosing ‘‘no perceptible velovene od

the issues in this case,’’ even though it involved a recs

tion of one of the participants in a scheme similar in ove '

respect to that presented by the facts in this ease. al

The defendant, also, claims error in the trial court’s in-

struction. We have examined the charge and find no eveer

therein. There is, however, merit in his contention that

certain of the counts in the indictment, on which the de-

fendant was convicted, ‘‘merged because of there being only

one mailing.’’ In fact, the Government concedes tind

as to counts 16, 17, and 18, counts 24 and 26, counts 25 and

27, counts 28 and 29, counts 32 and 34 and counts 42 and

44. In addition, counsel for the defendant takes the posi-

tion that counts 30 and 31 and counts 33 and 35 merged

because they concerned one and the same mailing. This

additional claim of the defendant presents no contest be-

tween the parties on the applicable legal principle ; the par-

497 F.2d at 565.

, See, also, United States v. Bornstcin (7th Cir. 1971) 447 F.2a

sor Ag denied 404 U.S. 851 (1971), which involved a scheme

etween an automobile garageman and an insurance adjuster to

defraud the insurance carrier by inflated repair bills.

le ceed eel

Sa

ties agree as to this. Their difference principally is a fac-

tual one and the District Court is in better position to re-

solve that factual issue than we are. We accordingly re-

mand the cause to the District Court for correction of the

judgment and sentence, and appropriate remission of fines

so as to give effect to the merger of such counts of the

‘ndictment as covered one and the same mailing as agreed

on by the parties and for resolution of the issue whether

there was a merger of counts 30 and 31, and counts 33 and

35. Except for remand for this purpose, the judgment of

conviction is affirmed.

Spat ne Re Daath, AID ih haa ee A as

en ee ee eee ee

9a

APPENDIX B

Judgment Below

UNI if r

TED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 75-1435

(Filed January 30, 1976)

Unirep Sra

TATES OF AmeERicA, Appellee,

vs.

STUART J IN PER

RT ALLEN Perkat, Appellant.

Judgment

Appeal from the United S 5 tent

PP | t

District of Maryland. ates District Court for the

Thi

8 cause came on to be heard on the record from the

United States District C

ourt for the Distri j

and was argued by counsel. f e District of Maryland,

PP Pane anprig whereof, It is now here ordered and

pa ay | 118 “igs that the judgment of the said Dis-

is hereby > i aa say ae cause, be, and the same

rere Acer . he case is remanded to the United

Relelenene ourt for the District of Maryland, at

cael dee r correction of the judgment and sentence

nsistent with the opinion of this Court filed hencotth ’

/s/ Wittt1aM K, Starr, II

Clerk

A TESS

10a

APPENDIX C

Order Denying Rehearing

No. 75-1435

(Filed March 1, 1976)

Uxitep StaTES OF AMERICA, Appellee,

—versus—

SruarT ALLEN PERKAL, Appellant.

Order

r active service having requested a

wring en bane is denied.

etition for rehearing

No judge in regula

poll of the court, reheé

1 has considered the P

n it is without merit.

nee of Judge Field and Judge

The pane

and is of opin1o

With the concurre

For the Court:

‘'s3/ DONALD RvussELL

United States Circuit Judge

Widener.

lla

APPENDIX D

This Appendix groups the indictment transactions by

the accidents. Each accident is given an arbitrary letter.

There is shown the relevant counts, the lawyer involved,

the insurance company and the exhibit number for its

pertinent file, the personal injury claimant, and the tran-

script reference to the beginning of the claimant’s testi-

mony. , The insusance company files contain the docu-

ments which were mailed as alleged in the indictment.

Accident A

Counts 1 and 2. Lawyer, Stanley J. Bomstein

Insurance Co. file, G. Ex. 18 (Nationwide).

Claimants, Madeline Giles, 5 Tr. 149; Eugene Evans, 6

Tr. 12.

Accident B

Counts 3 and 4. Lawyer, Bomstein

Insurance Co. file, G. Ex. 19 (Nationwide).

Claimant, Muriel Campbell, Jr., 6 Tr. 136.

Accident C

Count 5. Lawyer, Bomstein

Insurance Co. file, G. Ex. 2 (Allstate).

Claimants, Nellie Smith, 5 Tr. 172; Larry Smith, 6 Tr. 36.

Accident D

Count 6. Lawyer, Bomstein

Insurance Co. file, G. Ex. 3 (Allstate).

Claimants, Pauline Brown, 6 Tr. 54; James Browne, 6

Tr. 89.

12a

Accident E

Counts 7 and 8. Lawyer, Bomstein

Insurance Co. file, G. ios. 4 (Geico).

Claimant, Stanley Smith, 5 Tr. 63.

Accident F

Counts 20 and 21.

Insurance Co. file, G. Fix. 20 (Nationwide).

Lawyer, Bomstein

Claimants, Luther Wagner, 5 Tr. 38; Colleen Hack, 5 Tr.

132.

Accident G

Counts 39 and 40.

Insurance Co. file, G. Ex. 7 (Geico).

Lawyer, Bomstein

Claimant, Lee Davis, did not testify.

Accident H

Counts 41, 42 (merged with 44), 43.

Insurance Co. files, G. Ex. 8 (Criterion), G. Ex. 21 (Na-

tionwide).

Claimant, Floyd M ack, 3A Tr. 142.

Accident I

Lawyer, Bomstein

Counts 45 and 46.

Insurance Co. file, G. Ex. 1 (Md. Blue Cross & Blue Shield).

Claimant, Michael F. Paul, 6 Tr. 72.

Accident J

Count 16 (merged with 17 and 18).

Lawyer, Bomstem

Lawyer,

Bernard Reamer

Insurance Co. file, G. Ex. 15 (State Farm).

Claimants, Gregory Oliver, 5 Tr. 216; Roddie Wood, 5 Tr.

286; Richard Gordon, 6 Tr. 2.

13a

Accident K

Count 19.

Lawyer, Bernard Reamer

nsurance Co. file, G. Ex. 16 (State Farm)

Claimant, Nora Brown, 6 Tr. 205.

Accident L

Counts Z

s 22 and 23. Lawyer, Bernard Reamer

Insurance Co. file, G. Ex. 10 (Aetna)

Claimants, Lucille F

4 ille Harp, 5 Tr. 193; James Harp, 5 Tr

Accident M

Counts 32 (merged with 34), 33 (merged with 35)

Lawyer, Bernard Reamer

Insurance Co. file, G. Ex. 5 (Geico).

Claimants, Tvrone Jenki

-. 7 : ns, 3 Tr. 88; Ruby -_ ™

Tr, 103; Bryant Waller, 6 Tr. 112. saieiiieniieda

Accident N

C (

ounts 9, 10, 11, 13. Lawyer, Howard Reamer

Insurance Co. files, G. E

raed , G. Ex. 9 (Aetna), G. Ex. 22 (Royal

Claimants, Irving Owens

ee ee ee es SNe ee

Accident O

Counts 4

s 47 and 48. Lawyer, Morris S. Berman

Insurance Co. file, G. Ex. 13 (Aetna)

Claimant, Gilland McGuire, 5 Tr. 245.

l4a

Accident P

Counts 24 (merged with 26), 25 (merged with 27), 28

(merged with 29), 30 (merged with 31).

Lawyer, Maurice Siegel

Insurance Co. files, G. Ex. 11 (Aetna), G. Ex. 17 (State

Farm).

Claimants, Vera Palmer, 6 Tr. 222; Muriel Young, 6 Tr.

186.

Accident Q

Counts 14 and 15. Lawyer, Joseph Askin

Insurance Co. file, G. Ex. 14 (State Farm).

Claimant, Ella Cunningham, 6 Tr. 239.

Accident R

Counts 36 and 37. Attorney, Richard Butler

Insurance Co, files, G. Ex. 6 (Geico), G. Mx, 12 (Aetna).

Claimant, James C. Hill, 6 Tr. 155.