Opposition — Pitt River Tribe of Indians v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.

Service of the within and receipt of a copy

thereof is hereby admitted this

of April, A.D. 1976.

day

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y =: Bupreme Court, U. & |.

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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States, soos 1, ccm

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RIL E D& sy

APR Se IGE

mn: ney a

October Term, 1975

No. 75-1286

Pirt RIVER TRIBE OF INDIANS,

Petitioner,

vs.

PaciFic GAs AND ELECTRIC COMPANY, et al.,

Respondents.

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION

FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI.

Puitip M. BATTAGLIA,

811 West 7th Street, 10th Floor,

Los Angeles. Calif. 90017,

Attorney for Respondent

The Hearst Corporation.

FiintT & MAcKay,

Of Counsel,

Parker & Son, Inc., Law Printers, Los Angeles. Phone 724-6622

SUBJECT INDEX

I Page

Statement of the Case .....................0.0cccc.0.05000000-000. J

Il

IIIT cscnstdccotntiastaceuheasateionnnincosmmmanmnnimennetess 3

A. Petitioner Has Exhibited No Important

Question of Federal Law, as This Court Has

Held That Indian Right of Occupancy Has

Been Extinguished by Failure to Comply

With the Private Land Claims Act of 1851

ae BR Sts Pt tae een CANT TER Fe TY OO 3

B. The Issues Sought to Be Raised by Petitioner

Herein Present Political and Nonjusticiable

IE civnuscuninbbaceions sielasiuthadihaesiuaiadoaniaibdsaunebraiais 7

C. Petitioner Cannot Claim Any Right or In-

terest in the Subject Real Property Under the

oe ee Be eS eee 8

D. Petitioner Has No Standing to Attack Pat-

ents Issued to Respondent's Predecessors .... 11

Conclusion ........ sceshcesheitointilndeianid dutelecetemesinnieniiapichipetinin 12

APPENDIX

Act of June 2, 1862, Chap. 94 .................... App. p. |

Indians of California. 25 U.S.C. .....00.0000 l

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

Cases Page

Barker v. Harvey, 181 U.S. 481 (1901) ..3, 4, 5, 6,

Bohall v. Dilla (1884) 114 U.S. 47 oo...

Burke v. Southern Pacific R.R. Co. (1913) 234

en oe ee

Cramer v. U.S, (1923) 261 U.S. 219 ........ ~~ © !

Johnson v. M’Intosh, 8 Wheat. 586 ......... cecal

Lee v. Johnson (1885) 116 U.S. 48 0.

Sierra Investment Corp. v. County of Sacramento

(1967) 252 Cal. App. 2d 339.0000.

Super v. Work, 3 F.2d 90 (1925) 000... 6,

Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272..

Thompson v. Los Angeles Farming and Mill Co.,

DP Fe CUD cciecncticiaseieetcnicisacisnenicdaceinc 3,

United States v. Santa Fe Pacific Railroad Com-

pany, 314 U.S. 399 (1941) oo. 7,

United States v. Title Insurance and Trust Company,

205 US. 472 (1924) .....................3, 4 3, €,

Statute

Pxvate Land Claims Act of 1851 (9 Stat. 631)

sehleialeanenbadesetteaseatinaniammnelledadataaiedeaaiisten oe i em |

7

10

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1975

No. 75-1286

PiTT RIVER TRIBE OF INDIANS,

Petitioner,

vs.

PaciFic GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY, ef al.,

Respondents.

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION

FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI.

To the Honorable Chief Justice and Associate Justices

of the Supreme Court of the United States:

Respondent The Hearst Corporation respectfully sub-

mits the following brief in opposition to the within

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari:

I

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

The current Complaint herein, the Second Amended

Complaint, was filed on behalf of a legally undefined

entity, the Pitt River Tribe of Indians, and essentially

sought the recovery of vast areas of certain real property

located in the State of California, including property

to which title has rested in The Hearst Corporation

for decades. Other private corporations, also owning

real property in the same area, were made parties

= we

to this matter by the filing of substantially identical!

complaints.

The current pleading against The Hearst Corporation

contains fourteen purported causes of action, most

of which are based upon a claim that the Pitt River

Tribe of Indians retained somé right of permanent

occupancy in California lands. Petitioner now estimates

this to be a total of 3% million acres, of which

at least 500,000 acres are directly involved in this

action (Pet., p. 8). Other than the ninth and tenth

purported ,causes of action, petitioner no longer asserts

any cause of action not based on an alleged right

of occupancy. The ninth cause of action seeks to

attack patents on land issued to respondent’s prede-

cessors, while the tenth cause of action alleges a right

in land “under the principle enunciated in Cramer

v. United States, 261 U.S. 219.”

The trial court ruled on general and special demurrers

filed by The Hearst Corporation and the other respond-

ents herein that any right of tribal occupancy had

been extinguished by petitioner’s failure to comply

with the Private Land Claims Act of 1851 (9 Stati.

631) (hereinafter referred to as the “Act of

1851”). The court also ruled that each cause of action

was barred by applicable California statutes of limita-

tions, by laches, and by the fact that prior proceedings

by the petitioner before the Indian Claims Commission

were res judicata, thereby preventing recovery herein.

The trial court further found that the matters asserted

in the current pleading were nonjusticiable, and there-

fore subject only to legislative action.

On appeal, the California Court of Appeal affirmed,

specifically holding that any asserted right to tribal

occupancy had been extinguished by petitioner's failure

a

to comply with the Act of 1851 (Pet. App. C, pp.

C-7, 8), and that the petitioner’s ninth and tenth

causes of action were deficient (Pet. App. C, pp. C-

8-13). The California Supreme Court denied petitioner's

petition for a hearing by that court.

Il

ARGUMENT.

A. Petitioner Has Exhibited No Important Question of

Federal Law, as This Court Has Held That Indian

Right of Occupancy Has Been Extinguished by

Failure to Comply With the Private Land Claims

Act of 1851.

The judgment of the California Court of Appeal

is properly based upon the law establishing the extin-

guishment of Indian title claims in California as clearly

enunciated by this Court in Barker v. Harvey, 181

U.S. 481 (1901), and in United States v. Title Insur-

ance and Trust Company, 265 U.S. 472 (1924).

In Barker v. Harvey, this Court was presented with

a factual situation in which plaintiffs claimed title

by virtue of a patent confirmed by the Mexican govern-

ment. Defendants, so-called “Mission Indians,” claimed

as a defense a right of permanent occupancy by virtue

of alleged occupation of the premises prior to the

Mexican grant and before any dominion was acquired

by Mexico over the territory.

In discussing the purpose and intent of the Act

of 1851, this Court cited with approval the following

language in Thompson v. Los Angeles Farming and

Mill Co., 180 U.S. 72 (1901):

“Every question which could arise on the title

claimed could come to and receive judgment from

this court. The scheme of adjudication was made

—

a

complete and ali the purposes of an act to give

repose to titles were accomplished. And it was

certainly the purpose of the act of 1851 to give

repose to titles. It was enacted not only to fulfill

our treaty obligations to individuals, but to settle

and define what portion of the acquired territory

was public domain. It not only permitted but

required all claims to be presented to the board,

and barred all from future assertion which were

not presented within two years after the date

of the act.” 180 U.S. 77.

In rejecting any right to title in the “Mission Indians,”

this Court in Barker stated as follows:

“If these Indians had any claims founded on

the actions of the Mexican government they aban-

doned them by not presenting them to the commis-

sion for consideration, and they could not, there-

fore, . . . ‘resist successfully any action of the

government in disposing of the property.’ If it

be said that the Indians do not claim the fee,

but only the right of occupation, and therefore

they do not come within the provision of Section

8 as persons ‘claiming land in California by virtue

of any right or title derived from the Spanish

or Mexican government,’ it may be replied that

a claim of a right to permanent occupancy of

land is one of far-reaching effect, and it could

not well be said that lands which were burdened

with a right of permanent occupancy were a part

of the public domain and subject to the full

disposal of the United States.” 181 U.S. 491.

—

with a suit by the United States as guardian to the

“Mission Indians” to quiet in them a “perpetual right”

to occupy. use, and enjoy part of a confirmed Mexican

land grant in California, for which defendants held

a patent from the United States. The Indians never

presented a claim pursuant to the Act of 1851 to

the Commission, nor did the United States do so

for them. The Court discussed at some length its

opinion rendered in Barker, and noted the following

with respect to that decision:

“This court, after observing that, under the treaty

with Mexico and the rules of international law,

the United States was bound to respect the rights

of private property in the ceded territory, said

there could be no doubt of the power of the

United States, consistently with such obligation,

to provide reasonable means for determining the

validity of all titles within the ceded territory,

to require all claims to lands therein to be pre-

sented for examination, and to declare that all

not presented should be regarded as abandoned.”

265 U.S. 483.

This Court in Title Insurance determined that the

decision in Barker “has become a rule of property,”

stating in relevant part as follows:

“The question whether the decision | Barker] shall

be followed here or overruled admits of but one

answer. The decision was given twenty-three years

ago, and affected many tracts of land in California,

particularly in the southern part of the state.

In the meantime there has been a continuous

In United States v. Title Insurance and Trust Com-

pany, 265 U.S. 472 (1924), this Court was presented

growth and development in that section, land

values have enhanced, and there have been many

transfers. Naturally there has been reliance on

_ =

the decision. The defendants in this case purchased

fifteen years after it was made. It has become

a rule of property, and to disturb it now would

be fraught with any injurious results. Besides.

the government and the scattered Mission Indians

have adjusted their situation to it in several in-

stances. As long ago as Minnesota Min. Co. v.

National Min. Co. 3 Wall. 332, 18 L.ed. 42,

this court said (p. 334): ‘Where questions arise

which affect titles to land it is of great importance

to the public that when they are once decided

they should no longer be considered open. Such

decisions become rules of property, and many

titles may be injuriously affected by their change.

Legislatures may alter or change their lives, without

injury, as they affect the future only; but where

courts vacillate and overrule their own decisions

on the construction of statutes affecting the title

to real property, their decisions are retrospective,

and may affect titles purchased on the faith of

their stability. Doubtful questions on subjects of

this nature, when once decided, should be con-

sidered no longer doubtful or subject to change.”

265 U.S. 486.

Similarly, in the case of Super v. Work, 3 F.2d

90 (1925). the rights of Indians asserted in that

matter differed from those in Barker, supra, and Title

Insurance, supra, “only to the extent that in those

cases they were Mission Indians, while in the present

case, at and prior to the cession by Mexico, the

plaintiff Indians were merely roving bands” (3 F.2d

91). The Court of Appeals in Su»er concluded that

the failure of the Indians to present their claims pursuant

to the procedure of the Act of 1851 at the proper

= =

time resulted in fatal abandonment of any right in

said property, and this Court affirmed per curiam,

citing both Barker and Title Insurance.

Accordingly, any question on the subject of extin-

guishment of Indian title has been decided long ago

by this Court and petitioner cannot now ask to disturb

the holding of those cases.

B. The Issues Sought to Be Raised by Petitioner Herein

Present Political and Nonjusticiable Issues.

The issues sought to be raised by petitioner herein

are solely within the jurisdiction and purview of the

legislative branch and are not reviewable by the courts.

The issue of aboriginal or Indian title is a question

uniquely within the province of Congress and not

open to review by the courts. The extinguishment

of Indian title has been repeatedly siated to be a

political and nonjusticiable issue. The rule was first

stated by Chief Justice Marshall in the case of Johnson

v. M’Intosh, 8 Wheat. 586:

“The exclusive right of the United States to ex-

tinguish Indian title has never been doubted. And

whether it be done by treaty, by the sword, by

purchase, by the exercise of complete dominion

adverse to the rights of occupancy, or otherwise,

its justness is not open to inquiry in the courts.”

Similarly, this Court in the case of United States

v. Santa Fe Pacific Railroad Company, 314 U.S. 399

(1941) stated as follows at page 347:

“Extinguishment of Indian title based on aborig-

inal possession is of course a different matter.

The power of Congress in that regard is supreme.

The manner, method and time of such extinguish-

oie

ment raise political not justiciable issues (cita-

tions omitted).” See also, Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v.

United States, 348 U.S. 272.

Finally, the court in Super v. Work, supra, 3 F.2d

90 (1925), stated as follows:

“Congress at all times exercises plenary authority

over the tribal relations of Indians. The power

thus exercised is in its nature political, and not

judicial. It has accordingly been held not to be

subject to the control of the judicial department

of the government. The power of Congress is

so absolute that it may abrogate even the pro-

visions of an Indian treaty, which authority arises

from its paramount power over the property of

Indians by reason of its exercise of guardianship.

Congress may in the exercise of this power de-

termine the rights of Indians to the occupancy

of lands, and, if injury oecurs, the relief must

ye sought from Congress, and not from the courts.

(citation omitted ).” 3 F.2d 91.

Accordingly, the issues raised regarding “Indian title”,

Constitutional violations, and petitioner’s request for

an “evidentiary hearing” are not capable of judicial

remedy, bvt are rather political questions to be enter-

tained by the legislative branch, if at all.

C. Petitioner Cannot Claim Any Right or Interest

in the Subject Real Property Under the Decision in

Cramer v. U.S.

Petitioner has contended throughout the appellate

proceedings, and in its petition herein, that the decision

in Cramer v. U.S. (1923) 261 U.S. 219, affords some

basis of relief. Such an interpretation of Cramer is

—_ wa

a total misapplication of the case, as there is no similar-

ity whatsoever between the allegations contained in

Petitioner's Second Amended Complaint and the facts

upon which the Cramer decision is based.

Specifically, Cramer was a suit originally brought

by the United States Government, acting in behalf

of certain Northern California Indians, to cancel a

land patent issued to defendants’ predecessor. The pat-

ent was issued in 1866, but it excepted from the

grant such land as “shall be found to have been granted,

sold, reserved, occupied by homestead settlers, pre-

empted or otherwise disposed of.” The Indians were

found to have occupied the iand in question continuous-

ly since before 1859. They had fenced 150-175 acres,

a portion of which was irrigated and cultivated. In

addition, they had constructed dwellings on the land.

This Court in Cramer allowed these individual In-

dians to retain possession of public lands against the

claimant. on the basis of the foregoing facts, as well

as a conclusion that the Act of 1851 did not bar

those particular Indians’ rights because their claims

were not derived from the Spanish or Mexican Govern-

ments and “moreover it does not appear that these

Indians were occupying the lands in question when

the Act was passed.” (261 U.S. at 231). Their occupa-

tion of the land was in the nature of homesteading,

but because the homestead privilege was not extended

to Indians until the Act of March 3, 1875 and the

Indians in Cramer settled on the land in about 1859,

this Court based its findings on a basic federal policy

to respect the Indian right of occupancy, and stated

as follows:

“The action of these individual Indians in aban-

doning their nomadic habits and attaching them-

=— =

selves to a definite locality, reclaiming, cultivating,

and improving the soil and establishing fixed homes

thereon, was in harmony with the well-understood

desire of the government which we have mentioned.

To hold that, by so doing, they acquired no posses-

sory rights to which the government would accord

protection, would be contrary to the whole spirit

of the traditional American policy toward these

dependent wards of the nation” 261 U.S. 228-

229.

This Court held that the Indians had a right only

to the land which was actually enclosed, and that

this right did not extend beyond the limits of actual

occupancy. Such a decision, and the basis on which

the decision rests as discussed above, gives no support

whatsoever to any claim of a right to the property

which is the subject of this lawsuit by petitioner.

In this action, the United States is not a party,

petitioner did reside on the land they now seek at

the time of the Act of 1851, and that Act did apply

to petitioner. In this action, there was no allegation

of facts establishing a right similar to that of home-

steading in that petitioner did not allege ownership,

occupancy, or a description of specific property which

it claims, did not allege fencing of any particular

area, or that there was any cultivation or irrigation

of the property, or that dwellings were placed upon

the property. It should furthermore be noted that in

Cramer this Court only allowed a right of occupancy

as to that portion of the property which was continu-

ously, openly and observably possessed by the Indians

subsequent to the Act of 1851. It is clear that the

Cramer decision is no support for any right or interest

asserted by petitioner in this action.

pom;

The operative allegations of petitioner’s tenth cause

of action regarding the so-called “Cramer theory” merely

alleges that,

“After March 3, 1853, while Pitt River land was

part of the public domain plaintiff occupied it

and acquired title under principle enunciated in

Cramer v. United States, 261 U.S. 219.” (Pet.

App. A, pp. A-7, 8).

Under California law, Petitioner is presumed to have

pleaded its strongest possible case (Sierra Investment

Corp. v. County of Sacramento (1967) 252 Cal. App.

Zd 339, 341). and it is submitted that the California

Court of Appeal was clearly correct in finding this

allegation to be insufficient as a mere conclusion of

law (Pet. App. C, p. C-12).

D. Petitioner Has No Standing to Attack Patents Is-

sued to Respondent’s Predecessors.

In its purported ninth cause of action, petitioner

sought to challenge patents issued to respondent’s prede-

cessors. It is established that, even if there may have

been error in the issuance of a patent, a stranger

with no interest in the land cannot maintain an action

to challenge the patent (Burke v. Southern Pacific

R.R. Co. (1913) 234 U.S. 669, 692-693: Lee v.

Johnson (1885) 116 U.S. 48, 49-50; Bohall v. Dilla

(1884) 114 U.S. 47, 50-51). Petitioner did not allege

title to, ownership of, or any other right in the land

prior to the issuance of the patents which it sought

to challenge. Regardless. in view of the decisions of

this Court discussed above, it could not have done

so. Accordingly, it had no standing to challenge the

patents, and none of the cases cited by petitioner

is to the contrary.

— =

Conclusion.

For the foregoing reasons it is respectfully submitted

that the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari should be

denied.

Dated: April 19, 1976.

Respectfully submitted,

Puriip M. BATTAGLIA,

Attorney for Respondent

The Hearst Corporation.

FLiInt & MAcCKay,

Of Counsel.

APPENDIX.

Act of June 2, 1862, Chap. 94.

“Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Repre-

sentatives of the United States of America in Congress

assembled, That all the lands belonging to the United

States to which the Indian title has been or shall

be extinguished shall be subject to the operations of

the preemption act of the fourth of September, eighteen

hundred and forty-one, and under the conditions, re-

strictions, and stipulation; therein mentioned: Provided,

however, That when unsurveyed lands are claimed

by preemption, notice of the specific tracts claimed

shall be filed within six months after the survey has

been made in the field; and on failure to file such

notice, or to pay for the tract claimed within twelve

months from the filing of such notice, the parties

claiming such lands shail forfeit all right thereto, pro-

vided said notices may be filed with the Surveyor

General, and to be noted by him on the township

plats, until other arrangements have been made by

law for that purpose.”

indians of California

25 U.S.C.

§$ 651. Definitions

For the purposes of sections 651-657 of this title

the Indians of California shall be defined to be all

Indians who were residing in the State of California

on June 1, 1852, and their descendants now living

in said State. May 18, 1928, c. 624, § 1, 45 Stat. 602.

nalts

§ 652. Claims against United States for appropriated

lands; submission to Court of Claims; appeal;

grounds for relief

All claims of whatsoever nature the Indians of Cali-

fornia as defined in section 651 of this title may

have against the United States by reason of lands

taken from them in the State of California by the

United States without compensation, or for the failure

or refusal of the United States to compensate them

for their interest in lands in said State which the

United States appropriated to its own purposes without

the consent of said Indians, may be submitted to

the Court of Claims by the attorney general of the

State of California acting for and on behalf of said

Indians for determination of the equitable amount due

said Indians from the United States: and jurisdiction

is conferred upon the Court of Claims of the United

States, with the right of either party to appeal to

the Supreme Court of the United States, to hear and

determine all such equitable claims of said Indians

against the United States and to render final decree

thereon.

It is declared that the loss to the said Indians

on account of their failure to secure the lands and

compensation provided for in the eighteen unratified

treaties is sufficient ground for ‘equitable relief. May

18, 1928, c. 624, § 2, 45 Stat. 602.

$ 653. Statutes of limitations unavailable against

claims; amount of decree; set-off

If any claim or claims be submitted to said courts,

they shall! settle the equitable rights therein, notwith-

standing lapse of time or statutes of limitation or

the fact that the said claim or claims have not been

entices

presented to any other tribunal, including the com-

mission created by the Act of March 3, 1851 (Ninth

Statutes at Large, page 631): Provided, That any

decree for said Indians shall be for an amount equal

to the just value of the compensation provided or

proposed for the Indians in those certain eighteen

unratified treaties executed by the chiefs and head

men of the several tribes and bands of Indians of

California and submitted to the Senate of the United

States by the President of the United States for ratifica-

tion on the Ist day of June, 1852, including thie

lands described therein at $1.25 per acre. Any payment

which may have been made by the United States

or moneys heretofore or hereafter expended to date

of award for the benefit of the Indians of California,

made under specific appropriations for the support,

education, health, and civilization of Indians in Cali-

fornia, including purchases of land, shall not be pieaded

as an estoppel but may be picaded by way of set-

off. May 18, 1928, c. 624, § 3, 45 Stat. 602.

§ 658. Distribution of $150 from fund to each enrolled

Indian

Notwithstanding the provisions of section 656 of

this title, the Secretary of the Interior, under such

regulations as he may prescribe, is hereby authorized

and directed to distribute per capita the sum of $150

to each Indian of California living on May 24, 1950,

who is now or may hereafter be enrolled under sections

651 and 657 of this title. The Secretary of the interior

may, in his discretion, make such distribution from

time to time to persons on the roll of the Indians

of California approved on May 16, 1933, as he identifies

such enrollees, before the completion of the revised

a

roll provided for in section 651 of this title. The

Secretary of the Interior is authorized to withdraw

from the fund on deposit in the Treasury of the

United States arising from the judgment in favor of

the Indians of California entered by the Court of

Claims on December 4, 1944, and appropriated for

them by section 203 of the Act of April 25, 1945

(59 Stat. 77), such sums as may be necessary to

make the per capita payments required by this section,

including not to exceed $15,000 for the purpose of

defraying the expenses incident to carrying out the

provisions of sections 657 and 658 of this title. Such

payments shaii be made out of the accumulated interest

on such judgment fund and so much of the principal

thereof as is necessary to complete the payments. The

money paid to enrollees pursuant to this section shall

not be subject to any lien or claim of any nature

against any of such persons, except for debts owing

to the United States. May 24, 1950, c. 196, § 2,

64 Stat. 190.

§ 659. Distribution of judgment fund; preparation

of Indian roll; applications for inclusion

(a) The Secretary of the Interior shall prepare a

roll of persons of Indian blood who apply for inclusion

thereon and (i) whose names or the name of a lineal

or collateral relative appears on any of the approved

rolis heretofore prepared pursuant to sections 651-

657 of this title and the amendments thereto or (ii)

who can establish, to the satisfaction of the Secretary,

lineal or collateral relationship to an Indian who resided

in California on June 1, 1852, and (iii) who were

born on or before and were living on September 21,

1968.

—_

(6) The roll so prepared shall indicate, as nearly

as possible, the group or groups of Indians of California

with which the ancestors of each enrollee were affiliated

on June 1, 1852. If the affiliation of an enrollee’s

ancestors on that date is unknown, it shall be presumed

to be the same as that of the ancestors’ relatives

whose affiliation is known unless there is sound reason

to believe otherwise. Applicants whose ancestry is de-

rived partly from one of the grounds named in section

660(b) of this title and partly from another group

of Indians in California shall elect the affiliation to

be shown for them on the roll.

(c) Application for enrollment shall be filed with

the Area Director of the Bureau of indian Affairs,

Sacramento, California, on forms prescribed for that

purpose. Pub.L. 90-507, § 1, Sept. 21, 1968, 82 Stat.

860.

§ 660. Edqual share distribution of 1964 appropriation

(a) The Secretary shall distribute to each person

whose name appears on the roll prepared pursuant

to section 659 of this title, except those whose ancestry

is derived from one or more of the groups named

in subsection (b) of this section, an equal share of

the moneys which were appropriated by the Act of

October 7, 1964 (78 Stat. 1033), in satisfaction of

the judgment of the Indian Claims Commission in

consolidated dockets numbered 31, 37, 80, 80-D, and

347, plus the interest earned thereon, minus attorneys

fees, litigation expenses (including the reimbursement

of funds expe ~d under authority of the Acts of

July 1, 1946 (60 Stat. 348), August 4, 1955 (69

Stat. 460), and July 14, 1960 (74 Stat. 512)), a

—

proper share of the costs of roll preparation, and

such amounts as may be required to effect the distribu-

tion

(b) Persons whose ancestry is derived solely from

one or more of the following groups and persons

of mixed ancestry who elected to share, other than

as heirs or legatees of enrollees, in any award granted

to any of the following groups shall not share in

the funds distributed pursuant to subsection (a) of

this section: Northern Paiute, Southern Paiute, Mohave,

Quechan (Yuma), Chemehuevi, Shoshone, Washoe,

Klamath, Modoc, and Yahooskin Rand of Snakes. Pub.

L. 90-507. § 2. Sept. 21, 1968, 82 Stat. 860.

§ 661. Equal share distribution of undistributed bal-

ance of 1945 appropriation; credit to judg-

ment account

(a) The Secretary shall distribute to each person

whose name appears on the roll prepared pursuant

to section 659 of this title regardless of group affiliation

an equal share of the undistributed balance of the

moneys appropriated in satisfaction of the judgment

of the Court of Claims in the case of The Indians

of California against United States (102 Court of

Claims 837: 59 Stat. 94), plus the interest earned

thereon, including the reimbursed moneys and unex-

pended balances of the funds established by the Acts

of July 1. 1946 (60 Stat. 348), August 4, 1955

(69 Stat. 460), and July 14, 1960 (74 Stat. 512),

minus a proper share of the costs of roll preparation

enlion

and such amounts as may be necessary to effect the

distribution.

(b) The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized

and directed to credit to the judgment account referred

to in subsection (a) of this section, for distribution

as a part of such account, the sum of $83,275, plus

interest at 4 per centum per annum from December

4, 1944, which sum represents the value of sixty-

six thousand six hundred and twenty acres of land

erroneously used as an offset against said judgment.