motion to dismiss — Jimenez v. Hidalgo County Water Improvement District No. 2

e {LED

aioe BIS

In the Supreme Court of the United States

No. 75-1004

GUADALUPE JIMENEZ, et al.,

Appellants,

vs.

HIDALGO COUNTY WATER IMPROVEMENT

DISTRICT NO. 2, et al.,

Appellees.

On APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES District COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DIsTRICT oF TEXAS

MOTION OF APPELLEE HIDALGO AND CAMERON

COUNTIES WATER CONTROL AND IMPROVE-

MENT DISTRICT NO. 9 (MERCEDES DISTRICT) TO

DISMISS OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TO AFFIRM

JUDGMENT OF THE THREE JUDGE COURT

GARLAND F.. SMITH

SMITH, McILHERAN, YARBROUGH & GRIFFIN

P. O. Box 416

Weslaco, Texas 78596

(512) 968-2196

Attorneys for Said Appellees, Hidalgo

and Cameron Counties Water Con-

trol and Improvement District No.

9, Its Officers and Directors

>

E. L. Muewpernatt, Inc., 926 Cherry Street, Kansas City, Mo. 64106, 421-3080

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Explanation of Reference Abbreviations ........................

TE 0 I ccnrictcenentesnsmemennnnmemnenn

QUESTIONS PRESENTED .......................cecccccscocesseseesssoeee

STATUTE INVOLVED (Article 8280-3.2) ......... waesuiate

STATEMENT OF THE CASE. ................cccccos-e- -coocceoseosessees

1. Urban Lands Excluded From Original Boundaries

2. Exclusion of Farm Lands Which Became “Urban”

PE ET A Ie Se TN SR

3. Exclusion of Farm Lands Which Became “Urban”

As a Result of Rural Subdivisions | .....00...0000000000000..

4. Other Concerns Confronting Boare ........................

a.

b.

c.

Possible Loss of Water Right ...............................-

Districts’ Domestic Water Limited .........000........

Directors Were Appellants’ Elected Repre-

sentatives .....................

d. Potable Water Available at Cost ..0000000000 0...

e.

SUTTITIIIIIIIED. ” nccdeaheshiersiigssoeinianiecnmnnenabiebenmanianniugeatocans

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES .....000..0.......0-.c:cceseees

A. Appellants Were Not Denied Due Process in Ex-

clusion of Their Property Without Reasonable

and Adequate Notice of Their Right to Be Heard

on an Issue of Substantial and Direct Interest ....

B. The Exclusion of Appellants’ Communities Was

QD

Not for Impermissible Political Motives, and Did

Not Deny Appellants Equal Protection of the

SATII iishelgiaieneitanehhiaeain iii adi ialiatil

District Court Decision Is Not in Conflict With

Applicable Precedents Regarding Notice by Mail

Se STII - sciscacheshsosantiemncintannesisenstimennsbetinnidegebbanentsincsit

TI cecznsececessnesssesenesesseensssenensenseannceasusenntesnonmemnnnenes

PT Ee CU IED prcccvrensscorsnenssiantennsesnennennmeennemenen

II

Explanation of Reference Abbreviations:

1. Stipulations between Hidalgo and Cameron

Counties Water Control and Improvement Dis-

trict No. 9 and Plaintiffs will be identified by the

prefix MS followed by the stipulation number,

(Example MS 1 stipulation numbered 1) and

exhibits attached thereto will be identified by

prefix MX followed by the exhibit number.

Supplemental Stipulation is marked Sup. M plus

number.

2. Appellants’ Jurisdictional Statement will be re-

ferred to by the prefix J.S. followed by the page

number.

Index of Authorities

TEXAS CONSTITUTION

Re ONE a eT 3

ht 3

STATUTES

Ca 2, 4,6

I I mccecesitiititeti ie 5

TEXAS WATER CODE

I a a 7

I ae 3

EA a an SR Ee SVR es 3

SINT, I ae ER me ne 3

Section 51.072

CASE AUTHORITIES

Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 ooo. occcceccccceecseceeeees 12

Cipriano v. City of Howma, 395 U.S. 701

Ilr

Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 220.00... ccceccceeeeeeeeeeees 12

Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 ...............ccccccceceeeeeeeees 12

Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663... 12

Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 US. 161 ................ 9

Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621... 12

Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Com-

i, TE TA GE ccternnccnetennteeneetnntsomaemneninnasinnmnnvel 9,10

Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 ..00..0.0..e. 12

Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 USS. 208 .....:......9, 10

The State of Texas v. Hidalgo County Water Control

and Improvement District No. 18, et al., 443 SW2d

TITTIEP cocssoicsistdessinianiandaneeaiiamnisiiaeeeaiuiataatddtiinbeannéietnicissiiaiduicbisenes 7

In the Supreme Court of the United States

No. 75-1004

GUADALUPE JIMENEZ, et al.,

Appellants,

vs.

HIDALGO COUNTY WATER IMPROVEMENT

DISTRICT NO. 2, et al.,

Appellees.

On APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT oF TEXAS

MOTION OF APPELLEE HIDALGO AND CAMERON

COUNTIES WATER CONTROL AND IMPROVE.

MENT DISTRICT NO. 9 (MERCEDES DISTRICT) TO

DISMISS OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TO AFFIRM

JUDGMENT OF THE THREE JUDGE COURT

Pursuant to Rule 16, Paragraphs 1(a) and l(c), Re-

vised Rules of this Court, HIDALGO AND CAMERON

COUNTIES WATER CONTROL AND IMPROVEMENT

DISTRICT NO. 9, its officers and directors, Appellees here,

move the Court to dismiss this appeal, or in the alterna-

tive, to affirm the judgment of the Three Judge District

Court from which this appeal is taken.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

The Appellants’ Jurisdictional Statement on page 8

states the questions as follows:

1. Whether the plaintiffs and the class they repre-

sent were denied due process of law in the exclu-

sion of their property from the defendant districts

without reasonable and adequate notice of their

right to be heard on an issue of substantial and

direct interest?

2. Whether the exclusion of plaintiffs’ communities

from the districts for impermissible political mo-

tives denied plaintiffs the equal protection of the

law?

3. Whether by singling out railroads as a favored

class of landowner entitled to actual notice of a

‘proposed exclusion of realty, Article 8280-3.2,

V.A.T.C.S., denied to all other landowners, such as

plaintiffs and their class, the equal protection of

law?

STATUTE INVOLVED

Texas’ Article 8280-3.2 is substantially quoted in Ap-

pellants’ Judicial Statement, in the opinions of the Three

Judge Court, the Fifth Circuit, and the Single Judge Dis-

trict Court. (J.S. p. 3-7, la-59a) An omitted Section 7

is supplied by the brief of Appellee, Hidalgo County Water

Improvement District No. 2. (p. 2)

The statute is but a projection of a long standing state”

policy that treats urban and agricultural land differently.

3

Special purpose districts such as the two Appellee Dis-

tricts (Hidalgo County Water Improvement District No.

2, hereinafter for brevity called the San Juan District;

and Hidalgo and Cameron Counties Water Control and

Improvement District No. 9, hereinafter called the Mer-

cedes District) at their organization may include within

their boundaries a “town, village, or municipal corpora-

tion” (Tex. Water Code, Sec. 51.012) but only if approved

by a “majority of the electors in the city, town or mu-

nicipal corporation” with a “separate voting district” pro-

vided for the urban and rural areas. (Tex. Water Code

Sec. 51.035) These provisions were enacted in 1925, and

were in effect when the Mercedes District was organized.

These provisions recognize a potential conflict of interest

between urban and agricultural lands. That land and land

ownership and supply of irrigation water thereto are the

dominant public policy considerations is evident from the

constitutional provisions involved (Tex. Const. Art. III,

Sec. 52 and Art. XVI, Sec. 59) and the Water Code pro-

\ ‘sion that the petition for creation must be signed by “a

majority of the persons who hold title to land in the pro-

posed district which represents a total value of more than

50% of the value of all the land in the proposed district”.

(Sec. 51.013)

A non-resident owner of land within a district may

serve as a director of the district, if elected by qualified

electors residing in the district. (Tex. Water Code, Sec.

51.072) The clear intent of declared legislative policy is

that these special purpose districts include within their

boundaries only the lands that will be directly benefitted

by their special services, here irrigation, and for the ex-

clusion of lands not directly benefitted.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The two Appellee irrigation districts are controlled

by the same laws. Their actions in excluding urban sub-

divisions complied in good faith with Art. 8280-3.2. De-

cision must turn on whether (1) notice by posting and

publication per se denied Appellants notice of their right

to be heard; (2) whether impermissible political motives

denied Appellants equal protection; or (3) the require-

ment that railroads be given notice by mail created a fa-

vored class.

Repetition will not be here made of the statements

of the case as made by Appellants, our co-Appellee, nor

of the opinions of the three courts who have passed on

the case. (Appellants’ J.S. p. 8-12; San Juan District brief,

p. 3-4; Three Judge Court, J.S. p. 2a-9a; Fifth Circuit, J.S.

p. 24a-33a; Single Judge Court, J.S. p. 37a-39a) It may

be helpful to the Court if we extract from the stipulated

facts and present in chronological order the exact appli-

cation by the Board of Directors of the Mercedes District

of the public policy of the State as it relates to the ditinc-

tion or inherent conflict of interest between “urban” and

“agricultural” lands.

1. Urban Lands Excluded #rom Original Bound-

aries:

The Mercedes District was organized in 1928 and on

January 1, 1930, purchased the irrigation system of the

American Rio Grande Land and Irrigation Company,

which served a gross of 84,833.75 acres within its outer

boundaries, which included 5 cities. The original bound-.-

aries excluded 2,903.81 acres which composed the cities of

Mercedes, Weslaco, Elsa, Edcouch, and LaVilla to whose

5

treatment plants it continued to furnish raw river water.

(MS 9, 7 and MX 1 and 7)

2. Exclusion of Farm Lands Which Became

‘‘Urban”’ As Cities Grew:

The five cities grew out of their original boundaries

into the agricultural lands of the District. The District

was confronted with the problem of urban lands within

its corporate boundaries. Such lands were not being ir-

rigated, and were not benefitting directly from its irriga-

tion purpose. The Texas Legislature recognized the prob-

lem in 1949 by the enactment of Article 8280-4. Between

1951 and 1972 the district in 15 separate exclusion orders

one to two years apart, excluded a total of 2175.24 acres

which had been annexed by the 5 cities within its outer

boundaries, under Article 8280-4. (MS 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8c,

MX 1, 2 and 6)

3. Exclusion of Farm Lands Which Became

‘“‘Urban’”’ As a Result of Rural Subdivisions:

The 5 cities in the Mercedes District followed the Na-

tional pattern in dealing with slums and the threat of

slums posed by the mass movement to cities following

World War II. They strengthened their subdivision ordi-

nances to require urban developers to pave streets and

lay water and sewer lines to serve the subdivision, as a

condition of approval. Lack of appropriate land use laws

providing similar protection outside city limits left a hia-

tus in regulation, which invited instant slum developers

into the country, and they came. (MS 8h, 19, MX 4, p.

15-17, MX 13) Substantial irrigated farm land was con-

verted to urban use within irrigation districts over the

State and no longer used or contemplated use of the irri-

gation services of the districts. The Legislature again

took cogniz.nce of the problem by passing Article 8280-3.2

here in question.

The Board of Directors of the Mercedes District com-

plied in good faith with the procedures of Article 8280-3.2

and excluded 39 such urban subdivisions by its order of

October 17, 1972. (MS 8, 8a, MX 1, MX 4) Notice given

was by publication and posting, as provided by the Stat-

ute. Personal notice by certified mail was not given.

Whatever the efficacy of the two methods of notice, plain-

tiffs did in fact receive notice, and were present with their

attorney at the public hearing held by the Mercedes Dis-

trict. (MS 8) Those appearing admitted their land was

not being farmed or irrigated but opposed exclusion be-

cause they wanted the District to provide them with do-

mestic water and sewer services at a cost they could af-

ford to pay. (MS 8d) Of the 39 urban tracts excluded,

only 4 are represented by plaintiffs; all but two are ad-

jacent to existing sources of potable water from a city or

rural water supply corporation, or short extensions of

such lines will make potable water available; the remain-

ing two will be within range of lines of the Military High-

way Rural Water Supply Corporation now under construc-

tion. (Sup. M Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6)

4. Other Concerns Confronting Board:

The plight of plaintiffs with respect to potable water

supply did not escape the attention of the Board, and their

right to domestic water was preserved in the same way

and on the same terms as applied to the 5 cities within

the outer boundaries of the district. (MS 8d, e, f, 9, MX 4)

Other problems pressed for consideration:

a. Possible Loss of Water Right for Irrigation of

812.11 acres: The district held valid title to a water right

to irrigate the 812.11 acres of the 39 excluded tracts, which

7

water right could be forfeited for non-use under Sec. 5.030

of the Texas Water Code. This could be prevented by

excluding the urban lands, and transferring the irrigation

right to 812.11 acres which would use it. (MS 12, 13)

b. Districts’ Domestic Water Is Limited: A general

water shortage resulted in an adjudication of the water

rights of the Mercedes District, along with all diverters

from the Rio Grande from Falcon Reservoir to the Gulf.

The State of Texas v. Hidalgo County WC & ID #18, et al.,

443 SW2d 728. Water for domestic use within the rural

areas of the district including the 39 tracts is limited to

4,230 acre feet annually. (MS 10 and 11) The district also

holds as trustee title to water for the 5 cities and supplies

raw water to their treatment plants. Encouragement of

urban growth in rural areas could create a shortage in the

districts’ domestic supply. (MS 10a)

c. Directors Were Appellants’ Elected Representa-

tives: The five directors who passed the order of exclu-

sion were elected by qualified voters of the 39 excluded

tracts, as well as the remainder of the district. Appel-

lants either participated or were entitled to participate in

the elections at which the board members were elected.

As such the directors had a responsibility as well to the

residents of the 35 tracts who did not after invitation

join plaintiffs’ suit, and to the residents of the 4 tracts

represented by plaintiffs, who wanted their lands ex-

cluded. (MS 32, 33)

d. Potable Water Available at Cost: Directors had,

in addition to their contracts to supply raw water to the

treatment plants of the five cities, made contracts with

rural water supply corporations to furnish the domestic

water allotment of its rural inhabitants to such corpora-

tions for treatment and return as potable water to the

rural residents of the district through the lines of such

corporations. The directors thus knew that potable water

was thus available at cost to all but 2 of said tracts with

but slight extension of the supply lines of such cities and

rural supply corporations; and the 2 tracts would soon

have potable water available through the lines of the Mil-

itary Highway Rural Water Supply Corporation. It was

obvious that the District could accommodate plaintiffs’

desires only if it could produce and deliver potable water

to the 39 scattered urban tracts at a cost less than the

cities and supply companies already in the water treat-

ment business. (MS 24, Sup. M 1, 2, 3, 4, 5)

e. Financing: The Mercedes District had just com-

pleted a $10,800,000.00 reclamation project, and was in-

debted to the United States in that sum. There is a seri-

ous question as to whether the bonding capacity of the

district would be adequate to duplicate the existing water

lines and treatment facilities currently available to plain-

tiffs, even if it elected to do so. (MS 16, MX 8)

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

Appellants’ Brief will be answered under the headings

used in their Jurisdictional Statement:

A. Appellants Were Not Denied Due Process in

Exclusion of Their Property Without Reason-

able and Adequate Notice of Their Right to Be

Heard on an Issue of Substantial and Direct

Interest.

The Appellants either voted at the election at which

the directors who excluded their land were elected, or were

so qualified and entitled to so vote. There is no evidence

that an Appellant, or any qualified person was, at such

elections or any prior election, denied the franchise. Re-

° a]

9

gardless of how the notice was given, the Appellants had

actual notice of the public hearing, appeared, and pre-

sented evidence. The evidence presented by Appellants

at the hearing supported the findings made by the Board

in excluding their urban lands. (MS 8, MX 4) The stip-

ulations and evidence presented in the trial below reveal

the existence of no evidence that would justify a finding

other than that made by the Board.

Although the facts are agreed, Appellants would

change the result by equating this to be a voting rights

case, controlled by Gomillion vy. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339,

rather than a boundary case controlled by Hunter v. City

of Pittsburgh, 207 US. 161. (JS. p. 15 to 18) The Three

Judge Court correctly observed that it was “boundaries”

here involved, and for a permissible constitutional reason,

and declined to substitute the word “urban” for “colored”

and thereby strike down the legislative power of the states

to deal differently between “urban” and “farm” land. (J.S.

p. 6a-13a)

Appellants then seek to equate the exclusions to a

judicial process, requiring personal notice as in Mullane v.

Central Hanover Bank and Trust Company, 339 U.S. 306

and Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208, where

property interests and the judicial process were involved,

rather than a legislative process to change boundaries of a

political subdivision where constructive notice is adequate,

as in Pittsburgh v. Hunter. The Three Judge Court cor-

rectly rejected this contention, citing numerous statutes

providing for notice by posting and publication in bound-

ary situations, and pointing out the inconvenience ap-

proaching impossibility of giving personal notice in two

languages to the entire population and non-resident land

owners of such political subdivisions in the boundary sit-

uation here involved. (J.S. p. 14a-18a) The Court cor-

10

rectly observed that appellants’ reliance on Mullane and

Schroeder (J.S. p. 18a) is misplaced:

Each of those cases involved an existing, tangible prop-

erty interest, as opposed to what here seems to be at

best an intangible, possible future interest of undeter-

mined nature.

The Court then concluded that the notice provisions

of Article 8280-3.2 are constitutional.

B. The Exclusion of Appellants’ Communities

Was Not for Impermissible Political Motives,

and Did Not Deny Appellants Equal Protec-

tion of the Law.

Appellants do not ask for a service available to others,

but denied to Appellants since these Districts have never

provided such services to anyone. They would have the

districts duplicate existing water purification plants of the

cities and rural supply corporations and lay competing

water lines into the 39 urban subdivisions scattered over

the 84,659 rural acres of the Mercedes District and the

65,000 acres of the San Juan District. No racial or ethnic

issues are here involved and there is no evidence to sup-

port such a contention. Rural residents of all racial and

ethnic backgrounds have always made their own provi-

sions for drinking and domestic water, which is true na-

tionwide.

Appellants claim they were “fenced out” of the Dis-

tricts involved for impermissible political reasons. There

is no claim of racial discrimination, as was present in

Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 81 S.Ct. 125, 5 L.Ed.2d

110 (1960). It has been stipulated that racial discrimina-

tion was not the basis for the Districts’ actions. In fact,

there is no evidence of any motive or design on the part

11

of Appellee districts other than the exclusion of “urban

lands” from the corporate boundaries of the districts to

avoid a forfeiture of irrigation rights to the acres excluded,

where irrigation had been discontinued, and the transfer

of such rights to other lands seeking irrigation services.

Appellants still receive untreated water from the districts

for domestic use. The argument that the areas in question

were excluded because of a fear of how they would vote

in the future is mere speculation, and constitutional ad-

judications cannot be made upon that basis.

This appellee denies any stipulation or judicial admis-

sion that appellants’ lands were excluded because of such

speculation. To reduce appellants’ proposal to its ultimate

absurcit:,, the Mercedes District did arguendo presume

their success to demonstrate the insubstantial nature of

appellants’ claim. All such speculations were used as an

argument indicating the economic and political folly of

seeking to acquire domestic water and sewer services at

a price below that available through existing sources from

a water district which has, from its inception, engaged pri-

marily in irrigation functions, which has no present facili-

ties to engage in such activities, and which, quite probably,

does not have the financial capability to construct such

facilities even if the directors wished to do so. While such

practical realities must be considered by Courts as well as

other decision making bodies, there is no evidence that the

directors considered anything other than whether the

owner of the land did or did not utilize the irrigation ser-

vices provided by the districts, whether the land was urban

in fact, and whether exclusion would be in the best inter-

est of both the urban lands and the district.

An important distinction between the “voting rights”

cases and this case is that the former deal with a statute

or constitutional provision which operated to selectively

12

distribute the franchise to one class of residents while de-

nying it to others for political or economic reasons. Car-

rington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 85 S.Ct. 775, 13 L.Ed.2d 675

(1965); Evans v. Cornman, 398 US. 419, 90 S.Ct. 1752, 26

L.Ed.2d 370 (1970); Kramer v. Union Free School District,

395 U.S. 621, 89 S.Ct. 1886, 23 L.Ed.2d 583 (1969); Cipriano

v. City of Houma, 395 US. 701, 89 S.Ct. 1897, 23 L.Ed.2d

647 (1969); Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S.

663, 86 S.Ct. 1079, 16 L.Ed.2d 169 (1966); Phoenix v.

Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204, 90 S.Ct. 1990, 26 L.Ed.2d 523

(1970). In such cases, the challenged statute must be

examined to determine whether the exclusions are neces-

sary to promote a compelling state interest. Dunn v. Blum-

stein, 405 U.S. 330, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972).

However the challenged statute in the case does not

seek to distribute the franchise but merely provides a stat-

utory means to exclude “urban” property from an agri-

cultural water district. Since the challenged statute does

not operate to distribute the franchise to selected classes

of potential voters and since there is no evidence of any

improper motive, either on the part of the Texas Legisla-

ture in passing the statute or on the part of the districts

in excluding the “urban” tracts, Appellants have not been

unconstitutionally “fenced out” of the WCIDs involved and

have not been denied equal protection of the laws.

C. District Court Decision Is Not in Conflict

With Applicable Precedents Regarding Notice

by Mail to Railroads.

The statute does provide that “notice shall be given

to the railroad company by mailing, first class” ete. (J.§.

p. 23, 15a) The valid and constitutional basis for this

requirement is stated in the opinion of the Single Judge

Court (J.S. p. 52a-53a) and the Three Judge Court (J.S.

13

p. 18a-20a) and further argued in the Brief of the San

Juan District, pages 12-14. For brevity, these arguments

and authorities are adopted.

CONCLUSION

The Mercedes District has here demonstrated that the

act of the District in excluding Appellants’ urban lands was

a legislative act, wherein notice by posting and publication

is adequate; that Appellants’ right to keep their urban

lands within the irrigation district is not a constitutionally

protected right, and no invidious motive prompted the Dis-

tricts’ action; and that provision for personal (by mail)

notice to railroads is justified by permissible state interest,

and des not deny to Appellants equal protection of the

law.

WHEREFORE, this Appellee urges that this appeal

should be~dismissed, or in the alternative, the judgment

of the Three Judge District Court should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

By: GARLAND F. SMITH

SMITH, McILHERAN, YARBROUGH & GRIFFIN

P. O. Box 416

Weslaco, Texas 78596

(512) 968-2196

Attorneys for Hidalgo and Cameron

Counties Water Control and Im-

provement District No. 9, Its Offi-

cers and Directors, Appellees Herein

14

PROOF OF SERVICE

I, Garland F. Smith, one of the attorneys for Hidalgo

and Cameron Counties Water Control and Improvement

District No. 9, its Officers and Directors, Appellees herein,

and a member of the Bar of the Supreme Court of the

United States, hereby certify that on the 12th day of

February, 1976, I served copies of the foregoing Appeal,

on the several parties thereto as follows:

1. On Guadalupe Jimenez, et al., Appellants, by mail-

ing three copies to each in a duly addressed en-

velope, with postage prepaid, to the following:

Mr. David G. Hall

Texas Rural Legal Aid, Inc.

103 East Third Street

Weslaco, Texas 78596

Messrs. Melvin L. Wulf and

Joel M. Gora

American Civil Liberties Union Foundation,

Inc.

22 East 40th Street

New York, New York 10016

Mr. Sanford Jay Rosen

3504 Clay

San Francisco, California 94118

2. On Hidalgo County Water Improvement District

No. 2, by mailing three copies in a duly addressed

envelope, with postage prepaid, to Mr. Morris At-

las, P. O. Drawer 3725, McAllen, Texas 78501.

15

It is further certified that all parties required to be

served have been served.

By: GARLAND F. SMITH

SMITH, McILHERAN, YARBROUGH & GRIFFIN

Weslaco, Texas 78596

(512) 968-2196