Supplemental Brief — Rummler v. California

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Anited States

October Term 975

No, 74-Lo3l

WYN RUMMLER,

Appellant,

vs.

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF

CALIFORNIA,

Appellee.

On Appeal from the Court of Appeal of California

Second Appellate District

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF

WYN RUMMLER

1522 North Mariposa Avenue

Los Angeles, California 90027

663-6745

In Propria Persona

WESTERN PRINTING COMPANY, WHITTIER—696-1722

TOPICAL INDEX

Page

The Withdrawal Of Appellant’s Status To Act In

Propria Persona and His Jailing For Failing

To Hire An Attorney Were A Flagrant and

Knowing Violation Of Law ......... nlite

The Release Of The Jewelry To Mrs. Fleigel Was

A Flagrant And Knowing Violation Of The

Law And Was Intended To Damage Appellant’s

Reputation ............... i isadieiiiaiihdiasitadininarieemnmnan

The License Revocation Proceeding Against Mrs.

Uber Was An Attempt To ‘‘Legalize’’ The Re-

lease Of The Jewelry By Further Deception.

It Suggests That The Cosmetology Board’s Sub-

sequent Support Of Legislation To Correct Lic-

ensing Inequities Is A Camouflage 00000.

To Uphold The State Court Disposition Of This

Case Could, Because Of Its Evident Connection

With The Calderon Matter, Bring The Judicial

System Into Such Disrepute As To Cause Severe

Problems Of Public Safety 0000000

All Of Appellant’s Allegations As To The Pro-

ceedings Below Are Verifiable ............... ealsenaiieienes

12

ii ' Index

TABLE OF CITATIONS

Page

Brown v. United States (1959) 264 Fed.2d 363,

369 ...... : leiden

Faretta 1 v. California No. 73. 5772... a + SS

Johnson v. Louisiana (1972) 406 U. S. 356 .. . B

Loder v. Superior Court (1974) 43 Cal. App.3d

TTT ccsicctsesitmciiieniteneiscctiiataataaimaapaiitaiatiiaa iaiaaitaaitaililatl 24

Seusteen v. “State Sed ‘of ‘Bdsention (1969) 1

ol fF ee eieeniiiiiebadiatinaasia Te

Neagle, In re (1890) 135 U. S. L. niin a

People v. Burnick (1975) 14 Cal. 3d 306 . a

People v. Feagley (1975) 14 Cal.3d 338 .. ae,

People v. Sharp (1972) 7 Cal.3d 448 .... 3, 6, 25

Pettit v. State Board of Education ( 1973) 10 Cal.

Whitcomb v. Emerson (1941) 46 Cal.App. 408 ........... 2

Williams v. Florida (1970) 399 U.S. 78 20... 23

Zitney v. State Bar (1966) 64 Cal.2d 787 WW... 19

|

STATUTES CITED

Business and Professions Code

| aa ee

Section 7325. ............. oe alas idles teat! —

Section 7415. ....... ssiteiaseaiaainnaiialaiah cae dancac eat

ens Ca Ts i 18

index ili

OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED

Page

Opinion by Los Angeles City Attorney No. 74-174... 16

APPENDICES

Page

Appendix W Assembly Concurrent Resolution

Us: Ey ‘spesteeshdceiieticeisiniilliasanimeieeiiiibiatideiiaabas 31

Appendix X Memo, Contempt Order, Transcript

PED snictiseisesuiebsehsetasnitnsiicaaeaeniiitimaaenaciiasie 33

Appendix Y Order by Court of Appeal. 40

Appendix Z Dr. Aronsohn’s Declaration,

NS I i 42

Appendix Z-I Order by Superior Court — 46

Appendix Z-JI Order by Court of Appeal .. 47

Appendix Z-III Transcript Pages 2... 49

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Gnited States

October Term 1975

No. 74-1631

WYN RUMMLER,

Appellant,

vs

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF

CALIFORNIA,

Appellee.

On Appeal from the Court of Appeal of California

Second Appellate District

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF

Subsequently to the Jurisdictional Statement, this

Court has acknowledged in Faretta v California No.

73-5772 that a criminal defendant has a Constitutional

right to act in propria persona.

Subsequently to said Statement, Assembly Concur-

rent Resolution No. 103, copy attached as Appendix

W, has been submitted to the California Legislature.

It is pursuant to newly expressed wishes by the Board

=

of Cosmetology that a person confining his practice to

one branch of cosmetology not be prosecuted for doing

so without a licenss The resolution duplicates appel-

lant’s arguments and his citation of Whitcomb v Emer-

son (1941) 46 Cal.App. 403 in urging that existing lic-

ensing regulations are unreasonable. It says that the

Board is backing Assembly Bill No. 2386, which pro-

poses limited licensing for a person confining his prac-

tice to one branch of cosmetology.

These developments can be used for arguing that

the issues of this appeal are moot; that is, that now

that the self representation right has been affirmed

and now that the California Legislature appears to

be correcting the licensing inequities complained of,

there is no issue remaining in this appeal of sufficient

public importance to merit plenary consideration.

On the contrary, the right of the individual to rely

on the law is still very much an issue herein, and non-

intervention by this Court would invite dangerous al-

ternatives.

Moreover, the Assembly Concurrent Resolution ap-

pears to be part of a concert of deceitful gestures, made

in anticipation of appellant’s plans in this matter.

Said plans are, after this Court has ruled on his case,

to present it to the public, along with the facts stated

in the Calderon applications to this Court Nos. 73-1615

and 74-133, as proof of an internal attack on the United

States.

a

ealien

THE WITHDRAWAL OF APPELLANT’S STATUS TO

ACT IN PROPRIA PERSONA AND HIS JAILING

FOR FAILING TO HIRE AN ATTORNEY WERE A

FLAGRANT AND KNOWING VIOLATION OF LAW

When appellant applied to the Court of Appeal for

restoration of said status he called the Court’s atten-

tion to the following passages in People vy Sharp (1972)

7 Cal.3d 448:

‘**We do not purport to hold herein that an ac-

cused is not entitled to represent himself in a

proper case but only that such right is not a con-

stitutionally protected one. We have heretofore

set forth standards by which a trial court can de-

termine the competency of an accused who wishes

to represent himself as a condition for granting

such motion (see People v Floyd (1970) 1 Cal.3d

694, 702-703 ... and cases cited therein) and we

do not now depart therefrom. ... Aside from any

specific provision, as we have earlier indicated,

due process considerations may require that a de-

fendant be afforded the right of self-representa-

tion .. . in those rare instances where the denial

may truly offend the concept of ordered liberty.’’

Even the dissenting Justices of this Court in Far-

etta v California supra appear to concede that, al-

beit ‘‘in an extraordinarily small number of cases,”’ a

defendant may act as ably in propria persona as by at-

torney. They also seem to qualify their statement that

a trial judge should have discretion to deny a defen-

dant self-representation with the proviso, **when the

interests of justice so require.”’

_

At the time of appellant’s arrest he was informed

by Investigator John C. Blanchard of the Department

of Consumer Affairs that the District Attorney’s Of-

fice had investigated appellant’s background thorough-

ly and had evaluated his legal abilities as excellent.

Attached as Appendix X is a memo describing appel-

lant as “‘legal strategist, top notcher of legal talent.’’

Said memo was apparently prepared by either the Dis-

trict Attorney’s, the County Counsel’s or the State

Attorney General’s Office, and was eventually given

to appellant by the Probation Department. It is con-

sistent with an observation concerning appellant by

Prosecutor Carstairs, ‘‘He is obviously ne: an un-

schooled person in the law .. . a man who has shown

himself to be very lawwise.’’ (Reporter’s Transcript,

page 849, line 27; page 845, line 19, 20)

The District Attorney’s Office had enough records

concerning appellant to be aware of the following facts,

most of which were also contained in a declaration ap-

pellant filed with Judge Thelin when he made his mo-

tion for self-representation:

During the postwar forties appellant, who at that

time had had years of experience in law office employ-

ment, was repeatedly arrested for investigation by the

Los Angeles Police. Thereby he learned a lot about

the technique of interrogation.

In 1949 appellant was a defendant in propria per-

sona on a charge of a sex offense against some under

age girls. Appellant was incarcerated in Los Angeles’

former and infamous Lincoln Heights Jail during

a a

eee

cullen

these proceedings, which lasted 45 days and were dis-

missed after two hung juries. Many of the so-called

policemen assigned to that jail were not temperament-

ally qualified to work anywhere but in Auschwitz, and

their overriding duty was to try to wear out anyone

who persisted in a not guilty plea. They gave appel-

lant a crash course in all the gimmicks that are used to

pressure a defendant into throwing in the sponge.

Being innoculated against these things and experi-

enced in arrest and trial procedure, appellant had qual-

ifications which courts have customarily treated as suf-

ficient for granting pro se status to any reasonably

articulate defendant regardless cf whether he had ap-

pellant’s added legalistic skills.

During the 1949 prosecution appellant also learned,

by mistakenly doing them, many of the things a de-

fendant should not do in front a jury if he would would

prefer an acquittal to a deadlock. In subsequent years

appellant served as a juror himself in civil and crim-

inal cases and had additional experience in front of

judges and jurors as a litigant in propria persona in

civil cases.

The acquittal in the Calderon prosecution, being in

part due to appellant’s investigative and trial work,

did not suggest that appellant was badly trained.

While the present charge was being prosecuted ap-

pellant was, during continuances, again serving as a

juror himself in criminal] cases, this time in the Federal

courts. These courts knew that appellant was doub-

a

ling as a defendant, but waived the customary objec-

tions because of the special circumstances of the case.

Following Federal verdicts appellant was alternately

consulted by the U.S. Attorney and the defense at-

torney as to why he had won or lost. Thereby appellant

gained special insights into the problems of both sides.

If appellant did not meet the criteria by which, even

according to the doctrine of Sharp and the dissenting

views in Faretta, a defendant is qualified to represent

himself—who could ?

A copy of the contempt order is attached as part of

Appendix X, accompanied by a page from the Report-

er’s Transcript of the contempt hearing, and a page

from the Transcript of subsequent Superior Court pro-

ceedings in which Prosecutor Carstairs gave his ver-

sion of the matter. While some of the wording on the

contempt order has been crossed out, a comparison

with the accompanying attachments will show that the

order is very libelous.

When appellant applied to the Court of Appeal

for restoration of his pro se status, that Court, in the

persons of Justice Wood, Justice Lillie and Justice

Thompson, stayed further proceedings against appel-

lant, not staying them against Mrs. Uber, allegedly to

give the Court time to consider the matter. Three

months later, the Court having issued no further order,

appellant sent the Justices a letter inquiring as to the

reason for the delay. The Court then issued an order,

Appendix Y, stating it was adupting a suggestion by

= =

the County Counsel that another hearing in the Munici-

pal Court be held to determine whether appellant was

competent to represent himself. The reason given was

that it appeared impossible to obtain a Reporter’s

Transcript of the hearing before Judge Thelin, and

that, therefore, the record did not show whether Judge

Thelin’s order granting appellant pro se status was

based on an adequate showing.

Undoubtedly the Justices assumed that the second

hearing would be held before Judge Di Giuseppe, who

could be counted on to find appellant unqualified.

However, appellant had challenged Judge Di Giu-

seppe for cause, so the hearing was held before Judge

Harold Sinclair who restored appellant’s pro se status

with the comment, ‘‘It seems to me that the work I

have seen in these petitions and so forth is superior to

a lot of work I have seen from lawyers. Much supe-

rior. (Reporter’s Transcript of Hearing on Qualifica-

tions of Defendant to Act in Propria Persona, page 22,

lines 26-28)

Due to the Court of Appeal’s long delay in acting

on appellant’s petition, Mrs. Uber was tried separately.

Thereby she was deprived of the benefit she would

have had from appellant’s courtroom know-how had

they been tried together. No doubt the Justices in-

tended this.

suites

THE RELEASE OF THE JEWELRY TO MRS. FLEIGEL

WAS A FLAGRANT AND KNOWING VIOLATION

OF THE LAW AND WAS INTENDED TO DAMAGE

APPELLANT’S REPUTATION

During the trial, in the jury’s absence, Judge Light

repeatedly said there was no merit to the grand theft

charge, either on the embezzlement or the fraudulent

fee theory. and he was only persuaded from dismissing

it when Mr. Carstairs said this would prejudice the

medical charge. Following the trial Judge Light re-

iterated his understanding that the jewelry had been

deposited as security for the balance of the contract and

added, ‘‘I agree, frankly, that you were not guilty of

grand theft.’’ He added that the medical conviction

‘‘does not require any intent on your part to violate

the law.’’ (Reporter’s Transcript, page 1229, line 27

to page 1230, line 1)

Nevertheless, Judge Light also said, ‘‘No doubt in

my mind that Mrs. Fleigel has suffered injury as a re-

sult of the treatment.’’ This ‘‘injury,’’ he said, gave

Mrs. Fleigel grounds for a civil action against appel-

lant, and ‘‘If I were the trier of fact in this case, which

I were not, and if this was a civil case, which it was not,

about who should have the jewelry, the jewelry would

go back to Mrs. Fleigel.’’ On that ground he denied

appellant’s motion for return of the jewelry and said

it would be released to Mrs. Fleigel if she posted a

bond or other guarantee that the money secured by the

jewelry would be paid to appellant if the conviction

were reversed, Later at a hearing of which appellant

—

was not notified, Judge Light released the jewelry to

Mrs. Fleigel without the posting of any such bond or

guarantee. (Reporter’s Transcript, page 1232, lines

22, 23; page 1228, lines 1—4; page 1234, lines 16—28;

Jurisdictional Statement, page 101)

The only injuries to Mrs. Fleigel that Judge Light

could have been referring to were the rope-like scar on

her throat, the depigmented area on her forehead and

her drooping lower eyelids. In order to have believed

that she suffered these through the procedure he would

have bh d to disbelieve the ‘‘before’’ photo showing that

she already had these disfigurements and to have dis-

believed Mrs. Fleigel’s own testimony verifying the

photo. (Jurisdictional Statement, pages 85—88) To

regard her as anything but a calculating liar who used

her pre-existing disfigurements to deceive the examin-

ing physicians Judge Light would have had to disbe-

lieve the testimony of these physicians. One of them,

Dr. David Clifford Baer, testified as follows:

Q Would you say that you have no independ-

ent recollection of this examination, or is that too

strong a way to put it?

A That’s much too strong. Most of my pa-

tients don’t lie to me. So, this came on, it was

burned in my memory. (Reporter’s Transcript,

page 552, lines 1—5)

Dr. Aronsohn, testified as follows:

Q Dr. Aronsohn, these conditions that you ob-

served on Mrs. Fleigel, the rope-like condition on

her chin—did you observe any scars on her chin /

A Well, that is a scar.

=

Q Yes, Now that condition—I believe you’ve

already answered the question—you stated that

that could have existed before she had the treat-

ment.

A She said it didn’t.

Q What?

A But, again, I’m going on the history, the

testimony of the patient. I assumed she was being

honest and truthful. (Reporter’s Transcript,

page 446, line 19, to page 447, line 2)

The following matters additionally support the con-

clusion that when Mrs. Fleigel approached Mrs. Uber

she planned to frame her, and that this plan derived

from officials who subsequently controlled Judge

Light’s disposition of the jewelry.

Mrs. Fleigel testified that the jewelry was worth

$2300 to $2400; that she had no prior knowledge of ap-

pellant or Mrs. Uber; that she made a down payment

of $800 by money orders of which she retained copies

that she later presented to the prosecuting office; that

the jewelry was to secure a balance of $370; that she

obtained no written understanding of the terms on

which the jewelry had been deposited or a receipt.

(Reporter’s Transcript, page 361, lines 12—17; page

398, line 25 to page 399, line 8; Uber Preliminary

Hearing Transcript, page 21, lines 20—22; Rumm-

ler Preliminary Hearing Transcript, page 13, lines

9—10; Clerk’s Transcript Augmentation, page 16)

Having enough business sense to retain copies of

the money orders, Mrs. Fleigel would hardly leave that

= =

much jewelry with people she did not know without

more assurance than their word that the jewelry would

be returned. That assurance would seem to have been

a prior understanding with the authorities that the

jewelry would be recovered through a search warrant.

She told Investigator Gentile that the jewelry was

worth $800. (Clerk’s Transcript Augmentation, page

14) She told Mrs. Uber the same, and it was only at

the trial that she gave the actual value of $2300 to

$2400.

This mark-down forestalled suspicions as to why

she would leave several items of jewelry with a total

value so much more than the amount being secured

when fewer items would have been sufficient. It fits

a plan to beef up the theft charge.

Mrs. Fleigel may have been sent to Nona’s Youth

Fount to diseredit the evidence appellant had uncov-

ered in the Calderon prosecution, as suggested in the

Jurisdictional Statement, and she may not have been.

Either way the District Attorney’s Office had reason

to forestall an investigation of the question. Such in-

vestigation was likely to reveal the unlawful conduct

by major public officials in the Calderon prosecution

and in the subsequent teacher dismissal proceedings.

If appellant were convictcu of a charge involving

moral turpitude he would not have the stature to bring

about such an investigation.

However, Mr. Carstairs’ intended strategy of prov

ing only technical grand theft, that is, obtaining a fee

= =

with intent to violate Section 7415, would not imply suf-

ficient moral turpitude to satisfy his official superiors.

Therefore, these officials apparently pressured Mr.

Carstairs to include embezzlement and tried to facili-

tate a conviction by having appellant’s pro se status

withdrawn.

When this failed they evidently pressured Judge

Light to give the jewelry to Mrs. Fleigel, with the idea

that this would, by implying appellant’s claim on the

jewelry was illicit, discredit the acquittal.

Judge Light must have realized that appellant

would protest on appeal if he learned that the jewelry

had been released to Mrs. Fleigel without a bond. The

manner of the release deceived appellant into believing

it had not occurred. He would not be aware of it now

but for an exploratory search he made of the Clerk’s

files after this appeal was in process.

THE LICENSE REVOCATION PROCEEDING AGAINST

MRS. UBER WAS AN ATTEMPT TO “LEGALIZE”

THE RELEASE OF THE JEWELRY BY FURTHER

DECEPTION. IT SUGGESTS THAT THE COSME-

TOLOGY BOARD’S SUBSEQUENT SUPPORT OF

LEGISLATION TO CORRECT LICENSING INEQUI-

TIES IS A CAMOUFLAGE

After appellant had filed his Briefs in the Court

of Appeal, showing that the medical conviction would

boomerang regardless of what that Court did, the

prosecutor’s advisors must have realized that the re-

turn of the jewelry had made their positions even

worse,

==

While an acquittal does not bar every civil action

which may arise from the facts of the case, the criminal

trial judge is not entitled to make any disposition of

property seized from the defendant according to what

the judge claims the outcome of a civil suit should be.

It was then that the Attorney General’s Office de-

cided to get Mrs. Uber’s license revoked on the claim

that she had caused Mrs. Fleigel’s disfigurements by

using more than 10 percent of phenol. This, inasmuch

as it would be through a civil proceeding, would make

the release of the jewelry to Mrs. Fleigel seem irregu-

lar only in a technical sense.

To prevail the Attorney General’s Office prepared

a declaration for Dr. Aronsohn’s signature which

stated that Mrs. Fleigel’s disfigurements had been

caused by Mrs. Uber’s procedure. Like the search

warrant affidavit, the declaration put words into the

doctor’s mouth as though he had estimated the propor-

tion of phenol, assuming phenol was used, to be 50 to

88 percent. As can be seen from the copy of the dec-

laration attached as Appendix Z, Dr. Aronsohn crossed

out this part of the declaration. This was consistent

with the doctor’s testimony that, while phenol was a

possibility, he had no way of determining what caustic

had been used or its percentage. (Reporter’s Trans-

cript, page 425, lines 4—12; page 435, lines 22—27)

Nevertheless Deputy Attorney General Dora Levin

represented to the Hearing Officer that ‘‘the declara-

tion of the doctor states that phenol was used.”

(Transcript of Administrative Hearing No. 1682 OLA

a’

L-7528, page 3, lines 18—21. A copy of said page is

attached as part of Appendix Z) As Dr. Aronsohn

testified, his conclusion that the procedure caused the

disfigurements is based on Mrs. Fleigel’s statement

that she did not already have them. Obviously, the At-

torney General’s Office did not inform the doctor of

its awareness that Mrs. Fleigel’s statement was untrue.

Prior to his trial appellant had seen and admired

some of Dr. Aronsohn’s work as a cosmetic surgeon.

Much of this work is done for older women, and if the

patient has developed her mind, she will have the ap-

pearance of youth without its drawbacks, a quality

appellant finds specially attractive in a woman. There-

fore, in cross-examining Dr. Aronsohn, appellant made

sure that the record would present the doctor in a

psychologically favorable light.

In California, because of rising malpractice insur-

ance costs, making a commensurate living as a doctor

is ceasing to be any cinch. The situation has made doc-

tors particularly unsympathetic to the faking of mal-

practice claims.

Appellant expects to prove that the Board of Cos-

metology realized too late what a pickle it would be in

when the public, including the California Medical As-

sociation, heard about this matter. He expects to fur-

ther prove that the Board was trying to extricate itself

when it sponsored the views expressed in Assembly

Concurrent Resolution Nu. 103, Appendix W.

—15—

TO UPHOLD THE STATE COURT DISPOSITION OF

THIS CASE COULD, BECAUSE OF ITS EVIDENT

CONNECTION WITH THE CALDERON MATTER,

BRING THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM INTO SUCH DIS-

REPUTE AS TO CAUSE SEVERE PROBLEMS OF

PUBLIC SAFETY

In the United States it is a fact as well as a govern-

mental premise that the security forces do not control

the People but are instruments of the People. There-

fore, the main deterrent to vigilante law is the People’s

belief that the duly constituted courts will follow rules

more productive of justice than a posse would.

In California there are ominously increasing signs

of the courts losing the ability to command sufficient

respect, even from the security forces, to function ade-

quately. The Los Angeles Herald Examiner of July

3, 1975, reports that during a strike by employees of

Santa Clara County three court clerks defied an order

by Judge Bruce Allen declaring the strike illegal.

When Judge Allen sentenced them for contempt his

own clerk, Kalvin Hara, resigned to join the picket

line. The Los Angeles Times of August 9, 1975, re-

ports that in Napa County 48 striking deputy sheriffs

continued picketing in disregard of a court order. Re-

cently, when about two thirds of the San Francisco

police force walked out on strike, they ignored an order

by a Superior Court Judge prohibiting the strike. The

San Francisco Examiner of August 24, 1975, reports

that when officers who remained on the job responded

to crime emergencies they were confronted and jeered

—

by striking patrolmen, and that in many cases the tires

of their cars were slashed. One officer found the brake

line of his car had been cut.

The professionalized element of the San Francisco

police did not join in the strike, and that element in

the Los Angeles police would not join any strike either.

However, the pros never constitute a majority in even

the best of police departments, and in maintaining pub-

lic order without the Constitution the pros have to con-

tend with problems caused, not only by civilians, but

also by some of their fellow officers.

When the appellate courts also default, the prob-

lems of the police are multiplied, as are the problems

of the professionalized lower court jurist in obtaining

respect for his orders.

In this regard terrible damage will result if judges

and policemen become subject to political blackmail

through the threat of homosexuality charges brought

without proper procedural safeguards.

The purpose behind the appellate decisions in the

Calderon teacher dismissal actions was to establish a

path that would enable this. A further step in this

scheme was an opinion issued by the Los Angeles City

Attorney on May 19, 1975, No. 74-174, entitled The

Power of the Board of Civil Service Commissioners to

Establish Certain Employment Standards for Police

Officer Candidates and to Conduct Background In-

vestigations.

aa aaa ———

= =

This opinion purports to be merely a conclusion

that ‘‘decisional law’’ requires, under certain condi-

tions, the employment of self-announced homosexuals

as police officers. Actually it is part of a gimmick to

enable administrative determinations that police of-

ficers are homosexuals despite denials by the officers.

The ‘‘proof’’ in such cases is to be of the kind used to

uphold the Calderon teacher dismissal proceedings.

The same cases that the Court of Appeal cited against

Mr. Calderon, Morrison v State Board of Education

(1969) 1 Cal.3d 214 and Pettit vy State Board of Educa-

tion (1973) 10 Cal.3d 29, are cited in the City At-

torney’s opinion as authorizing the extension of these

standards into the Police Department. The opinion

noted that Assembly Bill No. 489, taking private homo-

sexuality out of the criminal purview, was nearing

passage.

Governor Brown’s signature on the bill was hardly

dry when administrative rather than criminal pro-

cedure was used to perfer charges of homosexual as-

sault against a Los Angeles Police Officer, Miss Col-

leen Clenny. It, too, was a dismissal proceeding, in

which Miss Clenny had no more rights than were af-

forded to Mr. Calderon, with the exception of a free

transcript. On the face of the matter, there was no

evidence against Miss Clenny that would even enable

a criminal complaint, much less a conviction, but she

was dismissed, nevertheless, with the same stigma that

accompanies a guilty verdict.

= =

Not long afterwards a Los Angeles County Supe-

rior Court Judge was arrested on a charge of violating

the same statute, Penal Code Section 288a (homosexual

oral copulation), that Mr. Calderon had been charged

under. Since the offense was now defined by law as a

relatively trivial misdemeanor, the Judge had far few-

er defense perogatives than Mr. Calderon had.

As a felony defendant Mr. Calderon had received a

preliminary hearing with a free transcript thereof,

an automatic continuance to the date of Superior Court

arraignment, another automatic continuance to the

date of another pre-trial hearing, this one on illegal

search, a free transcript thereof and another continu-

ance while the illegal search decision was reviewed.

Thereby Mr. Calderon learned the prosecution’s princi-

pal testimony in advance and had plenty of time to

prepare a defense. By means of the transcripts he

could nail the prosecution witnesses on inconsistencies.

As a misdemeanor defendant the judge was not en-.

titled to the above pre-trial procedures. He would

hear the prosecution’s testimony for the first time at

the trial, after which he would be afforded perhaps a

half hour recess before putting on his defense. Since

the charge was now labelled a misdemeanor, some

jurors would tend to vote for conviction more lightly

than they would in a felony proceeding.

Although the judge denies guilt, under the circum-

ain

stances he accepted a standard plea bargain, nolo con-

tendere to ‘‘trespassing.’’ (Mne. Ct. No. 521454)’

The case has been referred to the Commission on

Judicial Qualifications for possible ‘‘disciplinary ac-

tion.’’ Since, in civil proceedings arising from crim-

inal charges, a plea bargain is not proof of guilt, this

means the Commission may make an independent

‘*eivil’’ determination as to whether the original crim-

inal charge was true.

The California Supreme Court has ruled in Zitney

v State Bar (1966) 64 Cal.2d 787 that an attorney’s

license may be revoked on the precise charge of which

he was acquitted by jury in a criminal trial. Its pre-

mises seem equally applicable to judges, on the argu-

ment that a judge, being an exemplar to, among others,

‘children of tender years,’’ should not have the benefit

of reasonable doubt.

The salary of a California Superior Court Judge,

about $40,000 a year, is, like the salaries of high rank-

ing police officers, whopping good pay by the stan-

dards of the man in the street. This, combined with

the ceremonial respect a judge receives, can put him

in a dream world in which he forgets that his income

is only about one one-thousandth of that of one of Cali-

fornia’s First Families, such as the Chandler’s, whose

Times-Mirror Company netted forty million in 1973,

and who are among the backers of the internal attack.

1Appellant does not imply impropriety in the judge’s arrest. When this

appeal and the Calderon applications are published by appellant, the above case

number and the names of the other defendants to such charges with the cxcep-

tion of Mr. Calderon will be omitted.

—~ =

Some judges seem to have imagined that they them-

selves were immune from prosecution, and that, there-

fore, erosion of the rights a defendant presented no

danger to them personally. Several recent instances

of the indictment and conviction of judges have been

bringing them back to earth.

Probably a lot of judges have agreed with Los An-

geles Police Chief Davis that the private citizen’s right

to have firearms should be retained. They have more

reason to agree now that some policemen are using

withdrawal of their protection as a means of unionized

blackmail. Nevertheless, several prominent State

Senators and Assemblymen are pushing Assembly Bill

No. 2426 which would require private citizens to sur-

render their handguns to the police.

Recently, during a traffic altercation, a Los An-

geles County Superior Court Judge threatened the

other driver with a handgun. One can believe not a

few judges would be inclined these days to do likewise

to any policeman who tried to deprive them of their

weapons.

Not every policeman would disapprove, particular-

ly those planning to become judges themselves. They

remember what happened to Judge Harold J. Haley

in 1970 when he and a prosecutor were kidnapped from

his courtroom in Marin County. The police knew that

a shotgun was taped to the judge’s neck ready to blow

his head off if an attempt were made to thwart the

kidnapping. They also knew that they could not fire

afiiios

on the kidnappers without also firing on the prose-

cutor. Nevertheless, the police opened fire. One of

their shots crippled the prosecutor for life, and the

judge, of course, was killed. After that several judges

preferred to carry handguns themselves rather than

entrust their protection to the police.

The judge who drew his handgun during the traf-

fic altereation is Charles Older. This is the same jur-

ist who, in the face of press clamor and distortion,

maintained an iron-willed insistence that any defen-

dant has a right to be tried without inflammatory pub-

licity. Thereby he defeated a project, initiated by

Evelle Younger and culminating in the William Farr

contempt matter, aimed at destroying this right.

Underneath the facade, American judicial tempera-

ment has not changed any since the days of the Honor-

able Stephen J. Field who, before becoming a Justice

of the U.S. Supreme Court, was first a California

lawyer, then a California Legislator and next a Justice

of that State’s Supreme Court. During his law prac-

tice one Judge Turner, whose rulings Mr. Field fre-

quently took exception to, resented this to the point of

telling people he had in mind provoking a gunfight

with Mr. Field. Judge Turner was a much better shot,

so Mr. Field sought advice from Justice Nathaniel

Bennett of the California Supreme Court. Justice

Bennett recommended that Mr. Field wait in the street

and shoot Judge Turner on sight. Instead Mr. Field

started practicing with a pair of revolvers and appar-

SS

—_— =

ently when Judge Turner heard about this it dissuaded

him.

Later, as a U.S. Supreme Court Justice, Mr. Field

rendered a decision that one of the litigants disagreed

with. The litigant, the Honorable David 8S. Terry, for-

merly Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court,

was in the courtroom and he showed his disapproval

by knocking down a marshal, breaking one of the mar-

shal’s teeth and pulling a knife on some other marshals.

Justice Field sentenced Mr. Terry, with whom he had

formerly served on the California Supreme Court, to

six months, and saw that he served every day of it.

When Mr. Terry was released he accosted Justice Field

in a California restaurant and began slapping him

around. Justice Field had obtained a bodyguard in

anticipation of this, and the bodyguard shot Mr. Terry

through the heart. It looked like premeditated exces-

sive force, so Justice Field and his bodyguard were ar-

rested on murder charges. However, they were more

or less cleared. (In re Neagle (1890) 135 U.S. 1)

In drafting California law Justice Field’s contribu-

tions had been prodigious. Mr. Terry had been noted

as an honest and able jurist.

The moral is: the fact of a judge being a pro is no

guarantee he would not resort to curbstone justice if

this seemed to be the only justice available, and in such

the case he would not be deterred from violence by the

fact that the object of it was another judge.

Collaterally, in the course of appellant's case before

—23—

the State courts, it became evident that he was using

a modification of the rabble rousing technique, and that

this technique did not depend on the cooperation of the

major press facilities. It was obviously calculated to

inflame the more educated and affluent of the rank

and file, the judiciary and the police, against members

of their group who had been feathering their own nests

by assisting a plan to reduce their colleagues to the

level of little brothers of the rich.

After it was also evident that the medical conviction

would not thwart appellant’s plaus the California

Supreme Court began making moves that suggested it

was trying to create a refutation of the charges appel-

lant would make to the public. These moves were deci-

sions which superficially contradict appellant’s charges

that the appellate courts have been undertaking to

eliminate the necessity of reasonable doubt, jury un-

animity etc. for convictions.

Among these decisions are People v Burnick (1975)

14 Cal.3d 306 and People v Feagley (1975) 14 Cal.3d

338. These decisions adopt one of the main points of

the Calderon appeal to this Court No. 73-1615, i.e., that

it is unjust to stigmatize a person as a sex offender

through a civil proceeding. Feagley expressly rejects

the doctrine sanctioned by a majority of this Court in

Johnson v Louisiana (1972) 406 U.S. 356 that a hung

jury is sufficient to send a person to prison if a major-

ity vote for conviction. By inference it also rejected

the doctrine of Williams v Florida (1970) 399 U.S. 78

wherein this Court with the exception of Mr. Justice

—)

Marshall ruled that a six member jury was sufficient

for criminal cases carrying life imprisonment.

Another such move occurred January 16, 1975, when

the California Supreme Court granted a hearing in

Loder v Superior Court (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 231. In

this case a public school employee complains that the

records of a dismissed criminal charge against him

were used as grounds for non-reemployment. He seeks

to have the records sealed.

Concurrently with the granting of a hearing in

Loder, Senate Bill 1278 has been introduced in the Cal-

ifornia Legislature. This bill provides that whenever

a criminal charge has been acquitted or dismissed the

records shall be sealed and the arrest and all proceed-

ings thereunder shall be deemed not to have occurred.

This would make a teacher dismissal action based

on acquitted or dismissed charges impossible. There-

fore, when appellant presented the Calderon matter to

the public he would seem to be discussing a problem

that had already been corrected.

The plan behind these developments is, apparently,

to present them as new statutary and/or ‘‘decisional’’

law, with the Calderon teacher dismissal decisions be-

ing treated as res judicata. Since a decision is not res

judicata if it is arrived at through criminal collusion

it was important to the Court of Appeal not to encour-

ag. an Investigation of those decisions. Therefore, it

could not reverse the medical conviction herein since

=~ =

this would give appellant a plume that would add to

his ability to bring about such an investigation.

In Faretta supra there is an intriguing about face

from this Court’s position on February 20, 1973, as re-

ported in 410 U.S. 944. On that date this Court, with

the exception of Mr. Justice Douglas. denied a petition

No. 72-5503 by the defendant for certiorari in People v

Sharp supra, the decision which denied the right of

self-representation. There is an equal contrast provid-

ed by Justice Burger’s 1975 dissent in Faretta wherein

he said, ‘‘ . . . there is nothing desirable or useful in

permitting every accused person, even the most un-

educated and inexperienced, to insist on conducting his

own defense.’’ In 1959 he had said in Brown v United

States 264 Fed.2d 363, 369, that although compulsory

aid from amicus curiae to a pro se defendant would

sometimes be appropriate in complicated cases, ‘‘ The

accused should, however, still be permitted to present

his own case without reference to what is presented by

the amicus curiae.”’

Oviously, it would be highly improper for appellant

to herein impugn the motives of any Justice of this

Court. Such an accusation, if any, would be permis-

sible only before some other body. It is essential to ap-

pellant’s standing before the public that the record

hereof show him to have observed every propriety and

courtesy before this Court.

However, it may be constructive to point out some

vf the speculations that may develop in the public if

this appeal] is dismissed.

eniiiiue

The fact that appellant would eventually take the

pro se question to the Court was evident when this

Court accepted the application from petitioner Far-

etta. It might be speculated that this Court, aware

that the attempted destruction of the self-representa-

tion right had to be abandoned in order that appellant

would not have this point to present to the public, rea-

soned it would be better to give the victory to someone

other than appellant. Appellant might use it in the

way that, according to Mr. Justice Blackmun in his

Faretta dissent, some defendants will use the self-rep-

resentation right, i.e., ‘‘for personal or political self-

gratification.’’

It might also be speculated that it seemed good poli-

tics to uphold the self-representation right by a split

decision in order not to completely offend the people

Evelle Younger was lobbying for when he tried to de-

stroy that right by trickery at the ballot box. A fur-

ther speculation might be that the dissent was intended

to lend some seeming legitimacy to the three day jail

sentence, since a split decision would imply that the

self-representation issue was one on which reasonable

minds could disagree.

Such speculation is sure to follow any disposition of

this appeal that does not include reversal of the medi-

cal conviction, vacation of the contempt order and dam-

ages for the false imprisonment.

Appellant submits that, in view of the imminence

of a break-down of law and order in California, this is

—- =

no time for this Court to issue a decision that suggests

that justice is unobtainable through the judicial

process.

ALL OF APPELLANT’S ALLEGATIONS AS TO THE

PROCEEDINGS BELOW ARE VERIFIABLE

As alleged in the Jurisdictional Statement, appel-

lant sought damages for the jailing through mandamus

as providing for by California law. If it is claimed

that there is some irregularity in combining an appeal

from the mandamus decision with the appeal from the

trial judgement, appellant submits that this was cured

when the Court of Appeal refrained from treating the

matter as improperly before it and instead tried to

make it appear that the jailing had not occurred.

It may be contended that some of the citations from

various transcripts ete. are of things not in the record.

Nevertheless, these things occurred within the proceed-

ings below.

While the Clerk was preparing the record for ap-

peal Judge Light’s attitude was typified by the fact

that he would not even allow the transcript of the pre-

liminary hearing to be included. In considering a mo-

tion by appellant for augmentation of the record the

Court of Appeal’s attitude was about the same.

Appellant encountered a similar problem in having

the trial court record show that the Constitutional is-

sues were timely raised. He first raised these issues in

a habeas corpus application filed in the Superior Court

—28—

on August 23, 1972. However, appellant’s copy of the

minute order attached as Appendix ZI and appellant’s

stamped copies of the documents he filed are the only

remaining evidence of the application. Everything

else has disappeared from the Clerk’s files.

Appellant again raised the Constitutional issues in

his amendment to his petition to the Court of Appeal

for mandamus and/or certiorari. The copy of that

Court’s order attached as ZII shows that the amend-

ment was returned to appellant without explanation.

Appellant did manage to get his challenges of Busi-

ness and Professions Code Section 7321, 7325 and 7415

into the record of the proceedings before Judge Lon-

don. However, at the behest of the Attorney General,

the Court of Appeal relegated much of the Reporter’s

Transcript of these proceedings to a sort of ‘‘unoffic-

ial’’ portion of the record.

In view of what appellant has been up against in

building the record for appeal, appellant submits that,

if the Attorney General makes any statement like the

one in the Opinion that ‘‘Our attention is invited to no

part of the record supporting the claimed error,”’ this

Court should add a grain of salt to it.

Judge Light is ordinarily a very superior jurist.

To show that this assertion is not idle flattery, attached

as Appendix ZIII are copies of pages 861-863 of the

Reporter’s Transcript. They contain some of the more

wuusing exchanges during the trial and show Judge

Light’s flair for conducting same.

; _ ewe Y

PRR A e n anee - (Mamie.

-™-=

Appellant, who enjoys a game of wits with danger

involved, wishes to show his appreciation to the judge

for providing one. The most appropriate way to do

this, appellant feels, is to urge all procedural safe-

guards for a defendant, in case Judge Light ever has

need of them himself.

Respectfully submitted,

WYN RUMMLER

In Propria Persona

nollie

APPENDIX “W”

CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE—1975-76 REGULAR SESSION

Assembly Concurrent Resolution No. 103

Introduced by Assemblyman Bane

June 26, 1975

REFERRED TO COMMITTEE ON RULES

Assembly Concurrent Resolution No. 103—Relative to the

practice of cosmetology.

LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST

ACR 103, as introduced, Bane (Rls.). Practice of cosmetol-

ogy.

This measure requests the enforcement division of the De-

partment of Consumer Affairs to cease citing unlicensed in-

dividuals providing simple beauty services for violations of

the Business and Professions Code until the Legislature acts

on pending legislation.

Fiscal committee: no.

WHEREAS, The California State Department of

Consumer Affairs has caused some individuals, who have

been for years providing some simple beauty services, to

be cited for violations of the Business and Professions

Code; and

WHEREAS, Instructing such tradespeople to cease

performing their services to the public seriously damages

the economic well-being of those tradespeople and their

dependents at a time of high unemployment and at the

10 same time deprives their satisfied customers of service

1l they have enjoyed; and

12 WHEREAS, The Fourth District Court of Appeals, in

OOBnNODUhwWNr-

aula:

ACR 103 —2—

OOWOnNOW’ULh WN

SSRASKRKSRBSESBRNERRSL

the decision of Whitcomb v. Emerson, has held that in the

absence of a limited license to practice specialized

cosmetology services, it is unreasonable to require the

practitioner of a limited specialty to take the full

1,600-hour cosmetology training course and successfully

pass an examination on the entire field of cosmetology,

including hair, scalp, and nail care; and

WHEREAS, There is legislation pending before the

Legislature that will resolve the question as to whether

such simple services shall be exempted from licensing or

become regulated and licensed; and

WHEREAS, The intensity of interest in the problem is

exemplified by the introduction of AB 2386 by

Assemblyman Tom Bane, which is coauthored by

Assemblyman Leon Ralph, Chairman of the Assembly

Rules Committee, Assemblyman Julian Dixon, Majority

Caucus Chairman, Assemblyman Alister McAlister,

Chairman of the Assembly Finance, Insurance, and

Commerce Committee, Assemblyman Louis Papan,

Chairman of the Licensing Subcommittee, Assemblyman

Richard Alatorre, Assemblyman Willie Brown, Senator

Jack Schrade, Chairman of the Senate Business and

Professions Committee, and Senator Bill Greene, to

provide for limited licensing of those persons engaged in

the practice of makeup and eyelash application and leg

waxing; and

WHEREAS, The State Board of Cosmetology, which is

under the Department of Consumer Affairs, is actively

supporting the above-mentioned special licensing

legislation; now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Assembly of the State of California, the

Senate thereof concurring, That the enforcement

division of the Department of Consumer Affairs cease its

activities which are putting the above-mentioned people

out of work until the Legislature resolves the question

through the legislation pending before it; and be it

further

Resolved, That the Chief Clerk of the Assembly

transmit a copy of this resolution to the State Department

of Consumer Affairs, the Board of Cosmetology, and to

ny

ea

—33—

APPENDIX “X”

PORE BPE rpg gure

(ex st ait

4

SWwr/- FF STARLI SYS AY 7

JLXROUTIVE J'5 R& PTA

Ya ’ .

FOL1 202 TOA 1T!a12

YELLOW SQeoRND£4/S7

AC = 7

Low CROTON,

POOIM FER

(“ACE ASU VANATOMN

AAGAL STRATE GIS T

7oaP. Not wa? of LE Cae y OO a

wcrsre -

|

\

cae 2-36

; —34—

i

“4 3 IN Tid NUNACIPAL COURT OF LOS ANGELES JUDICIAL DisvRicy

| -* - s meow .

2 | COUATY OF LOS ANCELES, STATE OF CALIVONNIA

3 |

{

+ |

D | THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, }

Plaintiff, ;

’ ) €.0. # 5978

vs. F

;

8 NONA UBER and WYN RUMMLER,

9 Defendant s.

10

i WHEREAS, on the 26th day of September, 1972 in

12 Division 117 of the above entitled court, JAMES DI GIUSEPPE 9

13 a judge thereof presicing, and while said court was actually in

14 session in the courtroom and cnasaged in ROSS ede Ra? DASA

the above, No. Al22256,. . .. ss, — ;

15 cf which said Court haa jurigdiction ut said time, and said named

16 || defendants, and gach, of, eR. cones of the court aid suid jucsc

17 thereof, did then and there comcuct biacely in tue following

li

18 manner:

19 |

20 | See EXHIBIT "A" attached hereto, and by this

21 reference hereby incorporated as though set forth fully at

22 length herein.

23

t

24 |

A]

25 |

-6

—*

27 } a

28 _gaidstevemenss vrere-mede by satt

29 insolent, euseréssive,—dbellirerent,

30 | Lemptuous tone of voice, and

}

_ bbrca toning deacanor toward said eourt;—ert the juére there

alie

eo

_

|

7OTS76L 2/70

——3§... |

WHEREAS ,» seid statements, acts and conduct made by said

defendents, and each of them were willful and in disobedience of

the lawful orders of this Court made on June 14, 1972, July 10,

1972, and September 18, 1972. That said statements and conduct of

said defendants, and each of them, tended to and did obstruct the

administration of justice and interfere with the orderly proceed-

ings of the court at said time and place aforesaid, and said state-

ments, acts and conduct did tend to and did bring the court into

contempt and tended to and did interrupt its proceedings and impair

respect for said court and the peace of said judicial proceedings

and created a disturbance thereof, interfering with the due and

orderly course of court proceedings.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED by

this court that by reason of the acts, conduct and statements by

said defendants, and each of them, above mentioned, said defendants

were and are guilty of contempt of this court and the judge thereof

and of the authority of this court, and were emmmbOitterthe con-

mitted in the presence of this court while in actual session on

the 26th day of September, 1972, and

|

|

i

i

. |

-2-

7OTS7OL 2/70.

SSS Se

=_— =

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that for

said offense and said contempt and said acts and conduct above

mentioned that said defendants, and each of them, be confined

in the County Jail for a term of three days, commencing forth-

with. The Sheriff is directed to carry this judgment into

effect and confine said defendants, and each of them, in the

County Jail of Los Angeles County, State of California, for

said term of three days.

Done in open court this 26th day of September, 1972.

e ol sa °

= =

You have not shown any diligence. You have will-

fully been disobeying the order of this Court made

July 10, again on September 18, and as such this

Court finds both of you in contempt of court. You

are both sentenced to three days in the County

Jail. Your preliminary hearing is trailed to

October 6 at 8:30 a.m.

You are both again Placed under order to appear on

October 6 with counsel. If you fail to appear with

counsel on October 6, you will again be found in

contempt of court, and perhaps at that time this

Court will make an order that both of you remain

in custody until such time as you appear with

counsel.

Do you both understand that?

Mr. Rummler?

Yes, sir.

Mrs. Uber?

Yes.

That's the order of this Court.

May I say something?

Yes, you may.

I do have an arrangement with someone.

I have asked you about --

Mr. Leete. I have told you many times that he can

appear for me on December 11.

I understand what you've told me about Mr. Leete.

You have been telling me that Mr. Leete represented

you in this case and that you have been talking

with Mr. Leete. Mr. Leete has never made any

appearances in this case. You were told to talk

to Mr. Leete and have him come in, and I am not

~9-

= =

there successive opportunities by Judge DiGiuseppe

on three separate occasions to comply with a then exist-

ing order, which he had not attacked in and of itself,

notwithstanding that he came to court together with

Mrs. Uber on the third continued day.

He was questioned at length by the Judge and he

made representations to the Judge about the efforts

he had made, and I believe Mrs. Uber did. Judge Di-

Giuseppe. as far as I know—Well, he was absent from

the bench almost an hour. He came back, recited that

he had attempted to confirm the statement made to

him about the lawyers contacted and except in one case

he found that they—Well, to sum up—they had not

been advanced in good faith, he believed, to him. That

he had not been told correctly what had happened.

And the order of contempt, and this is where I continue

to marvel, was framed in such a way that it did speci-

fically recite the reason for the contempt: that there

had been willful disobedience with an order of the

Court and certain language that had originally been

framed *‘for loud and tumultuous conduct”’ was clearly

and unequivocally blocked out by the clerk. And Mr.

Rummiler seized continually on that to argue that there

had been a willful conspiracy by Judge DiGiuseppe to

indicate that he had been tumultuous when he hadn’t

been. And he certainly hadn’t been. But the order

didn’t recite that. The order had been crossed off

—39—

and he is still chewing on that cud. It is very disturb-

ing.

As far as Mrs. Flaegel is concerned.

There are none so blind as those who will not see.

—_— | —_

APPENDIX “Y”

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL

OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

WYN RUMMLER, )

Petitioner,)

v )

MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE LOS ) 2d Civ.

ANGELES JUDICIAL DISTRICT, )No. 41236

Respondent, )

PEOPLE OF THE STATE )

OF CALIFORNIA, )

Real Party in Interest)

Municipal Court of the Los Angeles Judicial District

No. A 122256

ORDER

THE COURT:

WHEREAS, on February 13, 1973 County Counsel

of the County of Los Angeles representing respondent

court filed with this court a letter-response that, inter

alia, included the following request:

‘Therefore, 1 would request on behalf of respon-

dent that the stay order originally issued by this Court

be modified so as tu permit respondent court to conduct

autiien

a hearing (with a court reporter present) concerning

petitioner’s ability to represent himself.’’; and

WHEREAS, the holding of said hearing will give

to petitioner the only relief which he presently seeks

and to which he is presently entitled; and

WHEREAS, there appears to be no reason why the

legitimate objectives of the instant petition will not be

accomplished and rendered moot by the holding of

said hearing, |

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the

petition itself is denied and the stay order heretofore

issued is terminated to permit the respondent court to

proceed expeditiously with the proposed hearing.

te 5)

ania

APPENDIX “Z”

OFFICE OF i

ADM'N, PROCEQURE |

i

|

!

!

comm EXHISIT

AGINGY Chama.

SLE NOA2 2602 8.

DATE ye

EVELLE J. YOUNGER, Attorney General

DORA LEVIN, Deputy Attorney General

800 Tishman Building

3580 Wilshire Boulevard

Los Angeles, California 90010

Telephone: (213) 620-2178

Attorneys for Complainant

BEFORE THE BOARD OF COSMETOLOGY

DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER AFFALRS

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In the Matter of the Accusation

Against: NO. 1682

NONA UBER

10822 Ventura Boulevard DECLARAT.ON

North Hollywood, California 91604

Cosmetologist License No. E-51089 and

Cosmetological Establishment License

No. A-80213,

Respondent.

ae ee ee ee ee ee ee”

I, RICHARD ARONSOHN, M.D., declare as follows:

I am a Physician licensed to practice medicine in the

State of California. I specialize in plastic surgery and chemo-

surgery. My business address is 6333 Wilshire Boulevard,

Los Angeles, California.

I examined Mrs. Dorothy Fleigel on October 30, 1970.

I found that she had suffered chemical burns on her entire face

and the frontal portion of her neck, extending to the upper

portion of her chest. Parts of her forehead and neck were

| completely and permanently depigmentized, and these areas were

mixed in with areas of hyperpigmentation (brown spots) which

would disappear in time. I found that Mrs. Fleigel'’s chin and

neck were permanently scarred, and that her lower eyelids drooped

OLiajr

‘L ADM LA

74-1116

~~ =

down and away from the corneas, causing lack of control of

lachrymal fluids.

I am familiar with the use of Phenol for facial re-

juvenation, In r oumens we > in strengthe-ranging

Erom-55—percent-to 88 percent, but I treat small areas at a time,

because of discomfort accompanying such treatment. Based on my

Ue Meuitd A VY mm he 24

examination of Mrs, Fleigel, I have ig d that i Rene was

waa ho] and-88- percent in ~

used in her case,

steength. Application of Phenol in strengths between 50 and 88

percent can produce dangerous effects, including convulsions,

respiratory failure, kidney damage, and even death.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing

is true and correct.

Executed on the {ue fas ef? , 1975,

day of

at Los Angeles, California.

— PP Maou wake

Dowdell.

HEARING OFFICER: Declaration is No. 5.

MRS. LEVIN: And finally I suppose these two

documents can be admitted together. There is a notice

to respondent pursuant to government code section

11514 informing her that declarations will be admitted

into evidence unless she notifies me she wishes to cross

examine the declarant and there is a declaration of

service by mail showing that the declarations and no-

tices were mailed to the respondent at her address of

record on March 5, 1975, and I will represent to the

Hearing Officer that no request for cross-examination

has been received by me.

HEARING OFFICER: I wouldn’t be at all sur-

prised. Okay, the notice and declaration is Exhibit 6.

MRS. LEVIN: That concludes the presentation of

evidence on behalf of the complainant.

HEARING OFFICER: As I understand it, the

declaration of the doctor says that Phenol was used, it

caused burns and the declaration of Phyllis Dowdell

indicates that phenol was used as well as the declara-

tion of Dorthy Fleigel who was apparently the victim.

MRS. LEVIN: That’s correct.

HEARING OFFICER: Do you have a recom-

mendation ?

oe oe

MRS. LEVIN: Yes. I would like to point out

preliminarily I don’t know whether this is apparent

from the certificate or not but apparently Nora Uber

is an elderly lady and the indication is that she would

not return to California or practice cosmetology in

California ; However, I would recommend that the pen-

alty of revocation be imposed in this case since it ap-

pears from the

46 | =

APPENDIX “Z-I° | APPENDIX “Z-IT”’

ee eo ee IN THE COURT OF APPEAL

ye Bea g - ~ 2 , & if

2 $ = & 1 ig 1S OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

a oe uF ft |g ; SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

-_ » & O x re) . F le DIVISION ONE

= a © S = *< ' = Io

PE BS f = |,

2, * Es 0% a | WYN RUMMLER, )

oo O f - > re _

2 8 gio ~ Petitioner,)

” a 4 se | = <n Vv )

> o z 4 = & A

@ 8 % : “4 oO MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE LOS _)

Ep: a > | ANGELES JUDICIAL DISTRICT, _) 2d Civ.

a + oO Z . 2 Respondent, ) No. 41236

= @ ¢ 9 "= | 5 PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CAL- +S)

P=. s 2 2| § IFORNIA, BY THEIR ATTORNEY,

y @ § § = = 2 JOSEPH P. BUSCH, )

r 5 iu z & 3 & Real Party in Interest.)

> 5 @

i=] ct ® _

za*% 4 , DER

y 1 | ew ap OR

ges LL? Ltives |

3 2 0 as aS E | Appellant Wyn Rummler has presented to this

~ Oo a E ee 2 5 | | court for filing a document entitled ‘‘Amendment to

he SS a 2.3 ss Petition for a Writ of Prohibition and/or in the Alter-

5 = ° ; - Be Zz = ; native Mandate and/or Certiorari, with Supporting

> ke ™ z A a | | Memorandum of Points and Authorities.”” The pro-

\o 4 a S al 2 3 a posed amendment consists of 94 typewritten pages and

Sf @ @ m4 Sse Is an additional document entitled “Exhibits” which con-

. & ct 3 4 4 E sists of approximately 80 pages. There were 25 pages

° » € 4 | a = in the original petition. This proposed amendment to

RS 8 of ce |S the petition was submitted for filing about 24 months

=~

oo ” z =

SE: ' i

- @& |

> 9

, = 3

—_ =

after the original petition was filed. Permission to

file the proposed ‘‘ Amendment to Petition’’ is denied.

Dated: February 14, 1973.

wooD

Presiding Justice

~~

APPENDIX “Z-IIT’”’

THE COURT: Just a minute. It will stand and

the jury will be the ones to decide whether that does,

in fact, have any relationship to the outcome of this

case.

That is, assuming they find that to be a fact neces-

sary for them to consider in assessing credibility.

THE WITNESS: Now, with respect to my pres-

ent credit standing, despite the fact that this charge

has been—

The COURT: Just a minute. Your credit stand-

ing, sir, has no bearing on the issues in this case.

MR. RUMMLER: That is exactly what I wanted

to ask your Honor.

If I understand correctly, I can call witnesses as

character witnesses, if I understand what you told me,

for myself. But, I cannot state anything about my own

character.

Is that correct ?

THE COURT: That is correct.

MR. RUMMLER: I see.

THE COURT: You are charged in Count I], sir,

with a crime that imvolves the character trait of

honesty.

MR. RUMMLER: Yes.

= =

THE COURT: As such, you are entitled to offer

testimony that you have good character for honesty,

if you wish to do so.

You may do that by calling persons who are fam-

iliar with your trait of character for honesty.

MR. RUMMLER: I feel that I am familiar with

myself.

THE COURT: Well, I’m sorry, sir, the law does

not permit an individual to give testimony as to his own

character.

It is permitted, it is character evidence based on

his reputation in the community in which he lives and

the people with whom he associates as tending to indi-

eate that one who has a good character for honesty

would be less likely to commit the crime that involves

a character trait of dishonesty.

MR. RUMMLER: Well, I certainly don’t want to

disobey any order of this Court. I am an in pro per

defendant. And it’s always been my understanding

that when a criminal defendant is being—

MR. CARSTAIRS: I am going to object to this,

your Honor. It is argument.

MR. RUMMLER: It is not argument, it is an ex-

planation.

MR. CARSTAIRS: Mr. Rummler has represented

himself as being sufficiently skilled and able to act in

propria persona. I think it ill-behooves him now to

alien

plead poor-mouth and claim that he just doesn’t under-

stand.

MR. RUMMLER: I think it ill—

THE COURT: Suffice it to say, Mr. Rummler,

you may not testify to your own character traits.

Proceed, sir.

MR. RUMMLER: Yes. Now, I would like Mr.

Carstairs instructed to have the courtesy to not inter-

rupt and cut in the way he does when I’m speaking.

It’s not done in a court.

I assume he’s had sufficient experience in court

procedure to know that.

THE COURT: Allright. Let’s eliminate the col-

loquy, gentlemen.

If you have an objection, Mr. Carstairs, make the

objection and state the grounds. And that will be suf-

ficient.

MR. CARSTAIRS: Yes, your Honor. The only

disability that I labor under is that if I wait for the

conclusion of the effluvium of Mr. Rummler, it will

be too late.

THE COURT: Now, that’s not required, Mr. Car-

stairs. We all labor under some burdens and that’s

one you will have to bear.

MR. CARSTAIRS: Very well, your Honor.

—§2—

MR. RUMMLER: Well, in order not to disobey

any rules, it has been my understanding that a criminal

defendant on the witness stand was encouraged to say

anything he saw fit with the view that he might thereby

reveal something incriminating.

However, it appears in this case—

THE COURT: Just a moment. Approach the

bench with the reporter, please.

(The following proceedings were had at the

bench, outside the hearing of the jury:)

THE COURT: Now, Mr. Rummler, as a defen-

dant charged with a crime of theft, if you wish to do

so, you may testify that, ‘““I am a thoroughly honest

man. I have never done a dishonest thing in my life.”’

However, if you do that, you open the door to the

prosecution to bring forward any evidence that they

may have of any past dishonest act that you may have

performed.

But. you may not say, ‘‘I have a reputation in the

community for honesty.’’ That is something you are

not qualified to testify to. Only others in the commun-

ity may testify as to their evaluation of your character.

Do you understand the difference?

MR. RUMMLER: Yes. I will be wanting then

two character witnesses Monday. I’m sorry, but I will

need them in the morning.

THE COURT: All right. Since you have taken

<a

the stand as a witness, you are also privileged to bring

forward any character witness to testify to your char-

acter as to truthfulness.

MR. RUMMLER: Yes.

THE COURT: Because your truthfulness is now

at issue since you have become a witness.

Here again, if you want to say, ‘‘I have never lied

in my life,’ you may do so. If you think the jury will

believe that.

MR. RUMMLER: That will be one of my long list

of lies, if I said that.

MR. CARSTAIRS: Can a witness comment on his

own credibility, your Honor, in that fashion?

THE COURT: Oh, yes. If in cross examination

the thrust of the argument is the witness is lying, he

may say, ‘‘I am not lying. I have never told a lie in

my life.’’

Of course, he opens up the door to the prosecution

to be able to prove any past lie that he may have en-

gaged in.

But, he may not say, ‘‘1’m known in the community

as a truthful person.’’ That he’s not competent to test-

ify to. That requires character evidence.