Reply Brief for the United States — United States v. San Francisco

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a Oc TOBER x PERM, 1989 py 2

Unirep States OF A’MERICA, PETITIONER

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Ciry anp County ov. SAN ERANCISCO, A MUNICIPAL rf

CORPORATION ye

6\ WRIT OF CERTIORSRI ‘TO THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT

COURT OF AP ALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT |

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REPLY BRIEF ‘por THE.UNITED STATES 6)

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INDEX

Page

"Argument:

Section 6 of the Raker Aet is a constitutional exercise of

« the law-making power of Congress and @s a law its

: enforceability is in no way affected -by the equitable

are asserted by the respondent- Sunes a cphiptocntne 1

. Section 6 of the Raker Act-is constitutional, _----- 2

. Respondent is ope to deny the constitution- ,

ality of Section 6. uke 8 atuwnec ner weus 4

“a . 3. Section 6 is to be given effect as a. statute bas = ‘5

4. Since Section 6 is a valid’ Federal statute, its require- Ps

* .: ment¢ cannot, be defeated by defenses urged by

or respdndent as effective against the enforcemfént>

es ae of mere contyact rights... + » ee aie 6

Conclusion... - anes: paw akc 5 une ee areks 8

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ee CITATIONS ie

Cases: ete ;

- Arizona.v. California, 283 U. 8. 423. inch

- Booth Fisheries v. Industrial Comm., 271 U.S. 208. wick ole

Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis!-327. meh cee

Bungh vy. Cole 263 U. 8. 250... hace

Butte City Water Co. v. ages. 196 U.S. 149 ye :

athoun Vv. Massie, 253 U. 8. 170. , ae

California Power Co: v. fies aver Cement Co., 295 U , 8. 142_

Camfield v. United States; 167 U. 8. 518 cee:

Daniels v. Tearney, 102 U. apd er

Frisbie v. United States, 67 U: 8. 166. :

Gibson v. Chougeau,. 13 Wall. 92 ich

Grand tapi gece Ry. Co. v. Oshorn, 193 U. 8. 17_-

Hall v. Rusbell, 101 U.S. 503- ae

Highland v. Russell art ‘o., 279 U.S. 253 : pee {7

Inyo Consolidated Water Co. v. JessA61 Cal. 516_2-_-

Kern River Co: y. United States, 257 U. $.-147-

a Los Angeles Investment Co. v. Gary, 181 Cal, 680_

Luz v, Haggin, 69 Cal. 245 ; VS

_ McKelvey v. United Slates, — Uy. S. 353. - - Sr

QANAATH AS WAP WWE WAWAAD PS &

Martin v. Imbrie, 262 Fed. poets Crass

Missouri, etc., Ry. Co.'v.. Resa we, Co., 97 U. 8. 491 :

New York v. United States, 257 U.S. 591 .

North* Dakota-Montana W. G. pies v. United States, 66

F. (2d) 5737. --<..- go. TIAA SE epee a 4,5

. 8 (1) .

219164—40

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Cases—-Continued.

Oregon & Cal, R. R, v..United States, 238 U. 8. 393__, 3, - ahd

“Rio Grande W eatern ” maa Compony v. ysis ga pick 239 ;

in a ; 2

Rudy v. Rossi, 248 U. Sta Pees _Lesereedpeal

St. Lowis' Co. v. Prendergast Co., 260°: 8. 469. ioe ened SPS

San Juan Light Co. v. Requena, 224 USS. a ee 2

Silver Lake etc. Co. v. Los Angeles, 176 Cal. 96 " 5

* Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251 4

¢ Sunderland v. United States, 266 U. 8. 226.....:-. -», ef

United States v. Alford,-274 U.S. 264. °.. PL pon! Pe 3

tnited States v. Belmont, 301 Ue 8. 324. -. .- ee 6

- United States v. Denver &é Railway, 159 U.S. 1___. ; 5,

‘United’ States v. Midivest Oil Cos, 236 U. 8. 459 2.0.0.5 2 5

United States v. Southern Oregon Co., 225 Fed. 560... > se

Utah Péwer & Light Co. v. t ‘mited States, 243 U. 8. 389. - ie 3

Vidal v. Girarii’s Executors, 2 How. 126.....- - - 6

Wall. v. Parrot Silver & Copper Ca., 244.0. S. 407. ___- e. 4

* Wasatch Mtning Co. v. Crescent Mining Co., 148 U.S. 293_- 2

Winona & St. Peter R. R. Co. v. Barney, 113 U.S. 618. 5

- Wisconsin Central R'd Co. v. Forsythe, 159 U.S. 46... ne. 4

Constitution and statute: : & =

U.S. Const: | | set i

hth one. 88, 8.2 es ota 3

Raker Act of Dee. 19,4913, ¢. 4, BY Stat. 242:

x} eee : 1, 2, 4, 6,7

~ See. 9 (Cu) . ; ies fe

Texts and miscellaneons: . |

461. D. 89__--. ae ; 4.

531.D.425...... % 2

3 Thompson, Real Pédperty (92); BO. 2007, : $:

6 Williston, Contracts (Rev. ed. 1988), « see. 1932 me °.7

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Inthe Supreme Court of theWnited States.

QcroneR TERM, 1939:

No. 587 !

«+L serep Saves or AMERICA, PETITIONER - LO od

; : ’ uv. . ‘ PSs ‘ , s

City AND County oF SAN FRANCISCO, A Monicrra

oy CORPORA TION . 3

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ON WRIT- OF CERTIORARI TO % HE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT

{© COURT OF APPE ALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

wv

REPLY BRIEF FOR THE a states

SECTION 6 OF THE RAKER ACT 18% CONSTITUTIONAL

EXERCISE OF THE LAW-MAKING POWER OF CONGRESS

.% AND AS A LAW ITS ENFORCEABILITY IS IN NO WAY.

AFFECTED BY THE EQUITABLE DEFENSES ASSERTED -

BY THE RESPONDENT ; | : ,

ae addition to the argument on the two points

raised in the Government’s mainsbrief, the re-\

spohdent raisés.a further question: “It is asserted >

that Seetion 5 regarded as a statute, is unconsti- |

tutions l, is not an exercise? -of . the Jaw-making | 4

‘power, and, therefore, must be considered only.as |

7 Cove mantain a contract to which the city assented

Br. 177, ree). Upon this premise it s urged that.

ce ertain equitable defenses make the covenant men-

4 (1) : ; , é mig p C

C ongress has the absolut® Aid Mulimited power to-

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forceable.’ The premise.is obviously fallacious and

with it falls the argument founded upon it.

; 1. Setion t ti of the Rake teAct is -constifutional— :

prese va bps. the conditions and ‘the mode. by which

interests, in the public lant shal be transferred,

fent of the-

und second

‘For the a e of the C ourt the arrang

briefs may be deseriked: Respondent's fity

_points (ir. a 56, 56-58) are so frivolous as to make dis-

<

2, this. reply brief. ~ °

i them, since the United States retains rights of reverter i#

_ the Interior has specifically held, the Raker Act granted te

cussion unnecessiry. Respondent apparently addresses: its -

points 4-40 14 and 15 (Br. 58-109, 165-176) ta the Govern-

ment’s first argument In th® main’ brief. Respondent's

points 10-13" Ur, 109-165) are addressed to the Govern-

auent’s second argument, KRespondent’s-point 16° @Byr.°177.

IST) and, infirectly, point ls (Br. I88-197) are treated in

Respondent bases no argument upon its repeated edeeri ion’

ies to tardiness of the ‘Sates i in makiiig it Fontention

that the: statute prohibits Tgericy ay ¥ agreement ds —~ ore

to sell énergy for resale’ (Br. 12-22, 96-97) but cencédes that’

the questiow is here presented f for decision (Br. 30).° Indeed.

it could not dogotherwise since this contention was‘ad vanced »

by reply br ivf in the district coart filed. February 2S WER)

long prior to. the argiiment on ~Mareh-22, 1938, and was

treated below as within the i issnies (R.A20, 666, 674; Br. 2

why.” Nan Juan Light Co. v. Requena, 224 U.S. 89, hn

Wisatech Mining C6. v. Crescent, Mining Co. Ws bs

293, 209-300; Martin vdgdyic, 262 Fed, 44, 46-47.

* The constitutionality @ESection 6 may here be rest&P riot

only on the power of Congress to-inrpose conditiors on the

disposition of public lands but also on its power to regulate

the lands granted by the Raker Act. As the Secretary of

‘the City only a deter mini able fee. 53. D.425. Rio Grand:

Western Railieay f om pug v. Néringham,. 259 U; S. 44; 44:

Kern Rirer Co. v. Pxited states. 230.8, S. 147, 1522 154.

see a ; Cc My

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teau a: 3 Wall. 92, 99.- “Thus it. may restrict aligna-’

_ tion of public lands after their conveyance to homie-

steaders. Ruddy v. Rossi, 248 U.S. 104. And int

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, Ngee tha Bae

US. ‘Const, An ‘LV, see: x Jd. 2: Gibson v. ‘Phew

granting lands it may impose restrictions and regu-

lations as to the manner of. their subsequent dis-

posal. Oregon &@al. R. R. v. United States, 238

U.S.” 393,° $1-422.. The power in ‘Congress-in- -

enter power as to its property analogous to the »

police power. Thus, for protection of public lands

it may regulate theaise made by individuals of pri- |

vate lands. Camfield v. U nite&® States, 167 U.S.

- 518, 525-526; United States vy, Alford, 274 U.S.

:

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264, 267; ef, Utah Power & Light Co. v. United

States, 243 3 U.S. 389, 404-405; Mekeetveyv. United

5 Slates, § 260 U.S. 'S. 353. Indeed, the United States -

ing) anti? rights in its lands to States may: ev en “

impose conditions unrelated to the rights vrantéd.

- Arizona v. California, 283 U. S. 423, 450, 464. _ Con-

' gress, of course, has power to adopt all means

_-Méonably necessary to effectuate any of the pur-

. poses for w hich the Federal Governments Aas cre-’

_ ated cand. this” includes authority to regulate

contracts of private individuals or of’ a_ state.

Frishie v. United States,.157 U. S160, 165; Cal-_

how v. Massie, 253 U. 8S. ¥70, 175; New York v.

United States, 257 U.S. 591, 601; . Highland v. Rus-

sell Car Co., 279 U.S. 253, 261. It follows that in

the exercise of its authority over public lands Con-

gress may régulate contracts so*far as they con- |

template’ the use of such lands. See Stephenson v.

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- 6 the contract here in question.

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Binford, 287°U. 8. 251, 274-275. So here, Can-

gress in g1 ‘anting rights-of-way over its lands and

the right to use other portions of such lands fer _.

‘reservoir and power-development ‘purposes: ‘was

3 fully @uthor ized as a condition to the grant of such

right® under the’ Raker Act, to. prohibit ad Section

2. Responde ut is estopped to deny the constitu- 7

tional ity of Section 6,—Since the City has accepted’

and is presently utilizing and enjoy ing the sub- »

stantial: rights, privileges - -and. benefits conferred -

by the Raker Act,” under well-established princi-

ples it is now estopped from contesting the-consti- -

tutionatity of a provision in the Act which qualifies |

and Himits:the rights sehen to the City. _ Daniels

v. Tearney,, 102 °U.S. 415, 221; Grand Rapids &

Indiana Ry. Co. vi Osborn, 193 US. 17, 29; Wail ©

X¥. Parrot Silver & Copper Co., 244 U.S. 407, 411:

‘St. Louis Co. . Préndergast Co., 260 ..U. >: 469;

Booth F ett v. Industrial Comm., 271 U.S. 208,

211;.North Dakota-Montana W. G, Ass’n v.U ’nited |

States, 66 F.2d 573 (C. C. A. 8), certiorari — 3

291. U. 8. 672. *

» The respondentoargues (Br. 38, 195-196) that the witer

and water rights involved in the Hetch Hetchy project were

acquired amder the laws of California and not froim the:

United States.. The references in the record to water ap-

propriations vy the City (R. 445-447) splainly relate only

, to filings, and inere filings do not perfect title. 7nyo Con-

solidated Water Co. az Jess, 461 Cal. 516° rena 46, I. D.

$9,. 95-96, - -

Whether the rigt to veer ce waters on-'the. public

lands of the United States deraigns from the United States

t

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ae hare as

Beste Me ane,

3. ‘Section 6 is to be given. effect as a statute.

The language quoted by the respondent from

~ United, States ¥ . Midwe st Oil Co., 236 U. 8/459,

-and Butte C ity Water. Co. Vv. Baker, 196 US. Ss. 119

(Br. 177), plainly fails to negative the well-settled oA

tule that every act of,Congress making a grant of

3 the publie lands is properly to be given effect both »

as‘a law-and as a conveyance. /Oregon & Cal.

R. R. vy. United States, 238 U. $6395, 415, 427, 435,

Wisconsin Central R’d Co. ¥ Forsythe, 159 U.S. :

46, 59 ; United. States v. Bynver &c. Railway, 150

U. $s. 1,14; tod Sines «or R.Co.v. Burney, .

; 113 U. 8. 618, 625; ; Missouri, ete. Ry, Co. v. Kansas

‘Ry. Co., 97 U.S. 491. This rule is not limited to

‘any particular type of grant, but: applies whether —

the grant be to’a riieed, Oregon v: ‘Cal. R. R. v.

United States, 238 U.S. 393,. 422; to a settler who-

has-made a homestead entry, Hall v. Russell, 101

| US . 505, 509 ; or to'a state, U7 nited States v. (South-

ern Oregon Co., 225 Fed. 560, 568 (Ore.).

Neither is ‘hee any merit in the attempted dis- é

‘ tinction of the Oregon &, Cal. R. R. case, supra,”

ia owner of ak w aters, Gulifor nia Pair Co. v. Beaver

Cement Co., 295 U. S..142, 162; Lue v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255, ~

336 (1886); or from the state, no rights\in the water on the _

lands of the’ Park or Forest’ could be acquired. either ‘by —

pure hase or appropriation ‘until’ the City had received per-

mission to build and had completed the’ works essential ‘to

the diversjon and application of the water to beneficial use. —

- Silver Lhke ete: Co. %. Los Angeles, 176 Cal. 96,°.103-104

_ (1917). The City could not, therefore, have per fected any.

Water rights prior to the passage of the Raker Att and the

construction of necessary y div ersion works. £2

*

| on the ground that the statute: there involved 5 was

_ held to be such only because passed “for. ainational -

p purpose”’ (Br. 178). The national _ purposes were

‘there considered, not in determining the éharacter

of the statute as law, but in ascertaining whether

its provisions should be enforced by fasfeiture.

4. Nitece Section 6.ia valid Federal'statute, its.”

requirements cannot be defeated-by defenses urged

by respondent. as effective against the enforcement

of mere. contract rights.—The objection that. en-

forcement ef the Raker Act wall tend to restrain

trade (Br. 183) has$-i0 merit. Obviously, the gen-’. |

"eral ‘policy-against restraint of trade cannot defeat

- the specifi¢ and paramount policy for the preven-

tion’ of. monopoly expt ‘essed by Congress in Section

6. “This i is the ultimate expression of public policy

‘ applicable. to this case. Borgnis | v. Falk Co., 147

. Wis, 327 (1911); Vidal vi. Girard’? Erecutors, 2

\ilow, 126, 197; see United States v. Belmont, 301

U.S. 324, 331, 332. It is also plain that state law:

against unreasenable restraints on alienation in-

‘yoked by respondent (Br. 183) is ineffective to

limit aestrictions imposed i in grants by -the United . .

States. Cf, Bunch v. Cote, 2638U. S. 250, 253-254;

Sunderland v. United States, 266 U. S. 226, 233.

Furthermore, the rule in ‘uestién’ is’ directed

against restraints.on the aliengtion of a fee simple.

See. 3 Thompson, Real Property (1924) sec. 2007,

p. 95. This restr aint, as to sale of energy, is but a.

resfriction as to the use of the granted: lands. Such -

restrictions as to use, even tho igh’ general, are

. *

é

“Valid. Los Angeles Investment Co. v. Gar 18

Cal. 680 (1919). Se Sy aiaigate sey oak

Responderit argues (Br: 186). thag-the fnjniction

should not be granted because. to grant it would be

. to deprive the city : of an annual revenue of $2,200,-

000. This argument is strange to the law. It is

but to say. that violation, of the law. (or breach of

’ the. contract) is to be excused. because respondent

may suffer a monetary loss from its enforcement."

Furthermore, the City does not show. that it could

not. secure an equal or even ‘greater revenue from

some other mode of disposition of the energy.

‘In answer to the respondent’s inference [Br

. 197) that jt is necéssary for the United\

have a “hdlance, of equities’’ in its fayér in érder

to précure'thie relive : iisked, it is to be ioted that the

" protection of the public interest by the. enforcenient

_ of a statute is sufficient to outw eigh any outstand- ~

ing ‘sequities”’, Oregon. & Cal. "R. Ry-v. United

. State s, 238 U.S. 393, 427. Fare “

bit Respondent contends that: noveompliance with

-, the prohibition, « of Section 6-is excused by legal

* impossibility, in that its -voters will thot. provide san

for the raising of funds with which to pure hase,

#ttistribution facilities. The defense. of -iinpossi-

; bility. is not available ina suit brought. to enforce a.

statute, gor & Cal.-R. RB. ve United States, |

238.U.8.: xg ‘Forthermpre, the so-calléd impos-———~ -

sibPity: is ‘purely subjective. That isthe ‘Onty, :

* through ‘its voters, has said ‘ we will not do -it”’

rather than “‘it cannot? he done.”’ This ty pe of

‘b 2

C

. tion.6 of; thefRaker Act, its enforcement through

At eet First Assistant Solicitor, Soir

jmipossibility: cannot excuse . performance. , See

WwW iHliston, Contracts: (Rev. ed. 1938) see. 1932, B..

5411. Finally, there obviously can be no impps-. |

' sibility of compliance where, as here, the obligation’

| imposed } ix a negative one, a mere » prohibition.

ye CONCLUSION Nk ae ae

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Sine e the. respondent persists in violating sec--

court action by the Attorney “General at the request :

Oof-the Sec retary of the Interior becomes. a duty

under the expr ess provisions of section 9 (a): of

: the Act. ‘Injunction: is obviously the appropriate ”

means for such enforcement and 1s, therefore —

author ized: by the Act. The so-called secoridary |

defenses. are all without merit, _and ‘the judgment

of the cireuit court of ‘appeals should be ré\ versed.

_ Respectfully submitted: 9°)"

aie eens FRANC 18 BIDDLE,

oat : Solicitor Ge neral.

GTA 9 / NORMAN M. LITTELL, -

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~ ‘ ¢

Assistant Attorney General.

J? Wituiam D. DexXety, |

Spee ial Assistant to the Attorney Ge neral-

' ¥ Lawrenof. S. APsey,

Roper 1. FABIAN,

‘Attorne ys, De partenent, of Fustice,

Ww ashington, DC

Freperic L. Kina,

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~ Department of the [nterior.

M ARCH 1940. Nes, legos ae She eee

“us GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 19400

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