Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Wilson v. Deukmejian
Supreme Court brief1989
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
ae *
| i? Supreme Court, U.S.
88= a ~ FILED
| 2090 ii ae
arr SPANAL UR.
In the Supreme Co =
OF THE ‘
United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1989
DON C. WILSON, et al.
Petitioners,
ior
GEORGE DEUKMEBEJIAN, et al.
Respondents.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA, FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
WILLIAM E. TRAUTMAN*® DONALD SPECTER
LUTHER KENT ORTON PRISON LAW OFFIC!
Davip D. CooKt General Delivery
BROBECK, PHLEGER & San Quentin, CA 94964
HARRISON Telephone (415) 457-9144
Spear Street Tower JAMES R. MADISON
One Market Plaza ORRICK, HERRINGTON &
San Francisco, CA 94105 S1 om aie
Telephone (415) 442-0900 Se Glaateomery Street
MICHAEL SATRIS, Esa. San Francisco, CA 94111
P.O. Box 337 Telephone (415) 392-1122
Bolinas, CA 94924
Telephone (415) 868-9209 Mark N. AARONSON
SAN FRANCISCO LAWYERS’
COMMITTEE FOR
URBAN AFFAIRS
625 Market St., Suite 1208
San Francisco, CA 94105
Telephone (415) 543-9444
Attorneys for Petitioners
* Counsel of Record
BOWNE OF SAN FRANCISCO. INC ¢ 190 NINTH ST. « SF CA 94103 « 4\§* 664 230
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether double-celled confinement of inmates at California’s
San Quentin Prison, though not per se unconstitutional, neverthe-
less violated the Eighth Amendment, as interpreted and applied
in Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981), and was properly
enjoined, in light of the demonstrated inhumane consequences of
overcrowding and double-celling at San Quentin under the
deplorable and sordid conditions that were found to exist there?
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
The petitioners, plaintiffs in the California Superior Court (the
trial court) and respondents in the California Court of Appeal, are
Don C. Wilson, Richard Parento and Ursula Gealey, on their own
behalfs, and as representatives of the class consisting of “all
persons who have been confined on the mainline at San Quentin
since June 16, 1981, or who may be confined there in the future.”
The respondents, defendants in the trial court and appellants in
the California Court of Appeal, are the Governor of the State of
California, the Secretary of the California Youth and Adult
Corrections Agency, the Director of the California Department of
Corrections, and the Warden of the California State Prison at San
Quentin.
il
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Question Presented ....... 3.5. +05 semua eee eee es
Parties To The Proceeding ... «5 .s.5.5550>4eenaens
Table Of Authorities ... 0:5: 5000s eeeee ee eee
Petition... sbi ia sae cee be eee eee
Opinions Below ... 0... 2 «5 i0cey pore ee
Jurisdiction. ...6 60.80 eee eee
Constitutional Provisions Involved .................56:
Statement Of The Case. 4525.2. sce ee ee
Reasons For Granting The: Wi... <s.09-0¢ ou wa
I. The Decision Below Conflicts with Rhodes v. Chap-
man, 452 U.S. 337 (1981), The Controlling Law Of
This Cowt 2260. cis dace ce eee ee
A. Rhodes v. Chapman Established That “Double-
Celling’” Of Inmates Would Be Unconstitutional
Where The Double-Celling Combined With Other
Conditions To Subject Inmates To Cruel And Unu-
sual Punishment... 2.44.0154555044 ee
B. Applying The Analysis Established In Rhodes vy.
Chapman, The Trial Court Properly Concluded
That Double-Celling Of General Population Prison-
ers At San Quentin, Under The Conditions Shown
To Exist There, Constituted Cruel And Unusual
Punishinent......-.5. 14555 ee i eee aaa et
C. The Decision Below, Which Reversed The Tnal
Court’s Judgment Condemning Double-Celling At
San Quentin Under The Conditions Then Existing
There, Mis-Construed The Trial Court’s Judgment
And Statement Of DecwiGh 32.5457 055
II. State And Federal Courts Require Guidance From
This Court In Their Efforts To Deal With The Conse-
quences Of The Continuing Nationwide Explosion Of
Prison Populations .... ¢...+- + sees ee ee eee
Conclusion... ..... Sool os eee eee
WwW NN N=
1]
15
16
il
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
United States Constitution
a
Lr ba ay bey 8
oe oe a iG a ako has ks avs ew ek Ras 2
Federal Statutes
Ee eS) a a ee : 2
Ged Us Ce rer 2
ae eee WOGtNON PSGS 2. ce cee Sy an 7
Cases
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) .............. = 7
Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 467 (1983)............. 12
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981) ............ passim
mrmmeey ©. Armets, 475 U.S. 312 (1986) ................ 7
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) .............. 12
Wright v. Rushen, 642 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir. 1981)........ 13
Miscellaneous
“Prisoners in 1988”, Bureau of Justice Statistics (1989) .. 15
supreme Court Practice Rule 28.2................... 2
No.
In the Supreme Court
OF THE
United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1989
Don C. WILSON, et al.,
’ Petitioners,
VS.
GEORGE DEUKMEBSIAN, et al..,
Respondents.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA, FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
Petitioners Don C. Wilson, Richard Parento and Ursula
Gealey, by their counsel, respectfully pray that a writ of certiorari
issue to review the judgment and opinion of the Court of Appeal
of the State of California, First Appellate District, entered in this
proceeding on December 12, 1988.
OPINIONS BELOW
The Declaratory Judgment and Permanent Injunction of the
California Superior Court is attached hereto as Appendix “A”.
The Statement of Decision supporting the judgment of the
California Superior Court is attached hereto as Appendix “B”.
The opinion of the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate
District, Division 3, reversing the trial court judgment in signifi-
cant respects, is attached hereto as Appendix “C”.
The order by the California Court of Appeal denying rehearing
in the case is attached hereto as Appendix “D”.
+
=
The California Supreme Court's decision denying review is
attached hereto as Appendix “E”.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the Court of Appeal was entered on Decem-
ber 12, 1988, and rehearing was denied on January 6, 1989. The
California Supreme Court denied the petition for review on
March 23, 1989.
This petition for certiorari is timely filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
$ 2102(c) and Supreme Court Practice Rule 28.2, within ninety
days of March 23, 1989.
This Court's jurisdiction is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1257(a).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED
This case involves the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution, which provide in relevant part as
follows:
Amendment VIII
“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”
Amendment XIV
“...[{NJor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.”
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioners filed this lawsuit on June 16, 1981, the day after this
Court’s decision in Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981). In
the complaint, petitioners, general population (or “mainline” )
inmates at the California State Prison at San Quentin, alleged
that the conditions of their confinement violated the Eighth
Amendment's proscription of cruel and unusual punishment, as
applied to the States through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, as well as standards established by state
constitutional and statutory law. They sought a declaration to that
effect and an injunction forbidding their confinement under such
conditions.
This lawsuit was prompted by the disastrous consequences at
San Quentin of twin policies which the California Department of
Corrections (“CDC’’) adopted in the late 1970's. One of the
policies was to congregate at San Quentin those prisoners consid-
ered the most dangerous, maladjusted and difficult to manage in
the department.” The second policy, said to be necessitated by a
dramatic increase in the inmate population statewide, was to
overcrowd the prison by double-celling these men in cells that are
six feet wide, eight feet deep and eight feet high.’
As a direct consequence of the decision to overcrowd C ulifor-
nia’s perceived “worst” inmates in San Quentin's cramped <ells,
the rate of violent incidents at San Quentin increased diamati-
cally from 1979 to 1982. While the mainline population increased
by 46% during the period 1979-1982, treatments for assault-
related injunes increased 519%. Treatments for self-inflicted
' By the end of 1982 the class of petitioners, which had been certified
by the trial court, numbered about 1950 mainline inmates.
>The CDC’s appellation for these prisoners was “Level IV”, on a
scale of I through IV. 79% of these Level IV prisoners were serving
sentences for violent crimes. Over one-third were serving life terms. Two
thirds were under thirty years old; 42% were under 25.
The CDC also divided its institutions into four levels. San Quentin
was one of two institutions denominated level IV primarily because of its
walled perimeter and internal armed secunty capabilities.
* Subtracting space consumed by bunks, the sink and the toilet, each
‘amate was left with about 9 square feet, only a portion of which was
actually usable. One inmate had to lie on his bunk in order to permit the
other to move around. Inmates assigned to upper bunks could not sit up
in bed without hitting their heads on the concrete ceiling. (Appendix B,
pp. B-5, B-6, B-9.)
ries had increased 369 Reported assaults, suicides and
eapons possession incidents had increased 193%. The Warden
testified, and penology experts confirmed, that levels of unre-
ported violence were also quite high, especially so in mainline
units where inmates had more personal contact with one another
By 1982, violence had escalated to the point where significant
portions of the prison were on “lockdown” more than half the
time. During lockdown, inmates are confined to their cells nearly
24 hours per day. (Appendix B, pp. B-9, B-10.)
On June 19, 1982, in spite of the recurring lockdowns, a riot
involving some 150 inmates and resulting in scores of stabbing
and gunshot wounds occurred on the Upper Yard, an outdoor
space utilized by mainline inmates. Prison officials attributed this
riot in part to overcrowding. The Warden imposed a lockdown
that virtually shut the prison down for months.
Notwithstanding the lockdown, prison officials proceeded with
their plans to expand double-celling of the mainline. Accordingly,
on September 20, 1982, the Honorable Louis H. Burke, former
Justice of the California Supreme Court sitting by designation as
a Judge of the Superior Court, issued a preliminary injunction
enjoining expansion of double-celling at San Quentin.
Prison officials kept much of the mainline at San Quentin
locked down for most of the balance of 1982 and early 1983. The
violence did not abate, however, so that a total lockdown of San
Quentin’s mainline again was imposed in late March 1983; the
lockdown was still in effect when tral commenced on April 21,
1983. Though the prison remained locked down through the
conclusion of trial in June 1983, “[dluring the tral there were
multiple acts of violence (including two murders) virtually
weekly.”- (Appendix B, p. B-11.) From January through mid-
May 1983, San Quentin’s mainline suffered the murders of three
prisoners, the stabbings of two correctional officers, the rape of a
female counselor, and two mass ailtercations involving twenty or
more inmates each, not to mention reports of numerous other
fights, altercations, and incidents involving weapons.
At the six-week bench trial, the court conducted two tours of
the prison. The prison’s warden characterized San Quentin as a
—
“monstrosity” that “should not be standing and operating as a
prison in California’. The Statewide Director of the CDC opined
that San Quentin was “not even fit for human habitation” and
that overcrowded confinement of prisoners there was
“inhumane”.
The warden also admitted that overcrowding at San Quentin
had led to an escalation of inmate violence. The prison psychia-
trist found that the double-celling at San Quentin under the
conditions that existed there had produced a “psychiatric bomb-
shell.” It produced a greatly increased number of psychiatric
cases, contributing to actual psychotic decompensation in some
cases, and forced his staff to practice “battlefield” psychiatry
Substantial expert and lay testimony corroborated these opinions
of San Quentin’s own chief staff, as did the figures. The court
found that “[t]here was substantial and convincing evidence that
overcrowding and close confinement cause unbearable stress on
[the] inmates... .” (Appendix B, p. B-10.)
The court also found that “the weaker of the two inmates in
each cell is frequently subjected to threats, harassment and
physical abuse (including sexual attack).” (Appendix B, p. B-9.)
\ vulnerable young prisoner told the terrifying story of how he
was repeatedly raped by his cellmate during a lockdown at San
Quentin and became too fearful to report the crimes because of
threats on his life, made at knifepoint by his cellmate, if he did
In sum, the trial court agreed with the Director of the CDC
that confinement at San Quentin was “inhumane” and, found
that conditions there “amount to physical and emotional torture
and endanger life,” and declared that “[n]Jot one of these results
has any penological purpose.” {Appendix B, p. B-10.) It found
that the prisoners “live under daily threat of injury or death” and
that the “violence at San Quentin is out of control.” (Ap-
pendix B, p. B-11.) It concluded that the “escalation of violent
incidents at San Quentin, including San Quentin's general popu-
lation, is the result of many factors,” but that one of two “highly
significant causes [was] overcrowding (and the double-celling
LTT NTE An ae TNE aE a
6
generated thereby)....” (Appendix B, p. B-12.)* Finally, the
trial court concluded that “[r]Jeduction of San Quentin's uncon-
siitutional rate of violence cannot be accomplished without imple-
mentation of a progiam that includes, at the least,...an
elimination of overcrowding and double-celling....” (Ap-
pendix B, p. B-12.)
As to the physical conditions at the prison, the trial court found
as follows:
Certain facts are readily apparent and were not substantially
disputed. San Quentin is one of California’s oldest prisons,
portions of which were constructed over 100 years ago.
Inmates share cells of 48 square feet in area and 360 cubic
feet of space. The cells lack adequate heat, proper lighting,
sufficient ventilation, and hot water. The plumbing is badly
deteriorated. The electrical sysiem is in total violation of all
relevant codes and has been aptly described as an “electrical
nightmare.” Fire hazards abound and the provision for fire
safety is extremely inadequate. Food is prepared and served
under unsanitary conditions by inadequately trainea and
improperly supervised food service workers, using outmoded
and unsafe equipment. General sanitation... remains
deplorable. The physical plant deficiencies and inadequate
sanitation practices at San Quentin expose the men confined
there to constant, severe and unjustifiable threats to their
health and safety. (Appendix B, p. B-2.)
The trial court found that the prison authorities had known of
the unconstitutional conditions of confinement for years, but that
they had done nothing to correct them:
The evidence produced at trial with regard to the length of
time the inhumane, unsanitary and dangerous conditions had
* The other was the new classification system, which the CDC had
instituted in part to relieve the prisoners of violence at other institutions.
The CDC’s own records indicated, however, that the strategy had failed.
Rates of violent incidents increased in two of the three levels of
institutions, in the third they had not decreased very much. (Ap-
pendix B, p. B-12.)
existed, were likely to continue to exist and worsen, was
overwhelming. Year after year, from at least 1977 through
1982, report after report from staff and state-retained consul-
tants of the California Department of Corrections called
attention to all of the serious plant deficiencies existing at
San Quentin. In addition, the medical staff warned of the
effect of double-celling on the health of the inmates. Virtu-
ally nothing has been done to correct these deficiencies and
absolutely nothing has been done to relieve the pressure of
overcrowding on the inmates.
... Repeated requests have been made to alleviate the un-
sanitary, unhealthful, overcrowded, tense and dangerous con-
ditions at San Quentin, and repeatedly these requests have
been ignored. (Appendix B, pp. B-13, B-14.)
On this basis, and on the basis of the “extreme callousness toward
the plaintiffs’ constitutional nghts” exhibited on the witness stand
by the defendant Secretary of the California Youth and Adult
Corrections Agency (after the governor, the seniormost official
with responsibility for the state’s prisons), the trial court found
that the conditions were the product of “deliberate indifference”:
[1]t appears clearly, positively and unmistakably that de-
fendants have been “deliberately indifferent,” as that term
has been defined by the federal courts, to the constitutional
rights of plaintiffs in causing, permitting and allowing the
conditions described herein to occur, persist and worsen... .
The Court finds that these conditions at San Quentin are
systemic and so grossly deficient that they are indeed the
product of “deliberate indifference.” (Appendix B, p. B-
13.)°
* The “deliberate indifference” standard was developed in individual
prisoner actions, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for money damages. See
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S.
312 (1986). It was not applied in Rhodes, which, like the present case,
was a Class action challenge of conditions of confinement. Hence the
trial court observed that it was not a necessary element of petitioner's
proof. (Appendix B, p. B-13, B-20, B-2!.) Nevertheless, the proof was
there, and the trial court so found.
8
As a result, the trial court declared that a range of conditions of
confinement at San Quentin, including double-celling, was cruel
and unusual within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment, and
banned confinement at San Quentin under such conditions. (Ap-
pendix A, p. A-2.)
The State did not appeal the trial court judgment as it related
to the structural and operational deficiencies at the prison. Thus,
on appeal “[t]he principal question [was] whether the court
erred in prohibiting the confinement of two inmates in a single
cell.” (Appendix C, p. C-1.) The Court of Appeal found that it
had and reversed the judgment in this respect. (Appendix C, p.
C-20.)
The trial court explicitly recognized that “[t]he leading federal
case in this area of the law is the recent case of Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981)” (Appendix B, p. B-3) and that,
in Rhodes “in analyzing double-celling the Court considered
virtually every aspect of inmate life and institutional design and
operation” of the prison in question (Appendix B, p. B-18). The
Court of Appeal, however, found that the trial court “appears to
have held double-celling unconstitutional regardless of any other
conditions of cell confinement.” (Appendix C, p. C-10.) Conced-
ing increased violence at the prison and acknowledging that the
judgment could be supported if it was shown that double- celling
had led to that increased violence, the Court of Appeal found that
the “evidence .. . does not support the finding that double-celling
itself was a cause of the increase.” (Appendix C, p. C-11.)
Repeating this Court’s caution in Rhodes “that Eighth Amend-
ment determinations should not be merely the subjective view of
judges” (Appendix C, p. C-7), the Court of Appeal reversed the
double-celling portion of the judgment. As set forth above, it
denied rehearing on this point and the California Supreme Court
denied review of the issue. (Appendices D and E.)
9
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
I. The Decision Below Conflicts With Rhodes v. Chapman, 452
U.S. 337 (1981), The Controlling Law Of This Court
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981), is this Court’s sole
decision in a comprehensive class-action challenge by convicted
prisoners to the conditions of their confinement. As such, it is a
seminal decision in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. For lower
courts and litigants it performs two essential functions. It provides
a blueprint for constitutional analysis of conditions in the nation’s
overcrowded prisons. It also establishes a baseline standard,
derived from an analysis of a prison which occupies one end of the
spectrum of conditions in American penal institutions, by holding
that confinement of two inmates in a cell designed for one does
not, per se, violate the Eighth Amendment.
There is trouble at the other end of the spectrum. It is at that
end where, after an exhaustive inquiry conducted in accordance
with the blueprint established in Rhodes, the trial court found the
conditions of confinement at California’s notorious San Quentin
Prison. The decision below by the Court of Appeal, which
purported to rely on Rhodes but which misconstrued and then
reversed the trial court’s ringing condemnation of double-celling
at San Quentin, effectively turns Rhodes on its head. For all
practical purposes the Court of Appeal’s decision means that
double-celling is per se constitutional—no matter where it is
practiced, no matter how inhumane its effects.
It is up to this Court to correct this manifestly erroneous result,
and, eight years after Rhodes, to provide a sorely-needed Eighth
Amendment standard that will guide the lower courts nationwide
as they grapple with the constitutional consequences of the
relentless population explosion in the state and federal prisons.
A. Rhodes v. Chapman Established That “Double-
Celling” Of Inmates Would Be Unconstitutional
Where The Double-Celling Combined With Other
Conditions To Subject Inmates To Cruel And Unusual
Punishment
In Rhodes v. Chapman, this Court resolved “[t]he question...
whether the housing of two inmates in a single cell at the
10
Southern Ohio Correctional Facility is cruel and unusual punish-
ment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.”
Id., at p. 339. The Court there “consider[ed] .. . for the first time
the limitation that the Eighth Amendment... imposes upon the
conditions in which a State may confine those convicted of
crimes.” (/d., at pp. 344-345.) Thus, Rhodes presented this Court
with “‘an occasion to consider specifically the principles relevant
to assessing claims that conditions of confinement violate the
Eighth Amendment.” /d., at p. 345.
Rhodes concerned the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility
(“SOCF”) a prison described by that trial court “as unquestiona-
bly a top-flight, first-class facility.” /d., at 340. The cells were
‘[a]pproximately 63 square feet” and “dayrooms” were adjacent
to them. /bid. Further:
The food was “adequate in every respect....” The air
ventilation system was adequate, the cells were substantially
free of offensive odor, the temperature in the cellblocks was
well controlled, and the noise in the cellblocks was not
excessive.... {T]he number of acts of violence... had in-
creased with the prison population, but only in proportion to
the increase in population. Respondents failed to produce
evidence establishing that double-celling itself caused greater
violence.
Id., at pp. 342-343.
Accordingly, this Court ruled that “[i]n view of the District
Court’s findings of fact, its conclusion that double-celling at
SOCF constitutes cruel and unusual punishment is insupporta-
ble.” /d., at 347. In concluding its opinion, the Court affirmed the
role of the courts in protecting against conditions of confinement
that inflict cruel and unusual punishment, observing that “condi-
tions in a number of prisons, especially older ones, have justly
been described as ‘deplorable’ and ‘sordid’ [Citations].” /d., at
p. 352.
The concurring opinion of Justice Brennan, joined in by Jus-
tices Blackmun and Stevens, reaffirmed “that today’s decision
should in no way be construed as a retreat from careful judicial
scrutiny of prison conditions...” /d., at 353. Noting that “(t]he
1]
touchstone of the Eighth Amendment inquiry is ‘the effect upon
the imprisoned’ ” (id., at p. 366), the concurrence explained that
it was only because “‘[t]he findings of the District Court leave no
doubt that the prisoners are adequately sheltered, fed, and pro-
tected, and that opportunities for education, work and rehabilita-
live assistance are available” and that “[v]irtually the only
serious complaint” was double-celling that these Justices con-
curred in the judgment.° That concurring opinion concluded:
J
The District Court in this case was unable to identify any
actual signs that the double celling at the Southern Ohio
Correctional Facility has seriously harmed the inmates there:
indeed, the court’s findings of fact suggest that crowding at
the prison has not reached the point of causing serious injury.
Id., at p. 369. While Rhodes held that double-celling is not per se
unconstitutional, it most certainly did nor hold that double-celling
is per se constitutional. Conditions at each prison, the context in
which double-celling is practiced, must be considered.
B. Applying The Analysis Established In Rhodes v. Chap-
man, The Trial Court Properly Concluded That
Double-Celling Of General Population Prisoners At
San Quentin, Under The Conditions Shown To Exist
There, Constituted Cruel And Unusual Punishment
The contrasts between the SOCF facility involved in Rhodes
and San Quentin are stark indeed. Whereas SOCF, a new prison,
was “unquestionably a top-flight, first class facility,” 452 U.S. at
340, the century-old San Quentin was, in the words of senior
officials of the CDC, a “monstrosity,” “unfit for human habita-
tion,” an institution of “inhumane” conditions of confinement.
Whereas at SOCF the food was “adequate in every respect,” at
San Quentin the food was, and for years had been, a threat to the
health of the inmates who ate it. Whereas at SOCF the air
* The concurring justices also noted that “[t]he overcrowding in the
cells is mitigated considerably by the freedom of most prisoners to spend
time away from their cells, especially in the dayroom.” /d., at 366, n. 14.
Indeed, the prison implemented a plan limiting double-celling to those
inmates free to move about the facility 15 hours a day. /bid.
12
ventilation system was adequate, the cells were substantially free
of offensive odor, the temperature was well controlled and the
noise in the cellblocks was not excessive, in the San Quentin
mainline cellblocks there was no ventilation, the odors were
offensive, the temperature was uncontrolled, the noise was deaf-
ening, the plumbing was substandard, the electrical system was
dangerous and jerry-rigged, the filth was pervasive, birds flew in
the rafters, and rats ran on the floors. Whereas at SOCF, the 63-
square-foot cells were located next to “dayrooms,” and the
inmates were out of their cells for most of the day, at San Quentin
the 48-square-foot cells were located on stacked tiers, with no
‘“dayrooms,” and, due to incessant “lockdowns,” the inmates were
frequently locked in their cells almost around the clock. Whereas
at SOCF the number of acts of violence had not increased out of
proportion to the increase in population, at San Quentin acts of
violence increased at rates several times the rate of population
increase: What is more, the trial court specifically found that
overpopulation and double-celling at San Quentin were principal
causes of the dramatic increase in violence.
This was, frankly, not a close case. The weight of the evidence
that distinguished San Quentin from SOCF, as analyzed in
Rhodes, made the trial court’s decision easier. It found: “The
unconstitutionality of each of the various conditions of confine-
ment at San Quentin discussed herein and addressed in the
Declaratory Judgment and Permanent Injunction ‘clearly, posi-
tively and unmistakably appears.’” (Appendix B, p. B-4.) The
evidence was also damning, in that the unconstitutional condi-
tions were found to be the product of the state’s “deliberate
indifference” to the Eighth Amendment rights of the petitioners.
The Constitution compelled the trial court to act in the face of
the overwhelming evidence of equalor, violence and inhumanity
at San Quentin. Mindful, however, that “broad discretionary
authority is necessary because the administration of a prison is ‘at
best an extraordinarily difficult undertaking,” Hewitt v. Helms,
459 U.S. 460, 467 (1983), quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.
539, 566 (1974), the trial court chose a conservative, carefully-
tailored remedy. It enjoined the defendants from confining the
plaintiffs under the conditions declared to be unconstitutional, but
13
stayed that injunction upon satisfaction of certain conditions.
Primary among these conditions was the state’s development of a
plan to correct the constitutional deficiencies. The trial court also
required the defendants to refrain from double-celling mainline
inmates during the pendency of the stay. (Appendix A, pp. A-3,
A-S.) Nothing less was required.
C. The Decision Below, Which Reversed The Trial
Court’s Judgment Condemning Double-Celling At San
Quentin Under The Conditions Then Existing There,
Mis-Construed The Trial Court’s Judgment And
Statement Of Decision
The Court of Appeal decision below misconstrued the trial
court’s Judgment and Statement of Decision by inferring that the
trial court had held that double-celling was unconstitutional
regardless of other conditions of cell confinement (i.e., that it was
“per se” unconstitutional). The Court of Appeal ruled: “Insofar
as the trial court held that double-celling was per se unconstitu-
tional, the court erred.” (Appendix C, p. C-10.) And: “From the
[trial] court’s treatment of double-celling as a discrete category
of conditions of confinement, it appears to have held double-
celling unconstitutional regardless of any other conditions of cell
confinement.” (Appendix C, p. C-10).
In the Statement of Decision, the trial court made clear the
basis of its conclusion that double-celled confinement on the
mainline at San Quentin was inhumane. The trial court was
persuaded that the continued confinement of men “under each
condition and under the totality of conditions which prevail there
is unconstitutional and must be remedied.” (Appendix B, p. B-1.)
The court noted that, “in analyzing double-celling”, the United
States Supreme Court in Rhodes had “considered virtually every
aspect of inmate life and institutional design and operation... .”
(Appendix B, p. B-18). The trial court also noted the Ninth
Circuit’s cautionary statements in Wright v. Rushen, 642 F.2d
1129, 1133 (9th Cir. 1981), including the comment that courts
‘must consider the effect of each condition in the context of the
prison environment, especially when the ill-effects of particular
14
conditions are exacerbated by other conditions.” (Appendix B, p.
B-19).
Far from employing a rule of “per se” unconstitutionality, the
trial court here stated that the Rhodes opinion had set forth “by
its factual presentation the standard by which the constitutionality
of double-celling under the Eighth Amendment may be deter-
mined”, noting that another judge had “aptly observed” that
“* each case must be judged on its own unique facts.’ ”
(Appendix B, pp. B-19, B-20).
The “unique facts” which compelled the trial court’s declara-
tion here that double celled confinement on the mainline at San
Quentin was unconstitutional are detailed in the Statement of
Decision (Appendix B) and in the Declaratory Judgment and
Permanent Injunction (Appendix A) and are summarized in the
Statement of the Case, above. The facts overwhelmingly support
the trial court’s conclusions. They need not be restated here. We
note only that the trial court properly weighed these unique facts
against those described in Rhodes v. Chapman and the many
other authorities which provide standards against which condi-
tions at a particular prison under scrutiny must be measured.
The trial court then enjoined the defendants from continuing to
confine men on the mainline “until each of the unconstitutional
conditions of confinement described above is eliminated or cor-
rected,” but stayed the injunction so long as defendants remained
in compliance with conditions “calculated to result in the expedi-
tious elimination, amelioration and correction of each unconstitu-
tional aspect of confinement on the mainline at San Quentin.”
(Appendix A, p. A-3.) Among the conditions of the stay of the
injunction was a requirement that the defendants act immediately
to reduce overcrowding by, among other things, eliminating
double celling. (Appendix A, p. A-3.)
At any time since the injunction issued in 1983, however,
defendants could have sought a modification of the stay provisions
in light of subsequent changes at the prison or sought a confirma-
tion from the trial court that subsequent changes had sufficiently
altered the “specific facts” relevant to the double-celling on the
fe
mainline at San Quentin such that double-celling would no longer
violate the injunction.’
Defendants, however, did neither of these things. Rather, they
asked the Court of Appeal to reverse the trial court’s ruling on the
double pretense that it had found double-celling to be “per se”
unconstitutional and that the tnal court had imposed a “blanket
ban” on double-celling. The Court of Appeal’s opinion, which
accepted this double pretense as the truth, reached a transpar-
ently erroneous conclusion as a result.
Il. State And Federal Courts Require Guidance From This
Court In Their Efforts To Deal With The Consequences Of
The Continuing Nationwide Explosion Of Prison
Populations
In Rhodes, the Court “granted the petition for certiorari be-
cause of the importance of the question to prison administration.”
452 U.S. at 344. The constitutionality of double-celling remains
an urgent and pressing question not only to prison administrators,
but to the individual prisoners affected by such confinement.
If anything, the magnitude of the issue has become more
evident and insisting since Rhodes. In Rhodes, this Court noted
that “[o]ut of 82 court orders in effect concerning conditions of
confinement” in federal or state correctional facilities as of March
31, 1978, “26 involved the issue of overcrowding. [ Citation.]” /d.,
at p. 356 (Brennan, J., concurring.)
Since 1980, the number of inmates confined in state and federal
prisons in the United States has nearly doubled. See, “Prisoners
in 1988”, Bureau of Justice Statistics (1989). Pressures on prison
administrators to overcrowd prisons and prison cells, perhaps
unconstitutionally, is greater now than ever. Indeed, litigation
challenging over-crowded prisons and jails now pends in virtually
every state in the union, placing on trial court judges the burden
of responsibly balancing administrative pressures against constitu-
tional nghts.
’ Elsewhere in its opinion, the Court of Appeal recognized that “[i]f
conditions have changed, defendants are entitled to apply to the tral
court for a modification of the injunction.” (Appendix C, p. C-19.)
16
This Court, by means of a thoughtful and well-articulated
opinion in this case, can provide much needed guidance to the
trial court judges in resolving claims of unconstitutional double-
celling and overcrowding and in fashioning appropriate remedies
where cruel and unusual conditions are found.
CONCLUSION
For all of the above reasons, the Court should grant the petition
for certiorari,
DATED: June 21, 1989
Respectfully submitted,
WILLIAM E. TRAUTMAN*
LUTHER KENT ORTON
Davip D. COOKE
BROBECk, PHLEGER & HARRISON
MICHAEL SATRIS
Mark N. AARONSON
San Francisco Lawyers’
Committee for Urban Affairs
DONALD SPECTER
STEVEN FAMA
Prison Law Office
JAMES R. MADISON
ORRICK, HERRINGTON &
SUTCLIFFE
Attorneys for Petitioners
* Counsel of Record
A-|
APPENDIX A
Superior Court of the State of California
for the County of Marin
No 103454
Don C. Wilson: Richard Parento; and Ursula Gealey
Plaintiffs,
VS
George Deukmejian, Governor of the State of California
N.A. Chaderjian, Secretary of the Youth and
Adult Corrections Agency of the State of California;
Daniel McCarthy, Acting Interim Director of the
California Department of Corrections; and
Reginald Pulley, Warden of San Quentin State Prison,
Defendants.
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AND PERMANENT
INJUNCTION
[Filed Sept. 13, 1983]
This cause came on regularly for tnal in Department No
Courtroom No. 1, Marin County Civic Center, before the Honor-
able Beverly B. Savitt, Judge of the Superior Court. Trial began
on April 21, 1983, and continued thereafter from day to day
through June F, 1983. Michael Satris, Luther Kent Orton, David
D. Cooke and Kathleen Foster appeared as counsel for plaintiffs
Don C. Wilson, Richard Parento, Ursula Gealey and the class of
persons represented by plaintiffs Wilson and Parento, consisting
of all persons who have been confined on the mainline at San
Quentin since June 16, 1981, or who may be confined there in the
future (the “Mainline Class’). James B. Cuneo appeared as
counsel for defendants George Deukmejian, N.A. Chaderjian,
Daniel McCarthy and Reginald Pulley. Oral and documentary
evidence was presented and has been considered by the Court
Each party lodged a proposed form of judgment and proposed
statement of decision which have been reviewed and considered
by the Court. The cause was submitted on July 8, 1983
A-2
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND _ DE-
CREED THAT the men comprising the mainline population in
the California State Prison at San Quentin since the filing of the
Complaint herein on June 16, 1981, have been and are now
confined there under conditions which violate Section 17 of
Article | of the California Constitution, Sections 2600 and 2652
of the California Penal Code, and the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution. The men com-
prising the mainline population at San Quentin Prison suffer cruel
and unusual punishment and are denied due process of law in the
following respects:
(i) The prison is overcrowded. The men are forced to
remain confined for extended periods of time, two men to a
single cell less than 48 square feet in floor space and 360
cubic feet of space, with little or no opportunity for meaning-
ful activity. Most of the men confined there are dangerous:
many are seriously maladjusted or have psychiatric
problems. The cells have inadequate heat, improper light and
insufficient ventilation. Almost no cells have hot water. The
plumbing is badly deteriorated. The electrical system in the
cell blocks is dangerously substandard, in total violation of all
electrical codes. Noise levels are excessive. Lack of proper
sanitation practices produces harborage for birds, mice,
roaches, bacteria and vermin of all sorts. The threat of injury
or death from fire is real and imminent. These conditions
threaten the physical, mental and emotional health and well-
being of the men confined on the mainline at San Quentin
and are not penologically justified.
(ii) The men are forced to live amidst excessive violence;
the threat of injury or death from violent assault is great and
is punishment not included in the punishment to which each
inmate is sentenced.
(iii) The men are forced to live in a prison in which the
threat of an outbreak of food-borne, water-borne, or vector-
borne disease is severe. Food is prepared and served under
unsanitary conditions, by inadequately trained and improp-
erly supervised food service workers, using outmoded and
unsafe equipment. Lack of proper sanitation practices pro-
A-3
duces harborage for birds, mice, roaches, bacteria and verim
of all sorts. Opportunities for contamination of the potable
water supply proliferate. The sanitary conditions existing are
below minimum acceptable standards of decency.
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED
AND DECREED THAT the above-named defendants, and each
of them, and their officers, agents, employees, representatives, and
all persons acting in concert or participating with them, shall be
and they hereby are enjoined and restrained from causing or
permitting any person to be confined on the mainline at San
Quentin unless and until each of the unconstitutional conditions
of confinement described above is eliminated or corrected.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DE-
CREED that the foregoing order enjoining and restraining de-
fendants from the continued confinement of men on the mainline
at San Quentin shall be stayed, but only if and so long as
defendants remain in compliance with each of the following
conditions calculated to result in the expeditious elimination,
amelioration and correction of each unconstitutional aspect of
confinement on the mainline at San Quentin:
(1) Defendants shall act immediately to reduce over-
crowding at San Quentin. In addition, within forty-five (45)
days ofthe issuance of this order, defendants shall submit to
the Court a plan to be implemented within ninety (90) days
thereafter for the prompt elimination of overcrowding at San
Quentin, which plan shall include the elimination of all
involuntary double-celling at San Quentin and shall address
the effect on the physical, mental and emotional well-being
of members of the Mainline Class resulting from their
confinement in institutions other than San Quentin.
(11) Within forty-five (45) days of the issuance of this
order, defendants shall submit to the Court a plan for the
evaluation and re-examination of the departmental classifica-
tion system by which San Quentin has been designated a
Level IV institution. The evaluation and re-examination
shall be submitted to the Court within ninety (90) days of
the completion of the plan and shall address, inter alia:
A-4
(a) the modification of the classification system in light of
the extent to which the system has contributed to the
unprecedented and unacceptable levels of violence at Level
IV institutions, in general, and at San Quentin, in particular:
(b) the designation of one or more Level III institutions
as Level IV institutions to minimize overcrowding and elimi-
nate involuntary double-celling of Level 1V inmates;
(c) the modification of the classification system to pre-
vent the commitment to Level IV institutions of men whose
youth or other personal characteristics render confinement at
a Level IV institution unsafe, inappropriate, or not necessary
for the protection of the public and the proper functioning of
the Department of Corrections.
(iii) Within forty-five (45) days of the issuance of this
order, defendants shall submit to the Court a proposal for the
development of a plan and schedule for the expeditious
elimination of the structural and operational deficiencies at
San Quentin which threaten the lives, health and safety of
the inmates confined there and which are more fully de-
scribed in the Statement of Decision herein. The plan and
schedule to be developed shall be submitted to the Court
within ninety (90) days after the completion of the proposal
and shall address each of the following:
(a) The correction of physical plant, equipment and oper-
ational deficiencies in the food preparation and food service
area which threaten health and safety;
(b) The correction or amelioration of conditions through-
out the institution, especially in the cell-block areas, which
create a risk of death or injury by fire or electrical shock;
(c) The provision of safe and sufficient heat, light, plumb-
ing, electricity, ventilation and hot and cold running water to
all mainline cells as well as the control of noise in the cell
block areas; and
(d) The more effective control of birds, mice, roaches,
bacteria and other vermin throughout the institution, espe-
A-5
cially in the food preparation, food service and cell block
areas.
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED
AND DECREED that the Court shall review the adequacy of
each plan or proposal submitted with the assistance of a Special
Master to be appointed by the Court within thirty (30) days of
the date hereof from the candidates to be nominated by the
parties in writing within fifteen (15) days of the date hereof.
Reasonable compensation for the Special Master shall be paid by
defendants. The Special Master shall consult with the Court upon
request and shall submit a written report each calendar quarter
until further order of the Court concerning the adequacy of
defendants’ implementation of each plan or proposal. Plaintiffs’
[and defendants’| counsel shall be provided with a copy of each
plan, proposal and Special Master’s report and will be afforded an
opportunity to comment on them. The order enjoining and re-
straining defendants from continued confinement of men on the
mainline at San Quentin shall be stayed only if and so long as the
Court remains satisfied with the adequacy of defendants’ plans
and proposals and the implementation thereof.
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED. ADJUDGED
AND DECREED that plaintiffs recover their costs of suit and
disbursements herein in the amount of $ , and their reason-
able attorneys’ fees according to proof to be submitted.
DATED: September 13, 1983.
/s/ BEVERLY B. SAVITT
Hon. Beverly B. Savitt
Judge of the Superior Court
B-|
APPENDIX B
Superior Court of the State of California
In and for the County of Marin
No. 103454
Don C. Wilson; Richard Parento; and Ursula Gealey,
Plaintiffs,
VS.
George Deukmejian, Governor of the State of California;
N.A. Chaderjian, Secretary of the Youth and
Adult Corrections Agency of the State of California;
Daniel McCarthy, Acting Interim Director of the
California Department of Corrections; and
Reginald Pulley, Warden of San Quentin State Prison,
Defendants.
STATEMENT OF DECISION
[Filed Sept. 13, 1983]
I. INTRODUCTION
This Statement of Decision is issued following a six-week trial
addressing the constitutionality of the conditions of confinement
of the mainline or general population inmates in the California
State Prison at San Quentin. At the trial, the parties called
dozens of witnesses and submitted hundreds of documentary
exhibits. In addition, this Court inspected the facility on two
separate occasions (once, on the last day of trial, without prior
notice to Defendants or to the inmates).
This Court is persuaded that Defendants’ continued confine-
ment of men at San Quentin under each condition and under the
totality of conditions which prevail there is unconstitutional and
must be remedied. Confinement at San Quentin is cruel and
unusual. The men imprisoned there live under conditions which
fall well below basic standards of human decency. Double-celling
in extremely small cells remains the rule on the mainline at San
Quentin. Violence in the prison is at an unprecedented level and
threatens to rage entirely out of control.
2
B-2
Certain facts are readily apparent and were not substantially
disputed. San Quentin is one of California’s oldest prisons,
portions of which were constructed over 100 years ago. Inmates
share cells of 48 square feet in area and 360 cubic feet of space.
The cells lack adequate heat, proper lighting, sufficient ventila-
tion, and hot water. The plumbing is badly deteriorated. The
electrical system is in total violation of all relevant codes and has
been aptly described as an “electrical nightmare.” Fire hazards
abound and the provision for fire safety is extremely inadequate.
Food is prepared and served under unsanitary conditions by
inadequately trained and improperly supervised food service
workers, using outmoded and unsafe equipment. General sanita-
tion, although improved in some respects since this suit was filed
in June of 1981, remains deplorable. The physical plant deficien-
cies and inadequate sanitation practices at San Quentin expose
the men confined there to constant, severe and unjustifiable
threats to their health and safety.
San Quentin is one of two maximum security prisons desig-
nated custody Level IV institutions in which California confines
its most violent offenders serving the longest terms. Since the
implementations of a revised custody classification system in
1980, virtually all prisoners at San Quentin are Level IV custody
inmates.
During recent years, as the result of a combination of factors
including determinate sentencing laws, mandatory prison terms
and longer sentences, the entire California prison system is vastly
overcrowded at all levels. At the time of trial, the Department of
Corrections was confining more than 32,000 inmates in a system
with a designed capacity of less than 24,000. Despite an approved
building program which will result in the construction of several
new prisons over the next five years, the system is expected to
continue to be overcrowded with the net system-wide population
increasing by approximately 100 inmates per week. Evidence
produced at trial indicated that the Department of Corrections
had more than 5,800 Level IV inmates, whose numbers are
increasing at a rate of approximately 1,000 per year, in Level IV
cells designed for no more than 4,300.
B-3
There are, to date, no reported California opinions in cases
challenging overall conditions of confinement in an institution of
the Department of Corrections. The courts of the state have had
little opportunity to consider and establish standards for evaluat-
ing conditions of prison confinement with respect to whether such
conditions are cruel or unusual. (However, state standards are
discussed for the first time, to this Court’s knowledge, in a new
decision filed July 12, 1983, by the Fourth District Court of
Appeal, /n Re The Inmates of the Riverside County Jail at Indio
v. Ben Clark, as Sheriff of Riverside County, 4 Civ. 27464, 83
Daily Journal D.A.R. 2057. This opinion states:
“The same basic test employed in the federal courts is
appropriate to assessing conditions of confinement chal-
lenged under the California Constitution”. (/d. at 2058)
The Court goes on to say that:
‘*. . In assessing the standards of decency which are essential
to this analysis, we think it appropriate that California courts
look chiefly to California standards and institutions for their
guideposts.” (/d., at p. 2058)
Prior to the Indio opinion California decisions relating to condi-
tions in penal institutions have been limited to a specific practice
in a specific institution. However, there is an abundance of federal
decisional authority concerning conditions of confinement in both
state and federal prisons. Federal cases have dealt with the
standards required under the Eighth Amendment to the United
States Constitution which bars “cruel and unusual punishment.”
The leading federal case in this area of the law is the recent case
of Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
California, however, has adopted Article 1, Section 17, of the
state constitution which, unlike the Eighth Amendment, bans
“cruel or unusual punishment.” In construing this provision, this
Court bears in mind the California Supreme Court’s admonition
in Allen v. Superior Court, 18 Cal.3d 520, 52 (1976), that our
constitution is “a document of independent force.” Our state
Supreme Court has further determined that the use of the
disjunctive between the terms “cruel” and “unusual” was pur-
poseful. People v. Anderson, 6 Cal.3d 628 (1972).
B-4
This Court has relied heavily upon federal cases in an attempt
rationally and meaningfully to evaluate the conditions of confine-
ment at San Quentin Prison in terms of their constitutionality.
This procedure was approved in the Allen decision cited above.
In its opinion in Rhodes, the United States Supreme Court
summarized conditions which had been held to violate the Eight
Amendment. These included unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain, punishment grossly disproportionate to the crime and inflic-
tions of pain which are “totally without penological justification.”
Other federal cases have held that inmates are entitled to reason-
ably adequate food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care,
ventilation, hot and cold running water, light, heat, plumbing, and
quarters which are reasonably fire-safe. Further, the federal courts
have held that inmates must be given reasonable protection from
constant threat of violence and sexual assault.
In California a punishment is “cruel or unusual,” within the
meaning of Article 1, Section 17, when it “shocks the conscience
and offends fundamental notions of human dignity.” /n re Lynch,
8 Cal.3d 410 (1972). Further, the California courts have found,
as the federal courts have, that the concept of cruel or unusual
punishment “must draw its meaning from the evolving standards
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” People
v. Vaughn, 71 Cal.2d 406 (1969), citing Trop v Dulles, 356 U.S.
86 (1958).
Criminal defendants who challenge the constitutionality of the
severity of their legislatively-mandated sentences must show that
the unconstitutionality “clearly, positively and unmistakably ap-
pears.”” People v. Wingo, 14 Cal.3d 169, 174 (1975); People v.
Dennis M., 70 Cal.2d 444, 453 (1969). Plaintiffs were not
required, under the circumstances and in the context of this civil
case, to meet this burden of proof. Nevertheless, the unconstitu-
tionality of each of the various conditions of confinement at San
Quentin discussed herein and addressed in the Declaratory Judg-
ment and Permanent Injunction “clearly, positively and unmis-
takably appears.”
B-5
Il. OBSERVATIONS OF GOURT
This Court visited San Quentin on two occasions during the
trial. On April 26, 1983, the Court toured the three cell blocks in
which general population prisoners were housed at that time, the
food preparation, service and storage areas, the hospital, the
school, the exercise yards, and the shop areas. On the last day of
trial, June 1, 1983, this Court again visited San Quentin, includ-
ing the two cell blocks in which general population inmates were
then housed as well as the dining and kitchen areas visited
previously. On the April 26 visit, the Court’s first impression upon
entering each cell block was that there was an enormous din
which was extremely deafening. It was easy to discern where all
the noise came from. Almost every inmate had his own television
set as well as his own radio. It was not unusual to see two
television sets playing along with a radio at one time in a single
cell. Each was being played loudly in an apparent attempt to
drown out the noise from other nearby sets. The cell blocks are
constructed of steel and concrete and reverberate the extreme
noise levels generated by the many television sets and radios as
well as the voices of staff and inmates.
While the temperature on the lower tiers could be quite
comfortable, the temperature on the fourth and fifth tiers was
extremely hot. There appeared to be no air circulation. (Most of
the men were in their cells as the prison was in a lockdown). Even
though the temperature outside and on the lower level was
comfortable, the men in the upper levels generally wore only their
underwear because of the discomfort from the heat.
In the cells in which there were two inmates, at least one
inmate was in his bed. This Court entered several cells and noted
that it was virtually impossible to have more than one person
moving about in the approximate 18 inches of space between the
bunkbed and the wall. Further, it was quite obvious that the men
who were assigned to the upper beds had insufficient headroom to
sit up in bed. (The beds are the only furniture in the cells
permitted and, therefore, the only place a person can sit to read,
to study or to write.) Most of the available space in the cells was
filled with the inmates’ personal property. Many of the cells had
boxes stacked from floor to ceiling filled with books, magazines,
B-6
papers, clothing, radios and other personal property. Many had
stools, lamps, fans and other articles of furniture which were
termed “contraband” by the prison officials who accompanied the
Court on this tour. There was no stool or ladder by which the man
assigned to the top bunk could climb up to or down from his
bunk. (Several of the inmate witnesses who later testified, testi-
fied that the men in the upper bunk had to use the toilet as a
footstool to reach the bunk.)
The light in the cells was very dim, making it very difficult to
read, write or study. Some of the cells had jury-rigged wiring to
attach various electrical appliances. There were bare wires appar-
ent in many places. There were electric fans with no guards over
the blades. Many of the cell fronts were covered in full or in part
by curtains, boxes, clothing and other materials hung there by the
inmates in an apparent attempt to acquire privacy. |
Many of the men were lying in their beds sleeping or staring
into space, and they appeared to the Court to be depressed.
In East and West Block the shower stalls were at one end of
each tier. In Alpine the showers were in the center of the tier.
Only a few men could take a shower at the same time. One of the
most common complaints from the inmates that the Court heard
was that they were unable to take a shower frequently enough.
Although the administration indicated that the men were permit-
ted to take a shower every other day, they admitted that when the
general population was in lockdown it was impossible to allow
them to shower that often, for the reason that there was insuff-
cient time to get the men to and from the showers in small groups.
Several of the shower rooms were dark as the lights were broken.
Some of the showers could not be used as one of the hot water
boilers was not functioning.
The cell fronts are open, barred doors. The doors have two
separate locking systems. One system is a bar which, when
unlocked, can be removed in one stroke for a whole tier. The
second locking system consists of individual locks on each cell
door. To release a prisoner from a cell the bar must be removed
and each cell door individually opened.
B-7
The utility alleyways (frequently referred to as “sally ports” or
“plumbing chases’) in all three of the cell blocks were viewed. A
sally port is a narrow (three or four feet wide) alleyway running
from one end to the other of each cell block from basement
through the fifth tier. Each sally port contains heating and
ventilating ducts, plumbing for the entire cell block, electrical
wiring and television antenna wires. Each sally port was filthy,
containing evidence of vermin and roaches; many had leaking
pipes, bare wires; open fuse boxes and other electrical boxes
frequently lacked covers.
There were birds flying overhead in the cell blocks.
In the dining area, food was served from open containers
unprotected by sneezeguards. The inmates going through the line
were permitted to serve themselves. There was no indication that
the inmates were expected to come to the meal with clean hands.
The plastic eating utensils were placed in such a way that an
inmate was likely to touch a number of forks, knives and spoons
as he was pulling his own out of the container.
In the main kitchen there was a single sink for washing hands
for all of the kitchen workers. There was no running water at that
sink that day. The floors were broken and uneven. The walls in
the vegetable room were black with mold and gave off a foul odor.
There were overhead sewage lines above the work surfaces where
food was being prepared. There was standing water outside the
freezer in the vegetable room and ice from leaking pipes on the
floor of the freezer. The door to the exterior from the vegetable
room had an inch or more of space between it and the floor,
permitting access to mice, rats and other vermin. There was
evidence of mice in this area.
In the main kitchen there was evidence of poor ventilation over
the steam cookers, creating problems with condensation and
dripping. There was a broken steam line over the tray washing
area which was wrapped with rags but through which, neverthe-
less, steam was permitted to escape. The floors were extremely
wet and slippery. Covers to the sewer lines were missing in many
places. Water had backed up and was flooding the basement
B-§
under the main kitchen and was being pumped out through the
kitchen.
In the bakery area there was a dead rat in a trap; there was
evidence of mouse droppings both in the dry food-storage area
and in the cooking room. The serving bins in the bakery were
dirty. There was a bird in the bakery and there were insects in
some of the corn flour. The mixing bowls had evidence of dried
food material and one showed evidence of mouse droppings.
There was a loose, filthy ventilation system filter hanging from the
ceiling in the bakery area.
The shower room provided for the kitchen workers had no
lights and was extremely dark.
The garbage containers both in the main kitchen and outside
where most were stored had no lids. The wet garbage was dumped
into large 55-gallon drums. Empty drums showed evidence of
rotting food. Many of the drums appeared to be old, cracked,
bent, and filthy, as was the broken concrete area around them.
At the Court’s second visit, on June 1, the prison was still in
lockdown. This lockdown was even tighter than on the visit six
weeks earlier as there had been a new outbreak of violence shortly
before the second visit. Most of the same conditions prevailed in
the cell block areas as had existed on the first visit. There were
even more inmates in their cells at this time. The inmates
appeared to be more depressed and sullen. The heat and the lack
of ventilation in the top tiers was more evident than on the first
VISIt.
There was some improvement noticed in the food preparation
areas. In particular, the empty garbage cans seemed to be free of
rotting debris and the bakery seemed to be cleaner than on the
Court's first visit. However, all of the rest of the conditions which
existed on the first visit seemed to be present on the second tour.
In addition, although the hot water was running in the main
kitchen washbasin, the basin itself was filthy and there were no
towels available. The vegetable slicer was dirty. The sink in the
butcher shop was dirty and there were no towels available. There
was steam escaping from the tray washer. The steam pipe which
the Court noted was broken at her first visit was still broken,
Eero
B-9
wrapped in rags and leaking. There were mouse droppings ob-
served in the bakery storage area. One of the large mixing bowls
in the bakery was cracked and broken, but nevertheless still being
used. The loose ventilation filter was still hanging from the
ceiling. There were still no lights in the kitchen shower room
Il. THE CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT OF GEN-
ERAL POPULATION PRISONERS AT SAN QUEN-
TIN AMOUNT TO CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
PUNISHMENT
The Court bases its decision concerning this matter on the
following facts which were adduced at trial.
\. Double-celling.
|. Two men are confined to a single cell only 48 square feet in
floor area and 360 cubic feet of space which contain a double
bunkbed, a toilet, and a sink with shelves above the toilet and
sink
2. The bunk beds are approximately 30 inches wide. This
leaves only 18 inches between the bed sides and the wall for two
men to move about.
~
3. There is only 18 square feet of floor space free from
furniture and fixtures.
4. The cells are filled with equipment, clothing, and other
personal belongs which the inmates have obtained in an attempt
to make their daily lives more comfortable. Two men who must
share such a cell cannot move about the cell at the same time.
5. The inmate required to take the upper bunk is unable to sit
up at any time as the distance between the top of the bunk and
the ceiling is only two-and-a-half feet.
6. The weaker of the two inmates in each cell is frequently
subjected to threats, harassment and physical abuse (including
sexual attack). Fear of retaliation prevents the weaker inmate
from complaining to the prison administration.
Men are confined in such cells for long periods of time. In
1982 inmates were in “lockdown” (in cells approximately 24
B-10
hours a day) for almost half of the year. Thus far in 1983, the
general population has been in lockdown since March 27
8. There is no dayroom area nor any place within the cell
blocks for inmates to move about, to exercise or to obtain relief
from the close confinement which double-celling compels
9. Because length of sentence is primary in determining
which level a person sentenced to state prison is placed, an
increasing number of very young men who have never before been
incarcerated have been committed to San Quentin under the new
classification system. Many of these young men are physically and
emotuonally weak and are not able to cope with imprisonment
with the more typical Level IV inmate housed at San Quentin
hese men are subject to threats, harassment, intimidation, sex
ual abuse and physical abuse in much greater numbers than the
general population as a whole. Further, these men have a higher
rate of suicide than does the general population
10. There was substantial and convincing evidence that over
crowding and close confinement cause unbearable stress on ir
mates who are frequently psychologically marginal or brittle
Such inmates are likely to decompensate and suffer mental or
emotional breakdowns
11. These conditions are inhumane. They amount to physica!
and emotional torture and endanger life. Not one of these results
has any penological purpose.
B. Other Conditions of Cell Confinement:
|. The cells have inadequate heat and grossly insufficient
ventilation. The temperature differences between lower tiers and
2
upper tiers can be as great as 15 or 29 degrees
2. There is no hot water in the cells
3. There is insufficient light in each cell
4. The plumbing is badly deteriorated
[he electrical system in the cell blocks 1s dangerous and in
tal violation of all electrical codes
6) Ihe noise levels are extremely high and exce
B-1]
Poor sanitation throughout the cell blocks produces harbor-
age for birds, mice, roaches, bacteria and other vermin
8. The threat of injury or death from fire is real and immi-
nent. The cell blocks are large; evacuation in the event of fire
would take at least 25 minutes. In addition, most of the cells have
jury-rigged and dangerous wiring.
These conditions threaten the physical, mental and emotional
health of the men confined on the mainline at San Quentin, who
are acknowledged to be the most dangerous in the prison system
and seriously maladjusted before they enter the system.
rhe conditions which exist in the cell blocks do not meet the
most minimum standard required for reasonably adequate shelter
( \ iolence
1. San Quentin prison has the highest measured rate of
violence in the California prison system. Violent incidents in the
last three years have multiplied many times and are dispropor
tionate to the rate of increase in the prison population.
>
2. State-wide statistics indicate that the 1982 rate of assaults
for the prison system as a whole was 6.24 per 100 of prison
population; for Level III prisons the rate was 6.00; for Folsom
(the only other Level IV prison in California) 9.56; and for San
Quentin, 15.44. In 1979 the rates were: statewide, 5.08; Level III,
7.04; Folsom, 4.35; and San Quentin, 5.27. During this three-year
period the San Quentin rate almost tripled and the Folsom rate
doubled, while the Level III rate decreased. The San Quentin
rate is 6] percent greater than that at Folsom and two-and-one-
half times greater than that at Level III institutions.
3. From January 1, 1983, until the start of the trial, April 24,
assaults occurred on the mainline at San Quentin on 20 separate
occasions, including one murder. During the trial there were
multiple acts of violence (including two murders) virtually
weekly. Although under 24-hour surveillance by correctional
officers, the men in the San Quentin general population live under
daily threat of injury or death. Violence at San Quentin 1s out of
control
B-12
4. This escalation of violent incidents at San Quentin, includ-
ing San Quentin’s general population, is the result of many
factors. Two highly significant causes are overcrowding (and the
double-celling generated thereby), and the classification system
implemented in 1980, which operates to place at San Quentin and
at Folsom State Prison those inmates who are perceived to be the
most dangerous and volatile inmates in the custody of the Depart-
ment of Corrections.
5. Implementation of this classification system has not re-
sulted in a significant reduction in the rate of violent incidents
occurring in Level II] institutions, nor has it resulted in any
reductions in the rate of violent incidents occurring in Level | and
Level II institutions.
6. Reduction of San Quentin's unconstitutional rate of vio-
lence cannot be accomplished without implementation of a pro-
gram that includes, at the least, both an elimination of
overcrowding and double-celling, and at the same time, a serious
reevaluation. of the classification system that congregates the
Department of Corrections’ so called ‘Level IV’ inmates at two
institutions, one of which is San Quentin. The classification
system is not and cannot be justified by the rates of violence at
‘Level I,’ “Level II,’ or ‘Level III’ institutions in the Department
of Corrections.
The legislature has decreed harder, longer sentences for those
who have committed felonies; however, it did not order that part
of each felon’s punishment was to live in dailv fear of life and
limb. Exposure to these dangers has no appropriate penological
function. The rate of violence is constitutionally impermissable.
D. Food Service.
1. Food is prepared and served under unsanitary conditions,
by inadequately trained and improperly supervised food service
workers, using outmoded and unsafe equipment.
2. The threat of an outbreak of food-borne, water-borne. or
vector-borne disease is severe.
B-13
3. Opportunities for contamination of the potable water
proliferate.
4. There is a lack of proper sanitation which produces harbor-
age for birds, bacteria and other vermin.
The conditions existing in the food service area are a threat to
the physical health of the inmates and fall below contemporary
standards of decency.
IV. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF IS NECESSARY AND AP-
PROPRIATE TO REMEDY THE UNCONSTITU-
TIONAL CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT.
The Court bases its decision concerning this matter on the fact
that unconstitutional conditions have long existed at San Quentin
and are likely to persist and even worsen in the absence of the
judicial intervention specified in the Declaratory Judgment and
Permanent Injunction.
The evidence produced at trial with regard to the length of time
the inhumane, unsanitary and dangerous conditions had existed,
were likely to continue to exist and worsen, was overwhelming.
Year after year, from at least 1977 through 1982, report after
report from staff and state-retained consultants of the California
Department of Corrections called attention to all of the serious
plant deficiencies existing at San Quentin. In addition, the medi-
cal staff warned of the effect of double-celling on the health of the
inmates. Virtually nothing has been done to correct these defi-
ciencies and absolutely nothing has been done to relieve the
pressure of overcrowding on the inmates.
The Court rejects defendants’ contention that the conditions
addressed in this Statement of Decision and in the Declaratory
Judgment and Permanent Injunction cannot be unconstitutional
if they are not the product of the “deliberate indifference” of
defendants or defendants’ employees. See “Legal Basis for
Court's Decision,” § 16, infra. However, it appears clearly, posi-
tively and unmistakably that defendants have been “deliberately
indifferent,” as that term has been defined by the federal courts,
to the constitutional rights of plaintiffs in causing, permitting and
allowing the conditions described herein to occur, persist and
B-14
worsen. Repeated requests have been made to alleviate the
unsanitary, unhealthful, overcrowded, tense and dangerous condi-
tions at San Quentin, and repeatedly these requests have been
ignored. The Court finds that these conditions at San Quentin are
systemic and so grossly deficient that they are indeed the product
of “deliberate indifference.”
The Court also bases its finding of defendants’ deliberate
indifference on the trial testimony of defendant N. A. Chaderjian,
Secretary of the Youth and Adult Corrections Agency, who
displayed extreme callousness toward the plaintiffs’ constitutional
rights.
V. ATTORNEY FEES.
An award of reasonable attorney fees and costs is appropriate in
this case as it involves the vindication of the constitutional rights
of the members of Plaintiff Class. The amount of such fees shall
be determined at a hearing to be had after entry of judgment.
VI. LEGAL BASIS FOR COURT'S DECISION.
The legal basis for the Court’s decision is as follows:
1. The Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States provides: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor exces-
sive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”
2. “No static ‘test’ can exist by which courts determine
whether conditions of confinement are cruei and unusual, for the
Eighth Amendment ‘must draw its meaning from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society.."’ Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981),
quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality
opinion). “The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment ~
is nothing less than the dignity of man.” Jd., 356 U.S. at 100. As
such, this Court is constitutionally bound to apply “broad and
idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity and
decency,” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976), in its
evaluation of the conditions of confinement on the mainline at
San Quentin.
3. The Supreme Court has stated:
B-15
“Today the Eighth Amendment prohibits punishments
which, although not physically barbarous, “involve the un-
necessary and wanton infliction of pain,” Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976), or are grossly disproportionate to
the severity of the crime, Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584,
592 (1977) (plurality opinion); Weems v. United States, 217
U.S. 349 (1910). Among “unnecessary and wanton” inflic-
tions of pain are those that are “totally without penological
justification.” Gregg v. Georgia, supra, at 183; Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976).[”] Rhodes v. Chapman,
452 USS. at 346.
4. The Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishments applies to the states through the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
5. Article I, Section 17, of the California Constitution pro-
vides: “Cruel or unusual punishments may not be inflicted or
excessive fines imposed.”
6. A punishment is cruel or unusual within the meaning of
Article 1, § 17 when it “ ‘shocks the conscience and offends
fundamental notions of human dignity.” Jn re Foss, 10 Cal.3d
910, 919 (1974), quoting Jn re Lynch, 8 Cal.3d 410, 424 (1972).
As with the Eighth Amendment, the concept of cruel or unusual
punishments “ ‘must draw its meaning from the evolving stan-
dards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society,’ ”
People v. Vaughn, 71 Cal.2d 406, 418 (1969), citing Trop v.
Dulles, 36 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
7. In Allen v. Superior Court, 18 Cal.3d 520, 525 (1976), the
Court stated: “It is established that our Constitution is a ‘docu-
ment of independent force (citations) whose construction is left
to this court, informed but untrammeled by the United States
Supreme Court’s reading of parallel federal provisions. . . .”
Furthermore, Cal. Const. Art. 1, Section 24 provides in part:
“Rights guaranteed by this Constitution are not heap
on those guaranteed by the United States Constitution. .
B-16
8. The use, by the drafters of the California Constitution, of
the disjunctive between the terms “cruel” and “unusual,” with
knowledge of the federal formulation, was “purposeful.” People v.
Anderson, 6 Cal.3d 628, 634 (1972), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958
(1972).
9. Calif. Pen. Code Section 2652 makes it a misdemeanor “to
use in the prisons, any cruel, corporal, or unusual punishment or
to inflict any treatment or allow any lack of care which would
injure or impair the health of the prisoner, inmate, or person
confined... .”
10. Calif. Pen. Code Section 2600 provides:
“A person sentenced to imprisonment in a state prison
may, during any such period of confinement, be deprived of
such rights and only such rights, as is necessary in order to
provide for the reasonable security of the institution in which
he is confined and for the reasonable protection of the
public.”
11. An analysis of state standards under Article I, Section 17,
of the California Constitution is found in a new opinion filed by
Division Two of the Fourth Appellate District of the Court of
Appeal.
“The same basic test employed in the federal courts is
appropriate to assessing conditions of confinement chal-
lenged under the California Constitution .. .
‘in assessing the standards of decency which are essential
to this analysis, we think it appropriate that California courts
look chiefly to California standards and institutions for their
guideposts. Jn Re The Inmates of Riverside County at Indio
v. Ben Clark, as Sheriff of Riverside County. (July 12, 1983)
83 Daily Journal D.A.R. 2057, 2058.
Justice Morris (4th District Court of Appeals, Division 2), in
her opinion in the /ndio case carefully contrasted the conditions of
confinement in the Indio jail to those which existed at the
Southern Ohio Correctional Facility which are set out in Rhodes,
supra, 452 U.S. 337 and the Metropolitan Correctional’ Center
considered in Bell v. Wolfish, supra, 441 U.S. 520:
OM
B-17
“In each of these cases the Supreme Court considered
arguments that overcrowded conditions at detention facilities
rose to the level of constitutional violations, and in each case
the court held that ““double-celling” or exceeding a facility’s
design capacity was not per se constitutionally prohibited.
(Citation). In each case the court directed its attention to
the particular conditions at the facility in question.
“The Metropolitan Correctional Center, at issue in Bell v.
Wolfish, was constructed in 1975, and “differ(ed) markedly
from the familiar image of a jail; there are no barred cells,
dank, colorless corridors, or clanging steel gates. It was
intended to include the most advanced and innovative fea-
tures of modern design of detention facilities. As the Court of
Appeals stated: ‘(1)t represented the architectural embodi-
ment of the best and most progressive penological planning.’
(Citation. )
“The Southern Ohio Correctional Facility, at issue in
Rhodes v. Chapman, was built in the early 1970's; it was
described as “ ‘unquestionably a top-flight, first-class facil-
ity.” (452 U.S. at p. 341.) Both the Bell and Rhodes
opinions stressed that under the conditions shown to exist at
those facilities, no constitutional violation could be found. By
clear implication, the court recognized that under other
circumstances, overcrowding would be critical to a finding of
unconstitutionality. (Citation.) Conditions of confinement
“alone or in combination, may deprive inmates of the mini-
mal civilized measure of life’s necessities.’ (Citation.)”
“The Indio jail facility differs substantially from the “top-
flight” and progressive facilities described in the two Su-
preme Court opinions. ... the jail is a “very badly outmoded
physical plant, in virtually all of the facilities,” in the uncon-
tradicted view of an expert from the Board of Corrections.
Breakdown of plumbing was common; maintenance suffered.
The problems of a badly designed, antiquated physical plant
could only be exacerbated by relying on 31 individuals to do
the work of 45 staff members.” (/d. at p. 2058).”
B-18
In Indio the Riverside County Jail was only twenty-two (22)
years old at the time of trial. In the present case the facility varies
in age from approximately 50 years to approximately 100 years.
No part of the facility has been built since 1950.
Under the circumstances set forth in this court’s Statement of
Decision, supra, this Court finds that the conditions of confine-
ment at San Quentin fail to meet contemporary standards of
decency, and are unconstitutional.
12. In Rhodes v. Chapman, supra, the Supreme Court was
concerned with the issue of double-celling. However, in analyzing
double-celling the Court considered virtually every aspect of
inmate life and institutional design and operation in the Southern |
Ohio Correctional Facility (SOCF). The Court discussed its
previous opinions in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976),
involving inmate medical care, and in Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S.
678 (1978), involving conditions of confinement in Arkansas’
punitive isolation cells, and observed:
“Conditions other than those in Gamble and Hutto, alone or
in combination, may deprive inmates of the minimal civi-
lized measure of life’s necessities. Such conditions could be
cruel and unusual...” 452 U.S. at 347 (emphasis supplied).
Most courts adopt Justice Brennan’s assessment of the majority
opinion in Rhodes, see 452 U.S. at 362-63 and n. 10 (Brennan, J.
concurring in the judgment), and refer to the analysis as one
respecting the “totality of conditions” of confinement. Ruiz v.
Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1139 (Sth Cir. 1982) amended in part,
vacated in part on other grounds, 688 F.2d 266 (Sth Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, U.S. , 103 S.Ct. 1938 (1983). The “total-
ity of conditions” approach adopted by the Supreme Court and by
these lower federal courts is an appropriate analytical framework
for this Court’s consideration of the constitutionality of conditions
on the mainline at San Quentin under both the state and federal
constitutions.
One court eschews the label “totality of conditions,” cautioning
against vagueness in findirgs of cruel and unusual punishments
and in creation of remedies for such constitutional violations; that
court prescribes a focus on “discrete areas of human needs.”
B-19
Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246-47 (9th Cir. 1982); see
also, Wright v. Rushen, 642 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir. 1981). That
same court also recognizes that
_ each condition of confinement does not exist in isola-
tion; the court must consider the effect of each condition in
the context of the prison environment, especially when the
ill-effects of particular conditions are exacerbated by other
related conditions. Wright v. Rushen, supra, 642 F.2d at
1133.
The Court’s judgment in the present case reflects these cautionary
statements by the Federal Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal.
13. Generally speaking, inmates are entitled under the Eighth
Amendment to “reasonably adequate food, clothing, shelter, sani-
tation, medical care, and personal safety.” Newman v. Alabama,
559 F.2d 283, 291 (Sth Cir. 1977) remanded on other grounds
sub nom. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978), cert. denied,
438 U.S. 915 (1978); Wright v. Rushen, 642 F.2d 1129, 1132-33
(9th Cir. 1981).
14. With respect to reasonably adequate shelter, Rhodes v.
Chapman, supra, sets forth by its factual presentation the stan-
dard by which the constitutionality of double-celling under the
Eighth Amendment may be determined. It does not confer a
federal constitutional blessing on double-celling in all circum-
stances. The court declared that “conditions in a number of
prisons, especially older ones, have justly been described as
“deplorable” or “sordid.” 452 U.S. at 352. The courts, including
this Court, “have a responsibility to scrutinize claims of cruel and
unusual confinement.” /d. On this basis, it is appropriate to
compare the conditions at the institution under scrutiny in Rhodes
v. Chapman with conditions found in other prisons such as San
Quentin.
One Federal District Court aptly observed:
“As important as what the Supreme Court decided in
Rhodes is what it did not decide. The Court did not rule that
double celling may never amount to cruel and unusual
punishment. Rather, the extensive analysis of related prison
B-20
conditions makes it crystal clear that each case must b
judged on its own unique facts.” Grubbs v. Bradley, 55
F.Supp. 1052, 1122 (M.D. Tenn. 1982).
e
2
Accordingly, since Rhodes, several courts, including the Grubbs
courtfhave determined that double-celling may violate or in fact
does violate the Eighth Amendment. Madyun v. Thompson, 657
F.2d 868 (7th Cir. 1981); Hendrix v. Faulkner, 525 F.Supp. 435
(M.D. Ind. 1981); French v. Owens, 538 F.Supp. 910 (S.D. Ind.
1982): Grubbs v. Bradley, 552 F.Supp 1052 (M.D. Tenn. 1982);
see also, Toussaint v. Rushen, #C-73-1422 SAW (N.D. Cal.)
(preliminary injunction issued Jan. 14, 1983, enjoining, inter alia,
double-celling in the restricted housing units at San Quentin).
15. “Sanitation is a discrete core area entitled to independent
Eighth Amendment protection.” Grubbs v. Bradley, supra, at
1127. Inmates are entitled to “reasonably adequate ventilation,
sanitation, bedding, hygenic materials and utilities (1.e., hot and
cold water, light, heat, plumbing), Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d
559, 568 (10th Cir. 1980). Their quarters must be reasonably fire-
safe. Leeds v. Watson, 630 F.2d 674, 675-76 (9th Cir. 1980);
Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F.Supp. 1265, 1383 (S.D. Tex. 1980) aff'd in
part, rev'd in part and remanded, 679 F.2d 1115 (Sth Cir. 1982)
amended in part, vacated in part, 688 F.2d 266 (Sth Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, ____. U.S. ___,, 103 S.Ct. 1438 (1983).
16. “[{DJeliberate indifference to serious medical needs of
prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain, ... proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.” Estelle v. Gam-
ble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). Mental health care falls within the
ambit of serious medical needs. See, e.g., Woodall v. Foti, 648
F.2d 268, 272 (Sth Cir. 1981), and Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d
44 (4th Cir. 1977).
This Court rejects defendant’s contentions that it must find that
defendants have been “deliberately indifferent” with respect to
conditions of confinement at San Quentin before it can properly
declare such conditions unconstitutional and fashion an appropri-
ate remedy therefor. However, as stated elsewhere in this State-
ment of Decision, the evidence showed that defendants have
B-21
indeed been “deliberately indifferent,” both literally and as that
tional rights delineated herein.
17. Inmates must be given reasonable “protect{ion] from the
constant threat of violence... and sexual assault.” Jones v. Dia-
mond. 636 F.2d 1364 (Sth Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed sub nom.
Ledbetter v. Jones, 453 U.S. 950 (1981); see also, Ramos vy.
Lamm, supra, 639 F.2d at 572. “...[CJonfinement in a prison
where violence and terror reign is actionable. A prisoner has a
right, secured by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, to be
reasonably protected from the constant threat of violence and
sexual assault by his fellow inmates, and he need not wait until he
is actually assaulted to obtain relief.” Woodhous v. Virginia, 487
F.2d 889, 890 (4th Cir. 1973), citing Holt v. Sarver, 442 F.2d
304, 308 (8th Cir. 1971). Furthermore, “[a] pervasive risk of
harm... may be established by much less than proof of a reign of
violence and terror in the particular institution.” Doe v. District of
Columbia, 701 F.2d 948, 961 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
“When a state confines a person by reason of conviction of a
crime, the state must assume the obligation for the safekeeping of
that prisoner. The means of protecting inmates from each other is
the provision of adequate physical facilities. Long-range plans
provide no satisfactory solution to those who are assaulted or
physically harmed today.” Finney v. Arkansas Board of Correc-
tions, 505 F.2d 194, 201 (8th Cir. 1974), on remand, Finney v.
Hutto, 410 F.Supp. 251 (N.D. Ark. 1976), aff'd 548 F.2d 470
(8th Cir. 1977), affd 437 U.S. 678 (1978), reh. denied, 439 U.S.
1122 (1979).
18. ‘“...[W]hen prison officials have failed to control or
separate prisoners who endanger the physical safety of other
prisoners, and the level of violence becomes so high as to
constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
Amendment, federal courts have broad authority to eradicate
such conditions and may order the development of a classification
system as part of the remedy. [Citation]. Jones v. Diamond, 549
F.2d 997, 1015 (Sth Cir. 1979), on reh., 636 F.2d 1364, 1376 (Sth
Cir. 1981) (same principal applied), cert. dismissed sub nom.
Ledbetter v. Jones, 453 U.S. 950 (1981).
B-22
“The classification system is a matter ordinarily leit to the
expertise and discretion of prison administrators. [ Citations omit-
ted]. Nevertheless, if the proof shows a sufficient connection
between an improper classification system and a protected consti-
tutional right, such as the right to be free from excessive violence.
there may be just cause for court intervention in the proper case.”
Grubbs v. Bradley, 552 F.Supp. 1052, 1124 (M.D. Tenn. 1982).
19. “... [While an inmate does not have a federal constitu-
tional right to rehabilitation, he is entitled to be confined in an
environment which does not result in his degeneration or which
threatens his mental and physical well-being.” Battle v. Anderson.
564 F.2d 388, 403 (10th Cir. 1977).
20. An Eighth Amendment violation is proved when “the
cumulative impact of the conditions of incarceration threatens the
physical, mental and emotional health and well-being of the
inmates and/or creates a probability of recidivism and future
incarceration.” Laaman vy. Helgemoe, 437 F.Supp. 269, 323
(N.D.H. 1977), quoted in Rhodes v. Chapman, supra, at 364
(Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
21. “...[J]Judicial intervention is indispensable if constitu-
tional dictates—not to mention considerations of basic humanity
—are to be observed in the prisons.” Rhodes v. Chapman, supra
t 354 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (emphasis in
the original). “... [Control of jails and prisons is best left to the
experts who are charged with the responsibility of running them,
except when the conditions do not comport with concepts of
human dignity of constitutional principles.” Jnmates of Sybil
Brand Institute for Women vy. County of Los Angeles, 130
Cal.App.3d 89, 101 (1982). “...[W]hena prison has been found
to be operated in plain violation of law, the court has the power,
and it is its duty, to order appropriate remedial action.” French y.
Owens, supra, at 926. When conditions of confinement amount to
cruel and unusual punishment, “federal courts will discharge their
duty to protect constitutional rights.” Rhodes y. Chapman, supra,
at 352. This Court will do no less.
22. The courts in this state_are vested with wide discretion in
formulating equitable remedies to cure constitutional violations.
B-23
Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 687 n.9 (1978); Molar v. Gates, 98
Cal.App.3d 1, 25 (1979); Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal.3d 258 (1971);
Central Valley Chapter of the Seventh Step Foundation, Inc. v.
Younger, 95 Cal.App.3d 212 (1979).
23. The Court need not find that defendants have acted
maliciously or in bad faith before it can declare conditions at San
Quentin unconstitutional or fashion its remedy. See, Rhodes v.
Chapman, supra, at 358 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judg-
ment). Furthermore, Defendants’ statutory duty to incarcerate
prisoners legally committed to them does not shield them from
injunctive relief to cure unconstitutional conditions of confine-
ment. See, e.g., Startrack, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 65
Cal.App.3d 451, 457 (1976); Merandette v. City and County of
San Francisco, 88 Cal.App.3d 105, 110-111 (1979). “Legislative
mandate cannot take precedence over constitutional provisions.”
Molar v. Gates, supra, 98 Cal.App.3d at 24.
24. The Court recognizes and does not dispute the prerogative
of the California legislature in the first instance to define conduct
as criminal, to establish criminal penalties, or to appropriate funds
to the various agencies of the Executive Branch as it sees fit or
proper. However, the prerogatives of the Legislative Branch are
circumscribed and limited by both the Federal Bill of Rights and
the California Constitution. Methodist Hospital of Sacramento v.
Savlor, 5 Cal.3d 685 (1971); Way v. Superior Court, 74
Cal.App.3d 165 (1977). It is this Court’s duty to enforce these
constitutional limitations whenever the exercise of legislative
prerogative results in a deprivation of constitutional nghts.
25. While reduction of population and elimination of double-
celling as a remedy for overcrowding at penal institutions may
well cause logistical difficulties for prison officials in the operation
of prison systems, it is nevertheless a remedy that may be ordered
in an appropriate case. Battle v. Anderson, 564 F.2d 388, 403
(10th Cir. 1977). Furthermore, while remedies ordered by a court
may be costly to accomplish,
Constitutional nghts are not. . .confined to those available at
moderate cost... .[T]he nature of the safeguards imposed by
the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment levy costs
B-24
impossible for an accountant to calculate, but esteemed by us
because they are literally priceless. Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d
1115, 1146 (Sth Cir, 1982)
26. “[T]he reduction of population at one institution must
not be accomplished in such a way that another facility becomes
unconstitutionally overcrowded.” Grubbs v. Bradley, supra, 552
F.Supp. at 1131.
The Court may appoint a Special Master to oversee
enforcement of its judgment. The powers of the Special Master
are to be dictated and delegated by the Court, and authority for
his or her appointment may be derived from C.C.P. § 564,
pertaining to receivers: “In Superior Court a receiver may be
appointed by the court in which an action or proceeding Is
pending, or by a judge thereof, in the following cases:. .. 3. After
judgment, to carry the judgment into effect... [and] 8. Where
receivers have heretofore been appointed by the usage of courts of
equity.” Special Masters, who are sometimes designated as “‘re-
ceivers,” have been appointed to enforce equitable decrees in
prison condition cases. Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1161 (Sth
Cir. 1982).
28. C.C.P. § 1021.5. The “private attorney general theory.
“seeks to encourage suits effectuating a strong congressional or
national policy by awarding substantial attorneys’ fees, regardless
of defendants’ conduct, to those who successfully bring such suits
and thereby bring about benefits to a broad class of citizens.’
Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal.3d 25, 43 (1977), quoting DAmico \
Board of Medical Examiners, 11 Cal.3d 1, 27 (1974). This case,
involving vindication of the constitutional rights of members of
the plaintiff class, is an appropriate case for an award of reasona-
ble attorneys’ fees to Plaintiffs. See, e.g., Inmates of Sybil Brand
Institute for Women v. County of Los Angeles, 130 Cal.App.3d at
112-114 (reasonable fee award in case involving several condi-
tions of confinement in women’s county jail facility housing pre-
trial detainees and sentenced prisoners)
2
B-25
29. Actions pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may be brought in
California State Courts. Brown vy. Pitchess, 13 Cal.3d 518 (1975)
42 U.S.C. § 1988 provides in part: “In any action or proceeding to
enforce a provision of Section [ |] 1983...of this ttle
the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other
than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the
costs.” This provision is a federal parallel to C.C.P. § 1021.5, and
under § 1988 reasonable attorney's fees to prevailing plaintiffs in
prison conditions litigation have been made in many Cases,
including the following: Ruiz v. Estelle, 553 F.Supp. 567 (S.D
Tex. 1982); Stewart v. Rhodes, 656 F.2d 1216 (6th Cir. 1981),
eri denied, 455 U.S. 991 (1982)
DATED: September 13, 1983
BEVERLY BLOCH SAVITT
Beverly Bloch Savitt
Judge of the Superior Court
af
C-]
APPENDIX C
In the Court of Appeal of the State of California
First Appellate District, Division Three
A026277
(Super. Ct. No. 103454 Marin County)
Don C. Wilson et al.,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
ft
GEORGE DEUKMEJIAN et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
[Filed December 12, 1988]
These consolidated appeals are from a judgment and orders
declaring conditions of confinement of the general inmate popula-
tion at the California State Prison at San Quentin (San Quentin)
unconstitutional and mandating significant changes in its opera-
tion. The trial court found severe structural and operational
deficiencies at the prison which threatened the lives, health, and
safety of its inmates. We agree with the trial court’s assessment of
those deficiencies, which are not now at issue in this appeal;
fortunately, most have been or are now being corrected. The
principal question in this appeal is whether the court erred in
prohibiting the confinement of two inmates in a single cell. As we
will discuss, we have concluded that the blanket ban on double
celling cannot be sustained.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 1981, two San Quentin prisoners filed a class action alleging
that conditions of confinement at the prison were unconstitu-
tional. The complaint, which sought declaratory and injunctive
relief, was filed on behalf of the “mainline” or general population
of the prison.’ Defendants were the warden of the prison, the
' More specifically, the class consisted of all persons confined at San
Quentin as of June 16, 1981, or who may be so confined in the future,
except for persons confined in restricted housing units. Conditions of
C-2
director of the California Department of Corrections, the Gover-
nor and others.”
On September 13, 1983, after a lengthy trial, the trial court
issued a declaratory judgment and permanent injunction in which
it concluded that the prisoners in the mainline population were
being subjected to cruel and unusual punishment in several
respects. The judgment stated: (i) The prison is overcrowded.
The men are forced to remain confined for extended periods of
time, two men to a single cell less than 48 square feet in floor
space and 360 cubic feet of space, with little or no opportunity for
meaningful activity. Most... confined there are dangerous; many
are seriously maladjusted or have psychiatric problems. The cells
have inadequate heat, improper light and insufficient ventilation.
Almost no cells have hot water. The plumbing is badly deterio-
rated. The electrical system in the cell blocks is dangerously
substandard, in total violation of all electrical codes. Noise levels
are excessive. Lack of proper sanitation practices produces har-
borage for birds, mice, roaches, bacteria and vermin of all sorts.
The threat of injury or death from fire is real and imminent.
These conditions threaten the physical, mental and emotional
health and well-being of the men confined on the mainline...
and are not penologically justified.
(ii) The men are forced to live amidst excessive violence; the
threat of injury or death from violent assault is great and is
punishment not included in the punishment to which each inmate
is sentenced.
(iii) The men are forced to live in a prison in which the threat
of an outbreak of food-borne, water-borne, or vector-borne dis-
confinement of prisoners in administrative segregation at San Quentin
are the subject of litigation in federal court. (See Toussaint v. Yockey
(9th Cir. 1984) 722 F.2d 1490; Toussaint v. McCarthy (9th Cir. 1986)
801 F.2d 1080; Rowland v. U.S. Dist. Court for N.D. of Cal. (9th Cir.
1988) 849 F.2d 380.)
> The action was also filed as a taxpayer's action by plaintiff Ursula
Gealey, who alleged that the expenditure of funds to imprison persons at
San Quentin under existing conditions is a waste of public funds and a
threat to the physical security and general welfare of all Californians.
C-3
ease is severe. Food is prepared and served under unsanitary
conditions, by inadequately trained and improperly supervised
food service workers, using outmoded and unsafe equipment.
Lack of proper sanitation practices produces harborage for birds,
mice, roaches, bacteria and vermin of all sorts. Opportunities for
contamination of the portable water supply proliferate. The sani-
tary conditions existing are below minimum acceptable standards
of decency.”
The court enjoined defendants from confining anyone at San
Quentin until each unconstitutional condition was eliminated or
corrected, but stayed the injunction provided defendants complied
to the court’s satisfaction with several enumerated conditions.
First, defendants were to submit a plan for the elimination of
overcrowding; that plan had to provide for elimination of all
involuntary double celling and “address the effect on the physical,
mentai and emotional well-being” of members of the class from
their confinement in institutions other than San Quentin. Second,
defendants were to submit a plan for the “evaluation and reexam-
ination” of the classification system which designated San Quen-
tin a prison for the placement of the most violent prisoners.
Finally, defendants were to submit a proposal for the elimination
of the numerous structural and operational deficiencies specified
in the court’s statement of decision. The judgment provided for
appointment of a Special Master to assist the court in reviewing
the adequacy of the plans. Defendants commenced compliance
with the court’s conditions, but also filed a notice of appeal from
the judgment.
In October 1983, defendants submitted its Phase I Report, a
preliminary proposal to implement the injunction, which included
a request for limited double celling. On January 19, 1984, after
reviewing defendants’ report and that of the Special Master, the
court issued an order stating that it was impressed with the
progress the defendants had already made toward correcting
structural and operational deficiencies at the prison which
threatened the lives, health, and safety of the inmates. The order
also specified in some detail what the final plan should include,
required a study of the classification system, directed the monitor-
ing of all inmates transferred from the mainline to other institu-
C-4
tions, and refused to allow any involuntary double celling absent a
riot or other similar emergency. Defendants also appealed from
that order.
In March 1984, this court granted in part defendants’ petition
for writ of supersedeas by partially staying the double celling
prohibition. In April 1984, defendants submitted a final plan to
implement the court’s findings, the Phase II Report. On August
30, 1984, the trial court approved the operations and structures
section of the plan, but ordered that double celling, whether
voluntary or involuntary, should not exceed the limit established
by this court’s stay. On September 24, 1984, the trial court issued
a second order, approving the final plan only provisionally. As will
be discussed in more detail later in this opinion, the order directed
defendants to report further on their efforts to alleviate over-
crowding by means other than transferring -prisoners; it also
ordered defendants to carry out a “total analysis” of the existing
system for classifying inmates and prisons. Defendants filed a
third notice of appeal from these two orders.
Finally, on June 19, 1985, the trial court issued an order
enjoining defendants from involuntarily transferring any class
member to either the North or Central facilities of the Correc-
tional Training Facility at Soledad. Defendants filed a fourth
notice of appeal from that order.
The several appeals have all been consolidated in this court.
FACTS
In recent years the prison population in California has in-
creased dramatically. In 1983 the design capacity of the institu-
tions in the statewide prison system was 23,557, but the inmate
population was over 32,000 and was increasing by approximately
340 prisoners per month. Between 1977 and mid-1982, the
number of inmates at San Quentin grew from 2,000 to 3,400. By
February 1983, the general population was 153 percent of design
Capacity.
At the time of trial, California prisons were divided into four
Categories, ranging from the least (Level I) to the most secure
C-5
(Level IV). The only two level IV prisons were Folsom and San
Quentin. In the late 1970's a new system for classifying prisoners
was adopted, which was intended to insure that prisoners were
placed in an institution with an appropriate level of custody, and
to house similar prisoners in the same institution. Prison adminis-
trators hoped that housing disruptive and assaultive prisoners in
One institution would free other institutions to provide programs
for less disruptive individuals. Their attempt was to provide a
more objective way of classifying prisoners than had been utilized
previously. Prisoners were classified as Level I, II, III, or IV
inmates, with the latter considered the most difficult management
problems within the system. Criteria utilized to classify prisoners
included length of term, nature of the crime committed, and prior
escapes or assaultive behavior. A prisoner might qualify for Level
IV custody solely on the basis of sentence length, and could be
confined at San Quentin with no previous convictions. Reclassifi-
cation of a prisoner based on in-prison behavior was possible.
Among the results of the classification system was that the most
violent offenders were concentrated at San Quentin. At the time
of trial, there were more Level IV inmates in the system than
Level IV cells available at Folsom and San Quentin; thus some
Level IV inmates were confined at Level III institutions.
The general or mainline population at San Quentin consists of
inmates who are ordinarily free to go from their cells to work,
school, and to the mess hall.’ At times, however, inmates in the
mainline population are “locked down,” or confined in their cells
for up to 23 hours each day, and are released only to take showers
and occasionally for meais. Among circumstances triggering a
lock-down are violent incidents, when prison officials need to
investigate and control inmates.
When the prison was not locked down, about 75 percent of the
mainline population inmates were out of their cells about 14 hours
a day; the rest, about 10 or 11 hours a day. Lock-downs were
frequent, however.
2 ‘. ‘ ‘ .
Other inmates are in secured housing units for various reasons.
Those units are also referred to as housing management control units or
lock-ups.
C-6
The overcrowding at the prison led the the double celling of
many mainline inmates. Prison officials testified that attempts
were made to double cell individuals who were “somewhat
compatible.’ Procedures were available to allow cell changes by
an inmate having difficulty with a cellmate or with medical
reasons for a change. The unit staff handled initial requests for
changes, with the inmate appeal process available to an unsatis-
fied prisoner. Nevertheless, accomplishing a change often took a
long time.
The conflicting evidence about the level of violence at the
prison and its causes will be discussed later in this opinion. It is
unnecessary for purposes of this appeal to set forth the evidence
about the deplorable structural and operational conditions at the
prison, as defendants do not challenge the trial court’s findings
and conclusions concerning those conditions.
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT: THE STAN-
DARD OF REVIEW
In considering these appeals, we must accept the trial court’s
findings of fact, provided they are supported by substantial evi-
dence. The constitutional significance of the facts found, however,
is a question of law for the independent judgment of this court.
(See People v. Louis (1986) 42 Cal.3d 969, 984-985; People v.
Levba (1981) 29 Cal.3d 591, 596-597 [discussing the two-tiered
standard of review in the context of a motion to suppress
evidence ].)
Our determination of whether the facts found amount to cruel
and unusual punishment is governed by Rhodes v. Chapman
(1981) 452 U.S. 337, in which the Supreme Court considered for
the first time whether conditions of confinement at a particular
prison constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of
the Eighth Amendment. Articulating the principles relevant to its
analysis, the court explained that the Eighth Amendment prohib-
its conditions of confinement which ‘“ ‘involve the unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain’ [citation]... .” (/d., at p. 346, fn.
omitted.) “Among ‘unnecessary and wanton’ inflictions of pain
C-7
are those that are ‘totally without penological justification.’ [ Cita-
tions.]” (/bid.)
The court emphasized that there is no static test for ascertain-
ing whether conditions of confinement are cruel and unusual.
Rather, “the Eighth Amendment ‘must draw its meaning from
the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society.’ [Citation.]” (Rhodes v. Chapman, supra, 452
U.S. at p. 346.) Conditions of confinement, “alone or in combina-
tion, may deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measure of
life’s necessities. Such conditions could be cruel and unusual
under the contemporary standard of decency. ... But conditions
that cannot be said to be cruel and unusual under contemporary
standards are not unconstitutional. To the extent that such condi-
tions are restrictive and even harsh, they are part of the penalty
that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.”
(/d., at p. 347.)
The court cautioned that Eighth Amendment determinations
should not be merely the subjective views of judges. (Rhodes v.
Chapman, supra, 452 U.S. at p. 346.) “In assessing claims that
conditions of confinement are cruel and unusual, courts must bear
in mind that their inquiries ‘spring from constitutional require-
ments and that judicial answers to them must reflect that fact
rather than a court’s idea of how best to operate a detention
facility.” [Citation.]” (/d., at p. 351.)
The specific question in Rhodes was whether the double celling
of inmates at an Ohio prison was unconstitutional. According to
the trial court’s findings, each 63-square-foot cell contained a
two-tiered bunk bed, a cabinet night stand, a wall-mounted sink
with hot and cold running water, and a toilet, a cabinet, shelf, and
built-in radio. About 75 percent of the inmates could choose to
spend most of their time outside the cells, in the day rooms,
school, workshops, library, or in visits. Other inmates spent more
time in their cells. The food was adequate, as was the air
ventilation system and the temperature. While violence had
increased with the prison population, evidence failed to establish
that it had increased out of proportion to the increase in popula-
tion, or that double celling itself caused greater violence.
C-8
The trial court had concluded that double celling under those
circumstances constituted cruel and unusual punishment, but the
Supreme Court disagreed. It reasoned that the double celling did
not “lead to deprivations of essential food, medical care, or
sanitation. Nor did it increase violence among inmates or create
other conditions intolerable for prison confinement.” (Rhodes vy.
Chapman, supra, 452 U.S. at p. 348.) The court acknowledged
that the double celling was not desirable and might even inflict
pain, but stated, “there is no evidence that double celling under
these circumstances either inflicts unnecessary or wanton pain or
is grossly disproportionate to the severity of crimes warranting
imprisonment.” (/d., at pp. 348-349, fn. omitted. )
Our review must also be quided by Whitley v. Albers (1986)
475 U.S. 312, decided by the Supreme Court while the instant
appeals were pending. In Whitley, the Supreme Court discussed
the requirements of the Eighth Amendment in the context of a
prisoner's claim that officials subjected him to cruel and unusual
punishment by shooting him during an attempt to quell a prison
riot. Relying on Estelle v. Gamble (1976) 429 U.S. 97, in which it
had held that deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of
prisoners is cruel and unusual punishment, the court stated that
an intent to inflict unnecessary pain is not required to establish an
Eighth Amendment violation. Nevertheless, it also stressed that
to be cruel and unusual punishment, conduct which does not
purport to be punishment at all must involve more than ordinary
lack of due care for ia prisoner’s interests or safety. (Whitley v.
Albers, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 319.) “Jt is obduracy and wanton-
ness, not inadvertence or error in good faith, that characterize the
conduct prohibited by the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause, whether that conduct occurs in connection with establish-
ing conditions of confinement, supplying medicial needs, or restor-
ing official control over a tumultuous cellblock.” (/bid., emphasis
added. )
Whether the trial court correctly assessed the constitutionality
of conditions at San Quentin is not the only question in this case.
Even if we were to agree with that assessment, we must also
evaluate the remedies it ordered. When a court has concluded
that an Eighth Amendment violation has occurred, its function is
C-9
“to [fashion] a remedy that does no more and no less than correct
that particular constitutional violation.” (Hoptowit v. Ray (9th
Cir. 1982) 682 F.2d 1237, 1246; see also Spain v. Procunier (9th
Cir. 1979) 600 F.2d 189, 194; Ruiz v. Estelle (Sth Cir. 1982) 679
F.2d 1115, 1144-1145, mod. on other grounds 688 F.2d 266.) A
remedial injunction which goes beyond what is required to correct
the Eighth Amendment violations must be reversed. (Union
County Jail Inmates v. Di Buono (3d Cir. 1983) 713 F.2d 985,
1001-1003; Hoptowit v. Ray, supra, 682 F.2d at pp. 1244-1245.)
This limitation on the court's discretion is based in part on the
recognition that “the problems of prisons in America are complex
and intractable, and... not readily susceptible of resolution by
decree. Most require expertise, comprehensive planning, and the
commitment of resources, all of which are peculiarly within the
province of the legislative and executive branches of government.
For all of those reasons, courts are ill equipped to deal with the
increasingly urgent problems of prison administration and re-
form.” (Procunier v. Martinez (1974) 416 U.S. 396, 404-405, fn.
omitted: see also Wilson v. Superior Court (1987) 194
Cal.App.3d 1259, 1268-1269.)*
OVERCROWDING
a. Double celling
Initially the court prohibited involuntary double celling; later, it
barred voluntary double celling as well. Before we consider
defendants’ objections to this ban, it is necessary to clarify what is
not at issue in this appeal and to determine precisely what the
trial court held with respect to double celling.
In its statement of decision the trial court made detailed
findings of fact about four categories of conditions of confinement:
double celling, “other conditions of cell confinement,” violence,
and food service. As to the “other conditions” category, which
included such deficiencies as inadequate heat and ventilation,
*When a federal court reviews conditions in a state prison, that
court's discretion in fashioning a remedy is also limited by principles of
federalism. (Hoptowit v. Ray, supra, 682 F.2d at p. 1246.)
ooo
cia
C-10
deteriorated plumbing, and an electrical system violating code
requirements, the court concluded that these conditions did not
meet “the most minimum standard required for reasonably ade-
quate shelter.” In other words, the court held that those condi-
tions combined to deprive prisioners of their need for habitable
shelter and in combination amounted to a violation of the Eighth
Amendment. (See Toussaint v. McCarthy, supra, 801 F.2d at
p. 1107.) The court also concluded that conditions existing in the
food service area threatened the physical health of the inmates
and fell “below contemporary standards of decency.” Defendants
do not dispute the sufficiency of the evidence to support the
court's findings concerning either of these two categories: they
have not attacked the judgment insofar as it concluded that these
deficiencies violated the Eighth Amendment and ordered their
correction.
The trial court also concluded that the rate of violence at the
prison was constitutionally unacceptable. As will be discussed.
defendants do dispute the court’s findings and conclusions on that
category.
The court’s findings and conclusions about double celling are
somewhat ambiguous. From the court’s treatment of double
celling as a discrete category of conditions of confinement. it |
appears to have held double celling unconstitutional regardless of |
any other conditions of cell confinement. The court also men-
tioned double celling in its findings about the escalating rate of
violence at the prison, stating that two of its many causes were the
double celling generated by overcrowding and the classification |
system which placed the most dangerous inmates at San Quentin.
Thus it appears that the court also prohibited double celling based
on its finding that the practice contributed to the unconstitutional
rate of violence at the prison.
ee
[I]n and of itself double-celling is not unconstitutional.”
( Toussaint v. Yockey, supra, 722 F.2d at p. 1492, citing Rhodes v.
Chapman, supra, 452 U.S. 337.) Considered in isolation, double
celling may be undesirable, harsh, and restrictive, but it does not
inflict unnecessary and wanton pain or violate contemporary
standards of decency. Insofar as the trial court held that double
celling was per se unconstitutional, the court erred.
C-1]
In Rhodes, the Supreme Court intimated that double celling
may be prohibited by the Eighth Amendment if it increases
violence among inmates. (Rhodes, supra, 452 U.S. at p. 348.)
Unquestionably prison officials are obligated to take reasonable
steps to protect inmates from physical abuse. (Hoptowit v. Ray,
supra, 682 F.2d at p. 1250.) Although “[vJiolence is unfortu-
nately epidemic to American prisons” (Murphy v. United States
(D.C. Cir. 1981) 653 F.2d 637, 342), “[v]iolence and sexual
assault among inmates may rise to a level rendering conditions
crue} and unusual.” (Alberti v. Klevenhagen (Sth Cir. 1986) 790
F.2d 1220, 1224.) Accordingly, we must also examine the suffi-
ciency of the evidence to support the court’s finding that double
celling was among the causes of increased violence at San
Quentin.
The evidence does indicate that in 1982, the number of
assaults, suicides, and weapon possession incidents per 100 aver-
age daily population at the prison was increasing, and that the rate
of increase was greater at San Quentin than at Folsom, the other
Level IV institution. That evidence, however, does not support
the finding that double celling itself was a cause of the increase.
The statistics upon which the court relied did not distinguish
between the mainline population and the segregated units, or
between single and double celled inmates. As defendants point
Out, an increase in violence as a whole does not establish that
double celling among the general population caused that increase.
Accordingly, the court’s prohibition on double celling based on its
causal relationship to the rate of violence at the prison cannot be
sustained. In light of our conclusion, the court’s ban on voluntary
double celling must also fall.
b. Monitoring of transferred inmates
The second component which the court ordered included in
defendants’ plan to eliminate overcrowding was a section address-
ing “the effect on the physical, mental and emotional well-being”
of members of the class resulting from their confinement in
institutions other than San Quentin. The court’s order on defend-
ants’ final plan requires monitoring of conditions of confinement
of any class member transferred to another prison within the
system. Defendants object to this order.
C-1]2
The monitoring réquirement apparently stemmed trom the
court's concern that’ its ban on double celling at San Quentin
would result in overcrowded conditions at other state prisons. Our
conclusion that the prohibition on double celling must be reversed
would seem to eliminate the reason for the monitoring
requirement.
The monitoring order must also be reversed for a more funda-
mental reason. Although a trial court has broad discretion in
tailoring a remedial injunction (see Times-Mirror Co. v. Superior
Court (1935) 3 Cal.2d 309, 331), that discretion is not unlimited,
particularly in a case such as this. As already stated, a court which
concludes that a condition of confinement violates the Eight’:
Amendment should “[fashion] a remedy that does no more an?
no less then correct that particular constitutional violation.
(Hoptowit v. Ray, supra, 682 F.2d at p. 1246.)
This action was brought on behalf of persons confined at San
Quentin or who might be confined there in the future, and
challenged conditions of confinement at that institution, not in the
State's prison system as a whole. The court’s function was limited
to devising a remedy for those conditions at San Quentin which it
found unconstitutional. Conditions at other state prisons were not
litigated in this action. These conditions are being litigated in
other courts. Plaintiffs do not explain how the monitoring of
inmates transferred from San Quentin would rectify conditions at
that prison, and cite no authority which supports this intrusive
aspect of the court’s remedial orders. The court abused its
discretion in mandating the monitoring of transferred prisoners.”
* Rowland v. U.S. Dist. Court for N.D. of Cal., supra, 849 F.2d 380 is
consistent with our conclusion. Rowland is the most recent appeal in the
lawsuit brought on behalf of prisoners confined in administrative segre-
gation in four California prisons. (See ante, p. 2, fn. 1.) A permanent
injunction, limited to Folsom and San Quentin, was issued by the trial
court to correct several unconstitutional conditions. A monitor was
appointed to review compliance with the injunction, and was ordered by
the trial court to investiage the transfer of Folsom prisoners to another
prison and evaluate the constitutionality of conditions at that prison. The
appellate court reversed, reasoning that the trial court had no jurisdic-
tion to send an emissary into a facility not covered by the injunction to
C-13
c. Alternatives to transferring inmates
The potential impact on other prisons of the San Quentin
double-celling underlies another order of the court challenged by
defendants. After reviewing defendants’ -proposed plan, the court
ordered that their final plan should contain solutions to the
overcrowding problem other than transferring prisoners to
crowded prisons elsewhere in the system; it listed several such
solutions, among them proposals for legislation to create a “safety
valve” release program. In its order evaluating the final plan, the
court stated that defendants had not “carried their burden” in
seeking the enactment of legislation and that the plan ignored
many alternative solutions to overcrowding. The order stated that
the court could not accept defendants’ policy choice to overcrowd
other institutions; it required defendants to report at a later date
theiz efforts to alleviate overcrowding through adoption of ap-
proaches other than the transfer of inmates.
As with the monitoring requirement, this order must be re-
versed for more than one reason. First, the reversal of the double-
celling ban removes one of the reasons underlying this order.
More importantly, “[c]ourts must recognize that the authority to
make policy choices concerning prisons is not a proper judicial
function.” (Hoptowit v. Ray, supra, 682 F.2d at p. 1246.) As
already stated, conditions of confinement elsewhere in the prison
system were not challenged in this lawsuit, and the court made no
findings with respect to the constitutionality of conditions in other
prisons. Under these circumstances, the court abused its discre-
tion by dictating that defendants had to alleviate overcrowding by
methods other than transferring of inmates. Furthermore, the
doctrine of separation of powers prohibits courts from compelling
legislative action. (California State Employees’ Assn. v. State of
California (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 103, 108-109.) By ordering
defendants to seek the passage of “safety valve” legislation, the
court impermissibly attempted to accomplish indirectly what it
could not order directly.
determine the existence of constitutional violations there. “If such
violations exist, they must be established on the basis of a new lawsuit
brought by allegedly aggrieved parties.” (Rowland, supra, at p. 382.)
d. Transfers to Soledad
On June 19, 1985, the court enjoined defendants from involun-
tarily transferring mainline prisoners to the North and Central
facilities of the Correctional Training Facility at Soledad. The
order provided that it would dissolve if conditions of confinement
at those facilities were found to meet constitutional standards in
two separate actions then pending. We take judicial notice of two
unpublished opinions in those actions, Jn re Rock (Nov. 14,
1986) HO000890 and /n re Daily and Smith (Mar. 16, 1987)
A026682, in which the reviewing courts reversed trial court orders
concluding that conditions at those facilities were unconstitutional
or ordering changes in the prison operation. In light of those
decisions, the parties now agree that defendants’ appeal from this
order is moot.
INMATE CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM
Among the conditions upon which the court stayed its judg-
ment was the submission of a plan for the evaluation and re-
examination of the classification system-by which San Quentin
was designated a Level IV institution. Defendants’ Phase |
Report included a proposal for_a comprehensive review of the
classification system. The court’s order in response to that report
specified several questions which should be addressed, including
the extent to which the classification system had contributed to
violence at San Quentin and whether the system should be
modified.
In April 1984, defendants submitted their Phase II Report and
a study titled “Preliminary Report, Review and Analysis of
Departmental Inmate Classification System.” According to its
introduction, the latter report had its origin in the trial court’s
directive in the instant case, but correctional administrators,
legislators, and others involved concluded that a more extensive
evaluation and modification of the overall classification system
was necessary. This preliminary report explained that a long-term
evaluation of the system would follow. Nevertheless, in its Sep-
tember 24, 1984, order, the trial court directed defendants to carry
out “a total analysis of the existing classification system.” It
C-15
ordered defendants to consult outside experts and include speci-
fied components in the analysis.
The Department’s evaluation culminated in its Inmate Classifi-
cation System Study: Final Report, January 1986, which was filed
with the trial court. In his 7th Quarterly Report to the trial court,
the Special Master expressed some criticism of the study, but
concluded that defendants had met the mandates of the court in
performing the study and recommended that they be found in
compliance with the final plan. (Special Master's 7th Quarterly
Report at p. 13.) In an order dated October 17, 1986, the trial
court accepted the Special Master's Report. °
Defendants contend that the court erred in requiring an evalua-
tion of the classification system. In general, courts defer to the
expertise of prison officials in classifying inmates, and will not
limit their discretion to classify prisoners as they deem appropri-
ate. (See, e.g., Groseclose v. Dutton (D.Tenn. 1985) 609 F.Supp.
1432, 1436, 1446-1447, vacated on other grounds and remanded
829 F.2d 581, 585.) Nevertheless, a court may order the develop-
ment of a classification system as part of the remedy when prison
officials have not controlled or isolated prisoners who threaten the
safety of others and the level of violence is so high that it
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. (See Jones v. Dia-
mond (5th Cir. 1981) 636 F.2d 1364, 1374, 1376.)
In this case, however, we will not decide whether the court
erred in ordering a study of the classification system. The duty of
a reviewing court is to decide actual controversies by a judgment
which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions on moot
questions. An issue in an appeal may be moot when an event has
occurred which makes it impossible for the court to grant the
appellant any effectual relief should it rule in his or her favor.
(See Paul v. Milk Depots, Inc. (1964) 62 Cal.2d 129, 132.)
Given the Department’s study, the Special Master’s Report and
the court’s acceptance of that report, any issues concerning the
classification system are moot.
*We have taken judicial notice of the study, the Special Master's
report, and the order accepting that report.
C-16
Defendants contend that a live controversy exists as to the
validity of the court’s factual findings about the effects of the
existing classification system. Regardless of those findings, how-
ever, defendants have prepared the study, the Special Master has
concluded that defendants have met the mandates of the court in
performing that study, and the court has accepted the Special
Master's Report. In plaintiffs’ words, ““With respect to the orders
requiring examination and reevaluation of the classification sys-
tem, there is nothing left to do. [Defendants] have complied.
[Defendants] so contend; the special master agreed; the trial
court so found. The studies cannot be un-written.” Any decision
by this court about whether the court should have ordered the
study would have no practical effect or provide defendants with
any effective relief.
In the alternative, defendants also urge that we should evaluate
the court's classification orders even if events have rendered those
orders moot, because the question is one of substantial public
interest which is likely to recur. (See Marin County Bd. of
Realtors, Inc. v. Palsson (1976) 16 Cal.3d 920, 929.) Undoubt-
edly the state’s prison system and the manner in which prisons
and inmates are classified is of considerable public interest.
Nevertheless, in any case challenging the constitutionality of
conditions of confinement, the validity of an order involving
classification will depend on the facts and circumstances of that
particular case. (See, e.g., Gates v. Collier (Sth Cir. 1974) 501
F.2d 1291, 1308-1310; Palmigiano v. Garrahy (D.R.1. 1977) 443
F.Supp. 956, 965-968, 987-988.) We are unaware of any other
similar pending case, and have not been convinced by defendants
that the precise questions raised by the court’s orders in this case
are likely to arise again.
OTHER ORDERS
Defendants also object to several other aspects of the court’s
post-judgment orders.
a. Compliance with health and fire surveys
Defendants have not challenged the court’s findings about the
many serious structural and operational deficiencies at San Quen-
C-17
tin or its conclusion that these deficiencies combined to deprive
inmates of habitable shelter and personal safety according to
contemporary standards of decency. Nor have they challenged
that portion of the injunction directing development of a plan for
the expeditious elimination of “the structural and operational
deficiencies at San Quentin which threaten the lives, health and
safety of the inmates... .”
In its January 1984 order on the proposed plan, the court stated
that it was impressed with the progress made by defendants in
correcting these deficiencies, and approved their schedule to
improve the situation, subject to several conditions. Among those
conditions was that the deficiencies to be monitored should
include not only those set forth in the court’s declaratory judg-
ment, “but also those set forth in the most recent Environmental
Health Survey conducted by the Environmental Health Division,
Department of Health Services, as well as the Fire Inspection
Report made by the State Fire Marshal as these reports apply to
structure, services,” and programs covered by this Court’s
decision.”
Defendants object to that condition, arguing that compliance
with health and fire surveys is desirable but that such reports do
not set constitutional standards. We agree. Opinions of experts as
to desirable prison conditions do not establish constitutional
minima. (Rhodes v. Chapman, supra, 452 U.S. at p. 348, fn. 13.)
While fire safety and environmental health are legitimate con-
cerns under the Eighth Amendment, “ ‘not every deviation from
ideally safe conditions constitutes a violation of the constitu-
tion.” ” (French v. Owens (7th Cir. 1985) 777 F.2d 1250, 1257.)
To the extent that the trial court’s order may be read as compel-
ling defendants to remedy all defects in every health survey and
fire inspection report, present and future, that order goes too far.
Nevertheless, the trial court is entitled to consider those reports in
determining whether conditions at the prison currently satisfy
contemporary standards of decency.
b. Inmate out-of-cell activities; staff training
In that January 1984 order, the court also conditioned its
approval of the proposal to eliminate structural and operational
On
C-18
deficiencies on the inclusion in the final plan of sections address-
ing inmate out-of-cell activities and staff training. Defendants
object to this condition as well.
Read as a request for information rather than a directive to
implement specific programs, the requirement that the plan report
on oOut-of-cell activities was not improper. The structural and
operational deficiencies being remedied included inadequate heat,
lighting, plumbing, and ventilation in cells; assessment of the
adequacy of any improvements would not be complete without
information about whether, when, and for how long inmates may
be out of those cells. Likewise, the directive regarding staff
training was not an abuse of the court’s discretion. It merely
directed the defendants to address staff training in working toward
compliance with the court’s order. This was done in the opera-
tions and structures section of defendant's plan which was subse-
quently approved by the court. If the court had ordered the
specific type of training required we would have a different
question. Proper training for guards is unquestionably desirable,
but the nature of that training is not a determinative issue in
respect to a violation of the Eighth Amendment. “[T]o require
prisons to have adequate... training programs [for staff] is an
impermissible judicial involvement with the minutiae of prison
administration. [Citation.]” (/foptowit v. Ray, supra, 682 F.2d at
p. 1251.)
c. Order on the final plan
In its September 1984 order, the court directed defendants to
“carry out their final plan.” Defendants express concern that
compliance with that plan may become the measure of the trial
court’s continuing jurisdiction over the prison, and ask this court
to modify the order to require them to carry out the plan only as
long as conditions at the prison remain unconstitutional.
However, our disposition of this appea! has significantly re-
duced the scope of that order. The final plan discussed defend-
ants’ proposals to eliminate, ameliorate, or correct each condition
cited by the court as unconstitutional. It addressed four general
topics: overcrowding, the inmate classification system, operational
deficiencies, and structural deficiencies. We have already ex-
C-19
plained why the court’s orders directed at overcrowding, such as
its ban on double celling and its requirement for monitoring of
transferred prisoners, must be reversed. Thus to the extent that
the September 1984 order directs defendants to carry out that
portion of their final plan for the elimination of overcrowding, it
too must be reversed.
In addition, we have concluded that any issues with respect to
the inmate classification system are moot because defendants
have complied with the court’s orders for an evaluation of that
system; therefore the order to carry out the final plan does not
encompass any Classification issues.
What remains of the September 14 order, then, is that defend-
ants are to carry out their final plan for the elimination of the
structural and operational deficiencies at the prison. We reiterate
that defendants have not appealed from the court’s judgment and
orders with respect to those deficiencies. If conditions have
changed, defendants are entitled to apply to the trial court for a
modification of the injunction. The question then will be whether
the changed conditions satisfy constitutional requirements, not
whether defendants have complied with all requirements of their
plan. (See Toussaint v. Yockey, supra, 722 F.2d at p. 1492, fn. 3;
Cody v. Hillard (8th Cir. 1986) 799 F.2d 447, 451, affd. in part,
revd. in part 830 F.2d 912; see also Welsch v. Goswick (1982) 130
Cal.App.3d 398, 404.)
Finally, in light of our conclusions with respect to defendants’
contentions, it is unnecessary to consider their alternative conten-
tion that the trial court had no jurisdiction to modify the injunc-
tion once notice of appeal from that injunction had been filed.
C-20
DISPOSITION
The declaratory judgment and injunction and the orders ap-
pealed from are reversed insofar as they: (1) hold double celling
unconstitutional; (2) prohibit involuntary or voluntary double
celling; (3) require the monitoring of transferred inmates:
(4) mandate defendants to seek the enactment of legislation and
consider methods other than transferring prisoners to alleviate
overcrowding. The appeal from the order of June 19, 1985, which
the parties agreed is moot, is dismissed. In all other respects, the
judgment and orders are affirmed. Plaintiffs and defendants shall
bear their own costs on appeal.
Merrill, J.
We concur:
White, P.J.
Barry-Deal, J.
D-|
APPENDIX D
Court of Appeal of the State of California
In and for the
First Appellate District
Division: 3
[Filed January 6, 1989]
Wilson, Don D.., et al.
VS.
Deukmejian, George, et al.
A026277 Old No. A022431
Marin County No. 103454
BY THE COURT:
The petition for rehearing is denied.
Dated: January 6, 1989
3.
E-]
APPENDIX E
Order Denying Review
After Judgment by the Court of Appeal
Ist District, Division 3, No. A026277
S008 560
In the Supreme Court of the Séate of California
In Bank
Don C. Wilson et al., Respondents,
Ms
George Deukmejian et al., Appellants.
Filed March 23, 1989
Robert Wandruff Clerk
Respondents’ petition for review DENIED.
The request for an order directing publication of the opinion in
the above-entitled cause is DENIED.
/s/ [Malcolm] Lucas
Chief Justice
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.