Opposition Brief — Robles v. Exxon Corp.

No. 88-1381

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1988

+

JOANNE ROBLES,

Petitioner,

Vs.

EXXON CORPORATION,

Respondent.

*

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR A WRIT OF

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

-

MIcHAEL D. JONES

Suite 1895

800 Bell Avenue

Houston, Texas 77002

Telephone: (713) 656-3299

Attorney for Respondent

March 1989

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING C©O., (800) 225-6964

OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

i

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether juror testimony should be received after

discharge of the jury to explain the verdict unanimously

rendered by the jury.

LIST OF PARTIES

The affiliates and partially owned subsidiaries of

Respondent Exxon Corporation are listed in Appendix A

to this Brief in Opposition.

il

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTION PREGENTED .....ssccwscsevessceenenas i

LIST GR PARTE ois oni cncesccdivedasastencaniuuen i

TABLE OF CONTENTS....... eet rer rrr. ii

TABLE OF ALPTHIORITIBD «oo. ..0 5 ccs csccscensceus iii

OCPINGOINGS DELGAW ook cicasassenecunvenetesesees 2

RULES INVOLVED)... 4c ssn ced ciceesanesae Cen cus 2

COUNTER STATEMENT OF THE CASE ........... 3

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION FOR

WRIT OF CERIRORARL 2... 0c ccs cccsenscwnscess 5

I. The case at bar is factually and legally

distinguishable from the precedent cited by

je PPPerPrerrr rer rk fr ear 5

II. The Court should deny the Application for

Writ of Certiorari because the reasoning in

Attridge is flawed and Attridge is an isolated

decision without support .............--5505. 8

A. The reasoning in Attridge is flawed...... 8

B. Attridge is an isolated decision without

SUPPOTt ..... cee ccc c cece eer cecsecceceeee 12

CONCLUSION 200s scvsscsaek es weer rer es er 17

APPENOIR A. occ bccessc cusses aperss sae App. 1

ili

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Abatino v. U.S., 750 F.2d 1442 (9th Cir. 1985) ........ 14

Audette v. Isaksen Fishing ae 789 F.2d 956 (1st

EE UES cage asc cdiche neh ndadkndieeaeds 15

Aspen Skiing Company v. Aspen Highlands Skiing

eR BE hy ree 7

Atiridge v. Cencorp Div. of Dover Technologies Int'l,

Inc., 636 F.2d 113 (2nd Cir. 19867) ............. passim

Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific R. R. v. Speth, 404

Be RE eH) 17

City of Los Angeles, et al. v. Heller, 476 U.S. 1115

ES Pr ee 7

Continental Baking Co. v. Old Homestead Bread Co.,

eS 0. 5 15

Davis v. United States, 865 F.2d 164 (8th Cir. 1988) .... 13

E. F. Hutton & Company, Inc. v. Arnebergh, 775 F.2d

ivi Vecek eaves nvetcaawonas 15

Gallick v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, 372

A hep kak babe as dédedenesesssecdens 7

Gov't of Virgin Islands v. Gereau, et al., 523 F.2d 140

NGG Anos kan 80054555 060 0x sexe. 14

Gov't of Virgin Islands v. Nicholas, 759 F.2d 1073

een laren shee Aa KReM edn asses owas 14

Haley et al. v. Blue Ridge Transfer Co., Inc., 802 F.2d

eer eee ee 15

Hard v. Burlington Northern Railroad, 812 F.2d 482

ECE en ee ee 14

Helm v. Bunch, et al., __ F2d ___ (6th Cir. 1989)

Ts vob sie accas en apes cecucetasanse 15

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

Martinez v. Food City, 658 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1981) .... 15

Maldonado v. Missouri Pacific Railway Company, 798

F.2d 764 (Sth Cir, 1986). ... 2... cc ccsccscscecceness 15

McNulty v. Borden, Inc. 542 F.Supp. 655 (E.D. Pa.

POE bade cnnedadaneetan dns db ecee EN chawekes ea o4.0 4% 17

Michaels v. Michaels, 767 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir. 1985)....15

Morrison v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 546 F.2d 154 (5th Cir.

SOUT s ohh dnc cnbadacdnpesacsancacnseabissasbeeanssce 7

Multiflex, Inc. v Samuel Moore & Company, et al.,

709 F.2d 980 (Sth Cir. 1983).......... 2.0... eee eee 15

Nissho-Iwai Company, Ltd. v. Occidental Crude Sales

729 F.2d 1530 (Sth Cir. 1984)............0. ee eeeeee 16

Ohanian v. Avis Rent-A-Car System Inc., 779 F.2d

ie Ce oe. | Pe reenrerrr TT rr yrrr rr: trier 15

Peveto v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 807 F.2d 486 (5th Cir.

SRO Fs Peon ene pire. 5, 6, 8, 10, 11, 15, 17

Robles v. Exxon, 862 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1989) 2, 8, 15, 17

Scogin v. Century Fitness, 780 F.2d 1316 (8th Cir.

SO oi knacukedeknasadantjueea candid yAweanndnagae) 15

Shillcut v. Gagnon, 827 F.2d 1155 (7th Cir. oy 13

Sims Crane Service, Inc. v. Ideal Steel Products, Inc.,

Be” Bi = Bea. Eo Sh, | Se ere eae 15

Singleton v. City of New York, et al., 632 F2d 185

ee ruse sh dae Neneh aud Rue eaees 14

Vv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

Skidmore v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 167 F.2d 54 (2d.

CE WOE Kidde wedeutincdesPacdbaresceseedens vena 10

Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579 (5th

Cir. 1974), cert. denied 419 U.S. 873 ....... 11, 12, 17

Smith v. City of Seven Points, 608 F. Supp. 458 (E.D.

i Pe ee ne ern err 15

Stephens v. South Atlantic Canners, Inc., et al., 848

Fie ee CE I POs on a sh ona knee dpecdeccasdss 15

Stockton v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 852 F.2d 740

ee Pa saa hones ve dvauaninesuer tex eeeed 13

Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107 (1987)....... 12, 16

United States v. Arpon, 861 F.2d 164 (8th Cir. 1988) .... 13

United States v. Bassler, et al., 651 F.2d 600 (8th Cir.

i POT UTER ET eer re es ony On enya D 14

United States v. Beltempo, et al., 675 F.2d 472 (2d.

Gah OD a sk hennegndenaceaus weit cecil a 14

United States v. Bohr, 581 F.2d 1294 (8th Cir. 1978) .... 13

United States v. Brooks, 677 F.2d 907 (D.C. Cir.

SOA 6 ors ov vesededcvherieee eee 14

United States v. Buckhanna, 787 F.2d 230 (7th Cir.

PS 485 6b AH EK SR teR Eee ead Ee ee ee 13

United States v. Casamayor, et al., 837 F.2d 1509

CEO Gee Wi hah Reakoua eee ee 13

United States v. Chereton, 309 F.2d 197 (6th Cir.

1962), cert. denied 366 U.S. 924, 978.............. 16

United States v. D’Angelo, 598 F.2d 1002 (5th Cir.

BOTT 605565056060) 344008 2 eee 14

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

United States v. Davila, et al., 704 F.2d 749 (5th Cir.

WU cuca bos eeeee0eekees6ns0eeekeh eee 14

United States v. Dotson, 817 F.2d 1127 (5th Cir.

Ey hn ncccccévaes ends tedecetee eee dee 14

United States v. Duzac, 622 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1980).... 14

United States v. Eagle, 539 F.2d 1166 (8th Cir. 1976) .... 14

United States Football League v. National Football

League, 644 F. Supp 1040 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)........... 6

United States v. Ford, 840 F.2d 460 (7th Cir. 1988) .... 13

United States v. Garcia, 732 F.2d 1221 (5th Cir. 1984) .... 14

United States v. Green, 779 F.2d 1313 (7th Cir. 1985) .... 13

United States v. Greer, 620 F.2d 1383 (10th Cir. 1980) .... 13

United States v. Gross, et al., 745 F.2d 58 (6th Cir.

1984) (unpublished) .........ccccccscccccecseceses 14

United States v. Hockridge, et al., 573 F.2d 752 (2d.

oe, PPPPPPTT TP Peee Terr re ere rere 14

United States v. Horton, et al., 646 F.2d 181 (Sth Cir.

BOE vnc 6000500 sacenbunkideesawetaasnacusosees 14

United States v. Jelsma, 630 F.2d 778 (10th Cir. 1980).... 14

United States v. Miller, 806 F.2d 223 (10th Cir. 1986) .... 13

United States v. Moten, 582 F.2d 654 (2d Cir. 1978) .... 13

United States v. Murphy, 836 F.2d 248 (6th Cir.

TON acs nccanccdusneestskenak teqegayteastesesscet 13

Vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

United States v. Pflaumer, 774 F.2d 1224 (3rd Cir.

RUUD A Rnd Cs £004 SNEL ARES Ce ean ahead endeeneennhasen 14

United States v. Serido, 705 F.2d 459 (6th Cir. 1982)

EE Cah cas Acecmapdannaneccaeedeccaie ets 13

United States v. Shackelford, 777 F.2d 1141 (6th Cir.

oP PP te ne UT ae MEN ty SOE er 13

United States v. Sjeklocha, 843 F.2d 485 (11th Cir.

EN ion ek aged thn Ce edCudeneedN ks UWS bs bakin so: 13

United States v. Widgery, 778 F.2d 325 (7th Cir.

i ARETE Tee eee TT TTT ET CeT eC CERT LETTE TTT Te 13

Young v. United States, 163 F.2d 187 (10th Cir. 1947)

CURR: GME BE WE FOO ov vcccccciicsccccctcadacs 14

UNITED STATES STATUTES

Fed. Rules Evid. Rule 606(b), 28 U.S.C.A

RE PR ee LNT Se et ee 2, 5, 11, 12, 16, 17, 18

Fed. Rules Civil Proc. Rule 58(2), 28 U.S.C.A....2, 5, 7

Fed. Rules Civil Proc. Rule 49, 28 U.S.C.A......... 7, 18

Texas STATUTE

V.T.C.A. Civil Practice and Remedies Code,

RR eR Sa emer atric Sei ia top hsa tere Cha weg 6, 11

No. 88-1381

sa

.

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1988

*

JOANNE ROBLES,

Petitioner,

vs.

EXXON CORPORATION

Respondent.

.

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR_A WRIT

OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT

OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

*

The Respondent, Exxon Corporation, hereinafter

“Exxon”, respectfully prays this Court to deny Peti-

tioner’s, JoAnne Robles’, hereinafter “Robles”, Petition

for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of

Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, hereinafter “Petition for a

Writ of Certiorari”.

*

OPINIONS BELOW

The Opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth

Circuit entered on January 12, 1989 is reported at Robles v.

Exxon Corporation, 862 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1989) and has

been reprinted in the Appendix of the Petition for a Writ

of Certiorari.

a

-

RULES INVOLVED

Fed. R. Evid. 606(b), 28 U.S.C.A.

Inquiry into validity of verdict or indictment.

Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or

indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or

statement occurring during the course of the jury’s delib-

erations or to the effect of anything upon that or any

other juror’s mind or emotions as influencing the juror to

assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or

concerning the juror’s mental processes in connection

therewith, except that a juror may testify on the question

whether extraneous prejudicial information was improp-

erly brought to the jury’s attention or whether any out-

side influence was improperly brought to bear upon any

juror. Nor may a juror’s affidavit or evidence of any

statement by the juror concerning a matter about which

the juror would be precluded from testifying be received

for these purposes.

Fed. R. Civ. P., Rule 58 (2)

Entry of Judgment

Subject to the provisions of Rule 54(b): -

ae (2) upon a decision granting other relief, or

upon a special verdict or a general verdict accompanied

by answers to interrogatories, the court shall promptly

approve the form of the judgment, and the clerk shall

thereupon enter it.

_—

>

COUNTER STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner’s lawsuit was tried before a jury on March

28 ana 29, 1988. After both parties rested, the court read

the Charge of the Court to the jury. The charge was

prepared by the court and no objection was raised by

plaintiff’s or defendant’s attorneys.

—

Several hours later, the jury announced that it had

reached a verdict. The court assembled the jury, the par-

ties, and the attorneys in the courtroom to receive the

verdict. The jury forewoman stated for the record that the

jury had reached a unanimous verdict and that she had

signed the verdict form indicating the jury’s decision. The

court then asked the entire panel to indicate whether this

was their verdict. All panel members nodded

affirmatively.

The clerk of the court took the jury form from the

forewoman and read the verdict into the record. The jury

found that both Robles and Exxon were negligent and

that said negligence was the proximate cause of the inju-

ries to Robles. The jury found Robles 51% negligent and

Exxon 49% negligent. The jury did not specify any dollar

amount for damages. Having received this verdict, the

court restated to the jury, as was indicated in the Charge

of the Court, that Robles would take nothing.

The court discharged the jury stating: “Now you may

talk about this case now to anybody you want to, the

lawyers or anybody else, but you don’t have to talk to

anybody. But you may. So now you are excused.” The

individual jurors then left the courtroom to go their way.

The court requested that the attorneys come to chambers.

While in chambers, the marshall/bailiff entered and

stated that the jury had apparently misunderstood the

charge. The court requested the marshall to bring the jury

back into the courtroom. The judge conducted an inter-

view of the members of the panel.

The judge specifically told the panel, “You are going

to have to tell us what the misunderstanding was.” The

jurors were not sworn and no questions were permitted

by either attorney. Various members of the panel, in

answer to the judge’s questions, explained what they

meant to do with their verdict.

The jury stated that they interpreted the charge to

mean that if they found the Plaintiff 51% negligent, the

judge would award damages instead of them. The jury

came to this conclusion despite the fact that the charge

specifically stated twice that a finding of more than 51%

negligence on the part of the plaintiff would preclude her

recovery.

After hearing this evidence and over the objection of

Exxon, the court requested that the jury re-deliberate

beginning the next morning. Following re-deliberations,

the jury found Robles 49% negligent and Exxon 51%

negligent and assessed damages against Exxon.

Exxon moved the court to enter judgment on the first

verdict pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule

58(2). The trial court refused tc do so and entered judg-

ment for Robles on the second verdict.

Exxon appealed. The Fifth Circuit reversed and ren-

dered holding that the trial court should have entered

judgment on the first verdict pursuant to Rule 58(2) Fed-

eral Rules of Civil Procedure and that the colloquia with

the jury was impermissible under Rule 606(b), Federal

Rules of Evidence, as had been previously decided by the

Fifth Circuit in Peveto v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 807 F.2d 486

(Sth Cir. 1987).

a

vr

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION

FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

I. THE CASE AT BAR IS FACTUALLY AND

LEGALLY DISTINGUISHABLE FROM THE

PRECEDENT CITED BY PLAINTIFF

Although the United States Court of Appeals for the

Fifth Circuit admitted that its decision in Peveto v. Sears,

Roebuck & Co., 807 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1987) was in irrecon-

cilable conflict with the United States Court of Appeals

for the Second Circuit decision in Attridge v. Cencorp Div.

of Dover Technologies Int'l, Inc., 836 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1987),

the case at bar is factually distinguishable from both

decisions and legally distinguishable from Attridge. The

causes of action in Peveto and Attridge were product lia-

bility causes of action rather than a negligence cause of

action as in the case at bar. In the product liability context

of both of these cases, “pure comparative fault” was

applicable. That is, the plaintiff's recovery was never

barred only reduced. In Peveto and Attridge, the juries

awarded sums to the plaintiffs allegedly intending that to

be the ultimate recovery by the Plaintiffs. These sums

were then reduced by application of pure comparative

negligence principles.

In the case at bar, the jury found Robles was 51%

negligent and consistent with the finding refused to

award damages as they were instructed. Later, the jury

disclosed their mental processes by explaining their

assumptions with regard to this verdict.

The court in Attridge found the juror interviews to be

proper because the interviews were designed to ascertain

what the jury decided and not why they did so. 836 F.2d

113, 117. In the case at bar, the jury allegedly found no

damages because the jury believed the judge would

award damages if the jury found Robles 51% negligent. In

fact, the judge did just that, he found no damages for

Robles as required by the Texas comparative negligence

statute, § 33.001, V.T.C.A. Civil Practice and Remedies

Code. In the case at bar, the judge inquired into “why”

the jury decided what they did. The Second Circuit

would prohibit this inquiry, as well, but would allow

testimony on what the jury decided.!

1 See United States Football League v. National Football

League, 644 F.Supp 1040 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) where the Court would

not allow post trial statements by jurors to the effect that the

award of $1.00 in damages would then permit the judge to

decide on the damages. Presumably, the Second Circuit in its

later opinion in Attridge would have distinguished this case

from its Circuit if Attridge were to apply in a situation such as

presented in the case at bar and in the United States Football

League v. National Football League supra.

In the case at bar, the jury answered five special

interrogatories. None of the answers was inconsistent.2

Barring inconsistencies, the court was required to enter

judgment on this verdict and not to return the jury to re-

deliberate. Rule 58(2) and Rule 49, Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, Gallick v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company,

372 U.S. 108, 83 S.Ct. 659 (1963); Morrison v. Frito-Lay, Inc.,

546 F.2d 154 (5th Cir. 1977), because it is presumed that -

the jury acted in accordance with the instructions given

them. Aspen Skiing Company v. Aspen Highlands Skiing

Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985); City of Los Angeles, et al. v.

Heller, 476 U.S. 1115 (1986).

In the case at bar, the jurors were polled and dis-

charged. The jurors unanimously agreed that the verdict

reported was the verdict agreed upon. The Trial Court

erred (1) by refusing to enter judgment on this verdict

and (2) electing to hear jurors’ post-verdict testimony.

2 In question No. 1, the jury was asked to consider the

evidence and based upon the evidence to determine if Robles

was negligent. The jury answered in the affirmative. In Ques-

tion No. 2, the jury was asked if this negligence was a proxi-

mate cause of her injuries. The jury answered in the

affirmative. The third interrogatory asked the jury to deter-

mine based on the evidence whether Exxon was negligent. The

jury determined Exxon was negligent. The fourth interrogatory

asked the jury if Exxon’s negligence was a proximate cause of

Robles’ injuries. Once again the jury answered in the affirma-

tive. Finally, the jury was asked to apportion negligence where

it found negligence and proximate cause on both parties. The

jury found Robles 51% negligent and Exxon 49% negligent. The

jury found Robles slightly more negligent than Exxon.

——— Sw

The case at bar differs from Attridge in the latter

aspect as well. In Attridge, the interviews were conducted

in-camera; whereas, in the case at bar, the jurors gave

unsworn testimony in open court.

The case at bar is sufficiently distinguishable from

Attridge to raise a significant doubt as to whether the

Second Circuit would have ruled any differently than the

Fifth Circuit ruled. In Robles, the jury found for the

Defendant; whereas, in Attridge, the jury found for plain-

tiff and the Second Circuit stated their rationale as ascer-

taining what the jury decided and not why they did so. In

the case at bar, the inquiry went to why the jurors found

Robles 51% negligent and not what the jurors decided.

Presumably, the Second Circuit would rule the same way

given this question.

Exxon agrees that Peveto and Attridge are in conflict

and Exxon urges the reasoning in Peveto. However, the

case at bar would have been decided by the Second

Circuit in the same manner as decided by the Fifth Cir-

cuit. As such, Robles does not have standing to urge this

Application for Writ of-Certiorari.

II. THIS COURT SHOULD DENY THE APPLICA-

TION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI BECAUSE

THE REASONING IN ATTRIDGE IS FLAWED

AND ATTRIDGE IS AN ISOLATED DECISION

WITHOUT SUPPORT.

A. The reasoning in Attridge is flawed.

The reliance by Robles on Attridge is misplaced

because Attridge was erroneously decided. The Second

Circuit’s decision in Attridge cannot be reconciled with

the purported reasons to justify inquiry into the juror’s

mental processes. The Second Circuit claims to ascertain

what the jury decided, not why they decided the way

they did.

In Attridge, the jury was instructed to find what

damages Mr. and Mrs. Attridge had suffered. The jury

found they suffered $150,000 in damages.

The next jury questions required the jury to appor-

tion fault, just the opposite of the order of questions in

the case at bar. The jury apportioned fault between Mr.

Attridge and the Defendants and between the

Defendants.

After the jury was polled and discharged, a court-

room deputy learned from two jurors that the jury

intended the $150,000 to be the recovery for Mr. and Mrs.

Attridge. The trial court conducted in-camera interviews

with all six jurors. Each agreed that the $150,000 was to

be the net recovery after reductions.

The question on the verdict form to the jury was the

amount of damages suffered by Mr. and Mrs. Attridge

and not the amount of damages after reductions. If the

jury understood reduction of the verdict, then the jury

could have calculated the proper amount. The suggestion

of “reduction” was made by the judge in his in-camera

interviews with the jurors.

The more probable explanation is that prior to those

in-camera interviews the jury did not understand “reduc-

tion” and under New York law the defendant was denied

the application of the “pure comparative causation”

statue as applied to products liability. The jury was not

supposed to know the effect of the reduction. The jury

10

was to decide the facts and not which party they wanted

to win or what amount that party should receive. The

jury decided Mr. and Mrs. Attridge suffered $150,000 in

damages. This is all they were asked to decide. The use of

written interrogatories is designed to elicit fact findings

to which the law may be applied as opposed to the

introduction of Mr. Prejudice and Miss Sympathy in the

general verdict situation. Skidmore v. Baltimore & O. R.

Ce., 167 F2d 54 (2d Cir. 1948).

In the latter case, the court refused to reverse the trial

court’s reliance on the general verdict which the Second

Circuit characterized as result oriented, but clearly

expressed its preference for the use of interrogatories.

The use of interrogatories prevents the jury from ignoring

the law and preserves the equal application of the law to

all parties before the court.

In Attridge, Cencorp was denied the application of

the comparative negligence law of New York. The trial

judge did not determine if the jurors knew that damages

would be reduced or not. It is conceivable that the jurors

believed Mr. & Mrs. Attridge would be made “whole” by

an award of $150,000. Under the law of New York, Mr.

Attridge’s negligence “takes” some of this award away.

The New York Legislature made this decision, but the

Second Circuit allowed the jury to override that legisla-

tive decision in this instance. When the jury determined

that Robles was more negligent than Exxon in the case at

bar, Texas law dictated the result that she receive nothing

even if the jury wanted Robles to receive some money.

The Fifth Circuit did not allow the jury to override

the Texas Legislature in this instance or in Peveto. The

11

statute providing that a plaintiff cannot recover in a

simple negligence action if the plaintiff is more negligent

than a single defendant was allowed to operate in this

case. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 33.001.

The Fifth Circuit in reviewing the legislative history

of Rule 606(b) noted that there are only two situations

where juror testimony is allowed and neither was present

in this case. Those two situations are the improper receipt

by the jury of extraneous prejudicial information or the

imposition of an outside, improper influence on a juror to

influence his/her decisions. These two exceptions deal

with material not addressed in the courtroom, material

not subject to cross examination, tests of relevancy, mate-

riality or authenticity.

In the case at bar, there are no allegations that extra-

neous prejudicial information was improperly brought to

the jury’s attention, nor are there allegations that jurors

were threatened or bribed. Rule 606(b) is clear that testi-

mony by these jurors should not have been elicited.

Nor is a distinction made in Rule 606(b) for unanim-

ity of the jurors. The trial court in the case at bar attempts

to distinguish Attridge from Peveto by stating that in both

Attridge and the case at bar the jurors were unanimously

mistaken as to the effect of their verdict. Similarly, the

trial court attempted to distinguish the case at bar from

Peveto and Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579

(5th Cir. 1974) by indicating that in both of those cases

several days passed before juror disagreement with the

verdict appeared; whereas, disagreement occurred within

minutes of the verdict in the case before the Court. The

Fifth Circuit rejected this argument as well noting that

12 -

the applicability of Rule 606(b) is determined solely by

the nature of the testimony and not the unanimity or

timeliness of the juror testimony.

The two exceptions to the receipt of juror testimony,

extraneous prejudicial information and improper influ-

ences brought to bear on jurors, are, as noted above,

necessary subjects of inquiry to insure the integrity of the

trial system. Any other exceptions open the door to end-

less inquiry into the jury’s decisional process.

This Court in its recent decision in Tanner v. United

States, 107 S. Ct. 2739 (1987) reviewed the legislative

history behind Rule 606(b). At the time Rule 606(b) was

being considered by Congress, two versions were in exis-

tence. One was the current version based on the common

law rule while the other permitted inquiry into juror

misconduct during deliberations. Congress specifically

understood, considered, and rejected the version of Rule

606(b) that would have allowed jurors to testify on juror

conduct during deliberations including misinterpretation

of instructions, or intoxication as alleged in Tanner. See

Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., supra, at 602 n.30, cert.

denied, 419 U.S. 873, where the Fifth Circuit stated that

“(W)hether or not the jury misunderstood the charge of

the court is not a question to be reexamined after the

verdict has been rendered.”

B. Attridge is an isolated decision without

support.

Robles would have this Court believe that the Cir-

cuits are evenly divided on the issue of what testimony

13

can be elicited from jurors and what testimony cannot be

elicited. Exxon’s research has found only the Attridge case

on the Circuit Court level for the proposition that Rule

606(b) permits juror testimony to determine what the jury

decided and not why the jury decided what they did. Of

fifty-one (51) opinions by the United States Circuit Courts

of Appeals involving juror testimony addressed by Rule

606(b), only Attridge allowed this inquiry. Thirty-six of

these cases were criminal cases. Eight of the criminal

cases allowed juror testimony under one of the excep-

tions contained in the rule, i.e. extraneous prejudicial

information or outside influence. See Davis v. United

States, 865 F.2d 164 (8th Cir. 1988); Stockton v. Common-

wealth of Virginia, 852 F.2d 740 (4th Cir. 1988); United

States v. Buckhanna, 787 F.2d 230 (7th Cir. 1986); United

States v. Green, 779 F.2d 1313 (7th Cir. 1985); United States

v. Serido, 705 F.2d 459 (6th Cir. 1982) (unpublished);

United States v. Greer, 620 F.2d 1383 (10th Cir. 1980);

United States v. Bohr, 581 F.2d 1294 (8th Cir. 1978); United

States v. Moten, 582 F.2d 654 (2d Cir. 1978).

Twenty-five of the criminal cases did not allow juror

testimony whether it involved jurors pressuring other

jurors, to mistakes in interpreting instructions, to love

letters to the prosecutor or to partial deafness. See United

States v. Arpon, 861 F.2d 164 (8th Cir. 1988); United States v.

Sjeklocha, 843 F.2d 485 (11th Cir. 1988); United States v.

Casamayor, et al., 837 F.2d 1509 (11th Cir. 1988); United

States v. Ford, 840 F.2d 460 (7th Cir. 1988); United States v.

Murphy, 836 F.2d 248 (6th Cir. 1988); Shillcut v. Gagnon,

827 F.2d 1155 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Miller, 806

F.2d 223 (10th Cir. 1986); United States v. Shackelford, 777

F.2d 1141 (6th Cir. 1985); United States v. Widgery, 778 F.2d

14

325 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Pflaumer, 774 F.2d 1224

(3rd Cir. 1985); Gov't of Virgin Islands v. Nicholas, 759 F.2d

1073 (3rd Cir. 1985); Abatino v. U. S., 750 F.2d 1442 (9th

Cir. 1985); United States v. Gross, et al., 745 F.2d 58 (6th Cir.

1984)(unpublished); United States v. Garcia, 732 F.2d 1221

(5th Cir. 1984); United States v. Davila, et al., 704 F.2d 749

(Sth Cir. 1983); United States v. Brooks, 677 F.2d 907 (D.C.

Cir. 1982); United States v. Beltempo, et al., 675 F.2d 472 (2d

Cir. 1982); United States v. Bassler, et al., 651 F.2d 600 (8th

Cir. 1981); Uniied States v. Horton, et al., 646 F.2d 181 (5th

Cir. 1981); Singleton v. City of New York, et al., 632 F.2d 185

(2d. Cir. 1980); United States v. Jelsma, 630 F.2d 778 (10th

Cir. 1980); United States v. Duzac, 622 F.2d 911 (5th Cir.

1980); United States v. D’ Angelo, 598 F.2d 1002 (5th Cir.

1979); United States v. Hockridge, et al., 573 F.2d 752 (2d.

Cir. 1978); United States v. Eagle, 539 F.2d 1166 (8th Cir.

1976); Gov't of Virgin Islands v. Gereau, et al., 523 F.2d 140

(3rd Cir. 1975).

The Fifth Circuit has allowed juror testimony to clar-

ify what was decided as being different from the verdict

delivered in open court. United States v. Dotson, 817 F.2d

1127 (5th Cir. 1987). After jurors telephoned and spoke

with the judge, the court sua sponte amended jury verdict

to reflect acquittal on one of ten counts. See also Young v.

United States, 163 F.2d 1&7 (10th Cir. 1947), cert denied 323

U.S. 770 (cited by Robles).

In two cases, one criminal and one civil, juror testi-

mony was permitted because the testimony went to the

fact that the jurors lied on voir dire. The testimony did not

involve inquiry into the deliberations of the jury. United

States v. Perkins, 748 F.2d 1519 (11th Cir. 1984) and Hard v.

Burlington Northern Railroad, 812 F.2d 482 (9th Cir. 1987).

15

In the fifteen remaining civil cases, no juror testi-

mony was aliowed to explain the verdict or how damages

were calculated except Attridge. Robles v. Exxon, supra,

Attridge v. Cencorp Div. of Dover Technologies Int'l, Inc.,

supra. Sims Crane Service, Inc. v. Ideal Steel Products, Inc.,

800 F.2d 1553 (11th Cir. 1986); Peveto v. Sears, Roebuck &

Co., supra, Ohanian v. Avis Rent-A-Car System Inc., 779 F.2d

101 (2d Cir. 1985); Michaels v. Michaels, 767 F.2d 1185 (7th

Cir. 1985); Maultiflex, Inc. v Samuel Moore & Company, et all.,

709 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1983); Scogin v. Century Fitness, 780

F.2d 1316 (8th Cir. 1985); or juror misconduct in disre-

garding instructions or pressuring other jurors, Helm v.

Bunch, et al., __. F.2d ___ (6th Cir. 1989)(unpublished);

Maldonado v. Missouri Pacific Railway Company, 798 F.2d

764 (5th Cir. 1986); Audette v. Isaksen Fishing Corp., 789

F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 1986) and Martinez v. Food City, 658 F.2d

369 (5th Cir. 1981).

In two cases testimony on extraneous prejudicial

information was allowed, Stephens v. South Atlantic Can-

ners, Inc., et al., 848 F.2d 484 (4th Cir. 1988) and Haley et al.

v. Blue Ridge Transfer Co., Inc., 802 F.2d 1532 (4th Cir. 1986)

and in one case the parties stipulated to receiving juror

testimony to explain the verdict. E. F. Hutton & Company,

Inc. v. Arnebergh, 775 F.2d 1061 (9th Cir. 1985).

The cases cited by Robles or the trial court either

involved no jury interviews, Smith v. City of Seven Points,

608 F. Supp. 458, 462 (E. D. Tex. 1985) or involved inquiry

before the jury was discharged Continental Baking Co. v.

Oid Homestead Bread Co., 476 F.2d 97 (10th Cir. 1973).

The situation presented in the case at bar would be

an inquiry into “why” and not into what was reported in

16

the courtroom. To allow an inquiry as urged by Robles,

would open the flood gates of appeals. All of the public

policy reasons for preventing such inquiry in the first

place would be swept aside and few, if any, verdicts

would be final. Tanner v. United States, supra, United States

v. Chereton, 309 F.2d 197 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied 366

U.S. 924, 978.

In any event, there are other less intrusive mecha-

nisms to address any perceived problems. For example,

in Nissho-Iwai Company, Ltd. v. Occidental Crude Sales, 729

F.2d 1530 (Sth Cir. 1984), the jury returned its verdict and

answers to special interrogatories awarding the plaintiff

damages on the contract cause of action, no actual dam-

ages on the fraud cause of action, but punitive damages

on the fraud cause of action. The trial judge recalled the

jury and asked them if they knew that actual damages

must be awarded before punitive damages are proper.

The foreman said that he did not know that, and the

judge sent the jury back to the jury room for further

deliberation. The jury returned with a finding of actual

damages. Plaintiff and defendant both moved for judg-

ment on the respective verdicts, but before ruling on

either, the court sua sponte declared a mistrial and

ordered a new trial.

In the case at bar, Robles could have filed a motion

for new trial had the law been researched and recognized

that the juror testimony elicited in this case was a viola-

tton of Rule 606(b). One may ask why Robles would move

for a motion for a new trial where the trial judge indi-

cated his intent to enter judgment on a verdict favorable

to the plaintiff. Even though the judge was offering

Robles’s counsel a bite from this “second verdict apple”,

Ta

17

he, unlike Eve, should not have bitten from the forbidden

fruit but should have urged an entry of judgment on the

first verdict and moved for a new trial within the appro-

priate time limits. Ignorance of the law is no excuse. In

this case, the Fifth Circuit has been clear in its pronounce-

ments on this issue. The jurors’ mistake as to the instruc-

tions or the effect of their answers on the law is not an

area of inquiry once the jury has been discharged. Small-

wood v. Pearl Brewing Co., supra; Chicago, Rock Island &

Pacific Railroad v. Speth, 404 F2d 291, 295 (8th Cir. 1968);

McNulty v. Borden Inc., 542 F.Supp. 655 (E.D. Pa. 1982).

a

oa

CONCLUSION

In the first instance, Robles is distinguishable from

Attridge, upon which the plaintiff relies. Robles is neither

Peveto nor Attridge, the two cases in conflict. Robles is a

much clearer case than either of those cases, according to

the Fifth Circuit, in that Robles does not involve what was

decided but why it was decided. As such, it must be

questioned whether Robles has proper standing to urge

this conflict between the Fifth, Sixth and Eighth Circuits

on the one hand and the Second Circuit on the other.

Secondly, Exxon urges this court to deny this Petition

for Writ of Certiorari because the Fifth Circuit’s decision

correctly interprets Rule 606(b) and recognizes all of the

many policy reasons for not inquiring into the jurors’

mental processes in arriving at a verdict. All of the cases

in which juror testimony has been received are distin-

guishable from the case at bar. These cases either

involved conflicting answers to special interrogatories,

18

which is addressed by Rule 49, Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, receipt of testimony before the jury was dis-

charged, which is not prohibited by Rule 606(b), testi-

mony limited to the two exceptions to Rule 606(b), and

finally, receipt of testimony in limited circumstances to

determine what the jury decided as opposed to why they

reached the verdict reported in open court. Based on the

above and foregoing, Respondent, Exxon Corporation,

moves this Court to deny Robles’ Petition for Writ of

Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the

Fifth Circuit in this case.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Michael D. Jones

MicHaEL D. JONES

Attorney in Charge

Fed. Admin. No. 7699

P. O. Box 2180, Suite 1895

800 Bell Avenue (77002)

Houston, Texas 77252-2180

(713) 656-3299

Attorney for Respondent

Exxon Corporation

APPENDIX

App. 1

EXXON CORPORATION

Affiliates and Subsidiaries - Not Wholly-Owned*

Abu Dhabi Petroleum Company Limited

Ace Polymer Co., Ltd.

Aditivos Orinoco, C. A.

Adria-Wien Pipeline Gesellschaft mit beschrankter

Haftung

Aircraft Fuel Supply B. V.

Aishin Sekiyu K. K.

Alberta Products Pipe Line Ltd.

Al-Jubail Petrochemical Company

Altona Petrochemical Company Limited

Alyeska Pipeline Service Company

Andian National Corporation, Limited

Arabian American Oil Company

Aramco Overseas Company

Aramco Services Company

Asakawa Sekiyu K.K.

Asociacion Civil “Colegio Internacional de Caracas”

Atlas Supply Company

Atlas Supply Company of Canada Limited

Australian Synthetic Rubber Company Limited

Aviation Services Saudi Arabia Limited

Awaji Gas Nenryo Kabushiki Kaisha

Azuma Sekiyu K.K.

BEB Erdgas und Erdol GmbH, Hannover

BT Asia Securities Limited

B.W.O.C., Inc.

Bangkok Aviation Fuel Services Limited

Bansu Ekika Gas K. K.

Bayerische Erdgasleitung G.m.b.H.

Beaverhill Resources Limited

Bel-Air Entreposage S. A.

BRIGITTA Erdgas und Erdol GmbH, Hannover

Bryan Woodbine Gathering Inc.

Byron Creek Collieries (1983) Limited

*Does not include companies with less than 5% Exxon .-

Ownership.

iii iia ell

App. 2

oo

Carlew Inc.

Carnduff Gas Limited

Cary Chemicals Inc.

Castle Peak Power Company Limited

Champlain Oil Products Limited

Changi Airport Fuel Hydrant Installation Pte. Ltd.

Chuo Sekiyu Hanbai K.K.

Commercial Polymers Pty. Ltd.

Compania Minera Disputada de Las Condes S.A.

Comptoir Auxiliaire du Petrole

Comptoir Oxonnaxien des Combustibles (C.O.C.)

Computer Centrum Groningen B.V.

DFTG Deutsche Flussigerdgas Terminal GmbH

Daihatsu Sekiyu K.K.

Daiichi Kouyu K. K.

Demulsificantes Del Orinoco, C.A.

Depot Petrolier du Gresivaudan

Depots de Petrole Cotiers

Depots Petrolier de la Corse

Deudan-Holding GmbH

Deutsche Erdgas Transport G.m.b.H.

Deutsche Transalpine Oelleitung G.m.b.H.

Devon Estates Limited

Dixie Pipeline Company

Dukhan Service Company

E S F Limited

Eagle Kenso K.K.

East Japan Oil Development Company, Limited

East Texas Salt Water Disposal Company

Eiko Sekiyu K.K.

Elwerath Erdgas und Erdol GmbH, Hannover

Elwerath Erdol und Erdgas AG

Emirates Chemicals Company

Emori Sekiyu K.K.

Emsland-Erdolleitung G.m.b.H.

Energie Marketing Service GmbH (EMS)

Entrepot Petrolier de l’Aveyron (E.P.A.)

Entrepot Petrolier de Mulhouse (E.P.M.)

Erdgas-Verkaufs-Gesellschaft m.b.H.

Esso Chemical Alberta Limited

Esso Energie G.I.E.

App. 3

Esso Exploration and Production Angola Inc.

Esso Malaysia Berhad

Esso of Canada Limited

Esso Resources Canada Limited

Esso Resources N.W.T. Limited

Esso Resources Ventures Limited

Esso Societe Anonyme Francaise

Esso Standard Tunisie S. A.

Etablissements Cloarec

Exact Reisebyra A/S

Exxon Chemical Pakistan Limited

489061 Ontario Inc.

F. T. Giken Kabushiki Kaisha

F.T. Shyoji K.K.

Federated Pipe Lines Ltd.

Ferngas Nordbayern G.m.b.H.

Ferngas Salzgitter GmbH

Forjas de Colombia, S. A.

Fuji Kogyo K.K.

Gasunie Engineering B.V.

General Bussan K.K.

General Highway K.K.

General Petrochemical Industries Limited

General Sekiyu K.K.

General Sekiyu Okinawa Hanbai K.K.

General Sekiyu Overseas Ltd.

General Shipping Co. Ltd.

General Unyu Kabushiki Kaisha

Geobutane - Lavera

Gewerkschaft Brassert Erdol und Erdgas GmbH

Gewerkschaft Elwerath & Co. GmbH -

Gewerkschaft Erdol-Raffinerie Deurag-Nerag

Gewerkschaft Gute Hoffnung Erdgas und Erdol GmbH

Gewerkschaft Kuchenberg Erdgas under Erdol GmbH

Goroku Sekiyu K.K.

Grande Ecaille Land Company, Inc.

Groupement Immobilier Petrolier

Groupement Petrolier Aviation

Groupement Petrolier de la Cote D’Azur

Groupement Petrolier de Nantes

Groupement Petrolier du Finistere G.I.E.

|

App. 4

Hannoversche Erdolleitung G.m.b.H.

Hanshin Kyowa Sekiyu K.K.

Hayakawa Sekiyu K.K.

Heinrich Schneider Spedition GmbH

Hiroshima General Gas Juten Kabushiki Kaisha

Hoei Sekiyu K.K.

Hokushin Bussan K.K.

~Hokuyu Sekiyu K.K.

Home Energy Company Ltd.

Home Oil Company Limited

Houston Regional Monitoring Corporation

Hydranten-Betriebsgesellschaft

Hydrierwerke Poelitz Aktiengesellschaft

Imperial Oil Limited

Imperial Pipe Line Company, Limited, The

Inada Ekka Gas Kabushiki Kaisha

Industry Promotion Enterprises Limited

Interprovincial Pipe Line (Alberta) Ltd.

Interprovincial Pipe Line (NW) Ltd.

Interhome Energy Inc.

Intamix Corporation

Intoplane Service Company Limited

Iranian Oil Participants Limited

Iranian Oil Services (Holdings) Limited

Iranian Oil Services Limited

Iraq Petroleum Company, Limited

Iraq Petroleum Pensions, Limited .

Japan Butyl Company Limited

Japan Coal Liquefaction Development Company, Ltd.

Jersey Nuclear-Avco Isotopes, Inc.

K.K. Aizu General

Daimaru

General Sekiyu Hanbaisho

Genetech

Heian Sekiyu

Kanagawa Sekiyu Shokai

Kyoei Agency

Kyoei Shosha

Kyowa Sekiyu Service

Marugo Izumasa Shoten

Marutaka Sekiyu

matatatatatatatals

RARARARAAR

App. 5

K.K. Nippatsu

K.K. Standard Sekiyu Osaka Hatsubaisho

K.K. Toresen

K.K. Uwano Sekiyu Shokai

K/S Statfjord Transport A/S & Co.

Kabushiki Kaisha Sankyo Plastics

Kai Tak Refuellers Company Limited

Kanto Kygnus Sekiyu Hambai K.K.

Karlsruhe-Stuttgart Rohrleitung Gesellschaft mbH

Kawasaki Kygnus Sekiyu Hambai Kabushiki Kaisha

Keiyo Sekiyu Hanbai K.K.

Kenya Petroleum Refineries Limited

Kibo Sekiyu Hanbai K.K.

Kimura Sekiyu Kabushiki Kaisha

Kinwa Sekiyu K.K.

Kobe Standard Sekiyu K.K.

Kowa Sekivu K.K.

Kowloon Electricity Supply Company Limited

Kygnus Ekka Gas Kabushiki Kaisha

Kygnus Kosan Kabushiki Kaisha

Kygnus Marketing Service K.K.

Kygnus Sekiyu K.K.

Kyushu Eagle K.K.

LPL Investments, Inc.

Lakehead Pipe Line Company, Inc.

LEAG Aktiengesellschaft fur luzernisches Erdol

Les Docks des Petroles d’Ambes

Long Beach Oil Development Company

Maasvlakte Coal Terminal B.V.

Maasvlakte Olie Terminal N.V.

Magota Sekiyu K.K.

Mainline Pipelines Limited

Maple Leaf Petroleum Limited

Marugo Gas K.K.

MEGAL FINCO

MEGAL GmbH

Meiji Sekiyu K.K.

MESBIC Financial Corporation of Houston

Metro Fuel Co. Ltd.

Mikawa Bussan K.K.

Minerals Limited

il

App. 6

Mittelrheinische Erdgas Transport Gesellschaft mit

beschrankter

Haftung

Montreal Pipe Line Limited/Les Pipe-Lines

Montreal Limitee

Mr. Lube Canada Inc.

Mytex Polymers Incorporated

NAM - K 7 B.V.

NAM - K 14 B.V.

NAM - K 15 B.V.

NAM/CLOMS - K 8/K 11 B.V.

NAM/CLOMS - L 13 B.V.

N. V. Nederlandse Gasunie

NPC Services, Inc.

Nakabayashi Sekiyu K.K.

Nansei Oil Terminal K.K.

Nansei Sekiyu Kabushiki Kaisha

Native Venture Capital Co. Ltd.

Near East Development Corporation

Nederlandse Aardolie Maatschappij B. V.

Neptune Bulk Terminals (Canada) Ltd.

Nichimo Oil (Bermuda) Co., Ltd.

Nichimo Sekiyu Seisei Kabushiki Kaisha

Nikko Sangyo K.K.

Nippon Unicar K.K.

Nisku Products Pipe Line Company Limited

Nissei Sekiyu Kabushiki Kaisha

Norddeutsche Erdgas-Aufbereitungs G.m.b.H.

Norddeutsche Mineraloelwerke Stettin G.m.b.H.

Nordrheinische Erdgas Transport Gesellschaft mit

beschrankter Haftung

Nord-West Oelleitung G.m.b.H.

Northward Developments Ltd.

Nottingham Gas Limited

107580 Canada Inc.

151742 Canada Inc.

158883 Canada Inc.

159129 Canada Inc.

160837 Canada Limited

Office Prive d’Assurances et de Courtages

aia

App. 7

Offshore Medical Support Limited

Oil Field Chemicals Company (Saudi Arabia) Ltd.

Oil Service Company of Iran (Private Company)

Oil Spill Response Limited

Oil Transport Company (Saudi Arabia) Limited

Oldenburgische Erdol Gesellschaft m.b.H.

Osaka Ashyu Nenryou K.K.

Osaka Propane Gas Hambai Kabushiki Kaisha

Osaka Sekiyu Gas Yuso K. K.

P.A.C. S.A.R.L. (Pinson Allegret-Causse)

P. T. Stanvac Indonesia

Pars Investment Corporation -

Peninsula Electric Power Company Limited

Petroleum Refineries (Australia) Proprietary Limited

Petroleum Services (Middle East) Limited

Petrosvibri S.A.

Pipe Line Services, Inc.

Plantation Pipe Line Company

Polder-Seehafeh-Harburg GmbH

Portland Pipe Line Corporation

Primaer Oel GmbH

Progas A/S

Raffinerie du Midi S.A.R.L.

Rainbow Pipe Line Company, Ltd.

Redwater Water Disposal Company Limited

Refineria Petrolera Acajutla, S. A.

Rheingas Erdgasleitungs-Geselischaft m.b.H.

Rochevert Inc.

Rotterdam Antwerpen Pijpleiding (Belgie)

Rotterdam-Antwerpen Pijpleiding (Nederland) N. V.

Ruhrgas Aktiengesellischaft

S.A. du Pipeline a Produits Petroliers sur Territoire

Genevois (SAPPRO)

S.A.R.L. Viain

SEAG Aktiengesellschaft fur schweizerisches Erdol

_ S.0.P. - Societa Oleodotti Padani S. p. A.

Saitama Sekiyu Hanbai K.K.

Sakurajima Futo K.K.

Sanko Oil Kabushiki Kaisha

Sanyo Sekiyu K.K.

Saraco S. A

4

ieee

App. 8

Saudi Arabian Lube Additives Company Limited

Schubert KG

Scurry-Rainbow Oil Limited

Seibu Kygnus Sekiyu Hambai Kabushiki Kaisha

Seismic Industries A/S

Senpoku Oil Service K.K.

SERAM Societa per Azioni

Servacar Ltd.

Shehtah Drilling Limited

Shimoka Sekiyu Kabushiki Kaisha

Shimoyama Sekiyu K.K. .

Shin-Nihon Yukagaku Kogyo K.K.

Shinohara Oil K.K.

Shizuoka Kanesho Hambai Kabushiki Kaisha

Smiley Gas Conservation Limited

Sociedad Anonima “Escuela Campo Alegre”

Sociedad de Inversiones de Aviacion

Sociedad Nacional de Oleoductos Ltda.

Societa Italiana per l’Oleodotto Transalpino S.p.A.

Societa per Azioni Raffineria Padana Olii Minerali-

SARPOM

Societe Anonyme de Gestion de Stocks de Securite

(SAGESS)

Societe Anonyme de la Raffinerie des Antilles

Societe Anonyme des Hydrocarbures

Societe Anonyme “Produits Lubrifiants de Madagascar”

PROLUMA S.A.

Societe Belge de Transport par Pipeline

Societe Civile de Mustapha Algerie

Societe Civile de Participation pour la Destruction des

Dechets Industriels (SOCDI)

Societe Civile Immobiliere “Courcelles-Etoile”

Societe Civile Immobiliere de la Croix au Chene

Societe Civile Immobiliere du 195 Avenue de Neuilly

Societe Civile Immobiliere Khariessa

Societe Civile Immobiliere “Kleber-Etoile”

Societe Civile Immobiliere “Les Casseaux-Bougainville

Societe de la Raffinerie d’Alger

Societe de la Raffinerie de Lorraine

Societe de Manutention de Carburants Aviation

(S.M.C.A.)

App. 9

Societe de Manutention de Carburants Aviation Dakar-

Yoff, S. A.

Societe de Promotion et de Financement Touristique

(CARTHAGO)

Societe d’Entreposage de San-Pedro

Societe des Pipe-Lines de Strasbourg

Societe des Transports Petroliers par Pipe Line

Societe d’Exploitation & de Developpement d’Operations

Commerciales

Societe du Caoutchouc Butyl (SOCABU)

Societe du Pipe Line de la Raffinerie de Lorraine

Societe du Pipe-Line Mediterranee-Rhone

Societe du Pipeline Sud-Europeen

Societe Esso de Recherches et d’Exploitation Petrolieres

Esso Rep

Societe Francaise Exxon Chemical

Societe “Geomines-Caen”

Societe Havraise de Manutention de Produits Petroliers

Societe Hoteliere de la Petite Campagne

Societe Immobiliere Paris-Niel

Societe Ivoirienne d’Operations Petrolieres S.A.

Societe Malgache de Raffinage

Societe Reunionnaise d’Entreposage

Socony-Standard-Vacuum Oil Company (Petroleum

Maatschappij)

Southern Natural Gas Development Pty. Ltd.

Standard Kosan Kavushiki Kaisha

Standard Service K.K.

Statfjord Transport A/S

Stockage Geologique de Gaz de Lavera

Suddeutsche Erdgas Transport Gesellschaft mit

beschrankter Haftung

Sun East Company Ltd.

Sydis, Inc.

Syncrude Canada Ltd.

Synergistics Industries Limited

System Plaza Kabushiki Kaisha

TAR-Tankanlage Rumlang AG

TBN Tanklager-Betriebsgesellschaft Nurnberg mbH

Taglu Enterprises Ltd.

Taihei Bussan K.K.

sain

App. 10

Taiko Sekiyu K.K.

Taisei Kogyo Sekiyu Hanbai K.K.

Takahama Kosan Kabushiki Kaisha

Taketsuru Yugyo K.K.

Tanaka Sekiyu Hanbai K.K.

Tankanlage A. G., Mellingen

Tanklager Altishausen A. G.

Tanklager Gesellschaft, Koln

Tanklager-Gesellschait Tegel

Tanklager Lechelles I S.A.

Tanklager Taegerschen AG

Tecnica Quimica Petrolera, S.A. de C. V.

Tecumseh Gas Storage Limited

THUMS Long Beach Company

Thyssengas G.m.b.H.

TIBA Speditions GmbH

Toa Nenryo Kogyo-Kabushiki Kaisha

Tohko Plastics Company, Limited

Tohpren Co. Ltd.

Toko Sekiyu K.K.

Tonen Energy and Marine (Singapore) Pte. Ltd.

Tonen Energy International Corp.

Tonen Maintenance K.K.

Tonen Properties Inc.

Tonen Sekiyukagaku Kabushiki Kaisha

Tonen Tanker Kabushiki Kaisha

Tonen Technology K. K.

Tonex Company Limited

Tophus Quen Pty. Ltd.

Towa Compounding Co. Ltd.

Towa Sekiyu K.K.

Toyoshina Film Company, Ltd.

Transalpine Oelleitung in Oesterreich Gesellschaft m.b.H.

Trans-Arabian Pipe Line Company

Transgaz Lavera

Tsurumaru Unyu K.K.

Turkish Petroleum Company, Limited

UBAG - Unterflurbetankungsanlage Flughafen Zurich

United Industry Development Co., Ltd.

Van Salt Water Disposal Company

W.A.G. Pipeline Proprietary Limited

De le ee elt LO aA. rll

an eve eye

App. 11

Wako Jushi Kabushiki Kaisha

Wako Kasei Kabushiki Kaisha

Wartempomp Nederland B.V.

Westdeutsche Erdolleitungs-G.m.b.H.

Westgas G.m.b.H.

Westgastransport B.V.

Winnipeg Pipe Line Company Limited

Worex S.N.C.

Yasaka Sekiyu K.K.

Yellowstone Pipe Line Company

Yoshiki Sekiyu Kabushiki Kaisha

Yoshimi Gas Kabushiki Kaisha_

Yuai Sekiyu K.K.

Yugen Kaisha Nishi Kobe Bosai Center