Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Ketchum v. Administrator, Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Commission

an. Supreme Court, US,

\ } FILED

S84, 1894) on™

eee ANIOL, JR

CLERK

Inu The

Supreme Court of the United States

@rctober erm, 1988

WALTER M. KETCHUM,

Petitioner,

vs.

ADMINISTRATOR, ATTORNEY REGISTRATION

AND DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION OF ILLINOIS

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT

WILLIAM J. MARTIN

WILLIAM J. MARTIN, LTD.

1010 Lake Street, Suite 604

Oak Park, Illinois 60301

(312) 848-2100

Attorneys for Petitioner

Pandick Technologies, Inc., Chicago @ (312) 236-0200

i

QUESTION PRESENTED

I. Are the due process or ex post facto principles as

construed in Bouie v. Columbia violated where a State

Supreme Court finds a disciplinary rule vague and amends

it in a court decision and then retroactively applies the

newly created rule to suspend an attorney’s law license?

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTION PRESENTED ..............--e 2005: i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........-.cceeecees iii

| Ree reer ee ces 1

CPTI TLIO «wn wn ccc ccc aces seunses 1

Po rr errr eee ee ea 2

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED ..... 2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE............-------; 2

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION:

I THIS PETITION SHOULD BE GRANTED

SINCE THE DECISION BELOW STANDS IN

DIRECT CONFLICT WITH THIS COURT'S

PRIOR HOLDING IN BOUIE V. COLUMBIA.... 7

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases: Page

Boute v. Columbia, 376 U.S. 347 (1964)........ passim

Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386 (1798) ................ 8

Cole v. Young, 817 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1987)........ 10

Connally v. General Const. Co, 269 U.S. 385 (1926) .. 10

Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277 (1867).......... 8

Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282 (1977) ............ 8

In re Corboy, 124 I1.2d 29, 528 N.E.2d 694

NE SORE OS es passim

In re Mark E. Jones, Jr., __ Tll.2d __ , __ N.E.2d __

(Ill. Sup. Ct. No. 66227, Slip Opinion,

Ee a 7,9

In re Ming, 469 F.2d 1352 (7th Cir. 1972) .......... 8

Lanzetta v. New York, 306 U.S. 451 (1939)......... 10

Lasdon v. Hallihan, 377 Ill. 187, 36 N.E. 2d 227

ee ede Ske knee essed se see cee 8

Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977)......... 7

Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) ............ 7

Miller v. Florida, 107 S. Ct. 2446 (1987) ........... 8

Moore v. Wyrick, 766 F.2d 1253 (8th Cir. 1985) ..... 10

Pierce v. United States, 314 U.S. 306 (1941)......... 7

Pringle v. Court of Common Pleas, 788 F.2d 998 (3rd

he a 10

iv

Cases: Page

Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232

Pe a ere rr re ren rr ra ee rae we 9

United States v. Godheim, 651 F.2d 1294 (9th Cir.

| ee er ree eee ey eerie 10

United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954)........ 4

Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (1981)............. 8

CONSTITUTION:

is Be ee re re ee passim

eS rere eres yer ee passim

STATUTES:

SR I or cw Ske chen Scan thease ees ees 2

107 TE.De Hate FERGIE) 2 wa cece cesens passim

Oy ee Dg cc ke execs cucaeeees 5, 6

OF PE 6 nas oso scce ste e nc ckaws 4

107 THESE Bale TERM) «w= 2 2c ccc sce vcesenns 3

No.

In The

Supreme Court of the Hnited States

@ctober Term, 1988

WALTER M. KETCHUM,

Petitioner,

v8.

ADMINISTRATOR, ATTORNEY REGISTRATION

AND DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION OF ILLINOIS

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT

PRAYER

Petitioner Walter Ketchum respectfully prays that a

writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment and order

of the Illinois Supreme Court.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Illinois Supreme Court is reported

at 124 [11.2d 50, 528 N.E.2d 689 and is attached hereto in

the Appendix.

2

JURISDICTION

On June 20, 1988, the Dlinois Supreme Court entered

an order suspending the petitioner from the practice of law

for two years. Petitioner filed a timely petition for rehear-

ing in the linois Supreme Court. On October 3, 1988,

the Illinois Supreme Court denied the petition for rehear-

ing. This petition is filed within ninety days of the order

denying the petition for rehearing and is thus timely. This

Court’s jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1257.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The ex post facto clause of the United States Constitu-

tion provides, “No State shall... pass any .. . ex post facto

law.” U.S. Const. Art. I, § 10.

The due process clause of the United States Constitu-

tion provides, “nor shall any State deprive any person of

life, liberty or property, without due process of law.” U.S.

Const. amend. XIV.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Since the 1960’s, Walter Ketchum (“Ketchum”) and

Richard LeFevour were good friends and neighbors.

LeFevour and Ketchum were attorneys and also main-

tained a professional relationship in which they referred

cases to each other. In addition, members of the LeFevour

and Ketchum families were extremely friendly, grew up

together and went to school together.

In 1968, LeFevour became a judge in the Circuit

Court of Cook County, Illinois. Eventually, LeFevour was

appointed the chief judge of Chicago’s traffic court. In 1981,

LeFevour was elevated to chief judge of the First Munic-

ipal District in Cook County. Ketchum’s law firm had a

substantial number of personal injury cases pending in the

First Municipal District, although neither Ketchum, nor

any members of his law firm, ever appeared before Judge

LeFevour.

3

From time to time, Ketchum loaned money to

LeFevour, both before and during LeFevour’s tenure as

a judge. The loans were informal in that no interest

was charged, no notes were drawn and discussions regard-

ing repayment did not occur. In short, the loans were

motivated out of charity and friendship. Before LeFevour

became a judge he repaid the loans. The complaint charged

that Ketchum loaned LeFevour $8,300.00 over approxi-

mately four years, a period in which LeFevour was a judge.

Although these loans were not repaid, Ketchum repre-

sented LeFevour’s wife and three sons in a personal injury

case which Ketchum believed would provide an ultimate

source of repayment.!

In December of 1981, LeFevour contacted Ketchum

and stated that he needed $10,000.00 so that he could pay

the hospital bills of his sickly mother. LeFevour stressed

that he needed the money so that his mother could be

released to spend the Christmas holidays at home and be

readmitted after the holiday season for additional hospi-

talization. Ketchum responded that he lacked the funds

to make the entire loan, but volunteered to contact other

attorneys to request that they assist in paying the hospital

bill. Ketchum then contacted six attorneys; four of them

agreed to make loans to Lefevour. Each drafted a $1,000.00

check payable to Richard LeFevour. Ketchum also loaned

LeFevour $2,000.00 at that time.

In 1984, Judge LeFevour was indicted by a grand

jury sitting in the Northern District of Illinois on mail

fraud, tax fraud and racketeering charges. The charges

were a part of the Operation Greylord investigation into

corruption in the Circuit Court of Cook County. Dur-

‘The actual recovery in the personal injury case amounted to

an initial judgment of $29,350.00 - more than enough funds to

repay $8,300.00 in loans — and still remains intact today subject

to Ketchum’s lien in a trust account at $10,000.00. (Hearing

Board Transcript, p. 172).

+

ing LeFevour’s trial, evidence relative to attorney loans,

including Ketchum’s, was introduced in the form of a stip-

ulation by the government.

Based on the evidence introduced at the LeFevour tri-

al, the Administrator of the Attorney Registration and Dis-

cipline Commission filed a complaint against Ketchum. In

the Illinois disciplinary system hearing panels, which com-

prise a Hearing Board, are empowered to “conduct hear-

ings on complaints filed with the Board and on petitions

referred to the Board. The panel shall make findings of

fact and conclusions of fact and law, together with a rec-

ommendation for discipline, dismissal of the complaint or

petition, or nondisciplinary suspension.” 107 [1l1.2d Rule

753(c)(3). A hearing panel concluded that Ketchum had

violated Rule 7-110(a) of the Illinois Code of Professional

Kesponsibility. This rule provided, in pertinent part, that

an attorney “shall not give or lend anything of value to

a judge.” 107 Ill.2d Rule 7-110(a). The hearing panel

ruled that Ketchum should be censured, finding that the

loans were not made with the intent to influence LeFevour

in his judicial capacity (nor did LeFevour yield any such

influence), that the loans were motivated by friendship,

and that no breach of judicial propriety occurred as a result

of the loans. The matter was then referred to the Review

Board, the next tier in the Illinois disciplinary system. The

Review Board “may approve the findings of the Hearing

Board, may reject or modify such findings as it determines

are not established by clear and convincing evidence, may

make such additional findings as are established by clear

and convincing evidence, may approve, reject or modify the

recommendations, may remand the proceeding for further

action or may dismiss the proceeding.” 107 I1l.2d Rule

753(e)(3). In considering the Hearing Board proceedings,

the Review Board did not dispute the findings that the

loans were motivated out of friendship and not made with

the expectation of judicial favor, but nonetheless, concluded

coon since manasa

5

that Ketchum should be suspended from the practice of law

for one year. Both parties appealed to the Illinois Supreme

Court.

In the mean time, the Administrator had instituted

disciplinary charges against the four attorneys who loaned

LeFevour money at Ketchum’s request. In addition to

these four attorneys, the Administrator also filed charges

against two other attorneys who had loaned money to

LeFevour. One of these attorneys loaned LeFevour

$2,500.00 in 1981 and $2,000.00 in 1982. The other attor-

ney, Patrick Tuite, loaned LeFevour $5,000.00 in 1982.

Tuite’s law firm, like Ketchum’s, had numerous cases pend-

ing in the district over which LeFevour presided.

The disciplinary charges against the foregoing

six attorneys ultimately reached the [Illinois Supreme

Court.? In a consolidated opinion, the Illinois Supreme

Court noted that Rule 7-110(a) lacked clarity and required

amendment. In re Corboy, 124 I1l.2d 29, 528 N.E.2d 694,

701 (1988). The court thus amended Rule 7-110(a) to be

read in conjunction with Rule 65(C)(4) of the Illinois Code

of Judicial Conduct.’ The court found that the all six attor-

? The six attorneys are prominent members of Illinois bar. The

Illinois Supreme Court deemed them “outstanding attorneys.”

Corboy, 528 N.E.2d at 701.

3“Neither a judge nor a member of his family residing in his

household should accept a gift, bequest, favor, or loan from any-

one except as follows:

(a) a judge may accept a gift incident to a public testi-

monial to him; book supplied by publishers on a com-

plimentary basis for official use; or an invitation to the

judge and his spouse to attend a bar-related function

or activity devoted to the improvement of the law, the

legal system, or the administration of justice;

(b) a judge or a member of his family residing in his

household may accept ordinary social hospitality; a gift,

bequest, favor or loan from a relative; a wedding or

engagement gift; a loan from a lending institution in its

(Footnote continued on the following page)

6

neys committed violations under the amended rule pro-

hibiting loans to a judge. The court, however, discharged

the disciplinary charges against the six attorneys finding

that they “were sailing in uncharted waters” and that “[iJt

would be unfair to apply the limitation we have today for

the first time defined to the respondents’ conduct in 1981.”

Corboy, 528 N.E.2d at 701.

On the same day that it discharged the forego-

ing six attorneys, the [Illinois Supreme Court suspended

Ketchum’s law license for two years. When read in juxta-

position, the two opinions issued on the same day read as

if they were decided by two different courts in two differ-

ent eras. Moreover, there is an invidious discrimination

when Ketchum’s law license is suspended for two years

for loaning LeFevour $3,300.00 more than Patrick Tuite,

while the complaint against Tuite, whose firm also had a

substantial number of cases pending in LeFevour’s district,

was discharged. Although Ketchum, like the six attor-

neys in Corboy, had never appeared before LeFevour while

LeFevour was a judge, the court based its decision on the

possibility that Ketchum might curry judicial favor from

LeFevour in the future. In re Ketchum, 124 Tll.2d 50, 528

N.E.2d 689, 693 (1988); App. 5. The court reached this

factual conclusion although the administrative fact find-

ing boards had not. Yet, while Ketchum was suspended

3 (continued)

regular course of business on the same terms generally

available to persons who are not judges; or a scholar-

ship or fellowship awarded on the same terms applied

to other applicants;

(c) a judge or a member of his family residing in his

household may accept any other gift, bequest, favor or

loan only if the donor is not a party or other person

whose interests have come or are likely to come before

him, including lawyers who practice or have prac-

ticed before the judge.” 107 Ill.2d Rules 65(C)(4)(a),

65(C)(4(b), 65(C)(4)(c).

7

for two years for loaning $8,300.00 to his long-time friend,

before whom he never appeared, the Illinois Supreme Court

subsequently discharged the complaint against an attor-

ney who had loaned $15,000.00 to Judge Reginald Holzer,

a judge before whom he never appeared but with whom

he “enjoyed a casual, friendly relationship.” In re Mark

E. Jones, Jr.,__Tl.2d —_,__N.E.2d__, (Ill. Sup. Ct.

No. 66227, Slip Opinion, December 6, 1988, p. 2.) In

Jones, the court found that because Jones had not appeared

before the judge, “the Administrator asks us to infer that

the respondent was willing to risk $15,000.00 in exchange

for the chance that, on some unspecified occasion in the

future, Holzer would be in a position to repay the favor.”

Jones, Slip Opinion, p. 7 (emphasis added).

Ketchum filed a Petition for Rehearing in the [linois

Supreme Court. The Court denied rehearing. Ketchum

now petitions this Honorable Court for a writ of certiorari.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

I. THIS PETITION SHOULD BE GRANTED

BECAUSE THE DECISION BELOW

STANDS IN DIRECT CONFLICT WITH

THIS COURT’S PRIOR HOLDING IN

BOUIE V. COLUMBIA.

In Bouie v. Columbia, 376 U.S. 347 (1964), this Court

found that the due process clause forbids “unforeseeable

and retroactive judicial expansion of narrow and precise

statutory language.” Jd. at 351. Bouie also recognized that

the due process clause prohibits retroactive judicial clar-

ification and expansion of ambiguous and vague statutes.

Id. See also Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977)

(judicially created obscenity test announced in Miller v.

- California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) could not be applied retroac-

tively under the Fifth Amendment due process clause.);

Pierce v. United States, 314 U.S. 306 (1941) (‘judicial

enlargement of a criminal act by interpretation is at war

with a fundamental concept of the common law that crimes

8

must be defined with appropriate definitiveness.”) In Bouie

this Court also noted that objections to vague statutes

“could not be cured retrospectively by a ruling either of

the trial court or appellate court, though it might be cured

for the future by authoritative judicial gloss.” 378 U.S. at

353.

The pronouncements in Bouie were explicitly grounded

in ex post facto concerns.‘ In Bouie, this Court found that

the constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto laws

fully apply where a court provides standards of conduct:

If a State legislature is barred by the Ex Post

Facto Clause from passing such a law, it must

follow that a State Supreme Court is barred by

the Due Process Clause from achieving precisely

the same result by judicial construction.

Id. at 353-54.

Here, the conclusion is inescapable that the decision of

the Illinois Supreme Court stands in patent and inexcus-

able violation of this Court’s unequivocal pronouncement

in Bouie. The Illinois Supreme Court conceded that the

*In Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386 (1798), this Court provided a

seminal statement on the intent and meaning of the ex post facto

clause:

lst. Every law that makes an action done before the

passing of the law, and which was innocent when done,

criminal; and punishes such action. 2d. Every law

that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it

was, when committed. 3d. Every law that changes

the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment,

than the law annexted to the crime, when commited.

4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence,

and receives less, or different testimony than the law

required at the time of the commission of the offense,

in order to convict the offender.

Id. at 390 (emphasis omitted). See also Miller v. Florida, 107 S.

Ct. 2446 (1987); Weaver v. Graham, 450 US. 24, 29 (1981); Dob-

bert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 292 (1977); Cummings v. Missouri,

4 Wall. 277, 325-26 (1867).

Shake aa Gs:

9

disciplinary rule alleged to be violated by Ketchum was

ambiguous. In fact, the rule was so ambiguous that the

court sua sponte amended the rule in the companion Cor-

boy decision. In re Corboy, 124 I11.2d 29, 538 N.E.2d 694,

701 (1988). Consistent with the uncertain terms of the

former rule, the Illinois Supreme Court concluded that it

would be unfair to punish the Corboy respondents for a vio-

lation of the amended rule forbidding loans to judges. /d.

With respect to Ketchum, however, the [Illinois Supreme

Court retroactively applied the rule and deprived Ketchum

of his law license for two years.® Such a course of action

is plainly inconsistent with the principles announced in

Bouie. Moreover, to the extent, if any, that Ketchum has

been punished for a violation of the old version of Rule

7-110, the ruling below is nonetheless in violation of due

process since the unamended version of Rule 7-110 was

concededly void for vagueness.® (It is well-established that

the due process clause forbids imposition of sanctions under

void statutes. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954);

5 Petitioner undoubtedly was entitled to the protections and

guarantees of the due process clause. A law license, of which

the petitioner was deprived, is a property interest for purposes

of the due process clause. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners,

353 U.S. 232, 238 (1957); In re Ming, 469 F.2d 1352, 1355 (7th

Cir. 1972); Lasdon v. Hallihan, 377 Tl. 187, 195, 36 N.E. 2d 227,

231 (1941).

6 During the hearings below, Ketchum interpreted Rule 7-110

to forbid loans to judges where an attorney appeared before the

judge. Although this construction was advanced in Corboy, the

Illinois Supreme Court, in a case of first impression, rejected

it. The court reasoned that although a judge may preside over

a court in which an attorney does not practice, the judge, in

the future, could be transferred to a tribunal in which an attor-

ney practices. Corboy, 528 N.E.2d at 700. The Illinois Supreme

Ceurt, however, appears to have abandoned this one-time hold-

ing by its language in In re Mark Jones, Jr.: “the Adminis-

trator asks us to infer that the respondent was willing to risk

$15,000.00 in exchange for the chance that, on some unspecified

occasion in the future, Holzer would be in a position to repay the

favor.” Jones, Slip Opinion, p. 7.

10

Lanzetta v. New York, 306 U.S. 451(1939). See also Con-

nally v. General Const. Co, 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (a

statute is invalid under the due process clause where it is

not “sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject

to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to

its penalties”).) Thus, the deprivation of Ketchum’s law

license under either the unamended or the amended ver-

sion of Rule 7-110 is certainly violative of the due pro-

cess clause. Moreover, the decision of the Illinois Supreme

Court in this case clearly is inconsistent with a host of deci-

sions which have remained faithful to Bowie. See, e.g., Cole

v. Young, 817 F.2d 412, 418-419, (7th Cir. 1987); Pringle

v. Court of Common Pleas, 788 F.2d 998, 1003, (3rd Cir.

1985); Moore v. Wyrick, 766 F.2d 1253, 1254-55, (8th Cir.

1985); United States v. Godheim, 651 F.2d 1294, 1297-1298,

(9th Cir. 1981).

In sum, the decision of the court below is in direct

conflict with a prior holding of this Court and is in conflict

with decisions from courts across the nation. The depri-

vation of the petitioner’s law license stands in violation

of the due process and ex post facto clauses of the United

States Constitution. This petition should thus be granted

to rectify the injustice, correct the defiance of this Court’s

authority, alleviate the split between the holding in this

case and others, cure the constitutional violations associ-

ated with the deprivation of Ketchum’s law license and to

clarify standards regarding retroactive application of judi-

cial constructions.

ee ee ee ne et

11

CONCLUSION

Petitioner Walter Ketchum respectfully prays that a

writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment and order

of the Illinois Supreme Court.

sea Dock’

WILLIAM J. MARTIN LTD.

WILLIAM J. MARTIN,

1010 Lake Street Suite 604

Oak Park, Illinois 60301

(312) 848-2100

Attorney For Petitioner

APPENDIX

A-1

IN RE KETCHUM

Cite as 124 Ill.Dec. 1, 528 N.E.2d 689 (111.1988)

528 N.E.2d 689

124 Ill.2d 50

In re Walter M. KETCHUM

Attorney, Respondent.

No. 65431.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 20, 1988.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 3, 1988.

On appeal from disciplinary proceeding, the Supreme

Court held that making loans to and soliciting loans for

circuit court judge or judge’s mother violates disciplinary

rule prohibiting lending anything of value to a judge and

warrants two-year suspension.

Suspension ordered.

Attorney and Client

Making loans to and soliciting loans for circuit court

judge or judge’s mother violates disciplinary rule prohibit-

ing ]) nding anything of value to a judge and warrants two-

year suspension. Code of Prof. Resp., DR 7-110(a), S.H.A.

ch. 110A, foll. #774.

William J. Martin, Ltd., William J. Martin, Oak Park,

for respondent.

Malcolm C. Rich, Executive Director, Chicago Coun-

cil of Lawyers, Chicago, for Chicago Council of Lawyers,

James J. Grogan, Atty. Registration and Disciplinary

Com’n, Chicago, for Adm’r.

PO

A-2

PER CURIAM:

Richard LeFevour, then presiding judge of the first

municipal district of the circuit court of Cook County, was

indicted in 1984 on charges of mail fraud, tax fraud, and

racketeering. During the course of his trial, the govern-

ment introduced evidence of certain financial transactions

between LeFevour and Walter M. Ketchum, the respon-

dent in this case. LeFevour was convicted in 1985 and

sentenced to a term of imprisonment. In the wake of

LeFevour’s conviction, the Administrator of the Attorney

Registration and Disciplinary Commission (ARDC) filed a

two-count complaint charging the respondent with viola-

tions of Rules 1-102(a)(2), 1-102(a)(5), and 7-110(a) and

Canon 9 of the Illinois Code of Professional Responsibility

(107 I11.2d Rules 1-102(aX(2), (a)(5), 7-110(a), 9-101 et seq.).

After a hearing on the matter, in 1986 the hearing panel

concluded that respondent had violated Rule 7-110(a) and

recommended that respondent be censured. Both respon-

dent and the Administrator appealed to the Review Board,

and in 1987 the Review Board agreed with the hearing

panel that respondent had violated Rule 7-110(a), but rec-

ommended a one-year suspension. On June 24, 1987, this

court granted respondent leave to file briefs and present

oral argument. The issue in this court is whether respon-

dent’s conduct in making loans to and soliciting loans for

LeFevour or his mother violated Rule 7-110(a) and, if so,

what sanctions are appropriate. Rule 7-110(a) provides in

pertinent part that an attorney “shall not give or lend any-

thing of value to a judge.”

Respondent was a long-time friend and neighbor of

LeFevour, whose residence was across the alley from

respondent's. Their families were extremely friendly and

their children grew up together, went to school together,

and played together. Before LeFevour became a judge,

he sometimes referred personal injury cases to respon-

dent, and respondent sometimes referred criminal cases

A-3

to LeFevour while LeFevour was still in private prac-

tice. LeFevour continued to refer personal injury cases to

respondent after LeFevour became a judge in the traffic

court in 1968, but the Administrator did not charge wrong-

doing on this account. In testimony before the hearing

panel, respondent described LeFevour as a good source of

business. LeFevour was named presiding judge of the first

municipal district in 1981. During the period in question

in this case, a large number of respondent’s personal injury

cases were pending in that district—at times as many as

50% of the cases he had on file.

Before LeFevour became a judge, respondent made

loans to him from time to time. These loans were always

repaid by LeFevour. After LeFevour became a judge,

respondent continued to loan him money. These loans fol-

lowed the same pattern: LeFevour would ask for a loan,

whereupon respondent would write LeFevour a check from

his business account. The loans were always interest-

free, were never evidenced by a note, and times for repay-

ment were never discussed. Respondent recalls neither

the circumstances surrounding these loans nor the rea-

sons LeFevour needed the loans. None of these loans,

with the possible exception of the first one, were repaid by

LeFevour.

The first loan, for either $1,000 or $2,000 (respondent

cannot recall which), was made sometime after LeFevour

became a judge but before February 1978. Although he

cannot recall the circumstances, he claims that LeFevour

repaid the loan. Between February 1978 and September

1982, respondent made five additional loans to LeFevour,

totalling $5,300. Four of these loans, totalling $4,300, were

made after LeFevour became the presiding judge of the first

municipal district. None of these loans were repaid.

Respondent claims that four of the five loans made

between 1978 and 1981 were advances on account of a

tort action in which the respondent represented LeFevour’s

A-4

wife, his two sons, and two other individuals not related

to LeFevour. A review of the respondent’s office records

indicates that these payments to LeFevour, contrary to

respondent’s assertion, were not advances. Where monies

were loaned by the respondent to his clients, the loans

were recorded in cost ledger sheets kept by respondent’s

office in the regular course of business. We note, howev-

er, that the Administrator brought no charges against the

respondent with respect to such loans. For the purpose of

this proceeding, it is significant that there were no entries

of any advances or loans on the cost ledger sheets which

referred to LeFevour or the tort action that respondent was

handling for the LeFevour family.

Respondent made two more loans to LeFevour in

December 1981. On December 21, 1981, LeFevour called

respondent and told him that his mother, Evelyn, with

whom the respondent was acquainted, was hospitalized.

Because of a dispute with his mother’s insurance carrier,

LeFevour needed to raise $10,000 to pay the hospital bill

so that she could be released to spend the Christmas holi-

day at home and yet be readmitted to the hospital shortly

thereafter if she required further hospitalization.

Although respondent had sufficient funds to loan

LeFevour the amount requested, he responded to Lefevour

that he was not able to make the loan. Instead he volun-

teered to contact other attorneys, using Judge LeFevour’s

name to request that they contribute to a fund to pay the

hospital bill. LeFevour consented to the respondent’s sug-

gestion. Although the respondent did not tell LeFevour

the names of specific individuals he would solicit, he told

LeFevour he would call attorneys.

That same day the respondent spoke to six Chicago

attorneys and asked each to contribute $1,000 to the hos-

pital bill. One attorney refused outright, and later another

attorney informed the respondent that he would not con-

tribute because his wife objected. The other four attor-

A-5

neys each delivered checks to respondent in the amount

of $1,000 payable to Richard LeFevour, the way in which

the respondent told them he was making his own check

payable. The respondent then wrote his own check to

Richard LeFevour in the amount of $1,000 and delivered

the five checks to LeFevour’s bailiff. None of these loans

were secured by notes, nor were provisions for repayment

made.

LeFevour cashed respondent’s $1,000 check. He

deposited the other four checks in his personal checking

account and within the next four weeks LeFevour expended

these funds for a variety of purposes, but not for repayment

of his mother’s hospital bill.

On December 24, 1981, LeFevour requested $1,000

more from the respondent, which respondent loaned

LeFevour interest-free and without a note by a check from

his business account. Finally, respondent made a similar

$1,000 loan to LeFevour in September of 1982. None of

these loans were repaid.

In sum, in the time that LeFevour was a judge, respon-

dent made LeFevour at least nine loans totalling at least

$9,300. Only two loans, totalling either $2,000 or $3,000,

were made in the 13 years LeFevour served as a judge in

the traffic court. The loans increased in frequency after

LeFevour became presiding judge of the first municipal dis-

trict: seven loans, totalling $7,300, were made in the 20-

month period after LeFevour became presiding judge.

The first count of the complaint filed by the Admin-

istrator against respondent relates to the loans made vy

respondent to LeFevour both before and after he became

the presiding judge of the first municipal district. The sec-

ond count relates to the respondent’s solicitation of other

attorneys to contribute funds for repayment of Evelyn

LeFevour’s hospital bill. As previously noted, only alleged

violations of Rule 7-110(a) are before this court.

A-6

The hearing panel, in reviewing the respondent's con-

duct, found that although the evidence suported a conclu-

sion that the respondent did not make loans to LeFevour

with an intent to influence or obtain judicial favor, several

factors necessitated sanctions against respondent. Among

other things, the panel found that respondent was an expe-

rienced practitioner who admitted being aware of Rule 7-

110(a) at the time the loans to LeFevour were made. The

panel noted that respondent had more than a social rela-

tionship with LeFevour, because LeFevour referred busi-

ness to him. Also, the panel found that respondent's

contention that his payments to LeFevour represented

advances toward recovery in a personal injury case rather

than outright loans was not “candid and forthright,” and

that LeFevour never repaid nor did respondent make any

effort to collect the loans. Therefore, the panel concluded

that respondent had violated Rule 7-110(a) and recom-

mended that the respondent be censured.

The Review Board agreed that the respondent had vio-

lated Rule 7-110(a). In arriving at its decison, the Review

Board stressed the vital function of Rule 7-110 in our sys-

tem of justice, noting that the rule is designed “to preserve

and protect the integrity of our Judicial System and to pre-

serve and maintain an independent and impartial Judicia-

ry. The practice of attorneys making loans to sitting judges

erodes and destroys the confidence of the public in the Bar,

the Judiciary, the entire legal system.”

The Board interpreted 7-110(a) as a per se rule—an

absolute prohibition against lending or giving anything

of value to a judge (except, of course, campaign contribu-

tions permitted by Rule 7-110(a)) regardless of the pur-

pose of the gift or loan, or whether the attorney benefitted

or anticipated gaining any benefit from his gift or loan.

The Board acknowledged that LeFevour and the respon-

dent were long-time friends, but concluded that “[wJhat

may well have begun with innocuous loans between friends

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struggling to begin practices developed into a festering sore

whose infection spread and engulfed numerous other attor-

neys.” Because respondent’s action “was not one single iso-

lated incident” but a “calculated, continuing wrong and a

blot upon our profession and our system of Justice,” the

Review Board felt that censure was too light a sanction,

and recommended a year-long suspension from the practice

of law.

In this court, the Administrator argues that Rule 7-

110(a) is a per se rule and therefore that each of the

loans the respondent made to LeFevour, as well as the

respondent’s solicitation of loans from other attorneys on

LeFevour’s behalf to raise money to pay LeFevour’s moth-

er’s hospital bill, constitutes a disciplinary violation with-

out regard to whether the respondent received any benefit

from his conduct. The Administrator asks that the respon-

dent be suspended from the practice of law for a substan-

tial period of time. Respondent argues that 7-110(a) is not

a per se rule and that his actions were never motivated by

a desire to influence the administration of justice or curry

judicial favor, but solely by his friendship and desire to

help the LeFevour family in their times of need.

Although the issue raised here by the parties is

whether Rule 7-110(a) is a per se rule, our opinion in Jn

re Corboy (1988) 124 Ill.2d 29, 124 Ill.Dec. 6, 528 N.E.2d

694, has already dealt with this question to the extent nec-

essary to give adequate guidance to the bench and bar of

this State. In that opinion, we held that evidence of dis-

honest intent and motive is not necessary to justify impo-

sition of discipline. (In re Corboy, 124 I1l.2d at 39, 124

Il. Dec. at 11, 528 N.E.2d at 699, citing In re Clayter

(1980), 78 Il.2d 276, 283, 35 Ill. Dec. 790, 399 N.E.2d 1318.)

We further held that evidence showing a lack of dishonest

intent is usually only appropriate to determine the nature

and severity of the sanction imposed. (Jn re Corboy, 124

[l.2d at 39, 124 ll. Dec. at 11, 528 N.E.2d at 699, citing

A-8

In re Clayter (1980), 78 Ill.2d 276, 35 Ill.Dec. 790, 399

N.E.2d 1318.) It is unnecessary for us here to determine

whether the per se construction urged by the Administra-

tor is applicable. In In re Corboy, we declared that Rule 7-

110(a) must be read in conjunction with the Code of Judi-

cial Conduct, Rule 65(C)(4)(a) (107 Il.2d R. 65(C)(4)(a)),

and we directed an amendment to Rule 7-110(a) to that

effect. By reading the amended rule as we have strictly

construed it in In re Corboy, the limited extent to which

an attorney may make a gift or loan to a judge will be

apparent. However, under any analysis of Rule 7-110(a),

respondent’s loans were improper. The evidence supports

the conclusion that respondent intended to and did in fact

receive an actual benefit from the loans made to LeFevour.

Therefore, we cannot accept respondent’s contention that

he had no intent to receive a benefit from his conduct. At

all times relevant to his proceeding the respondent had a

large volume of cases pending in the district over which

LeFevour presided; the Review Board noted that at all

times from 20% to 50% of the respondent’s practice con-

sisted of cases in that district. (Cf. In re Corboy, 124 Il].2d

at 48, 124 Ill. Dec. at 14, 528 N.E.2d at 702 (Board found

attorney Tuite’s firm had a number of cases in the first

municipal division, but also found there was absolutely

no evidence that attorney Tuite’s loan was an attempt to

gain favor in any way).) Although neither the respondent

nor any of his associates in this case ever appeared before

LeFevour, in view of the large volume of cases the respon-

dent had in the first municipal district, as well as the fact

that LeFevour was a good source of business for respon-

dent, it was to respondent’s advantage to maintain an ami-

cable relationship with LeFevour, the administrative head

of that branch, in the event it ever became necessary for

him or his associates to appear before the presiding judge

in a case or to make a request of the presiding judge, who

in the exercise of his administrative responsibilities may

have been of assistance to lawyers who had cases pending

there.

A-9

It is obvious that the respondent’s loans to LeFevour

were a means of cementing and maintaing his relationship

with his old friend, who had been elevated to the leadership

of the district of the court in which he and lawyers in his

office appeared frequently in a large number of cases. See

In re Schwarz (1972), 51 I11.2d 334, 282 N.E.2d 689 (mo-

tive and intent must ordinarily be inferered from conduct).

Therefore, although it appears there had never been an

occasion when LeFevour had actually favored him in the

past, there was certainly the appearance of impropriety.

Given this, and the fact that, at times, fully half of respon-

dent’s practice was in the division over which LeFevour

presided, there was the real possibility that the respondent

might be the beneficiary of LeFevour’s favor in the future.

For that reason, we view the loans made to LeFevour

and the solicitations the respondent made on behalf

of LeFevour’s mother as conferring a benefit on both

LeFevour and the respondent. LeFevour benefitted

through the receipt of the loans and respondent’s services

as solicitor of loans from other attorneys. Respondent

intended to benefit and did benefit by the continuance and

guarantee of a favorable relationship with the judge, which

might prove to be valuable to respondent in the future.

That maintaining this benefit was the primary reason

behind the loans is illustrated by the incident in which

LeFevour asked the respondent for $10,000. Although

the respondent had enough money to loan LeFevour the

$10,000, and LeFevour was apparently in a situation where

his family was in great need of the money to assure con-

ti: aued medical care for LeFevour’s mother, respondent

claimed not to have the money. This highlights that friend-

ship and concern for LeFevour’s family were not the under-

lying motives for the loans. This conclusion is supported

by the fact that although respondent claims that all loans

were made for purely friendly purposes, respondent has

admitted that he actually could not remember the purpose

A-10

of any of the loans to LeFevour. Also, the marked increase

in frequency of loans from respondent to LeFevour in the

period after LeFevour became presiding judge suggests a

purpose behind the loans other than friendship. Clearly,

the respondent was not concerned about the financial need

of LeFevour’s family, but made the loans simply because

he did not want to run the risk of incurring LeFevour’s

wrath and losing his favor by refusing to lend him money.

We conclude that under the circumstances of this case,

it was a violation of Rule 7-110(a) for the respondent to

make loans or give anything of value—in this case the

respondent’s services in soliciting other lawyers—to the pre-

siding judge of a court or « division of a court in which the

respondent had pending a substantial volume of the cases

he was handling, even when the judge had never been per-

sonally involved in any of the cases.

This court has not had the occasion to decide the proper

sanction for a violation of Rule 7-110(a). In determining

the appropriate sanction for a disciplinary violation, each

case must be decided on its own facts. (Jn re Halil (1983),

96 I1l.2d 371, 69 Ill.Dec. 370, 447 N.E.2d 805.) Respondent

argues that the appropriate sanction, if any, is a private

reprimand, based on several cases from other jurisdictions.

These decisions are distinguishable because they involved

isolated incidents of misconduct, not the kind of continuing

pattern of misconduct at issue in the present case.

This case is far different from the cases consolidated

in In re Corboy, where the attorneys’ conduct constituted a

violation of Rule 7-110(a) only because of the construction

we placed on Rule 7-110(a) in that case. Here, respondent's

conduct constituted a violation of that rule even without

the strict construction we have placed on the rule in ques-

tion. ,

Considering the seriousness of the disciplinary viola-

tions in this case, the repeated nature of the violations, and

the fact that respondent is an experienced practioner who

A-11

knew of the prohibitions of Rule 7-110(a) at the time the

loans were made, we feel respondent’s conduct warrants a

more severe sanction than censure. Accordingly, respon-

dent is suspended from the practice of law for two years.

Respondent suspended.

Justice STAMOS took no part in the consideration or

decision of this case.