Reply Brief — Maine v. United States Environmental Protection Agency
Supreme Court brief1989
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| Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED
No. 88-684 cee i1 1989
JOSEPH PE SPANIOL, JR.
| CLERK
In The
ews
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1988
,
vr
STATE OF MAINE, COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,
STATE OF CONNECTICUT, STATE OF VERMONT,
STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
and RICHARD L. OTTINGER,
Petitioners,
V.
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
and LEE THOMAS, Administrator, CINCINNATI GAS &
ELECTRIC COMPANY, et al.. MONONGAHELA POWER
COMPANY, NORTH AMERICAN COAL CORPORATION, et al.,
PEABODY HOLDING COMPANY, INC., et al.,
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY,
Respondents.
,’
-
REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS
,%
4
THomas Y. Au James E. TreERNEY
Assistant Chief Counsel Attorney General of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania State of Maine
Department of Environmental
s D. N
Resources THomas D. WARREN
514 Executive House nnd gpa ——
P.O. Box 2537 ounsel of Record for
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120 all Petitioners)
(717) 787-4488 Grecory W. SAMPLE
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
State House Station No. 6
Augusta, Maine 04333
(207) 289-3661
(Additional Counsel for Petitioners
Appear on the Following Page)
CCCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-6964
OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831
JerFREY L. AMESTOY
Attorney General of the
State of Vermont
J. WaALLAcE MALLEY, Jr.
Assistant Attorney
General
Office of the Attorney
General
109 State Street
Montpelier, Vermont 05602
(802) 828-3171
Cary EDWARDS
Attorney General of the
State of New Jersey
Pau H. SCHNEIDER
Deputy Attorney General
Environmental Protection
Section
Richard J. Hughes Justice
Complex (CN-112)
Trenton, New Jersey 08625
(609) 292-1500
Hon. RicHarD L. OTTINGER
Pace University School
of Law
78 North Broadway
White Plains, New York
10603
(914) 681-4234
CLARINE Narp1 RIDDLE
Deputy Attorney General
(Acting Attorney
General of the
State of Connecticut)
BRIAN COMERFORD
Assistant Attorney General
State Office Building
Room 147
Hartford, Connecticut 06106
(203) 566-7213
JEFFREY R. Howarp
Deputy Attorney General! of the
State of New Hampshire
GeorcE DANA BISBEE
Senior Assistant Attorney
General
State House Annex
25 Capitol Street
Concord, New Hampshire
03301
(603) 271-3679
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
I oe a ae eee bb ee enea eae i
I ett ee TU cl a an wee 1
1. EPA’s Claim that the Interstate Pollution Provi-
sions Are Implemented Whenever Air Quality
Standards Are Adopted Or Revised Is False.... 1
2. The Industry Respondents’ Claim that Section
110(a)(2)(E) Compliance Has, De Facto, Been
Found by EPA Highlights the Critical Deficiency
in EPA’s Application of Section 126............ 2
NE Son .05 8 60h a 54 oa hod eae ees wh eka NER 4
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CLEAN Arr Act
ee ee a, OE POE bs ng cn cen cat bianvaeesdeceseees 3
SB Peeera, Se UDA. © TEIGNME) 6 onc ce cscscsees 2
§ 110(a)(2)(E), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(E).......... passim
ee es Sy OE PN oo ko os nk ohh aber e nee bewe es a3
er oe Aa PROD 6 sauces ad eessaveavases 3
REGULATIONS
ee ee ms ee GEE. FD, IG7O). wo cece cece sescssses 2
a RS Ly) 2
52 Fed. Reg. 24672 (July 1, 1987)................2005. 2
en
INTRODUCTION
Two significant arguments are presented in opposi-
tion to this Petition that were not presented to the Court
below. First, the Federal Respondents dispute the peti-
tioners’ assertion that EPA has made the Clean Air Act’s
interstate air pollution provisions effectively meaning-
less, suggesting instead that those provisions are imple-
mented through “an ongoing process” of SIP revisions.
Second, Industry Respondents argue that EPA’s disposi-
tion of the interstate petitions does constitute performance
of the statutory duty claimed by the petitioners — to
determine that the SIPs of upwind states comply with the
interstate standard of § 110(a)(2)(E) — although not in so
many words. Neither argument has merit.
1. EPA’s Claim that the Interstate Poliution Provisions
Are Implemented Whenever Air Quality Standards
Are Adopted or Revised Is False.
The Government responds to the central legal asser-
tion of the Petition — that EPA’s construction of the Clean
Air Act leaves the Act’s interstate pollution control provi-
sions virtually meaningless — by reciting three circum-
stances under which the Act’s prohibition of excessive
interstate pollution will be applied by EPA:
EPA’s review of various SIP revisions submitted by
States is an ongoing process and under EPA’s con-
struction Section 110(a)(2)(E)’s prohibition on inters-
tate air pollution has to be satisfied for the Agency to
approve of each revision. In addition, whenever a
new NAAQS is promulgated or an existing NAAQS
is revised, EPA must ensure that all SIPs and revised
SIPs submitted for its review conform to Section
110(a)(2), including paragraph (E)’s prohibition.
Brief of Federal Respondents, at 10-11. The first mecha-
nism holds no promise for any but the most isolated,
local cases of interstate pollution. As noted in the Petition
at 12, EPA’s determination that only new emissions need
to be evaluated in the context of a SIP revision, rather
than the combined effect of new and previously approved
emissions, has been challenged and upheld in two
Circuits.
The latter two means conceivably offer an oppor-
tunity to examine the cumulative effect of multiple emis-
sions. But contrary to the Government's assertion, EPA
has not required the States to demonstrate compliance
with § 110(a)(2)(E) on any of three occasions since 1977
when the agency has adopted or revised a NAAQS. See 43
Fed. Reg. 46264 (Oct. 5, 1978) (new lead standard); 44
Fed. Reg. 8202 (Feb. 8, 1979) (revised ozone standards);
and 52 Fed. Reg. 24672 (July 1, 1987) (revised particulate
matter standards). The suggestion in the Government's
brief of a gradual, but steady review by EPA of interstate
pollution has no basis in the agency’s own construction
of the statute.
ho
The Industry Respondents’ Claim that Section
110(a)(2)(E) Compliance Has, De Facto, Been Found
by EPA Highlights the Critical Deficiency in EPA’s
Application of Section 126.
The briefs of both groups of Industry Respondents
oppose certiorari on the new theory that EPA has effec-
tively already determined that SIPs of the upwind states
do adequately prevent interstate pollution:
(I]n the final analysis, EPA undertook precisely the
inquiry that would have governed the review of the
————————eeeerererereore
Midwestern SIPs for their conformity with
§ 110(a)(2)(E). * * * In these circumstances, even
assuming arguendo that the § 126(b) petitions were
sufficient to trigger review of the Midwestern state
SIPs, EPA’s failure to state in haec verba that those
SIPs have adequate provisions to prevent violations
of § 110(a)(2)(E) in the petitioning States was, at
worst, harmless procedural error.
Brief of Respondents Cincinnati Gas and Electric Co., et
al., at 14; see also Brief of Respondents Peabody Holding
Company, Inc., et al., at 9-10. More extreme even than the
position taken by EPA, which fails to implement
§ 110(a)(2)(E) but at least leaves the question of compli-
ance unresolved, the Industry Respondents would put
the issue to rest. But they do so only by standing
§ 110(a)(2) on its head. Rather than having the Adminis-
trator approve each SIP if he finds that it satisfies the
statutory criteria, these Respondents obtain the same
result if the Administrator merely finds that evidence
submitted by downwind states in a remedial administra-
tive proceeding is insufficient to prove the interstate cri-
terion is violated.
This logical somersault lays bare the critical defi-
ciency in EPA’s application of § 126 to these petitions: its
placement of the full burden of proof on the petitioning
states to prove violations of § 110(a)(2)(E), even in the
absence of any prior agency determination of compliance.
Thus, contrary to Cincinnati Gas’s footnote 21, the
Administrator’s allocation of the burden of proof is pre-
cisely the instrument by which the Act’s provisions to
control interstate pollution are eviscerated. Until the
Administrator accepts the same oversight responsibility
for interstate pollution that he exercises under § 110 for
intrastate pollution, the interstate provisions of the Act
will remain effectively meaningless.
s.
ll
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, and those stated in the
Petition, certiorari should be granted in this case.
Respectfully submitted,
Dated: February 10, 1989
James E. TiERNEY
Attorney General of the
State of Maine
THomaAs D. WARREN
Deputy Attorney General
(Counsel of Record for
all Petitioners)
Grecory W. SAMPLE
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney
General
State House Station No. 6
Augusta, Maine 04333
(207) 289-3661
THomas Y. Au
Assistant Chief Counsel
Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania
Department of Environmental
Resources
514 Executive House
P.O. Box 2537
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania
17120
(717) 787-4488
(Additional Counsel for Petitioners
Appear on Following Page)
JEFFREY L. AMESTOY
Attorney General of the
State of Vermont
J. WALLAcE MALLEy, Jr.
Assistant Attorney
General
Office of the Attorney
General
109 State Street
Montpelier, Vermont 05602
(802) 828-3171
Cary EDWARDS
Attorney General of the
State of New Jersey
Pau. H. SCHNEIDER
Deputy Attorney General
Environmental Protection
Section
Richard J. Hughes Justice
Complex (CN-112)
Trenton, New Jersey 08625
(609) 292-1500
Hon. RicHArRD L. OTTINGER
Pace University School
of Law
78 North Broadway
White Plains, New York
10603
(914) 681-4234
CLARINE Narpi RIDDLE
*Deputy Attorney General
(Acting Attorney
General of the
State of Connecticut)
BRIAN COMERFORD
Assistant Attorney General
State Office Building
Room 147
Hartford, Connecticut
06106
(203) 566-7213
JEFFREY R. Howarp
Deputy Attorney
General of the
State of New Hampshire
GEORGE DANA BISBEE
Senior Assistant Attorney
General
State House Annex
25 Capitol Street —
Concord, New Hampshire
03301
(603) 271-3679
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