Opposition Brief — Richardson v. Peoples Natural Gas Co.

In the

Supreme Court of the Anited States

October Term, 1988

WILLIAM B. RICHARDSON,

Petitioner,

Vv.

THE PEOPLES NATURAL GAS COMPANY, et al.,

Respondents.

Own PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE PEOPLES NATURAL GAS

COMPANY AND GERALD A. WILSON IN

OPPOSITION TO PETITION

FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI .

ECKERT SEAMANS CHERIN &

MELLOTT

JOHN J. BUCHAN—Counsel

JEFFREY G. BROOKS

600 Grant St., 42nd FI.

Pittsburgh, PA 15219

(412) 566-6000

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

py) Bigs PS ikey. & 468). a ene li

COUNTER-STATEMENT OF THE CASE.......... |

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ................... 4

Pt) IE Sor eee OR a Ee re 6

I. THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIO-

RARI PRESENTS NO SPECIAL OR

IMPORTANT REASONS FOR THE

EXERCISE OF THIS COURT’S DISCRE-

TION TO REVIEW THIS MATTER ..... ao

Il. THE COMPLAINT WAS PROPERLY

DISMISSED ON THE BASIS OF FAIL-

URE TO STATE A CLAIM UPON

WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED ..... 7

A. Petitioner Has Not Suffered Any Loss

for Which Damages Are Recoverable at

rr eer Res ee ee eee eee 7

B. The Complaint Does Not State a Cause

of Action for Which Relief Can be

Granted Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1985.... 8

a ee ee ae 10

APPENDIX

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Page(s)

District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman,

PS ee rere aoe eae 7

Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971) .......... 9

Hagerty v. Succession of Clement, 749 F.2d 217 (Sth

Ce NG Ohba i Sakaa nh 0 kb (0d de Claas ep ene 7

Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 477

IN on oan se ceed abs eeewan debe s ees 8

United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. Scott, 463 U.S.

Ee 5a X55 6 MaRN SONS OES FA ee eeeees 9

STATUTES AND RULES

Ne EE kb bisa ncegsvaniesivacsecebasanes 3

EE io.s's4ce sk ch par cate a cane ee sen ses 8

re ree Pree eer eae ae 8

Oe RUDD iva vce voc wewn ee en ewes sacese 9,10

IED 6c ais cadence csccucatotsectean 4

Se I Sk. adn dvb aeebice cee henna 4, 6

Rule 12(b) Fed. R. Civ. P. .........--2 seer ee. 3, 4, 6

ye ee Serer eee ere ree re 7

OS eS aerrreerrrer rer 3

EE oy i we scincvenvesssvsbeeeuvcss |

I OG is 5 nbsp sua b cokes wnee vegans 2, 10

Si caeteetelh Ai dieeinneienniian -otte eaten anttieadeadienineaet terete

Pra

i nemeee meer =

COUNTER-STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This action and related proceedings before the Penn-

sylvania Public Utility Commission (““PUC”) and the

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania had their origin in a

notice from appellee, The Peoples Natural Gas Company

(“Peoples”), to Petitioner William B. Richardson advising

Richardson that Peoples intended, at its expense, to test

the gas meter located in Richardson’s residence.' Appar-

ently fearing that a test of the meter would reveal a defec-

tive service line and, further, prompt a request by Peoples

that the meter be relocated to the exterior of his residence,

Richardson filed a complaint/with the PUC? seeking an

order directing Peoples to refrain from requesting a reloca-

tion of the gas meter. /

Following hearings before the PUC, an order was

entered directing Richardson to permit Peoples access to

the meter for purposes /of conducting the required tests

and, if necessary, installing a remote reading device on the

meter and directing Peoples to adhere to Peoples’ custom-

ary standards in detérmining whether or not to demand

relocation of the meter (Appendix, pp. A—2-3).

Richardson appealed to the Commonwealth Court of

Pennsylvania June 28, 1985.

'Periodic testing, and if necessary, replacement of obsolescent

meters, is mandated by statute. 52 Pa. Code §59.21 (Appendix, p. A-1).

In conjunction with the testing of the meter, the property owner’s ser-

vice line to the meter is also tested in order to assure that the line is

capable of transmitting natural gas safely. In the event the service line

leaks or is otherwise defective, the customer must replace the line before

service may be restored. The meter is the property of the gas company;

the service line belongs to the property owner.

2Richardson v. The Peoples Natural Gas Company, No. Z-8470299.

3See 52 Pa. Code. §59.18 (Appendix, p. A-1)

2

Upon Richardson’s failure to respond to a motion to

dismiss filed by the PUC, the Commonwealth Court dis-

missed Richardson’s appeal March 21, 1986. In response,

Richardson filed a petition in the Commonwealth Court

that was treated by that court as a motion for reconsidera-

tion. In that motion Richardson complained of the con-

duct of the PUC proceedings and included, by reference,

the allegations of the instant complaint which plaintiff filed

in the lower court November 4, 1985.

The Commonwealth Court denied reconsideration in

an order dated April 11, 1986. No appeal was taken from

the order of the Commonwealth Court.

As a result of the filing of the complaint in the district

court and the pendency of the related appeals, and despite

the determination in the administrative proceedings that

Peoples’ conduct was appropriate and in accordance with

law, no further action had been taken by Peoples to enter

Richardson’s residence for the purpose of testing, and if

necessary, replacing the gas meter. No alterations of any

kind have been made by any party either to the gas meter

or service line.

Following service of the complaint in the district

court, all defendants filed motions to dismiss. The motion

filed on behalf of Peoples and Gerald Wilson, a Peoples

employee, requested a dismissal of the complaint pursuant

to Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

averring, inter alia, that the complaint failed to allege a

cause of action upon which relief can be granted.

Following four status conferences before the district

court, the district court entered an order on September 29,

1987 dismissing the complaint. Richardson took an appeal

3

to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third

Circuit.

Upon the filing of Richardson’s appeal, Peoples

moved for counsel fees and costs pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§1912 and Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Proce-

dure. The court of appeals entered an order on May 19,

1988 affirming the order of the district court and awarding

Peoples $150 as counsel fees based on the frivolous nature

of the appeal. Richardson filed a petition for rehearing in

the court of appeals which was denied in an order dated

July 1, 1988.

4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Petition for Writ of Certiorari presents no basis

for the exercise of this Court’s discretion to review this

matter. None of the elements enumerated in Rule 17 of the

Rules of the Supreme Court are involved in this matter

nor asserted by petitioner. This case does not involve a

substantial question of general importance. Instead, this

matter simply involves a property owner unhappy at the

prospect that a test of his gas service line, done in conjunc-

tion with a statutorily-mandated gas meter inspection, may

reveal defects in the line, necessitating repair.

Richardson’s complaint was properly dismissed pur-

suant to Rule i2 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

for a variety of reasons. Richardson initially prosecuted

this action in state administrative proceedings and, on

appeal, to the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.

Those state proceedings terminated in judgments adverse

to Richardson. Richardson did not appeal to the Pennsyl-

vania Supreme Court. Richardson’s complaint improperly

seeks to invoke the jurisdiction of a federal district court to

review state court decisions and, as such, was properly

dismissed. Furthermore, the complaint is purely specula-

tive and seeks to recover monetary damages for a purely

hypothetical or prospective “injury” and otherwise fails to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted by inappro-

priately relying upon statutes intended to combat racial or

class discrimination.

The complaint was also properly dismissed since the

complaint seeks to litigate issues and claims asserted by

Richardson before the Pennsylvania Public Utility Com-

mission and the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.

The state proceedings terminated in final judgments

adverse to Richardson and, consistent with theories of

5

judicial economy, res judicata and collateral estoppel,

Richardson may not seek to relitigate the same issues and

claims in federal court.

6

ARGUMENT

I. THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

PRESENTS NO SPECIAL OR IMPORTANT

REASONS FOR THE EXERCISE OF THIS

COURT’S DISCRETION TO REVIEW THIS

MATTER

The Petition for Writ of Certiorari does not present

issues of special or general importance beyond the interests

of the parties to this action. The Petition cites no lack of

uniformity or conflict among the courts of appeal or any

departure from the usual course of judicial proceedings.

This action was dismissed following the filing of motions

to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. As discussed more fully below, the dis-

missal of this action pursuant to Rule 12 was entirely

appropriate. Reduced to its essence, this matter involves

merely a utility customer unhappy at the prospect that a

test and/or replacement of the utility’s meter may reveal

defects in the customer’s service line that may make

repairs or alteration to the line by the customer necessary

for the continuation of service.

As made unequivocally clear by Richardson’s

“Motion In Opposition to Dismissal,” filed both in the

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania and in the lower

court, Richardson asserted the identical ‘‘over-

riding... constitutional precepts” (Appendix, p. A-5) in

both the state administrative and state court appellate pro-

ceedings as in this action. In addition, the identity of issues

presented in the state proceeding to those in the present

action warrants dismissal on the basis of the doctrines of

res judicata and collateral estoppel. The complaint filed in

7

the lower court is merely an attempt to invoke the jurisdic-

tion of the district court in review of state court proceed-

ings. Richardson did not proceed with further appeals in

the state courts, choosing instead to initiate an action in

federal court. It is axiomatic that if the constitutional

claims presented in an action in federal district court are

“inextricably entwined” with a state court’s prior denial of

those same constitutional claims, the district court lacks

jurisdiction to review the state court decision. District of

Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482-

84, n. 16 (1983). Merely casting the complaint in the form

of a civil rights action is insufficient to overcome the lack

of jurisdiction in the district court to entertain matters

disposed of in prior state court proceedings. Hagerty v.

Succession of Clement, 749 F.2d 217, 220 (Sth Cir. 1984).

The complaint seeking a review in the lower court of

decisions in state proceedings adverse to Richardson was

properly dismissed.

Il. THE COMPLAINT WAS ?ROPERLY DIS-

MISSED ON THE BASIS OF FAILURE TO

STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN

BE GRANTED

A. Richardson Has Not Suffered Any Loss for

Which Damages Are Recoverable at Law

The complaint was properly dismissed pursuant to

Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a cause of action upon

which relief can be granted for the simple fact that Rich-

ardson has not suffered any loss, economic or otherwise.

While the complaint alleges that the various defendants

“conspired to manipulate a situation whereby the plaintiff

must, at his expense, make alterations in the service line,”

the complaint is devoid of any allegation that Richardson

|

8

has in fact incurred any injury whatsoever. The complaint

appears to address, as to appellees Wilson and Peoples,

purely anticipated, prospective or hypothetical injury.

Richardson seeks monetary damages to redress an

“injury” that has not occurred. Clearly, the complaint is

speculative and premature.

Richardson is apparently contending that, since he is

alleging a violation of constitutional rights, he is entitled to

a recovery of monetary damages in the event he should

prevail in his claim (Petition, p.7). If so, Richardson’s con-

tention has been rejected by this Court in Memphis Com-

munity School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299 (1986),

wherein this Court held that when parties seek damages for

violation of constitutional rights, “the level of damages is

ordinarily determined according to principles derived

from the common law of torts.” Jd. at 306. Since damages

in tort cases are intended to serve as compensation for

injury actually incurred, a plaintiff is not entitled to “dam-

ages” based wholly on the “abstract value of a constitu-

tional right.” Jd. at 307.

B. The Complaint Does Not State a Cause of Action

for Which Relief Can be Granted Pursuant to 42

U.S.C. §1985

Richardson contends, in part, that federal court sub-

ject matter jurisdiction is appropriate pursuant to “28

USCS sect. 1343(1)(2)(3)” (Appendix, p. A-10).4 Richard-

son’s reliance on 28 U.S.C. §1343, and by necessary exten-

sion, upon 42 U.S.C. §1985, is misplaced. Section 1985 is

intended only to redress injury caused by class or racially

based discrimination. See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S.

4Presumably Richardson intended to invoke 28 U.S.C.

§§1343(a)(1), 1343(a)(2) and 1343(a)(3).

9

88, 102 (1971). The complaint contains no allegation that

Richardson was discriminated against because of class-

based or racially discriminatory animus, nor do any facts

appear from the complaint from which the court could

reasonably infer conspiratorial acts motivated by such

animus.

If Richardson seeks to invoke the provisions of

§1985(3) and 42 U.S.C. §1343(a)(3) in his conclusory alle-

gations of a conspiracy to deprive Richardson of a variety

of constitutional protections with the aim of causing Rich-

ardson to incur expense in the alteration of his gas service

line (Appendix, p. 60), such reliance is misplaced.‘ Section

1985 was enacted in order to combat the prevalent animus

against Blacks and their supporters in the struggle to

achieve civil rights following the Civil War. United Broth-

erhood of Carpenters v. Scott,, 463 U.S. 825, 836 (1983). In

order to make out a cause of action under §1985(3), the

plaintiff must allege a racial or other class-based invidious,

discriminatory animus underlying the conspirators’ action.

Id. at 835. The complaint alleges no racial or political

motive underlying the defendant’s “conspiracy” and may

be liberally read only to allege merely an economic “con-

spiracy.”” Conspiracies motivated by an economic animus

were held by this court in Scott to be outside the purview

of §1985(3).° Id. at 837. As such, no cause of action is

stated pursuant to 1985(3) and dismissal of any claim

based on that statute is appropriate.

528 U.S.C. §1985(3) provides for the recovery of damages incurred

as a result of a conspiracy to deprive a person of the equal protection of

the laws.

10

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing premises, the Petition for Writ of

Certiorari should be denied.

~~:

A-l

APPENDIX

52 Pa. Code.

§59.18 Location of meters.

Meters shall be installed in either of the following

locations:

1. Inside the building, preferably in a dry, well-

ventilated place not subject to excessive heat, and as

near as possible to the point of entrance of the pipe

supplying service to the building.

2. Outside the building at a location selected by

the utility. A meter cover or housing is required if, in

the judgment of the utility, conditions require the

physical protection for the meter installation.

§59.21 Meter tests.

a. Test schedule for other than Class A, B and C

meters. Each public utility shall make and record tests of

orifice, rotary displacement and turbine type service

meters as follows:

x * *

2. Rotary displacement meters shall be tested and cali-

brated at the factory in accordance with recognized and

accepted practices and shall be correct to within 1.0% when

passing gas at their rated capacities. A record of the test

shall be made available to and retained by the utility

for the life of the meter. At least once every 10 years a

differential-rate test shall be made and the results checked

against the original test recorded at the time of installation.

At least every two years the meter shall be inspected to

observe the condition of the meter bearings—noise, vibra-

tion, and the like—and the level and condition of the oil in

A-2

the reservoirs. An observed problem shall be promptly

corrected. A record of the results of these two-year tests

shall be maintained by the utility for a period of ten years.

In lieu of a differential-rate test, a test method approved by

the Commission may be used.

ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED for the reasons stated in

the accompan)ing discussion:

1. That The Peoples Natural Gas Company shall

promptly contact Mr. William B. Richardson by letter

advising him of the person’s name and telephone

number for him to contact in order to schedule a

pressure test of his gas line and a meter change.

2. That Mr. William B. Richardson shall contact,

and reasonably cooperate with, the personnel of The

Peoples Natural Gas Company who are responsible

for scheduling pressure tests and the changing of

meters.

3. That Mr. William B. Richardson shall permit

personnel of The Peoples Natural Gas Company to

enter his residence at a mutually convenient time for

the purposes of testing the gas line between the gas

' meter and the curb valve and of changing his gas

meter, and, if indicated, consistent with Paragraph 4

of this Order, installing a remote reading device on his

gas meter.

4. That the personnel of The Peoples Natural Gas

Company shall apply its usual practices, procedures,

and guidelines in assessing Mr. Richardson’s circum-

stances and in determining the location for the gas

meter for Mr. Richardson’s residence.

A-3

5. That his Order shall not preclude The Peoples

Natural Gas Company from using any remedy pro-

vided by law or regulation in order to apply, in

Mr. Richardson’s circumstances, the service practices

it uses in the usual course of its business.

February 5, 1985 /s/ James D. Porterfield

JAMES D. PORTERFIELD

Administrative Law Judge

A-4

In THE

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylv

Sitting in Harrisburg

WILLIAM B. RICHARDSON, ,

Petitioner

vs , No. 1757 CD 1985

PENNSYLVANIA UTILITY

COMMISSION

/

MOTION IN OPPOSITION TO DISMISSAL

AND NOW comes the petitioner, William B. Rich-

ardson, and moves for cancellation of the order of the

Commonwealth Court of March 21st, 1986 (attached), and

hereby presents his answer to the Motion to Dismiss filed

by the respondent, the Pennsylvania Public Utility Com-

mission (PUC), based on the Rules of Appellate Procedure

prescribing time limitations for the filing of briefs with this

honorable Court.

1. The petitioner for several months now has not pre-

pared a brief in support of his petition. He will not prepare

such a brief at this time because there is first a matter of

putting false evidence in proper perspective. Until such is

done, the petitioner cannot proceed to base his arguments

on evidence accepted by the PUC when he believes The

Peoples Natural Gas Company’s (PNG’s) only witness was

discredited. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) believed

this witness was credible.

2. Examples of incredibility: the transcript shows that

the witness read into evidence a letter he had written to the

petitioner and this letter was read with every intention that

A-5

it was the witness’ testimony: He said: “Our servicemen

have made several attempts to change your gas meter but

found no one home on each occasion.” This statement is

false. This statement appears at page 21 of the transcript,

lines 14 through 16. He was not questioned about this until

page 41 (L. 21) where the ALJ asked the witness if he could

testify whether he made any attempts to change the meter

other than the two letters he read into the evidence. It then

became clear that the witness had never sent anyone and

that he had no personal knowledge of anyone ever failing

to gain entrance at the petitioner’s house. See page 42

which is taken up entirely by the witness in explaining the

letter and ending up top of page 42 with ““—historically we

can’t get ahold of these people anyway, so I would say, no,

I did not—.” The foregoing is not the only false statement

in this case.

3. The over-riding of constitutional precepts by the

PUC projects a picture of the same thing happening again

at a bench hearing. The petitioner has filed in Federal

Court and has asked for a jury where, hopefully, he will

receive more honest treatment. A copy of the federal com-

plaint is attached. The petitioner believes the Common-

wealth Court should require an answer or response to each

paragraph of this Motion and review the record with

whatever follow-up action it deems appropriate.

ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF RECOMMENDED

ACTION

4. Article 5 Section 10 para. (c) of the Pennsylvania

Constitution delegates power to the Supreme Court of

Pennsylvania to make rules governing practice, procedure

and the conduct of all courts. But this is not an absolute

grant of power. Some of this power is taken away where

A-6

substantive rights are in issue and where operation of the

rules deny such rights.

para. (c), Art 5 Sect. 10: “—if such rules are consistent

with this Constitution and neither abridge, enlarge nor

modify the substantive rights of any litigant.”

5. The time delay in filing petitioner’s brief is waivable

even under the Rules. Refer to the “Explanatory note—

1979” under Rule 1511 of Rules of Appellate Procedure.

6. There is a statutory right of appeal from an Admin-

istrative Agency:

Title 42 Pa. C.S.A. Sect. 702. “Any person aggrieved

by an adjudication of a Commonwealth Agency—

shall have the right to appeal therefrom to the court

vested with jurisdiction of such appeals—.”

The undeserved credence given the PNG witness was gross

prejudice. Such unreasoned distinctions injected into

agency decisions deny open and equal resolution of griev-

ances. Under such circumstances, the right of appeal is

meaningless unless the Commonwealth Court can exercise

some modicum of ethical control.

7. Unreasoned distinctions and the exercise of power

and authority which the legislature never intended—and

never expressly conferred nor implied—has been the hall-

mark of this case in the PUC. The Amendment I right of

the petitioner to petition for a redress of grievance has

certainly been abridged—along with other rights—but it is

remarkable that the Amendment I abridgment is clearly

visible simply by reading the complaint and answer before

the PUC and then trying to apply the Order of the PUC.

Tiieciiieeiaiil

A-7

8. The Order of the PUC affects the petitioner’s per-

sonal and property rights. This Order also affects the per-

sonal and property rights of thousands of PNG’s custom-

ers. Nowhere does the Administrative Law Judge cite

authority for such an Order in the context of the pleadings

which he undertook to address. Couple this with the fact

that the credibility of the testimony on behalf of The Peo-

ples Natural Gas Company was nil and irrelevant in its

effort to uphold what it had alleged in its answer in

response to petitioner’s complaint.

INCLUSION BY REFERENCE IN THIS MOTION

9. The petitioner hereby includes by reference the alle-

gations of the attached complaint filed by the petitioner in

the Federal District Court in Pittsburgh as though such

allegations were set out in full herein.

CONCLUSION

10. The abuses of the Pennsylvania Utility Commis-

sion reflected by the record in this case should be

addressed by the Commonwealth Court in its capacity as

monitor of agency action and should, upon its own

motion, undertake a study of this particular case before the

PUC due to allegations made by the petitioner relating to

the hearing of November 5, 1984, that the Gas Company

(PNG) witness testified falsely and may come under Title

18 Pa. C.S.A. Sect. 4902 or 4903.

Respectfully submitted,

WILLIAM B. RICHARDSON

149 Westmoreland Avenue

Greensburg, PA 15601

A-8

I hereby certify that I am by first class mail postage

pre-paid serving a true and correct copy of this MOTION

IN OPPOSITION TO DISMISSAL upon the Pennsylva-

nia Public Utility Commission, the Attorney General of

Pennsylvania, The Peoples Natural Gas Company, and the

United States District Court for the Western District of

Pennsylvania on April 8th, 1986, addressed as follows:

Goria A. TISCHUK, Esquire Clerk of Court, U.S.

Deputy Attorney General District Court

564 Forbes Avenue U.S. Post Office &

Pittsburgh, PA 15219 Courthouse

Pittsburgh, PA 15219

TERRYL A. MORELAND, JEFFREY G. Brooks, EsQuire

ESQUIRE ECKERT SEAMANS CHERIN

Pennsylvania Public Utility |& MELLOTT

Commission 600 Grant Street, 42nd FI.

P.O. Box 3265 Pittsburgh, PA 15219

Harrisburg, PA 17120

A-9

In THE

United States District Court

For THE

Western District of Pennsylvania

WILLIAM B. RICHARDSON, 7

Plaintiff

vs

GERALD A. WILSON, Customer’s

Service Foreman and his employer,

PEOPLES NATURAL GAS CO.;

JOSEPH FARRELL, Director, Bureau of

Consumer Services and his employer,

PENNSYLVANIA PUBLIC UTILITY

COMMISSION; the Administrative

Law Judge, JAMES D. PORTERFIELD;

and SARA J. COHICK, Consumer

Service Representative. ;

Civil Action

No. 85-2641

COMPLAINT

1. The jurisdictional statutes are Title 28 USCS Sect.

1331 and Title 28 USCS Sect. 1343(1)(2)(3) and relevant

Title 42 statutes, if any.

2. The defendants have, purposefully and intention-

ally and acting under color of law, conspired to manipulate

a situation whereby the plaintiff must, at his expense, make

alterations in the service line into plaintiff's house which

breaches the original contract, does not enhance the gas

A-10

service in anyway, is contrary to law, and has been sup-

ported only by invalid evidence including lies, slander and

libel.

3. The defendants have, purposefully and iniention-

ally and acting under color of law, conspired to deprive the

plaintiff of his constitutional protection against the:

a. right to due process and equal treatment.

b. impairment of contract.

right of free association.

preservation of property and reputation.

a 9

e. Amendment I guarantee against vindictive or

unresponsive State action relative to a petition for

redress of grievance.

4. The defendant Administrative Law Judge for the

Public Utility Commission, purposefully and intentionally

and acting under color of law, conspired to deprive the

plaintiff of his due process rights by rendering an order

following a hearing on November Sth, 1984, in which the

plaintiff herein was complainant and the gas company was

respondent and which order was entered in the record

beyond the statutory time limit, it was also unresponsive to

the pleadings, unsubstantiated by the evidence, unsup-

ported by subject matter jurisdiction, reflective of an

unfair trial, and in violation of the plaintiffs Amendment |

right to petition for a redress of grievance.

5. The defendant Administrative Law Judge, purpose-

fully and intentionally and acting under color of law, con-

spired to deprive the plaintiff of his due process rights by

being neither neutral nor detached but displayed bias and

prejudice and acted on matters aside from the matters put

pneneeenaintateial

A-11

in issue by the complaint and answer, treated the gas com-

pany as though it was the Amendment I petitioner when

such is impossible, instituted “off the record” discussions

during the hearing designed to fortify the gas company’s

case, dismissed the plaintiffs complaint and instituted a

judgment order for the gas company in a form of relief for

it which was neither set out by way of complaint or in the

course of hearing and, in so doing, violated the right of the

plaintiff to pre-trial notice required to acquaint him with

the issues to be decided.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

A. That a jury be impaneled to try the cause for

damages.

B. That the plaintiff have $10,000.00 compensable

damages.

C. That the plaintiff have $10,000.00 punitive

damages.

D. That the plaintiff have such other or additional

award for his time, costs and expenses associated with the

State litigation as well as with this litigation along with

such other, additional or alternative relief as may appear to

the Court to be equitable.

WILLIAM B. RICHARDSON

149 Westmoreland Avenue

Greeusburg, Pennsylvania 15601