Motion — Montgomery v. Kaiser

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‘ Octrésen Taam 196%

Na. 328

JOHN MoNTGOMERY. 27 UL.

Appellants, [° »

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Vs.

Eryestive Kise. -> ou. ane

Appellees.

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On Appeai from -he levteer Strate: District Court

for the Nerrherr Durrree- o- Lalitornia

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Motion ww Affirm

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SUBJECT INDEX

Page

Questions Presented vcinssnashtsawpivitenasilialesiniiaeiumsnisiiesionoiiinccdcuies i

Statenient of the Case wo... jemincenidesatednidsbesmatassbetildisdsoes 2

Argument _secegecnscesessossenstecoevensesssoesosoeses , . 4

Tlie Three, Jude Court Below Correctly Found That the

California Maximum Grant Statute Violates the Equal Pro- er

tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Unite

States ‘Constitution OIE SNOOP Ce te 4

*

‘The Points Presented on Appeal by Appellants Are Not Sub-

_ stantial and Do Not Warrant Argtenent Before This Court. T--

Conclusion Siosealeuks Siocintttetaccsepasiteies oenideaeeaa cunts a. §

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.

- . .. TABLE OF a OETED

Cases Pages

FS. ee Guano Co, vy. ’. Virginia, 253 US. 412 ( 1920) sites 5

Green v. Dept. of Publie Welfare, 270 F, Supp. 173 (D. Del

MET): cubsecccesumapsioanababilasaiieeaihee are se -4

Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Ry v. Ellis, 165 US. 150 se ga dD.

Harper v, Virginia seared of Elections, 383 US. 663 (196) . 6

MeLaughlin’ v. Florida, 379 US. ER Se eS | (

Morey v. Douds, 354 US. tk ene ARE 5

"Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 ( 1966) spoeiies ae Be rs 7

ile v. Thompson, 294 U.S. 618 (1969) ........ ete enelaalicen 7

Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) ..... 6.

Seavrein | PS

California Welfare and Institutions Code: Section 11450

(a) PERE : : ; essescensensey 2, 4,8

California Welfare and Institutions Code Section. 11452... 2

California W elfare and Institutions Code Section 11205... ile | 6

42 U.S.C. Gection 601 ee RO TE eA A + 6

42 U.S.C. Section 602 (a) (7) wf piseran 3

42. USC, Section 602(a)(8)(A) (i ladies ies? eae Wass aecenes 3

42 v S.C. Section 2981(a) (1 ane RSA Re ee ‘

. CONSTITUTION

United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment ........... .- =

State REGULATIONS

California Publie Social Services Manual:

Seetion 44:11. 23. 24 . Nas a ea marae We 3

In the Supreme Court of the

United States _

Ocroser Term 1969

No. 828

' Jonn MontTcomeny, et al.,

| Appellants,

Vs.

ERNEstINE Kaiser, et al.,

oF - | , _ Appellees.

On Appeal from the United States District Court ae

for the Northern District of California .

‘Motion to Affirm

Appellees, pursuant to Rule 16 of the Rules of the

Supreme Court of the United States, move that the judg-

ment and decree of the District Court be affirmed on the

ground that the question raised by Appellants are without

substantial merit:

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

a Does the California maximum grant statute, Welfare

and Institutions Code Section 11450(a), violate the equal

2

protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when it

operates to deny to nearly half of the families on Aid to

Families with Dependant Children the ‘ninout of money

determined by Appellants to he necessary to meet their

minimal needs while allowing other AFDC families

amount to meet their total needs?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellees, the Plaintiffs below, are members of a-class '

of recipients of the Add to Families with Dependent

Children (hereinafter AFDC) whose basic financial needs,

as determined by Appellants, are not met because of the

restrictions of the California maximum grant statute Wel-

fare and Institutions Code (hereinafter W&I Code) Section

.11450(a) which was held unconstitutional below. Pursuant

to statutory mandate of California W&I Code Section

11452,1 Appellant Montgomery has issued “cost schedules”:

which list the dollar amounts nee essary to achieve “mini-

mum standards of adequate eare” for AFDC recipients

in California. However, during fiscal years 1967-68 -a

monthly bit rage of 368,800 AFDC xecipients (or approxi-

mately 47° of*the total) received welfare payments in

| dollar amounts less than those which had been established

as their minimal needs due to the operation of the statute

challenged herein. The remaining AFDC recipients, ap-

proximately 53% of the total, received their full needs.

Appellees represent those AFDC recipients in California

who receive or have received payments in amounts less

than their budgeted needs because of the operation. of

California’s maximum grant statute. Their respective. cir-

cumstances demonstrate the manner in which the statute

operates and affects the entire claas, as well as how it

‘J. The text of which is set forth in Appellants’ Jurisdictional

Statement Appendix B.

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se ee tin ae At Lt Ny al iit GE tlh ae eS

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affects two sub-classes contained within the entire class. .

Appellee Kaiser, whose case is typical of the principal —

class, has four children currently eligible for AFDC and ©

receives for them ahd herself an amount which is $37 per

month (or nearly $450 per year) less than the amount

which Appellant Montgomery has determined as minimal

for all of the family’s needs. In an uncontested affidavit

Appellee Kaiser pointed se that it would be difficult to

support her family on the amount established by the

cost schedule but since the amount is substantially less it

is impossible. Appellee Kaiser has stated that her children

are often deprived of food and clothing.

The remaining Appellees, and the sub-classes they repre-

sent, demonstrate more specific patterns of denial caused

by the challenged provision, Appellee Williams, a repre-

sentative of the first sub-class, had the usual needs listed

in the cost schedule, and as required by federal law? and

state regulations*® was also entitled to an additional AFDC

allowance for her work training expenses for child care and

transportation. In January, 1968, these amounts totalled

$212. Under the maximum limitation set by the W&I Code

Section 11450(a), however, Appellée Williams received only

$148. She was thus foreed to use earnings, which under

the Economie Opportunity Act* and parallel California reg-

ulations® were to be exempted as a work incentive, to meet

needs which for cther more fortunate AFDC families are

met by theit walfare grants. In some months even those

earnings were insufficient and Plaintiff Williams suffered

2. 42 USC Section 602(a) (7)

3.. California Publie Social Services Manual, Section 44-113.233,.

et seq.

4. 42 USC Section 2981(a)(1). This provision was subse-,

. quently incorporated in modified form into the Social See urity Act

by 42 USC Section 602 (a) (8) (A) (ii). .

>. 5. California Publie Sociatper rv ie es Manual, Section 44- 111. 23- .

24 (effective 7-1-68).

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an actual loss hecause of her efforts to beeome self support-

ing through her work training program.

Appellees Crosby, Howard, and Hood represent a second

subelass, that of large families. This is the group of persons

most severely discriminated against by the maximum grant

limitation, Appellee Hood is thie mother of eleven .children

whose monthly needs, according to Appellants’ cost sched-

ules, amount to $532. However, the maximum grant payable .

to a family of this size according to W&I Code Section

-11450(a) is only $399 which means that Appellee’s family

receives $133 per month less than the state considers neces-

sary to provide clothing, food, she Iter and other essential

items. Appellee’s Howard family of thirteen children, and

Appe ‘Hlee’s Crosby’s house hold of ten children suffer similar

depr ivation.

The case. is before this Cou on the appeal of John

Montgomery, et’ al., who seek to reverse the decision. of .

the -three judge panel, one: judge dissenting, which pre-

liminary enjoined enforeément of California’s W&I Code

‘Section 1145 10(a) because it created arbitrary and irrational

distinctions among AFDC: recipients to the deprivation. of

these plaintiffs and their class, Appellants applied for and

secured a Stay below of the Preliminary Injunction pending

decision of this Court.

ARGUMENT =

The Three Judge Court Below. Correctly Found That the California

Maximum Grant Statute Violates the Equal Protection Clause

of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Consti-

tution.

The three judge court below, one judge dissenting, cor-

rectly determined that California’s s W&I Code Section

11450(a) violates the equal protection clause of the Four-.

teenth Amendment of the United States Constitution be-

‘ause it creates arbitrary and irrational classifications

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which: bare no relationship to the purpose of the statute.®

In its opinion the court stated:

“The defendants have not claimed that the lines

drawn by Section 11450(a) are rational. Nowhere

has the state set forth a plausible explanation. why

the needs of the one AFDC recipient are fully met,

while the needs of another recipient are: not. [f the

purpose of the aid limitations is to reduce state ex-

penditures, there are methods by which the state could

- accomplish that objective without discriminating

among AFDC recipients. The present scheme penal-

izes some recipients but not others on the basis of

circumstances which are beyond the control of the

recipients and have no rational relationship to the

purpose of the AFDC program. Section 11450(a) con-

sequently denies to the burdened class of AFDC 1

cipients equal protections ofthe laws and i is there aa

unconstitutional. TE it

It is well settled that the equal protection clause forbids

arbitrary classifications by state statutes and requires that

any state statutory discriminations be based on differences

reasonably related to the purpose of the act. Gulf, Colorado

& Santa Pe Ry v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150 (1896) 32S. Royster

Guano Co. v. Virginia, 203 U.S. 412. (1920) ; Morey v. Douds,

dot U.S. 457 (1957); WeLaughlin ev. Florida, 319-ULS, 184

(1964). Moreover, where a fundamental right, as-in this

6. The court also correctly pereeived that the California statu

tory increment of $6.00 per child did not distinguish the California

statute from those provisions elsewhere which impose absolute ceil

ings on the amount of aid to a family since:

“The minimal $6 inerement does not close the gap between

child need as ealeulated by defendant Montgomer v and actual

aid for large family children, while children trom smaller

families may receive suflicient aid to cover their caleulated

needs.” Cf. Page 8, Appendix A, Appellants’ Jurisdictional

Statement. .

7. Cf. Page 7, Appendix A, Appellants’ Jurisdictional State

ment,

case—the right of survival, is asserted, the proper stand-

ard to be used in determining whether a state statute

Violates the equal protection clause is that of “close seru-

_ tiny.” Harper v, Virginia Board of Elections, 383 US.

663 (1966); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942),

ee Appellants concede that the purpose of the AFDC pro-

gram is fo furnish financial assistance to needy dependant

children and their-families “to help maintain and strengthen

family life and to help such parents or relatives to obtain

or retain capability for the maximum self support and -

_personal independance” 42 USC Section GOLS Under this

: mandate, and pursuant to State Law W&l Code Section

11452, Appellant Montgomery adopted cost schedules in

which ‘he determined the minimum needs of family units

for vital items such as food, shelter, clothing, transporta-

tion, ete., and in which he quite reasonably determined

that these néeds vary according to the number, age, sex,

and county of residence of the members of the recipient

family. . |

However, actual payinents to AFDC recipients do. not.

vary according to these factors. The statute in question

limits the amount that an AFDC family may receive solely

on the basis of the number of children in the family and

drastically decreases the permissible allotment -per child

as the family size increases.” Thus an extra $49. per month.

is allowed by the maximum. grant statute to meet food,

clothing, and other needs for the third child of a family,

while only $6 per month is allowed fo meet the same need

for the tenth child” In other Words, a child in a darge

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8. The parallel state provision is California W&I Code Section

11205.

%. Cf. chart at Page 3, Appellants’ Jurisdictional Statement.

10. ; It*should also be noted the $6 monthly allowance alloted for

all needs is less than one-third ‘of the amount Appellants’ schedule

as necessary for food alone ($19.10 per month).

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family would benefit economically if he were removed from

his family and placed in_one of sinaHer size—despite the

Caproess statutory purpose that payments strengthen family

life.

Less blatant but equally invidious consequences occur

in those California families of all sizes which ar®affected

by the maximum grant. Every such family is deprived

Pe some <ssentials of life while other AFDC families are

©

given fumds to meet their needs. Appellant Montgomery

admits that.statistically 47% of the AFDC recipients in

-Californi& are discriminated against by the challenged stat-

ute while the rm mainder ef the AFDC recipients have their

full ‘newts net. When faced with the uncontested facts,

the lower « art_of necessity found’ that there were no ra)

tional bases for the discrimination which results from opera-

tion of the California maximum grant statute, and that the

Statate was th refore unconstitutional. |

The Poiimts Presented on Appeal by Appeliants Are Not Substantial

- aad Do Not Warrant Argument Before This Court.

Appellants argue that the discrimination inherent in the

Maxine rant statute is justified by the need of the State

to presery+ funds. This argument has repeatedly been re-

jected by ‘this Court. “The saving of welfare costs cannot

be an imdependant-ground for an invidious classification.”

Shapir Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). Even when con-

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setwation ©? pubhe funds is a statute’s primary purpose,

such a statote may not discriminate arbitrarily. Rinaldi v.

Feager. 334 US. 305 (1966); Green iv. Dept. of Public Wel-

re. “OO FL Supp 173 (D. Del. 1967). oe

Lppe ‘: ention that the statute provides the same

acum srant Nimit for each family of the same size’ is,

at course. trae, fut entirely beside the point. The classifi-

catiog Wilch Plaintiffs contend is’ arbitrary -and irrational

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is that created between families of different sizes. Appel-

lants bare made no attempt-whatsoever to justify this dis-

erimima tad. Fypally irrelevant is Appellants’ contention

‘that the state need not guarantee that each family will

reveive the amount of its state estimated needs. Appelle&

have 2oo Ta:sed that contention‘in this case. The point con- |

tested teiow is the inequitable distribution ‘of payments

whieh are’ made in a fashion which permits some families

re. Pp

to Teveire their state determined needs while others do not.

Appelkes have asked, and the three judge panel has or-

Jered. omty that all families be treated equally.

4 farther claim ef Appellants that the maximum grant

Lmitatiems are rational because “there must be some in- -

sencive Zor welfare recipients to seek employment.” (Juris-

tetas. Statement, Page 10) 1s equally without merit.

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tums omiy where there is an employable | person in’ the

tamiv am whe ma an. inducement to seek-employment might

de relevant. Tt aff ects employables and unemployabies alike

—omsegmentty the work incentive rationale must be sum-

marcy cismossed as making the statute invalid for over:

waciiac. However, more significantly, there are many pro-

cisions om the federal and California statutes relating to

pubis Assistance which specifically provide work j incentiy ves

;

for emmihi cable } ersons Who are receiving aid incuding, ‘

Que. Thase provisions which the maximum grant ae-

oe

cray thwarwd as a work ingentive in the case of Appellee

Waa. WAT Code Section 11450(a) is in no wavy ration-

ay mboed To these statutory schemes and work incentive

Tal Vis, e

The Cuctormia maximum grant does not operate to limit °

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a Fd ee ed i

Bp

SSMS LUSION

In conclusion, Sopeilunns hive raised no substantial:

questions which warrant Suties argument of this case. We

respectfully submit <hac <1 .judrment and decrees of the

three judge panel, one jie dissenting, should be affirmed..

“Because a.Stay of the Ttrelminary Injunction’ has been

granted by the three inte enurt and the Appellees are:

suffering irreparabie nau by the continued operation

of the statute in qnescum, Armless respectfully request

that this motion to aifirm speedily granted. | ‘

Taomas L. Free,

CEERIE “4 GAINES S, 7

ost .- Attorneys for Appellees.