Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Bradley v. School Board of Richmond

Supreme Court brief1965

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RY ments" ¥:. e Office-Supreme Court, U.S.

ae COURT, Goa “FILED —

AUG 2 1965

Ly THE . - JOHN F. DAVIS, CLERK |

Supreme Court of the United States

OcTOBER Term, 1965 ;

_Carotyn Brapiey, et al, .

Petitioners,

—— ;

Tue Scuoot Boarp or THE City oF

_RicuMonp, Vireinn, et al.

PETITIGN FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

; UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT i

JACK GREENBERG ~

James M.:Nasrit, III |

10 Columbus Circle

New York, N.Y. 10019

' §. W. Tucker .

Henry L. Mars, III .

214 East Clay Street

Richmond, Virginia

Attorneys for. Petitioners

FARLEY Da EM

INDEX

. f*

Citations to Opinions Below | .

a. aE ae SINT i Aen Oe ee TO ae

~ Questions Presented

Statutes and Constitutional Provisions Involved .....::..

Statement ..... Peethee oh A ae

Reasons for Granting the Writ a os

I. The Richmond Pupil iaiiiiae: Plan; Viewed

in the Context of Continuing Faculty Segre-

gation and Other Favtors, Is Fundamentally

Inadequate ‘to Disestablish - he Segregated

System of Schools

. ee Segregation of Public School PE Vie-

lates the Fourteenth Amendment and Negro

PAGE

Pupils Are Entitled to Relief Against’ This _

Element of Segregated School Systems ..........

Conclusion aaa ie ate

“Appendix

| Memorandum of J uly 25, 1962 .

Opinion of May 10, 1963 ..

Memorandum of March 16, 1964

Order Dated March 16, 1964 hieliiiicsnanlegs aa

Opinion of April 7, 1965 eo ". 40a

Judgment Filed April 7, 1965 ... LI ROAR

Tasca OF Cases

eo Enka Corp. v. N. L. R. B,, 119 F. 2d 60 (aan

+» . Cir, 1941) . meh : eeSicccaes 25 |

“Anderson V. Martin, 375 U: S, 399 pinnate alchanis 23, 30. .

Augustus v. Board pf Public iain of Escambia |

_ County, 306 F. rakes (5th Cir. BN Areiaacanas 29 ©

| Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U. S. 31 ................... ma 5

Board of Public Instruction’ of Duval County V.

- Braxton, 326 F. 2d 616 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied,

-—~"377 U. S. 924 ES Se 17,28

Bowditch v. Buncombe Dunet Board of Ed, 345 F. 2d.

UD besa cncecthacaganiecielesrcamnsinienctonninoniaiints 16, 28

Brooks v. School District of City of Moberly, Mo., 267

. F.2d 733 (8th. Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U. S. 804 ae

Browder v. Gayle, 352 U. S. 903 . 26

_ Brown v. Board of nee, 347 .U. S. 483, 349 U.S. .

SU siassesiantsonisnancpasenhaceaincs ics “as....2, 6, 28, 25, 26,

. ae : 28, 34, 35

Brown. v. County. School Board of Frederick: County,

— F, 2d —— (4th Cir. No. 9825, May 24, 1965) .... 16

Bryan v. Austin, 148 F. Supp. 563 (E. D. S. C. 1957),

judgment vacated 354 U. S. 933 .. . 82

Bush v. Orleans Parish School Beard, 308 F. 2d 491

(5th Cir. 1962) atdeehie . 20

PAGE

~ Calhoun v. Latimer, 321 EB. 2d 302 (5th Cir. 1963), va-

_ eated and remanded- 877 Sf ee ee 27, 29°

Carson v. Warli¢k, 238 F. 2d 724 (4th Cir. 1956) viebieuaas 20

Christmas v. Board of Education of Harford County,

, - 231 F. Supp. 331 (D. Md. 1964) edn ahiecaaabiaaitbnbckci 29

Colorado Anti-Discrimination Commission ..v. Conti- unt

nental Air <a, 372 U. S. ie ER. 7 25

Dawson-v. Baltimore City, 350 SE, ae ER 26.

Dillard v. School Board of the City of Charlottesville,

308-F. 2d 920 1s Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 374 U. Ss.

EE AR er aS 2 Se RRR SOOO EET. 12

Dodson v. School Board of City of enn 289

rc Sa Pe EINE. IPOD citcceniactcsnicsrcestnsinnniainiccnnsenid omnes 20°

Dowell “v. School Board of Oklahoma’ City Public . :

Schools, 219 F. Supp. 427 (N. D. Okla. ee 29

‘Pranklin v. County School Board of Giles County,

‘Civil.No. 64-C-73- R, W. D. Va. June 3, 1965 _- siniaiea 29, 30,

Gilliam Vv. School Seas’ of City of Hopew ell, 345 F. 2d

I I a iittala. .28 ©

_Green v. School Board of City of Roanoke, 304 F, 2d

118: (4th Cir. 1962) .... icsssisitastishebaliaisnaesgelessaannin 20

Griffin v. Board of Supervisors, 339 F. 2d 486, (4th |

- Cir. 1964) Ieiacihahsaialadedinideeidouit daetia tliouin cae 28

Griffin v. School Board of Prince manene County, 377

U.S. 218 ii pecionanilseninbielaninsiatnanaes 26

Holmes ¥. Atlanta, 350 U. S. ae 26

iv’

| 3 PAGE

Jackson v. School Board of the City of Lynchburg, 321

F, 2d 230 (4th Cir. 1963) : 28

. Johnson v. Vinginia, 373 U. S. 61 ns nnnnseceenseneeneees e

‘4 Law srence v. Bowling Green, Ky. Board of Education,

~ Civil No. 819, 8 Race Rel. L. Rep. 74 - D. Ky. 7

4963) + TTD AE REREAD Store CO A SOO 29

Lowisiana v. United States, 380 U. S. BEF stem Ave 24

Manning Vv. Board of Public Instruction of Hillsborough

' County, Fla., Civil No..3554, 7 Race Rel. L. Rep. 681

a ee Ge ae 29

Mapp v. Board of Education of City of Chattanooga,

Sal

. 319 F. 2d 571 (6th Cir. 1963). ...... P 4 . @. .

Mason v. Jessamine County, Ky. Board of Education, _

Civil No. 1496, 8 Race Rel. L. Rep. 75 (E. D. Ky.

1963) i satiacannasisiieieiiiilanincinnienseiaion a

McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S, 637... 34

Nesbit v. Statesville City Board of Education, 232 F.

Supp. 288 °(W. D. N. C. 1964), vacated 345 F. 2d 333. _

(4th Cir. 1965) ..... , sidiipaiendinniisinatia a

N. L. R. B, v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock

ag BOB ON nnninnieniansessesesseeneeenepseninsenennnsnennes 24

Northcross v. Board of Education of Memphis, 302

F. .2d 818 (6th Cir. 1962) ) 20

Northcross. v. Board of Education of Memphis, 333

F. 2d 661 (6th Cir. 1964) oa : ~ 29

Peterson v. Greenville, 373 U. S. 244 2... nee < ae

Price v. The Denison Independent hool District,

— F. 2d —— (5th Cir. No. 21,632, July 2, 1965) .... 17.

Poa

; PAGE

' Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479 eee CE EEE a ce

Singleton v. Jackson. —— oe School Dis-

1965 A Grek RAE 19

Sperry.Gyroscope Co., ee. v. N; L. R. B., 129 F. 2d 922

(2nd Cir. 1942) . a =a 25

Tillman v. Board of Instruction. of Volusia County, .

Florida, Civil No. 4501, 7 Race Rel. L. me well

(S. D. Fla. 1962), ..... eds 29)

Turner v. Memphis, 369 U. S. 350 2 esceccecseegioneenee, 26

United States v. Crescent Amusement. Co., 323 U.S.”

panna reese. : 24

Wheeler v. Durliam City Board of Education, ——

F. 24 — (4th Cir, No. 9630, June 1, 1965) ..........16, 28

. _ Starurss i

Ala. Acts 40, 41, 1956 1st Sp. Sess. aa a

Ala. Acts 239,.361, 1957 Sess. ........ Fae ee 32

Code of Va., 1950 (1964 Replacement Vol. ), 422. 205 . . 27

Code of Va., 1950 (1964 Replacement Vol.), $2207 .... 28

F..R. Civ. Proe., Rule 23(a) .. nail on

* La. Acts 1956, Acts 248, 249, 250, 252 inn ' 32 -

S. C. Acts 1956, Act 741, repealed by, ‘Act 223 of 1957 .... 32

28 U. 8. C. $1254(1) . ; \ “ee §

PAGE

ee nc Oi... ene cee Le

ee ee aa a

42 U.S. C. $§1981, sacha SAR oes Uist at ORE -:

42 U. S.C. A. §2000d ” NEAR TNE OO kk: 16, 17, 33, 34

‘OTHER. AUTHORITIES

1960 hie of Population, Vol. 1, “Characteristies of”

the Population,” aur I, U.S. Summary Table 230 .... 32

110 Cong. Recs 6325 (daily ed: March 30, eS ES

General Statement of Policies Under Title Vv I of the

Civil Rights Act.of 1964. Respecting Desegregation

.of Elementary and Secondary Schools, HEW Office

of Education, April 1964 ot. ...17, 18, 24, 33, 34

Lamanna, Richard A. “The Negro Teacher and Deseg-

regation”’, Sociological Inquiry, Vol. 35, No. 1, Winter

1965 . istic dhecinpielnetiaataeanamiicand pietimtineeicn | a

Research Division—National Education Association,

Teacher Supply and Demand in-Public Schools, 1965 —_-

(Research Report 1965-R10, June 1965) .................... . 8.

Southern Education Reporting Service, “Statistical |

Summary of School Segregation—Desegregation in

the Southern and Border States”, 14th Rev., Nov.

1964 ...... onotee seeneteneneinereanee “10, 23, 30, 31

: Ty THE

| Supreme Court of the Huited Stites.

Ocrossr. Term, 1965

Carotyn Brab ey, e¢ al.,

Petitioners,

—V.— |

° . THe ScHoou Boarp or THE City OF

RicuMonp, VirGini, et al.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

| UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT |

Petitioners pray that a writ of certiorari issue to. re-

view the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Fourth Circuit entered in the above-entitled cause

on April 7, 1965.

Citations to Opinions Below

‘The memorandum opinion of the District Court of July

25, 1962 (R. I-61)’ is unreported and is printed in the ap-

pendix hereto, infra p. la. The opinion of the°Court of

Appeals issued May 10, 1963 (R. I-76), printed in the ap-

' 4The record contains Volumes I to’ VI. Each volume begins with

a page numbered 1. Thus record citations herein are to the volume

and page numbér as move indicating Volume I, page 61.

pendix hereto, infra p. 9a, is reported at 317 F. 2d 429.

The District Court’s opinion of March 16, 1964 (R. 1-128),

appears in the appendix below at page 29a. The second

opinion of the Court of Appeals dated April 7, 1965 (R.

_ V-5), printed in the appendix p. 40a, fre, is reported at

345 F. 2d | o

’ Jurisdiction

The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered on

April 7, 1965 (R. V-36); appendix p. 71a, infra. Mr. Jus-

tice Goldberg on June 28, 1965, extended, the time for fil-

- ing the petition for certiorari until August 1; 1965.. The

jurisdiction of this Court js invoked under 28 U. S. C. See-

“tion 1254(1). }

Questions Presented

1. Whether the Richmond, Virginia school board’s “free-

dom of choice” policy is adequate under Brown v. Board of -

Education to disestablish the system of racial segregation

_ ereated by past compulsory pupil assignment policies in the

-eontext of a continuing practice of assigning all school .

teachers on the basis’of race in a segregated pattern.

2. Whether Negro pupils are entitled to demand a

prompt end to the school authorities’ practice of racially

segregating teachers by: assigning them on the basis of

race as a violation of the pupils’ right to attend a non-

discriminatory public school system. |

‘e

Statutes and Constitutional Provisions Involved

This case involves Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amend-

ment to the Constitution of an United States.

e | . Statement

This cause was filed i in the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Virginia September 5, 1961, by

petitioners, a group of Negro parents and children in Rich-

mond, Virginia, who sought injunctive relief against public

school segregation pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §1343 and 42

_ U.S. C. §§1981 and 1983. Petitioners sought. an injune-

tion against the Richmond school board and superintendent

and against the Virginia Pupil Placement Board, a state

agency with statutory responsibilities concerning the as-

signment of pupils. Petitioners: here seek a review of the

adequacy of the school board’s. desegregation plan which

was approved by the courts below. =

‘The complaint, brought as a class action under Rule

23(a), F. R. Civ. Proce., alleged, inter alia, that the school

authorities had not devoted efforts toward thitiating non-

segregation and bringing about the elimination of racial

_ discrimination in the public school system and that they

had not “made a reasonable start to effectuate a transition

to a racially non-discriminatory system...” (R. I-11)..

2 The cae also alleged “Federal Question” jurisdiction

under 28 U. C. §1331. ‘ .

- Pw

The complaint as ‘amended’ requested‘an order requiring

admission of the 11 minor petitioners in specified all-white

schools and also general injunctive relief against the segre-

- gated systenv and discriminatory practices. It included a

" request that the defendants be required to submit to the

court'a desegregation plan as well as periodic -reports of

their progress in effectuating a transition to a racially non-

discriminatory school system (R. 1-36-37). Petitioners also

‘sought attorneys’ fees. The defendants generally denied

that petitioners were entitled to relief; the Richmond offi-

cials contended that sole responsibility for placing pupils

was in the hands of the defendant Pupil Placement Board

_(R. 1-53,'55).

July 23, 1962, the case was tried before Hon. Sohn D.

- Butzner, Jr.,* and on July 25, 1962, Judge Butzner filed

an opinion (R. I-61) and entered an. injunction (R. I-71)

against the defendants requiring the admission of ten’ peti-

tioners to white schools,’ but refusing any general injunc-

tion against discrimization. ; amen

Although all, of the petitioners were thereby admitted to

. white schools, they appealed the refusal to enter general

injunctive relief and to require a desegregation plan. The

Fourth Cireuit (Judge Bryan dissenting) reversed and re-

manded, directing entry of an injunction against the dis-

a ac aical and indicating that the school board

. Followi ing motions: to dismiss the original complaint (R. 1-15,

20) the complaint was amended January 4, 1962 (R. 1-26). "The -

amended complaint alleged facts concerning ‘the applications of the

individual plaintiffs’“admission to specified schools.

+The transcript of the trial of July 23, 1962, is Vol. II of the

record.

5 The remaining infant petitioner had been admitted by the

school authorities dial to the hearing.

ss ;

shotld be encouraged to submit a more definite plan for’

termination of the discriminatory system (317 F. 2d 429,

May 10, 1963). The majority opinion eontains a detailed

factual statement describing the segregated operation of

the Richmond schools, and the limited first steps which had ~

departed from total segregation. - It referred to earlier

school segregation litigation in Richmond from 1958 to

1961 culminating in the admission of 1 Negro to a white

school by an order of Distriet Judge Lewis, refusing -any

class relief and dismissing the prior case from the docket.*

The Court of Appeals concluded that it found “nothing to :

indicate a desire or intention to use the enrollment or as-

signment systems as a vehicle .to desegregaté the schools”

and that the tefusal to enter an injunction left. the defen-.

dants “free to ignore the rights of other applicants” for

nonracial assignments. ei 7

When the present case commenced ‘in September 1964 ~~~

7 Richmond had-41,568- children (17,777 white and 23,791

Negro)’ attending 61 schooJs.* Only 37 Negro children were -

® The Court of Appeals’ description of the prior case is in 317 F.

2d at 432, n..3, 435. The prior suit, Warden v. School Board of °

City of Richmond (E. D. Va., July 5, 1961), unofficially reported

6 Race Rel. L. Rep. 1025, was filed September 2, 1958; by Negro

pupils who had been denied admission in two white schools. As

the Fourth Circuit obser¥ed, the school board converted the White

school which most of thé plaintiffs sought to enter to a Negro

school by transferring out its white students and faculty and mov-

ing in Negro students and faculty. A_single remaining plaintiff

who sought transfer from a Negro school five miles from her home

to a white school in her neighborhood finally obtained admission

by the court order entered July 5, 1961, three years after her

original application. (School Board Minutes pertaining to the 1958

events described are Pl’s Exhibits 16 and.17 in the present record.)

7 Pl’s Exhibit 8, Depositions of Willet, et al. p. 8 (hereinafter

cited’as Deposition). ‘a

8 (R. 1-43-44.) : \

assigned with whites at three schools (R. 1-45-46). The first

desegregation had begun in the 1960-61 term with 2 Negroes

in white schools. Judge Butzner’s opinion described the

manner in which pupils were initially placed in schools and

promoted from one to another on the basis of race through

use of dual overlapping attendance areas for Negroes and

whites. It also described the discriminatory application

of transfer criteria to those Negro pupils. who actively

sought admission to white Schools (R.. 1-62-64, 66-68). Al-

though the local school board professed not to have assign-

‘ment power, it continued to maintain’dual attendance areas |

adopted before the Brown decision which governed an esti-

mated 98% of the children who were placed routinely by

the Pupil Placement Board in accord with the locally estab- .

lished: pattern. Thé routine placement of Negroes in all-

Negro schools was sought to be justified at the trial by the

authorities. on the theory that Negroes preferred segrega-

tion. Chairman Oglesby: of the Placement Board testified

(R. 11-54-55) : :

Normally, I would sat fully 99 per cent of the Negro

_ parents who are entering a child in First Grade prefer

_to have that child in the N egro school.

| * ‘ * * * *

And it is true that in general there will be two schools

“that that child could attend in his area, one white and

one Negro, and we assume that the Negro wants to go -

to the, Negro school unless he says otherwise, but if he

says otherwise, he gets the other school.

Pupils who sought transfers out of the zones were judged

- by the Pupil Placement Board’s transfer standards. This |

involved, the court found, the rejection. of Negro transfer

applications on academic and residence standards not ap-

_ plied to white pupils routinely enrolled in the same schools

. (R...1-65-68).

Richmond: pupils had been assigned to re on the

basis of separate pina atteridance areas for Negroes 7

-and whites for many years.° Maps indieating the location

of schools and the ‘areas. for the high- schools (Pl’s Ex. 5),

junior high- schools. (Pl’s Ex. 6) and elementary schools

~(PI’s Ex. 7) were introduced in evidence. Plaintiffs. also.

introduced school-census data showing that Negroes and

whites lived in the same neighborhoods in many sections

‘of the City: ‘ale

The faculties in the white pupil schools were all white,

and the scliools with Negro students had all Negro teachers

(Deposition 13). The school board’s Rules and Regulations

describe the personnel policies and procedures (PIl’s Ex: 1

at p. 28):

2. Assignment of ‘Employees.

_ Each employee of the school board shall ie assigned

to a specific position by and under the direction of the

- superintendent of schools and may be transferred to

any other position for which qualified.

® Testimony at pp. 27-28 illustrates the epetetion of the over-

lapping zones, where white pupils and Negroes in the same areas

attend different schools.

- See generally R. IT-12-24 ‘anes PI's Exhibits 12- 15.

Exhibit 14, a plastic overlay, indicates the number of white and

Negro pupils by age group in each section of the City, and can be

- compared with the school attendance areas when placed over Ex-

hibits 5, 6 or 7..

3. Transfer of ‘employees.

Transfer may be made by the superintendent on his

own authority or at the request of the employee for

any purpose which in the judgment of the superin-

tendent is for the welfare « the employee or the .

schools.

A statement of “Richmond Public Schools Administrative

Policies” (attached to Pl’s Ex. 1) indicates that the respon-

sibility for personnel selection is shared by the administra-

tion, Personnel Department and the school principal or

department head ‘concerned. Teachers in Richmond are

le .

given ten month contracts, serve a two year probation

when first employed, and thereafter usually have continuing

‘contracts which are renewed unless they are notified to

‘the contrary by April 15th of each year. (See Pl’s Ex. 1,

Rules and Regulations, Ch. VI, pp. 24-31.)

The evidence showed a pattern of severe overcrowding

in Negro schools and under-ufilization of white schools. 4s -

the Court of Appeals observed (317 F. 2d at 435),.the

authorities had not dealt with overcrowding by assigning

‘Negro pupils to schools with white children which had

available space in the same areas (R. II-32). Instead, they

built new schools for Negroes and converted white schools .

to all-Negro schools (ibid:): At the time of the trial 90

_ Negro children had been granted transfers to white schools

_ for the 1962-63 term in addition to-the 37 enrolled during

the 1961-62 year (R. II-77- 78).

After’ the Fourth Circuit remanded the case the district

court entered an order June 6, 1963, enjoining the defen-

dants from refusing the admission of any pupil to any

‘public school on the basis of race, from assigning pupils

on the basis of dual overlapping zones, from assigning

pupils on the basis of race upon promotion from one school

to another, and from conditioning -the grant of transfers _

on the.applicants’ submission to futile, burdensome or dis-

criminatory procedures (R. I- 97- 98). The court also invited

the defendants to submit a desegregation plan, and stipu-

lated that the injunction would be superseded by an ap- |

proved plan (R. I- 98).

On July 11, 1963, plaintiffs aes for further injunctive

relief challenging the school board’s .action in assigning

- pupils for the forthcoming term in accord with a resolution

_the board had: adopted March 18, 1963 (R. I-100). ‘At the

hearing on this motion on July 29, 1963 (R. Volume III),

the school board filed ‘its March 18, 1963 resolution and

requested that the court approve it as a plan of desegrega-

tion (Defendants’ Ex. 1 and la). The full text of the resolu-

. tion is set out in the margin”

oe “Whereas, the eisai School Board has been advised by

special counsel and the City Attorney that in order to comply with

the decision of the Federal District Court.in the case of Bradley

v. The School Board of the City of Richmond and the State Pupil

Placement Board, the school attendance areas prev iously- estab-

lished for .white and Negro schools may. no longer be used in the

assignment of pupils.

’ “Now, Therefore, be it Resolved as follows:

“(a) Recommendations for :assignment of pupils seeking

enrollment in the -publie school system for the first time or

’ jnitial enrollment in the junior or senior high schools shall be

made upon consideration ofthe distance the pupils live from

such schools; the capacity. of Such school ; availability of space

in other schools ; whether the \program ‘of the pupil can be

met by such school ; the school preference as shown on the

pupil placement application form; and what i is * deemed to- be

in the best interest of such pupil.

“(b) The school administration shall recommend that pupils

be assigued to the schools which they attended -the preceding

At the hearing the superintendent testified that for the

then forthcoming 1963-64 term dual attendance zones. had

-been abolished and no new zones were adopted (R. ITL-6, 8);

that all pupils entering school were required to apply for a

specific school (R. III-8) ;. that every child finishing: the °

top grade in elementary school or junior high school was

required to choose a school (ibid.) ; that no Negro applicant

to a white school was denied admission (ibid.); that the

only criteria applied thus far were school capacity (but this

~ had not resulted in denial ofsany Negro application to a

white school) (R. IIJ-10) and a May 3lst deadline for

transfers (R. III-12); that pupils enrolled in a school con-:

tinued in that school unless they requested to move out or

reached the top ‘grade: (R. III-17-18) ; that a total of 239

“Negroes applied before the deadline and were admitted at

white schools -(148 finishing highest grade in school, 81 in

grades below top grade, 10 beginning school) (R. III-22).”

tes

year, except those eligible for promotion to another school.

However, application may .be made by “the parent, guardian

or other person having custody of such pupils for their place-

ment in another’ school named in the application in which case

the reason’ for the requested transfer should be stated.. The

sehool administration may recommend to.the Pupil Placement

Board that such application be approved if it be deemed to be

in the best interest of the pupil. ,

“(e) Applications for transfers to a particular school must

be mde and received by the school administration before

June 1 preceding the school year to which the placement

- requested is to be applicable.” (Defendant’s Exhibits 1 and

la.) 5 . &

‘ 12'No current figures on ‘Richmond- desegregation are in the rec-

ord. A published report ‘indicates that in November 1964 there

were 846 Negro children attending 13 schools with white children.

This represented about 3% of the Negroes in the system. Southern

Education Reporting Service, “Statistical Summary of School

_ Segregation—Desegregation in the Southern and Border States”,

14th Rev., Nov. 1964, p. 59. ne

After hearing this testimony the Court set dates for the

petitioners te-file exceptions to the plan as it had been

explained and indicated it would. schedule a further hearing

on thé proposed plan. — :

On August “22, 1963, plaintiffs. filed’ mangtions to the

plan attacking it as vague-and indefinite and conferring

absolute discretion on the school authorities to determine

’ assignments, and asserting that as the plan had no Specific

- school zones the plan “affords the Court no basis upon

which to appraise the practical inipact of an order approv- -

ing the plan or any part of it” (R. I-1i0-111). The -peti-

,tioners objected to the provision granting transfers. if:

“deemed to be in ‘the best interest of the’ pupil? and also

objected that the plan “omits any provision for the assign-

ment, or reassignment of teachers and staff- of the schools

-on a nonracial basis” saying they were ‘asserting “their per-

sonal rights to attend a school system in which there is no .

racial segregation or discrimination” (R. I-112).

September 9, 1963, plaintiffs filed a motion fora ne.

rary restraining order to require the admission at a white

high school of two:Negro pupils who had been denied trans-

fers on the ground that their applications were not received

before the deadline. The Court granted the restraining

' order on the basis of the prior injunction (R..I-123), and it

was subsequently made permanent (R. 1143-144).

On December 20, 1963, there was a further hearing on: -

' ‘the plan and on petitioners’ motion: for attorney's’ fees (R.

- Volume IV). By agreement prior. evidence was considered’

‘part of, the eviderice on the: ‘plan. The application forms

were vee in evidence ; ;* the superintendent indicated that |

- Sateade, the statewide Pupil Placement form (Def’s Ex. 3)

has no space designated for pupils te indicate*the school they désire

pupils other than those completing the last grade in a —

school were asked to state the reason they sought a trans-

fer. The superintendent stated that in 1963 there was one

instance in which about 40 or’50 white children applied

~ to a school that was overcrowded and “the parents were

consulted” but no one was “sent to a school ‘against his

~ will” (R. IV-10). Counsel for the Pupil Placement Board

advised the Court that that board approved the plan (R.

_ IV-19).

The a ra testified at the July hearing that the

school board’s purpose was to follow a “freedom of choice”

_ plan similar to the one in Baltimore, and that the boerd

had been guided i in this by a suggestion made by the Fourth —

Circuit’ in the Charlottesville™ case (R. ILI-7).

On March 16, 1964, Judge Butzner approved ’ the plan

and dissolved the injunction entered J une 6, 1968 (R. I-128).

The Court said’ that while the plan was framed in broad

language, it was valid as .it was being administered. and

interpreted; that the “best interest” criterion could not be

used to deny transfers or admission unless made more defi-

nite;.and that the school capacity criterion presented no

problem at present but that if the situation changed resi-

dential requirements must avoid discrimination. The Court

said that the absence of provision for faculty desegregation :

did not require ‘rejection of j a plan for the assignment of

2 fmm .

to, attend. But the sunerintendent testified that.all parents were

required to indicate the school they chose wien the child entered

. school or finished the highest grade in a school.

as Dillard v. School Board of the City of Chortottesvitte, 308 FL

2d 920, 923- 924: (4th Cir. 1962), cert. denied 374 U. S. 827.

On petitioners’ appeal the Fourth Circuit, en banc, ‘af-

firmed, with Judges Sobeloff and Bell dissenting in part —

(345 F. 2d .310; appendix 40a). The Court held that the

plan allowing “free transfers is an acceptable device for

achieving a legal desegregation of schools,” noting that

- the Court required “the elimination of discrimination from.

initial assignments as a. condition of approval of a free

_ transfer plan” and that “diserimination is eliminated as

readily by a plan under which each pupil initially assigns

himself as he pleases as by a plan under which he is in-

voluntarily assigned on a geographic system” (345 F. 2d

at 318-319). The court said thafthe board might have estab-

lished a single zone System for initial placements but that

“would have been a major task” and that eliminating zon-

_ ing was the equivalent of rezoning and “easier of accom-

-~ plishment” when the board intended to allow pupils to

choose schools i in any event: (zbid.). *

‘The Court held that the District Court did not hese its

discretion in declining to order staff desegregation, stating

that there’ was no inquiry “as to the possible relation, in

fact or in law, of teacher assignments to ‘discrimination

against pupils” or as to the impact of an order upon the

administration of the schools, and thus petitioners had not

“discharged the burden they must shoulder of showing that

such assignments effect a denial of their. constitutional

rights” (345 F. 2d at 320). The Court said, in part:

. Whether and when such an inqpiry is to be had are

matters with respect to which the District Court also

has a large measure of discretion. The Fifth and Sixth

. Cireuits have so held, and we agree. When direct,

measures are employed to. eliminate all’ direct discrimi-

14 :

nation in the assignment of pupils, a District Court

may defer inquiry as to the appropriateness of sup-

plemental measures until the effect and the sufficiency

of the direct ones may be determined. The possible

relation of a reassignment of teachers to protection of

the constitutional rights of pupils need not be deter-

mined when it is speculative. When all direct diserimi-

nation in the assignment of pupils has been eliminated, .

assignment of teachers may be expected to follow the’

racial patterns established in the schools (ibid.) (foot-

notes omitted). .

The Court affirmed the disallowance of counsel fees as

within the trial judge’s discretion saying that an award was

required “only in the extraordinary case” (id. at 321).

Judges Sobeloff and Bell concurred in approval of the’

freedom of choice plan but made their “concurrence tenta-.

tive on the assumption that the Resolution is an interim

measure only ‘and widl be subject to a full review and re-

appraisal at the end of the present school year, or cert@inly

not later than this*fall after the opening of the 1963-66

school term, when the results of two years of the Resolu-

‘ tion’s operation will be known” (345 F. 2d at 321). They

said that they were “not fully persuaded that the plan will .

be’ enough to enable the Negro pupils . to extricate them-

selves from the segregation which. has "long been firmly

established and resolutely maintained in Richmond” (id. at :

322), and that much depended: upon. the board’s. attitude,

which in the past had been that it had no duty “to integrate

a particular school or desegregate it” or “to promote inte-

gration.”

quires administrators of schools to proceed actively with

They asserted that “good daith compliance re-

their nontransferablé duty to undo the segregation which

both by action and inaction has been persistently perpetu- .

ated” (id. at 323).

J udges: Sobeloff and Bell dissented from the rulings con-

cerning staff desegregation, the dissolution of the 1963 in-

junction, and counsel fees. On the teacher issie they wrote

(id. at 324):

. The composition of the faculty as well as the com-

position of its student body determines the character

of a school. Indeed, as long as there is a strict sepa-

ration of thé races in faculties, schools will remain

“white” and “Negro,” making student desegregation .

more difficult. The standing of the plaintiffs to raise

the issue of faculty desegregation | is conceded.’ The

question of faculty desegregation was squarely raised

in the District Court and should be heard. It should

not remain in limbo indefinitely. After a hearing there

is a limited discretion as to when and how to enforce

the plaintiffs’ rights in respect to this, as there is in‘

respect to other issues, since administrative considera-

tions are involved; but the matter should be inquired

into. promptly. There is no legal reason why desegre-

gation of faculties and student bodies may not proceed |

simultaneously.

-16

Reasons for Granting the Writ

This case involves two of the issues of greatest current

concern in school segregation litigation’ throughout - the

..South, the question of the adequacy of so-called freedom —

of choice desegregation plans to disestablish patterns of

racial segregation created. by governmental compulsion in

the context of continuing faculty segregation, and the right

‘of Negro pupils to demand a prompt end of the practice of

assigning teachers on the basis of the race of@the pupils in

schools. Adoption of the Richmond plan and approval of

it by the Fourth Circuit has been emulated widely by

school districts and courts. At least four cases involving

comparable issues already have been decided by the Fourth

Circuit, and the views expressed in the Richmond case have

been reaffirmed.’ Indeed, the major new phenomenon in

school desegregation litigation is the sudden abandonment

of age-old normal schoql zoning-practices and adoption of

so-called free choice plans.

The issue ‘of faculty desegregation is .of transcendent

importance in thousands of school districts where teachers

are still assigned on the basis of race in-a segregated pat-

tern. The United States Commissioner of Education, as

authorized by Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,**

See, e.g., Bowditch v. Buncombe County Board of Education,

345 F. 2d 429 (4th Cir. 1965) ; Nesbit v. Statesville City Board of

Education, 345 F. 2d 333 (4th Cir. 1965) ; Brown v. County School

Boar@ of Fredcrick County, I’. 2d (4th Cir. No. 9825,

May 24,1965); Wheeler v. The Durham City Board of Education,

F. 2d (4th Cir. No. 9630, June 1, 1965).

16 Title VI conditions federal financial assistance on nondiscrimi-

nation. Act of July 2, 1964, P. L. 88-352, Title VI,°72 Stat. 202,

42 U.S. C. A. §2000d, et seq.

[ee oe

has adopted a rule requiring that all desegregation plans

submitted by districts receiving federal financial assistance

“shall provide for the desegregation of faculty and staff”

by making “initial assignments” nonracially and by steps

toward the ¢limination of teacher. and staff segregation |

resulting from prior assignments based’on race.” It is

important that this Court announce a similar unequivocal

position against faculty segregation practices to establish

a uniform rule for those distriets in litigation’ (and sub-

mitting court approved plans as the basis for federal aid)

and those submitting plaris to the Commissioner of Edu-

eation. The Congressional proponents of the Civil Rights

_Act of 1964 proceeded on the express assumption that the

Commissioner could require faculty desegregation. Intro- °

ducing Title VI, Vice President (then Senator) Humphrey

made express reference to a Fifth Circuit opinion requir-

ing faculty desegregation which this Court had declined

to review, saying: , : :

In such cases the Commissioner might also be Jus-

‘tified in requiring elimination of racial discrimination

in employment or assignment of teachers at least

where such-discrimination affected ‘the educational op-

portunities of students. See Board of Education v.

Braxton’ (326 F. 2d 616 (5th Cir. 1964) ].

This dées not mean that Title VI would authorize

a féderal official to prescribe pupil assignments, or to

** General Statement of Policies Under Title VI of the Civil.

Rights Act of 1964 Respecting Desegregation of Elementary and

* Secondary Schools, HEW, Office of Education, -April 1964, Part V.

' B(1) (cited hereinafter as General Policy Statement). This State-

ment is reprinted in the appendix to Price v. The Denison Indepen-

dent School District, F. 2d —— (5th Cir. No. 21632, July 2,

1965), and also in Southern School News, May 1958, p. 8.

| ee

select a faculty, as opponents of the bill have sug-

‘thority to adopt, with the approval of the President,

a general requirement that the local school authority

refraiit from racial discrimination in treatment of.

pupils and teachers and authority to achieve compli-

~ ance With that requirement by cutting off funds or by.

other means authorized by law. (110 Cong. Ree. 6325

(daily ed. Mareh 30, 1964) ) |

However, the prospect of federal administrative pres-

sure for faculty desegregation does’ not eliminate the

urgent need for a similar expression from this Court.

First, with respect to particular districts in litigation, the

Commissioner of Education has indicated that a “final

order of a court.of the United States” will be accepted in

licu of & plan submitted to the ageney (General Policy

- Statement, parts IILB and IV). Court orders finally ap-

proving plans which fail to contain basic provisions like

faculty desegregation will work to create conflict. As

Judge Wisdom of the Fifth Circuit recently wrote:

The judiciary has of course functions and duties

tinct from those of the executive department, but iff

carrying out a nationgl policy we have the same ob-

jective. There should be a close correlation, therefore,

‘between the judiciary’s standards in enforcing the na-

tional policy requiring desegregation of public schools

- and the executive department’s standards in admin-—

istering this policy. . . . If in some district courts

judicial guides for approval of a school desegregation

. plan. are more acceptable to the community or sub-

stantially less burdensome than H. E. W. guides, school

gested. The only authority conferred would-be au-- ... .

OO nthe,

19 ;

boards may turn to the federal courts as a means of

circumventing the H. E. W. requirements for financial

aid. (Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School |

' District, F. 2d , Oth Cir. No. 22,527, June 22,

1965.) 2

Second, with respect to general standards the Comniis-

sioner obviously will be guided to some substantial degree

by the, legal principles emanating from the courts. Judi-

cial declarations casting doubt on the necessity for faculty

desegregation might immeasurably impair and stir re-

sistance to the effective administration of the Commis-

sioner’s existing policy implementing the Act of Congress.

The Richmond Pupil Assignment Plan, Viewed in the

Context of Continuing Faculty Segregation and Other -

Factors, Is Fundamentally Inadequate to Disestablish

the aieearee System of Schools. |

Richmond’s plan for. assigning pupils, or rather, not

assigning them, to. schools is basically inadequate to effec-

tuate the constitutionally required transition of a racially

segregated school system to one operated without dis-

crimination. There is no question here of the right of a

school board in the abstract to allow pupils to choose their

schools. The question is whether adoption of a policy- pro-

viding for pupils to choose their schools is adequate. to

undo the effects of past wrongs; and discharge the duty

to eliminate a segregated system. Petitioners submit that.

a school board does not adequately discharge:-its affirma-

tive duty to initiate desegregation when, after years of

actively placing pupils in schools on a segregated basis,

“it adopts a “hands-off” attitude about pupil placements

while maintaining faculty segregation in the schools.

Richmond traditionally has placed pupils in schools by

the use of geographic attendance: areas, allowing pupils

‘choice in some situations between two schools in the same

| vicinity. Separate schools and attendance areas were main-

tained for Negroes. The totally segregated situation ex-

isting before, and for a number of years after, Brown v.

Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483, was entirely the w ork

of state agents. The authorities’ attempt to evade com-

pliance with Brown through grossly discriminatory appli-

cation of the Virginia Pupil Placement law is spread on

the record of this case, 4nd recounted in the first opinion

of the court below (317 F. 2d 429). In the era before the

courts finally denounced use of the “pupil placement laws”

to maintain segregation by initial placements based on

race and discriminatory t transfer procedures for those who

sought to escape segregation,”® segregationist: school boards.

widely proclaimed as the utmost wisdom a judicial declara-

tion that “[s]omebody must enroll the pupils in the schools.

They cannot enroll themselves; and we can think of na one

better qualified to undertake the task than the officials of

the schools’ and the school boards having the schools in .

charge” (Carson v.. Warlick, 238 F. 2d 724 (4th Cir. 1956) ).

' Faced with judicial condemnation of their pupil place-

ment schéme, and the knowledge that assignment ‘of chil-

18 See, for example, Green v. School Board of .City of Roanoke, .

304 F. 2d 118 (4th Cir. 1962) ; Dodson v. School Board of City of

Charlottesville, 289 F. 2d 439 (4th Cir. 1961); Bush. v. Orleans

' Parish School Board, 308 F. 2d 491, 498 (5th Cir. 1962); North-

cross Vv. Board of Education of Memphis, 302 F. 2d 818 (6th Cir.

1962).

dren by fairly drawn geographic areas in‘Richmond would

result in desegregation of a substantial number of schools

and the assignment of white children to Negro schools,’

the authorities have announced the principle of “free

choice.” They have’.done so fortified by the knowledge |

that social pressure will tend to preserve much of the

pattern # segregation, their theory that “99 per cent. of

the Negro parents . ... prefer. .-. the Negro school” (R. |

II-54), and ‘the continued practice of faculty ‘segregation

which proclaims the pattern the state ‘has struggled to

preserve, so that no one can mistake a “Negro school” or

a “white school,” 7

Faculty segregation is the key factor in the equation.

It racially identifies schools as effectively as a sign over ©

the door and enables the plan to offer parents a choice

between a Negro-faculty school-and a white-faculty school.

Continued faculty segregation obviously discourages whites

from attending Negro schools no matter how accessible or

convenient. The principal implication of segregation prac-

. tices, that Negroes are considered inferior and unfit to

associate with whites, is surely not lost on white parents

confronted with a school board policy which indicates by.

its very.existence that the race of teachers makes a dif-

ference and is something to bataken into, account in organ-

_ izing schools. Cf. Anderson v. Martin, 375 U. S. 399. Nor

is it lost on Negro parents that the school authorities are

moving only grudgingly under pressure, clinging -to ves-

tiges of the segregated system to make it clear that at least

as a gross proposition Negro pupils enter white schools

19 See the maps and overlays indicating the number of pupils i in

various Areas of the city discussed i in note 10, supra.

3 on ees ee

as unwelcéme aliens, and that. the school board will never

take the initiative to put. them there. Negroes know that

‘Negro teachers face a diminishing need for their. services

to the extent that Negro pupils choose desegregated schools

if. Negroes are excluded from the possibility of assignments

to teach white’ children. Teachers who are a significant

portion of the Negro leadership group are thus faced with

a cruel dilemma by the scinetvainantice

_ A basie effect of the free chdice plan—especially when

.- combined with, faculty segregation—is to perpetuate the s

all-Negro school. The board knows. that there are no ap-

plications by whites to attend Negro schools. It also knows

* that although initially white schools have the capacity to

absorb some Negro pupils in vacant seats, tat capacity

is finite and indeed very limited when compared with the

total number of Negro pupils. The promise to deal with

_ ° such an overcrowding by prescribing attendance zones or

some. geographic standard if more Negroes apply to a

white school than it can hold, is no complete answer. It

apparently ignores the ahlization of the school board to

prevent overcrowding in Negro schools by assigning Negro

pupils to nearby white schools with vacant space Sl

to provide an equal educational opportunity in both' schoo

The school board’s thedty that it will not force Negro:

children ‘to go to school with whites and that’ there is noth-

ing w rong with “voluntary” pupil! segregation, coupled

with mandatoty teacher segregation, runs afoul of its ob-.

ligation to provide equal — opportunity without

regard. to race.

The so-called freedom of f choice—joffta with staff seg- .

regation—plan represents a partial abdication of the school .

* 2

board’s duty to insure equal education by equal utilization

and allocation of available facilities. There is no evidence

to support, and good reason to doubt, the conclusion of the

eourt below that a free choice plan is “administratively, far

easier of accomplishment”: than a plan Of initially placing

pupils in schools. It is as reasonable to-think that large

numbers of transfers would make planning for the future

infinitely more difficult and complicated, and render useless

. the normal type of projections of school enrollments used

‘in school building plans and the like under the: previous

zoning system. (See Pl’s Ex. 2-the school board’s five

year projection of enrollments in each school from the

1962-63 to 1966-67 term. ) The projected administrative _

feasibility of the freedom of choice ,plan seems clearly

linked to an expectation that relatively few of the more

than 23,000 Negroes in the system will transfer to white

schools.

None of the above is intended to deny a school board’s

abstract, hypothetical, right to adept a free choice plan in _

other circumstances. The school board relies on the fact

that Baltimore used .such-a plan. As Judges Sobeloff and

Bell pointed out in their concurring opinion, Baltimore had

an entirely different official response.to the Brown decision.

than Richmond did. And Baltimore, which had free choice

before Brown, desegregated its faculties.°° The majority

below apparently rejects the suggestion of Judges Sobeloff

and Bell that the free choice plan cannot be properly ap-: .

praised until experience indicates how it works, and seems

20 “Statistical Summary of School Segregation—Desegregation,”

supra, p. 31, indicates Baltimore City had 2,052 Negro teachers in

desegregated positions.»

to decide that the method of allowing parents to choose

schools is unobjectionable per se and thus it does not matter

to what extent the method actually desegregates the school

system. It should be nofed that the Commissioner of Edu-

cation, while ‘indicating that freedom of choice plans as

well as other types of plans may be submitted to the Office

_ of Edueation, has serv ed advance noticé that actual per-

formance will be a test in ev aluating plans to determine

H# they ‘accomplish the purposes of the Civil. Rights Act -

(General Policy Statement, supra, part V. B.(6)), and that

periodic compliance reports will be required.

_ Courts of equity have in other circumstances required

‘wrongdoers to do more thian ceasé their unlawful activities

and.compelled them to take further affirmative steps to

. undo the effects of their wrdéftgdoing. This Court only re-

cently approved such a decree in Louisiana v. United States,

380 U.S. 145, 1 154, saying:

[T]he court has not es the power but the heey |

to render a dectee w hich will so far as possible .elimi-

nate the discriminatory effects of the past as well as

_bar like diserimination in, the future. —

z *s

Analogies exist under the Sherman Antitrust Act, where:

unlawful combinations ar& commonly dealt” with through

dissolution and stock divestiture decrees (see, é.g. United

States vy. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U. S, 173, 189, and

casés cited), and under the Tuticnal Labor Relations Act

where it was early recognized that disestablishment of an

employer- dominated labor organization “may be the only

effective way of wiping the slate clean and affording. the

employees an opportunity .to start afresh in organizing

.” (N. L. R. B. v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry

25.

Dock Co., 308 U. S@241, 250).** Similar equitable princi- .

ples should be applied here where the school board has

adopted the method of operation least calculated to extend

a deségregated education to large numbers of pupils.

II.

Segregation of Public School Teachers Violates the

Fourteenth Amendment and Negro Pupils Are Entitled

to Relief Against This Element of Segregated School

- Systems. -

‘The segregation of public employees by race plainly vio-

lates the Fourteenth. Amendment under principles settled

in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483, 349 U. S.

294, and the long line of cases applying the Amendment to

— all racial discrimination by the states.” Discrimi- .

21 See also American Enka Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 119 F. 2d 6b, 63

(4th Cir. 1941): In Sperry Gyroscope Co. Inc. v. N..L. R. B., 129

F. 2d 922, 931-932.(2nd Cir. 1942), Judge Jerome Frank compared

Labor Board orders requiring disestablishment of company-dom-

inated unions to “the doctrine of those cases in which a court of

equity, without relying on any statute, decrees the sale of assets,

of a corporation although it is a solvent going concern, because the

past repeated unconscionable conduct of dominating stockholders

makes it highly improbable that fhe improper use of their power

will ever cease’ (citing cases).

22 In a unanimous opinion this Court said :

“. . , [U]nder our more recent decisions any state or

federal law requiring applicants for any job to be turned away

because of their color would be invalid under the Due Process

Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Due Process and

Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.”

Colorado Anti-Discrimination Commission v. Continental Air Lines,

372 U.S. 714, 721.

See also, Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U. S. 61 (courtroom) ; ; Bailey

v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31 (transportation) ; Peterson v. Greenville,

‘ -

ne)

- oe"

nation in the hiring and assignment of public school

teachets surely violates the teachers’ rights. The defen-.

dants cannot seriously contend to the contrary. The only

possible justification for withholding relief is that peti-

tioners .who' are publie school pupils are not entitled to

invoke the aid of the courts to halt the admittedly ur lawful

‘practice. Petitioners submit that the unlawful practice is

elosely linked to their right under Brown v. Board of Edu-

cation, 349 U. S. 297, to have the district courts supervise

the effectuation of “a racially nondiscriminatory school

system” (349 U. S. at 301, emphasis added). The Court in

deciding the second Brown case, supra, pointed to admin-

istrative problems related to “the physical condition of the

school plant, the school transportation system, personnel,

revision of school districts and attendance areas into com-

pact units to achieve a‘system of determining admission

to the publie schools on a nonracial basis, and revision of

local laws and regulations . . . ”, as matfers to be considered

in appraising the time necessary for good faith compliance

(emphasis added). We believe that the Court plainly re-

garded the task as one of ending all discrimination in school

systems, ineluding discrimination in the transportation sys-.

tem, attendance districts or the other factors mentioned.

The delay countenanced by the “deliberate speed” doctrine -

was predicated on the assumption that dual school systems

would be reorganized. |

373 U. S. 244 (restaurant) ; , Turner v. Memphis, 369+U. S. 350

(airport restaurant) ; Browder v. Gayle, 352 U. S..903_ (buses) ;

Griffin v. School Board of Prince Edward County, 377 U. S. 218

(schools); Dawson v. Baltimore City, 350 U. S. 877 (municipal ae

beaches); Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U. 8. 879 scene golf

courses). ‘

27 . 4

The brief of the United States, as amicus curiae, in

“Calhoun v. Latimer, 377 U. 8. 263, argued in this Court |

ae 7 ere ha

Obviously, a public school system ‘cannot be truly non-

discriminatory if the school board assigns school per-:

sonnel on the basis of race. Full desegregation can

never be achieved ‘if certain schools continue to have

-all-Negro faculties while others have all-white faculties.

Schools will continue to be known as “white schools”

or “Negro schools” depending on the racial composi-

tion of their faculties. It follows that the school au-

thorities must take steps to eliminate segregation of

personnel as well as’ pupils. (Brief of the United

States, pp. 39-40.) | |

The Court in Calhoun vacated the judgment without dis-

cussion, of this issue. We submit that this case presents an

appropriate occasion to consider this question.

The record indicates the complete segregation of: school °

faculties and the general personnel policies of the school

system (see pp. 7-8, supra).. Virginia law, and the personnel

policies of Richmond, authorize the superintendent to as-

sign and reassign teachers and other staff serving the -

pupils. Code of Va. 1950 (1964 Replacement Vol.), §22-205.?*

*8 Section 22-205 provides: -

Assignment of teachers, including principals, by superinten-

dent.—The division superintendent shall have authority to

assign to their respective positions in the school wherein they

have been placed by the school board all teachers, including

‘principals, and reassign them therein, provided no change or

_ reassignment shall affect the salary of such teachers; ‘and

. provided, further, that he shall make appropriate reports and

explanations on the request of the school board. ;

Another Virginia law enacted in 1962, Code of Va. 1950

(1964 Replacement Vol.), §22-207, plainly encourages

teacher segregation by expressly authorizing teachers. to

terminate their contracts with school boards if pupils or

‘ teachers at their schools are desegregated.* This law,

plainly enacted in defiance of Brown, shows the ‘link be-

tween teacher and pupil segregation in segregationists’

thinking. |

-But the Fourth Circuit has not vista its disapproval of |

faculty segregation in any of the cases in which it has con-

sidered the matter”® and apparently has adopted the view

24 §22-207. Written contracts with teachers required ; termination

by teachers.—Written contracts shall be made by the school board

with all publie school teachers, éxcept those temporarily employed

as substitute teachers, before ‘they enter upon their duties, in #&

form to be presepibed by the Superintendent of Public Instruction.

_ Such contracts shall be signed in duplicate, each party holding a

copy thereof.

Every such contract hereafter entered into, whether or not

expressly provided therein, may be terminated by the teacher, by

notice in writing to the ocal school. board, at any time after both

white and Negro pupils shall have been enrolled, or both white and

Negro teachers shall have been employed, in the school to which

the contracting teacher is assigned. (Emphasis supplied.) '

(The second paragraph was added by a 1962 amendment; Acts of

Va. 1962, chapter 185.)

25 Faculty segregation was first considered by the Fourth Circuit

in Jackson v. School Board of the City of Lynchburg; 321 F. 2d

.230, 233 (4th Cir. 1963), where it held that a complaint, asking

for desegregation of a school system was sufficient to raise the

question. See also, Griffin v. Board of Supervisors, 339 F. 2d

486, 493 (4th Cir. 1964); Bowditch v. Buncombe County Board

of Ed., 345 F. 2d 329, 332, 333 (4th Cir. 1965); Wheeler v.

Durham City Board of Education, F. 2d (4th Cir. ,

No. 9630, June 1, 1965), and Gilliam v. School Board of - City of

Hopewell, 345 F. 2d 325 (4th Cir. 1965).

In the Fifth Circuit see: Board of Public Instruction of Duval

i v. Brazrton, 326 F. 2d 616, 620 (5th Cir. 1964), cert.,

: : 29

that faculty desegregation must depend upon some kind

of evidentiary showing by plaintiff Negro pupils that they

ave disadvantaged by the practice in the circumstances of .

the pagicular case. That is the onlyareasonable explana-

tion.for the Fourth Circuit’s repeated statements in cases

where the existence of faculty segregation is undisputed,

~ that there was insufficient showing that faculty segregation

was a denial of plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. The Fourth

- Cireuit apparently accepts the standing of pupils to litigate.

the question but demands that they prove that faculty

segregation is a discrimination against them—as opposed

to a discrimination against the teachers themselves.

“

denied 377 U. S, 924 (affirming a trial court order requiring a

faculty desegregation plan). See also Augustus -v. Board of Public

Instruction of Escambia County, 306 F. 2d 862 (5th Cir. 1962) ;

Calhoun v. Latimer, 321 F. 2d 302 (5th Cir. 1963), vacated and

remanded 377 U. S. 263.

’ The Sixth. Cireuit has twice held that it was proper for pupils

and their parents to raise the issue of segregation of teachers.

Mapp v. Board of Education of City y Chattanooga, 319 F. 2d

571, 576 (6th Cir. 1963); Norther Board of Education of

City of Memphis, 333 F. 2d 661, 666 (6th Cir. 1964).

Several other courts have discussed the question of segregation _

of teachers with a. variety of results. Brooks v. School District

-of City of Moberly, Mo., 267 F. 2d 733 (8th Cir. 1959), cert. .

denied 361 U. 8. 894 (1959) (teacher firing) ; Franklin v. County

_ Scool Board of Giles County, Civil No. 64-C-73-R, .W. D .Va.,

June 3, 1965 (same); Christmas v. Board of Education of Har-

. ford County, 231 F. Supp. 331 (D. Md. 1964) ; Nesbit v. Statesville

City Board of Education, 232 F. Supp. 288 CW. D. N. C. 1964),

vacated, 345 F. 2d 333 (4th Cir. 1965); Tillman v. Board of: In-

struction of .Volusia County, Florida, Civil No. 4501, 7 Race Rel.

'L. Rep. 687 (S. D. Fla. 1962) ; Manning v. Board of Public Instruc-

tion of Hillsborough County, Fla., Civil No. 3554, 7 Race Rel. L.

Rep. 681 (S. D. Fla. 1962) ; Lawrence v. Bowling Green, Ky. Board

' of Education, Civil No. 819, 8 Race Rel. L. ‘Rep. 74 (N. D. Ky.

1963) ; Mason v. Jessamine County, Ky. Board of Education, Civil

No. 1496, 8 Race Rel. L. Rep. 75 (E. D. Ky. 1963); Dowell-v. School

Board vf Oklahoma Osty Public sats 219 F. Supp. 427 (N. Dz

Okla. erent

fare ae

But, as Judges-Sobeloff and Bell have said, faculty segre-

- gation obviously makes student desegregation more diffi-

_ cult. To the extent that students or parents are given a

choice between schools, faculty segregation. encourages

them to make their choice on.a racial basis. The very exist-

ence of faculty segregation reflects the school authorities’

judgment that the race of teachers is significant and makes —

a difference. Cf. Anderson v. Martin, 375 U. S. 399. This

is obvious in the context of states'where school segregation °

_.has been defended vigorously by public officials for a decade

since Brown.

| Faculty segregation assures continuance of the prevail-

ing trend of one-way desegregation, i.e., movement of Negro

pupils to formerly white schools without any corresponding

movement of white pupils to Negro faculty schools.

Throughout the southeast part of the country there are few

exceptions to this brand of “desegregation” which leaves

the “Negro” school intact with an all-Negro ‘student. body

and faculty.” .If the established trend continues it may

have extraordinarily serious implications threatening the

jobs of large numbers of Negro teachers. They are not

assigned to teach white pupils and face the departure of

some Negro pupils to white-faculty schools, with a corre-

sponding decrease in demand for their services. A recent

decision by Judge Michie in the Western District of Vir-

ginia enjoined school authorities who discharged every

Negro teacher in‘a small ‘system when the schools desegre-

gated (Franklin v. School Board of Giles County, F.

26 See the comprehensive statistics published by the Southern.

Education Reporting Service in its periedic, “Statistical Summary.

of School Segregation—Desegregation in the Southern and Border

States,” 14th Revision, November 1964, passim.

‘*

Supp. ——, W. D. Va., Civ. No. 64-C-73-R, June 3, 1965).

Casesvfnvolving Negro teacher discharges coincident with

desegregation are pending in district courts in N orth. Caro-

lina, Texas and Oklahoma.

- The public importanee of the issue is illuminated perhaps

-by consideration of some societal factors involved. - It is

estimated that there are 419,199 white teachers and 116,028

Negro teachers in 11 southern states, 6 border, states (ex-

cluding Maryland) and the ‘District of Columbia.” In 1963-

64, Virginia public schools employed 31,443 white teachers

and 9,051 Negro teachers.” There were 733,524 white pupils

and 34,176 Negro pupils (total 967,700).*° Of 128 districts

with Negro and white pupils, 81 districts had at least one

Negro pupil in school with whites in November 1964, but

only five of those districts had Negroes teaching in school

with whites.* There was no faculty desegregation in Ala-

bama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi and South Caro-

lina.” One North Carolina district, 2 Florida districts, and

_ 7 Tennessee districts ‘had some faculty desegregation, and

one Arkansas district had a Negro supervisor of elementary

schools , but 4 Negro teachers in desegregated classes.**

-2t Southern Education Reporting Service, Statistical Summary

- of School Segregation- Desegregation (cited supra, note 12) (Nov.

1964), p. 2.

28 Td. at 59.

°° Ibid.

~ 80 Ibid. The summary reports: “Some Negro teachers are teach-

ing in schools with whites in Alexandria and Roanoke,.and in .

Arlington and Fairfax Counties. In Prince Edward County, nine

of the 68 teachers in the county's one high school _— three ele-

mentary schools are white.”

31 Td. at 2.

82 Td. at 8, 15, 39, 50.

There has been a prolonged national shortage of teachers

and the supply of new teachers does not meet the demand.**

This pattern holds true in Virginia.** The N. E. A. Re-

search Division conservatively estimates -the national

teacher turnover rate at 8.5 percent of teachers withdraw-

ing from teaching annually.**

Within the Negro community Negro teachers generally

are recognized as having a leadership role with a ‘compara-

tively high ecdénomic position,** but their potential ‘as

leaders. in efforts to promote desegregation of public facili-

ties and schools is limited by the vulnerability of their posi-

tion as employees of segregationist state agencies:*? Con-

tinued faculty segregation, posing the danger of discharge

a3 Research Division—National Education Association, Teacher

Supply and Demand in Public Schools, 1965 (Research sepert

1965-R10, June 1965), pe. .

*% Id. at 57.

35 Td. at 29.

36 According to the 1960 census ‘the median income for the non-

white family was $3,662, but the median for the non-white family

whose head was employed as an“‘elementary or secondary teacher

was $6,409 -(1960 Census of Population, Vol. I, “Characteristics

of the Population,” Part I, U. S. Summary, Table 230, pp. 1-611).

37 Tamanna, Richard A., “The Negro Teacher and Desegrega-

tion”, Sociological Inquiry, Vol. 35, No. 1, Winter 1965. Alabama

“has enacted 7 laws to permit firing of teachers who advocate de-

segregation (1956 Ist Sp. Sess., Acts 40, 41; 1957 Sess., Act 239,

361; 1961 Sp. Sess., Acts 249, 383, 443). Arkansas laws: prohibited

NAACP members from holding public employmént and required

teachers to list organization membership until Shelton v. Tucker, .

364 U. S. 479. A series of Louisiana laws provided for dismissal

of public employees advocating integration (La, Acts 1956, Acts

248, 249, 250, 252). Until challenged in, court South Carolina

barred public ‘employment of NAACP members (S. C. fActs 1956,

Act 741), repealed by Act 223 of 1957. See Bryan v. Austin, 148

F.- Supp. 563 (E. D. S. C. 1957), judgment vacated 354 U. S.

933. ° 2

of Negro teachers as Negro pupils go to white schools

where no Negro teachers are assigned threatens potentially

° ¢ ‘* ‘ . e

disastrous social consequences for one of the most impor- _

tant social and economic groups in Negro communities in

- the South.

Petitioners submit that faculty segregation per se vio-

lates the constitutional rights of Negro pupils because of

its inevitable tendency to impede desegregation of pupils.

In recognition of this the United States Commissioner. of

_ Education; implementing ‘Title VI of the Civil Rights Act

of 1964,°* has announced the following. ruling to all school

districts submitting plans for desegregation in order to

qualify for federal financial aid (General Policy Statement,

supra, Part V. B,):

_ 1. Faculty and staff desegregation. All desegrega-

tion plans shall provide for the. desegregagion of fac-

ulty and staff in-accordance with the- following’ —

ments: : Pag

a. Initial assignments. The race, color, or national

origin of pupils shall not be a factor in the assignment

to a particular school or class within a school of

téachers, administrators or other employees who serve

pupils. |

b. Seah pation resulting from prior discriminatory

assignments. Steps shall also be taken toward the

elimination of segregation of teaching and staff person-

nel in the school resulting from prior assignments

based on race, color, or national origin (see also, V. E.

4(b)):

88 42 U.S. C.-A. §2000d. -

The General Policy Statement also indicates that it will

' not, accept an “Assurance of Compliance” (HEW Form.

441) from any school system in which “teachers or other

staff who serve pupils remain segregated.” We submit that

the determination by the United States Commissioner of —

Education that faculty desegregation must be. included in

order for a desegregation plan to be “adequate to. accom-

plish the purposes of the Civil Rights Act” is entitled to -

- substantial weight. But beyond that ‘the Commissioner’s-

determination iniplements the clear intent of the Congres-

sional proponents of Title VI. See Vice President (then

Senator) Humphrey’s interpretation o Title Vi quoted

supra, pp. 17- 18.

‘The Fourth Cirenit has not indicated that ghere “ any

_ justification for the policy of assigning \teachers on the

_ basis of the race of. the pupils, and the ‘school authorities.

\have not suggested any. Nor have the school authorities ”

made any effort to establish that there are administrative

obstacles to faculty desegregation justifying delay under

the doctrine of the. second Brown decision (349 U..S. at.

300-01). :

A policy of assigning teachers to $chools on the basis of

the race of the pupils is plainly. invidious even, without

regard to its effect on what schools various pupils attend.

Pupils admitted to public schools are entitled to be treated

alike without racial differentiations in those schools.

student’s relationship with teachers: is central to the edu-

cational experierice in public schools. When a state decrees

_that those-Negro pupils.in all-Negro schools be taught only

by Negro teachers and that those Negro pupils in schools |

with white children be taught only, by white teachers, it

significantly perpetuates the segregation of Negro Ameri- |

cans in their educational experience. This is contrary to

the egalitarian principle of the Fourteenth Amendment and

the teaching of Brown that segregated education is “in-

herently unequal.” ae os ‘

The issues ‘presented by the “freedom of choice” plans

and the-faculty segregation issue merge into a common

problem of vital importance to the implementation of the

Brown decision, and are worthy of the attention of this

Court. | ; | tet

CONCLUSION °

Wherefore, for the foregoing reasons it is respect-

fully submitted that the petition for certiorari should be

granted. me

Respectfully submitted,

JACK GREENBERG

James M. Nasrit, III

10 Columbus Circle

New York, N. Y. 10019 ~

Pas —— '§. W. Tuexer

».—- Henry L. Marsa, IIT

| 214 East Clay Street.

Richmé@ad 19; Virginia

» APPENDIX

Memorandum of the Court

[July 25, 1962]

Eleven Negro students, their parents and guardians in-

stituted this action to require the defendants to transfer the

students from Negro public schools to white public schools.

The plaintiffs also Pray, on behalf of all persons similarly

situated, that the defendants be enjoined from operating

racially segregated schools and that the defendants be

required to submit to the Court a plan of desegregation.

.The Pupil Placement Board answered, admitting that the

_ plaintiffs had complied with its regulations for transfer

and denying the other allegations of the complaint. The

City School Board and the Superintendent of Schools an-

swered and moved to dismiss on the ground that sole

Pupil Placement Board pursuant to the Pupil Placement

Act of Virginia, Sections 22-232.1 through 232. 17 of the

Code of Virginia, as amended.

The defendants interpreted the bill of complaint as

tacking the constitutionality of the Pupil Placement Act

- and moved to dismiss on the ground that its constitution-

ality should first be determined by the Supreme Court of

Appeals of Virginia, or the case should be heard by a dis-

trict court of three judges. | , :

The evidence disclased that the City of Richmond is

divided into a number of geographically defined attendance

areas for both white and Negro schools. These areas were

established by the School Board prior to 1954 and have not

e 2a

Memorandum of the Court

been changed in a material way since that time. Several

areas for white and Negro schools ,oyerlap. The Pupil

Placement Board enrolls and transfers all students. Neither

the Richmond School Board nor the Superintendent mnakes.

recommendations to the Pupil Placement Board.

During the 1961-1962 #chool’ term, thirty-seven Negro

students were assigned to white schools. For the 1962-1963

school term, ninety additional students have been -assigned.

At the start of the 1962-1963 school term all of the white

high schools will have Negro students in attendance. Negro

students will also attend several of the white junior high |”

schools and elementary schools.

Rigid adherence to placement of students by attendance

areas has been modified in four respects. First, the Chaiy-

man of the Pupil Placement Board testified that any Negro

- child applying for enrollment in the first grade’ of a white

public school in his attendance area is assigned to that

_ school. Second, the Superintendent of Schools testified that

George Wythe High School and John Marshall High School

had been constructed to accommodate all high school stu-

. dents in their respective attendance areas. Counsel stated

in argument that six Negro students had applied for admis-

sion to George Wythe High School for 1962 and all had

been accepted. Third,"a. Negro student presently attending ° -

a white school, upon promotion to a higher school, is rou-

tinely assigned to a white school. Fourth, some Negro stu-

‘dents have been assigned to schools in white attendance

areas.

Usually, however, assignments of students based on pro-

motion from an elementary school to a junior high school

3a.

Memorandum of the Court

and from junior high to high school are routinely made by

the Pupil Placement Board. These assignments generally

follow a pattern, aptly described as a system of “feeder

schools,” that existed prior to 1954. Thus, a student from

a white elementary school.is routinely promoted to a white

junior high school and in due course to a white high school. ~

A Negro student is routinely promoted from a Negro le-

mentary school to a Negro junior high school and finally a

Negro high school. In order to change the ngrmal course

of assignment based on promotion all students must apply -

_ to the Pupil Placement Board. The majority of the plain-

tiffs in the present case are such applicants.

The Chairman of the Pupil Placement Board testified

that 98 per cent of the applications were of a routine nature

_and were handled by the staff of the Board.. The remain-

ing 2 per cent, divided about equally between white and

Negto applicants, requested transfers from one school to

another outside of the regular routine. These percentages

applied to the entire state, but there was no evidence that

they varied materially for the City of Richmond,

First to be determined are the defendants’ motions to

dismiss on the ground that the case involves the consti-

tutionality of the Pupil Placement Act. The plaintiffs have

made no challenge’ of the constitutionality of the Act,

and the motions are denied. | ies

The second issue is the joinder of the School Board and

Superintendent of Schools. The State Pupil Placement _

‘Board has authority over the placement of pupils, and the

local officials refrain from making recommendations to the

Board, but approximately 98 per cent of the placements

4a,

Memoranllum of the»Court

are made routinely as a-result of the regulations of the

School Board pertaining to attendance areas. The evidence

shows that the State Pupil Placement Board has no inclina- _

tion to vary these attendance areas, although undoubtedly

it has authority to do so. In view of this situation, the

School Board and the Superintendent of Schools are proper

parties. |

- The next issue concerns the plaintiffs’ applications. ‘The

Court was advised that Lemuel Wimbish, Jre has been

_assigned to Chandier J unior High School to which he had

made application: His case is moot.

The following studefts who have completed elementary

school seek admission to Chandler Junior High School:

Carolyn.Bradley, Rosalind Dobson, John Edward Johnson,

Jr., and William Dunbar Quarles, Jr. Renee

The State Pupil Placement Board, after comparing -test

scores of these students with test scores of other students, -

denied the applications on the ground of lack of academic

_ qualifications, The, plaintiffs do not challenge the tests or’

_ the method of comparison used by the State Pupil Place- -

meént Board. The plaintiffs emphasize, however, that stu-

dents from white elementary schools in the same attend-

ance area are placed routinely in Chandler Junior High

School, and their scores are not scrutinized by the State’

Pupil Placement Board. On the other hand, the plaintiffs,

because they. sought transfer based on promotion from a

Negro elementary school, are screened by the State Pupil’

Placement Board. This is a valid’ criticism of the procedure

inherent in the system of “feeder schools.”

: < 7 . e . .

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_ Memorandum of the Court

Proper scholastic tests may be used to determine the

FEC of students. But when the tests are applied only -

o Negroes seeking admission to particular schools and not

to white students routinely assigned to the’same schools,

the use of the tests cannot be sustained. Jones v. School

Board of Alexandria, 278 F. 2d 72 (4th Cir. 1960). |

Plaintiff, Morgan N. Jackson, who was promoted from

Graves Junior High School, seeks admission to John Mar-

shall High School. His application was denied because he

- lives thirteen blocks ffom the John Marshall High School

and five blocks from a Negro high-school. The plaintiffs

point out that he lives in the attendance area of John Mar-

shall High School, and had he been a white student che

would have been routinely assigned to John Marshall High

‘School without determination of whéther his residence was °

“closer to that high school or any other high school. Resi, |

dence may be a proper basis for assignment of pupils, but.

it is an invalid criteria when linked to a system of “feeder

. schools.” Dodson v. School Board of the City of Char-

lottesville, 289 F. 2d 439 (4th Cir. 1961). Paes

The third group of plaintiffs, namely, Michael Bradley,

Daria A. Cameron, Bruce W. Johnson, Phyllis Antoinette

‘Johnson and Robert S. Meyers,- seek to transfer from

Graves Junior High School to Chandler Junior High

School. They were denied transfer because of lack of aca-

demic qualifications. The evidence showed that the same

standards for determinings transfer from one junior high

school to another junior high school were applied by the

Board indiscriminately to both white and colored students.

Were this the only factor in this phase of the case, the issue’

Memorandum of the Court

would involve only judicial review of the decision of an.

administrative board. However, the. situation of these

plaintiffs must be considered in the context of the system

of “feeder schools,” which routinely placed them in the

Graves Junior High School while white studentg routinely

were placed in Chandler Junior.High School. The applica-

tion of scholarship qualifications under these circumstances

is ‘discriminatory. Green v. School Board of the City of

Roanoke, F.. 2d - (4th Cir., May 22, 1962).

The foregoing facts and conclusions of law require the

admission of the plaintiffs to ” schools for which they

made application. 3 Q

The plaintiffs prayed that the defendants be enjoified

from’ continued discrimination in the city schools and that

the School Board be required to submit a desegregation

plan. The Court has weighed all'of the factors presented

by the evidence in this case and finds that the defendants

have taken measures to eliminate racially discriminatory

enrollments in the first grade. Apparently they are elimi-

nating discriminatory enrollments in George Wythe High

School and they are routinely assigning Negro students in

white junior high schools to white high schools.

While the School Board has not presented a formal plan

of desegregation, fe Court finds that the defendants have

made a reasonable start toward a non-discriminatory school . -

system resulting in the attendance of 127 Negro students

in white schools for the 1962-1963 School term. In view of

the steps that have been taken in this direetion, the Court

concludes that the defendants should be allowed diseretion

Vf, .

_ Memorandum of the Court )

to fashion within a reasonable time the changes necessary

to eliminate the remaining ee : features of the -

system of “feeder schools.”

In Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955),

the Supreme Court stated “Traditionally, equity has been

_ . characterized by a practical flexibility in shaping its rem-

edies and by a facility for adjusting and ‘reconciling public

and private needs.” The Court is of the opinion that the -

relief decreed in this case is sufficient at this time in view

of the evidence presented. The refusal.of broad injunctive

relief now is not to be construed as approval to continue the

“feeder school system” as it, is now operated. See Hill v. -

School Board of the City of Norfolk, Virginia, 282 F. 2d

473 (4th Cir. 1960); Dodson v. School Board of the City of:

Charlottesville, 289 F. 2d 439 (4th Cir. 1961).

_ This case will be retained on the docket for such further

relief as may be appropriate. :

Joun D. Burzner, Jr.

. United States District Judge

Richmond, Virginia | ate |

apm

Decree. 7

This cause came on to be heard upon the bill of complaint,

the amended complaint, the several motions to —-..

answers filed by the PupijgPlacement Board of the*Com-

monwealth of Virginia and the School Board of the City of

Richmond and. the Division Superintendent of Schools, the

depositions of witnesses duly taken and filed, the testimony

of witnesses heard ore tenus and exhibits ; and was argued

_ by-counsel. :

‘Upon consideration whereof, for reasons appearing in

‘ the Memorandum ‘of the Court this,day made a part of the

record, the Court doth Apspnen, Onvss and Decree as fol-

lows: . ;

ee ae motions to dismiss are denied. .

2. ‘The defendants, and each of them, are enjoined and

restrained from denying Carolyn Bradley, Michael Bradley,

Daria A. Cameron, Rosalind Dobson, Bruce ‘W. Johnson,

* John Edward Johnson, Jr., Phyllis Antoinette Johnson,

- Robert S. Meyers and William Dunbar Quarles, Jr., admis-

sion to Chandler Junior High School, and from bontan

Morgan N. Jackson umereiaas ‘to John Marshall High

School.

' 3. The prayer of the plaintiffs for further —

’ relief is denied at this time.

4, ‘This cause is retained on the docket, with leave of any -

_ party, or of persons constituting a class with the plaintiffs,

; to petition. for appropriate relief..

Soux D. Burzner, JR.

3 | United States District Judge

Richmond, Virginia

J uly 25, 1962

ee eee

° .

ee ne em epee noe

fen

Minerva Brapuey, I. A. Jackson, Jr.,

[xe ScHoot Boarp oF THE City or RICHMOND, VIRGINIA, .

H. I. Witzet, Division Superintendent of Schools of the.

City. of Richmond, Virginia, and E. J. Octespy, ALFRED@

L. Winco and E. T. Justis, individually and constitut-

ing the Pupil Placement Board of the Commonwealth

of Virginia,

"Opinion of Boreman, U. s. C.J. ‘

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS:

| FourtH Cmeovit

No. 8757

A Argued Jan. 9, 1963:

Decided May 10, 1963

Rosa LEE QUARLES,

JoHN Epwarp J OHNSON, Evisu C. MYERS and ELIZABETH

S. — 3

ie (ee

: _Appellees.

: > — -

Henry L. poor III, Richmond, Va. (S. W. a:

tichmond, Va., on brief) for appellants.

Henry T. Wickham, Sp. -Counsel, City of Richmond

J. Elliott Drinard, City Atty., Richmond, Va. and Tucker,

fays, Moore & Reed, Richmond, Va., on brief) for ap- .

ellees, The School Board of the City of Richmond, Vir-.

ere

inia, and H. I. Willet, ia Superintendent of Schools. .

Appellants;

em 5 mentee Renate aD

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.