Jurisdictional Statement — Voorhes v. Dempsey

; : thoe-Supreme Court, U.S.

: FILED.

OCT 17 1964

-

‘'s &

: JOHN F. DAVIS, CLERK -

In the

"-. Supreme Court of the Bnited States -

| OCTOBER TERM, 1964 3 i

no. 6 0-0

Avis B. ‘Voorues, ao G.. VOORHES,

. AND RupOLPH PRESUTTI, . .

Appellants,

Vv.

Joun Dempsey, Er AL;

- Appellees.

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT

COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF CQ} NECTICUT

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

Coxii. C. Tarr

750 Main Street

Hartford 3, Connecticut .

Icor I. Sikorsky, Jr.

111 Pearl Street

Hartford 3, Connecticut

RicuHarp M.. RITTENBAND *

75 Pearl Street

Hartford 3, Connecticut

Attorneys for Appellants

SUBJECT INDEX

v>

e .

Opinion Below

: Statutes Involved

Questions Presented

Statement of Facts _ co

The Questions Are Substantial

I. The use of mandatory party. levers

the independent voter equal protection of

_.the laws as es by the pnopent:

Amendment. : '

II. The party lever, whether EN or Op-

tional, violates the rights of all voters to a

secret ballot‘ and also thus denies their right

to a free ectection. 2 4 ; ;

Conclusion —

_ Appendix _

Opinion of the United States District Court,

-

District of Connecticut

Connecticut General Statute § 9-242 S

PAGE

ne

18

17.

. "9 ;

TABLE OF CITATIONS

CAsEs: ne : PAGE

American Federation of Labor v. “Watson, 327 US. 582,

592-93 (1946) ie bk oa 2

Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 112 L.Ed. 430, 84 S.Ct

454; 32 Law Week 4101 (1963). : 7

Davis, Secretary, a et al. v. ome

et al., 374°U.S. 803 (1963) 3 ‘ « 3

Eaton v. Brown, Calif. 1892; 31 P. 250 : 8, 9

es Board of Election Com’'rs, 149 Mich. 390, 113 NW.

6 (1907). . 10

Johnson Vv. Clark, 25 F.Supp. 285 (ND. Tex. 1938) i. 7:

Kautenburger v. Jackson, 85- Ariz. 128; 333 P.2d 293, 295

‘ (1988) . ‘ . 6

McConnell, et al. v. Frink, Secy of State of Alabama, et el, 3

374 U.S. 802 (1963) e ; 3

Norris v. a 172 Md. 667, 192 A. “m3

(1987) 8

" Reynolds, Judge, et al. v. Sims, et al, 377 US. 533 (1963) 3

Roman v. Sincock, 375 U.S. 877 (1963) “0 a

Smith v. Blackwell, 115 F.2d 186 (4 Cir. 1940) 7

State v. Green, 121. Ohio St. 301, 168 N.E. 131 (1929) 66

ALR 894. a

State v. Keating, 53. Mont? 371, 163 P. 1156 (1917) : 8

Vann, et al. v. Baggett, 377 U.S. 533 (1963) : a 3

STATUTES: |

General Statutes of Connecticut, Rev. of 1958,

Section 9-242 °. , . 345,17

. 42: U.S.C. § 1983, 1988 eo, ». 44

28 U.S.C. § 1343 (3) and (4) aks » + os

28 U.S.C. § 2281 ay Sus . 24

2% USC. $1953 ; ; . a4

Ls)

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

Oye

OCTOBER TERM, 1964

| No.

. Avis B. Voorues, Wim -G. Voorues, —

AND RupOLPH PRESUTTI, @

Appellants,

Vv.

Joun Dempsey, Er At,

: Appellees. .

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT

COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

.

\ 7

_ JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT .

Judgment Appealed From.

Appellants, Avis B. Voorhes} William G. Voorhes, and .

Rudolph Presutti, appeal from the final judgment of the

specially-constituted United States District Couft for the Dis-

trict .of Connecticut. Appellants - submit this Statement to.

show that the Supereme Court of ‘the United. States has juris-

diction of the appea] and that substantial questions are pre-

sented.

OPINION BELOW.

The Opinion of the United-States District Court for the.

District of Connecticut which is the subject of this appeal is

not yet reported. A copy of the Opinion granting the de- ~

fendants’ Motion for Dismissal of Action is attached hereto

as Appendix A. .

. J

: Jurisdiction

- This action was brought by voters in the U. S. District

' Court. for the District of Connecticut under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

and 1988 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (3) and (4) to restrain and

enjoin the enforcement of certain provisions of the General

Statutes of the State of Connecticut which make a party lever

mandatory on all voting machines in the said state on the

_ grounds that these statutes impair certain rights of the named

plaintiffs and all others similarly situated under the Fourteenth

| Amendment of the United States Constitution. .

A spécial three judge court. was convened to determine

the cause pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2281 et seq, In. due course

the defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss which was granted

~ on June 22, 1964 and judgment ‘was entered dismissing the

action on June 23, 1964. From this judgment the plaintiffs-

led a eS |

The: jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to review this -de-

cision by direct appeal is conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1253. The

following decisions sustain the jurisdiction of this Court to

review a judgment on direct appeal from a three judge district

court: - , ac

American Federation of Labor v.. Watson, 327

| U.S, 582, 592-93 (1946);

and the following reapportionment cases in the October 1963

’ Term of the Supreme Court of the United States: - .

‘7

3

——_ Judge, et. al.

533 (1963); Vann, et

377 U.S. 583 (1963);

AE

‘

g

2

Davis, Secretary, State Board of Elections, et al.

v. Mann, et al., 374 US. -” iiines aa ae

jurisdiction: aoted ); '

‘Roman Vv, Sincock, 375 U.S. 7 (1963) ‘oie

- able jurisdiction —

Statutes Involved —

Section 9-242 of the Connecticut General Statutes (1958

. Rev.) is the statutory provision involved, and this statute is

9 at Ce & Sages B aes ee,

i‘ . Questions Presented

_ The following questions are presented by this appeal:

A. Whether the Constitution of the United States re-

quires the State to provide its.citizens a means or method of

voting wherein absolute secrecy. is preserved.

B. If the answer to the Question A above is “Yes” whether

> right to absolute secrecy would be violated by a system

of voting whereby a voter may. not split his ticket without

| ee oe ee ee en ee

not voting a straight party ticket.

@ Whether the mandatory party lever established by the

Connecticut General Statutes denies the plaintiffs their right

to free selection by. placing upon them mental and psycho-

logical pressure to merely and solely pull a party jever. —

2

4

D. Whether the mandatory party lever established by

$9242 of the Connecticut General -Statutes subjects inde-

pendent voters of said state to a more burdensome condition

in casting their vote than the conditions to vote required of

voters registered in a party.

* & Whether the mandatory party lever established by the

Connecticut General Statutes denies Independent ‘voters of

said state equal protection of the law.

_ IF. Whether'the mandatory party lever is class legislation

establishing a preferential group accorded privileges and im-

eee ee

Statement of Facts . ™~

All Connecticut voting machines are equipped with

mandatory party lever. This means that a Connecticut elector

cannot vote for any candidate without first pulling a a party

lever to unlock the machine. If there is a particular candidate

on the party slate for whom he does not want to vote, the °

elector must specifically reject that candidate by pushing up

. a key assigned to his name. The elector may then vote for

another candidate for that particular office by depressing the

key assigned to him, or by writing in the name of a candidate

", not on the ballot. Each party lever, (or “straight ticket device,”

as it is called in the statute) on every voting machine is con-

nected to a common bell so that said bell is caused to ring

whenever the party lever is operated. The .requirements for

both the mandatory party lever and the bell are embodied in

§ 9-242 of the Connecticut General Statutes, Revision of 1958, :

Revised to 1964, which is set out in Appendix B of the Juris-

dictional Statement.

Appellants, who are Cinetetinen wane, teneie On

action on behalf of Ives and others similarly sityated

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 1988, and 28 U.S.C. § 1848, to

eA.

enjoin the operation of Counecticut voting machines equipped ;

with a mandatory party lever and to have § 9-242 of the Con-

necticut General Statutes declared unconstitutional. Plaintiffs

named as defendants the Governor and the Secretary of the

State, both of whom are ele ction officials of the State of Con-

nécticut. The complaint alleged that the mandatory party

lever system employed by Connecticut violates the Fourteenth

Amendntent to the United States Constitution because it:

(1) . denies the plaintiffs their right to a secret ballot, for

those outside the booths can tell whether an elector has voted

for a split ticket by listening for the clic | ing of the individual

keys and noting the longer time required to vote;

voting efforts to pulling a party lever. °

In due course the defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss for

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, -

’ which was granted on June 22, 1964; judgment was entered

dismissing the action on June 23, 1964. The Memorandum

and Order filed by the District Court, and the Judgment en-

tered by it, are set out in Appendix A attached hereto. In

brief, the Court adjudged that no claim was made upon which

‘relief could be granted on the grounds that:

(1) There .was no allegation that the broad discretion

vested by the Federal Constitution in the states to formulate

election systems had been abused.

(2) The use of the mandatory party lever, while operat-

ing as a discrimination against the independent voter, is not

such an unfeasonable discrimination that the independent

voter is deprived of the equal protection of the laws.

»

6 .

(3) Even if the Federal Constitution requires a secret

ballot, such a requirement does not extend to the possibility

\that others might disc ver ‘A lack of party fealty on the part

Of a voter, because /he has’ split: his vote.

Th Questions are Substantial

There are 1 79, 029 registered voters: in Connecticut; of

these 469,185 tlassify themselves as “independent.” These

unaffiliated voters should not be forced to act as party mem-

bers when casting: their votes — not even momentarily. It is

‘contrary to ‘ur basic’ principles to be forced to vote and then

to “unvote,” in order to choose our candidates for public

Office. ‘Some measure of the burden imposed by the manda-

tory party lever system may be found in the fact that since .

1945 bills to abolish the party lever have been introduced at -

every legislative session, in Connecticut.

The Judgment of ‘the specially-constituted District Court,

however, says in essence that the alleged burdens placed upon

voters by the mandatory party lever are. so insubstantial as

not to réquire plenary consideration. The plaintiffs respect-

fully disagree with this conclusion and affirm that there is a-

constitutional right to absolute secrecy of the ballot and abso-

lute equality .in ‘the method and technique of casting a ballot.

It has been held that a state statute which prevented a can-

didate’s name from ever appearing at the head of the lists on

voting machines was unconstitutional because .it deprived the

candidate of a right protected by the privileges and immu-’

nities clause of the Constitution. Kautenburger v. Jackson, 85

- Ariz. 128; 333 P.2d 293, 295 (1958.). There the Arizona

Supreme Court said:

“It has been retognized, we think correctly, that it is a

commonly known and accepted fact that where there

are a number of candidates for the same office, the

« @

~

*)

.

7 7

names appearing at the noel of the list have a distinct

advantage.” |

That reasoning applies with at least equal force to those can-

didates from the two major parties whose. names appear on

Connecticut voting machines. Conversely, °it follows: that’

-much of the unfair advantage thus attained is a result of the

burden under which the independent voter must ‘cast his vote.

Thus, the state-sanctioned burden denies the independent

voter the equal protection of the laws guaranteed him by the

Fourteenth Amendment. Anderson v. Murtin, 375 U.S. 399,

- 112 L.Ed. 430, 84 S.Ct. 454; 32 Law Week 4101 (1963).

The District Court, in its Memorandum of Decision, as-

sumed without deciding that the Federal Constitution or

statutes require a secret ballot. Thus the important questions

of whether there is a federally-protected ‘right to a secret

ballot, and — if. it does exist —.the gxtent of its scope, are .

presented by this appeal, which questions affect each voter,

not only of Connecticut, but of the United States.

In Johnson v. Clark, 25 F. Supp. 285 (N.D. Tex. 1938), the

court was concerned with the meaning of “ballot” as it is used °

in Title 2, U.S.C.A. § 9, in providing that the manner of voting

“shall be by written or poaee ballot, or by machine.” The

~ court said at page 286:-

“The word ‘ballot’ in an election provision means a”

method which will insure, so far_as is possible, the

secrecy and integrity of the popul vote.”

Smith v. Blackwell, 115 F. 2d 186 (4 Cir. 1940), however,

seemed to deny the existence of ‘a constitutional right to

secrecy, and held that there was no “case or controversy” when

certain electors tried to maintain a declaratory judgment ac-

tion against the Secretary of State of South Carolina, where

ae

he was not specifically charged with any duty by the South

Carolina statutes.to preserve secrecy of the ballot.

With deference to the Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit,

we feel: that the court in Johnson reached the correct con-.

clusion. A ballot originally consisted of a ball, bean, a grain

of corn, or other small article whicii could be concealed in the

hand so that others might not know how the voter cast his

ballot: It implies secrecy in the matter of voting, and any act

by which an elector, in secrecy, casts his vote for or against a

¢undidate or an issue constitutes a ballot. See Norris v. Mayor

& City Council, 172 Md. 667, 192 A. 531 (1937); State v.

Green, 121 Ohio St. 301, 168 N.E. 13! (1929), 66 ALR 849.

See also State v. Keating, 53 Mont. 371, 163 P. 1156 (1917).

I. The Use of Mandatory Party Levers Denies the In- |

- dependent Voter Equal Protection of the Laws as —

Guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.

The basic feature of the party lever is by definition that it

improperly discriminates against small political parties and the

independent voter by forcing said independent voter to vote

for a major party as a’ condition precedent to voting. The |

independent voter is the one class of voter, as opposed to

electors enrolled in a political party, who must first pull a lever

of a party in which he is not enrolled before he carrvote. This

is discriminatory and places psychological coercive pressure

upon him to vote for either party slate instead of splitting his

_ “ballot. In a case involving a paper ballot the question was

raised whether paper ballots which had printed blocks for the

major parties were proper. Under the statute under considera-

tion in that case a voter could check a block and vote for a

party slate or check individual blocks for each office. In that |

case the California Supreme Court in Eaton v. Brown, infra.

held that the use of such party blocks on the‘ballot was un-

constitutional and void because “it is an attempt to discrimi-

9

nate against classes of yoters and its effect, if allowed to be

‘valid, would be to subject such classes to the alternative of

partial disenfranchisement, or to the casting of their votes

_upon more burdensome conditions than others no better en-

titled under the fundamental law to the free and untrammeled

exercise of the right of suffrage.” -The Court went on to state

‘that such party labels were unconstitutional because,

“it would be of no benefit to any party to allow it a

ticket heading unless it had a full*state and local ticket,

for no voter of the party could express his choice by

stamping the party designation without partial or total

disenfranchisement . . . upon these grounds we hold

that this provision destroys the just and equal and

uniform operation which is an election law, of ll others,

is demanded, no less by the express terms of our funda-

mental law than by the genius and spirit of our institu-

tions . . . There should be no party designation printed

at the head of the tickets because there can be no

voting by stamping such designation.”

Eaton v. Brown, Calif. 1892; 31 P. 250.

This is the precise issue presented by this case and its

reasoning is persuasive for the appellants’ contention ‘that a

party lever discriminates against independent voters and small

parties, and subjects all such voters to an unequal burden in

the casting of their ballot; and thus denies them equal pro-

tection of the laws as well as the right to a free selection.

II. The Party Lever, Whether Mandatory or Optional,

Violates the Rights of All Voters to a Secret Ballot

(a)

and Also Thus Denies Their Right to a Free Elec: |

tion.

‘Without absolute secrecy being insured, men would feel

constrained to vote in certain ways out of fear of reprisal, and

not by exercise of free choice. Therefore if we assume — as

did the District Court in granting defendants’ Motion to Dis-

10

miss — that there is a discernible sound which is emitted when

a voter splits his ticket using the mandatory party lever, the

question now is whether the. right to a secret ballot is violated

by such a system. That is, assuming there is a right to a secret

ballot, does the right tacbate a requirement that no one be

» able to ascertain whether a voter has split his ticket?

In Helme v. Board of Election Com’rs, 149 Mich. 390, 113

N.W. 6 (1907), the Michigan Supreme Court invalidated the

‘use of an election machine which could not handle ali the

issues and candidates, so that a voter had to ask for’ a paper

ballot to vote in a split ticket. The statute providing for the

machine was held unconstitutional because it failed to aftord

secrecy of the vote. The court skid:

“It is obvious that a voter cannot ask for and vote such _

a ballot without indicating that he does ‘not vote for

his full party ticket, and, to the degree that he is reluc-

tant to have his want of party fealty known, it acts as a

deterrent to his voting for the persons of his choice,

and operates against his independence as a voter.”

» Similarly, if a Connecticut party-member cannot split his

ticket without indicating to those outside the voting booth

(required by law to be members of the major. parties ) that he

chas done so, the element of coercion must be felt, in denial of

his right of free choice.

- The District Court’s opinion discounts the effect of the

ascertainability of ticket-splitting by saying that no one can

tell which candidates or party a voter has chosen. This argu-

ment defines secret ballot too narrowly. If the necessity for

a secret ballot is to’ be found in the’ importance. of insuring

. ‘that every man follow his eonscience when voting, then a

broader scope must be given to secrecy. It must include the

inability on the part of anyone to determine who is a ticket-

splitter. ,

ll

a

* Conclusion —

The questions involved in this appeal are substantial and.

ought to be resolved by this Court. The unfettered right of

suffrage, essential to a democratic society, is being denied to.

1,279,029 Connecticut voters: by the mandatory party lever

system. Whether it is to continue is of such fundamental im-

portance that it ought now to be determined by this Court.

Respectfully submitted,

Coutin C. Tarr

750 Main Street

‘Hartford 3, Connecticut

Icon I. Sikorsky, Jr.

111 Pearl Street

Hartford, .Connecticut

RICHARD M. RITTENBAND

75 Pearl Street _

Hartford, Connecticut

—_ -

~«

13

APPENDIX A

United States District Court

District, of Connecticut

Avis B. Voornes, Et AL, ~ 7

P. laintiffs o*

-_— Civil Action

Joun Dempsey, Governor of the |

State of Connecticut, and.

Extra T. Grasso, Secretary of:

the State af: Connecticut,

Defendants

No. 10,462

-

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

Morton To Dismiss

Three Connecticut voters, on behalf of themselves and

"others similarly situated, bring this action under the Civil

Rights Acts, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988, and 28 US.C..

§ 1343, to enjoin the operation of Connecticut voting machines

equipped with a mandatory party lever and to have Section

9-242 of the Connecticut General Statutes (1958 Rev.), which

requires that the machines be so equipped, declared uncon-

stitutional. The defendants, the Governor and Secretary of

"the State of Connecticut; have moved to dismiss the complaint

for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. _

We find the complaint fatally deficient and grant the motion

to dismiss.

_ Section 9-242 of the Connecticut General Statutes provides

that all voting machines in Connecticut shall be equipped with -

¥

14

party levers but “shall permit an elector to vote for any person

_ for any office, whether or not nominated as a candidate b, any

party or organization, and shall permit voting in absolute

secrecy.” ‘Any Connecticut elector is free to vote or not to

= vote for any candidate; however, since a party lever must be

+ pulled to unlock the machine, the elector. must specifically

reject any candidate on the party slate for whom he does not

wish to vote by pushing up a key assigned to that candidate's

name. The elector may.then vote for another candidate for .

that particular office by pushing down the key assigned to the

candidate of his choice or by writing in the name of a send

date not on the ballot. :

The complaint ‘alleges that the eanhians party lever sys-

tern employed by Connecticut violates the Fourteenth Amend-

- ment to the United States Constitution because it:

(1) denies the plaintiffs their right to a free selection |

through mental and psychological . pressure. to restrict their

voting efforts to pulling a party lever;

(2) subjects: independent voters to more burdensome

conditions than party voters;

(3) denies the plaintiffs their right to a secret ballot, for

those outside the booths can tell whether an elector has voted

for a split ticket by listening for the clicking of the individual

keys ‘and noting the longer time required to vote.

The allegations of ‘the complaint plainly “fail to state any

. claim upon which - this court may grant relief. Under the

Federal. Constitution the states: have been entrusted with

broad discretion -in formulating an election system: United

States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 311 (1941), and nothing in the

complaint indicates that this discretion has been abused. The

‘mandatory party lever statute does not deny any candidate —

a place on the ballot, nor does it prevent any voter from voting

"5

.

15

for any candidate. A vote for a straight ticket is accorded no

greater weight in the final.tallies than a vote for a split ticket. .

While the wisdom of the mandatory party lever statute may

be questionable, if can h: ly be termed fundamentally un-

fair or unreasonably discriminatory in contravention of the

Fourteenth Amendment. Indeed; the disadvantaging .incon-

_venience to split ticket, voters from the Connecticut statute

would appear to be mich less than the New Jersey statutes,

‘sustained by a. three judge court in Voltaggio v. Caputo, 210

F.Supp. 337 (D.C.N.J.), app dismissed, 371 U.S. 232 (1962), :

denying an independent candidate the opportunity to have

his name listed on the ballot with the top group of candidates.

Cf. McDougal v. Green, 335.U.S. 281 (1948).

The utilization of party levers, be they optional or manda-

tory discriminates against the independent voter to the extent

the latter must spend more time and effort to vote for the

_ same number of candidates than one who votes-for a straight

ticket. However, there is a rational basis for this discrimina-

tion, for the party lever simplifies and speeds up the voting

process for large numbers of voters. It is for the legislature

to determine the wisdom of making such a discrimination: for’

this purpose. We are unable to see that the slight extra effort ~

required for,an independent voter to pull a party lever and

reject candidates for. whom he does not care to vote consti-

tutes such a burdensome and unreasohable discrimination that

the independent voter is deprived of the equal. cnusues of

the laws. -

Assuming, but without deciding, that the Federal Consti-

tution or statutes require a secret ballot,’ the party lever does

not deprive voters of a secret’ ballot. No one outside the booth

can tell for which candidates or party a ballot has been cast,

> 1 Compare Johnson v. Clark, 25 F Supp. 285 (N.D. Tex. 1938) :

ith Smith v. Blackwell, 115 F.2d 186 (4 Cir. 1940).

-— 16

or indeed; whether an elector has voted for any candidates at

all. Plaintiffs’ ‘claim.of an unsecret ballot amounts . actually

only to the possibility that a voter may be subjected to an

accusation of a lack of party fealty for having split his vote,

a far cry from an unsecret ballot. Even this accusation may be

wholly false; for a voter may finally vote a straight ticket after ;

rejecting certain candidates by pushing their individual keys

back up. For all practical intents and purposes, the Connecti-

cut procedure is a secret ballot.

. Nor is there any federal statute upon which relief may be

granted. The. only federal statute relating to the mechanics

_of voting (other than absentee ballots ) which has come to our

atténtion is 2 U.S.C. $9, which simply provides: “All votes

for Representatives in Congress must be by. written or printed

ballot, or voting machine the use of which has been duly

authorized by the State law; and all votes received or recorded

contrary to this. section shall. be of no, effect.” .Obviously

nothing in this statute can be construed to prohibit a state

from authorizing the use of a voting machine equipped with

a mandatory party lever. Cf. Smith v. Blackwell, 115 F.2d 186,

189 (4 Cir. 1940).

The motion to cents the complaint is granted.

re) ?

J. josurn SMITH,

United States Circuit Judge

Rosert P. ANDERSON,

United States District Judge

M. JosePH BLUMENFELD,

United States District Judge —

June 22, 1964. - '

eee eS

17

APPENDIX B -

-* .

_ Statute ard

“Bose. Constractiqn requirements

» A ygting machine approved by the. maaan of the state

shall be so constructed as to provide facilities for voting for

the candidates of at least seven different pargies or organiza-

tions. It shall be provided with a single straight ticket device

for eaclr of such parties, by the use of which an elector may

vote for all the candidates of that party, and shall permit an

elector té vote for any person for any office, whether or not.

nominated as a candidate by any party ‘or organization, and

shall permit voting in absolute secrecy: Any such machine

shall have a bell which shall be so connected to the straight

ticket device for each party as to ring whenev er any straight

ticket device is operated; each straight ticket device on such

machine shall beso connected to the same bell.. Such machine .

shall be so constructed that an elector cannot vote for a can-

didate-or on a proposition for whom or on which he is not

lawfully entitled to vote. It shall be so constructed as to pre-

vent an elector from voting for more than one person for the

same office, except when he .is lawfully entitled to vote for

more than one person for that office, and it shall afford him an.

opporunity to vote for only as many persons for that office as

he is by law entitled to vote for, at the same time preventing

his voting for the same person twice. It shall be so con-

structed that all votes cast will be registered or recorded by |

the machine, and shall be provided with a lock by méans of

which any illegal: movement of the voting or registering

mechanism is absolutely prevented.* It shall be capable of ad-

justment for use at primaries so as to permit voting for indi-

QO

18

vidual candidates without ‘first operating a straight ticket

‘ device. Any such machine which has a curtain lever which is

not visible to the election officials while the machine is being

operated shall have.a bell so attached to the curtain lever as

_ to ring when the curtain lever is closed. (1949. Rev., § 1191;

- 1988, Supp. § 719d; 1957, P.A. 561, § 4.)”

‘