Brief for the Respondents in Opposition — Laughlin v. Garnett

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CITATIONS

Cases:

Adame eT. Gel. ©. 107 Po GY ASO. 2 nce cnencccses 5

Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Abbott, 130 F. (2d) 40___-- 4

Anderson v. Rohrer, 3 F. Supp. 367...........-.--.----- 5

Coleone ¥. Gated; VIG F Cay 8G ean cence s cence cewese ans 6

Coener ©; Armee, SE PO. BiG cas sc once as ince awcccnd 7

ae 4 v. O'Connor, 99 F. (2d) 135, certiorari denied, 305

5

Larecque ¥. Dorsey, 200 Pea: G60 .6... oon cence ccvcnnce 7

Sees $F: Fes, THe FG) Gio ncas ccc ecncsnccsasixn 6,7

National Surety Co. v. Page, 58 F. (2d) 145, rehearing de-

WOE, OE Bs Gee) ies Covna cen kebivucGicwanseetcawen

Piscine ¥. Daseh, OF F. CR) GI cennsccccwntesccesnxss

Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U. 8, 483._.......-.-------------

United States v. Atherton, 102 U. S. 372__.__.-.---------

Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F. (2d) 396, affirmed, 275 U.S. 503____--

Rules:

Rule 12 (f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure_---_----

Rule 15a of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-_-------

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584286—44

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Inthe Supreme Gourt of the Wited States

OctoBER TERM, 1943

No. 820

JAMES J. LAUGHLIN, PETITIONER

v.

LESLIE C. GARNETT, JOHN W. FIHELLY, AND ALLEN

BaKER

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF

COLUMBIA

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION

OPINION BELOW

The per curiam opinion of the court of appeals

(R. 49-50) is reported at 138 F. (2d) 931. The

order of the district court denying petitioner’s

motion for leave to file a proposed third amended

complaint appears at pages 41-42 of the record.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals (R. 51)

was entered on November 8, 1943. A petition for

rehearing was denied on November 13, 1943 (R.

(1)

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2

54). On February 11, 1944, the Chief Justice of

the United States extended petitioner’s time for

filing a petition for a writ of certiorari to March

13, 1944 (R. 53), and on March 11, 1944, he

granted petitioner an additional extension of time

until March 28, 1944 (R. 53). The petition for a

writ of certiorari was filed on March 28, 1944.

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under

Section 240 (a) of the Judicial Code, as amended

by the Act of February 13, 1925.

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the district court abused its discretion

in denying petitioner leave to file his proposed

third amended complaint.

STATEMENT

Petitioner instituted an action for conspiracy

and for malicious prosecution against respondents,

a former United States attorney, an assistant

United States attorney, and a police officer at-

tached to the United States attorney’s office (R.

3-14). The answer to the complaint filed by re-

spondents alleged as a ‘‘further defense’’ that the

complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief

could be granted against respondents, in that the ~

complaint showed on its face that respondents’

acts were performed in the course of their official

duties (R. 44-45). Without formal action by the

district court, petitioner filed an amended com-

plaint (R. 14-20), and, after respondents had

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3

moved under Rule 12 (f) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure to strike the amended complaint

(R. 45-46), again voluntarily amended his com-

plaint without formal action by the court (R. 20-

23). Motions by respondents to dismiss the second

amended complaint on the ground that it failed to

state a claim (R. 45-46) were sustained, and peti-

tioner was given leave to move for permission to

file a third amended complaint, provided that a

copy of the proposed complaint accompanied the

motion (R. 23). The motion was made (R. 23-

41) and denied (R. 41-42). On appeal, the Court

of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed

the order denying leave to file the proposed third

amended complaint (R. 51).

The second amended complaint alleged in sub-

stance that respondents, acting maliciously, with-

out probable cause, and palpably beyond the scope

of their official duties, prevailed upon certain per-

sous to make false charges against petitioner and

prepare false documents; that on the basis of such

false testimony respondents brought about peti-

tioner’s indictment and trial on several criminal

charges of which he was ultimately acquitted (R.

20-23). The proposed third amended complaint

set forth the alleged reasons which inspired re-

spondents’ malice towards petitioner. It further

alleged that respondents induced certain persons

to make false charges against petitioner and trans-

mitted such charges to the Bar Association in an

5 BNRESTO

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endeavor to harass him in the practice of law;

that respondents endeavored to induce petitioner’s

clients to dispense with his services; that on the

promise of lower prison sentences they indueed

certain of petitioner’s clients to make false

charges against him and by means of false charges

and forged documents succeeded in having him

indicted and tried on criminal charges of which

he was ultimately acquitted. The proposed com-

plaint also set forth the means by which petitioner

allegedly discovered the alleged conspiracy and

annexed as part of the complaint affidavits by the

persons who allegedly had been induced to make

the false charges. (R. 24-33.)

ARGUMENT

The narrow question presented by this petition

is whether the district court abused its discretion

in denying petitioner leave to file his proposed

third amended complaint. We think that it is

clear that no abuse of discretion was shown.

The gist of the complaint is that respondents

maliciously instituted criminal charges against

petitioner by the use of false testimony. Peti-

tioner contends (Pet. 9) that the allegations that

2 Under Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

“when justice so requires” the court may allow the filing of

amended pleadings. The granting of such leave is a matter

of discretion and is therefore not subject to review except

for abuse. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Abbott, 130 F.

(2d) 40, 44 (C. C. A. 4); ef. United States v. Atherton, 102

U. S. 372, 375.

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respondents induced certain persons to make the

false charges and prepare the false documents

which formed the basis of the prosecution (para-

graphs 18 and 19, R. 29-30) take this complaint

out of the general rule that prosecuting officials

are immune from civil liability for acts performed

in their official capacity even though actuated by

malice.” However, the immunity of a government

official from civil liability extends to ‘‘action hav-

ing more or less connection with the general mat-

ters committed by law to his control or super-

vision.”’ Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U. S. 483, 498;

Cooper v. O’Connor, 99 F. (2d) 135, 139 (App.

D. C.), certiorari denied, 305 U. S. 642. The db-

taining of evidence to be presented to a grand

jury is as much a function of a prosecuting attor-

ney as the presentation of such evidence. Hence,

under the cases cited, respondents cannot be sub-

jected to civil liability for such acts.

Petitioner also contends (Pet. 8) that para-

graphs 13 and 14 of the proposed complaint, in

alleging that respondents Baker and Garnett in-

duced certain persons to make false charges

* Cooper v. O'Connor, 99 F. (2d) 135 (App. D. C.), cer-

tiorari denied, 305 U. S. 642; Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F. (2d) 396

(C. C. A. 2), affirmed, 275 U. S. 503; Anderson v. Rohrer, 3

F. Supp. 367 (S. D. Fla.) ; cf. Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U. 8.

483; Jones v. Kennedy, 121 F. (2d) 40 (App. D. C.), cer-

tiorari denied, 314 U. S. 665; Glass v. Ickes, 117 F. (2d) 273

(App. D. C.), certiorari denied, 311 U. S. 718; Adams v. H.

O. L. C., 107 F. (2d) 139 (C. C. A. 8); Phelps v. Dawson,

97 F, (2d) 339 (C.C. A. 8).

a

.

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against petitioner and transmitted such charges

to the Bar Association (R. 27-28), charged acts

which are not within the scope of the immunity

granted to prosecuting officials. It may be, as the

court below suggested (R. 50), that allegations of

the malicious institution of false charges in an

endeavor to cause an attorney’s disbarment * would

present a basis for a civil action against prosecut-

ing officials.* In the instant case, however, there

is no suggestion that the acts alleged in para-

graphs 13 and 14 resulted in the temporary dis-

barment of petitioner alleged in paragraph 27

(R. 32), or even in formal charges against peti-

tioner. In themselves these paragraphs present a

situation analogous to that where efforts to cause

institution of criminal proceedings have proved

unsuccessful and have therefore been held not to

be actionable. Melvin v. Pence, 130 F. (2d) 423

(App. D. C.); Larocque v. Dorsey, 299 Fed. 556,

559 (C. C. A. 2); Cooper v. Armour, 42 Fed. 215

(C. C. N. D. N. Y.). And in any event, as the

’ Malicious attempts to effect revocation of a license have

been held to support actions for malicious prosecutions.

Melvin v. Pence, 130 F. (2d) 423 (App. D. C.); National

Surety Co. v. Page, 58 F. (2d) 145 (C. C. A. 4), rehearing

denied, 59 F. (2d) 370.

* The court below indicated (R. 50) that in its judgment

the presentation of charges to a Bar Association, while

privileged, is beyond the scope of a prosecutor’s normal duties

and therefore not protected by the immunity doctrine ex-

pressed in Cooper v. O’Connor, supra. Cf. Colpoys v. Gates,

118 F. (2d) 16 (App. D.C.).

AER PR AY a OL Tertiary EERE

. MC

7

court below held, the allegations of these para-

graphs, together with those of paragraph 27, are

clearly too vague and indefinite to stand alone as

a cause of action when the main allegations of the

complaint relating to official misconduct on the

part of the respondents are stricken.

Moreover, the question before the district court

in the instant case was whether to allow the pro-

posed third amended complaint as a whole to be

filed. Paragraphs 13, 14, and 27 constitute a

minor undeveloped portion of a long complaint

based primarily on the charge of malicious prose-

eution of criminal offenses. By its dismissal of

the second amended complaint, the district court

had already ruled that the criminal proceedings

presented no ground for relief, and petitioner had

taken no appeal from that order. Yet the bulk

of his third amended complaint consisted of a

repetition, with only unimportant amplifications

of evidentiary details, of the very same allegations

which he had made in the second amended com-

plaint. Clearly, therefore, the inference is war-

ranted that petitioner’s asserted cause of action

rested primarily upon the allegations of false

criminal charges just as had been the case with

all the prior complaints he had filed, and the court

was under no duty to allow him to file a complaint

the main portion of which consisted of a replead-

ing of facts which had already been properly held

insufficient to constitute a cause of action.

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CONCLUSION

The action of the district court in denying leave

to file a third amended complaint involved no

abuse of discretion, but on the other hand was

plainly in accordance with applicable decisions of

this Court, and the judgment of the court below

affirming that action presents no question war-

ranting further review. Accordingly, we respect-

fully submit that the petition for a writ of certi-

orari should be denied.

CHARLES Fany,

Solicitor General.

Tom C. CLARK,

Assistant Attorney General.

CHesTeR T. Lane,

Epwarp G. JENNINGS,

Special Assistants to the Attorney General.

BEATRICE ROSENBERG,

Attorney.

Aprin 1944.

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE; 1944

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