Brief on Behalf of State of Louisiana — Michel v. Louisiana

; | :

MO ge. om | HAROLD 6. WILLEY Clerk

In the

Supreme Court uf the United States

, Oc TOBER TERM. 1955: f

JOHN MICHEL. | PETITIONER.

"STATE OF. LOUISIANA —

On Writ of Certiorari'to the Kupreme Court of the State

, of Louisiana.

i oor i

BRIEF ON BEHALF OF THE STATE OF

Potaicuriotites

\ e . : 2 < .

. _ “FRED S_ LeBLANC,

% 4 9 Attorney fre rerat :

“5 aes os MICHAEL E. CULLIGAN,

ae . . Ay fatané Atte ey Gon ral

EON D. HUBERT. Se:,

‘ Distrie Attorney

ADRIAN %. DUPLANTIER,

Fives? 4x stan?

fhist 14 y

ior — f rt Bu

New Orlear I may

SUBJECT INDEX,

Statement of Issues casca ie 1

Aveuinant |

I. The Louisiana law which ‘provides a.time

limitation for filing objections to the m&n- —

ner of. selecting a grand jury “does not

violate any federal constitutional provisiof “3-7 "

I. Federal | courts, as a general rule,. must

accept, the interpretation placed upon state

statutes by state courts - ees ass

IF. The Wilson doctrine | is not'an. “evasion” to . |

deprive petitioner of a ‘federal right. ee ae

IV. R.S2 1 5:202 as interpreted in the. Wilson

“ease isa valid procedural statute which does

not unreasonably interfere with the as-

y |. Sertion of fede Se Re ee

Conelusion ee sabes Sr ote eet 49°

‘TABLE OF AUTHORITIFS

Cuses: 3

. Avery v. lie 308 U. ra 444; 60 S . Ct. 321,

> eB Ble77 Gey Re |

Bailey v. Coanmomodati 193 Va. 814, 71 S.E. 2d. |

R68 (1952), cert den, 344°US. 866, 73 S:Ct.

186, 97 L.Ed. 686 (1952) 8

Bellingham Bay .& BCR. Co. v. New Whatcom,

172 US. 314, 19 S.Ct. 205, 43 L.Ed. . 460

NY cc ai ea 5

a

ow.

11 : a

Tables oO}. dulhorities-——4 ( ( ‘ontinued )

Yep: : ee Page

Burford v. Sun Oil Co.:, 319 U.S. -315, :63 S.Ct.

‘1098, 87 L.Ed. 1424 (1943).

Edelman wv. California, oe US, 357, 73 S.Ct.

7 993. 97 fd. 387 (1953) So ae

Parker v. INinois, goo US. a 68 S.Ct. 708, 92

L.Ed. 886. (1948) picpuche ee |

Rogers —iihend ae ae 24 S.Ct: 257, -

48 L.Ed. 417 (1904) © IG metic ee

Snyder v, Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 54 S.Ct.

330, 78°L Ed. 674 (1934) - . Saas 18 -

State v. Chianelli, 226 La. 552, 76 So.2d:727 2S *

f+ eereak ieee . je oe oe

‘State v. Wilson, 204 La. 24, 14 So. 2d 873: 320

U.S. 714, 64 S.Ct. 257, 88 L.Ed. 419

(1943). ae meen AS

Stein v. New York. 346 U. s, 156, 38 S.Ct.- 1077,

97 L.Ed. 1522 (1953). URNS Rae : 18

Williams v. Georgia, 349 USS. 156, 75 S.Ct. 814, |

90 ti: TOR LINO i

- Williams v. Kaiser, 393 U; 3. 471, 65 Sct ee

; 89 L.Ed. 398 (1945). : a.

Yakus v. United ‘Sites: 32} US ta 64S a

660, 88 L.Ed. 834 (1944). 7 16

Statutes: ° SA Rat, ean . nate

Article 202; Louisidna Code’ of Criminal - Pro- -.

cede (1028) 3 La R:S. 1B: 202. 34, 12

“7.

| :* the : :

Supreme Court of the Mnite® States.

‘OCTOBER TERM, 1955

Jolin MICHEL, P ETITIONER,

Us,

STATE OF peak }

On Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State ©

: of Louisiana.

_— ON BEHALF OF THE STATE. OF

LOUISIANA.

SN

‘STATEMENT OF ISSUES

rr

‘May it please the Court: |

The facts: of this. case are succmetly stated by:

the Supreme Court of Louisiana in the opinion

which is repr oduced at pages 45-57 of the record.

As the opinion well illustrates, the State’s case -

acainat netitioner “an its merits was very strong.

Se py SESS Sms _-~—st -

‘In fact, the State produced the direct testimony

of two eyé-witnesses’ to the crime, strong and .

ss igh

(1).

’ plentiful corroborative evidence, and a free and

voluntary confession by petitioner. This is, thus,

not a situation where constitutional rights were

violated to. Strengthen a weak case. gi

On February 13, 1953, patitioner, : a Negro, Was

indicted for aggravated. rape by the grand jury.

for the Parish of Orleans, which was empaneled

to serve igen September 2 2, 1952'to Mareley, 1! 153.

(R. 1-2 On the same day upon w hich t e term.

_of the aie jury ended, to wit; March. 2, 1953, .

the court appointed counsel to répresent petitioner. :

CR. 3.). Although some attempt . « Made. by coun-

sel for petitioner in his br ief to show that he was

not appointed on thig date, there actually is no |

doubt about it. The minutes of the court evidence

the appointment (R. 3); the evidence taken on |

the question shows it clear ly; (R. 30-37), the per: |

curiam of the lower court is unequivocal on the

point (R. 40); and the Supreme. Court of Loui-

‘giana recognized the appointment as having been

made on March 2, 1953. (R. 47). |

On March 9, 1953, petitioner filed a motion to

quash the indictment on the ground that he was

aeprived or aue process and of equai protection |

_ of the law because there had been systematic ex-

clusion of Negroes from the grand jury which

indicted him. (R. 15-16). The State filed an

. answer and demurrer to this motion to quash on

. the ground | that it had not been Teeay within the

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time limit italia for filing such pleas by the

law of Louisiana (R.17). The trial court sustained | |

‘the demurrer (R. 18), and this ruling was. affirmed

by the Supreme Court. of’ Louisiana. (R. 46-48). |

_ It is important: to note at. this point that the

only matter at issue and passed upon by the Loui-.

siana courts was whether petitioner’s motion to °

quash was filed timely. The Louisiana courts did

not and could not .as the issues were presented,

-! pass upon the question of whethér there had been

~ in fact systematic exciusion of Negroes from the.

grand jury. That question was. never befor®the

Court.

Louisiana eourts,” and it is not now before Bi

Thus, the only issue before this Court is whether

the Louisiana procedural stat jte which requires a\

motion to quash an indictment on the ground of \

the illegality of a grand jury to be filed within

a definite time limitation violates any federal con- ,

stitutional right of petianene.

4

ARGUMENT

L

The bsoiiadiiian lea which provides astime limi-

tation. forAlling objections to the manner of select-

ing a grand jury does not. violate any federal! con-

oi,

stitutional provision. La. Rev. Stat. AS: 202 and

the. Wilson. case.

>

_ In. 1928 Louisiana adopted®a compreliensive

‘Code of Criminal Pi -ocedure. This Code was ré-

-enacted verbatim by the Legislature of tavidins

in 1950. in a general revision of the Louisiana |

‘ statutes. The 1928 Code became Title’ 1 15 of the.

.* Louisiana Revised Statutes’ of 1950. Articles 202

| of this Code (or R. S.15: 202) provides as follows:

' “$202. TIME FOR URGING OBJE :CTIONS,

| TQ ARRAY: WAIV ER |

oe All Gbjections to the manner of selecting: or

_drawing any juror or jury or to any defect |

or irregularity that can-be. pleaded against.

_any array or venire must be filed, pleaded,

_ heard or urged before the expiration -of the ._

- '- third judicial day of the term for which said

jur y shall have been drawn, or before enter-

ing upon the trial of the case if it be ear

sdoner; otherwi ise, all such objections shal

be consider ed as waived and shall: not ate

war ds be urged or heard.” Ce

3\

It should be noted ‘that while ‘this section does

_ not specifically refer to grand juries, it is con-

tained ina a of the Code entitled ‘ ‘Grand and —

Petit Lwries”. It is thus clear that Article 202 by —

‘inclusion in: a- Part so entitled, deals with both -

.grand and petit juries. As‘will be seen hereafter, :

this has alw ays been the interpr etation placed. upon

it by the courts of Louisiana.

In 1943, the Supreme Court of Louisiana, in a

case identical in every respect with the instant ©

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case, interpreted Article 202 ts Mean that an ac-

cused could gile attacks upon the gr: and jury only.

until the third judicial day azter the end of the

‘grand jury term. | Siate v. Wilson, 204 ia.24, 14

S. (2d) Se ( 1943 ), 920 U.S: 714. | : ane

in the instant ease, the mot ion to quesa was-not

tiled sata March 9, 1953, or seven days after the

pp of the ecu jury term, which ended March 2,

53. Thus ‘it is clear that petigerer filed his

a pert too oe andthe ‘ Supreme Court of Loui-

sjana so held; ; firming the Wilson case. |

Before discussing the constitutional ‘vali ty of

the Wilson doctrine, w hich. was affirmed ahd ap-s

a in the instant case. by the: Louisi: ana courts,

it is well to note a.few Mnatter's about the Wilson

ZZ €ase.: pate ms | Sete ao i

ae © The Supocuis Court of Louisiana in the Wil-

son case clear ly recognized that Ar title 202 as ap-.

pGcable to gr ang juries s should be interpreted: to.

.. A an accused three days after the end of the

grand jury term, “hecatise if the time limitation

should be inter preted to mean three days.after the’

beginning. of the. six, months term af the grand 3

jury, no opportunity to make an attack upon the

a Bh sce jury w ould be afforded. those persons who

‘were indicted after these th¥ee days had élapsed.

3

Thus the Supreme ‘Court of Louisiana recognize d

the principle that.a defendant is entitled to a

reasonable time within which to raise federal con-

B

ania

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stitutional questions, and interpr eted Article 202

_S0 as to provide Such a period. | ,

. The Supreme Court’ of the United States

iad an appeal in the Wilson ease, but there-

ajfler dismissed the appeat i ma per cur tani reading .

as follows: : ‘

s

“The motion to dismiss is gr bind and the:

appeal is dismissed, it appearing that-the de-

cision is based upon a non-federal ground ade-

quate to support it.”’See Wilson v. Louisiana,

.320. U.S. 4, 64 hea Ct: 207, 88 L.Ed. 419

(1943). . 7 3

. Thus, this Court. has iteads ps assed upon n. fhe

precise issue involved. in this, case, and: jhas ap--

_ proved the Wilson doctrine. Actiég under the Wil-

son decision-as approved by this Court, the Loui-

stana Supreme Court held that the motion to quash

in the instant case was filed too late. Under the

rule announced by the United States Supreme

Court in the Wilson case, the decision of the Louisi-

ana Supr emé Court ih the instant ease shoyld be.

aftirmed;: being * ‘based upon a: non-federal ground .

adefuate to support. it’. The United: States: Su-

preme ‘Court is without power. to decide whether

_ Aonstitutional rights have been violated when the

federal questions-are. not seasonably raised in ace

- cordance with state Iaw.. EB “pesuege ve € Jalifornia,

ae d44U.5 5. 357, 73 Sup. Ct. 293 oh. Ed.: 387 (1953).

- M oe 4 -, we o Z

Sek Reale

Le ;

Federal courts, as a gen€ral rule, must accept

See

the interpretation placed upen ‘ state statutes ‘by

- state apie Poe |

It is/a Well-cstablished printiple that federal

courts Must necept the meaning and interpretation.

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placed on a state statute by. State. ‘courtss: The

Us ited States Supweme Court?! has always insisted,

hat state’ courts be permitted to decide questions

7 state law, and has even had federal courts de-

cline jurisdiction, to await a ruling from a‘state,

court: Cf Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U:S. 315, 63

Sup: Ct. 1098, 87 1. Ed: 4424 (1943); Williams

ial 325 U.S. 471, 65 Sup. Ct. 363 >, 89 Lid:

8 (1945). | ree

This doctrine does not prevent the Supreme

Court of the United : ‘States fron: determining

whether the’ statute aS SO ‘interpreted, violates Q

redler ral | ceemitiectivoad privilege. But it’ does me: in

iat the Stipreme Court 0! the United St: ites will

ee undertake: to place an_ interpret: ation: upon a-

“ate statute different from that. ‘given it: by: the -

Beaks conyts. ePVeEN tough ‘it nyki\not, aApree Ww ith.

the inter pre tution. It has been recogni: zed that: the@

_ orfiy -instance: in wilieiy this generai rule Wili not,

“be «pplied is where the circumstances give rise to

an infer ‘erice that the state “court is guilty ot ae

“evasion” an interpretation of state’ law with the

‘specifie intent to deprive a t litigant. of a federal |

.

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prohibit: ed “er

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many times since the Ww isda doctrine was enun-

8

right. See Williams wv. Georgia, 349 US . 875 at

399, 7 5 Sup: Ct. SM, 99 L.Ed. advance ae oS

see ie. bg

The Wilson doctrine is not an’ “evasion” to

deprive petitioner of a federal right. :

Petitioner o that the Wilson doctrine is a

rule stated above. T his j is based on ‘the theor y that

Article 202 does not mean Ww hat the Supi eme Court

of Louisiana says it means. It shoulil be. remem-

bered that the Wilson doctrine was not developed

for the instant case but has ‘been tiie law of Loui-

siana since. the Wilson decision was approved by

this Court thirteen years ago. The Supreme Court:

of Louisiana adhered to its prior interpretation of

Article 202 in this case.and its companion case,

State v. Labat and Poret, and-also’i In-a later case,

State v., Chianelli, 226 La... 952 76 (S2d) 737

(1954), 7.

siane 1 Supre eme’ Court's in its opinion in this case

‘ x + =

. a0), fiat the LL ouisketia Legislature has met

sion” within the intendment oi the |

:°

Chi ited. “Not only has the Legis lature not changed. .

the Wilson dectri: 1, but. it has approved it by re- -

enacting Article 202 of the Criminal! Code without

enange in 1950 as Section 202 of Titte 15 of the

Lousiana | Revised: Statutes,

{ Oo =

It is cle: ir from the re asoning of the opinion in

the wr, ilson case that,the Court was rot attempting

to “evade”: In fact quite the contrary is evident.

The ‘Touidiann Supreme Court in the Wilson case”

interpreted Article 202 i in the most liber ‘al: manner

possible, per Thitting - ra defendant: to .attuck the

grand jury until three days‘after the end of the

grand jury term instead of three days after the

beginunig thereor. The effect.of the decision is to

give a defendant -more time, not less time, to raise

federal questions. In fact, the meticulous concern

of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the protection

i tederal rights is the certral theme of the de-

cision. For ex ‘ample, the following language from

the “gue A in Wilson on rehearing is: significant:

3 . Obviously, under the eonstruction re-_

wii the filing of the motion to quash with-

in three judicial days after the Grand Jury

is dfawn, the defendant would not be afforded

an opportunity, through proper pleadings, to

challenge the legality of the drawing and se-

lectine of the jur y, the array‘or venire. There-

- fore, this Court, by giving Article 202 sueh

constraction would unquestionably: make its

proy ISLUTIS Ulco! istit tutional under ‘our . State

and Feder ‘al Constitutions because ofa deni: aul

of due process of Jaw.

“While the constitutionality y of Aces

_ of the Code of Criminal Pr ocedure is not 9

tacked in this case. it is clear that its pro-

visions apply te all persons charred with

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crime’ regardless 6f color, race, or previous.

condition of* servitude and, romestny it does

ot conflict with the provisions of the articles

of the State and Federal Constitutions guar-

anteeing: per sohs the equal protection of the

-law.’ Neither gs the-constuction w hich we

have placed upon its provisions in the major-

ity opinion.deny to-any person char ged with

Violating a- criminal law, ‘the “equal protec-

tion of the law beeause of race: color, or

a previaus condition of servitude. The inter-

; pretation which we have placed upon the sta-

tute is in keeping with ofr previous holdings;

in cé ses Where persons of the white race were

tried for criminal offenses and failed to com-

ply with the. provisions of Article 202 of the.

Code of Crimi inal P rocedure in attacking the’

egality of the drawin ig and selecting of the

Grand Jury, that-the pea came too late and

would’ not be cénsidered.” S/ate v. Welson,

204 La. 24, at 75- 76, 14S. (2d) 873 (1943).

In-State v.-Chiar ielli, supra, decided after the

instant: ‘case, this concern about federal rights w as

"" again. expressed by the Supreme Court of” Loui-

siana in these-awords:

; “We are conscions ¢ of the fact that under

the interpretation giveh to Article 202 by the.

Wil Son Case and others following it an. ac-

cused can indefinitely delay th. trial of his

‘case by w aiting until the date-fixed for trial

to object. te the petit jury ariay or venire.

However, to avoid these unnecessary delays:

Article 202 of the: Code of Criminal Proce-

4 ; é a ete a)

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