Amicus Curiae Brief — People Not Politicians, et al., Applicants v. Robert Onder, et al.

No. 26A326

______________________________

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

______________________________

PEOPLE NOT POLITICIANS AND RICHARD VON GLAHN,

Applicants,

v.

CONGRESSMAN ROBERT ONDER, et al.,

Respondents.

and

STATE OF MISSOURI AND DENNY HOSKINS,

in his official capacity as Missouri Secretary of State,

___________________________

Respondents.

BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER, AMERICAN

CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF MISSOURI FOUNDATION, AND AMERICAN

CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION IN SUPPORT OF APPLICANTS

______________________________

Gillian R. Wilcox

Jason Orr

Jonathan D. Schmid

Kristin M. Mulvey

ACLU OF MISSOURI FOUNDATION

406 W. 34th Street, Suite 420

Kansas City, MO 64111

Ming Cheung

Cecillia D. Wang

Sophia Lin Lakin

Dayton Campbell-Harris

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION

FOUNDATION

125 Broad Street

New York, NY 10004

Mark P. Gaber

Counsel of Record

Aseem Mulji

Simone Leeper

Benjamin Phillips

Isaac DeSanto

CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER

1101 14th Street NW, Suite 400

Washington, DC 20005

(202) 736-2000

mgaber@campaignlegalcenter.org

Annabelle E. Harless

CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER

55 W. Monroe Street, Suite 1925

Chicago, IL 60603

Counsel for Amici

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE ................................................................................. 1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ........................................................................................ 3

ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................. 5

I.

The district court lacked jurisdiction to mandate use of the HB 1 map...... 5

II.

The district court’s order violates federal law. ............................................. 9

III.

The district court’s order violates Purcell. .................................................. 13

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 15

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Pages

Abbott v. League of United Latin American Citizens, 146 S. Ct. 418 (2025) ............. 13

Allen v. Milligan, 599 U.S. 1 (2023) ............................................................................... 1

Allen v. Milligan, 146 S. Ct. 1377 (2026)..................................................................... 13

Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission,

576 U.S. 787 (2015) ............................................................................................. 1, 11

Armour v. Ohio, 925 F.2d 987 (6th Cir. 1991)............................................................... 5

Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, Inc., 575 U.S. 320 (2015) ............................ 12

Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254 (2003) ......................................................................... 11

Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)........................ 1

Coleman v. Ashcroft, 696 S.W.3d 347 (Mo. 2024) ......................................................... 2

Department of Commerce v. New York, 588 U.S. 752 (2019) ........................................ 1

Gill v. Whitford, 585 U.S. 48 (2018)............................................................................... 1

Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25 (1993)........................................................................... 13

Hoskins v. Von Glahn, No. 26A304 (S. Ct.) ................................................................... 2

Kalson v. Paterson, 542 F.3d 281 (2d Cir. 2008) ....................................................... 5, 7

Luther v. Hoskins, 730 S.W.3d 567 (Mo. 2026) ............................................................. 2

Maggard v. State, 733 S.W.3d 411 (Mo. 2026) .............................................................. 2

Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479 (1996) ...................................................... 9

Missouri State Conference of the National Association for the Advancement of

Colored People v. Ferguson-Florissant School District, 894 F.3d 924

(8th Cir. 2018) ........................................................................................................... 2

Missouri State Conference of the National Association for the Advancement of

Colored People v. State, 730 S.W.3d 550 (Mo. 2026) ............................................... 2

Moore v. Harper, 600 U.S. 1 (2023) .......................................................................... 1, 10

ii

Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975)..................................................................... 12

No Bans on Choice v. Ashcroft, 638 S.W.3d 484 (Mo. 2022) ......................................... 2

Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565 (1916) ................................................ 11

Perry v. Perez, 565 U.S. 388 (2012) .............................................................................. 13

Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) .......................................................................... 1

Rucho v. Common Cause, 588 U.S. 684 (2019) ............................................................. 1

Shapiro v. McManus, 577 U.S. 39 (2015) ...................................................................... 5

Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944)........................................................................ 1

State v. League of Women Voters of Missouri, 730 S.W.3d 591 (Mo. 2026) ................. 2

State ex rel. Fitz-James v. Bailey, 670 S.W.3d 1 (Mo. 2023) ......................................... 2

Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) ..................................................................... 1

United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Co-op., 532 U.S. 483 (2001) ................. 12

Von Glahn v. Hoskins, No. SC101805, 2026 WL 2628846 (Mo. Sep. 3, 2026) ............. 2

Watson v. Republican National Committee, 146 S. Ct. 2165 (2026) ............................ 1

Wise v. State, 732 S.W.3d 827 (Mo. 2026).................................................................. 1, 2

Statutes

2 U.S.C. § 2c .............................................................................................................. 4, 10

2 U.S.C. § 2a(c) .............................................................................................................. 10

28 U.S.C. § 1253.............................................................................................................. 5

28 U.S.C. § 2284(a) ..................................................................................................... 5, 6

28 U.S.C. § 2284(b)(1) ................................................................................................. 6, 7

28 U.S.C. § 2284(b)(3) ................................................................................................. 6, 8

Constitutional Provisions

U.S. Const. amend. XIV ................................................................................................. 6

iii

U.S. Const. art. I, § 2 ...................................................................................................... 6

U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 ....................................................................................... 6, 10

iv

INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE1

Campaign Legal Center (“CLC”) is a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization

dedicated to securing free and fair elections for all voters. CLC regularly litigates

before this Court and state high courts on voting rights and redistricting matters,

including as counsel for parties or amici curiae in Watson v. Republican National

Committee, 146 S. Ct. 2165 (2026), Moore v. Harper, 600 U.S. 1 (2023), Rucho v.

Common Cause, 588 U.S. 684 (2019), Gill v. Whitford, 585 U.S. 48 (2018), and Arizona

State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, 576 U.S. 787

(2015).

The American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) is a nationwide, non-profit, nonpartisan organization with more than 1.7 million members, founded in 1920 and

dedicated to the principles of liberty and equality enshrined in the Constitution. In

support of those principles, the ACLU has appeared before this Court as counsel or

amicus curiae in numerous cases involving electoral democracy or redistricting,

including Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944), Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533

(1964), Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986), Citizens United v. Federal Election

Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), Department of Commerce v. New York, 588 U.S.

752 (2019), Allen v. Milligan, 599 U.S. 1 (2023), and Moore v. Harper, 600 U.S. 1

(2023). The ACLU has an interest in promoting free and fair elections and fair

districting, including specifically in Missouri, having served as counsel in Wise v.

1 No counsel for any party has authored this brief in whole or in part, and no entity

or person, aside from amici curiae and their counsel, made any monetary contribution

intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief.

1

State, 732 S.W.3d 827 (Mo. 2026), and Missouri State Conference of the National

Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. Ferguson-Florissant School

District, 894 F.3d 924 (8th Cir. 2018); both cases sought to address the harmful

impacts of the challenged districts on minority voters in Missouri.

The American Civil Liberties Union of Missouri (“ACLU-MO”) is the statewide

affiliate of the ACLU, with over 20,000 members and a longstanding interest in and

history of protecting the constitutional rights of all Missourians. Through direct

representation or on behalf of amicus curiae, the ACLU-MO regularly engages in

litigation to protect rights related to voting, including the right to referendum. These

cases include, but are not limited to Maggard v. State, 733 S.W.3d 411 (Mo. 2026);

State v. League of Women Voters of Missouri, 730 S.W.3d 591 (Mo. 2026); Missouri

State Conference of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v.

State, 730 S.W.3d 550 (Mo. 2026); Coleman v. Ashcroft, 696 S.W.3d 347 (Mo.

2024); State ex rel. Fitz-James v. Bailey, 670 S.W.3d 1 (Mo. 2023); and No Bans on

Choice v. Ashcroft, 638 S.W.3d 484 (Mo. 2022).

CLC, ACLU, and ACLU-MO participated as amici in Von Glahn v. Hoskins,

No. SC101805, 2026 WL 2628846 (Mo. Sep. 3, 2026) and in Luther v. Hoskins, 730

S.W.3d 567 (Mo. 2026), and were counsel for the plaintiffs in Wise v. State, 732 S.W.3d

827 (Mo. 2026). They also submitted an amicus brief in this Court on Monday in

Hoskins v. Von Glahn, No. 26A304 (S. Ct.). Each has an interest in ensuring

Missourians the opportunity to vote in lawful congressional districts and in the sound

interpretation of federal law governing redistricting and redistricting litigation.

2

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

What was originally a manufactured emergency by Missouri’s Secretary of

State is now a real one. Moments after this Court declined to stay the Missouri

Supreme Court’s unanimous order and injunction, a single federal district judge

decided to intervene and second-guess the decisions of this Court and the state high

court. This is simply unprecedented and must be urgently halted.

The district court had no jurisdiction to enter its temporary restraining order

(“TRO”), the TRO violates federal law, and the Secretary is purporting to comply in a

manner that violates both Missouri and federal law. After months of a cynical scheme

to run out the clock and cause chaos in Missouri’s elections, Secretary Hoskins was

told by the Missouri Supreme Court that HB 1 (the 2025 congressional map) “is not

the law and has never been the law,” and that the 2022 map was the only legal map

in Missouri. App. 27a n.8. Secretary Hoskins applied to this Court for emergency

relief, and Justice Kavanaugh denied the Secretary’s request. Less than half an hour

later, a single judge of the federal District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri

issued an order purporting to enjoin the Secretary from using any map other than the

HB 1 map, a map that “is not the law and has never been the law” in Missouri. Id.

The TRO must be urgently stayed.

First, in effect, the TRO leaves Missouri with no congressional map whatsoever.

This is an untenable situation, and one that directly violates federal law, which

requires a lawful congressional map. Moreover, the district court cannot require the

use of the HB 1 map as the Secretary claims it has done. Among many other

jurisdictional infirmities, the district court failed to take the required steps to convene

3

a three-judge district court as federal law requires, and a single judge cannot issue a

mandatory injunction in this situation. Recognizing this limitation, the district court

purported to issue only a TRO preventing the Secretary from using any map other

than HB 1. But this order results in no congressional map at all, because it does not

and cannot disturb the Missouri Supreme Court’s order enjoining the Secretary from

using HB 1—an order Justice Kavanaugh declined to stay.

Second, the TRO itself violates the Elections Clause and federal law.

Exercising

its

Elections

Clause

authority,

Congress

has

mandated

that

Representatives be elected from districts, and those districts may “only” be those

“established by law.” 2 U.S.C. § 2c. An order that leaves a State with no map—or with

a map the court lacks jurisdiction to impose—is decidedly not the “law” and thus

flouts both Section 2c and Congress’s Elections Clause authority. A district court

cannot order relief that compels a violation of federal law, and its equitable authority

to issue a temporary injunction does not give it license to override Congress’s express

directives or the Constitution. There must be a map, and that map is the 2022 map

the Missouri Supreme Court ordered to be used.

Third, the district court’s order is a stark violation of the Purcell principle.

While claiming to preserve the status quo, the district court’s order violently upended

the status quo less than two months before the general election, and minutes after

Justice Kavanaugh rejected the Secretary’s request to do just that. To avoid a

violation of the Elections Clause and federal statutes passed pursuant to it, this Court

4

should immediately stay the order below, including by granting an administrative

stay.

ARGUMENT

I.

The district court lacked jurisdiction to mandate use of the HB 1 map.

The district court lacks jurisdiction to mandate the use of HB 1—and indeed

the court’s order did not expressly do so, see infra. When an action is filed challenging

the constitutionality of a congressional map, a “district court of three judges shall be

convened.” 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a). This mandatory language “creates an obligation

impervious to judicial discretion.” Shapiro v. McManus, 577 U.S. 39, 43 (2015).

Though the statute mentions a “request” for a three-judge court being “fil[ed],” the

mandatory language in the statute makes the convening of a three-judge court a

“jurisdictional requirement once it becomes clear” there is a plausible constitutional

claim satisfying the conditions set forth in § 2284(a). See Armour v. Ohio, 925 F.2d

987, 989 (6th Cir. 1991); see also Kalson v. Paterson, 542 F.3d 281, 286-87 (2d Cir.

2008) (holding that Section 2284 is jurisdictional and a three-judge court must be

convened even in the absence of a party’s request). Whether one or three federal

judges must hear a case (and thus whether this Court has mandatory appellate

review) is not a decision left to the plaintiff’s prerogative.2 Thus, upon determining

that the action challenges the constitutionality of a congressional map, the single

2 This is plain from the corresponding statute establishing appellate jurisdiction. See

28 U.S.C. § 1253 (providing for direct review in this Court of cases “required by any

Act of Congress to be heard and determined by a district court of three judges”).

5

district judge must “immediately notify the chief judge of the circuit” who then must

take steps to empanel two other judges. 28 U.S.C. § 2284(b)(1).

A single judge is limited in what actions can be taken on his or her own in cases

required to be adjudicated by three-judge courts. Upon “a specific finding, based on

evidence submitted, that specified irreparable damage will result if the order is not

granted,” the single judge may issue a TRO. 28 U.S.C. § 2284(b)(3). But the single

judge may not “hear and determine any application for a preliminary or permanent

injunction.” Id. That is especially the case where, like here, that single judge is

mandating the use of a districting plan that was never lawfully enacted.

Furthermore, “[a]ny action of a single judge,” including issuance of a TRO, “may be

reviewed by the full court at any time.” Id.

There is no question that Plaintiffs’ complaint seeks to enjoin the use of

Missouri’s legally operative congressional map—the 2022 map—based on claims that

its use in the 2026 general election would violate the federal Constitution. See, e.g.,

ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 50-1093 (alleging that implementing the 2022 congressional map

violates U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1; art. I, § 2, and amend. XIV); id. at Prayer for

Relief (seeking declaration that “failure to use the HB1 Congressional maps—as

ordered by von Glahn—is unconstitutional”). Once it was clear Plaintiffs challenged

the constitutionality of congressional apportionment, a panel was required.4

3 ECF citations are to the district court docket below, Onder v. Missouri, No. 4:26-cv-

01424-SRC (E.D. Mo.).

4 To the extent Respondents contend that their case was a constitutional challenge to

the state supreme court’s order and not the State’s congressional map, that is mere

6

The single district court judge failed to take any steps to convene a three-judge

court as it was “immediately” required to do. 28 U.S.C. § 2284(b)(1). Plaintiffs’ failure

to request a three-judge court did not eliminate the district court’s jurisdictional

obligation, once the statutory conditions were satisfied, to comply with

Section 2284(b)(1)’s requirement that it act “immediately.” See, e.g., Kalson, 542 F.3d

at 286-87. Yet the district court did not, and still has not, done so.

The nature of the challenge was apparent to the district court from the start—

it ordered expedited briefing on September 5 (one day after the complaint was filed)

as to other jurisdictional hurdles. ECF No. 13. The district court was also aware of

the necessity for a three-judge court because Intervenors raised the issue. ECF No.

12-4 at 15. Rather than notifying the Chief Judge of the Eighth Circuit to request the

appointment of two additional judges, the district court waited three more days and

then issued its TRO less than half an hour after Justice Kavanaugh denied the

Secretary’s application to stay the state supreme court’s order.

The Chief Judge of the Eighth Circuit surely would have acted with haste,

given the urgent nature of this case, to appoint two additional judges to provide the

necessary complement of three judges to adjudicate Plaintiffs’ request for relief. All

three judges could have participated in assessing the propriety of Plaintiffs’ request

semantics. They claim that conducting the 2026 general election under congressional

boundaries apportioned pursuant to the 2022 map that is operative Missouri law

would violate the U.S. Constitution. That is plainly a “challeng[e] [to] the

constitutionality of the apportionment of congressional districts” of the State. 28

U.S.C. § 2284(a). The remedy they sought was a different congressional map on

account of constitutional claims.

7

for relief. By failing to notify the Chief Judge of the Eighth Circuit of the pendency of

a constitutional challenge to Missouri’s congressional map and instead by proceeding

to issue a TRO, the district court improperly insulated its TRO from dissolution by

the three-judge court as Section 2284 contemplates. See 28 U.S.C. § 2284(b)(3) (“Any

action of a single judge may be reviewed by the full court at any time before final

judgment.”). The three-judge court could have already rectified the district court’s

erroneous TRO.

Furthermore, the Secretary appears to contend that the district court’s TRO

was functionally a mandatory preliminary injunction—relief that Section 2284 does

not permit a single judge to grant. This is at odds with the district court, which

characterized its order as a TRO that “enjoin[ed]” Secretary Hoskins from

“implementing . . . any congressional district map other than the HB 1 map for the

November 3, 2026 general election.” App. 13a. By the terms of the TRO, it does not

undo or affect the Missouri Supreme Court’s injunction prohibiting the use of HB 1—

it merely restrains the Secretary from using some other map (such as the 2022 map).

While it defines the prohibited maps by reference to HB 1, it does not by its terms

mandate the use of HB 1 so as to conflict with the Missouri Supreme Court’s order

prohibiting the use of HB 1. It restrains; it does not compel action. By its express

terms, the TRO thus leaves Missouri with no congressional map for an election less

than two months away.

The Secretary characterizes the district court’s order differently. He claims

that the district court ordered the “use [of] the HB 1 map.” App. 50a. And he claims

8

that any contrary reading is “patently absurd.” App. 61a. But if the Secretary is

correct and the district court in fact mandated the implementation of HB 1 for the

2026 general election—a map that is “not the law and has never been the law,”

App. 27a n.8—then that is a mandatory injunction, not a restraining order. See

Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 484 (1996) (explaining that a “mandatory

injunction” requires a “party to take action” while a “prohibitory injunction []

restrains a responsible party”) (citation modified) (emphasis added). The district court

did not dispute that HB 1 is not law and that its use violates the Missouri

Constitution. App. 5a (acknowledging that issuance of TRO would result in general

election not conducted “in accordance with the Missouri Constitution”). Because HB

1 does not spring from any source of Missouri law, the only way the TRO can compel

its use is as a court-imposed remedial map—i.e., a mandatory injunction not a

restraining order.

The TRO thus does one of two things, neither of which is tolerable. It either (1)

restrains the Secretary from using the only map legally available under Missouri law

or (2) judicially imposes HB 1 as a remedial map. The former leaves Missouri with no

congressional map while the latter exceeds the court’s TRO power under Section 2284

in the absence of three judges. On either reading, the TRO must be stayed.

II.

The district court’s order violates federal law.

The district court’s order violates the Elections Clause and federal law for

much the same reasons Amici warned a stay of the Missouri Supreme Court’s

judgment would. First, it intrudes on the legislative prerogative of the state’s

lawmaking authority, which includes the referendum and is subject to the Missouri

9

Supreme Court’s exercise of ordinary judicial review. And second, it violates the

Elections Clause’s express commitment of congressional redistricting authority to

Congress itself by ordering a violation of 2 U.S.C. § 2c. Amici focus here on the latter

violation.

The Elections Clause vests initial authority to regulate the times, places, and

manner of congressional elections in “the Legislature” of each State, which for over a

century the U.S. Supreme Court has understood to include the exercise of legislative

power by popular referendum. U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1; Moore v. Harper, 600 U.S.

1, 23-26 (2023). But the ultimate authority over congressional elections lies with

Congress, which may “at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations.” U.S.

Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.

Pursuant to its authority under the Elections Clause, Congress enacted

2 U.S.C. § 2c, which requires that “[i]n each State . . . there shall be established by

law a number of districts equal to the number of Representatives to which such State

is so entitled, and Representatives shall be elected only from districts so established.”

2 U.S.C. § 2c (emphasis added). Congress has also enacted 2 U.S.C. § 2a(c), which

similarly requires each State to “redistrict[] in the manner provided by the law thereof

after any apportionment.” 2 U.S.C. § 2a(c) (emphasis added). As this Court explained,

in 1911, Congress amended 2 U.S.C. § 2a(c) to replace language requiring

redistricting by “the legislature” of each State with a new requirement to redistrict

“in the manner provided by the law[] thereof” to accommodate states, like Missouri,

that incorporated initiative or referendum powers in their state lawmaking processes.

10

See Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 576 U.S. 787, 809

(2015); Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565, 568 (1916). When Congress

enacted 2 U.S.C. § 2c in 1967, it carried over the same principle and went even further

by requiring that “only” districts “established by law” may be used to elect

Representatives.

Congress has, in other words, expressed the final word on congressional

redistricting under the Elections Clause. It has used that authority to require all

States, including Missouri, to elect Representatives in districts, and those districts

may only be those established by law.5

The district court’s TRO directly violates 2 U.S.C. § 2c and the Elections Clause

because it prohibits Missouri from using any map other than HB 1, which is not the

“law.” In effect, it leaves the State in limbo with no legally operative congressional

districts, because the only districts “established by law” in Missouri are the 2022

districts enacted by the General Assembly, as the Missouri Supreme Court held. The

Secretary has understood the TRO to be a mandatory injunction to use HB 1, which

would also plainly violate 2 U.S.C. § 2c’s terms. As noted, the district court did not

refute that the 2022 map is the State’s map by law—and for good reason, as the

Missouri Supreme Court is the “ultimate expositor[] of state law.” Mullaney v. Wilbur,

421 U.S. 684, 691 (1975).

5 Of course, the phrase “by law” includes remedial redistricting conducted by a state

or federal court, either when the state fails to redistrict or when its redistricting map

violates state or federal law. See Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254 (2003). But the single

district court judge here had no jurisdiction to impose HB 1 as a remedial map to

remedy alleged constitutional violations. See Part I.

11

The district court instead entered its injunction based on an unsubstantiated

equitable determination that using a map other than HB 1—which is, again, not the

law—will result in irreparable harm. But no matter how a court weighs the equities,

its equitable authority does not extend to disregarding federal law. “The power of

federal courts of equity to enjoin unlawful . . . action is subject to express and implied

statutory limitations.” Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 575 U.S. 320, 327

(2015). “Courts of equity can no more disregard statutory and constitutional

requirements and provisions than can courts of law.” Id. at 327-28 (citation omitted);

see also United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Co-op., 532 U.S. 483, 497 (2001)

(“[A] court sitting in equity cannot ‘ignore the judgment of Congress, deliberately

expressed in legislation’”) (citation omitted).

This principle applies with particular force in the context of congressional

redistricting. The Elections Clause commits to Congress the ultimate, superseding

authority over congressional elections, so the relevant federal law here is not only a

congressional enactment, but the Constitution itself. Moreover, this Court has held

that when federal courts fashion remedies in redistricting cases, including interim

remedies, they are bound by the same federal-law constraints that bind the State,

which in this case, is a directive to use districts legally established by the State’s own

laws. See Perry v. Perez, 565 U.S. 388, 394 (2012) (“A district court making . . . use of

a State’s plan must, of course, take care not to incorporate into the interim plan any

legal defects in the state’s plan.”). The legal defect in HB 1 is that it is not the law.

The district court’s equitable determination does not permit it to force Missouri to use

12

an unlawful map or to leave the State without a lawful map in violation of the

Elections Clause and 2 U.S.C. § 2c. The order should be immediately stayed.

III.

The district court’s order violates Purcell.

Purcell requires granting a stay. It is difficult to conceive of a more prototypical

candidate for application of the Purcell doctrine than a single federal district judge

waiting fifteen minutes after an order of the Supreme Court to issue a contradictory

order with the effect of precluding a state from using any congressional map at all.

This Court’s precedent on this issue forecloses any other outcome. It has

repeatedly emphasized that Purcell is an equitable principle, rooted in federalism,

which forcefully warns that “lower federal courts should ordinarily not alter the

election rules on the eve of an election.” Abbott v. League of United Latin Am. Citizens,

146 S. Ct. 418, 419 (2025) (quoting Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Democratic Nat’l

Comm., 589 U.S. 423, 424 (2020) (per curiam)) (emphasis added). “[T]he Constitution

leaves with the States primary responsibility for apportionment of their federal

congressional . . . districts,” and federal courts must “neither affirmatively obstruct

state reapportionment nor permit federal litigation to be used to impede it.” Growe v.

Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 34 (1993) (emphasis added); see also Allen v. Milligan, 146 S.

Ct. 1377, 1381 (2026) (“While federal courts should not impose changes close to an

election, States are free to decide for themselves whether last-minute changes to an

election are in their best interests.”) (internal citation omitted).

The basic facts of this case are undisputed and make this Court’s path clear.

Missouri’s highest state court has unanimously issued a decision on a matter of state

electoral procedure based entirely on state constitutional grounds. App. 28a-29a.

13

What’s more, Justice Kavanaugh, presented with arguments identical to those

presented by Plaintiffs here, has already declined to stay that judgment or to

intervene in any way. Nevertheless, fully aware of all of this, the district court

granted a TRO entirely incompatible with the Missouri Supreme Court’s order on the

day of the deadline for finalizing the ballot in Missouri. See App. 13a.6 If Purcell does

not foreclose the district court’s incredibly late-breaking action in this case, it is

unclear what purpose the doctrine serves.

The district court claims that its order is necessary because “[p]reserving the

status quo entails using the same map for the general election that Missouri used for

its primaries—the HB 1 map.” App. 5a. But HB 1 is not the status quo. The Missouri

Supreme Court could not have been more clear when it stated that “HB 1 is not the

law and has never been the law;” the 2022 Map is the only “valid congressional

redistricting in effect.” App. 27a n.8. Bafflingly (and erroneously), the district court

deems this fact “irrelevant” to its decision. App. 11a. As noted supra, Part I, the

district court’s equitable authority in this case is limited to preserving the status quo.

As such, a clear and direct statement by the Missouri Supreme Court defining the

legal status quo, undisturbed by the U.S. Supreme Court, is far from “irrelevant”—it

is binding.

6 Notably, the Secretary has already taken the position that this Court is not bound

by that deadline, having previously requested a decision from this Court on his

emergency application for a stay of the state supreme court’s order by September 14.

Because that state law September 8 deadline is about the candidates appearing on

the ballot, and not which voters are assigned to which districts, there is no practical

impediment to this Court granting the relief sought here.

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Finally, the district court claimed that “[t]his case presents Purcell in reverse,”

suggesting that “the public interest concerns that the Purcell principle invokes—

avoiding voter confusion, disincentivizing voting, and preserving the fair and orderly

operation of elections—support issuing a TRO.” App. 12a. One need only review the

past day’s news coverage to see how far off the mark that is. There is nothing “fair”

or “orderly” about a federal court issuing an order that results in no possible

congressional map or in issuing an order outside its jurisdiction to compel the use of

a map that “is not the law and has never been the law,” App. 27a n.8, merely because

it was illegally used in the state’s primary election as part of an ill-fated and

misguided scheme to run the clock.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the application should be granted.

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September 9, 2026

Gillian R. Wilcox

Jason Orr

Jonathan D. Schmid

Kristin M. Mulvey

ACLU OF MISSOURI FOUNDATION

406 W. 34th Street, Suite 420

Kansas City, MO 64111

Ming Cheung

Cecillia D. Wang

Sophia Lin Lakin

Dayton Campbell-Harris

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION

FOUNDATION

125 Broad Street

New York, NY 10004

/s/ Mark P. Gaber

Mark P. Gaber

Counsel of Record

Aseem Mulji

Simone Leeper

Benjamin Phillips

Isaac DeSanto

CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER

1101 14th Street NW, Suite 400

Washington, DC 20005

(202) 736-2000

mgaber@campaignlegalcenter.org

Annabelle E. Harless

CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER

55 W. Monroe Street, Suite 1925

Chicago, IL 60603

Counsel for Amici

16