Amicus Curiae Brief — National Park Service, et al., Applicants v. National Trust for Historic Preservation in the United States
Supreme Court briefAug 18, 2026
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No. 26A203
In the Supreme Court of the United States
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE et al.,
Applicants,
v.
NATIONAL TRUST FOR HISTORIC PRESERVATION
IN THE UNITED STATES,
Respondent.
On Application for a Stay of the Injunction Issued by the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia
and Request for an Immediate Administrative Stay
BRIEF OF MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT
Elizabeth B. Wydra
Brianne J. Gorod*
Joshua D. Blecher-Cohen
Nina G. Henry
CONSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY CENTER
1730 Rhode Island Ave. NW, Suite 1200
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 296-6889
brianne@theusconstitution.org
Counsel for Amici Curiae
* Counsel of Record
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................................................................
iii
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ............................................................................
1
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ........................................
1
ARGUMENT ...........................................................................................................
3
I.
The Constitution Gives Congress—Not the President—Ultimate
Control over Federal Property, Including the White House ................
3
II.
Congress Neither Authorized nor Appropriated Funds to Demolish the
East Wing and Construct a Massive Ballroom .....................................
4
III.
There Is No National-Security Carveout to Congress’s Control over
Federal Property and Federal Spending ...............................................
8
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................
10
APPENDIX ..............................................................................................................
1A
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases
Anthropic PBC v. U.S. Dep’t of War,
825 F. Supp. 3d 1101 (N.D. Cal. 2026) ..................................................
9
Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.,
513 U.S. 561 (1995) .................................................................................
6
Hilton v. Braunskill,
481 U.S. 770 (1987) .................................................................................
3, 8
Nken v. Holder,
556 U.S. 418 (2009) .................................................................................
3, 8
President & Fellows of Harv. Coll. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,
788 F. Supp. 3d 182 (D. Mass. 2025) .....................................................
9
Sackett v. EPA,
598 U.S. 651 (2023) .................................................................................
6
Susman Godfrey LLP v. Exec. Off. of the President,
789 F. Supp. 3d 15 (D.D.C. 2025)...........................................................
9
TRW Inc. v. Andrews,
534 U.S. 19 (2001) ...................................................................................
6
U.S. Dep’t of Navy v. FLRA,
665 F.3d 1339 (D.C. Cir. 2012) ...............................................................
4
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns,
531 U.S. 457 (2001) .................................................................................
6, 8
Yates v. United States,
574 U.S. 528 (2015) .................................................................................
5
Constitutional Provisions
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8 ..................................................................................
3
U.S. Const. art. I, § 9 ..................................................................................
3
U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3 ................................................................................
1, 3
Statutes and Legislative Material
3 U.S.C. § 105 ..............................................................................................
iii
2, 5
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – cont’d
Page(s)
Act of Feb. 10, 1820, ch. 10, 3 Stat. 541 .....................................................
4
Act of Feb. 13, 1815, ch. 41, 3 Stat. 205 .....................................................
4
Act of June 23, 1949, ch. 236, 63 Stat. 231 ................................................
4
Act of June 28, 1902, ch. 1301, 32 Stat. 419 ..............................................
4
Act of Mar. 3, 1823, ch. 62, 3 Stat. 784 ......................................................
4
Act of Mar. 3, 1829, ch. 51, 4 Stat. 362 ......................................................
4
Committee on the Judiciary, Reconciliation Submission Pursuant to S.
Con. Res. 33 (May 4, 2026) (Sen. Leg. Couns. Draft MDM26A10
9PR) .........................................................................................................
8
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-117, 123 Stat.
3034 (2009) ..............................................................................................
4, 7
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, 129 Stat.
2242 (2015) ..............................................................................................
9
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-31, 131 Stat.
135 (2017) ................................................................................................
9
Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2024, Pub. L. No. 118-47,
138 Stat. 460 (2024) ................................................................................
2, 7
H.R. Rep. No. 118-145 (2023) .....................................................................
7
Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-8, 123 Stat. 524
(2009) .......................................................................................................
4
Resolution Approving PDC-0017-WA10, S. Comm. on Env’t & Pub.
Works, 111th Cong. (Feb. 4, 2010) .........................................................
4
Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act, 2000, Pub. L.
No. 106-58, 113 Stat. 430 (1999) ............................................................
7
White House Safety and Security Act of 2026, S. 4430, 119th Cong. ......
8
Other Material
Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) .....................................................
iv
7
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – cont’d
Page(s)
Brett Samuels, Trump: Cost of New Ballroom May Reach $400M, The
Hill (Dec. 17, 2025), https://thehill.com/blogs/in-the-know/5652531
-trump-cost-new-ballroom-400m ............................................................
8
U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., Principles of Federal Appropriations Law
(4th ed. 2016)...........................................................................................
5
v
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1
Amici curiae are Members of Congress who understand that the Constitution
empowers Congress—not the President—to control federal property, including
determining whether (and how) parts of the White House should be demolished or
constructed. Amici, who filed an amici curiae brief before the D.C. Circuit earlier in
this case, have a strong interest in protecting Congress’s constitutional responsibility
for federal property from executive-branch encroachment and thus in the outcome of
this application. A list of amici appears in the Appendix.
INTRODUCTION AND
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Constitution grants Congress ultimate control over all “Property belonging
to the United States,” including the power to “dispose of and make all needful Rules
and Regulations respecting” federal property. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3. The White
House is, indisputably, federal property. It was built only after Congress authorized
its construction and appropriated funds to cover that expense. And for over two
centuries since, the White House has been renovated and maintained pursuant to
congressional authorizations and appropriations. In short, whereas the President
lives in the White House for only a finite period while in office, the Constitution
entrusts Congress with making long-term decisions about the “People’s House.”
1 Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.6, amici curiae state that no counsel for
a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no party or counsel for a party
made a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of this
brief. No person other than amici curiae or their counsel made a monetary
contribution to its preparation or submission.
1
Congress neither authorized the demolition of the White House’s East Wing
and construction of a ballroom nor appropriated funds to carry out that project. To
begin, the authorization law Applicants cite “authorize[s]” Congress to act (by
appropriating funds), not the President. 3 U.S.C. § 105(d). Moreover, that law lets
Congress fund only maintenance and upkeep on the White House’s existing physical
plant, permitting funding to be used for the “care, maintenance, repair, alteration,
refurnishing, improvement, air-conditioning, heating, and lighting (including electric
power and fixtures) of the Executive Residence.” Id. § 105(d)(1). And even if that law
somehow covered the challenged project, there is an additional problem for
Applicants: Congress never appropriated funds to carry it out.
The 2024
appropriations act is narrower than § 105(d), funding only “required” and “continued
preventative maintenance” and “safety and health issues” at the Executive
Residence. Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2024, Pub. L. No. 118-47, 138
Stat. 460, 532 (2024). The appropriation itself confirms that Congress did not fund
largescale construction: the entire amount, even if devoted to that project alone,
would cover less than 1% of the ballroom’s estimated $400,000,000 cost.
Recognizing all this, two courts have held that Applicants are unlikely to
succeed on their claim that this project is lawful. See Appl. App. 35a-54a, 310a-42a.
The President nonetheless seeks to continue work on the ballroom, arguing that
national-security concerns necessitate its construction. But there is no nationalsecurity carveout to Congress’s control over federal property and federal spending. If
the President believes national-security concerns require the project, there is a
2
solution: he can bring those concerns to Congress and convince Congress to authorize
the project and appropriate the requisite funds. Until then, continued work on this
project remains unlawful, and Applicants cannot show that they are “likely to succeed
on the merits,” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009) (quoting Hilton v. Braunskill,
481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987)). The district court’s injunction should remain in place.
ARGUMENT
I.
The Constitution Gives Congress—Not the President—Ultimate
Control over Federal Property, Including the White House.
The Constitution grants Congress exclusive control over all federal property.
As a result, the executive branch can only demolish or construct federal buildings
when Congress authorizes that action and appropriates funds for it.
Three
constitutional provisions undergird that exclusive congressional authority. First, the
Property Clause gives Congress the power “to dispose of and make all needful Rules
and Regulations respecting . . . Property belonging to the United States.” U.S. Const.
art. IV, § 3. Second, the Appropriations Clause provides that “[n]o Money shall be
drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.” Id.
art. I, § 9. Third, as relevant here, the District Clause gives Congress the power to
“exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District . . . as may
. . . become the Seat of Government of the United States.” Id. art. I, § 8.
These overlapping provisions provide Congress, acting for the people, with the
sole authority to permit and fund construction on federal property in Washington,
D.C.
The Constitution thus vests Congress with exclusive authority to expand,
maintain, and renovate the White House, even as individual presidencies come and
3
go.2 And its “absolute” federal-spending authority, including over federal property,
forms “a bulwark of the Constitution’s separation of powers,” serving as a
“particularly important . . . restraint on Executive Branch officers.” U.S. Dep’t of
Navy v. FLRA, 665 F.3d 1339, 1347-48 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (Kavanaugh, J.) (quotation
marks omitted). When construction is necessary, Congress—not the President—has
acted to authorize and fund specific work. This history belies Applicants’ suggestion
that the President is empowered “to renovate, secure, and protect the White House
and its grounds . . . without exception.” Appl. 3. Allowing the President to demolish
an entire wing of the White House and rebuild it to his liking, while entirely
bypassing Congress’s constitutional role and ignoring clear statutory constraints,
disrupts the balance of powers put in place by the Constitution’s Framers.
II.
Congress Neither Authorized nor Appropriated Funds to Demolish
the East Wing and Construct a Massive Ballroom.
Congress has neither authorized nor appropriated funds for the East Wing’s
demolition and the construction of a ballroom in its stead. First, Congress has not
2 Congress has funded construction work on the White House since it was first
built shortly after the Founding. After the War of 1812, Congress passed legislation
providing for “the President’s House” to be “repaired or rebuilt forthwith” and funding
that construction. Act of Feb. 13, 1815, ch. 41, 3 Stat. 205, 205; see Act of Feb. 10,
1820, ch. 10, 3 Stat. 541, 541. Later, Congress funded a series of White House
expansions. See Act of Mar. 3, 1823, ch. 62, 3 Stat. 784, 784; Act of Mar. 3, 1829, ch.
51, 4 Stat. 362, 362-63; Act of June 28, 1902, ch. 1301, 32 Stat. 419, 460. And in the
1940s, Congress appropriated millions of dollars to modernize the White House. See
Act of June 23, 1949, ch. 236, 63 Stat. 231, 235. More recently, Congress authorized
and funded significant updates to the White House’s physical systems infrastructure.
See, e.g., Resolution Approving PDC-0017-WA10, S. Comm. on Env’t & Pub. Works,
111th Cong. (Feb. 4, 2010); Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111117, 123 Stat. 3034, 3188 (2009); Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. No. 1118, 123 Stat. 524, 661 (2009).
4
authorized such construction.
Applicants claim to find authority in 3 U.S.C.
§ 105(d)(1). See Appl. 22-26. But the text of that statute does not authorize the
demolition of an entire wing of the White House. Section 105(d) provides that “[t]here
are authorized to be appropriated each fiscal year to the President such sums as may
be necessary for” the “care, maintenance, repair, alteration, refurnishing,
improvement, air-conditioning, heating, and lighting (including electric power and
fixtures) of the Executive Residence at the White House.” 3 U.S.C. § 105(d)(1). If
later “appropriated under” this Section, those approved funds may then be spent for
the designated purposes. Id. This “appropriation authorization” operates only as a
“directive to Congress itself,” U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., Principles of Federal
Appropriations Law 2-54, 2-56 (4th ed. 2016), and, as the D.C. Circuit recognized
below, “confers no affirmative authority to act on the Executive Branch,” Appl. App.
323a.
On top of that, the text of § 105(d) provides no support for the challenged
project. Demolishing the East Wing does not fall within the meaning of “alteration”
or “improvement,” the only terms Applicants invoke to support their actions, see Appl.
22-23, and so falls outside the activities § 105(d) authorizes Congress to fund. To
start, the specific expenses listed in the statute deal with discrete aspects of upkeep
for an existing building.
These words “immediately surrounding” references to
alteration and improvement “cabin the[ir] contextual meaning.” Yates v. United
States, 574 U.S. 528, 543 (2015). This “avoid[s] ascribing to one word a meaning so
broad that it is inconsistent with its accompanying words, thus giving unintended
5
breadth to the Acts of Congress.” Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 575 (1995)
(quotation marks omitted). Here, that principle counsels against a broad reading of
“alteration” and “improvement,” which would not merely warp Congress’s statutory
text but do so at Congress’s expense, giving the President carte blanche authority to
demolish the entire White House if he so chose.
Applicants’ view of “alteration” and “improvement” would also render most of
§ 105(d) superfluous, despite the “cardinal principle of statutory construction” that
statutes must be “construed [so] that . . . no . . . word shall be superfluous, void, or
insignificant.”
TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (quotation marks
omitted). Understanding “alteration” and “improvement” to authorize changes to the
White House’s existing structure short of demolition preserves the textual
significance of each entry and avoids hiding “elephants” in statutory “mouseholes”—
something Congress does not do, as this Court has “often remarked.” Sackett v. EPA,
598 U.S. 651, 677 (2023) (quoting in part Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S.
457, 468 (2001)). Congress did not authorize the President to tear down the White
House by giving him permission to conduct routine maintenance and upkeep.3
Second, Congress never appropriated funds for the unauthorized renovations.
The 2024 Appropriations Act is narrower than § 105(d) and does not cover the East
Wing’s demolition and reconstruction as a giant ballroom. The Act appropriated “[f]or
Given Congress’s constitutional control over all federal property, the
President cannot demolish federal property without Congress’s authorization even if
private funding were available. The President could not, say, unilaterally tear down
the Washington Monument absent express congressional authorization—even if he
raised private funds to cover the cost.
3
6
the repair, alteration, and improvement of the Executive Residence at the White
House pursuant to 3 U.S.C. 105(d), $2,475,000 . . . for required maintenance,
resolution of safety and health issues, and continued preventative maintenance.” 138
Stat. at 532 (emphasis added). The challenged construction accomplishes none of
those objectives. It is not “required maintenance” or “preventative maintenance,”
both of which contemplate action taken to preserve existing property (rather than to
tear down extant structures and build new ones). See, e.g., Maintenance, Black’s Law
Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (“The care and work put into property to keep it operating
and productive; general repair and upkeep.”). Nor does “resolution of safety and
health issues” encompass the challenged project. That language has long appeared
in appropriations for White House repair and restoration.4 Paired together in the
context of a building, “safety” and “health” refer to issues related to the building’s
existing physical plant. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 118-145, at 55 (2023) (referring, in
the Act’s accompanying House Report, to a program funding space rentals for
“relocations from Federal buildings due to forced moves and relocations as a result of
health and safety conditions”). Sandwiching “safety and health” between “required
maintenance” and “continued preventative maintenance” confirms that the Act
From 1999 to 2009, the appropriation under 3 U.S.C. § 105(d) covered
“required maintenance, safety and health issues, and continued preventative
maintenance.” See, e.g., Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act,
2000, Pub. L. No. 106-58, 113 Stat. 430, 446 (1999). From 2009 onward, the
appropriation has covered “required maintenance, resolution of safety and health
issues, and continued preventative maintenance.”
See, e.g., Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2010, 123 Stat. at 3168.
4
7
covers standard issues related to building conditions (for example, crumbling facades
or asbestos remediation) rather than external security threats.
Third, the amount of appropriated funds as compared to the cost of the East
Wing demolition and reconstruction confirms the appropriation was intended to fund
only modest maintenance needs. An appropriation of $2,475,000 falls well short of
the estimated $400,000,000 needed for that project. See Brett Samuels, Trump: Cost
of New Ballroom May Reach $400M, The Hill (Dec. 17, 2025), https://thehill.com/
blogs/in-the-know/5652531-trump-cost-new-ballroom-400m.
This dramatic gap
belies any congressional plan to permit such a project. Even if all the funds Congress
appropriated for “White House Repair and Restoration” were allocated toward that
single project, they would cover less than 1% of estimated costs.5 Just as Congress
does not “hide elephants in mouseholes,” Whitman, 531 U.S. at 468, it does not fund
largescale construction projects with drop-in-the-bucket funding.
III.
There Is No National-Security Carveout to Congress’s Control over
Federal Property and Federal Spending.
Before this Court, the President argues that national-security interests weigh
in favor of its application for a stay. See Appl. 33, 38. But to merit a stay, the
President must make “a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits.”
Nken, 556 U.S. at 434 (quoting Hilton, 481 U.S. at 776); id. (“It is not enough that the
By way of contrast, recent proposals to fund East Wing renovations via
congressional action contemplate far larger sums, up to $1,000,000,000. See White
House Safety and Security Act of 2026, S. 4430, 119th Cong. ($400,000,000);
Committee on the Judiciary, Reconciliation Submission Pursuant to S. Con. Res. 33,
§ 5 (May 4, 2026) (Sen. Leg. Couns. Draft MDM26A10 9PR) ($1,000,000,000).
5
8
chance of success on the merits be better than negligible.” (quotation marks omitted)).
He has not done so here.
As discussed above, the Constitution grants Congress ultimate control over
both federal spending and federal property, including the White House.
These
constitutional powers do not contain carveouts whenever the President invokes
national-security concerns. To be sure, courts “accord[] great weight and deference
to invocations of national security,” but “such arguments are not an automatic getout-of-law-free card” that allows the executive branch to bypass Congress’s
constitutional role. Appl. App. 354a; cf. President & Fellows of Harv. Coll. v. U.S.
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 788 F. Supp. 3d 182, 201 (D. Mass. 2025) (finding it “difficult
. . . to conclude” that asserted national-security grounds were “anything other than
pretextual”); Susman Godfrey LLP v. Exec. Off. of the President, 789 F. Supp. 3d 15,
47 (D.D.C. 2025) (finding no “evidence to remotely support” any “national-securityrelated” interest); Anthropic PBC v. U.S. Dep’t of War, 825 F. Supp. 3d 1101, 1132-33
(N.D. Cal. 2026) (finding stated national-security grounds “implausible,” “contrary to
the evidence,” and “pretextual”).
If the President believes national-security concerns warrant the demolition or
construction of federal property, the Constitution requires him to come to Congress.
Indeed, Congress has passed legislation in the past addressing security needs related
to the White House. See, e.g., Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No.
114-113, 129 Stat. 2242, 2503 (2015) (appropriating funds “for security improvements
at the White House complex”); Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017, Pub. L. No.
9
115-31, 131 Stat. 135, 435 (2017) (appropriating to the Secret Service “an additional
amount for ‘Procurement, Construction, and Improvements’ for necessary expenses
for Presidential security”). And if similar needs arise now or in the future, Congress
can do so again.
Today, no less than in the past, questions about how best to protect current
and future White House residents, staff, and visitors fall well within the ambit of
Congress’s powers over federal property and federal spending. And that means that
the construction the President seeks should not proceed until Congress authorizes
that construction and appropriates the funds for it.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should deny the application.
Respectfully submitted,
Elizabeth B. Wydra
Brianne J. Gorod*
Joshua D. Blecher-Cohen
Nina G. Henry
CONSTITUTIONAL
ACCOUNTABILITY CENTER
1730 Rhode Island Ave. NW, Suite 1200
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 296-6889
brianne@theusconstitution.org
Counsel for Amici Curiae
Dated: August 18, 2026
* Counsel of Record
10
APPENDIX
APPENDIX
LIST OF AMICI CURIAE
Members of Congress
Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse
Ranking Member, Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works
Sen. Richard J. Durbin
Senate Minority Whip
Ranking Member, Senate Committee on the Judiciary
Sen. Angela Alsobrooks
Sen. Richard Blumenthal
Ranking Member, Senate Committee on Veterans’ Affairs
Sen. Martin Heinrich
Ranking Member, Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources
Sen. John Hickenlooper
Sen. Mazie K. Hirono
Sen. Amy Klobuchar
Ranking Member, Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry
Sen. Ben Ray Luján
Sen. Edward Markey
Ranking Member, Senate Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship
Sen. Gary Peters
Ranking Member, Senate Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs
Sen. Jack Reed
Ranking Member, Senate Committee on Armed Services
Sen. Adam Schiff
Sen. Jeanne Shaheen
Ranking Member, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
1A
Sen. Chris Van Hollen
Sen. Ron Wyden
Ranking Member, Senate Committee on Finance
Rep. Robert Garcia
Ranking Member, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
Rep. Jared Huffman
Ranking Member, House Committee on Natural Resources
Rep. Hakeem Jeffries
House Minority Leader
Rep. Katherine Clark
House Minority Whip
Rep. Pete Aguilar
Chair, House Democratic Caucus
Rep. Jim Himes
Ranking Member, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
Rep. Ro Khanna
Ranking Member, Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party
Rep. Rick Larsen
Ranking Member, House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
Rep. Zoe Lofgren
Ranking Member, House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology
Rep. Gregory Meeks
Ranking Member, House Committee on Foreign Affairs
Rep. Joseph Morelle
Ranking Member, House Committee on House Administration
Rep. Jamie Raskin
Ranking Member, House Committee on the Judiciary
Rep. Bobby Scott
Ranking Member, House Committee on Education and the Workforce
2A
Rep. Adam Smith
Ranking Member, House Committee on Armed Services
Rep. Mark Takano
Ranking Member, House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs
Rep. Bennie Thompson
Ranking Member, House Committee on Homeland Security
Rep. Maxine Waters
Ranking Member, House Committee on Financial Services
3A
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