Amicus Curiae Brief — Public Interest Legal Foundation, Inc., Petitioner v. Scott T. Nago, Chief Election Officer of the State of Hawaii

No.26-98

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

________________

PUBLIC INTEREST LEGAL FOUNDATION, INC.,

v.

Petitioner,

SCOTT T. NAGO, in his official capacity as Chief

Election Officer for the State of Hawaii,

________________

Respondent.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit

________________

BRIEF FOR AMICUS CURIAE CENTER FOR

ELECTION CONFIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF

PETITIONER

________________

PAUL D. CLEMENT

Counsel of Record

JAMES Y. XI

JEFFREY C. THALHOFER

CLEMENT & MURPHY, PLLC

706 Duke Street

Alexandria, VA 22314

(202) 742-8900

paul.clement@clementmurphy.com

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

August 21, 2026

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Pursuant to this Court’s Rule 29.6, Applicant

states as follows: The Center for Election Confidence

has no parent corporation, and no publicly held

corporation owns ten percent or more of its stock.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT ............. i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................... iii

STATEMENT OF INTEREST ................................... 1

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ........................... 2

ARGUMENT ............................................................... 4

I.

Public Access To Statewide Lists Of

Registered Voters Is Critical To The NVRA’s

Goals Of Accurate Voter Rolls And Increased

Registration Of Eligible Voters ........................... 4

A. Public Access to Information Concerning

Voter Rolls Is Critical to the Accuracy of

Voter Rolls .................................................... 7

B. Public Access to Information Concerning

Voter Rolls Is Critical to the Increased

Registration of Eligible Voters ..................... 9

II. The Decision Below Frustrates The NVRA’s

Purposes In The Very Circuit Where They

Are Most Essential ............................................ 11

CONCLUSION ......................................................... 17

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Bellitto v. Snipes,

302 F.Supp.3d 1335 (S.D. Fla. 2017) ...................... 6

Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm.,

594 U.S. 647 (2021) ................................ 4, 12, 15, 16

Buckley v. Valeo,

424 U.S. 1 (1976) .................................................... 11

Campaign Legal Ctr. v. Scott,

49 F.4th 931 (5th Cir. 2022) .................................... 6

Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd.,

553 U.S. 181 (2008) ............................................ 9, 13

Del. Strong Fams. v. Denn,

136 S.Ct. 2376 (2016) ............................................. 11

Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Wisc. State Legis.,

141 S.Ct. 28 (2020)................................................... 7

Greater Birmingham Ministries

v. Sec’y of State for Ala.,

105 F.4th 1324 (11th Cir. 2024) .................... 6, 9, 10

Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Inst.,

584 U.S. 756 (2018) .................................... 4, 5, 9, 11

Jud. Watch, Inc. v. Lamone,

399 F.Supp.3d 425 (D. Md. 2019) ............................ 6

La Union del Pueblo Entero v. Abbott,

167 F.4th 743 (5th Cir. 2026) .......................... 13, 16

League of Women Voters of Fla. Inc.

v. Fla. Sec’y of State,

81 F.4th 1328 (11th Cir. 2023) .............................. 13

Mont. Democratic Party v. Jacobsen,

545 P.3d 1074 (2024) ............................................. 17

iv

Project Vote/Voting for Am., Inc. v. Long,

682 F.3d 331 (4th Cir. 2012).................. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10

Purcell v. Gonzalez,

549 U.S. 1 (2006) .................................................. 5, 7

Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Benson,

2025 WL 2731704 (6th Cir. Sept. 25, 2025) ............ 6

Republican Party v. Degraffenreid,

141 S.Ct. 732 (2021)................................................. 7

Reynolds v. Sims,

377 U.S. 533 (1964) .............................................. 5, 7

Storer v. Brown,

415 U.S. 724 (1974) ................................................ 11

United States v. Paxton,

148 F.4th 335 (5th Cir. 2025) .......................... 13, 14

Va. Coalition for Immigrant Rts. v. Beals,

803 F.Supp.3d 454 (E.D. Va. 2025) ......................... 6

Veasey v. Abbott,

830 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 2016).................................. 13

Voter Reference Found., LLC v. Balderas,

616 F.Supp.3d 1132 (D.N.M. 2022) ......................... 6

Voter Reference Found., LLC v. Torrez,

160 F.4th 1068 (10th Cir. 2025) .............................. 8

Watson v. Republican Nat’l Comm.,

146 S.Ct. 2165 (2026) ............................................. 12

Statutes

52 U.S.C. §20501(b) .................................................... 4

52 U.S.C. §20501(b)(2) ................................................ 4

52 U.S.C. §20501(b)(3) ................................................ 5

52 U.S.C. §20501(b)(4) ................................................ 5

v

52 U.S.C. §20507(i)(1) ................................................ 5

52 U.S.C. §20510(b) .................................................... 8

52 U.S.C. §21083(b)(1) .............................................. 15

52 U.S.C. §21083(b)(2) .............................................. 15

Cal. Elec. Code §3000.5(a) ........................................ 13

Cal. Elec. Code §3011(a)(9) ...................................... 16

Cal. Elec. Code §3011(c) ........................................... 16

Cal. Elec. Code §3017(a)(2) ...................................... 16

Cal. Elec. Code §3019 ............................................... 14

Cal. Elec. Code §3019(a)(2) ...................................... 15

Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. §11-102(b) .............................. 13

Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. §11-106(2) .............................. 14

Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §293.269911(1) ....................... 13

Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §293.269923 ........................... 16

Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §293.269927(1) ....................... 14

Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. §254.470.................................... 16

Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. §254.470(2)(a) ........................... 13

Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. §254.470(11) ............................. 14

Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. §260.695.................................... 16

Wash. Admin. Code §434-261-051(2) ....................... 15

Wash. Admin. Code §434-261-052(2) ....................... 15

Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §29A.40.010 ......................... 13

Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §29A.40.110 ......................... 14

Other Authorities

A.B. 1921, 2015-2016 Gen. Assemb.,

Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016) ............................................ 16

vi

Bob Christie, Former San Luis Mayor Pleads

Guilty to Illegally Collecting Early Ballots

in 2020 Primary, AZCentral (June 2, 2022),

https://perma.cc/ML8R-P6EW ............................... 12

Ctr. for Election Confidence Amicus Br.,

Bost v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections,

No. 24-568 (U.S. July 29, 2025)............................... 1

John C. Fortier & Norman J. Ornstein, The

Absentee Ballot and the Secret Ballot:

Challenges for Election Reform,

36 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 483 (2003) ...................... 13

John C. Fortier, Absentee and Early Voting:

Trends, Promises, and Perils

(AEI Press 2006) .................................................... 13

Richard Gonzales, North Carolina GOP

Operative Faces New Felony Charges That

Allege Ballot Fraud, NPR (July 30, 2019),

https://perma.cc/VU86-6G8J ................................. 12

H.R. Rep. No. 103-9 (1993) ......................................... 6

Or. Dep’t of Transp., After-Action Report

Regarding Oregon Motor Voter Issues

(Oct. 7, 2024), https://perma.cc/H4A7-7EH5 ........ 14

Or. Sec’y of State, DMV Automatic Voter

Registration Error (updated Aug. 5, 2026),

https://perma.cc/RCC9-KM4T ............................... 14

D. Palmer, Absentee and Mail Ballots in

America: Improving the Integrity of the

Absentee and Mail Balloting Lawyers

Democracy Fund (Jan. 2019),

https://perma.cc/VSC4-TF8E ................................. 12

S. Rep. No. 103-6 (1993) ......................................... 6, 8

vii

Tracey Tully, Error Led to 400 Noncitizens

Voting, New Jersey Governor Says, N.Y.

Times (July 21, 2026) ............................................ 14

Voting by Mail and Absentee Voting, MIT

Election Data & Science Lab (Feb. 28,

2024), https://perma.cc/4R83-NMDQ .................... 12

STATEMENT OF INTEREST1

Center for Election Confidence, Inc. (CEC), is a

nonprofit organization that promotes ethics, integrity,

and professionalism in the electoral process. CEC

works to ensure that all eligible citizens can vote freely

within an election system with reasonable procedures

that promote election integrity, prevent vote dilution

and disenfranchisement, and instill public confidence

in election systems and outcomes. To accomplish

these objectives, CEC conducts, funds, and publishes

research and analysis regarding the effectiveness of

current and proposed election methods. CEC is a

resource for lawyers, journalists, policymakers,

courts, and others interested in the electoral process.

CEC also periodically engages in public-interest

litigation to uphold the rule of law and election

integrity and files amicus briefs in cases where its

background, expertise, and national perspective may

illuminate the issues under consideration. See, e.g.,

Ctr. for Election Confidence Amicus Br., Bost v. Ill.

State Bd. of Elections, No. 24-568 (U.S. July 29, 2025).

CEC submits this brief not to discuss the merits or the

acknowledged circuit split, which are ably addressed

in the Petition, but to explain why public access to lists

of registered voters is critical to the NVRA’s goals and

why this Court’s intervention is vital now.

1 Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.6, amicus curiae states

that no counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or in

part and that no entity or person, aside from amicus curiae, its

members, and its counsel, made any monetary contribution

toward the preparation or submission of this brief. Pursuant to

Supreme Court Rule 37.2, counsel of record were given timely

notice of this filing.

2

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Congress enacted the National Voter Registration

Act (“NVRA”) to further two complementary goals:

increasing the number of eligible voters registered and

removing ineligible voters from registration rolls.

Congress did not just leave it to election officials to try

to make strides behind closed doors.

Instead,

transparency is a cornerstone of Congress’ effort to

increase participation while securing election

integrity. The NVRA thus requires state officials to

maintain and produce records of voter-roll

maintenance programs and activities so that the

public can inspect them—and thereby verify that

states are meeting their statutory roll-maintenance

efforts and that states are neither including ineligible

voters nor excluding eligible ones. Organizations

across the political spectrum have long relied on the

public-inspection mandate to ensure that state

officials are pursuing both goals, and not one at the

expense of the other.

The NVRA’s promised transparency is critical to

Congress’ ultimate objective of ensuring that voter

rolls are both accurate and comprehensive. As to

accuracy, Congress recognized that the debasement or

dilution of eligible votes by ineligible ones both

infringes basic rights and discourages some citizens

from participating in the democratic process.

Congress also recognized that requiring transparency

would have the dual benefits of cross-checking state

roll-maintenance efforts and assuring the public that

state electoral processes are above board.

And

Congress viewed its intervention as necessary to

promote state roll-maintenance efforts because of the

3

abysmal records of voter-roll list maintenance in many

states. By excluding the most essential record that

represents the culmination of the entire process—the

voting

rolls

themselves—from

the

NVRA

transparency

mandate,

the

decision

below

undermines Congress’ goals, and it does so in a circuit

where transparency is most needed.

The public-inspection mandate is no less critical

to the NVRA’s goal of ensuring comprehensive voter

rolls. For one, public confidence in election integrity

begets more participation. And many organizations

across the political spectrum, including groups like

Greater Birmingham Ministries and Project Vote, rely

on the public-inspection mandate to ensure that

eligible voters are not excluded from the rolls. Once

again, excluding the voter rolls themselves from the

NVRA’s transparency mandate can only frustrate

efforts to ensure that the voter rolls are

comprehensive.

It is vital that the Court grant certiorari in this

case not only because the Ninth Circuit is the largest

regional circuit in terms of population and geography,

but because many jurisdictions in the Circuit have

adopted policies that make accurate voting rolls

especially critical. Unlike states in other parts of the

country that require voters to request a mail-in ballot

to receive one, several states in the Ninth Circuit

(including California, Hawaii, Nevada, Oregon, and

Washington) automatically send mail-in ballots to all

voters whose names appear on the voter roll, so that

the voter roll determines the total number of ballots

issued and circulating in each election. And unlike

states that include numerous procedures on the back

4

end to ensure that the mail-in vote is accurate (such

as identification and witness requirements), many

states in the Ninth Circuit have relatively weak

safeguards, relying on signature matching (in some

cases with a heavy thumb on the match-confirmation

side of the scale) instead of more reliable methods of

ensuring the accuracy of the vote. Making matters

worse, several states in the Ninth Circuit permit

third-party ballot collection, exacerbating concerns

about pressure, intimidation, and potential fraud. See

Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 594 U.S. 647,

686 (2021). In those states, accurate voter rolls are

especially critical to sound election administration,

and providing transparency into the voter rolls is a

critical tool to ensuring accuracy and public

confidence.

This Court should grant the petition to resolve the

acknowledged circuit split and reimpose public

oversight in the states that most urgently need it.

ARGUMENT

I.

Public Access To Statewide Lists Of

Registered Voters Is Critical To The NVRA’s

Goals Of Accurate Voter Rolls And

Increased Registration Of Eligible Voters.

In 1993, Congress enacted the NVRA to increase

eligible voter registration and remove ineligible

persons from voter registration rolls. Husted v. A.

Philip Randolph Inst., 584 U.S. 756, 761 (2018); see 52

U.S.C. §20501(b). These goals are complementary.

Increased voter registration is not an end in itself; the

point is to “enhance[] the participation of eligible

citizens as voters in elections for Federal office.” 52

U.S.C. §20501(b)(2). But without safeguards to ensure

5

that “accurate and current voter registration rolls are

maintained,” id. §20501(b)(4)—with “ineligible

persons,” including people who have moved or passed

away, removed, Husted, 584 U.S. at 761—eligible

voters’ “right of suffrage [may] be denied by a

debasement or dilution” of their votes, Purcell v.

Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4 (2006) (quoting Reynolds v.

Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964)). More generally, a

failure of public confidence in “the integrity of the

electoral process,” 52 U.S.C. §20501(b)(3), “drive[s]

honest citizens out of the democratic process and

breed[s] distrust of our government,” Purcell, 549 U.S.

at 4. The NVRA’s twin aims of registration and rollaccuracy thus work hand in glove to increase

participation by eligible voters.

In enacting the NVRA, Congress was not content

to have election officials improve their systems behind

closed doors. Instead, consistent with its recognition

of the importance of public confidence in the election

process, Congress prioritized transparency.

The

NVRA requires that state election officials maintain

records of their voter-roll-maintenance programs and

activities for at least 2 years and make these records

available to the public. Specifically, officials “shall

make available for public inspection and, where

available, photocopying at a reasonable cost, all

records concerning the implementation of programs

and activities conducted for the purpose of ensuring

the accuracy and currency of official lists of eligible

voters.” 52 U.S.C. §20507(i)(1). Congress’ use of the

mandatory “shall” was intentional; the legislative

history confirms Congress’ conviction that these

“records must be made available for public inspection

and, where available, photocopying at reasonable

6

costs.” S. Rep. No. 103-6, at 35 (1993) (emphasis

added); see also H.R. Rep. No. 103-9, at 19 (1993)

(same). Moreover, the end goal of all these records and

all these transparency mandates is to ensure that the

voting rolls are both accurate and comprehensive,

making the voting rolls the most critical record that is

subject to the NVRA transparency mandate.

While some groups may prioritize accuracy and

others champion comprehensiveness, organizations

from across the political spectrum have relied on the

NVRA’s public-inspection mandate to seek records,

including voter rolls, for a variety of purposes.

Political and advocacy organizations need access to

NVRA list information for a wide range of speech

activities, including voter registration and get-outthe-vote efforts, confirming the accuracy of voter lists

purchased from states, holding state officers

accountable for election integrity, and informing the

public about their elections. See, e.g., Bellitto v.

Snipes, 302 F.Supp.3d 1335 (S.D. Fla. 2017);

Campaign Legal Ctr. v. Scott, 49 F.4th 931 (5th Cir.

2022); Greater Birmingham Ministries v. Sec’y of State

for Ala., 105 F.4th 1324 (11th Cir. 2024); Jud. Watch,

Inc. v. Lamone, 399 F.Supp.3d 425 (D. Md. 2019);

Project Vote/Voting for Am., Inc. v. Long, 682 F.3d 331

(4th Cir. 2012); Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Benson,

2025 WL 2731704 (6th Cir. Sept. 25, 2025); Va.

Coalition for Immigrant Rts. v. Beals, 803 F.Supp.3d

454 (E.D. Va. 2025); Voter Reference Found., LLC v.

Balderas, 616 F.Supp.3d 1132 (D.N.M. 2022).

7

A. Public

Access

to

Information

Concerning Voter Rolls Is Critical to the

Accuracy of Voter Rolls.

The franchise is denied not just when an eligible

voter is barred from the polls, but when his vote is

“debase[d] or dilut[ed]” through participation in

elections by ineligible persons. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at

555. As a matter of constitutional principle, “[t]o the

extent that a citizen’s right to vote is debased, he is

that much less a citizen.” Id. at 567. And as a

practical matter, “[v]oters who fear their legitimate

votes will be outweighed by fraudulent ones will feel

disenfranchised” and may opt out of “our participatory

democracy.” Purcell, 549 U.S. at 4. “Confidence in the

integrity of our electoral processes is essential” to our

form of government. Id.; see also Republican Party v.

Degraffenreid, 141 S.Ct. 732, 734 (2021) (Thomas, J.,

dissenting from denial of certiorari) (citing Democratic

Nat’l Comm. v. Wisc. State Legis., 141 S.Ct. 28, 31

(2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in denial of

application to vacate stay)). And the NVRA recognizes

that one critical way to assure public confidence in

state electoral processes is to let the public see for

itself how those processes work.

Access to voter lists is an essential tool for

ensuring that election officials perform their “duty of

accountability to the public in ensuring that voter lists

include eligible voters and exclude ineligible ones.”

Project Vote, 682 F.3d at 339 (Wilkinson, J., joined by

Diaz and Floyd, JJ.). “[T]he NVRA as a whole[]

make[s] evident Congress’[] intent to support the

transparency and circulation of voter data among the

public to help detect and correct errors.” Voter

8

Reference Found., LLC v. Torrez, 160 F.4th 1068, 1081

(10th Cir. 2025) (Tymkovich, J.). Armed with the

public-inspection mandate and a private right of

action, 52 U.S.C. §20510(b), members of the public can

ensure that the democratic process is run fairly and

without “administrative chicanery, oversights, or

inefficiencies.” Project Vote, 682 F.3d at 335. “It is

self-evident that disclosure will assist the

identification of both error and fraud in the

preparation and maintenance of voter rolls.” Id. at

339. The public can assess whether the state’s

activities are effectively generating an up-to-date,

well-maintained, and accurate voter list that includes

all eligible applicants and excludes individuals who

have (among other things) passed away, moved out of

state, or are otherwise ineligible to vote—a list that

becomes the baseline for future lists. “Without such

transparency, public confidence in the essential

workings of democracy will suffer.” Id.

Public oversight of list maintenance is critically

important. Congress recognized in the NVRA that

“[t]he maintenance of accurate and up-to-date voter

registration lists is the hallmark of a national system

seeking to prevent voter fraud.” S. Rep. No. 103-6, at

18. Yet many states do a poor job maintaining

accurate rolls.2 “It has been estimated that 24 million

voter registrations in the United States—about one in

Perhaps unsurprisingly, state officials do not always take

kindly to such scrutiny. See, e.g., Voter Reference Found., LLC v.

Torrez, 160 F.4th 1068, 1074-75 (10th Cir. 2025) (recounting

advocacy group’s publication of discrepancy in New Mexico’s

voter data, New Mexico’s accusation that the group was

“perpetuating misinformation,” and the state’s referral of the

group for criminal prosecution under invalid statute).

2

9

eight—are either invalid or significantly inaccurate,”

and “about 2.75 million people are said to be registered

to vote in more than one State.” Husted, 584 U.S. at

760. As discussed infra Part II, this problem is

particularly acute in the Ninth Circuit, since states

like California, Hawaii, Nevada, Oregon, and

Washington send ballots to all registrants included on

their voter rolls.

This Court’s review of the

acknowledged circuit split on public access to voter

lists is essential now.

B. Public

Access

to

Information

Concerning Voter Rolls Is Critical to the

Increased Registration of Eligible

Voters.

The NVRA’s public-inspection mandate is also

vital to the increased registration of eligible voters.

For one, as explained above, ensuring election

integrity via transparency and accountability also

promotes voter involvement. Indeed, as Justice

Stevens explained, “public confidence in the integrity

of the electoral process has independent significance,

because it encourages citizen participation in the

democratic process.” Crawford v. Marion Cnty.

Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 197 (2008) (plurality op.).

For another, members of the public rely on the

public-inspection mandate not just to ensure that

voter rolls “exclude ineligible [voters,]” but that they

“include eligible voters.” Project Vote, 682 F.3d at 339.

When Greater Birmingham Ministries “sought to

guide previously disenfranchised individuals through

the process to have their rights restored and to

register to vote,” Greater Birmingham Ministries, 105

F.4th at 1336 (Abudu, J., concurring in part and

10

dissenting in part), it relied on the public-inspection

mandate to compel the production of “the list of every

voter removed from the statewide voter rolls following

the 2020 general election” and “records related to

voters who were removed or denied registration

because of a disqualifying felony conviction,” id. at

1328 (majority op.). And when Project Vote sought to

ensure that “students at Norfolk State University, a

historically African-American college,” were not

improperly denied registration, it, too, relied on the

public-inspection mandate to compel production of

voter registration applications for voters who had not

registered to vote in time for the relevant election.

Project Vote, 682 F.3d at 333. Those are just two of the

many cases demonstrating that individuals and

advocacy groups across the ideological spectrum rely

on the public-inspection mandate to further the

NVRA’s interlocking goals of increased participation

and election integrity.

As Greater Birmingham Ministries learned,

courts have been divided on the proper scope of

transparency protected by the NVRA. Even wellintentioned

requests

for

voter-registration

information to facilitate the restoration of the

franchise to those removed from voter rolls have been

stymied by overly narrow interpretations of the

NVRA.

*

*

*

At bottom, public oversight of state registration

and list-maintenance processes is about good

government.

While the perceived viewpoints or

partisan affiliation of a given inspection-mandate

plaintiff may differ from case to case, it should be

11

common ground that, when it comes to stategovernment processes, “‘[s]unlight’ … is ‘the best of

disinfectants’ in elections.” Del. Strong Fams. v. Denn,

136 S.Ct. 2376 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting from

denial of certiorari) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.

1, 67 (1976) (per curiam)).

II. The Decision Below Frustrates The NVRA’s

Purposes In The Very Circuit Where They

Are Most Essential.

“[T]here must be a substantial regulation of

elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some

sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the

democratic processes.” Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724,

730 (1974). With respect to state voter rolls, “[f]or

many years, Congress left it up to the States to

maintain accurate lists of those eligible to vote in

federal elections, but in 1993, with the enactment of

the [NVRA], Congress intervened.” Husted, 584 U.S.

at 761. With the advent of widespread mail-in voting

in the wake of the pandemic, accurate voting rolls and

transparency to ensure public confidence are more

important than ever. And nowhere are the NVRA’s

list-maintenance requirements, and public oversight

of compliance, more important than within the Ninth

Circuit. The problem of ineligible voters on state rolls

is sharply exacerbated there by state election regimes

that automatically send all registered voters mail-in

ballots, have limited safeguards to ensure the

integrity of those automatically mailed ballots, and

next to no restrictions on third-party ballot collection.

1. The widespread mail-in voting that has

characterized recent elections is historically unique.

In the 1936 election, “only about 2% of 45 million votes

12

were being cast by absentee ballot,” and “[b]y 1960, it

was estimated that less than 5% of voters had cast

absentee ballots in any election.”3 “In the 1980s,

California became the first state to allow eligible

voters to request absentee ballots for any reason at all,

including their convenience.”4 The practice expanded

slowly in the decades that followed, before exploding

during and after the COVID-19 pandemic.

That development poses a real problem for

election integrity and public confidence. Mail-in

voting creates more links in the chain between the

printing and casting of a ballot. This creates more

opportunities for honest mistakes and political

chicanery, and partisan actors of all political stripes—

including Republican5 and Democratic6 officials and

operatives—have seized the opportunity for electoral

advantage.

It is therefore no surprise that diverse sources

have recognized that “[f]raud is a real risk that

accompanies mail-in voting.” Brnovich, 594 U.S. at

686; accord Watson v. Republican Nat’l Comm., 146

S.Ct. 2165, 2183, 2191 (2026) (Alito, J., dissenting);

3 D. Palmer, Absentee and Mail Ballots in America: Improving

the Integrity of the Absentee and Mail Balloting 6 Lawyers

Democracy Fund (Jan. 2019), https://perma.cc/VSC4-TF8E.

4 Voting by Mail and Absentee Voting, MIT Election Data &

Science Lab (Feb. 28, 2024), https://perma.cc/4R83-NMDQ.

5 Richard Gonzales, North Carolina GOP Operative Faces New

Felony Charges That Allege Ballot Fraud, NPR (July 30, 2019),

https://perma.cc/VU86-6G8J.

6

Bob Christie, Former San Luis Mayor Pleads Guilty to

Illegally Collecting Early Ballots in 2020 Primary, AZCentral

(June 2, 2022), https://perma.cc/ML8R-P6EW.

13

Crawford, 553 U.S. at 195-96 (documenting fraud

“perpetrated using absentee ballots and not in-person

fraud”); id. at 225 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“absenteeballot fraud … is a documented problem”); League of

Women Voters of Fla. Inc. v. Fla. Sec’y of State, 81

F.4th 1328, 1334 (11th Cir. 2023) (Pryor, J., respecting

denial of rehearing en banc) (“the record before the

district court contained undisputed evidence that

vote-by-mail fraud[] has plagued Florida elections in

the past.”); La Union del Pueblo Entero v. Abbott, 167

F.4th 743, 753 (5th Cir. 2026) (“mail-in voting is a rich

field for fraud”); United States v. Paxton, 148 F.4th

335, 337 (5th Cir. 2025) (“Mail-in ballots are not

secure.”); Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 263 (5th Cir.

2016) (en banc) (“mail-in voting ... is far more

vulnerable to fraud [than in-person voting],

particularly among the elderly”); John C. Fortier,

Absentee and Early Voting: Trends, Promises, and

Perils 51-58 (AEI Press 2006); John C. Fortier &

Norman J. Ornstein, The Absentee Ballot and the

Secret Ballot: Challenges for Election Reform, 36 U.

Mich. J.L. Reform 483, 508 (2003).

2. Despite these well-documented vulnerabilities,

mail-in voting makes voting easier, and most states

within the Ninth Circuit have made the policy choice

to send mail-in ballots to all registered voters without

any need to apply or opt in. California, Hawaii,

Nevada, Oregon, and Washington automatically send

mail-in ballots to all registered voters. Cal. Elec. Code

§3000.5(a); Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. §11-102(b); Nev. Rev.

Stat. Ann. §293.269911(1); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann.

§254.470(2)(a); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §29A.40.010.

While voter rolls that include erroneous registrations

of individuals who have moved, died, or are otherwise

14

ineligible threaten election integrity and voter

confidence in every state, these issues are particularly

acute in states that automatically send mail-in ballots

to all registered voters. (After all, in a state that

requires voters to affirmatively request a mail-in

ballot, voters who have died, for example, will not be

able to request a mail-in ballot.). Thus, when Oregon

state employees mistakenly registered nearly 2,000

voters7 (including, the state itself has suggested,

because employees mistakenly classified foreign

passports and birth certificates as proof of U.S.

citizenship),8 the state sent each of those erroneously

registered individuals a ballot, and some of those

individuals ended up casting votes they were ineligible

to cast.9

On the back end, each of these states relies on

signature matching to verify that a mailed ballot was

actually cast by a registered voter, eschewing stronger

safeguards such as “number-matching requirements

… designed to confirm that every mail-in voter is

indeed who he claims he is.” Paxton, 148 F.4th at 341.

See Cal. Elec. Code §3019; Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. §11106(2); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §293.269927(1); Or. Rev.

Stat. Ann. §254.470(11); Wash. Rev. Code Ann.

§29A.40.110. Signature matching looks at whether a

Or. Sec’y of State, DMV Automatic Voter Registration Error

(updated Aug. 5, 2026), https://perma.cc/RCC9-KM4T.

7

Or. Dep’t of Transp., After-Action Report Regarding Oregon

Motor Voter Issues 2 (Oct. 7, 2024), https://perma.cc/H4A7-7EH5.

8

9 In fact, a similar error occurred in 2023 in New Jersey, and

“roughly 400” ineligible voters ended up casting unlawful ballots.

See Tracey Tully, Error Led to 400 Noncitizens Voting, New

Jersey Governor Says, N.Y. Times (July 21, 2026).

15

ballot envelope signature appears similar to a

signature on file from a voter’s registration; there is no

independent check of the voter’s identity, such as with

an identification card, Social Security number, or

proof of residence.10

Moreover, some of the Ninth Circuit’s most

populous states water down even the relatively weak

safeguard of signature verification. See, e.g., Cal. Elec.

Code §3019(a)(2)(A), (B) (requiring not a match, but

only “similar characteristics” between signatures and

establishing “[a] presumption … that the signature on

the identification envelope, … is the voter’s signature

and that the vote will be counted”); Wash. Admin.

Code §§434-261-051(2), 434-261-052(2) (establishing

similar presumption and requiring two separate

election officials to find discrepancy before sending

notice requiring voter to cure). Signature mismatch

cure provisions, for their part, are a one-way ratchet

in favor of eligibility; they do nothing to weed out

ballots cast by ineligible voters.

3. The integrity problems with automatic mail-in

voting and weak signature-matching safeguards are

further compounded by the third-party ballot

collection permitted in many states within the Ninth

Circuit.

“As the Carter-Baker Commission

recognized, third-party ballot collection can lead to

pressure and intimidation.” Brnovich, 594 U.S. at

686. At its worst, so-called “ballot harvesting” may

involve “partisan operatives … collect[ing] … voters’

completed mail ballots” while “ensur[ing] that the

10 The Help America Vote Act supplies such a requirement, but

it applies only to new registrants who register by mail, 52 U.S.C.

§21083(b)(1)(A), (2)(A)(ii).

16

ballots were cast for a particular candidate.” La Union

del Pueblo Entero, 167 F.4th at 753.

Sensibly, then, “[r]estrictions on ballot collection

are … common” throughout the Nation. Brnovich, 594

U.S. at 685. But they are rare in the Ninth Circuit.

California, for instance, imposes next to no

restrictions on third-party ballot collection. It permits

a “vote by mail voter who is unable to return the ballot

[to] designate another person” to do so. Cal. Elec. Code

§3017(a)(2).

Anyone may be “designat[ed]”—

California in 2016 repealed a requirement that the

ballot collector have a familial or cohabitation

relationship to the voter, and the same bill repealed a

prohibition on paid or volunteer campaign operatives

acting as ballot collectors. A.B. 1921, 2015-2016 Gen.

Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016). Whether a voter is

actually “unable to return [a] ballot” is not verified,

and, while the ballot envelope must bear “the name

and signature of the person authorized by the voter to

return the vote by mail ballot,” omitting that

information does not disqualify the ballot. Cal. Elec.

Code

§§3017(a)(2),

3011(a)(9), (c).

(Similarly,

California requires a ballot to be mailed within three

days of third-party collection, but does not disqualify

ballots “solely” for ignoring this deadline, id.

§3017(a)(2).)

Regimes like California’s abound in the Ninth

Circuit: Nevada and Oregon have similarly relaxed

rules, see Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §293.269923; Or. Rev.

Stat. Ann. §§254.470, 260.695, while Washington and

Hawaii law say nothing about who may or may not

return ballots. For its part, when Montana tried to

impose restrictions, including a prohibition on paid

17

collection, its state supreme court invalidated them.

Mont. Democratic Party v. Jacobsen, 545 P.3d 1074,

1100-07 (2024).

*

*

*

The decision below frustrates the NVRA’s core

purposes precisely where the Act’s transparency and

public-oversight mechanisms are most needed—in the

Ninth Circuit. Likewise, other courts have diverged

on the scope of transparency rights the NVRA affords

the public. This Court should not await further

percolation of the acknowledged split on the question

presented; it should grant certiorari and enforce the

public-inspection mandate where it matters most.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should grant

the petition for certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

PAUL D. CLEMENT

Counsel of Record

JAMES Y. XI

JEFFREY C. THALHOFER

CLEMENT & MURPHY, PLLC

706 Duke Street

Alexandria, VA 22314

(202) 742-8900

paul.clement@clementmurphy.com

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

August 21, 2026