Amicus Curiae Brief — Public Interest Legal Foundation, Inc., Petitioner v. Scott T. Nago, Chief Election Officer of the State of Hawaii

No. 26-98

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

PUBLIC INTEREST LEGAL FOUNDATION, INC.,

Petitioner,

v.

SCOTT T. NAGO, in his official capacity as Chief

Election Officer for the State of Hawaii,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE FOR THE HONEST

ELECTIONS PROJECT

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

DANIEL A. BRUCE

HOLTZMAN VOGEL BARAN

TORCHINSKY & JOSEFIAK

PLLC

15405 John Marshall Highway

Haymarket, VA 20169

(540) 341-8808

dbruce@holtzmanvogel.com

JASON B. TORCHINSKY

Counsel of Record

ELIZABETH PRICE FOLEY

HOLTZMAN VOGEL BARAN

TORCHINSKY & JOSEFIAK

PLLC

2300 N Street, NW, Ste. 643

Washington, DC 20037

(202) 737-8808

jtorchinsky@

holtzmanvogel.com

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE.............................1

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ............................1

ARGUMENT................................................................4

I.

THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S RULE CONFLICTS

WITH THE NVRA’S TEXT AND STRUCTURE ..........4

II.

THE NINTH CIRCUIT ERRONEOUSLY

FOUND A CONFLICT BETWEEN THE NVRA

AND HAVA WHERE NONE EXISTS ....................10

CONCLUSION ..........................................................16

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Page(s)

Alexander v. Ams. United Inc.,

416 U.S. 752 (1974) ................................................6

Almendarez-Torres v. United States,

523 U.S. 224 (1998) ................................................9

Am. Sur. Co. v. Marotta,

287 U.S. 513 (1933) ................................................6

Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co.,

537 U.S. 149 (2003) ................................................5

Blausey v. United States Tr.,

552 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2009) ................................4

Burgess v. United States,

553 U.S. 124 (2008) ................................................6

Colautti v. Franklin,

439 U.S. 379 (1979) ................................................6

Dep’t of Agric. Rural Dev. Rural Hous. Serv.

v. Kirtz,

601 U.S. 42 (2024) ................................................13

Esteras v. United States,

606 U.S. 185 (2025) ............................................2, 4

iii

K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.,

486 U.S. 281 (1988) ................................................9

King v. Burwell,

576 U.S. 473 (2015) ................................................8

Maracich v. Spears,

570 U.S. 48 (2013) .............................................. 6-7

Mortensen v. United States,

322 U.S. 369 (1944) ................................................7

Morton v. Mancari,

417 U.S. 535 (1974) ..............................................12

N.Y. State Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Dublino,

413 U.S. 405 (1973) ................................................8

Posadas v. Nat’l City Bank,

296 U.S. 497 (1936) ..............................................12

Project Vote/Voting for Am., Inc. v. Long,

682 F.3d 331 (4th Cir. 2012) ..................................8

Pub. Int. Legal Found., Inc. v. Bellows,

92 F.4th 36 (1st Cir. 2024) ............................. 2-3, 8

Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co.,

426 U.S. 148 (1976) ..............................................12

Rodriguez v. United States,

480 U.S. 522 (1987) ..............................................12

iv

Trainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co.,

331 U.S. 519 (1947) ................................................9

United States v. Morton,

467 U.S. 822 (1984) ................................................9

Voter Reference Found., LLC v. Torrez,

160 F.4th 1068 (10th Cir. 2025).........................2, 8

Watt v. Alaska,

451 U.S. 259 (1981) ..............................................12

Statutes

52 U.S.C. § 20501 ....................................................4, 8

52 U.S.C. § 20507 ..................................... 1-3, 5-10, 14

52 U.S.C. § 21082 ......................................................13

52 U.S.C. § 21083 ................................................11, 13

52 U.S.C. § 21145 ......................................................13

Pub. L. No. 103-31, 107 Stat. 77 .................................9

Rules

Sup. Ct. R. 37.2 ............................................................1

Sup. Ct. R. 37.6 ............................................................1

v

Other Authorities

Sarah J. Eckman, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R45030,

Fed. Role in Voter Regis.: The Nat'l Voter Regis.

Act of 1993 (NVRA) & Subsequent Devs.

(Feb. 7, 2025) .................................................. 10-11

S. Rep. No. 103-6 (1993), as reprinted in 1993

U.S.C.C.A.N. 14157..........................................8, 15

Karen L. Shanton, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R46949,

The Help Am. Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA):

Overview & Ongoing Role in Election

Admin. Pol'y (Mar. 20, 2026) ...............................11

1

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE 1

Honest Elections Project (“HEP”) is a nonpartisan

organization devoted to supporting the right of every

lawful voter to participate in free and honest elections.

Through public engagement, advocacy, and publicinterest litigation, HEP defends the fair, reasonable

measures that legislatures put in place to protect the

integrity of the voting process. HEP supports

commonsense voting rules and opposes efforts to

reshape elections for partisan gain. HEP has a

significant interest in this case because the Ninth

Circuit’s interpretation of the National Voter

Registration Act’s public disclosure mandate

undermines a crucial tool Congress enacted to ensure

accuracy, transparency, and accountability with

respect to State voter rolls.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The Court should grant the petition to resolve an

important and recurring question on which the

Circuits have divided: Whether a State’s statewide

voter registration list is a record subject to public

disclosure under Section 8(i)(1) of the National Voter

Registration Act (“NVRA”), 52 U.S.C. § 20507(i)(1)

1 Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.6, no counsel for any

party authored this brief in whole or in part. No person or entity

other than Amicus and the counsel below contributed the costs

associated with the preparation and submission of this brief.

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.2, Amicus notified all

counsel of record of its intention to file this brief at least 10 days

prior to its filing deadline.

2

(the “Public Disclosure Provision” or “Provision”).

The Ninth Circuit held that Hawaii’s voter

registration list is not subject to public disclosure,

App. 39a, conflicting with the First and Tenth

Circuits. Pub. Int. Legal Found., Inc. v. Bellows,

92 F.4th 36, 56 (1st Cir. 2024); Voter Reference Found.,

LLC v. Torrez, 160 F.4th 1068, 1082 (10th Cir. 2025).

That conflict warrants this Court’s review.

The petition ably explains why the Ninth Circuit’s

decision conflicts with the NVRA’s text and purpose.

Pet. 4–13. This brief examines why the Ninth Circuit’s

decision also conflicts with the NVRA’s structure and

why the purported conflict the court found—between

the NVRA and the Help America Vote Act (“HAVA”)—

does not exist.

The NVRA’s Public Disclosure Provision uses

sweeping language: Each State shall maintain and

make available for public inspection “all records

concerning the implementation of programs and

activities conducted to ensure the accuracy and

currency of official lists of eligible voters,” subject only

to two express exceptions. 52 U.S.C. § 20507(i)(1)

(emphasis added). Under the well-established

expressio unius canon, Congress’s inclusion of two

narrow exceptions from public disclosure (not

applicable here) confirms that it did not intend to

exempt any other records “concerning” activities

designed to “ensur[e] the accuracy and currency” of

voter registration lists from disclosure. Id.; see also

Esteras v. United States, 606 U.S. 185, 195 (2025).

3

The Provision’s broad, pro-disclosure objective is

confirmed by its express language: It guarantees

public access to “all records concerning” State

activities conducted “for the purpose of ensuring the

accuracy and currency” of voter registration lists.

52 U.S.C. § 20507(i)(1) (emphasis added). The Ninth

Circuit’s mistake was to construe this language

narrowly, treating a statewide list as a finished output

that sits outside the States’ list-maintenance process.

App. 31a–33a.

But Congress did not bifurcate “input” and

“output” voter-list maintenance. Instead, it broadly

directed public disclosure of “all records concerning”

activities conducted “for the purpose of ensuring the

accuracy and currency of official lists of eligible

voters[.]” These State activities—the “inputs” that

ensure list accuracy—are implemented through

changes to the statewide list. Removal, correction,

retention, and inactive-status decisions are recorded

there. The statewide list, therefore, is not a static

product sitting outside the process that creates it. It is

the record in which that process occurs and is

reflected. The statewide list is thus the definitive

record “concerning” the State’s activities to ensure

accurate rolls, not a detached output outside the

Public Disclosure Provision’s reach.

As the First Circuit has recognized, disclosure of

the statewide lists enables the public to evaluate

whether a State’s list-maintenance programs are

lawful and effective. Bellows, 92 F.4th at 47–49.

Disclosure thus effectuates the NVRA’s stated

purposes—protecting and enhancing the right of

4

“eligible citizens” to vote, protecting the integrity of

the electoral process, and ensuring that “accurate and

current voter registration rolls are maintained.”

52 U.S.C. § 20501(b) (declaration of NVRA’s

purposes). By refusing to allow public disclosure of

Hawaii’s statewide voter registration list, therefore,

the Ninth Circuit gutted the Public Disclosure

Provision’s public oversight function. Certiorari is

needed to resolve the lower courts’ disagreement over

that statutory design.

ARGUMENT

I. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S RULE CONFLICTS WITH

THE NVRA’S TEXT AND STRUCTURE

The Ninth Circuit pointed to the NVRA’s structure

and the Public Disclosure Provision’s surrounding

provisions as support for its conclusion. But the

NVRA’s structure and traditional principles of

statutory construction support Petitioner’s reading.

First, contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s view, the

exemptions contained in the Public Disclosure

Provision do in fact “cast doubt on [that court’s]

interpretation.” See App. 33a. “The general rule of

statutory construction is that the enumeration of

specific exclusions from the operation of a statute is an

indication that the statute should apply to all cases

not specifically excluded.” Blausey v. United States

Tr., 552 F.3d 1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2009); see also

Esteras v. United States, 606 U.S. 185, 195 (2025)

(discussing the expressio unius canon). This is

5

particularly true where the exclusion is such that “it

is fair to suppose that Congress considered the

unnamed possibility and meant to say no to it.”

Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 168

(2003) (citation omitted).

Congress identified two exceptions—and only

two—in the same sentence: information relating to a

declination to register and information identifying the

voter registration agency through which a particular

voter registered. 52 U.S.C. § 20507(i)(1). Beyond those

two categories, “all records concerning…official lists of

eligible voters” are to be made available to the public.

Id. Congress’s decision to include these two narrow

exceptions to an otherwise broad disclosure

provision—all in the same sentence—shows that

Congress did not intend to exclude any other

categories of information from disclosure. The two

exclusions make sense given the oversight and

accountability purposes of the Public Disclosure

Provision. A declination to register and the identity of

the agency through which an individual registers bear

little to no relationship to the Provision’s goal of

ensuring that the States’ voter registration lists

remain accurate and current. Id.

Second, the fact that Congress expressly required

certain information to be publicly disclosed

broadens—not narrows—the scope of the Public

Disclosure Provision. Specifically, paragraph (2) of the

Provision provides that the records to be disclosed

“shall include” the names and addresses of registered

voters who are sent a removal notice and whether the

person has responded to the notice. 52 U.S.C.

6

§ 20507(i)(2). But the phrase, “shall include,” is

generally used as a phrase of “extension or

enlargement rather than as one of limitation or

enumeration.” See Am. Sur. Co. v. Marotta, 287 U.S.

513, 517 (1933). It is in contrast to the phrase, “shall

mean,” which “excludes any meaning that is not

stated.” See Burgess v. United States, 553 U.S. 124,

130 (2008) (quoting Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379,

392 n.10 (1979)). If Congress meant to confine public

disclosure to removal notices and responses, it could

have said “shall consist of” rather than the broader

“shall include” language in paragraph (2), or it could

have otherwise limited paragraph (1). It did not.

Third, the Public Disclosure Provision covers “all

records concerning the implementation” of activities

conducted “for the purpose of ensuring the accuracy

and currency of official lists of eligible voters[.]”

52 U.S.C. § 20507(i)(1) (emphasis added). The Ninth

Circuit focused on the word “concerning” and held that

statewide lists “are not records concerning the

implementation of those programs . . . but rather the

objects of the implemented programs[.]” App. 33a

(emphasis in original). Under this view, the statewide

list is not a record “concerning” a State’s listmaintenance program; it is a separate record that falls

entirely outside that process.

But the Ninth Circuit’s statutory analysis is

exactly backward. In ordinary statutory usage, “for

the purpose of” denotes Congress’s primary objective,

and any relevant act undertaken with that objective

falls within the statute. See, e.g., Alexander v. Ams.

United Inc., 416 U.S. 752, 760–61 (1974); Maracich v.

7

Spears, 570 U.S. 48, 71–72 (2013). Here, the express

statutory goal of the Public Disclosure Provision is

“ensuring the accuracy and currency of official lists of

eligible voters[.]” 52 U.S.C. § 20507(i)(1). Under a

plain-language analysis, therefore, the phrase “for the

purpose of” identifies the objective that defines the

covered programs and activities subject to public

disclosure. Any State program or activity that is a

“means of effectuating or facilitating” the accuracy

and currency of registration lists is thus a record that

must be disclosed. Mortensen v. United States, 322

U.S. 369, 374 (1944).

Nothing in the NVRA’s text, structure, or

legislative history supports the Ninth Circuit’s inputversus-output distinction. State “programs and

activities” undertaken with the goal of ensuring the

accuracy and currency of voter registration lists are

subject to public disclosure. Such programs and

activities are an “input” toward that congressional

goal of an accurate and current voter registration list,

but so is the statewide list, which is indeed the most

important “record” indicating whether Congress’s goal

has been achieved. The statewide voter registration

list is not a static product sitting outside the State

programs and activities that create it: It embodies the

results of registration, maintenance, additions,

removals, and corrections, and is therefore the

definitive “record [ ] concerning” whether the State’s

“programs and activities” have achieved Congress’s

“purpose of ensuring the accuracy and currency of

official lists of eligible voters[.]”.

8

Reading the Public Disclosure Provision to cover

only inputs, as the Ninth Circuit did, lets State

officials shield the resulting list—the object Congress

required them to keep accurate—while disclosing only

the paperwork used to create it. That would make

meaningful public review of the “accuracy and

currency” of statewide registration lists impossible.

52 U.S.C. § 20507(i)(1); see also 52 U.S.C. § 20501(b)(4)

(NVRA purposes). Congress enacted the NVRA

against a history of list maintenance programs that

could be abused in design or implementation. S. Rep.

No. 103-6, at 32 (1993), as reprinted in 1993

U.S.C.C.A.N. 14157. As the First, Fourth, and Tenth

Circuits have recognized, disclosure of the statewide

lists enables the public to evaluate whether a State’s

list maintenance programs are lawful and effective.

Bellows, 92 F.4th at 47–49; Project Vote/Voting for

Am., Inc. v. Long, 682 F.3d 331, 334–35 (4th Cir.

2012); Torrez, 160 F.4th at 1082.

By refusing to allow public disclosure of Hawaii’s

statewide voter registration list, therefore, the Ninth

Circuit gutted the Public Disclosure Provision’s stated

purpose. As this Court has held, courts “cannot

interpret federal statutes to negate their own stated

purposes.” King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 493 (2015)

(quoting N.Y. State Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Dublino, 413

U.S. 405, 419–20 (1973)). Accordingly, the Court

should grant the petition to clarify that the NVRA’s

Public Disclosure Provision reaches the official

statewide list, subject to the statute’s express

exceptions and any independent protections that

apply to particular fields.

9

Fourth, the NVRA’s structure bolsters the

conclusion that the best reading of the Public

Disclosure Provision requires disclosure of the

statewide registration list. Courts do not “construe

statutory phrases in isolation” but “read statutes as a

whole,” including their design. United States v.

Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 828 (1984); K Mart Corp. v.

Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988). The “‘title of a

statute and the heading of a section’ are ‘tools

available for the resolution of a doubt’ about the

meaning of a statute.” Almendarez-Torres v. United

States, 523 U.S. 224, 234 (1998) (quoting Trainmen v.

Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 528–29

(1947)).

Here, the NVRA’s title—the “National Voter

Registration Act.” Pub. L. No. 103-31, 107 Stat. 77

(emphasis added), and the title of the Public

Disclosure Provision—“Public disclosure of voter

registration activities”—confirm that Congress’s focus

was voter registration. 52 U.S.C. § 20507(i) (emphasis

added). Indeed, the Disclosure Provision is part of a

larger section titled “Requirements with respect to

administration of voter registration.” 52 U.S.C.

§ 20507 (emphasis added). Collectively, these titles

support reading the Public Disclosure Provision to

reach all registration records, including the most

important registration record of all, the statewide

voter registration list.

Indeed, when Congress intended specific NVRA

provisions to apply only to a specific list-maintenance

activity—such as removal—it expressly said so. See,

e.g., 52 U.S.C. § 20507(c)(2)(A) (regulating the time

10

frame for completing “any program the purpose of

which is to systematically remove the names of

ineligible voters from the official lists”); id.

§ 20507(a)(4) (requiring States to “conduct a general

program that makes a reasonable effort to remove the

names of ineligible voters from the official lists” based

on death or change in residence). Congress’s decision

not to limit the Public Disclosure Provision to specified

list-maintenance activities, by contrast, reinforces

that it applies broadly to all records concerning the

States’ voter registration programs and activities,

including the statewide voter- registration list itself.

II. THE NINTH CIRCUIT ERRONEOUSLY FOUND A

CONFLICT BETWEEN THE NVRA AND HAVA

WHERE NONE EXISTS

The Ninth Circuit treated HAVA’s silence on public

disclosure as a reason to narrow the NVRA. App. 35a.

But the statutes address different questions.

The NVRA supplies a public-access rule for records

concerning the accuracy and currency of official voter

lists. HAVA specifies the architecture States must use

to create and manage those lists. One statute governs

access; the other governs the system. There is no

conflict merely because HAVA does not repeat the

NVRA’s disclosure command.

Passed in 1993, the NVRA standardized a number

of voter registration processes for States to follow in

federal elections. Sarah J. Eckman, Cong. Rsch. Serv.,

R45030, Fed. Role in Voter Regis.: The Nat’l Voter

Regis. Act of 1993 (NVRA) & Subsequent Devs. 1 (Feb.

7, 2025). For example, the NVRA required States to

11

permit eligible citizens to register to vote while

applying for a State driver’s license, to establish a

mail-based voter registration process using a

standardized federal registration form, and to provide

in-person registration at designated registration sites.

Id. It also established “procedural requirements for

States to follow when performing voter registration

list maintenance or when adding, removing, or

modifying records for registered voters.” Id.

HAVA, on the other hand, was a much more

sweeping statute. Enacted in response to electionadministration issues encountered during the 2000

election,

HAVA

set

requirements

for

the

administration of federal elections (including,

standardizing voting systems and provisional-voting

procedures), authorized election grant programs, and

created the Election Assistance Commission. Karen L.

Shanton, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R46949, The Help Am.

Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA): Overview & Ongoing Role in

Election Admin. Pol’y 2–3 (Mar. 20, 2026).

With regard to voter registration, HAVA requires each

State to implement “a single, uniform, official,

centralized, interactive computerized statewide voter

registration list” maintained at the State level and

containing the name and registration information of

every

legally

registered

voter.

52

U.S.C.

§ 21083(a)(1)(A). The list must serve as the single

system for storing and managing the official list

throughout the State; local information must be

entered into that system; and the system must

support regular maintenance and accurate, regularly

updated records. Id. at §§ 21083(a)(1)(A)(i), (vi), (a)(2),

(a)(4). That architecture makes the statewide list the

12

natural object of public oversight, not a reason to

exclude it.

Indeed, the Ninth Circuit’s rule produces the

incongruity that the public may inspect pieces of the

process but not the State-level record that HAVA

identifies as the single official system. App. 33a–35a.

But county fragments cannot reveal whether the

State’s records reconcile across county lines, whether

duplicate or outdated registrations remain, whether

removals were implemented consistently, or whether

eligible voters disappeared from the final list. Process

records alone show what officials did or intended to do;

the statewide snapshot shows what the State’s official

system actually contains.

HAVA’s silence on public disclosure therefore

cannot repeal the NVRA’s express Public Disclosure

Provision. It is “well settled…that repeals by

implication are not favored and will not be found

unless an intent to repeal is clear and manifest.”

Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 524 (1987)

(cleaned up); accord Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535,

551 (1974). Courts “must read the statutes to give

effect to each if we can do so while preserving their

sense and purpose.” Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 26667 (1981). Accordingly, this Court has recognized only

two categories of repeals by implication: (1) “where

provisions in the two acts are in irreconcilable

conflict”; and (2) where “the later act covers the whole

subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a

substitute.” Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426

U.S. 148, 154 (1976) (quoting Posadas v. Nat’l City

Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936)). Beyond those well-

13

settled categories, courts must give complementary

statutes their plain effect. Dep’t of Agric. Rural Dev.

Rural Hous. Serv. v. Kirtz, 601 U.S. 42, 63 (2024).

HAVA’s no-effect provision confirms the point. It

states, “Except as specifically provided in

§ 21083(b)…nothing in [HAVA] may be construed to…

supersede, restrict, or limit the application of” the

NVRA. 52 U.S.C. § 21145(a)(4). The Ninth Circuit’s

reading turns that explicit instruction on its head: It

uses HAVA’s silence to limit the NVRA, even though

Congress expressly directed that HAVA not do so. At a

minimum, that statutory relationship presents a

question of exceptional importance warranting this

Court’s review.

HAVA’s targeted security and privacy provisions

further show that Congress knew how to protect

sensitive information without exempting an entire

statewide list. HAVA requires technological security

measures against unauthorized access to the

computerized list, 52 U.S.C. § 21083(a)(3), and

separately restricts access to information about an

individual’s provisional ballot to that individual,

52 U.S.C. § 21082(a)(5)(B). Those focused protections

support a field-specific, record-specific approach

rather than a categorical ban on public inspection of

voter registration records.

The Ninth Circuit’s rule cannot be justified by

administrability concerns. The NVRA’s Public

Disclosure Provision requires States to maintain

records for at least two years and make them available

for inspection and copying at reasonable cost; it does

14

not require public access to a live database,

unrestricted system credentials, or a bespoke

interface. 52 U.S.C. § 20507(i)(1). A State can produce

a dated, appropriately redacted copy of the official

statewide list as it exists when the request is

processed, preserving the record while avoiding direct

access to the underlying system.

A snapshot-based production is administrable. The

State can identify the relevant fields, export the list as

of a specified date, and retain a copy for the statutory

retention period. If the State updates the list between

requests, each production can be labeled by date, just

as other public records are produced as of a particular

time. The Court need not prescribe a single file format

or audit protocol to resolve whether the list is covered

by § 20507(i)(1).

Privacy concerns do not justify categorical

withholding. The NVRA’s Public Disclosure Provision

expressly excludes information about declinations to

register and the identity of the registration agency

through which a particular voter registered. 52 U.S.C.

§ 20507(i)(1). The State can honor those limits by

omitting or redacting protected fields. It can likewise

address any separate, field-specific privacy rule

without withholding the nonexempt statewide list.

That approach gives effect to both transparency and

privacy, rather than converting a concern about

particular data fields into an exemption for the entire

record.

Statewide access is essential to meaningful

oversight. A reviewer with only county fragments

15

cannot identify cross-county duplicates, test whether

removals and new registrations are reconciled

statewide, compare treatment across counties, or

determine whether the final list contains unexplained

gaps. Nor can removal notices alone answer whether

a challenged entry was actually removed, whether an

eligible voter was restored, or whether the State’s list

remains accurate after officials act. The statewide

record is the necessary check on the process records.

The practical consequences are especially serious

for public-interest organizations. Congress did not

design the NVRA’s Public Disclosure Provision as a

“take our word for it” provision. It contemplated public

scrutiny of list-maintenance programs because abuses

can occur in both program design and implementation.

S. Rep. No. 103-6, at 32 (1993), as reprinted in 1993

U.S.C.C.A.N. 14157. If the official statewide output is

unavailable, oversight is reduced to reconstructing the

State’s system from local fragments—an approach

that is slower, less reliable, and unable to reveal

statewide patterns.

The Ninth Circuit considered none of these

questions and instead manufactured a conflict

between the NVRA and HAVA that does not exist. The

Court should grant certiorari to correct this error and

ensure that the NVRA and HAVA are construed, as

Congress intended them to be, as complementary

enactments.

16

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should grant

the petition for a writ of certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

DANIEL A. BRUCE

HOLTZMAN VOGEL

BARAN TORCHINSKY &

JOSEFIAK, PLLC

15405 John Marshall

Highway

Haymarket, VA 20169

(540) 341-8808

dbruce@

holtzmanvogel.com

JASON B. TORCHINSKY

Counsel of Record

ELIZABETH PRICE FOLEY

HOLTZMAN VOGEL

BARAN TORCHINSKY &

JOSEFIAK, PLLC

2300 N Street NW

Suite 643

Washington, DC 20037

(202) 737-8808

jtorchinsky@

holtzmanvogel.com

efoley@

holtzmanvogel.com

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

August 21, 2026