Amicus Curiae Brief — John Ream, Petitioner v. Department of the Treasury, et al.

No. 26-93

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

__________________

JOHN REAM,

Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY,

et al.,

Respondents.

__________________________

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

__________________

BRIEF OF NATIONAL TAXPAYERS

UNION FOUNDATION AS AMICI CURIAE

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

__________________

TYLER MARTINEZ

Counsel of Record

NATIONAL TAXPAYERS

UNION FOUNDATION

122 C Street N.W., #700

Washington, D.C. 20001

tmartinez@ntu.org

(703) 683-5700

August 20, 2026

i

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Amicus agrees with the petitioner’s statement of

the question presented:

1. Whether the federal prohibition on home

distilling exceeds Congress’s enumerated

powers; and

2. Whether the Court should overrule Gonzales v.

Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) or at least clarify that

Congress’s commerce power does not extend to

regulation of local, noncommercial conduct and

that its exercise is subject to meaningful

judicial scrutiny.

This brief addresses only the first question.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED ........................................ i

TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................. ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................... iv

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE ............................ 1

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ........................... 2

ARGUMENT ............................................................... 4

I. THE DECISION BELOW CREATED A

CIRCUIT SPLIT ON THE VALIDITY OF THE

FEDERAL

PROHIBITION

ON

HOME

DISTILLING. ................................................... 4

A. This Court Should Clarify How To Determine

Whether A Law Is “Necessary” To Implement the

Taxing Power. ...................................................... 5

B. The Court should clarify how to determine

whether a law is “proper” to implement the taxing

power. ................................................................... 7

II. CONGRESS HAS INCREASINGLY ABUSED

THE TAXING POWER TO IMPLEMENT

SUBSTANTIVE REGULATIONS. .................. 9

A. Congress Increasingly Relies On Taxes

Designed To Be Avoided, Rather Than Paid, To

Influence Private Behavior. ................................ 9

iii

B. Congress Has Enacted Extensive Regulatory

Schemes To Support A Tax, Then Repealed The

Tax And Leaving The Regulations In Place. .... 11

C. Many Provisions of the Internal Revenue Code

Impose

Substantive

Requirements

And

Prohibitions Only Tenuously Connected To

Revenue Collection. ........................................... 13

CONCLUSION.......................................................... 15

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Bristol Myers Squibb Co. v. Kennedy,

608 U.S. ___, 224 L. Ed. 2d 830 (May 18, 2026) ... 10

Bristol Myers Squibb Co. v. Sec’y,

155 F.4th 245 (3d Cir. 2025) ........................... 10, 11

Carman v. Yellen,

112 F.4th 386 (6th Cir. 2024)................................ 14

Gonzales v. Raich,

545 U.S. 1 (2005) ...................................................... i

Jack Daniel’s Props., Inc. v. VIP Prods. LLC,

599 U.S. 140 (2023) ................................................. 4

McCulloch v. Maryland,

4 Wheat. (17 U.S.) 316 (1819) ............................. 5, 8

McNutt v. Dep’t of Justice,

173 F.4th 204 (5th Cir. 2026)...................... 2, 3, 5, 8

NAACP v. Ala. ex rel. Patterson,

357 U.S. 449 (1958) ............................................... 13

Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius,

567 U.S. 519 (2012) ........................................... 7, 12

Ream v. Dep’t of the Treasury,

174 F.4th 480 (6th Cir. 2026)...................... 2, 5, 6, 8

Silencer Shop Found. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,

Firearms and Explosives,

No. 6:25-CV-056-H, 2026 WL 2255460

(N.D. Tex. Aug. 5, 2026) .................................. 12, 13

Sonzinsky v. United States,

300 U.S. 506 (1937). .............................................. 12

Statutes

26 U.S.C. § 4081 .......................................................... 9

v

26 U.S.C. § 4161(a) ..................................................... 9

26 U.S.C. § 4181 .......................................................... 9

26 U.S.C. § 4218 .......................................................... 9

26 U.S.C. § 5000A(c) ................................................. 12

26 U.S.C. § 5000D ..................................................... 10

26 U.S.C. § 5000D(c)(1)(A)........................................ 11

26 U.S.C. § 5000D(c)(2)............................................. 11

26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) ................................................. 14

26 U.S.C. § 5811(a)(2) ............................................... 12

26 U.S.C. § 5812(a) ................................................... 12

26 U.S.C. § 5861 ........................................................ 12

26 U.S.C. § 6033(b)(5) ............................................... 13

26 U.S.C. § 6050I(a) .................................................. 14

26 U.S.C. § 6050I(d)(3) ............................................. 14

26 U.S.C. §§ 5801–5872 ............................................ 12

Rules

27 C.F.R. § 479.84 ..................................................... 12

Sup. Ct. R. 37 .............................................................. 1

Other Authorities

Internal Revenue Serv., 2024 Data Book,

Pub. No. 55-B (May 2025) ..................................... 13

vi

Internal Revenue Serv., 2025 Data Book,

Pub. No. 55-B (April 2026) .................................... 13

JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, Estimated Budget Effects of

the Revenue Provisions of Title XIII

(Nov. 19, 2021)....................................................... 11

1

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE1

Founded in 1973, the National Taxpayers Union

Foundation (NTUF) is a non-partisan research and

educational organization dedicated to showing

Americans how taxes, government spending, and

regulations affect everyday life. NTUF advances

principles of limited government, simple taxation, and

transparency on both the state and federal levels.

NTUF’s Taxpayer Defense Center advocates for

taxpayers in the courts, producing scholarly analyses

and engaging in direct litigation and amicus curiae

briefs upholding taxpayers’ rights, challenging

administrative overreach by tax authorities, and

guarding against unconstitutional burdens on

interstate commerce.

The Sixth Circuit’s decision below interprets both

Congress’s taxing power and the Necessary and

Proper Clause as it relates to the exercise of that

power. Because the proper scope of the federal

government’s taxing and ancillary powers has a

profound impact on the American taxpayer, Amicus

has an institutional interest in this Court’s decision.

1 Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37, counsel for Amicus

represents that none of the parties or their counsel, nor any other

person or entity other than Amicus or its counsel, made a

monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or

submission of this brief. Counsel for Amicus certifies timely

notice was provided to all parties of the intent to file this brief.

Amicus thanks Patrick Miller for his contributions to this brief.

2

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The implications of this case extend beyond

moonshine and the federal prohibition on home

distilling. In many areas, Congress has used its taxing

power for far more than revenue raising. In effect, the

taxing power is becoming a back door federal police

power. Because many provisions of the Internal

Revenue Code do not directly raise revenue, both

current and future tax law depends on a correct

understanding of the scope of the Necessary and

Proper Clause in the context of the taxing power.

This interaction between the Congress’s taxing

power and the Necessary and Proper Clause has

substantial implications not only for the whiskey

industry, but for firearms, cryptocurrencies, and the

entire Internal Revenue Code. Because the Sixth

Circuit’s decision below conflicts with that of the Fifth

Circuit in McNutt v. Department of Justice and

presents a matter of significant national importance,

this Court should grant certiorari. McNutt v. Dep’t of

Justice, 173 F.4th 204 (5th Cir. 2026). This Court

should decide this case and provide a consistent and

workable standard that enables the government to

raise revenue without eroding essential limits on

enumerated powers.

The decision below does not adopt such a workable

standard. The Sixth Circuit held that the prohibition

was “necessary” to respond to a long national history

of alcohol tax evasion, and “proper” because it was

intended to raise revenue, is not explicitly forbidden

by the Constitution, and does not “circumvent some

other limit on Congress’s power.” Ream v. Dep’t of the

Treasury, 174 F.4th 480, 488 (6th Cir. 2026). Even

3

granting these debatable contentions, the logic is

capacious. While the opinion protests that “alcohol is

sui generis, or very close to it,” id., any number of

prohibitions may meet these broad criteria, from

prohibitions on home gardening to 3-D printing.

Furthermore, the standard creates a perverse

incentive for Congress to create new excise taxes to

allow prohibitions on substitutes.

In McNutt, the Fifth Circuit applied a better

standard that preserves the existing tax code while

preventing unchecked expansion of federal power

through the tax code. 173 F.4th at 221. A law passed

in support of the taxing power is only “proper” if it

operates upon existing taxable events. In other words,

the Necessary and Proper Clause does not empower

Congress to prevent taxable events from occurring

merely because it may be difficult to tax them. See id.

This distinction will help lower courts address

emerging disputes related to the taxing power while

preserving the existing federal collection apparatus

because liens, levies, summonses, bonds, marks,

registrations, and records all operate upon existing

taxable events and properly facilitate revenue

collection.

Despite the substantial disagreement between the

Fifth and Sixth Circuits on the validity of this federal

home distilling prohibition, both courts agreed that

the prohibition cannot be sustained under the taxing

power itself because it does not directly raise revenue.

This agreement, however, raises the stakes for the

circuit courts’ subsequent split on the proper

application of the Necessary and Proper Clause. To

preserve reasonable tax enforcement structures while

honoring the limited nature of the federal

4

government’s enumerated powers, this Court should

grant a writ of certiorari.

ARGUMENT

I.

THE DECISION BELOW CREATED A

CIRCUIT SPLIT ON THE VALIDITY OF THE

FEDERAL

PROHIBITION

ON

HOME

DISTILLING.

The decision in Ream allows the federal

government to enforce the prohibition on home

distilling within the Sixth Circuit. The decision in

McNutt prevents it from enforcing the same statute in

the neighboring Fifth Circuit. Such a geographical

disparity creates an intolerable situation where

identical conduct may be punished in one jurisdiction

but not in another.2

In the decision below, the Sixth Circuit splits from

the Fifth’s reasoning in McNutt both in the focus of the

analysis and the conclusion. While both courts applied

the two-prong test from McCulloch v. Maryland to

determine whether the prohibition is necessary and

proper, they differ substantially in their application of

each prong. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. (17

2 The inequity of the situation borders on comical—the home

distilling ban is unenforceable in Mississippi, the last state to

repeal prohibition, while it remains fully enforceable in Kentucky

and Tennessee, both famous for their iconic spirits. See, e.g., Jack

Daniel’s Props., Inc. v. VIP Prods. LLC, 599 U.S. 140, 148 (2023)

(“A bottle of Jack Daniel’s—no, Jack Daniel’s Old No. 7

Tennessee Sour Mash Whiskey—boasts a fair number of

trademarks. Recall what the bottle looks like (or better yet,

retrieve a bottle from wherever you keep liquor; it’s probably

there)[.]”).

5

U.S.) 316, 421 (1819); Ream, 174 F.4th at 486–87;

McNutt, 173 F.4th at 217–21. This Court should grant

certiorari here to clarify both the application of the

McCulloch test in the context of the federal taxing

power and the result with respect to this case.

A. This Court Should Clarify How To

Determine

Whether

A

Law

Is

“Necessary” To Implement the Taxing

Power.

In both Ream and McNutt, the circuit courts

applied McCulloch’s formulation that “to be

‘necessary,’ a law must be ‘plainly adapted’ to an

enumerated power.” McNutt, 173 F.4th at 219; see

also Ream, 174 F.4th at 487. Despite applying the

same standard, each court’s reasoning bears little

resemblance to the other. The direct circuit split on

federal powers warrants this Court’s attention.

The McNutt court examined the role of the home

distilling ban in the overall statutory structure and its

connection to the core purpose of the taxing power:

raising revenue. See McNutt, 173 F.4th at 218–20. The

Fifth Circuit concluded that the provision did not raise

revenue, but rather prevented it, by prohibiting the

occurrence of an event that would otherwise be

taxable. Id. at 219. Consequently, the prohibition was

not plainly adapted to raising revenue and therefore

not necessary, within the meaning of the necessary

and proper clause.

The Ream court, in contrast, examined the

historical circumstances surrounding the passage of

6

the ban in 1868. See Ream, 174 F.4th at 488. The court

paid special attention to widespread evasion of excise

taxes, as reflected in the congressional debates.

Because it would be difficult to track and tax spirits

distilled in homes, the court reasoned, it was

necessary to prevent distilling outside of heavily

regulated locations subject to inspection at any time.

See id. at 487. The court did not, however, explain how

preventing the occurrence of a taxable event furthers

the purpose of the taxing power: raising revenue. The

government takes the same perspective in its response

to this petition, arguing that the statutory location

restrictions are necessary to secure revenue collection.

See Fed. Respondents Br. at 15.

This logic rests on the unstated-but-essential

premise that the prohibition on home distilling

increases (or at least preserves) the demand for and

production of taxed distilled spirits. In other words,

both the Ream court and the government assume that

by preventing activity that may be difficult to tax, the

government stimulates revenue from commercial

spirits. This assumption is tenuous, resembling the

long-debunked theory that Congress may seek to

increase tax revenue from the sale of one particular

good by prohibiting the sale of substitute goods. See,

e.g., United States v. Dewitt, 76 U.S. 41, 44 (1869)

(rejecting similar taxation theory in prohibition of sale

of oil as “too remote and too uncertain” to be part of

the proper “execution the power of laying and

collecting taxes.”). A federal power to mandate

commerce in order to collect a tax would have no

limiting principle because, “the Government’s logic

7

would justify a mandatory purchase to solve almost

any problem.” Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius,

567 U.S. 519, 553 (2012) (“NFIB”). Apart from this

impermissible substitution-of-demand theory, the

nexus between prohibiting home distilling and the

revenue received from commercial distilling is too

attenuated for the prohibition to be “plainly adapted”

to raising revenue.

Therefore, the Court should grant certiorari to

clarify how courts should determine what is

“necessary” to implement the taxing power and

resolve the split between Ream and McNutt. The

Court should clarify whether the focus of the analysis

should be on necessity at the time of legislation or at

the time of challenge, and whether the Ream court’s

substitute-goods theory is a valid approach to the

necessity analysis.

B. The Court should clarify how to

determine whether a law is “proper” to

implement the taxing power.

The second inquiry likewise split the circuits:

whether the distilling prohibition is a “proper” use of

federal power to implement the enumerated taxing

power. The Necessary and Proper Clause grants only

power “incidental” to the enumerated power and “does

not license the exercise of any ‘great substantive and

independent power[s]’ beyond those specifically

enumerated.” NFIB, 567 U.S. at 559 (2012) (quoting

McCulloch, 4 Wheat. (17 U.S.) at 411). While both

circuit courts examined the propriety of the home

8

distilling ban, they divide over whether it was a

proper exercise of this ancillary power.

The Sixth Circuit in Ream concluded that the

prohibition is proper because it was intended “to

collect revenue,” it is “not expressly ‘prohibited by the

constitution’; nor does it seek to regulate conduct

indirectly, or to circumvent some other limit on

Congress’s power.” Ream, 174 F.4th at 488 (quoting

McCulloch, 4 Wheat (17 U.S.) at 423). While each of

these assertions is at least debatable, the last is the

most significant—if Congress may prohibit an entire

class of products merely to further its ability to tax a

subset of that class, it will have substantial power to

circumvent traditional limits on its enumerated

powers. It would become a back door to a federal police

power, all in the dubious assertion of raising revenue.

In contrast, the Fifth Circuit denied that the

Necessary and Proper Clause provides such broad

power. See McNutt, 173 F.4th at 221. The court

explicitly noted the lack of a limiting principle,

observing that the government’s logic (logic later

adopted by the Ream court) would allow it to

“criminalize nearly any at-home conduct only because

it has the possibility of concealing taxable activity.” Id.

While the Fifth Circuit provided the example of homebased businesses, many other activities may also fall

within the sweep of Ream’s logic. For example,

making one’s own fly-fishing lures and biofuel, or

reloading ammunition, all avoid various federal excise

taxes. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 4161(a) (tax on fishing

equipment); 26 U.S.C. § 4081 (tax on gasoline and

diesel); 26 U.S.C. § 4181 (tax on ammunition) cf. 26

U.S.C. § 4218 (tax imposed on private use as if sold in

interstate commerce).

9

The Court should grant certiorari in this case to

resolve these competing understandings of the sweep

of the Necessary and Proper Clause. Left unchecked,

the Ream decision could provide the basis for a

nascent police power that is reserved to the states.

II. CONGRESS HAS INCREASINGLY ABUSED

THE TAXING POWER TO IMPLEMENT

SUBSTANTIVE REGULATIONS.

The importance this case extends beyond the

prohibition on home distilling, creating a question of

nationwide importance. Congress has increasingly

turned to its taxing power to implement substantive

policy and regulations in an array of fields including

firearms, pharmaceuticals, and cryptocurrencies.

These laws come in many forms, but three of the

most significant patterns are (A) taxes that are not

intended to be paid, but rather to influence behavior;

(B) large regulatory regimes tied to a tax they outlive;

and (C) regulations that create substantial burdens

with only a tenuous connection to raising revenue.

Each area of congressional action implicates the

Necessary and Proper Clause relative to the taxing

power, and the Court should take this opportunity to

clarify that relationship to aid lower courts wrestling

with these problems.

A. Congress Increasingly Relies On Taxes

Designed To Be Avoided, Rather Than

Paid, To Influence Private Behavior.

While the essential purpose of the taxing power is

to raise revenue, Congress has increasingly deployed

10

taxes to influence behavior with no reasonable

expectation that they will produce revenue.

A key recent example involves the changes to

Medicare Part D created by the Inflation Reduction

Act of 2022. The changes impose an excise on sales of

certain drugs when the manufacturer and the

Department of Health and Human Services cannot

agree on a “maximum fair price.” 26 U.S.C. § 5000D.

The exaction is measured by gross sales, rather than

income, and increases over time if the manufacturer

does not reach an agreement with the Department.

See id. The penalty escalates dramatically—as

observed by the Third Circuit, “[t]he daily excise tax

begins at 185.71% of a selected drug’s sale price on the

first day of noncompliance and reaches 1,900% of the

sale price after 270 days.” Bristol Myers Squibb Co. v.

Sec’y, 155 F.4th 245, 254 (3d Cir. 2025), cert. denied

sub nom. Bristol Myers Squibb Co. v. Kennedy, 608

U.S. ___, 224 L. Ed. 2d 830 (May 18, 2026). The

manufacturer can avoid these ruinously large taxes

only by reaching an agreement with the Department

or withdrawing all of its drugs (not just those subject

to the dispute) from the major Medicare Part D

programs. See id.; 26 U.S.C. § 5000D(c)(1)(A), (2).

No firm will pay such a confiscatory charge, and

Congress did not expect one to.3 Like the prohibition

As Judge Hardiman noted, “the excise tax would be so

confiscatory that Congress’s Joint Committee on Taxation

projected that a nearly identical excise tax provision in a

precursor bill would raise ‘no revenue.’” Bristol Myers Squibb Co.,

155 F.4th at 272 (Hardiman, J., dissenting) (citing JOINT COMM.

ON TAX’N, Estimated Budget Effects of the Revenue Provisions of

Title XIII, at 8 (Nov. 19, 2021)).

3

11

on home distilling, this provision does not operate to

tax a course of conduct but to foreclose it. A

manufacturer who cannot reach an agreement with

the Department forfeits, in a matter of days, sums

exceeding the entire commercial value of the product.

As in this case, the key provisions of the law are not

designed to increase revenue, but to influence

behavior. Congress did not want anyone to pay the

drug-pricing tax any more than it really wants liquor

excise taxes from home distilling. Instead, the

legislature is using the taxing power as a way to

regulate conduct, with no legitimate aim for growing

the federal fisc. The Court should grant certiorari to

reinforce the principle that the taxing power is to raise

revenue, not a back door federal police power.

B. Congress

Has

Enacted

Extensive

Regulatory Schemes To Support A Tax,

Then Repealed The Tax And Leaving The

Regulations In Place.

Congress has also built extensive regulatory

schemes on a simple tax, then maintained the

regulations even after repealing the tax. While this

Court upheld the Affordable Care Act’s individual

mandate as an exercise of the taxing power, see NFIB,

567 U.S. at 570, in 2017 Congress reduced the shared

responsibility payment to zero but left the coverage

requirement in force. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(c). The Court

expected that “the [ACA] payment will raise

considerable revenue,” despite it being “plainly

designed to expand health insurance coverage.” Id. at

567. But now the tax rate is zero, leaving behind the

regulatory structure, but no federal taxes collected.

12

Similarly, the National Firearms Act of 1934

(NFA) was passed pursuant to the taxing power and

is housed in the Internal Revenue Code. 26 U.S.C.

§§ 5801–5872; see also Sonzinsky v. United States, 300

U.S. 506, 513 (1937). In addition to imposing taxes on

regulated firearms and “destructive devices,” the NFA

prohibits the unlicensed manufacture, possession,

sale, and transfer of unregistered items. 26 U.S.C.

§ 5861. The licensing process is extensive for

prospective purchasers, who must pay a $200 tax and

complete an arduous application process. See 27

C.F.R. § 479.84; 26 U.S.C. § 5812(a). In 2025,

however, the One Big Beautiful Bill Act reduced the

tax rates to zero on short-barreled shotguns, shortbarreled rifles, silencers, and certain other weapons,

while leaving the registration apparatus, the approval

process, and the associated criminal penalties in

place. See 26 U.S.C. § 5811(a)(2). Without the tax to

ground the federal exercise of power, a district court

recently enjoined the NFA’s provisions regulating the

newly untaxed firearms and devices. Silencer Shop

Found. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and

Explosives, No. 6:25-CV-056-H, 2026 WL 2255460, at

*12 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 5, 2026). The district court relied

heavily on the Fifth Circuit’s decision in McNutt and

rejected the government’s argument that the

regulatory framework was necessary and proper to

implement the NFA’s remaining special occupational

tax. Id. at *15–18.

The dispute at issue in the present case will have

ramifications far beyond the home distilling ban.

13

C. Many Provisions of the Internal Revenue

Code Impose Substantive Requirements

And Prohibitions Only Tenuously

Connected To Revenue Collection.

The Internal Revenue Code is replete with

substantive provisions that bear only a tenuous

connection to revenue production. For example, 26

U.S.C. § 6033(b)(5) currently requires § 501(c)(3)

organizations to provide the Internal Revenue Service

(IRS) with “the names and addresses of all substantial

contributors” to the organization. This information

does not aid the IRS in its collection practices—the

agency typically examines less than 10% of the forms

annually4—but imposes a substantial reporting

burden

on

charitable

organizations.

More

significantly, the disclosure of this information

potentially

violates

the

First

Amendment’s

protections of the freedom of association and related

privacy rights. See, e.g., NAACP v. Ala. ex rel.

Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958). Similarly, the

Johnson Amendment (26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3)) threatens

the tax-exempt status of organizations if they

“participate in, or intervene in . . . any political

campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any

candidate for public office.” 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3).

These provisions have only a tenuous relationship, if

any, to raising revenue for governmental operations,

4 See, e.g., Internal Revenue Serv., 2025 Data Book, Pub. No.

55-B at 53, table 3-5 (April 2026), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irspdf/p55b.pdf; Internal Revenue Serv., 2024 Data Book, Pub. No.

55-B at 53, table 21 (May 2025), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irsprior/p55b--052025.pdf.

14

but both have profound effects on taxpayers and

charitable organizations.

To provide one final example, 26 U.S.C. § 6050I(a)

requires individuals “engaged in a trade or business,

and . . . who, in the course of such trade or business,

receives more than $10,000 in cash in 1 transaction

(or 2 or more related transactions)” to make certain

reports to the government. In 2021, Congress

expanded the definition of “cash” to include “any

digital asset[.]” 26 U.S.C. § 6050I(d)(3). The potential

privacy ramifications from these reports are

extensive, and the Sixth Circuit recently reversed a

district court decision dismissing a challenge to the

law on enumerated powers, First Amendment, and

Fourth Amendment grounds. Carman v. Yellen, 112

F.4th 386, 394 (6th Cir. 2024).

Each of these three categories expands federal

power without raising revenue. The first imposes

taxes that are never meant to be paid to compel the

desired course of conduct. The second regulates even

after the revenue-raising measures have been

repealed. The third regulates without a direct tie to

generating revenue. As courts confront cases arising

from these various types of laws, they need a workable

standard to evaluate their validity under the

Necessary and Proper Clause. This case provides the

Court with an opportunity to provide that standard.

15

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Amicus respectfully

requests that this Court grant a writ of certiorari and

reverse the decision below.

Respectfully submitted,

TYLER MARTINEZ

Counsel of Record

NATIONAL TAXPAYERS

UNION FOUNDATION

122 C Street N.W., #700

Washington, D.C. 20001

tmartinez@ntu.org

(703) 683-5700

August 20, 2026