Opposition Brief — Ker'Sean Olajuwa Ramey, Petitioner v. Texas

Supreme Court briefSep 22, 2026

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No. 26-5637 (26A380)

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

KER’SEAN OLAJUWA RAMEY,

Petitioner,

STATE OF TEXAS,

Respondent–Appellee.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI AND

MOTION FOR STAY OF EXECUTION

KEN PAXTON

Attorney General of Texas

BRENT WEBSTER

First Assistant Attorney General

AMBER PLATT

Associate Deputy Attorney General

for Criminal Justice

TRAVIS G. BRAGG

Assistant Attorney General

Counsel of Record

Post Office Box 12548

Capitol Station

Austin, Texas 78711

512.936.1400

Travis.Bragg@oag.texas.gov

TOMEE M. HEINING

Chief, Criminal Appeals Division

Counsel for Respondent

CAPITAL CASE

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Whether the Court has jurisdiction over claims that were

disposed of on an adequate and independent state law ground.

Whether the Court should expend its limited resources to

consider fact-bound questions, raised on the eve of Ramey’s impending

execution date, where the claims are procedurally defaulted, dilatory,

and meritless.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED ...................................................................... i

TABLE OF CONTENTS ...........................................................................ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................... iii

INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................... 1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE .................................................................. 4

Ramey’s Trial ................................................................................... 4

II.

Ramey’s Postconviction Proceedings ............................................... 8

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT................................................. 11

Certiorari Review and a Stay of Execution Are Foreclosed by

an Independent and Adequate State-Procedural Bar. .................. 13

II.

Ramey Provides No Compelling Reason for Further Review

and His Claims Lack Merit. ........................................................... 21

Ramey’s Batson claim lacks merit. ....................................... 22

Ramey’s IATC-punishment claim lacks merit...................... 27

REASONS FOR DENYING THE MOTION FOR STAY........................ 34

Standard of Review ........................................................................ 34

II.

Ramey Cannot Demonstrate His Case is Worthy of a Stay. ......... 36

Ramey has not made a strong showing that he will

succeed on the merits. ........................................................... 36

Ramey is unlikely to suffer irreparable harm. ..................... 36

The State and the public have a strong interest in seeing

the state court judgment carried out. ................................... 36

CONCLUSION ........................................................................................ 38

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Aguilar v. Dretke, 428 F.3d 526 (5th Cir. 2005) ..................................... 12

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) .................................................. 20

Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983) ...................................... 34, 35, 36

Barr v. Lee, 591 U.S. 979 (2020) ............................................................... 3

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) .......................................... passim

Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. 53 (2009) ................................................ 14, 15

Bucklew v. Precythe, 587 U.S. 119 (2019) ....................................... 3, 4, 37

Busby v. Davis, 925 F.3d 699 (5th Cir. 2019) ......................................... 20

Buxton v. Collins, 925 F.2d 816 (5th Cir. 1991) ............................... 35, 36

Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538 (1998)............................... 35, 36, 37

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) ......................... 13, 14, 17, 20

Crutsinger v. Davis, 936 F.3d 265 (5th Cir. 2019) .................................. 37

Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005) ................................................ 22

De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Medical & Clinical Servs. Fund,

520 U.S. 806 (1997) .............................................................................. 17

Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167 (2001) .................................................. 12

Ealoms v. State, 983 S.W.2d 853 (Tex. App.—Waco 1998, pet. ref’d) .... 26

Emery v. Johnson, 139 F.3d 191 (5th Cir. 1997) .................................... 29

Ex parte Blue, 230 S.W.3d 151 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).................... 16, 20

Ex parte Hood, 211 S.W.3d 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) ........................ 16

Ex parte Kerr, 64 S.W.3d 414 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) ............................ 15

Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144 (2017) ....... 17

Felkner v. Jackson, 562 U.S. 594 (2011) ................................................. 24

iii

Flowers v. Mississippi, 588 U.S. 284, 301–303 (2019) ............................ 23

Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. 488 (2016) ................................................. 13

Gomez v. United States Dist. Court, 503 U.S. 653 (1992)....................... 37

Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255 (1989) ........................................................ 13

Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945) ..................................................... 18

Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991) ......................................... 24

Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993) .................................................. 35

Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573 (2006)....................................... 3, 34, 38

Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770 (1987)............................................... 35

Hoffman v. Cain, 752 F.3d 430 (5th Cir. 2014) ...................................... 24

Hughes v. Quarterman, 530 F.3d 336 (5th Cir. 2008) ............................ 17

James v. Kentucky, 466 U.S. 341 (1984) ................................................. 14

Kunkle v. Texas, 125 S. Ct. 2898 (2004).................................................. 21

Kyles v. Whitley, 498 U.S. 931 (1990) ..................................................... 12

Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518 (1997)............................................ 17

Leavitt v. Arave, 646 F.3d 605 (9th Cir. 2011)........................................ 33

Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362 (2002).......................................................... 14

Martel v. Clair, 565 U.S. 648 (2012) ....................................................... 37

Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) ................................................. 18

Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003) .............................................. 23

Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005) ................................................. 23

Moore v. Texas, 122 S. Ct. 2350 (2002) ................................................... 18

Murphy v. Dretke, 416 F.3d 427 (5th Cir. 2005) ..................................... 24

Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637 (2004) ................................................ 34

Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (2009) ....................................................... 35

Pitchford v. Cain, 608 U.S. 391 (2026) ........................................... passim

Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766 (2010) ......................................................... 24

Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005) ..................................................... 38

Rivera v. Quarterman, 505 F.3d 349 (5th Cir. 2007).............................. 20

Rocha v. Thaler, 626 F.3d 815 (5th Cir. 2010).................................. 18, 20

Satterwhite v. State, 858 S.W.2d 412 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) ................ 26

Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992) .................................................. 16

Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 (2008)......................................... 23, 24

Sochor v. Florida, 504 U.S. 527 (1992) ................................................... 18

Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856 (2002) .................................................... 14

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) ................................ 27, 28

Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) ................................................... 27

Wong v. Belmontes, 558 U.S. 15 (2009) ................................................... 33

STATUTES

28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) .................................................................................. 15

28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1).............................................................................. 12

28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2).............................................................................. 12

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) .................................................................................. 12

28 U.S.C. § 2253 ...................................................................................... 34

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) .............................................................................. 34

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) .................................................................................. 19

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.071 § 5 ............................................. passim

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.071 § 5(a)(1)................................. 15, 18, 19

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.071 § 5(a)(3)................................. 16, 18, 20

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.071 § 5(d) ................................................. 15

RULES

Supreme Court Rule 10 ............................................................... 11, 21, 22

Supreme Court Rule 14.1(h) ................................................................... 21

INTRODUCTION

In August 2005, Petitioner Ker’Sean Olajuwa Ramey, along with

LeJames Norman, entered a neighbor’s home with the intention of

stealing cocaine. They shot and killed the home’s occupants, Celso Lopez,

Tiffani Peacock, and Sam Roberts. Tiffani was shot in the back of the

head as she was begging on her knees, her boyfriend Sam was shot

multiple times as he tried to defend himself, and Celso was left to bleed

out from an “accidental” shot to his cheek.

After the Texas jury found Ramey guilty of capital murder, they

learned that Ramey procured the guns used in the crime by leading a

crew to conduct multiple raids of another person’s house (the Narin

residence) in an effort to clean out his cache (three raids in total). The

jury also learned of Ramey’s lengthy violent and criminal history, which

began at a young age but then took a particularly dark turn at sixteen

and escalated from there. Based on these and other egregious facts, the

jury voted in favor of death.

Pursuant to the order of the trial court, Ramey is scheduled to be

executed sometime after 6:00 P.M. on September 23, 2026. As

shown below, he has already availed himself of the full state and federal

appeals available to death-row inmates in Texas. Now, over four years

after his federal habeas proceedings concluded and one day before his

scheduled execution, Ramey seeks certiorari review of the Texas Court of

Criminal Appeal’s (CCA) decision to dismiss his subsequent state habeas

application, which itself was only filed two weeks prior. See App.328a,

319–20a.

In the question presented in the instant petition for certiorari,

Ramey argues that review is warranted because the trial court violated

Batson v. Kentucky1 during jury selection, his trial counsel was

ineffective (IATC) during the punishment phase of trial, and the CCA’s

dismissal of these claims on procedural grounds was neither adequate

nor independent. See generally Pet. Writ Cert. (Pet.). However, his

petition is not worthy of the Court’s review. The CCA’s abuse-of-the-writ

bar has long been recognized as adequate and independent state law

grounds on which to dismiss a subsequent habeas application. Ramey’s

petition simply does not demonstrate any special or important reason for

this Court to review that decision, and this Court does not typically

476 U.S. 79 (1986)

engage in routine error correction. Certiorari review is therefore

unwarranted.

Similarly, Ramey’s request for a stay is meritless. He has the

burden of persuasion on his stay request, and he is required to make “a

clear showing” that he is entitled to one. Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S.

573, 584 (2006). “Last-minute stays should be the extreme exception, not

the norm[.]” Bucklew v. Precythe, 587 U.S. 119, 150 (2019); see also Barr

v. Lee, 591 U.S. 979, 981 (2020). As the Court has explained:

“the last-minute nature of an application” that “could have

been brought” earlier, or “an applicant’s attempt at

manipulation,” “may be grounds for denial of a stay.”

If litigation is allowed to proceed, federal courts “can and

should” protect settled state judgments from “undue

interference” by invoking their “equitable powers” to dismiss

or curtail suits that are pursued in a “dilatory” fashion or

based on “speculative” theories.

Bucklew, 587 U.S. at 150 (quoting Hill, 547 U.S. at 584–85).

By delaying until the last minute to raise his claim, Ramey fails to

make the requisite showing to justify interference by the federal courts.

Twenty-one years have passed since Ramey killed three people in their

home. The ensuing delay in carrying out his sentence should weigh

heavily in the evaluation of this application for a stay, and justice for

Ramey’s victims should be denied no longer. Simply put, “[t]he people of

[Texas], the surviving victims of Mr. [Ramey]’s crimes, and others like

them deserve better.” Id. at 149. The strong interest of the State in the

timely enforcement of Ramey’s sentence is not outweighed by the

unlikely possibility that certiorari will be granted. Ramey thus fails to

demonstrate that he is entitled to a stay of execution under this Court’s

precedent. Accordingly, Ramey’s request for a stay should be denied.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Ramey’s Trial

On direct appeal the CCA summarized the facts of the crime:

The bodies of Celso Lopez, Tiffany [sic] Peacock, and

Sam Roberts were found in Roberts’s residence by his parents

on August 25, 2005. Lopez had been shot four times: once in

the cheek and three times in the back of the head. Peacock

was shot twice in the head. Roberts was shot five times: once

in the chest, once in the neck, and three times in the back of

the head. They had been killed on or about August 24.

Stacy Johnson, [Ramey’s] former girlfriend, testified

that he called her at 12:29 a.m. and 12:59 a.m. on August 25.

He went to her house after their conversation, and slept there

until shortly before 6 a.m. She said that he seemed “distant.”

Two days later, Johnson accompanied [Ramey] to his

house where he dug up “something” from his backyard.

Johnson drove him to a dam. While Johnson was driving,

[Ramey] called his former step-father, Lonny Lyte. (Both

Johnson and Lyte testified about this conversation.) [Ramey]

asked Lyte, “If you was to kill somebody, what would you do

with the guns?” Lyte responded by saying that he would throw

them in the river.

When they reached the dam, Johnson saw [Ramey]

throw two pistols into the water. She later returned to the

dam with the police and pointed out to the dive team the place

where she remembered him throwing the pistols. They were

found in the approximate location she indicated.

After he threw the pistols in the water, [Ramey]

admitted to Johnson that he had committed a murder. He first

said, “You know what this is about,” to which she responded

in the affirmative. When they returned to her house, he

admitted to everything in detail, and he threatened to kill her

if she told anyone.

A firearms examiner from the Department of Public

Safety testified that markings on the bullets that were

recovered from the victims’ bodies were consistent with the

bullets having been fired from the pistols that were recovered

from the water at the dam.

The pistols had been stolen from a residence on August

19, 2005. The owner of the pistols identified them, and one of

the pistols was further identified by records of registration.

Gerald Manzanalez and Christopher Times testified that, on

August 19, they and [Ramey] had broken into a residence

where they stole the pistols and some other firearms.

LeJames Norman testified that, on August 24, he and

[Ramey] had gone to the scene of the murders, Sam Roberts’s

residence. Their objective was to steal 100 kilograms of

cocaine they believed to be inside.

He said that he and [Ramey] prepared by stealing masks

from a discount store. The jury saw the store’s surveillance

videotape which showed them stealing the masks at 9:22 p.m.

on August 24.

Norman testified that they also prepared by wrapping

tape around their shoes so as not to leave a trail. They donned

their masks and cocked their guns before entering the house.

They knocked on the door. Celso Lopez answered, and the two

men forced their way inside. Norman held a gun on Lopez,

while [Ramey] ran to the rear of the home, where he hoped to

find the cocaine. As [Ramey] searched for the drugs, Norman

accidentally shot Lopez in the cheek. [Ramey] quickly

returned to the front room and forced Lopez, bleeding and

begging for help, to move to a bedroom and lie on the floor.

At that point Roberts came home, accompanied by

Peacock (his girlfriend). When she saw what was happening,

Peacock panicked and tried to run away. Norman grabbed her

and forced her to her knees inside the house, near the front

door. As she was bending down, he shot her in the back of the

head. Seeing his girlfriend fall limp to the floor, Roberts

attacked Norman. The two men “tussled” in the kitchen until

[Ramey] shot Roberts, freeing Norman who immediately shot

Roberts several more times while he lay on the floor. [Ramey]

then returned to the bedroom and shot Lopez in the back of

the head as he lay on the floor.

[Ramey] and Norman left the house. As they walked

away, Norman realized that he had left his police scanner

inside the house. [Ramey] quickly returned to retrieve the

scanner. While inside, he shot the victims several more times

to ensure that they were dead.

[Ramey] and Norman did not find any cocaine.

Eight other witnesses testified that [Ramey] had

admitted to them that he had participated in the murders.

App.7a–9a.

On federal habeas review, the district court summarized the

evidence presented during punishment:

The State based its punishment-phase case on Ramey’s

escalating violent actions. The State presented testimony and

evidence that, when Ramey stood trial at age twenty-one, he

had already amassed a significant criminal history. Ramey

began acting out in school at a young age. His first interaction

with the legal system occurred when at age sixteen he coerced

a seven-year-old boy into performing oral sex on him.

Originally charged with aggravated sexual assault, the

charge was reduced to assault and the court sentenced him to

juvenile probation for one year.

At age seventeen, Ramey pleaded guilty to criminal

mischief for breaking into a vending machine at his high

school. Less than six months later, Ramey and another friend,

broke into his alternative learning school and ransacked the

principal’s office. His probation for the two offenses was

eventually revoked for failing to pay fees, perform his

community service hours, and report to his probation officer.

Ramey’s subsequent stay in the county jail did not squelch his

lawlessness.

Jurors found out that Ramey had actually burglarized the

Nairn residence three times. The State also presented

evidence that, after burglarizing a different location, Ramey

attempted to run over the homeowner with his car. Witnesses

testified that Ramey had planned other burglaries.

Additionally, Ramey told friends that he had carried out

various crimes for which he was never charged. Importantly,

Ramey bragged that he had committed other murders.

Ramey’s behavior did not improve while incarcerated before

trial. He armed himself with weapons, created disturbances,

and threatened guards.

The State’s final witness was Dr. Richard Coons, a

psychologist. Dr. Coons did not examine Ramey, but his

review of relevant records led him to opine that an offender

like Ramey would “commit criminal acts of violence in the

future which would constitute a continuing threat to society.”

Tr. Vol. 38 at 81.

The defense only called two witnesses in the penalty phase.

Ramey’s mother, Ms. Terral Stevens, provided an overview of

Ramey’s life. Ms. Stevens told jurors of Ramey’s early

emotional and mental problems, including a diagnosis of

dyslexia and ADHD at age four. Early evaluations revealed

emotional disturbances and a lack of social skills. Ramey told

evaluators that his step-father had abused him. Ramey’s

mother, however, failed to seek the necessary help for her

son's problems.

Dr. Mark Kunick, a psychiatrist, based his testimony on an

interview with Ramey and Ramey’s mother, his review of

records, and his understanding of the facts of the case. Dr.

Kunick opined that Ramey’s nonviolence since incarceration,

his close-knit family, and his lack of mental illness would

make it unlikely that Ramey would be a future danger.

The jury answered Texas’ special issues in a manner

requiring the imposition of a death sentence.

App.44a–45a.

II.

Ramey’s Postconviction Proceedings

On January 23, 2007, Judge Williams entered judgment for a

capital murder conviction and death sentence. CR.191–95. The CCA

affirmed Ramey’s conviction on direct appeal—including multiple claims

under Batson—on February 11, 2009. App.1a–30a. On October 5, 2009,

this Court denied Ramey’s petition for a writ of certiorari. Ramey v.

Texas, 558 U.S. 836 (2009).

In 2008, Ramey’s state habeas counsel, Mr. Richard Rogers III, filed

an initial state habeas application, which included the IATC-punishment

claim at issue here. SHCR.3–75. 2 Judge Williams, presiding over both

trial and state habeas proceedings, issued findings of fact and conclusions

of law recommending denial of relief. SHCR.145–61. After considering the

recommendation, the CCA remanded a single issue to the trial court for

further development. App.32a. After further briefing, however, the CCA

held that this issue was not cognizable on state habeas review and found

the rest of Ramey’s claims lacked merit; thus, the court denied relief.

App38a–39a.

Ramey then took his case to federal habeas court. Ramey finally

filed his amended petition, which included both claims under Batson and

the present IATC-punishment claim. See generally ECF No. 30, Ramey v.

SHCR refers to the State Habeas Clerk’s Record for state writ number WR74,896 and AP-76,533 (this number applies to the later filing and setting of a single

claim by the CCA). It is followed by the relevant page numbers.

Davis, 314 F. Supp. 3d 785 (S.D. Tex. 2018). The lower court denied

federal habeas relief. App.40a–116A. Ramey sought a certificate of

appealability (COA) from the Fifth Circuit on three claims: (1) a Batson

claim; (2) IATC during the guilt phase; and (3) IATC during the

punishment phase (the same raised here). Ramey v. Davis, 942 F.3d 241,

246 (5th Cir. 2019).

That court granted a COA as to the first two claims but denied as

to the third. Id. at 258. The court ultimately affirmed on the district

court’s decision on the Batson and IATC-guilt claims. App.135a. Ramey

again

sought

certiorari

from

this

Court

the

Batson

and

IATC-punishment claims. See generally Pet. Writ Cert., Ramey v.

Lumpkin, 142 S. Ct. 1442 (2022). The Court denied his petition on April

4, 2022. Ramey, 142 S. Ct. at 1442.

On May 7, 2026, the 24th Judicial District of Jackson County,

Texas, scheduled Ramey for execution on Wednesday, September 23,

2026. On September 9, two weeks before his execution, Ramey filed in

state court a subsequent state habeas application, his second application

overall. See App.327a–28a. He also filed a suggestion that the CCA

reconsider the denial of his first state habeas application and a motion

for stay of execution. On September 21, the CCA dismissed his

subsequent application as an abuse of the writ. App.328a.; see Tex. Code

Crim. Proc. art. 11.071 § 5. It also denied the motion to stay the execution

without order and took no action on the suggestion to reconsider. Ramey

then the instant petition for a writ of certiorari and application for a stay

of execution. The State opposes both.

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

The questions that Ramey presents for review are unworthy of the

Court’s attention. Supreme Court Rule 10 provides that review on writ of

certiorari is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, and it will be

granted only for “compelling reasons.” Where a petitioner asserts only

factual errors or that a properly stated rule of law was misapplied,

certiorari review is “rarely granted.” Id.

Here, Ramey advances no compelling reason to review his case, and

none exists. Indeed, the issues in this case involve only the lower court’s

proper application of state procedural rules for collateral review of

criminal convictions. Specifically, Ramey was cited for abuse of the writ

because he did not meet the subsequent application requirements of

Article 11.071 § 5. The state court’s disposition, which relied upon an

adequate and independent state procedural ground and did not reach the

merits of Ramey’s claim, forecloses certiorari review or a stay of

execution.

As Justice Stevens noted, concurring in the denial of an application

for a stay in Kyles v. Whitley, 498 U.S. 931, 932 (1990):

This Court rarely grants review at this stage of the litigation

even when the application for state collateral relief is

supported by arguably meritorious federal constitutional

claims. Instead, the Court usually deems federal habeas

proceedings to be the more appropriate avenues for

consideration of federal constitutional claims.

And, if Ramey sought federal habeas now, the petition would also

be impermissibly successive 3 and barred by the relevant statute of

limitations. 4 These claims would also be procedurally defaulted by virtue

of the CCA’s application of § 5. 5 Ramey’s petition presents no important

Ramey is re-raising claims from his initial federal habeas proceeding. “A claim

presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254 that

was presented in a prior application shall be dismissed.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1). To

the extent that he is raising any new claims, he fails to meet requirements of

§ 2244(b)(2)(A).

Ramey’s statute of limitations under § 2244(d) began on December 4, 2012.

App.48a-53a; Ramey v. Davis, 942 F.3d 241, 248 (5th Cir. 2019). And his federal

habeas proceeding did not toll the statute of limitations. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S.

167, 181–82 (2001).

Aguilar v. Dretke, 428 F.3d 526, 533 (5th Cir. 2005) (“Texas’ abuse-of-writ rule

is ordinarily an ‘adequate and independent’ procedural ground on which to base a

procedural default ruling.”).

questions of law to justify this Court’s exercise of its certiorari

jurisdiction, and the petition should be denied.

Certiorari Review and a Stay of Execution Are Foreclosed

by an Independent and Adequate State-Procedural Bar.

Ramey seeks review of the lower court’s dismissal of his Batson and

IATC-punishment claims. See generally Pet. Despite the CCA’s explicit

statement that it was not “reviewing the merits of the claims raised,”

App.328a, Ramey argues that it necessarily and always makes a prima

facie determination of the merits when applying the abuse-of-the-writ

bar, meaning this Court can reach them too. Pet. 17–19. But he is wrong,

and the CCA’s dismissal on a state law ground strips the Court of

jurisdiction.

“This Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain a federal claim on review

of a state court judgment ‘if that judgment rests on a state law ground

that is both ‘independent’ of the merits of the federal claim and an

‘adequate’ basis for the court’s decision.’” Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S.

488, 497 (2016) (quoting Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 260 (1989)). The

state law ground barring federal review may be “substantive or

procedural.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991).

To be adequate, a state law ground must be “firmly established and

regularly followed.” Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 376 (2002) (quoting

James v. Kentucky, 466 U.S. 341, 348 (1984)). Discretion does not deprive

a state law ground of its adequacy because “a discretionary rule can be

‘firmly established’ and ‘regularly followed’—even if the appropriate

exercise of discretion may permit consideration of a federal claim in some

cases but not others.” Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. 53, 60–61 (2009).

Ultimately, situations where a state law ground is found inadequate are

but a “small category of cases.” Kemna, 534 U.S. at 381.

A state law ground is “independent of federal law [when it] do[es]

not depend upon a federal constitutional ruling on the merits.” Stewart

v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002). There is no presumption of federal

law consideration. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735–36. To so find, the state

court’s decision must “fairly appear to rest primarily on federal law, or to

be interwoven with the federal law.” Id. Where there is no “clear

indication that a state court rested its decision on federal law, a federal

court’s task will not be difficult.” Id. at 739–40.

Texas, like Congress, has imposed significant restrictions on

subsequent habeas applications. Compare Art. 11.071 § 5, with 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(b); see Kindler, 558 U.S. at 62 (noting that federal courts should

not “disregard state procedural rules that are substantially similar to

those to which we give full force in our own courts”). A Texas court may

not reach the merits of a claim in a subsequent application “except in

exceptional circumstances.” Ex parte Kerr, 64 S.W.3d 414, 418 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2002). The applicant bears the burden of providing “sufficient

specific facts establishing,” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.071 § 5(a), one

of these “exceptional circumstances,” Ex parte Kerr, 64 S.W.3d at 418.

Ramey argued in the CCA that his Batson claim was authorized

under Article 11.071 § 5(a)(1) because it relied on a new rule of law,

specifically Pitchford v. Cain, 608 U.S. 391 (2026). App.236a–38a.

For purposes of Subsection (a)(1), a legal basis of a claim is

unavailable on or before a date described by Subsection (a)(1)

if the legal basis was not recognized by or could not have been

reasonably formulated from a final decision of the United

States Supreme Court, a court of appeals of the United States,

or a court of appellate jurisdiction of this state on or before

that date.

Art. 11.071 § 5(d). “Stated another way, if the legal basis for the claim

was recognized by or could have been reasonably formulated from a

[decision from any of those courts], then the applicant has failed to meet

the unavailability exception.” Ex parte Hood, 211 S.W.3d 767, 775 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2007), different result reached on reconsideration, 304 S.W.3d

397 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). The CCA emphasized “that lack of

recognition is not enough to render a legal basis unavailable. If the legal

basis could have been reasonably formulated from a decision issued by a

requisite court, then the exception is not met.” Id.

For his IATC-punishment claim, Ramey argued that was

authorized under Article 11.071 § 5(a)(3). App. 35–37. There, an

applicant can prove that, “by clear and convincing evidence, but for a

violation of the United States Constitution no rational juror would have

answered in the [S]tate’s favor one or more of the special issues.” Art.

11.071 § 5(a)(3). This section “more or less, [codifies] the doctrine found

in Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992).” Ex parte Blue, 230 S.W.3d

151, 151 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The CCA found that Ramey did not

“satisfy the requirements of Article 11.071 § 5” for either claim and it

dismissed “the application as an abuse of the writ without reviewing the

merits of his claims.” App.328a.

Here, Ramey challenges § 5 as neither adequate nor independent.

Pet.17–19. He is wrong on both counts. The Fifth Circuit “has held that,

since 1994, the Texas abuse of the writ doctrine has been consistently

applied as a procedural bar, and that it is an . . . adequate state ground

for the purpose of imposing a [federal] procedural bar.” Hughes v.

Quarterman, 530 F.3d 336, 342 (5th Cir. 2008); cf. Expressions Hair

Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1149–50 (2017) (noting that

this Court generally defers to a court of appeals’ interpretation of their

respective states’ laws); De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Medical & Clinical Servs.

Fund, 520 U.S. 806, 810 n.5 (1997) (noting “settled practice of according

respect to the courts of appeals’ greater familiarity with issues of state

law”).

Further, this Court has held on numerous occasions that it “will not

review a question of federal law decided by a state court if the decision of

that court rests on a state law ground that is independent of the federal

question and adequate to support the judgment,” Coleman, 501 U.S. at

729, because “[the Court] in fact lack[s] jurisdiction to review such

independently supported judgments on direct appeal: Since the state-law

determination is sufficient to sustain the decree, any opinion of this Court

on the federal question would be purely advisory.” Lambrix v. Singletary,

520 U.S. 518, 523 (1997) (citing Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125–26

(1945), and Sochor v. Florida, 504 U.S. 527, 533–34 & n.112 (1992));

Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1042 (1983).

There can be no question that simply determining whether there is

a new case for purposes of § 5(a)(1) is independent of any application of

federal law. As for § 5(a)(3), determining whether an inmate has provided

the requisite level of evidence to prove innocence of the death penalty

does not touch on federal law. See Moore v. Texas, 122 S. Ct. 2350, 2353–

54 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting in grant of stay) (“The [CCA] was not

required to pass on any federal question in deciding whether ‘clear and

convincing evidence’ showed that ‘but for a violation of the United States

Constitution no rational juror would have answered in the state’s favor

one or more of the special issues that were submitted to the jury.’”

(quoting Art. 11.071 § 5(a)(3))). Federal law does not dictate whether

Ramey met the “clear and convincing” burden of proof mandated by Texas

law. Art. 11.071 § 5(a)(3) ; see Rocha v. Thaler, 626 F.3d 815, 823–24 (5th

Cir. 2010) (the federal courts of appeals “have unanimously held that a

federal court’s determination that a petitioner cannot prove his actual

innocence does not constitute a decision on the merits of the petitioner's

constitutional claim for habeas relief”).

Ramey’s

latest

subsequent

state

habeas

application

was

appropriately dismissed on adequate and independent state law grounds.

For his Batson claim, he argued that this Court announced a new rule of

law in Pitchford and, thus, § 5(a)(1) gave him passage through the bar.

But of course, that is a complete misapprehension of Pitchford.

In that case, this Court reviewed the Mississippi high court’s

decision on Pitchford’s Batson claim through the lens of 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d). Pitchford, 608 U.S. at 394. In doing so, it was necessarily

reviewing the state high court’s application of already established law.

The Court determined that “the Mississippi trial court never conducted

the essential third step of the Batson inquiry.” Id. at 395. And, it held

that “the Mississippi Supreme Court unreasonably applied the clearly

established Batson precedents” in agreeing with the federal district

court’s grant of relief. Id. at 401.

By very dent of this Court’s analysis, Pitchford cannot and did not

announce a new rule of law. It was simply this Court applying the already

established precedents of Batson and its progeny. And for these very

reasons, Ramey could not satisfy § 5(a)(1).

For his IATC-punishment claim, the claim could not have

demonstrated his innocence of the death penalty. Art. 11.071 § 5(a)(3);

see Rocha, 626 F.3d at 825–26 (“Evidence that might have persuaded the

jury to decline to impose the death penalty is irrelevant” to a claim of

actual innocence of the death penalty). As will be shown below, the

punishment case against Ramey was considerable.

Ramey points to Rivera v. Quarterman, 505 F.3d 349 (5th Cir. 2007)

and Busby v. Davis, 925 F.3d 699 (5th Cir. 2019) for the proposition that

the CCA’s evaluation of the state procedural bar implicates federal

constitutional questions. But those cases dealt with the state court’s

dismissal of intellectual disability claims under Atkins v. Virginia, 536

U.S. 304 (2002). Busby, 925 F.3d at 706–07; Rivera, 505 F.3d at 355. But

the CCA has explained it engages in a prima facie review of Atkins claims

under § 5(a)(3). Ex parte Blue, 230 S.W.3d at 162–63. The same is not

true for all claims brought under that exception.

Absent an indication in the CCA’s order, the CCA presumptively

did not reach the federal issue raised. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735

(explaining that there is no presumption of federal-law consideration

unless it is first determined that the state court decision “fairly appears

to rest primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with the federal

law”), 739–40 (“In the absence of a clear indication that a state court

rested its decision on federal law, a federal court’s task will not be

difficult.”). Ultimately, the abuse-of-the-writ bar—a state-law ground

clearly and unambiguously applied by the CCA—prohibits this Court

from exercising jurisdiction over the claims for which Ramey now seeks

review. See Kunkle v. Texas, 125 S. Ct. 2898, 2898 (2004) (Stevens, J.,

concurring) (“I am now satisfied that the Texas court’s determination was

independently based on a determination of state law, see Tex. Code Crim.

Proc. art. 11.071, § 5 [ ], and therefore that we cannot grant petitioner his

requested relief.”). Ramey’s claims are foreclosed by an adequate and

independent state procedural bar and certiorari review should be denied.

II.

Ramey Provides No Compelling Reason for Further Review

and His Claims Lack Merit.

The Court requires those seeking a writ of certiorari to provide “[a] direct

and concise argument amplifying the reasons relied on for allowance of the

writ.” Sup. Ct. R. 14.1(h). The Court would be hard pressed to discover any

such reason in Ramey’s petition, let alone amplification thereof. Indeed, Ramey

makes no allegations of circuit or state-court-of-last-resort conflict. See Sup.

Ct. R. 10(a)–(b). He makes a plea based on “systemic” due process violations

and broad applicability. But this is just sheep’s clothing for what he really

seeks: pure error correction in his case. And that is hardly a good reason to

expend the Court’s limited resources. See Sup. Ct. R. 10 (“A petition . . . is

rarely granted when the asserted error consists of . . . the misapplication of a

properly stated rule of law.”). And such a request is especially problematic here

because the court below did not reach the merits of Ramey’s claims. This Court

is one “of review, not of first view.” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 718 n.7

(2005).

Further, Ramey has already sought, and this Court has denied,

certiorari review of these claims, and twice for his Batson claim. While those

denials are not precedential, the same jurisprudential concerns that

dictated that result continue to apply. Ramey provides no compelling

reason why he should be entitled to additional bites at the apple.

Consequently, this case presents an exceptionally poor vehicle for

reaching the merits of Ramey’s claims and his petition should be denied

on this basis alone

Ramey’s Batson claim lacks merit.

Ramey asserts that the trial court violated Batson and Pitchford by

when

granted

the

State’s

peremptory

challenge

Cheryl

Steadham-Scott (Scott), the only African-American against whom the

State used a peremptory strike.

In Batson and subsequent cases, the Court has spelled out

how a trial court should determine whether a prosecutor

employed a peremptory challenge based on race. After the

defendant makes a prima facie showing that a peremptory

strike was based on race (step one), the prosecutor must

provide a race-neutral reason for the challenged strike (step

two). Then, at step three, defense counsel has an opportunity

to rebut the prosecutor's race-neutral reason as pretextual,

and the trial court in turn decides whether the prosecutor’s

race-neutral reason for striking a juror is pretextual “in light

of all evidence with a bearing on it.”

Pitchford, 608 U.S. at 394 (quoting Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 252

(2005) (Miller-El II)) (citing Flowers v. Mississippi, 588 U.S. 284, 301–

303 (2019); Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 478–479 (2008)).

The third step will “largely will turn on evaluation of credibility.”

Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.21. “Credibility can be measured by, among

other factors, the prosecutor’s demeanor; by how reasonable, or how

improbable, the explanations are; and by whether the proffered rationale

has some basis in accepted trial strategy.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S.

322, 339 (2003) (Miller-El I). In short, the trial court considers the

relevant circumstances bearing upon racial animosity. Miller-El II, 545

U.S. at 239. But “the best evidence often will be the demeanor of the

attorney who exercises the challenge.” Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S.

352, 365 (1991) (plurality opinion).

A trial court’s denial of a Batson claim “is entitled to ‘great

deference’ and ‘must be sustained unless clearly erroneous.’” Felkner v.

Jackson, 562 U.S. 594, 598 (2011) (quoting Snyder, 552 U.S. at 477).

That, however, “is the standard on direct review;” AEDPA imposes an

even higher standard which “‘demands that state-court decisions be

given the benefit of the doubt.’” Id. (quoting Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766,

773 (2010)). “Therefore, the federal court’s role is to ‘determine whether

the trial court’s determination of the prosecutor’s neutrality with respect

to race was objectively unreasonable and has been rebutted by clear and

convincing evidence to the contrary.’” Hoffman v. Cain, 752 F.3d 430,

448–49 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Murphy v. Dretke, 416 F.3d 427, 432 (5th

Cir. 2005)).

The thrust of Ramey’s claim is that the trial court bypassed the

third step of Batson by not seeking input from defense counsel. App.13–

15. “The full record citation confirms this abrupt termination.” App.15.

But that is not what the record shows.

Ramey did not lodge his Batson challenge as to Scott until three

weeks later.6 App.62a. The trial court allowed the objection, and the State

provided its race neutral reasons. 30.RR.8–10.7 After the State spoke, the

court said it was comfortable with what the record reflected, but then

asked, “Anything else?” 30.RR.10. Trial counsel answered, “No, sir.” Id.

This case is distinguishable from Pitchford where the court there did not

permit trial counsel to assert his counter to the State’s reasoning. 608

U.S. at 396.

Scott, the only African-American venireperson the State struck,

was repeatedly unable to answer questions regarding her ability to

consider the death penalty, both in her jury questionnaire and during

voir dire. On the questionnaire, she left blank the question, “Have you

ever been opposed to the death penalty?” and responded in another

section that she was “neither generally opposed to nor generally in favor

of capital punishment.” 41.RR.CX-23 at 12, 16.8 It is worth noting here

The delay between jury selection and the beginning of the trial was due to the

Christmas and New Years holidays.

“RR” refers to the Reporter’s Record from the trial. This is preceded by the

volume number and followed by the relevant page numbers.

Volumes 40 and 41 of the reporter’s record contain twenty-three juror

questionnaires made part of the record as court exhibits. This Court granted the

that, under Texas law, “failure to complete the juror questionnaire is a

valid reason to strike a venire member.” Ealoms v. State, 983 S.W.2d 853,

856 (Tex. App.—Waco 1998, pet. ref’d) (citing Satterwhite v. State, 858

S.W.2d 412, 423 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993)).

During voir dire,

Scott was repeatedly unable to answer the State’s questions

regarding her ability to adjudge the death penalty, both in her

jury questionnaire and during voir dire. When asked whether

she understood the death penalty or whether she would

change it, she replied, “Yea. I don’t know how I would change

it, but—I don’t know how I would change it.” When asked if

she believed in the death penalty, she responded, “I mean,

you’re asking me stuff like do I believe in the death penalty. I

don’t know if I believe in it, you know.”

App.6a. She also said that she would “need much more of a burden” than

what the law required. 29.RR.78. When answering Ramey’s Batson

challenge, the prosecutor noted that Scott indicated she could not impose

the death penalty and, had the State pushed further, she was close to

being challengeable for cause. 30.RR.10.

Every reviewing court since then has agreed the State carried its

burden under Batson by providing sufficiently race-neutral reasoning.

Director’s motion to supplement the ROA with these documents, filed under seal.

ROA.6206. At the time of filing this brief, the Director does not have the sealed,

supplemental ROA. Accordingly, the Director will refer to these questionnaires by

listing the volume, exhibit number, and page numbers.

The trial court said that it was “comfortable with the record reflecting

what it did with respect to” Scott. Id. The CCA on direct appeal held that

“the record supports the trial court’s ruling that the State struck [Scott]

because of her inconclusive opinions on the death penalty and not her

identity as an African-American.” App.6a. The federal district court,

App.69a–70a, and Fifth Circuit, App.124a–130a, agreed on federal

habeas. Ramey has failed at every turn and in every court to show a

constitutional violation under Batson occurred. Pitchford does not

provide him any new purchase. This claim deserves no further

development.

Ramey’s IATC-punishment claim lacks merit.

In his second issue, Ramey asserts a claim of IATC during the

punishment phase. Pet.16–17. This Court is well familiar with the

standards announced in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984),

and their application under Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003), and

its progeny, to trial counsel’s obligation to investigate and present a case

for mitigation during the punishment phase. Importantly, if one prong of

Strickland is found dispositive, either deficiency or prejudice, the Court

need not address the other. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. “Failure to make

the required showing of either deficient performance or sufficient

prejudice defeats the ineffectiveness claim” because without proof of both

elements “it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted

from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result

unreliable.” Id. at 687, 700.

In his petition, Ramey makes broad sweeping allegations about his

trial counsel but does not fully brief in specifics well enough to respond

here. Suffice it to say, as in his prior state and federal habeas

proceedings, Ramey alleges in his subsequent state application an almost

wholesale failure to investigate potential mitigating and aggravating

evidence. See App.266a–69a. But, counsel put before the jury the very

mitigation theories Ramey now pushes: turbulent childhood, low IQ, and

emotional and developmental disorders. Indeed, a review of trial

counsel’s closing arguments at punishment shows its reliance on these

themes. 39.RR.10–18.

To be fair, the federal habeas courts recognized that although there

was duplication, Ramey’s federal habeas counsel was able to put forward

“a more detailed analysis of what trial counsel could have—and should

have—done at the mitigation phase.” Ramey, 942 F.3d at 257–58. Truly,

Ramey’s complaint is that trial counsel did not put the same degree of

evidence before the jury as current counsel would. This is precisely the

type of backward-looking second guesses which Strickland strictly

prohibits. Moreover, a petitioner cannot demonstrate prejudice with

duplicative evidence. Emery v. Johnson, 139 F.3d 191, 197 (5th Cir.

1997).

The State’s case for future dangerousness was very strong, if not

insurmountable. Ramey’s troubles began at a young age where he would

continuously act out in school. SX.266–65.9 In 2001, when Ramey was

sixteen, he coerced seven-year-old Deroderick Jones to perform oral sex

on his penis for the promise of one dollar and a cell phone, a promise on

which he reneged after he finished with Deroderick. 37.RR.11–14.

He also forced Deroderick’s five-year-old brother, Deontae, to watch

while Ramey debased his brother. 37.RR.14–15. Pierre Woods, who was

twelve at the time, also witnessed this assault. 37.RR.15–19. Ramey was

charged as a juvenile with aggravated sexual assault. SX.251. However,

SX refers to exhibits proffered by the State at Ramey’s capital murder trial. It

is followed by the relevant exhibit number.

the charge was reduced to assault, and the court sentenced him to

juvenile probation for one year on November 5, 2001. Id.

Less than two years later, Ramey and a friend broke a vending

machine at a high school, causing $617.23 in damage. 37.RR.19–31.

Ramey pleaded guilty to criminal mischief and was sentenced to 180 days

in jail, probated for one year. 37.RR.31–35. He was also charged fines and

restitution and required to complete 100 hours of community service,

which he never did. Id.

Less than six months later, Ramey and another friend broke into

Ramey’s alternative learning school. 36.RR.55–66. Ramey ransacked the

principal’s office while his friend trashed the coach’s office. 36.RR.49–66.

Again, when approached by law enforcement, Ramey’s accomplice

admitted the wrongdoing while he denied any involvement. 36.RR.66–70.

Ramey continued to lie even during his grand jury testimony. 36.RR.70–

76.

On April 29, 2004, his probation was revoked for the burglary,

failure to pay fees and restitution, and failure to keep up with his

community service hours. SX.222. He was sentenced to only five months

in the county jail. Id. On September 8, 2004, he pleaded guilty to criminal

trespass for his vandalism at the school and he received 180 days in jail

probated for a year, thirty days in county jail, and fines. Id. On April 5,

2005, this probation was revoked because he failed to report to his parole

office, submit to a urinalysis exam, and pay his fines. Id. He received five

months in county jail. Id.

And yet, just over four months later on August 19th, Ramey and his

cohorts burglarized Nairn’s residence, where Ramey procured the guns

used in the capital murder. During the State’s punishment case though,

the jury learned this was just the first of three raids Ramey lead on

Nairn’s place. On September 18th, less than one month after the first

burglary and triple murders, Ramey and his associates went to Narin’s

again. 37.RR.70–106. The following night, Ramey said he wanted to go

back in and get everything, so they went back in and cleaned the place

out. 37.RR.114–25.

That night Ramey told a cohort he wanted to break into the “Robles’

house” next. 37.RR.80. The very next night Ramey and an unknown male

burglarized Crystal Robles’s house. 37.RR.35–60. When Ms. Robles

returned home, she saw Ramey run from her house and speed away in a

car. 37.RR.43–54. She began to chase after him, but Ramey attempted to

hit her with his vehicle. Id. After he was arrested for the triple murders,

police asked him about the Robles burglary. Id. Ramey denied any

involvement and created an alibi involving Stacy Johnson. Id.

Norman testified that Ramey was planning another burglary of the

“Viella’s.” 38.RR.10. He also discussed a time when Ramey told him that

Ramey killed someone with a high-powered rifle during a home invasion

in Victoria. 38.RR.9–10. Other accomplices had similar recounts of

Ramey bragging about various misdeeds. Ramey told Times about

sexually assaulting Deroderick Jones. 37.RR.99. Ramey said that while

at Carver Elementary, he also stole laptops from the school. Id. Ramey

claimed to have stolen a car in Victoria. Id. He also talked to Times about

his plan to sell dope to pay for his probation. Id. Butler stated that in

addition to bragging and joking about the triple murders, Ramey boasted

that he and a couple of friends shot and killed a Hispanic man during the

course of a robbery in Victoria. 37.RR.106–07.

Then there was Ramey’s behavior while awaiting trial. On August

23, 2006, guards performed a “shake down” of Ramey’s cell. 37.RR.157–

69. They found a shank in his belongings. Id. They also discovered the

toilet had been stopped up with trash, toilet paper, and feces. Id. The

guards told Ramey and the other inmates to clean up the mess. Id. Ramey

began yelling and threatening the guards. Id. He became so belligerent

that the guards had to place him in a restraint chair. Id. After the guards

left him to clean, he continued kicking the door and screaming at the

guards. Id. On November 29, 2006, while the first panel was in voir dire,

Ramey became belligerent and again threatened the guards. 37.RR.175–

82. He refused to leave his cell because he was upset about the loss of

television privileges. Id.

Even assuming counsel was somehow deficient, Ramey cannot

show prejudice. As the evidence demonstrated, Ramey is a violent

individual with an escalating pattern of criminal behavior. Further, the

heinous nature of the crime was sufficient for the jury to answer the

future dangerous issue in the affirmative and negate the mitigating effect

of his proffered evidence. As such, Ramey does not prove prejudice.

See Wong v. Belmontes, 558 U.S. 15, 27–28 (2009); Leavitt v. Arave, 646

F.3d 605, 616 (9th Cir. 2011).

REASONS FOR DENYING THE MOTION FOR STAY

Standard of Review

A stay of execution is an equitable remedy. Hill, 547 U.S. at 584. “It

is not available as a matter of right, and equity must be sensitive to the

State’s strong interest in enforcing its criminal judgments without undue

interference from the federal courts.” Id. (citing Nelson v. Campbell, 541

U.S. 637, 649–50 (2004)). “It is well-established that petitioners on death

row must show a “reasonable probability” that the underlying issue is

“sufficiently meritorious” to warrant a stay and that failure to grant the

stay would result in “irreparable harm.” Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880,

895 (1983), superseded on other grounds by 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).

Indeed, “[a]pplications for stays of death sentences are expected to

contain the information and materials necessary to make a careful

assessment of the merits of the issue and so reliably to determine

whether plenary review and a stay are warranted.” Id. To demonstrate

an entitlement to a stay, a petitioner must demonstrate more than “the

absence of frivolity” or “good faith” on the part of petitioner. Id. at 892–

93. Rather, the petitioner must make a substantial showing of the denial

of a federal right. Id.

In a capital case, a court may properly consider the nature of the

penalty in deciding whether to grant a stay, but “the severity of the

penalty does not in itself suffice.” Id. at 893. The State’s “powerful and

legitimate interest in punishing the guilty,” as well as its interest in

finality, must also be considered, especially in a case such as this where

the State and victims have for years borne the “significant costs of federal

habeas review.” Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 421 (1993) (O’Connor,

J., concurring); Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 556 (1998) (both the

State and the victims of crime have an important interest in the timely

enforcement of a sentence). Thus, in deciding whether to grant a stay of

execution, the Court must consider four factors: “(1) whether the stay

applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the

merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a

stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other

parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest

lies.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009) (quoting Hilton v.

Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987) ); see also Buxton v. Collins, 925 F.2d

816, 819 (5th Cir. 1991).

II.

Ramey Cannot Demonstrate His Case is Worthy of a Stay.

Ramey has not made a strong showing that he will succeed

on the merits.

Given the dilatory, procedurally defective, and meritless nature of

his claims, Ramey fails to show that there is any significant possibility

that the Court will grant certiorari. As demonstrated above, Ramey’s

failure to offer a sound claim for relief therefore supports the denial of a

stay of execution.

Ramey is unlikely to suffer irreparable harm.

In a capital case, a court may properly consider the nature of the

penalty in deciding whether to grant a stay, but “the severity of the

penalty does not in itself suffice.” Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 893. In his

application for a stay of execution, Ramey only points to the irreversible

nature of the death penalty. Stay.3. Without more, Ramey cannot satisfy

this prong by showing, outside of the penalty itself, a likelihood that he

will suffer irreparable harm if a stay of execution is not granted.

The State and the public have a strong interest in

seeing the state court judgment carried out.

The State and crime victims have a “powerful and legitimate

interest in punishing the guilty.” Calderon, 523 U.S. at 556 (citation

omitted). And “[b]oth the State and the victims of crime have an

important interest in the timely enforcement of a [death] sentence,”

Bucklew, 587 U.S. at 149 (quotation omitted); see Nelson, 541 U.S. at 650

(“a State retains a significant interest in meting out a sentence of death

in a timely fashion”); Gomez v. United States Dist. Court, 503 U.S. 653,

654 (1992) (per curiam) (“[e]quity must take into consideration the

State’s strong interest in proceeding with its judgment”). Once postconviction proceedings “have run their course . . . finality acquires an

added moral dimension.” Calderon, 523 U.S. at 556. “Only with an

assurance of real finality can the State execute its moral judgment in a

case” and “the victims of crime move forward knowing the moral

judgment will be carried out.” Id. The State should be allowed to pursue

its “strong interest in enforcing its criminal judgments without undue

interference from the federal courts.” Crutsinger v. Davis, 936 F.3d 265,

273 (5th Cir. 2019) (citations and internal quotations omitted).

Indeed, Ramey has already passed through the state and federal

collateral review process. The public’s interest is not advanced by

postponing Ramey’s execution, and the State opposes any action that

would cause further delay. Martel v. Clair, 565 U.S. 648, 662 (2012)

(“Protecting against abusive delay is an interest of justice.”) (emphasis in

original).

It is no secret that “capital petitioners might deliberately engage in

dilatory tactics to prolong their incarceration and avoid execution of a

sentence of death.” Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277–78 (2005) . The

fact that this claim was not raised until after an execution date was set

must inform the Court’s analysis. “A court considering a stay must also

apply ‘a strong equitable presumption against the grant of a stay where

a claim could have been brought at such a time as to allow consideration

of the merits without requiring entry of a stay.’” Hill, 547 U.S. at 584

(quoting Nelson, 541 U.S. at 650). Here, Ramey’s claims are meritless

and do not warrant staying his execution.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Ramey’s petition for a writ of

certiorari should be denied. Moreover, the State’s strong interest in the

timely enforcement of a sentence is not outweighed by the unlikely

possibility that Ramey’s petition for certiorari will be granted. Thus, his

motion for a stay of execution should be denied as well.

Respectfully submitted,