Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Justin A. Jefferson, Petitioner v. Moses Andre Stancil, Director, Colorado Department of Corrections, et al.

Supreme Court briefJul 28, 2026

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,,?f>-5463 ORIGINAL

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Justin A Jefferson — PETITIONER

vs.

MOSES ANDRE STANCIL et la. — RESPONDENT(S)

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE 10th CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Justin Jefferson

(Your Name)

P.O.Box 999

(Address)

Canon City, Co. 81215

(City, State, Zip Code)

(Phone Number)

filed

JUL 2 8 2026

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Question 1

Whether the Government’s threat and consequence of Life Incarceration Without

the Eligibility to be Granted Parole for refusal to not self-incriminate, create a

compulsion in a prison setting, that constitute atypical and significant hardships in

relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life, in violation of the Fifth Amendment

and precedent set by this United States Supreme Court.

Question 2

Whether the Decision and Application of the Turner Analysis, that is used to override

the Protections of the Fourteenth Amendment and validate violations of

Constitutional Rights, is an adequate Analysis to fairly and properly evaluate the

validation of violations of Constitutional Rights, and is not in itself, a violation of the

Constitution’s Protection of Substantive Due Process of the Fourteenth Amendment

LIST OF PARTIES

[ ] All parties appear in the caption of the case on the cover page.

[x] All parties do not appear in the caption of the case on the cover page. A list of

all parties to the proceeding in the court whose judgment is the subject of this

petition is as follows:

MOSES ANDRE STANCIL, Director of the State of Colorado Department of

Corrections;

CHRIS LOBANOV-ROSTOVSKY, Head of the Sex Offender Management Board, in his

official capacity;

AMANDA RETTING, Head of the Sex Offender Management Board, in his official

capacity;

SLOBHAN BARTLOW, Warden of the Fremont Correctional Facility, in his official

capacity;

SHANNON FOLZ, Therapist at Fremont Correctional Facility, in her official and

personal capacity;

JAMES BAILEY, Therapist at Fremont Correctional Facility, in his official and personal

capacity;

J.R. HALL, Head of the Parole Board, in their official capacity

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Number

OPINIONS

JURISDICTION

VII

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Vlll-X

STATEMENT OF THE CASE......................................................................

1-2

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

2-9

CONCLUSION

INDEX TO APPENDICES

Page Page

Count Numbers

APPENDIX A

7pgs

12-18

8pgs

19-27

18pgs

28-46

21 pgs

48-68

7pgs

69-75

Jefferson v. Stancil, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 18106

APPENDIX B

Jefferson v. Stancil, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51764

APPENDIX C

United States v. Von Behren, 822 F.3d 1139

APPENDIX D

Mckune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24

APPENDIX E

Parole Board Defer Actions from 2020-2025

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

Al-Owhali v. Holder, 687 F.3d 1236 .............................................................................

Pa9e

Number

Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226......................................................................................

Herlein v. Higgins, 172 F.3d 1089..................................................................................

Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479........................................................................

Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853........................................................................................

Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730........................................................................................

Jefferson v. Stancil, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 18106......................................................

Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499.............................................................................

6,8

Lefkowitzv. Turley, 414 U.S. 70....................................................................................

Mauro v. Arpaio, 188 F.3d 1054...................................................................................

Mckune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24..........................................................................................

4,5,6

O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342..................................................................

Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292........................................................................................

Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337...............................................................................

Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472....................................................................................

Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78........................................................................................

5,7

CASES

United States v. Von Behren, 822 F.3d, 1139................................................................ 2,3,4

Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312.....................................................................................

STATUTES AND RULES

USCS Const. Amend. V................................................................................................

USCS Const. Amend. XIV(1)........................................................................................

C.R.E 404(b)(2).............................................................................................................

Fed 413(a)....................................................................................................................

F.R.E 414(a).................................................................................................................

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment below.

OPINIONS BELOW

[x] For cases from federal courts:

The opinion of the United States court of appeals appears at Appendix A to the

petition and is

[x] reported at Jefferson v. Stancil, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 18106, or,

[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

[ ] is unpublished.

The opinion of the United States district court appears at Appendix B to the

petition and is

[x] reported at Jefferson v. Stancil, 2025 U.S. Dist. Lexis 51764', or,

[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

[ ] is unpublished.

[ ] For cases from state courts:

The opinion of the highest state court to review the merits appears at

Appendix

to the petition and is

[ ] reported at

or,

[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

[ ] is unpublished.

The opinion of the

appears at Appendix

to the petition and is

[ ] reported at! or,

[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

[ ] is unpublished.

court

JURISDICTION

[x] For cases from federal courts:

The date on which the United States Court of Appeals decided my case

was June 23, 2026.

[x] No petition for rehearing was timely filed in my case.

[ ] A timely petition for rehearing was denied by the United States Court of

Appeals on the following date:, and a copy of the

order denying rehearing appears at Appendix.

[ ] An extension of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted

to and including(date) on(date)

in Application No.A.

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U. S. C. § 1254(1).

[ ] For cases from state courts:

The date on which the highest state court decided my case was.

A copy of that decision appears at Appendix.

[ ] A timely petition for rehearing was thereafter denied on the following date:

, and a copy of the order denying rehearing

appears at Appendix.

[ ] An extension of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted

to and including(date) on(date) in

Application No.

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U. S. C. § 1257(a).

VII

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

USCS Const. Amend. V - No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise

infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases

arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War

or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in

jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against

himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall

private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.

USCS Const. Amend. XIV(1) - All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and

subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State

wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the

privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any

person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person

within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

C.R.S. 18-1.3-1004-

(1)(a) - Except as otherwise provided in this subsection (1) and in subsection (2)

of this section, the district court having jurisdiction shall sentence a sex offender to

the custody of the department for an indeterminate term of at least the minimum

of the presumptive range specified in section 18-1.3-401 for the level of offense

committed and a maximum of the sex offender’s natural life.

(3) - Each sex offender sentenced pursuant to this section shall be required as a

part of the sentence to undergo treatment to the extent appropriate pursuant to

section 16-11.7-105, C.R.S.

C.R.S. 18-1.3-1006(1 )(a) - On completion of the minimum period of incarceration

specified in a sex offender’s indeterminate sentence, less any earned time credited to the

sex offender pursuant to section 17-22.5-405, C.R.S., the parole board shall schedule

a hearing to determine whether the sex offender may be released on parole. In

determining whether to release the sex offender on parole, the parole board shall

determine whether the sex offender has successfully progressed in treatment and

would not pose an undue threat to the community if released under appropriate treatment

and monitoring requirements and whether there is a strong and reasonable probability

that the person will not thereafter violate the law. The department shall make

recommendations to the parole board concerning whether the sex offender should be

released on parole and the level of treatment and monitoring that should be imposed as

a condition of parole. The recommendation shall be based on the criteria established

by the management board pursuant to section 18-1.3-1009.

VIII

C.R.S. 18-1.3-1009(1)(a) - The criteria by and the manner in which a sex offender may demonstrate

that he or she would not pose an undue threat to the community if released on

parole or to a lower level of supervision while on parole or probation or if

discharged from parole or probation. The court and the parole board may use the

criteria to assist in making decisions concerning release of a sex offender,

reduction of the level of supervision for a sex offender, and discharge of a sex

offender.

(1)(b) - The methods of determining whether a sex offender has successfully

progressed in treatment; and

(1)(c) - Standards for community entities that provide supervision and treatment

specifically designed for sex offenders who have developmental disabilities. At a

minimum, the standards shall determine whether an entity would provide adequate

support and supervision to minimize any threat that the sex offender may pose to

the community.

C.R.E 404(b)(2) - Permitted uses. This evidence may be admissible for another purpose,

such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,

absence of mistake, or lack of accident.

Fed 413(a) - Permitted Uses. In a criminal case in which a defendant is accused of a

sexual assault, the court may admit evidence that the defendant committed any other

sexual assault. The evidence may be considered on any matter to which it is relevant.

F.R.E 414(a) - Permitted Uses. In a criminal case in which a defendant is accused of child

molestation, the court may admit evidence that the defendant committed any other child

molestation. The evidence may be considered on any matter to which it is relevant.

Colo. Admin Reg 700-19 (IV)(I) - STOMP Recommendation for Progression to COMMUNITY: Sex Offender

Treatment in the prison setting is preliminary and is continued in the community

after release from prison. Since offenders cannot complete treatment in a facility,

the SOTMP has developed criteria for offenders to receive a

recommendation for release to parole. In accordance with the Risk, Need,

Responsive Model, the SOTMP has developed risk-based criteria formats.

Offenders with a sex offense participating in the SOTMP must meet all the

following criteria to receive a recommendation for release to parole from the

SOTMP team, SOTMP, as a result of team staffing, will provide documentation

regarding progression to community based on the offender’s behavior, successful

progress in treatment, and SOMB standards.

(IV)(K)(1) - Offenders may be placed on a treatment probation contract if they

are not adequately progressing in treatment or are not meeting program

expectations. The intent of treatment probation is to provide the offender with

opportunities, time frames, and requirements to meet program expectations.

Offenders who do not successfully meet the conditions of the treatment

probation contract may be suspended from group and recommended for

termination.

SOTMP Contract -

(l)(2)(C) -1 understand that in order to meet criteria for successful progress in

treatment I will be required complete a disclosure of my offense related sexual

history relevant to identified risk areas as verified through either the sexual history

polygraph process or other clinical indicators.

(I)(2)(D) - I understand that while I have the right to refuse to answer polygraph

questions that could result in self-incrimination, the SOMB Standards explain that

sex offense specific treatment for sex offenders shall; Require offenders to

disclose all current sex offending behaviors and complete a full sex history

disclosure. If it is verified that I have engaged in purposeful acts of non

cooperation or using “counter measures” to manipulate the results of a polygraph

examination it may result in a recommendation for suspension and

termination from treatment.

(III)(A) - Treatment information will be given to the correctional/support system.

This includes; case managers, parole officers, Parole Board, Community

Correction Centers and Boards, and other Professionals who become responsible

for providing for your mental health treatment and management. Information may

also be released to probation and parole officers, the court or other judicial entities

when requested. The information may include; parole board summaries, risk level,

treatment attendance, level of participation, motivation, relapse, prevention

information, information reported during polygraph examinations, PSL or Risk

Management Plan, offense specific evaluation, risk factors, problem areas,

treatment plan and summary, or general progress, and will not require additional

written consent. Even after program completion, withdrawal or termination

this information may be released without additional written consent.

(Hl)(l) -The goal of this program is “No more victims”. In an effort to prevent further

victimization, information regarding criminal patterns of behaviors may be

released to law enforcement. If you are suspected of committing a crime,

treatment information may be shared with law enforcement officials for the purpose

of providing public safe

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Facts Material to the Consideration of Question 1

In order for Mr. Jefferson to be admitted into the Sex Offender Treatment and

Monitoring Program, in March 2023, Jefferson was first required to submit a re-entry

form that distinctively required the admission of guilt. Though Jefferson has confessed

that he is innocent of his conviction, he has ever refused participation in treatment, and

insisted on telling the truth as required of him. Thus he stated on his entry form that “I

can’t remember ever [committing the offense], but if [the alleged victim] said I did, then

it would have been wrong for me to have done so.” The Plaintiff was later called into

an interview by Defendant Shannon Folz who consistently pressed that she did not

believe the Plaintiff, and then insinuated and stated to the Plaintiff that she did not

believe that he was “Ready for treatment at this time” because to her, the Plaintiff was

in “denial” for not admitting guilt.

The following week or so, Jefferson was then interviewed by Defendant James

Bailey. Bailey presented Jefferson an opportunity to resubmit a new re-entry form,

instructing him that he needed to state and clarify an admission of guilt. Jefferson was

made aware of the threat and was compelled that if he refused, then he would be

deemed in “denial” and/or non-cooperative with the Fifth Amendment violation

requirements of treatment to successfully progress in treatment (this includes;

admitting, documenting, and sharing Fifth Amendment information of charged,

uncharged, and alleged illegal acts) where if Jefferson refused, his eligibility to be

granted parole will be revoked and he would remain in prison for up to the remainder

of his natural life.

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Facts Material to the Consideration of Question 2

When Jefferson’s Constitutional Rights were violated as an inmate, he learned

then that the Turner Analysis governing his circumstances created a substandard that

abridged his fundamental rights, and Rights of all inmates. Thus when filing his claims,

Jefferson sought to re-invoke his guaranteed Protections of the Fourteenth

Amendment of the Constitution to evaluate the violations of his fundamental rights.

However, because Turner was created by this Court and superseded the protections

of the Fourteenth Amendment, the lower courts had no authority to make a ruling on

this issue, only this Court has the authority to evaluate the Decision and Application of

Turner.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

1. Argument for the Allowance of the Petition For Writ of Certiorari For

Question 1

1.1.

The 10th Cir Court of Appeals’ decision is in conflict with the ruling of

itself on the same important matter from States v. Von Behren.

In United States v. Von Behren, 822 F.3d, 1139, the 10th Cir Court of Appeals

concluded that that Colorado Government’s threat to revoke Von Behren’s supervised

release on parole for his failure to answer potentially incriminating polygraph questions

through the SOTMP, rose to the level of unconstitutional compulsion.

“The government argues that [...], there is no constitutional violation until

a judge actually revokes Mr. Von Behren's supervised release. The

government cites no authority for this bifurcated approach. A witness is

compelled under the Fifth Amendment as soon as the government

threatens him with a substantial penalty—it makes no difference whether

he proceeds with answering or stands on his right. See Turley, 414 U.S,

at 75-76”...”ln sum, we hold that the government compelled Mr. Von

Behren to be a witness against himself. For the reasons set forth above,

we REVERSE.” Von Behren

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However, here in Jefferson v. Stancil, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 18106, the same

10Th Cir Court of Appeals decided that the same Colorado Government’s threat to keep

Jefferson Incarcerated Without the Eligibility to be Granted Parole for the rest of his life

if he were to fail to give incriminating admission of guilt statements, with additional

details to charged acts, uncharged acts, and charged alleged acts that can be used

against him under F.R.E 413, 413, and C.R.E 404(b) to supplement insufficient

evidence of a crime charged against him; and where his actual words do not need to

be used in court for his statements to be shared and “furnish a link in the chain of

evidence” to lead to a prosecution (see Hoffman v. United States,341 U.S. 479, 486,

95 L. Ed. 1118, 71 S. Ct. 814 (1951)-, through the same SOTMP, does not rise to the

level of unconstitutional compulsion.

Instead, the Jefferson court equated the consequences of Life Incarceration

Without the Eligibility to be Granted Parole due to his eligibility to be granted parole

being systematically revoked, see Appendix E, to be on the same level as a loss of a

prison privilege and housing accommodation. The court further cited “Any impact on

Jefferson’s parole eligibility is “simply not the result of his refusal to incriminate himself,

but [rather is] a consequence of his inability to complete rehabilitation” Jefferson

Note: The same court in the decision in Von Behren, recognized and rejected

this as an errant argument, stating that;

“The government counters that there was no unconstitutional

compulsion because [] the government would be seeking a remand to

prison for Mr. Von Behren’s failure to complete treatment, not for his

refusal to incriminate himself. We are not persuaded by this argument.

Mr. Von Behren was not permitted to complete treatment solely and

directly as a result of invoking his Fifth Amendment privilege and

refusing to answer incriminating questions. The government's argument

is a distinction without a difference. ” Von Behren

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Thus as seen in Von Behren, Jefferson was too compelled by the Government

against his Fifth Amendment Right by the threat of a substantial consequence that

constituted atypical and significant hardships in relation to the ordinary incidents of

prison life.

1.2.

The 10th Cir Court of Appeals decided on an important question in a

way that conflicts with relevant decisions of this court in Mckune v.

Lite.

The 10th Cir Court of Appeals’ decision in Jefferson conflicts with the precedent

set by this Court in Mckune v. Lite, 536 U.S. 24. Where Mckune too, challenged the

constitutionality of a sex offender treatment program requiring Fifth Amendment

violations. The decision in Mckune ultimately, shed light on what would constitute

unconstitutional compulsions in a prison setting.

“So the central question becomes whether the State's program, and the

consequences for nonparticipation in it, combine to create a compulsion

that encumbers the constitutional right. If there is compulsion, the State

cannot continue the program in its present form; and the alternatives, as

will be discussed, defeat the program's objectives.” Mckune, Paragraph

18 Opinion.

“A prison clinical rehabilitation program, which is acknowledged to bear a

rational relation to a legitimate penological objective, does not violate the

privilege against self-incrimination if the adverse consequences an

inmate faces for not participating are related to the program objectives

and do not constitute atypical and significant hardships in relation to the

ordinary incidents of prison life. ” Mckune, Paragraph 23 Opinion

i.e “In the present case, respondent's decision not to participate in the

Kansas SATP did not extend his term of incarceration. Nor did his

decision affect his eligibility for good-time credits or parole. 224 F.3d at

1182. ” Mckune, Paragraph 25 Opinion.

The threat and consequence of Life Incarceration Without the Eligibility to be

Granted Parole to compel Jefferson to self-incriminate himself, meets the threshold

standard of “longer incrimination” and “affecting his eligibility for parole” that this Court

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would consider to be unconstitutional compulsion, however, this precedent was not

recognized and contradicted by the 10th Cir. Court of Appeals in Jefferson.

2. Argument for the Allowance of the Petition For Writ of Certiorari For

Question 2

2.1.

Through the decision of Turnery. Safley, this Court has entered a

decision in conflict with itself

This Court’s decision on the Constitution’s Substantive component to Due

Process, does not allow for the validation of fundamental rights to be violated by the

Government when it is not proven to be necessary, or proven to actually serve the

interest sought by the violation, no matter what process is provided.

“The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ guarantee of ‘due process of

law’to include a substantive component, which forbids the government to

infringe certain 'fundamental' liberty interests at all, no matter what

process is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve

a compelling state interest." Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-02, 113

S. Ct. 1439, 123 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1993)

This Court further, has more than once contradicted the constitutionality of the

application of Turner’s ‘reasonable relation’ standard within prisons;

"'The unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain ... constitutes cruel and

unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment.'" Whitley v.

Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319, 89 L. Ed. 2d 251, 106 S. Ct. 1078 (1986)

(some internal quotation marks omitted). We have said that "among

'unnecessary and wanton' inflictions of pain are those that are 'totally

without penological justification.'" Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337,

346, 69 L. Ed. 2d 59, 101 S. Ct. 2392 (1981). In making this determination

in the context of prison conditions, we must ascertain whether the

officials involved acted with "deliberate indifference" to the inmates'

health or safety.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 738, 153 L. Ed. 2d 666,

122 S. Ct. 2508 (2002).

“The [Fourteenth Amendment] right not to be discriminated against based

on one's race is not susceptible to the logic of Turner. It is not a right

that need necessarily be compromised for the sake of proper prison

administration.” Johnson v. California, 543 U.S, at 510.

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“Although the Magistrate Judge dismissed the possibility that contraband

could be hidden in a short beard, the Magistrate Judge, the District Court,

and the Court of Appeals all thought that they were bound to defer to the

Department’s assertion that allowing petitioner to grow such a beard

would undermine its interest in suppressing contraband. [The RLUIPA

Analysis], however, does not permit such unquestioning deference [...]

and without a degree of deference that is tantamount to

unquestioning acceptance, it is hard to swallow the argument that

denying petitioner a 1/2-inch beard actually furthers the Department’s

interest in rooting out contraband. ”... ’’Even if the Department could make

that showing, its contraband argument would still fail because the

Department cannot show that forbidding very short beards is the least

restrictive means of preventing the concealment of contraband. ” Holt v.

Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853

"[The Sandin Analysis] provides a reasonable means of assessing

whether the response of prison administrators to correctional and

rehabilitative necessities are so out of the ordinary that one could sensibly

say they rise to the level of unconstitutional compulsion." McKune v. Lile,

536 U.S, at 41.

Moreover and altogether, these contradictions to the decision of Turner show,

and is best summarized from Johnson, that, though “rightful incarceration brings about

the necessary withdrawal or limitations of many privileges and rights, a retraction

justified by the considerations of our penal system” O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482

U.S. 342, when it comes to the protections of constitutional rights, strict scrutiny is not

strict in theory, but fatal in fact. Even if all the Government’s prison constitution

violations were to be subjected to strict scrutiny, or at least some substantial form of it,

not all would be invalidated by it. Strict Scrutiny would not preclude the ability of prison

officials to address the compelling interests of a prison. Instead, however, prison

officials would be required to demonstrate that any policy violating a constitutional right,

be necessary to that end to which their interest is sought, as intended by the protections

of the constitution but contradicted by the decision of Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78.

6 of 75

2.2.

Through the decision of Turner, this Court has entered a decision in

conflict with the Constitution

The Constitution does not grant an exception, nor does it give the Supreme

Court the authority to amend an exception to the State or Government, to allow Sate

Government Prison Officials, as they are one and the same, to abridge protected rights.

“No State shall make or enforce any law which abridge the privileges or

immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive

any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” USCS

Const. Amend. XIV

“In constitutional cases, the court’s duty is to construe, not to rewrite or

amend, the Constitution”5e/Z v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 288, 84 S. Ct.

1814, 12 L. Ed. 2d 822 (1964)

In contradiction, the decision of Turner amended the power of the Government

to supersede the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment. Where, instead of the

standard of the Fourteenth Amendment requiring that when the Government violates

constitutional rights, the violation is valid if it is proven necessary to achieve the

Government’s compelling interest; the guaranteed constitutional protection was

abridged by Turner and reduced to;

“When a prison regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the

regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological

i nte rests. ” Turnery. Saflev, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 S. Ct. 2254, 96 L. Ed.

2d 64 (1987)

As a result, Turner has led to a precedent of lower courts deferring to the

Government in the evaluation to validate the Government’s violation of fundamental

rights, a substandard that is less than that guaranteed under the Fourteenth

Amendment’s protections.

In most cases, Turner is an impregnable test for inmates to ever surmount the

first stage;

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“In ruling on a Motion to Dismiss, a court need only assess, as a general

matter, whether a prison regulation is reasonably related to a legitimate

penological interest." Al-Owhaliv. Holder, 687 F.3d at 1240 (10th Cir.)

“The inquiry under Turner is not whether the policy actually serves a

penological interest, but rather whether it was rational for jail officials to

believe that it would.” Mauro v. Arpaio, 188 F.3d 1054, 1060 (9th Cir.)

Turner does not require "actual proof that a legitimate interest will be

furthered by the challenged policy. The connection between the two need

only be objectively rational." Herlein v. Higgins, 172 F.3d 1089, 1091 (8th

Cir.)

It is recognized by this Court, that if Turner were to be the Supreme analysis of

constitutional right within prisons, then;

“Turner's standard would allow prison officials to use race-based policies

even when there are race-neutral means to accomplish the same goal,

and even when the race-based policy does not in practice advance that

goal, it is too lenient a standard to ferret out invidious uses of race.

Contrary to the CDC's protest, strict scrutiny will not render prison

administrators unable to address legitimate problems of race-based

violence in prisons.” Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499.

However, Turner’s “too lenient” flaw is not unique to just race-base policies, but applies

to constitutional right violations in practice. Thus it is evident, that a policy merely

reasonably related to a legitimate interest, is not in itself, justification that the policy is

necessary to violate constitutional rights to achieve that interest, in contradiction to the

guaranteed protections of the Constitution.

2.3.

The 10th Cir Court of Appeals decided on an important question of

federal law that has not been, but should be, settled by this Court

The Opinions by both the 10th Cir. Court of Appeals and Dist. Court in this case

believed that they had to defer to the Government and solely rely upon the

unquestioning deference of Turner to validate the infringement of Mr. Jefferson’s Fifth

Amendment Right. Thus, it is asked of this Curt to clarify, is Turner’s “reasonably

8 of 75

related” “unquestionable deference" standard the proper analysis for the lower courts

to have solely relied upon to validate whether a Government’s compulsion against Fifth

Amendment Rights is Constitutional?

And further, whether Turner constitutionally can, discretionally should, and fairly

be applied as an amended exception for the Government to supersede the standard

protections for all fundamental rights guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendment under the Constitution.

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CONCLUSION

There are many complex facets of this great nation arising constitutional challenges

that this court in not an expert in. Still, the Constitution entrusted the courts to protect

constitutional rights from the Government when they are unnecessarily infringed upon, for

that discretion, power, and responsibility lies within the Court. When it becomes true that

this Court is incapable and/or unwilling to uphold the protections of constitutional rights of

inmates, and defers judgment to the Government defending their own self and their own

belief that their own policy is merely reasonably related to their own interest, then that

is the day the Court has lost sight of what it stands to protect, for all citizens, even when it

is unpopular to do so.

Humbly and respectfully, the petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Date^ June 26, 2026

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.