Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Ike Jackson, Jr., Petitioner v. United States

Supreme Court briefJul 1, 2026

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

No. ____

In the Supreme Court of the United States

Ike Jackson, Jr.,

Petitioner,

United States of America,

Respondent.

APPENDIX

TABLE OF APPENDICES

Appendix A:

Opinion, United States v. Jackson,

2026 WL 927200 (11th Cir. Apr. 6, 2026). .................................. 1a

Appendix B:

Judgment, United States v. Jackson,

No. 5:24-CR-00060-MTT-CHW (M.D. GA. May 14, 2025). ...... 10a

Appendix C:

Plea Agreement, United States v. Jackson,

No. 5:24-CR-00060-MTT-CHW (M.D. GA. Feb. 21, 2025). ...... 18a

Appendix D:

Sentencing Hearing, United States v. Jackson,

No. 5:24-CR-00060-MTT-CHW (M.D. GA. June 30, 2025). ..... 30a

APPENDIX A:

Opinion,

United States v. Jackson, 2026 WL 927200 (11th Cir. Apr. 6, 2026) (Per Curiam)

USCA11 Case: 25-11876

Document: 32-1

Date Filed: 04/06/2026

Page: 1 of 8

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 25-11876

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,

versus

IKE JACKSON, JR.,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 5:24-cr-00060-MTT-CHW-1

____________________

Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH, and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Ike Jackson appeals his 200-month sentence of imprisonment for possession with intent to distribute 40 grams or more of

USCA11 Case: 25-11876

Document: 32-1

Date Filed: 04/06/2026

Page: 2 of 8

fentanyl, seeking to argue that his attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel at his sentencing. The government, in turn,

moves to dismiss Jackson’s appeal pursuant to the sentence appeal

waiver in his plea agreement, an issue Jackson anticipated and addresses in his brief. After thorough review, we dismiss the appeal.

We review the validity of a sentence appeal waiver de novo.

United States v. Johnson, 541 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 2008). We

also review de novo whether a defendant knowingly and voluntarily

waived his right to appeal his sentence. United States v. Benitez-Zapata, 131 F.3d 1444, 1446 (11th Cir. 1997).

A sentence appeal waiver found in a plea agreement will be

enforced if it was made knowingly and voluntarily. United States v.

Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343, 1350 (11th Cir. 1993). To establish that a

sentence appeal waiver was made knowingly and voluntarily, the

government must show either that: (1) the district court specifically

questioned the defendant about the waiver during the plea colloquy; or (2) the record makes clear that the defendant otherwise understood the full significance of the waiver. Id. at 1351; see also Fed.

R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(N) (requiring that the district court inform the

defendant of the terms of an appeal waiver). The touchstone for

assessing whether an appeal waiver was knowing and voluntary is

whether it was clearly conveyed to the defendant that he was giving up his right to appeal under most circumstances. United States

v. Boyd, 975 F.3d 1185, 1192 (11th Cir. 2020).

“Plea agreements, like contracts, should be interpreted consistent with the parties’ intent.” United States v. Hardman, 778 F.3d

USCA11 Case: 25-11876

Document: 32-1

Date Filed: 04/06/2026

Page: 3 of 8

896, 900 (11th Cir. 2014). “The language of a plea agreement

should be given its ordinary and natural meaning unless the parties

indicate otherwise.” Id. “[A]s long as an appeal waiver is voluntarily and knowingly entered into as part of a valid plea agreement,

and that agreement is accepted by the court, the waiver is enforceable” and “cannot be vitiated or altered by comments the court

makes during sentencing.” United States v. Bascomb, 451 F.3d 1292,

1297 (11th Cir. 2006). Further, we’ve “never adopted a general

‘miscarriage of justice’ exception to the rule that valid appeal waivers must be enforced according to their terms.” King v. United

States, 41 F.4th 1363, 1368 n.3 (11th Cir. 2022). “An appeal waiver

includes the waiver of the right to appeal difficult or debatable legal

issues or even blatant error.” United States v. Grinard-Henry, 399

F.3d 1294, 1296 (11th Cir. 2005). There is a strong presumption

that the statements made during a plea colloquy are true. United

States v. Medlock, 12 F.3d 185, 187 (11th Cir. 1994).

The Supreme Court has granted a petition for writ of certiorari to consider: (1) whether the only permissible exceptions to a

sentence appeal waiver are for claims of ineffective assistance of

counsel or that a sentence exceeds the statutory maximum; and (2)

whether an appeal waiver applies when the sentencing court advises a defendant that he has the right to appeal and the government does not object. Hunter v. United States, 146 S. Ct. 288 (2025).

However, we’ve explained that “[g]rants of certiorari do not themselves change the law, and must not be used by courts as a basis to

grant relief that would otherwise be denied.” In re Bradford, 830

USCA11 Case: 25-11876

Document: 32-1

Date Filed: 04/06/2026

Page: 4 of 8

F.3d 1273, 1275 (11th Cir. 2016) (citation modified). “Until the Supreme Court issues a decision that actually changes the law, we are

duty-bound” to apply our precedent. Gissendaner v. Comm’r, Georgia Dep’t of Corr., 779 F.3d 1275, 1284 (11th Cir. 2015).

Here, Jackson’s appeal waiver is enforceable. For starters,

the record reflects that Jackson was competent to waive his right

to appeal his sentence. At the change-of-plea hearing, Jackson confirmed that he had obtained a General Equivalency Diploma, could

read and write, and was not under the influence of any drugs, alcohol, or medication. As for the Presentence Investigation Report’s

reference to Jackson’s history of mental health and substance abuse

issues, Jackson reported at the change-of-plea hearing that his mind

was clear, he was not receiving any treatment for any mental illness, and he was not suffering from any serious illnesses. As we’ve

noted, Jackson’s statements to the district court under oath at the

hearing are entitled to a presumption of truth. Medlock, 12 F.3d at

187. This is especially true since nothing else in the hearing suggests that Jackson was incompetent to enter his plea agreement,

and Jackson never argues to us that any competency issues affected

his ability to knowingly and voluntarily enter into the plea.

The record also shows that Jackson knowingly and voluntarily waived the right to appeal his sentence. Bushert, 997 F.2d at

1351. At the hearing, Jackson stated that he had signed and initialed

the plea agreement, had read and reviewed the agreement with his

counsel, and understood the plea agreement. The appeal waiver

in the agreement he signed provided that:

USCA11 Case: 25-11876

Document: 32-1

Date Filed: 04/06/2026

Page: 5 of 8

[Jackson] knowingly and voluntarily waives any right

to appeal [his] sentence . . . . [Jackson]’s sentence appeal waiver does not apply if:

(1) the Court imposes a sentence that exceeds the advisory guideline range as that range has been calculated by the Court at the time of sentencing; (2) the

Court imposes a sentence that exceeds the statutory

maximum; or (3) the United States appeals [Jackson]’s

sentence under the authority of 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b).

The agreement further stated that Jackson “waive[d] any right to

collaterally attack [his] conviction and sentence under 28 U.S.C. §

2255, or to bring any other collateral attack, except that [he] shall

retain the right to bring a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.”

It also provided that the waiver did not bar him from filing a habeas

corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.

At the hearing, the district court detailed the appeal waiver

provision, noting that Jackson had “give[n] up [his] right to appeal

and [his] right to seek review of [his] sentence,” subject to three

exceptions. The court asked if Jackson had reviewed the waiver

provision with his counsel, and Jackson said that he had. The court

then listed the exceptions to the waiver like this: “You can appeal

if I give you a sentence longer than the guideline range I have calculated, you can appeal if I give you a sentence longer than the statutory maximum, and you can appeal if the Government files an

appeal.” The court continued: “With regard to your right to seek

review of your sentence, sometimes called collateral review or habeas corpus review, you give that right up except on the grounds

USCA11 Case: 25-11876

Document: 32-1

Date Filed: 04/06/2026

Page: 6 of 8

of ineffective assistance of counsel.” Jackson affirmed that he

“freely and voluntarily” agreed to “give up [his] right to appeal and

[his] right to seek review of [his] sentence except as stated in the

plea agreement,” and that he understood the court’s explanation

and did not have any questions about giving up his right to appeal

or seek review of his sentence. The district court thus expressly

discussed the appeal waiver with Jackson and Jackson confirmed

that he understood its terms and was freely entering his guilty plea.

The waiver was made knowingly and voluntarily.

Further, the claim Jackson seeks to raise on appeal is that his

trial attorney was ineffective for failing to object at sentencing

when the district court imposed a sentence within the guideline

range after commenting that: (1) based on Jackson’s criminal history and the circumstances of the current offense involving fentanyl, “a sentence at the top of the guideline would be warranted”;

(2) based on his “actual role in the offense,” a sentence “below the

bottom of the guideline range is appropriate”; and (3) the sentence

would be 200 months, which the court later correctly described as

“within” the guidelines. But bringing an ineffectiveness claim on

direct appeal plainly is barred by the sentence appeal waiver in his

plea agreement. The appeal waiver bars any appeal of his sentence,

on direct appeal or collaterally, except where his sentence exceeded

the advisory guideline range or the statutory maximum; the government appeals his sentence; or he raises, collaterally, a claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel. Jackson’s 200-month sentence

does not exceed the statutory maximum of 40 years’ imprisonment, nor is it above the calculated guideline imprisonment range

USCA11 Case: 25-11876

Document: 32-1

Date Filed: 04/06/2026

Page: 7 of 8

of 188 to 235 months, nor has the government appealed his sentence. And to the extent he seeks to raise a claim based on his counsel’s ineffective performance at sentencing, the plain language of

the agreement preserved this kind of claim only on collateral attack. Indeed, the plea agreement expressly says that Jackson may

bring an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim in a collateral attack

but did not include the same language for direct appeals, reflecting

that the parties intended to preclude Jackson from pursuing an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim on direct appeal.

There are no other applicable exceptions that would allow

Jackson’s ineffective-assistance claim to proceed. Jackson argues

that his appeal waiver should not be enforced because to do so

would constitute a miscarriage of justice, but we’ve never recognized this kind of exception to the enforcement of valid appeal

waivers. King, 41 F.4th at 1368 n.3. Additionally, while the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in a case addressing the permissible exceptions to an appeal waiver, we must apply our precedent

until the Supreme Court issues a decision changing our Court’s

law. Gissendaner, 779 F.3d at 1275. As for Jackson’s argument that

a direct appeal is appropriate based on certain of the court’s comments -- that a sentence below the guideline range was appropriate

and that his counsel would file a notice of appeal on his behalf if he

wished -- it is foreclosed by our precedent. As we’ve squarely held,

a district court’s comments at sentencing do not alter the sentence

appeal waiver. Bascomb, 451 F.3d at 1297. And finally, Jackson’s

appeal waiver is enforceable even if the district court blatantly

USCA11 Case: 25-11876

Document: 32-1

Date Filed: 04/06/2026

Page: 8 of 8

erred by imposing sentence within the guideline range after commenting that a sentence below the range was appropriate. GrinardHenry, 399 F.3d at 1296.

Accordingly, we GRANT the government’s motion to dismiss this appeal pursuant to the appeal waiver in Jackson’s plea

agreement.

DISMISSED.

APPENDIX B:

Judgment,

United States v. Jackson, No. 5:24-CR-00060-MTT-CHW (M.D. GA. May 14, 2025),

ECF No. 35.

10a

Case 5:24-cr-00060-MTT-CHW

Document 35

Filed 05/14/25

Page 1 of 7

AO 245B

Judgment in a Criminal Case

(Rev. 12/19) Sheet 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Middle District of Georgia

JUDGMENT IN A CRIMINAL CASE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

IKE JACKSON, JR

Case Number:

USM Number:

5:24-CR-00060-MTT-CHW(1)

49416-511

PAUL M. COGNAC

Defendant’s Attorney

THE DEFENDANT:

☒ pleaded guilty to count(s) 1

☐ pleaded nolo contendere to count(s)

which was accepted by the court.

☐ was found guilty on count(s)

after a plea of not guilty.

The defendant is adjudicated guilty of these offenses:

Title & Section / Nature of Offense

21:841(a)(1) and 21:841(b)(1)(B)(vi)

Possession of Fentanyl With Intent

to Distribute

The defendant is sentenced as provided in pages 2 through

the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.

Offense Ended

02/15/2024

Count

of this judgment. The sentence is imposed pursuant to

☐ The defendant has been found not guilty on count(s)

☒ Count(s)

☒ is ☐ are dismissed on the motion of the United States.

It is ordered that the defendant must notify the United States Attorney for this district within 30 days of any change of name,

residence, or mailing address until all fines, restitution, costs, and special assessments imposed by this judgment are fully paid. If ordered to

pay restitution, the defendant must notify the court and United States attorney of material changes in economic circumstances.

May 12, 2025

Date of Imposition of Judgment

s/ Marc T. Treadwell

Signature of Judge

MARC T. TREADWELL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Name and Title of Judge

05/14/2025

Date

11a

Case 5:24-cr-00060-MTT-CHW

Document 35

Filed 05/14/25

Page 2 of 7

AO 245B

Judgment in Criminal Case

(Rev. 12/19) Sheet 2 — Imprisonment

Judgment — Page

DEFENDANT:

CASE NUMBER:

IKE JACKSON, JR

5:24-CR-00060-MTT-CHW(1)

IMPRISONMENT

The defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the United States Bureau of Prisons to be imprisoned for a

total term of: Two hundred (200) months as to Count 1 to be served consecutively to any term of imprisonment that may be imposed

in Bibb County Superior Court Case No. 17-CR-75142.

It is the Court's intention that the defendant receive credit for time served since his arrest on February 15, 2024, for the offenses

comprising the instant federal offense.

☒

The court makes the following recommendations to the Bureau of Prisons:

Defendant shall participate in the Residential Drug Abuse Program (RDAP) during the period of imprisonment.

☒

The defendant is remanded to the custody of the United States Marshal.

☐

The defendant shall surrender to the United States Marshal for this district:

☐

as notified by the United States Marshal.

a.m.

☐ p.m.

The defendant shall surrender for service of sentence at the institution designated by the Bureau of Prisons:

☐

before 2 p.m. on

☐

as notified by the United States Marshal.

☐

as notified by the Probation or Pretrial Services Office.

RETURN

I have executed this judgment as follows:

Defendant delivered on

, with a certified copy of this judgment.

UNITED STATES MARSHAL

By __________________________________________________

DEPUTY UNITED STATES MARSHAL

12a

Case 5:24-cr-00060-MTT-CHW

Document 35

Filed 05/14/25

Page 3 of 7

AO 245B

Judgment in a Criminal Case

(Rev. 12/19) Sheet 3 — Supervised Release

Judgment—Page

DEFENDANT:

CASE NUMBER:

IKE JACKSON, JR

5:24-CR-00060-MTT-CHW(1)

SUPERVISED RELEASE

Upon release from imprisonment, you will be on supervised release for a term of: Five (5) years.

MANDATORY CONDITIONS

You must not commit another federal, state or local crime.

You must not unlawfully possess a controlled substance.

You must refrain from any unlawful use of a controlled substance. You must submit to one drug test within 15 days of

release from imprisonment and at least two periodic drug tests thereafter, as determined by the court.

☐ The above drug testing condition is suspended, based on the court's determination that you

pose a low risk of future substance abuse. (check if applicable)

You must make restitution in accordance with 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663 and 3663A or any other statute authorizing a sentence of

restitution. (check if applicable)

You must cooperate in the collection of DNA as directed by the probation officer. (check if applicable)

☐

☒

☐ You must comply with the requirements of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (34 U.S.C. § 20901, et seq.)

as directed by the probation officer, the Bureau of Prisons, or any state sex offender registration agency in the location

where you reside, work, are a student, or were convicted of a qualifying offense. (check if applicable)

You must participate in an approved program for domestic violence. (check if applicable)

☐

You must comply with the standard conditions that have been adopted by this court as well as with any other conditions on the

attached page.

13a

Case 5:24-cr-00060-MTT-CHW

Document 35

Filed 05/14/25

Page 4 of 7

AO 245B

Judgment in a Criminal Case

(Rev. 12/19) Sheet 3A — Supervised Release

Judgment—Page

DEFENDANT:

CASE NUMBER:

IKE JACKSON, JR

5:24-CR-00060-MTT-CHW(1)

STANDARD CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION

As part of your supervised release, you must comply with the following standard conditions of supervision. These conditions are imposed

because they establish the basic expectations for your behavior while on supervision and identify the minimum tools needed by probation

officers to keep informed, report to the court about, and bring about improvements in your conduct and condition.

1. You must report to the probation office in the federal judicial district where you are authorized to reside within 72 hours of your

release from imprisonment, unless the probation officer instructs you to report to a different probation office or within a different time

frame.

2. After initially reporting to the probation office, you will receive instructions from the court or the probation officer about how and

when you must report to the probation officer, and you must report to the probation officer as instructed.

3. You must not knowingly leave the federal judicial district where you are authorized to reside without first getting permission from the

court or the probation officer.

4. You must answer truthfully the questions asked by your probation officer.

5. You must live at a place approved by the probation officer. If you plan to change where you live or anything about your living

arrangements (such as the people you live with), you must notify the probation officer at least 10 days before the change. If notifying

the probation officer in advance is not possible due to unanticipated circumstances, you must notify the probation officer within 72

hours of becoming aware of a change or expected change.

6. You must allow the probation officer to visit you at any time at your home or elsewhere, and you must permit the probation officer to take

any items prohibited by the conditions of your supervision that he or she observes in plain view.

7. You must work full time (at least 30 hours per week) at a lawful type of employment, unless the probation officer excuses you from

doing so. If you do not have full-time employment you must try to find full-time employment, unless the probation officer excuses

you from doing so. If you plan to change where you work or anything about your work (such as your position or your job

responsibilities), you must notify the probation officer at least 10 days before the change. If notifying the probation officer at least 10

days in advance is not possible due to unanticipated circumstances, you must notify the probation officer within 72 hours of

becoming aware of a change or expected change.

8. You must not communicate or interact with someone you know is engaged in criminal activity. If you know someone has been

convicted of a felony, you must not knowingly communicate or interact with that person without first getting the permission of the

probation officer.

9. If you are arrested or questioned by a law enforcement officer, you must notify the probation officer within 72 hours.

10. You must not own, possess, or have access to a firearm, ammunition, destructive device, or dangerous weapon (i.e., anything that was

designed, or was modified for, the specific purpose of causing bodily injury or death to another person such as nunchakus or tasers).

11. You must not act or make any agreement with a law enforcement agency to act as a confidential human source or informant without first

getting the permission of the court.

12. If the probation officer determines that you pose a risk to another person (including an organization), the probation officer may

require you to notify the person about the risk and you must comply with that instruction. The probation officer may contact the

person and confirm that you have notified the person about the risk.

13. You must follow the instructions of the probation officer related to the conditions of supervision.

U.S. Probation Office Use Only

A U.S. probation officer has instructed me on the conditions specified by the court and has provided me with a written

copy of this judgment containing these conditions. For further information regarding these conditions, see Overview

of Probation and Supervised Release Conditions, available at: www.uscourts.gov.

Defendant’s Signature

USPO Officer’s Signature

Date

14a

Case 5:24-cr-00060-MTT-CHW

AO 245B

(Rev. 12/19)

Document 35

Filed 05/14/25

Page 5 of 7

Judgment in a Criminal Case

Sheet 3D — Supervised Release

Judgment—Page

DEFENDANT:

CASE NUMBER:

IKE JACKSON, JR

5:24-CR-00060-MTT-CHW(1)

SPECIAL CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION

You shall participate in a program of drug and alcohol testing and treatment. The U.S. Probation Office shall administratively

supervise your participation in the program by approving the program, administering the testing, and supervising the treatment. You shall

contribute to the costs of such treatment not to exceed an amount determined reasonable by the court approved "U.S. Probation Office's Sliding

Scale for Services", and shall cooperate in securing any applicable third-party payment, such as insurance or Medicaid.

You shall participate in a mental health treatment program and comply with the treatment regimen of your mental health provider.

The U.S. Probation Office shall administratively supervise your participation in the program by approving the program and monitoring your

participation in the program. You shall contribute to the costs of such treatment not to exceed an amount determined reasonable by the court

approved "U.S. Probation Office's Sliding Scale for Services", and shall cooperate in securing any applicable third-party payment, such as

insurance or Medicaid.

You are prohibited from possessing or using alcoholic beverages while enrolled in treatment such as mental health, sex offender or

substance abuse treatment.

You shall submit your person, property, house, residence, vehicle, papers, computers (as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1)), other

electronic communications or data storage devices or media, or office, to a search conducted by a United States Probation Officer. Failure to

submit to a search may be grounds for revocation of release. The Defendant shall warn any other occupants that the premises may be subject

to searches pursuant to this condition.

15a

Case 5:24-cr-00060-MTT-CHW

Document 35

Filed 05/14/25

Page 6 of 7

AO 245B

Judgment in a Criminal Case

(Rev. 12/19) Sheet 5 — Criminal Monetary Penalties

Judgment — Page

DEFENDANT:

CASE NUMBER:

IKE JACKSON, JR

5:24-CR-00060-MTT-CHW(1)

CRIMINAL MONETARY PENALTIES

The defendant must pay the total criminal monetary penalties under the schedule of payments on Sheet 6.

TOTALS

Assessment

$100.00

Restitution

$.00

Fine

$.00

AVAA Assessment*

$.00

JVTA Assessment**

$.00

☐ The determination of restitution is deferred until

An Amended Judgment in a Criminal Case (AO245C) will be

entered after such determination.

☐The defendant must make restitution (including community restitution) to the following payees in the amount listed below.

If the defendant makes a partial payment, each payee shall receive an approximately proportioned payment, unless specified otherwise in

the priority order or percentage payment column below. However, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3664(i), all nonfederal victims must be paid

before the United States is paid.

☐ Restitution amount ordered pursuant to plea agreement $

☐ The defendant must pay interest on restitution and a fine of more than $2,500, unless the restitution or fine is paid in full before

☐

the fifteenth day after the date of the judgment, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3612(f). All of the payment options on Sheet 6 may be

subject to penalties for delinquency and default, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3612(g).

The court determined that the defendant does not have the ability to pay interest and it is ordered that:

☐ the interest requirement is waived for the

☐ fine

☐ restitution

☐ the interest requirement for the

☐ fine

☐

restitution is modified as follows:

* Amy, Vicky, and Andy Child Pornography Victim Assistance Act of 2018, Pub.L. No. 115-299.

** Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-22.

*** Findings for the total amount of losses are required under Chapters 109A, 110, 110A, and 113A of Title 18 for offenses committed on or after September

13, 1994, but before April 23, 1996.

16a

Case 5:24-cr-00060-MTT-CHW

Document 35

Filed 05/14/25

Page 7 of 7

AO 245B

Judgment in a Criminal Case

(Rev. 12/19) Sheet 6 — Schedule of Payments

Judgment — Page

DEFENDANT:

CASE NUMBER:

IKE JACKSON, JR

5:24-CR-00060-MTT-CHW(1)

SCHEDULE OF PAYMENTS

Having assessed the defendant’s ability to pay, payment of the total criminal monetary penalties is due as follows:

☐ Lump sum payment of $

☐

not later than

in accordance with ☐ C,

due immediately, balance due

☐

, or

☐ E, or ☐ F below; or

☒ Payment to begin immediately (may be combined with

☐ Payment in equal

☐ C,

☒ F below); or

(e.g., weekly, monthly, quarterly) installments of $

over a period of

(e.g., 30 or 60 days) after the date of this judgment; or

(e.g., months or years), to commence

☐ D, or

☐ Payment in equal

(e.g., weekly, monthly, quarterly) installments of $

over a period of

(e.g., months or years), to commence

(e.g., 30 or 60 days) after release from imprisonment to a

term of supervision; or

☐ Payment during the term of supervised release will commence within

(e.g., 30 or 60 days) after release from

imprisonment. The court will set the payment plan based on an assessment of the defendant’s ability to pay at that time; or

☒ Special instructions regarding the payment of criminal monetary penalties:

Any criminal monetary penalty ordered by the court shall be due and payable in full immediately. Present and future Assets are subject to

enforcement and may be included in the treasury offset program allowing qualified federal benefits to be applied to the balance of criminal

monetary penalties.

Payment during the term of supervised release will commence within 60 days after release from imprisonment. The court will set the payment

plan based on an assessment of the defendant’s ability to pay at that time. (fine/restitution) payment shall be due during the period of

imprisonment at the rate of not less than $25 per quarter and pursuant to the bureau of prisons’ financial responsibility program. The value of

any future assets may be applied to offset the balance of criminal monetary penalties. The defendant may be included in the treasury offset

program, allowing qualified benefits to be applied to offset the balance of any criminal monetary penalties.

Unless the court has expressly ordered otherwise, if this judgment imposes imprisonment, payment of criminal monetary penalties is due during

the period of imprisonment. All criminal monetary penalties, except those payments made through the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Inmate

Financial Responsibility Program, are made to the clerk of the court.

The defendant shall receive credit for all payments previously made toward any criminal monetary penalties imposed.

☐

Joint and Several

Defendant and Co-Defendant Names and Case Numbers (including defendant number), Total Amount, Joint and Several Amount,

and corresponding payee, if appropriate.

☐

The defendant shall pay the cost of prosecution.

☐

The defendant shall pay the following court cost(s):

☐

The defendant shall forfeit the defendant’s interest in the following property to the United States:

Payments shall be applied in the following order: (1) assessment, (2) restitution principal, (3) restitution interest, (4) AVAA assessment,

(5) fine principal, (6) fine interest, (7) community restitution, (8) JVTA assessment, (9) penalties, and (10) costs, including cost of

prosecution and court costs.

17a

APPENDIX C:

Plea Agreement,

United States v. Jackson, No. 5:24-CR-00060-MTT-CHW (M.D. GA. Feb. 21, 2025),

ECF No. 24.

18a

Case 5:24-cr-00060-MTT-CHW

Document 24

Filed 02/21/25

Page 1 of 11

l1E11nl'r'.''iFFR?·I Pll(l?5(Jl1l)Qll'!Af:

tN 'I:HE UNITED STAtES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICTOF GEORGIA

MACOND1V1Sl0N

.•

l)NlTEl> STA'.CES OF AMERICA

CASE NO, 5:24-CR·60•MTT

JKE JACI{SQN,

Defe1it'ia11t.

l'LEAAOREEMENT

The United States Attomey for !he Middle District of Georgia fUlllted States") and

Defondiult IKE JACI{.SON enteril1fo t!ii& plea .iigreement, agreeing as follows:

(I)

Defendant aekn.owledges that Defend!i!lt has reviewed and disenssed the Indictment

11ga_inst Defendant.in tliis ll'.llltter with.Defendar!.t'i, attorney ar!.dDei;ndi!.nt' s attomey has expli,inei;I

:Oefendant niuferslap,di,that Oefenc11Ult is not required to plead gullty, and that Detbndant

has theJ·i15htto plead not guilty anti to elec.t instead to be h'ioo by a Juty. Defendant under~tands

that w: ajuty hial Defendant would enjoyapresufuption ofintiocence, 1111d !hat the Unfted States

would haye tho bu1-den of provtng Del):mdl!llt'll guilt beyol\d a reasonable doubt. Defendimt

uni;le:rst!lllds tbat Defendm;it :would. be entitled t<:> the servilXlS Qf an !]ttomey at all stages of sueh a

trial. Defendilllt iiuderstands thatDefe1iaant wii:uld be ehtitied to. confr011t il.tltl to cro:ss-¢xarnine

the United States' witnesses, an,l to present witnesses and evidence in Defendant's own behalf.

Defondant1;t11dersta11ds that Defendant wo'llld have the right to testify i11Defe11dattt's own l;,!;l.half;

19a

Case 5:24-cr-00060-MTT-CHW

Document 24

Filed 02/21/25

Page 2 of 11

but tlrat Defe11da11t co11ld not be compelled to do so, Defendant ha.s diBcussed these rights wilh

Defendant's attru11ey. Defendant knowlrtgly and voluntarily waives Defendl!llt's right to plead not

guilty and to proceed tu trial.

(3)

Being.fully i.lOgnizant ofDefendant'!irigllts, and ln.~a11ge forth1:> eonsidetatlons to be

made by the· United States as set furth ilt Pal'agi'aph (4) below, Defenda11t agrees JlUrsuaut to

Federal Ru1e ofGriminal :Procedure l l{e){J.)(A), a,s follows:

(A)

Defendant is guUty and will knoWingly aml' \".Oltmtatily enter. a plea of w1Uty to

Count One of the Indlctrneut which charges Defe:J1dant with Possession of.Fentanytwlth Intent to

Dist:dbutein violatiou of Title 21, United State~ Cmie, S.ections ~4I(a)(1)and 84l(b)(l)(B)(vi),

(B)

Pefendairt fully 1Jnde1-stimds that Defonclimt's plea .of gi.ult:Y as set futth it1

Subparagr1\llh CA), above,will subjtctDefendantto thefollowingpel!alties on Cou11t One:

" a 1n.a,cimum si;ntence Qf 40 years imprisonment;

• a minimum sentence of$ ys1ars imprlso11111enf;

• amaitimii1n fme ofi/;5,00<\000,00, ol.'both; and

•• a teini ot'superv1Bedrelease of$ year(s),

Defe11da11tfutther acktmwledg;,s that the .Court is:re.qukedto im.pose a mandatory assessment -0f

$100,00 per count.

(C)

P<:i"endant acknowledges and umlerst1111ds. that the C-0urt ls net bound by llnY

estl!nate. tif th¢ probable sentencb\g ta:nge that Defe1idant may have 1,eceived from DefeJ1da11t's

attorney, the United States, or the,Probation Office, Defend81ltfurther acknowledges and agrees

lhatDefeudantwill not be alloWlJd,to withdraw Defentlant's pls1a Ol'.I the grom1d that Defendaqt

receiwd an estimated guideline range n:om the Ut1it1Jd States, Defendant's :attorney, or the

20a

Case 5:24-cr-00060-MTT-CHW

Document 24

Filed 02/21/25

Page 3 of 11

Probption O(fice which fa. differentfl\:!111. the guidel111e rMge computed by the .Probation Office in

the l'resenteuee Illvesfigation Report OJ' dif'fereut from the guideline range found by the Court to

l)e the \Jorrect guideline rauge.

(D)

Defendant unde1·stands fufly and has diseusss:d With Defem.imtt's 11tm1-ney that the

Court wlll mllt be able to deteimine fhe approp.date guideline sentence until after a Presentence

Investigatio11 Report has b~ completed. D.efEindant imderst:itJlds and has. diso11ssed wlth

Defendant's attomey that Defefidirt1t will have the .opp◊tturu.ty to review ·the :PtesetttettPe

fuvestigation. Repol't and to object to and challenge .any fucts reported therein. Defe11dant

uude!'!ltaoA~ and has disCtlssed with Deft)nda11t's attl)rney that any objectipns 01· chal~es by

D~eud1U1t orJJefendafit'S attorney t◊ thefacts .or i'ec◊llltnendatiom; presemed ilithe Pn1s.e11tence

Investigation Rtiport or a11y disagreementwith the Court's rulings onsw.ili. olijeetloua or challenges

will not 1:/e gro!lllds for wilhdJ:aw111g tl1e plea of guilty. Nothmg in this agreement primludes the

United States from providing fu1land ae(:Urate !nfor1Mtton to the Court and the Probation Office

foruse in cat.culatlng the advisory guldo.line range 11pplieableto Defendant.

(B)

Defe:nda11t u11derstands 1md. has di~cullired with Det\indt!nt's !ltt;or.ney that after the

Cout't detetmines. the advisoey suidelilt11 l'a1:1ge applicable to Defendant, the Court l1as the

llisctetkn1 and autho1ityto impose a sentence. that is mol'e severe or less severe than the se11tenee

recomn1ettdedby·theguid<:fm!-ls,

ce1tailt citcumstances, Defondant knowingly and volu11tadly waives any right to appeal

Deieudaut's sentenee, .inelnding the wnonnt of any resliti,tfon n.nposed as part of l)e~ndant's

sontonce. Defendant's sentence apPeal waiver does 11otapply if: (1) the Courtimposes a sentence

that .exceeds the adYisory .guideline range as that range has been calculated by the Comtat the time

21a

Case 5:24-cr-00060-MTT-CHW

Document 24

Filed 02/21/25

Page 4 of 11

of sentencing; (2) the Cou1t in:tposes a 11entence that eKceeds tl1e statutory msiixln;mm; or (3) t!ie

United States: appeals Defe11dant's sentence nttder the anth011ty of 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b). Nothing

in this agreemenI shall. deprive the Unitec1 State~ of iw right to appeai Defendant'1l sentene'l; as

authorized J;,y 18 U.S,C. § 3742(b). If, however, the United States appe4l$ Def,mdant's sentimce.

pnrsu!\llt to this stafuoo, Defe11dant is released froin DlJfendant' s WaiVlJr of Defendant's tight to

appe:111 altogether,

.f>efend!\l1t wiiives any ti,ght to collaterally attack Defelldam's ~ortvictlon and ,senteixce

under 28 u.s.c. § 2255, orto bring any otlier collaterm attack;, except that Deferidaiit shall retain

the right to bri11g II elnim of h1effeetive 11s.sistance ofcriunseI. This provision shall not bar the. filing

of apetition fot writ of habdM coxpi:!s,J1s permitted by 28 u.S.C. § 224L

Def.eiidant undetstatida and acknowledges tltat the walvei-s outlined herein may result in

the diSJplssal Qf any appeal or collateral altaclc Defendant wight file chaflenglng Defendant's

c.onvictiou or selltence. !£'Defendant ftles a notice o:f appeaLor P,Qllateral attack, notWith~tauding

this .agrei:ltnellt, Defenda11t agrees, that this cilse shall, upon motion of the United Smtes., be

remanded to theCoul't to cleteimine whether Defendant is in brencli of this ngrewnentl1lld, ,if so,

to Ptii:lnit the l)nit~d Stlltes to withdraw fro111 tM plea 11gte1:1111¢11t.

(G)

Defendant agi'eeS to pl'ovide coiltplete, candid, and tmtl1ful statemoots to law

enfonrement pfficer~ regarding Defendant;s involvemtmt and the nivolvement .of al! oth1;:1•s

iltvolved in the chargesull~ged in th!J present lndic\mertt as we1las ,iny and aUeri1ttlnat vioh1tlons

about which Defendant has knowledge or lnfortnation ahd that sncll infotliiation pxovided Will be

pursuant. to and covwed hy this agreeuuint. Defenda11t fwther ag('ees to prov41e complete, pandid,

a11d ti:utltful. testimony regarding suc!i matters in any ptoeeedillg, Def-0nd11J1t1JJ1det11tandsthat this

agreement does not require Defendant to lJnpJlcate any particular individual or individuals orto

22a

Case 5:24-cr-00060-MTT-CHW

Document 24

Filed 02/21/25

Page 5 of 11

"make a ease.'' Rather, thla agreement reqitires Defend!lnt to be ttuthi'ut and to testify truthfi.llly

whei1evet eruled upon.

(B)

Defendant further agrees that all evidence, except biological evidence as defined.in

l ~ U.S.C. § 3oO:OA, if tiny, obt1#ned in ihia .investigation and prosecution .may be destroye<i or

.retucned to its rightful ownill' 30 d!lys after entry ofthe judj!ine.lll: or tlwi-eafte1·.

(1)

The United Sta\flS and Defendant hl3l'eby agree that any breach of this agteement

by Defaudant pccasioned by a failure l;o eoopl3l'ale; by w1thhol<iiug infocnmtion, giVJpg of f,tlse

infonootion, pe1jury, or fallm-e to testify in anyjudicfol proceedlli.g fu co11nectioli with the

individuals, matters, and tntn~actfo.ps refi:m:ed to in tl1e Indictment, would: (.a) not l!elleve

Defendant ofDefendant's pli,a ofgullty; (b) ):lermit the U11:ited Smtes to l1Jinstatea11d ptooeod with

ptosccutioli 01111ny Other charges arising fi:om .the matt.ors rofertec! tu in this. Iudiotment; (c) permit

the United Stat;,s to instigate and proceed with the prosecution of auy other o:ffeuses adsing from

a hre;ieh of thi$ agreeme11t; includin~,rpe1ju:cy, false ileclaratlcm,false :statement, and/or obstruction

ofjustice; {!lid (d) pel'lliittheUliited States to ut!lize:agaitmt befe11doot i11 any $\Jbst.JqnentJ,udiofal

procl!eding any and all stlltenlentsmade by Defe11c!ant. lf a !egftimate issue arises as to whether or

not there has been a. breach of tlus l\J!reement, sa:id nw::s.tlon shall be dete11n1ned by the United

States Disttict Court fur the MiddieDiiltJ'ictofGeotgia. The butden ofestabli$hlng such a breaeh

shafI be upon the United St11tes and shall be esfl;lblished by a:preponc!erance of the evidence; The

Fedenil Rutea.of:evidenee slial1 Mt 11p11Jy hl any headng to establfah s11cha bt¢lleh, butevi<lenee

sha!Lbe a<h11Itted a11d excluded at the Court's disctetioti.

Jn exchange fot the con$tderatiun set foi:th in Patai:,>i:aph £3) above, th~ Uttited States agrees

23a

Case 5:24-cr-00060-MTT-CHW

(A)

Document 24

Filed 02/21/25

Page 6 of 11

Tlle United States will accept the plea of guilty by Defendant as provided in

Pal'agraph (3)(A), above, in fall satisfaction of all possible federal. crimjn,il charges, known to the

Untted States Attorney at the time of Defendant'.s guilty plea, which. might b(!Ve been bronght

against Defendant solely jn this dfatdct, The United States agrees to dismiss all remaining coimts

c,f t!te pl;lndillg Indicttnent in exchi!U$ll for Defend1111t's 'plea Qf guilty tq Count Qne .c,f the

Indictinent:

(13}

IfDefen\l,µitcoeyerates tl'.llthfully and completely with the United Stateil, including

being debdefed andptov1ding tntthtul te$!lmony·11t any pmceed!l)g re$qlting frQm or reli,ted tq

Defendanfs coopel'!ltion, then tlxe U!ilted States willmak\l the exte1it ofDtJfe1ld;mt'll cMp!:)tation

lmown to thesentencmg co,u:t. TfDefendnnt is not comple.tely tnif11ful and .Olllldid in Defendant's

.CQO)'etiltiml with the United States, Dl:lf!imlant may be subject to prQseeutfon fo1· :perjury, :mlse

statements, obstmetiOn ofjustica, and/or any other applicable charge. If Defendant's ~oope1·11tinn

fa. completedbetbre sen!encil)g, tlle United States wi!Lconsider whether stlch coqperation qualifies

,is "si1J,sta1itialasil1$ianctJ"pt1!'1n1ant to 18 U.S,C, ~. 3553{e} !li:rd/or U.S,S.O. § 5:R..1 ,l 1uxd warmnts

the filutg ,of .a motion at the time of sentencing 1'llcommending a downward deparm1-e fto1n (he

app!\eable guideline range. if Defendant's c9operatio11 is completed after sentencing,. the United

States witl. cons/der whether such cooper11tio11 <J.Ualifies A$ ,:'substantial as;sistanc~' p1ll'l!U!lllt to

Federal Ritle of Crllnilial Proc.edure 35(b) and warratits the filing of a .motion for reductroi1 of

sentence, In eftlier (;8lle, Defendant lJ)l,ierstands that t1Ie detexmination as to whether Defendant

has provided "su!,stantialasswtanee"!'llstssolely with the United Statoo. Any good faith effor~ on

the. patt of Defendant that do not .substantially assist 1n the investigation or p)'osecutfon ofanother

person who has committed a erime will not result in either a motion fol' downward dei)lUi:Jn'e .or a

Rule 3,5(b) motion,. fu addition, should Defendaµt fail to coope;:ate tratlr!hlly and completely with

24a

Case 5:24-cr-00060-MTT-CHW

Document 24

Filed 02/21/25

Page 7 of 11

tlie Unlted States, or if Defendant engages 1n any additional e11m1nal conduct, Defendant $hall IJOt

be entitled to consideration pursuant to this paragraph.

(C)

l'ur.suant to U.S.S,G, § 1.Bl.8, the United States agrees that any self,incdmina!ing

information wlllch was previously unknown to the United Statcs and. is provided to the United

States by Defendant in connection with Defundant's ooopen1tlc:m and as iuesuJt of Defendant's

plea agre1,ment to cooperate wfl1 not be uaiod in detetuiinfog the iippli¢able guideline range.

FllitheJ~ the United States agrees not to bri11g !idditional chnrgoo agah1L't' Defendant, witl1 the

.excepllo11 of chal'ges 1'eSulting from or related to a violent felony, as defined in Hf U:S.C,

§ .924(e)(,2)(B), based on any fafonnatlon provided J;iy Defet)dant in eonue1;tio11wiQ1 Defendant's

coopera.tion, which inJmwation wc1s notkirown to the United States pdor tQ said cMperatltm. This

does li.Otreslrlct the United States' use ofinformation prevlonslyknown orlndependen!Lyoblained

fp:r s:uch purposes,

(D)

The United States agrees •that it will file a 111.otlon requesting that Defendant's

ofknse level be reduced by one level under U.S.S.G, § 3El,l(b) for timely notifying the United

States of Defendant's intention to enter II guilty plea, bu.t Defand!)nt imder,stands that whether

Defendant is etitltled to any Offense-level i'e<luctlQll under tJ.s.s.o, 3E 1.1 is entiiely within tlie

Courf.s di.scretio1i. Tlte United .States l'eserves the tight to furnish the Court with full and aocumte

information lllldlot argue against the two-level rc4\lctiQn for !fCccptnnce of respQnsi!Jlltty if

D.efendant engages ot has e,ugs1gedin conduct in<:onsistent with ac\-;eptingresponslbility, as defined

in U.S.S.G. § 3EL1 .and its cmnmentary.

(6)

Nothmg herein Iin1fts the senteiicing discretion of the Court. The United Stille& and

Defendant understllnd and agree thattlte. Court should eonsiderlts se11te11ce h1 llgltt of the advisory

25a

Case 5:24-cr-00060-MTT-CHW

Document 24

Filed 02/21/25

Page 8 of 11

Ullited States Sente11cit)g Gttitlelme$. Defendant therefore agrees. that at sente1rcing the Court may

determine any fact pertlileUt to Defendant's sentence by a preponderance of the evidence aiid the

Comt may consider a1u1y reliable. ini'91n)iitfon, including hearsay. Defem!nnt exptessly waives any

claim of l'ight to an indictment, trial by J11ry, 1Jnd/or proof'beyond a i'easo111Jbfo doubt on any fact\llll

determinations that pettilin to.the. sentence to be imposed by the Court.

(7)

This Jigi'eemei1t co11,stitutes .the entire agi'eement h1;1tween Defendant and the United States,

andno ot11et promises 01·indueeme11tshave.been mad;:,, directly orindirectly, by any agent ofthe

United States,. including ttny Assis.tanft United {ltat\:il, Attom(:)y, coneerlliug anyplca to be curered

in!hls ea$e, ni pm•ticulrtr, De:fenclatttl\clmt)wledgel.l and agrees that no oni>has iuomised Defi;!Udam

thanhe Court wiil impose any particulauentenoe or a sentence within any partimllanange in order

to induce this plea. In. addition, Defendant states U111t no J1e)'Spn has, diwctly or indirectly,

tlu·.eatened, or coerced :Oefendanr to tfo on·cttl:aln fron1 doing anythin.g in eounectkin with any

aspect .oftbfa oose, ii1cl:utlit1g ente1ing a plea of guilty,

Defendant understanrls that this agreet;11lll1f.hinds only the Office of the \Ji:riltJd Stales

Attot11ey /h1· the Middle Pis11fot of OMtgla, and that the agreement does not bind any other

co1l:!poileflt of !he United States Departme11t of Justice, nor does it bind .any state or local

prosecuting au!hority, unl¢ss ex.pres~ly ntl!ted h\l!'eln.

As an aid to this Court, ili~ United States and D(;}fenda11t, by and through Defel1.da11t's

attorney, enter into the folloyiing $til)ulatio11 ofFact, This slip\ilation lsc entered into. i11 good f\Uth

. .

.·.. .• .

. .

. .. . . ..

. . .

. . ·.

• ••

with all paTtles nnd&standlng thst t!1e stipulation 1s not binding on the Comt Undei• U$:S.G,

§ 6Bl .4(d) ('Policy Statement), this Comtmay accept this stipulation as wiitten. The facts s.et forth

26a

Case 5:24-cr-00060-MTT-CHW

Document 24

Filed 02/21/25

Page 9 of 11

below ru·e intended to n!low the Cowt to satisfy it obligation under Federal Rule of Cl'hnlnal

Procedure l1 (b)('.I) te ensure that an adequ11te fE1ctual basis to support the plea exists. fa

cletemliuing an appropiiate gtiideline rat!ge pr ultimate sentence, ihe Court, in its diseretl<m, and

consfateirt with it$ ohligatio11 to determine the filets relevant to se11tenclng, may considel' Othel'

·information in addition to thefacis setforthhel'<l,

Sul:ijcct tq the above paragraph, the 'Onlted SJatlls: lih.d Defe11dant st!pulat(;J and agree tliat

Defendant ls 1nfactgullty ofthe offense to which Defendant is pfoadhig guilty, ihat the

followilig facts .are tme and correct, and that t11e United States attrfal could p1,ovethe following

facts beyond a;:easomible douh~:

On thr.i .ev¢n~ o:t' Febl't1iily lS, 2024, favestigators established snl'VeillaMe fo !he ateas of

6000 Harrison Road, Macon, GA ("Bd<lw,vir.,w Jun aud Suites"), ~hr., ac!c!l'ess, provided by a

ctmfide.nti~l infonnantfo.ra tli~n:ansaction to tak\l pl,a~

J:Ji,,,\tt . ~

Agents .obse1,yec! the J:ackson walk down the; breezewayauc! knock on room.202, where tlie

qrngtt'!lllsaotion was to be c@ducrec! in. J:a.okson thenwa1ked dovm the stairs, left the motel, and

headed towimis the inoot'llootfo:n of Eisenhower J?arkway and lliitl'faon Road. Marked. Bibb County

She11fl"& Office vnlts activated their lighj;I. and mµde oontaotwith Jackson. Puring tl:u; search of

-, 1 i,\J.t-' 4ihe Jaekso11's petson, d!lpntles found 21.69 gram$ of crystal met!Jamp1tetamhie, a.cellphone, and ii

.~·

flt

ho.telxoom key card..

Agent!! oonfinnedwith the 1not1Jlthat J:ackson rented room 128. A wa1'rartt wal:! at1thotlzed

and granted to search romn 128 ofthe 131:idgeview Inn and Suites. Agertts entered the empty

room and. lbcati:d a black backpack. Inside the bat,•kpack WM a blackhandheld radio with the

name •~IKE" taped 011 Jt,. a head.phone b'Ox $eCuted with blacktape, and plastiq baggies. In~id.e tne

27a

Case 5:24-cr-00060-MTT-CHW

Document 24

Filed 02/21/25

Page 10 of 11

headphones box was a cleat bag cortt4it4ng an opened k(logram offentanyl and a briGkof

±'enwnyllnslde a VllCUulll seal¢d bag; The total amount offet1taityl .seized was 1,.713.7 gran1s.

. (9)

ACCEPTANCE·OFPLEA AGREEMENT

Def'1!tdant understands attd bas fnlly dlseussed with Detbn<lant's attorney that this

agrepmeut shall b.:loome .effflotive O.lliY upo,trlhe Cot1tt's a1;;C<iptiUlce of:'this agr®roent and tM

Court's acceptance ofthe plea ofguilty by Deferi.danL

SO AGREED, this~ day off@Jtt\!le

C, SHANELLE BOOKER

ACTl:NGDNl'l'EP.StATESATI'OR:NEY

28a

Case 5:24-cr-00060-MTT-CHW

Document 24

Filed 02/21/25

Page 11 of 11

r, IKE JActCSON, haw reau this ag!'eemtJilt aud had this ag!'eement read to me by my

itttomey, PAUL COGNAC. I have discussed tltis l}greement wlth my attorney, at1d I fnUy

understand it and agree t() its teims. D\lfendant acknowledges that Defundant a1ithotlzed !iiJd

i;onse»Jed to the negotiatioM betweeit the United States and the attorney for Defendant thatled to

thl!l.ilgteement.

l~JACJ~

DEFENDANT

1, PAUL COGNAC, attorney fur. Defendaµt IKE JAGI($0N, .have explained the

Indictment and )he Unit1ld States' evidence) 1tceived '!hrmigh discovery and 1ey itwestigation of

!he ch11rge t9 Defendant. l b(i/ieve Defendalit understands the .charge against Defendant' !llld the

evideuce that would be presented against Defendant at a trial. I hiive read this agreement,. have

hee11. given a <,opy of it .for my :(ile, 1!lld have -0xplained it to Defendant. To the best of my

lmowiedge and he!Jef, Defendant w:tder$!ands this agre

PAUL!);!

ATTORNEY FOR.DEFENDANT

29a

APPENDIX D:

Sentencing Hearing,

United States v. Jackson, No. 5:24-CR-00060-MTT-CHW (M.D. GA. June 30, 2025),

ECF No. 52.

30a

Case 5:24-cr-00060-MTT-CHW

Document 52

Filed 06/30/25

Page 1 of 15

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

MACON DIVISION

_________________

)

) Case No. 5:24-CR-60

vs.

)

) Macon, Georgia

IKE JOHNSON JR., DEFENDANT

)

________________________________)

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

SENTENCING HEARING

BEFORE THE HONORABLE MARC T. TREADWELL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

May 12, 2025

APPEARANCES:

FOR THE GOVERNMENT:

Shelby Brunette, AUSA

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE

Post Office Box 1702

Macon, GA 31202-1702

FOR THE DEFENDANT:

Paul M. Cognac

Attorney at Law

312 Crosstown Road, Suite 106

Peachtree City, Georgia 30269

Proceedings reported stenographically

_______________________________________________________________

DARLENE D. FULLER, USCR

Registered Professional Reporter

Registered Merit Reporter

Certified Realtime Reporter

Georgia Certified Reporter No. 5641-3440-5157-6832

31a

Case 5:24-cr-00060-MTT-CHW

Macon, Georgia

Monday, May 12, 2025

11:08 a.m.

THE COURT:

Page 2 of 15

I call next Mr. Campbell -- I'm sorry,

Mr. Jackson.

For the government we have Ms. Brunette; and for

Filed 06/30/25

P R O C E E D I N G S

Document 52

Mr. Jackson, Mr. Cognac.

I have in Mr. Jackson's case the presentence report

that was prepared after he entered his guilty plea.

offense level is 32; he's a career offender so that becomes 34.

There is a 3-level decrease for acceptance.

history category is VI.

months.

And I do have a sentencing memorandum Mr. Cognac has

prepared on behalf of Mr. Jackson.

And I have reviewed that.

Good morning, Mr. Jackson.

THE DEFENDANT:

THE COURT:

Good morning, sir.

I have been talking about the presentence

report that was prepared after you entered your guilty plea.

THE DEFENDANT:

THE COURT:

The criminal

The guideline range is 188 to 235

The base

Yes, sir.

Have you received a copy -- have you

reviewed that report with Mr. Cognac?

THE DEFENDANT:

THE COURT:

Yes, sir.

Do you have any questions about it?

DARLENE D. FULLER - FEDERAL COURT REPORTER - (478) 752-3497

32a

Case 5:24-cr-00060-MTT-CHW

Document 52

THE DEFENDANT:

THE COURT:

Filed 06/30/25

Page 3 of 15

No, sir.

Very well.

Mr. Cognac, I will hear from

you regarding a reasonable sentence.

MR. COGNAC:

Your Honor, I am briefly going to go

over the arguments I made in my sentencing memorandum -- I know

the Court has reviewed that -- specifically, for a request for

a variance.

involvement in this was driven by his own addiction, and he was

doing this to service his own addiction.

You know, his

He does qualify as a career offender under current

His guidelines are as stated.

case law.

It is interesting to note in this particular area of

law, I will not say that it's become devoid of reason and

logic, but it has certainly begun to strain reason and logic.

His 2017 conviction in Paragraph 57, the Aggravated Assault

with a Deadly Weapon and the Terroristic Threats, both of those

qualify as a crime of violence.

Circuit case for the aggravated assault with a deadly weapon,

and then U.S. v Najee Oliver, that's a 2020 case, for the

terroristic threats to commit a crime of violence.

the only permutation of terroristic threats under Georgia law

that would qualify.

U.S. v Hicks is the Eleventh

And that's

And his 2011 conviction, he had a False Imprisonment,

which would not qualify as a crime of violence under U.S. v

Chitwood.

It only ever would qualify under the old residual

DARLENE D. FULLER - FEDERAL COURT REPORTER - (478) 752-3497

33a

Case 5:24-cr-00060-MTT-CHW

Document 52

Filed 06/30/25

Page 4 of 15

clause, and that was removed from the sentencing guidelines in

2016.

The misdemeanor conviction would not qualify because

under 4B1.2(a) the offense would have to be punishable by

imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.

So, really what qualifies for that second one is the

Terroristic Threats to Commit a Crime of Violence.

Najee Oliver decision in 2020--that's at 946 F.3d 1276--is

interesting because under -- the Eleventh Circuit in January of

2020 issued an opinion stating that Georgia's terroristic

threat statute was indivisible and overbroad and therefore did

not qualify as a predicate offense as a crime of violence under

the Armed Career Criminal Act, which would be analogous to this

case.

And the

Subsequently, six months later, without any change of

facts, without any change of circumstances, the Eleventh

Circuit vacated Oliver II and issued Oliver III, ruling in fact

the Georgia terroristic threat statute is divisible and that a

threat to commit a crime of violence is a qualifying predicate

offense under the Armed Career Criminal offense.

would have been sentenced after January but before June, he

would in fact not qualify as a career offender.

So, if he

And there are other cases that seem to defy logic as

to what qualifies as a crime of violence.

For instance,

Attempted Carjacking does not qualify as a crime of violence.

DARLENE D. FULLER - FEDERAL COURT REPORTER - (478) 752-3497

34a

Case 5:24-cr-00060-MTT-CHW

Document 52

Filed 06/30/25

Page 5 of 15

Hobbs Act Extortion does not qualify as a crime of violence.

Attempt to Commit Hobbs Act Robbery or Conspiracy to Commit

Hobbs Act Robbery do not qualify as a crime of violence.

Hostage Taking, Involuntary Manslaughter, Kidnapping, and

Murder For Hire do not qualify as a crime of violence.

So, this area of law, it seems to be so constrained

that -- whether it applies or doesn't apply, it's so -- the

vagaries of it are so difficult for an individual to understand

that their prior history amounts to career offender that it's

just -- in my mind I think the Court should vary downward from

that career offender guideline because this area of law is

really straining reason and logic at this point.

Secondarily, Mr. Jackson, because he qualifies as a

career offender, does not -- or is not allowed a reduction for

role in the offense.

That's a 2003 decision.

And that's U.S. v Jeter, 329 F.3d, 1229.

His actions in all of this were that of a courier.

The undercover agent was talking with someone in Mexico who

arranged this deal, and my client was to deliver what the

arrangements were.

hotel where this took place, was speaking with this person who

they believed was in Mexico, who had arranged all this, had

negotiated all of this.

The undercover agent at the time was at the

My client, he didn't fully understand the scope.

Again, he was just doing what he was instructed to do.

DARLENE D. FULLER - FEDERAL COURT REPORTER - (478) 752-3497

35a

He was

Case 5:24-cr-00060-MTT-CHW

Document 52

Filed 06/30/25

Page 6 of 15

addicted to drugs and trying to get a little money or a little

bit of drugs to feed his addiction.

the activity.

His role was that of a courier.

because he's career offender, we think the facts would have

supported a reduction for role in the offense.

He didn't plan or organize

He didn't exercise decision-making authority.

THE COURT:

And though he does not qualify

Let me ask you this.

How is it that --

this doesn't, from what I see, sound quite like the typical

courier situation.

actual source of supply -- in Mexico?

I mean, he's -- his contact is with the

MR. COGNAC:

The undercover was contacting a source

of supply in Mexico.

My understanding from my client was he

was not in direct contact with that person.

through a third-party intermediary on where to go and what to

do and what to deliver.

That was coming

THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. COGNAC:

I have -- I went on the United States

Sentencing Commission and they have a "Quick Facts for Career

Offender".

will provide a copy to the Court.

interesting information in there, but the bottom line is across

the country -- and this is for 2023 -- the average sentence in

months in 2023 was 154 months; in 2019, it was 152 months for

all career offenders across the country.

I have given a copy of this to the government and I

And there's a lot of

You know, my client has been trying to deal with his

DARLENE D. FULLER - FEDERAL COURT REPORTER - (478) 752-3497

36a

Case 5:24-cr-00060-MTT-CHW

Document 52

Filed 06/30/25

Page 7 of 15

drug addiction for a long time, and he has been accepted into

an in-house treatment program here in Macon.

letter.

significant period of time before he can do that.

actively trying to deal with his addiction.

And I have a

But, obviously, he's going to have to serve a

But he is

He is also trying to just improve his condition while

he's in custody.

numerous courses he's taken, online courses he's taken while

he's been in custody in Butts County.

improve his circumstance.

There's a copy of a transcript of the

He is just trying to

So, there is one other matter if we approach, Your

Honor, I would like to address the Court.

has agreed to this.

And the government

Just briefly, Your Honor.

(Discussion was held at the bench, out of the hearing

of the general public at 11:18 a.m.:)

MR. COGNAC:

So, my client had agreed to cooperate --

he was actually sent letters, one, to cooperate from the time

he was arrested before he even was indicted in this case.

met with the government, he gave a proffer, he gave

information, which I understand was truthful, but will not be

resulting in a 5K motion.

something were to get out and the other people in the jail find

out that he attempted to cooperate.

qualify for a 5K, he did provide information that was truthful.

THE COURT:

He is concerned for his safety if

And although he does not

Okay.

DARLENE D. FULLER - FEDERAL COURT REPORTER - (478) 752-3497

37a

Case 5:24-cr-00060-MTT-CHW

Document 52

MS. BRUNETTE:

Filed 06/30/25

Page 8 of 15

Do you want me to tell them now while

we're here?

THE COURT:

Yes.

MS. BRUNETTE:

It is true that since he was

incarcerated and he found out about this indictment, he has

been more than willing to talk to the government.

called the FBI numerous times, and we had to tell him to stop

and wait for his attorney.

he wanted to cooperate from the get-go.

He has

So, I agree with the defense that

During the proffer, the information that was

provided -- while some of it I know for a fact was truthful, we

couldn't confirm all of the information.

was provided didn't provide any substantial assistance, which

is why he didn't receive a 5K, because he was on probation,

pursuant to individuals the government has already charged had

already had change of pleas and were already facing sentencing

on, as well as information about John houses that we have

already busted five or six times.

defense that he did provide or attempt to provide information;

however, the ones that I could confirm didn't relate to the

substantial assistance in any way for the government in the

little bit that I was looking for me to know.

Okay.

The information that

So I will agree with the

THE COURT:

Thanks.

(Proceedings resumed on the record in open court at

11:20 a.m.:)

DARLENE D. FULLER - FEDERAL COURT REPORTER - (478) 752-3497

38a

Case 5:24-cr-00060-MTT-CHW

Document 52

Filed 06/30/25

Page 9 of 15

THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. COGNAC:

Again, Your Honor, taking into

Anything else, Mr. Cognac?

consideration all the factors of 3553(a), we believe that a

sentence of 120 months is reasonable under the circumstances.

We would also request that he be given credit for

time served.

The offense charged is the same one he was

arrested on in the State on February 15th of 2024.

writted into the federal custody in December 19th of 2024, but

we would, because of his same offense, request that he be given

credit back to February of 2024.

He was

We would request a recommendation to the Residential

Drug and Alcohol Program and to a facility as close to Macon as

possible.

My client would like to address the Court.

THE COURT:

Mr. Jackson?

THE DEFENDANT:

THE COURT:

THE DEFENDANT:

THE COURT:

THE DEFENDANT:

Yes, sir.

We'll hear from you.

Yes, sir.

Would you like to say anything, sir?

Yes, sir.

I, um, I want to -- I want

y'all to forgive me for my actions and stuff, and I apologize,

sir.

THE COURT:

Ms. Brunette?

MS. BRUNETTE:

Thank you, sir.

The government believes that the

guideline range is more than fair given the nature of this

DARLENE D. FULLER - FEDERAL COURT REPORTER - (478) 752-3497

39a

Case 5:24-cr-00060-MTT-CHW

Document 52

Filed 06/30/25

Page 10 of 15 10

charge.

When you look at Mr. Jackson's history, what you see

is the only time he has not been in trouble was when he -- for

an extended period of time was when he was incarcerated.

Almost every time after he gets out of an incarceration, within

one to two years he's picking up more crimes.

And since eighteen years old to now, what we are

seeing is an increase in his behavior from Simple Battery

charged as a Family Violence to increasing to Terroristic

Threats, False Imprisonment, and then Aggravated Assault, and

now drug trafficking large amounts of fentanyl.

Defense highlights that terroristic threats should or

should not be considered for a violent offense, and he keeps

referencing Armed Career Criminal.

is different than a career offender.

armed career criminal.

Career Offender Act, and he got the Career Offender Act because

of his repeat offenses and his history of serious violent

felonies that continue to increase over time.

Armed Career Criminal Act

He isn't charged as an

He's gotten an enhancement under the

There is a difference between what qualifies as a

violent offense under Career Offender and Armed Career

Criminal.

imposes a mandatory minimum of 15 years; Career Offender

doesn't do that.

sentencing range, but it doesn't give a mandatory minimum.

so to argue that counts shouldn't be considered as a violent

And the reason for that is Armed Career Criminal

It increases the -- and leads to enhanced

DARLENE D. FULLER - FEDERAL COURT REPORTER - (478) 752-3497

40a

And

Case 5:24-cr-00060-MTT-CHW

Document 52

Filed 06/30/25

Page 11 of 15 11

offense I think is misrepresenting what is being alleged in the

PSR.

Mr. Jackson, I do believe, was a courier.

I don't

think that there is any dispute that he was acting at the

behest of somebody else.

he willingly chose to engage in behavior with individuals while

on probation, and he was serving time on probation violations

because of -- he got revoked because of this, which is why he

was writted.

But that doesn't change the fact that

And he was on probation for extremely serious and

violent crimes.

So, to get out and be on probation, to

immediately go out and start engaging with those same

individual--where, as defense said, he was feeding his own

habit--there has been no show by him to change his behavior or

remove himself from a path that's going to continue criminal

conduct.

range is appropriate.

properly applied, and I think a low- to mid-range of guidelines

is appropriate in this matter.

THE COURT:

Mr. Jackson, I have considered the presentence report

And for that reason I do think that the guideline

I think the Career Offender has been

Thank you, Ms. Brunette.

that was prepared after you entered your guilty plea.

the Plea Agreement you have with the government, and you are

adjudicated guilty of Count One of the Indictment.

I accept

As we have discussed, your guideline range is 188 to

DARLENE D. FULLER - FEDERAL COURT REPORTER - (478) 752-3497

41a

Case 5:24-cr-00060-MTT-CHW

Document 52

Filed 06/30/25

Page 12 of 15 12

235 months based on a career offender adjusted offense level of

31 and a criminal history category of VI.

In imposing the sentence, I have considered the

advisory sentencing range and the sentencing factors found at

18 U.S.C. Section 3553(a), and I have made an individualized

assessment of the facts of your case.

There is one mitigating factor that I see, or at

least one that I attach particular significance to, as I always

have done, and that is the fact that it is clear you were

operating as a courier.

and the circumstances of this offense, particularly the drugs

involved--fentanyl--a sentence at the top of the guideline

would be warranted.

Otherwise, given your criminal history

However, taking into account your actual role in the

offense, I believe a sentence below the bottom of the guideline

range is appropriate.

for a period of 200 months, and that sentence will run

consecutively to any term of imprisonment that may be imposed

in Bibb County Superior Court Case Number 17-CR-75142.

I commit you to the Bureau of Prisons

I will recommend to the Bureau of Prisons that you

participate in the RDAP Program.

I will not make a recommendation as to the location

of your incarceration, particularly given your criminal history

and the nature of this offense.

THE DEFENDANT:

Yes, sir.

DARLENE D. FULLER - FEDERAL COURT REPORTER - (478) 752-3497

42a

Case 5:24-cr-00060-MTT-CHW

THE COURT:

Document 52

Filed 06/30/25

Page 13 of 15 13

The Bureau of Prisons is in a much better

position to make that determination.

Now, Mr. Cognac, what was the date of State custody?

MR. COGNAC:

February 15th of 2024, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

"15th"?

MR. COGNAC:

Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

And that was for this offense?

MR. COGNAC:

Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

I do believe on the facts I have it would

be appropriate that your sentence should run from

February 15th, 2024.

Because the sentence is within an advisory guideline

range greater than 24 months, I am required to state the reason

for the sentence.

decided on adequately reflects the defendant's criminal

history, the seriousness of the offense, and it affords

adequate deterrence to future criminal conduct.

I believe the sentence at the level I have

I impose a mandatory assessment in the amount of

$100.

sanction based on your financial condition.

penalties shall be paid in accordance with the Court's Standing

Order 2017-2.

I waive the imposition of a fine and any alternative

Any financial

Your term of imprisonment will be followed by a

period of supervised release of five years.

That shall include

the mandatory, standard, and special conditions as noted in the

DARLENE D. FULLER - FEDERAL COURT REPORTER - (478) 752-3497

43a

Case 5:24-cr-00060-MTT-CHW

Document 52

Filed 06/30/25

Page 14 of 15 14

presentence report and the Court's Standing Order 2017-2.

THE DEFENDANT:

THE COURT:

Yes, sir.

In your Plea Agreement you knowingly and

voluntarily waived your right to appeal with some exceptions.

Should you decide to appeal, Mr. Cognac will continue to

represent you and he will file a notice of appeal or a waiver

of appeal on your behalf.

THE DEFENDANT:

THE COURT:

Yes, sir.

Now that the findings of the Court have

been made and sentence imposed, are there any objections to the

sentence as to the findings of fact and conclusions of law,

Mr. Cognac?

MR. COGNAC:

No, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

Ms. Brunette?

MS. BRUNETTE:

THE COURT:

Very well.

MR. COGNAC:

No, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

Ms. Brunette?

MS. BRUNETTE:

THE COURT:

No, Your Honor.

Anything further, Mr. Cognac?

No, Your Honor.

That concludes this matter, then.

you all.

Mr. Jackson, good luck to you, sir.

(Proceedings concluded at 11:29 a.m.)

END OF RECORD

DARLENE D. FULLER - FEDERAL COURT REPORTER - (478) 752-3497

44a

Thank

Case 5:24-cr-00060-MTT-CHW

Document 52

Filed 06/30/25

Page 15 of 15 15

CERTIFICATE OF OFFICIAL REPORTER

I, Darlene D. Fuller, Federal Official Realtime Court

Reporter, in and for the United States District Court for the

Middle District of Georgia, do hereby certify that pursuant to

Section 753, Title 28, United States Code, that the foregoing

is a true and correct transcript of the stenographically

reported proceedings held in the above-entitled matter and that

the transcript page format is in conformance with the

regulations of the Judicial Conference of the United States.

Dated this 30th day of June, 2025

_________________________________

Darlene D. Fuller, RPR, CRR, RMR

NCRA No. 5803

Federal Official Court Reporter

Georgia CCR 5641-3440-5157-6832

Michigan Certification CSR-0929

DARLENE D. FULLER - FEDERAL COURT REPORTER - (478) 752-3497

45a

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.