Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Mehmet Emin Tatas, Petitioner v. Ali Baba's Terrace Inc., et al.

Supreme Court briefAug 3, 2026

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IN THE

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

MEHMET EMIN TATAS,

Petitioner,

ALI BABA’S TERRACE INC, ALI RIZA DOGAN

SENOL BAKIR AND TOLGAHAN SUBAKAN

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Second Circuit

PETITION FORA WRIT OF CERTIORARI

43 Vine Street Lynbrook,

NY 11563

Phone: 530-400-3340

juliomehmet@windowslive.com

August 17, 2026

* Petitioner Pro Se

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

The Seventh Amendment guarantees the right to a civil jury trial and preserves the jury's role as

fact finder under proper legal instructions. This Court has repeatedly held that any impairment of

that right must be reviewed with the "utmost care" and "the most exacting scrutiny." Dimick v.

Schiedt,293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935); City ofMorgantown v. Royal Ins. Co., 337 U.S. 254, 258

(1949).

The questions presented are:

1. Whether the Seventh Amendment and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 61 permit a court of

appeals to affirm a general civil verdict on harmless-error grounds where the district court

submitted a dispositive theory of liability on a general verdict form without instructing the jury

on its essential legal elements, such that the reviewing court cannot determine whether the jury

rejected the theory on the facts or failed to consider it under the governing law, despite a circuit

conflict over the General Verdict Rule.

2. Whether, under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 46 and 51 (d)(1)(B) and the Seventh

Amendment, a party forfeits a timely requested jury instruction supported by the record merely

because counsel later expressed general satisfaction with the final jury charge, contrary to the

approach of several courts of appeals and this Court’s preservation principles reflected in Sunkist

Growers, Inc. v. Winckler & Smith Citrus Products Co., 370 U.S. 19 (1962).

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW AND RULE 29.6 STATEMENT

The following is a list of all parties to the proceedings in the court whose judgment is sought to

be reviewed:

•

Petitioner: Mehmet Emin Tatas

•

Respondents: Ali Baba's Terrace Inc. (now dissolved), Ali Riza Dogan, Senol Bakir, and

Tolgahan Subakan

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 29.6, Petitioner Mehmet Emin Tatas is an individual and is not

a corporation. No parent corporation or publicly held company owns 10% or more of any interest

or whose stock is publicly held in Petitioner.

RULE 14.1(b)(iii) STATEMENT

The following proceedings in federal trial and appellate courts are directly related to the above

captioned case within the meaning of Rule 14.1 (b)(iii):

•

Mehmet Emin Tatas v. AU Baba’s Terrace Inc., AU Riza Dogan, Senol Bakir, and

Tolgahan Subakan, No. 24-1543, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Court. Summary Order entered November 6, 2025. Rehearing and rehearing en banc

denied March 11, 2026.

•

Mehmet Emin Tatas v. Ali Baba's Terrace Inc., AU Riza Dogan, Senol Bakir, Tolgahan

Subakan and Admiral Insurance Company, No. 1:19-cv-10595, United States District

Court for the Southern District of New York. Judgment entered April 16, 2024.

There are no other proceedings directly related to this case within the meaning of Rule

14.1(b)(iii).

RELATED PROCEEDINGS

Mehmet Emin Tatas v. AH Baba's Terrace Inc., AH Riza Dogan, Senol Bakir, and

Tolgahan Subakan, No. 24-1543, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Court. Summary Order entered November 6, 2025. Rehearing and rehearing en banc

denied March 11, 2026.

Mehmet Emin Tatas v. AH Baba's Terrace Inc., AH Riza Dogan, Senol Bakir, Tolgahan

Subakan and Admiral Insurance Company, No. l:19-cv-10595, United States District

Court for the Southern District of New York. Judgment entered April 16, 2024.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page(s)

QUESTIONS PRESENTED.......................................................................................................... i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW AND RULE 29.6 STATEMENT.......................................... ii

RULE 14.l(b)(iii) STATEMENT....................................................................................................... iii

RELATED PROCEEDINGS................................................................................................................ iv

TABLE OF APPENDICES......................................................................................................... vii

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES........................................................................................... ix

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES............................................

xix

INTRODUCTION...........................................................................................................................1

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI................................................................................2

OPINION BELOW..........................................................................................................

JURISDICTION............................................................................................................................. 2

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED..................................... 3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE...................................................................................................... 3

Background............ ........................................................................................................ 3

Proceedings Below........................................................................................................ 4

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT...................................................................................5

The Court of Appeals Improperly Treated Preserved Rule 51 Objection as

Forfeited and Affirmed Through Appellate Substitution of a Verdict Form for

Missing Legal Instructions........................................................................................... 8

II.

The Decision Below Deepens an Active Inter-circuit Conflict Concerning

Rule 51 Preservation and the Futility Principle........................................................ 11

III.

Application Of The General Verdict Rule Presents An Exceptionally

Important Question of Post-Trial Procedure.............................................................. 16

The Decision Below Conflicts With This Court’s Precedent.........................17

The Circuits Are Deeply Divided On Application Of The General

Verdict Rule.........................................................

IV.

This Case Is an Ideal Vehicle to Address the Questions Presented............... 28

The Decision Below Violates the Seventh Amendment by Usurping the Jury's

Constitutional Function..................................................................................... 30

CONCLUSION........................................................................................................................... 33

TABLE OF APPENDICES

Page(s)

APPENDIX A— Orders and Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Second Circuit, Filed November 6,2025

App.la-lOa

APPENDIX B—Order Denying Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc from the

United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Filed

March 11, 2026

App. 11 a-12a

APPENDIX C—Final Judgment of the United States District Court for

the Southern District of New York, Filed April 16, 2024

App.l3a-14a

APPENDIX D—Verdict Form of the United States District Court for

the Southern District of New York, Filed April 16, 2024

App.l5a-23a

APPENDIX E— Jury Instructions, United States District Court for

the Southern District of New York, Filed April 7, 2024

App.24a-42a

APPENDIX F — Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Panel Rehearing and

Rehearing En Banc to the United States Court of Appeals

For the Second Circuit Filed February 20, 2026

APPENDIX G — Jury Trial Records of the United States District Court for

vii

App.43a-67a

the Southern District of New York, Filed April 2 and 9, 2024.. ..App.68a-78a

APPENDIX H— Pre-Trial (Motion in Limine) Records of the United States

District Court for Southern District of New York, Filed

March 28,2024

App.79a-82a

APPENDIX I— Order of the Supreme Court of the United States Extending

the Time to File a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

(No. 25A1112), Dated April 10,2026

APPENDIX J

App.83a-85a

(TRIAL EXHIBIT 2): Petitioner’s Audio Recording with

Stipulated English Translation Admitted into Evidence

During Jury Trial, United States District Court for the Southern

District of New York, Recorded on February 16,2016

App.86a-90a

APPENDIX K (TRIAL EXHIBIT 3): Petitioner’s Audio Recording with

Stipulated English Translation Admitted into Evidence During

Jury Trial, United States District Court for the Southern

District of New York, Recorded on February 17, 2016

App.91a-108a

APPENDIX L —Selected Trial Transcript Excerpts Demonstrating Evidentiary

Support for the Omitted Liability Instructions, United

States District Court for the Southern District of New York

(Trial Transcript Excerpts, Apr. 2 & Apr. 9, 2024)

viii

App.l09a-134a

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

CASES

Accord Maccabees Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Morton,

941 F.2d 1181,1184 (11th Cir. 1991)......................................................................................... 28

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242,255 (1986)............................................................................................................. 31

Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co.,

77 F.3d 1215, 1229-31 (10th Cir. 1996)....................................................................................... 26

Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman,

295 U.S. 654 (1935)................................................................................................................... 1,30

Banc One Capital Partners Corp. v. Kneipper,

67 F.3d 1187,1193 (5th Cir. 1995)................................................................................................ 1

Boonmalert v. City ofNew York,

721 Fed.Appx. 29, 34 (2d Cir. 2018)........................................................................................... 20

Bouley v. Continental Oil Co.,

454 F.2d 85, 88 (1st Cir. 1972)................................................................................................... 12

Brown v. Sandals Resorts Int’l,

284 F.3d 949 (8th Cir. 2002)........................................................................................................ 13

Chowdhury v. Worldtel Bangladesh Holding, Ltd.,

F.3d 42, 50 (2d Cir. 2014)............................................................................................ 27

City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc.,

499 U.S. 365,384(1991)....................................................................................

City ofLos Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S.

796, 106 S. Ct. 1571 (1986)

....................................................................................

City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik,

485 U.S. 112 (1988)........................................

City ofMorgantown v. Royal Ins. Co.,

337 U.S. 254, 258(1949)............................................................................................................... i

Curtis v. Loether,

415 U.S. 189, 194 (1974)........................................................................................................... 7,31

Davis v. Rennie,

264 F.3d 86, 106 (1st Cir. 2001)................................................................................................... 27

Dimick v. Schiedt,

293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935).......................................................................................................... i ,30

Dudley v. Dittmer,

795 F.2d 669, 673 (8th Cir. 1986)............................................................................................... 28

Eberhardt v. Integrated Design & Construction, Inc.,

167 F.3d 861,871 (4th Cir. 1999)................................................................................................ 13

Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker,

554 U.S. 471,482 (2008)........................................................................................................ 17,19

Farrell v. Klein Tools, Inc.,

866 F.2d 1294,1300-01 (10th Cir. 1989)..................................................................................... 26

Farley v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.,

197 F.3d 1322, 1329 (11th Cir. 1999).......................................

Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc.,

523 U.S. 340(1998).................................................................................................................... 30

Feingold v. New York,

366 F.3d 138, 158 (2d Cir. 2004)

'................................................

Fillippon v. Albion Vein Slate Co.,

250 U.S. 76,81-82(1919)............................................................................................................20

Foley v. Commonwealth Electric Co.,

312 F.3d 517(1 st Cir. 2002).......................................................................................................... 12

Friedman & Friedman, Ltd. v. Tim McCandless, Inc.,

606 F.3d 494, 502-03 (8th Cir. 2010).......................................................................................... 27

Gasoline Products Co. v. Champlin Refining Co.,

283 U.S. 494(1931)...............................................................................................................30,32

Gillespie v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,

386 F.3d 21, 30 (1st Cir. 2004)..............................................

Gradsky v. Sperry Rand Corp.,

489 F.2d 502, 506 (6th Cir. 1973)................................................................................................ 21

Greenbelt Coop. Publ'g Ass'n v. Bresler,

17,18,19

398 U.S. 6, 11 (1970)

Gerber v. Riordan,

649 F.3d 514, 530 (6th Cir. 2011)................................................................................................. 9

Gulliford v. Pierce County,

136 F.3d 1345 (9th Cir. 1998)...................................................................................................... 13

Gunnell v. Utah Valley State College,

152 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 1998J.................................................................................................... 13

Hedgpeth v. Pulido,

555 U.S. 57, 61-62 (2008).......................................................................................................... 6,7

xii

Hertz Corp. v. Friend,

559 U.S. 77, 84-85(2010)............................................................................................................ 29

Hetzel v. Prince William County,

523 U.S. 208, 211 (1998).......................................

23,32

Hughes v. Rowe,

449 U.S. 5,6(1980)..................................................................................................................... 29

Hurley v. Atlantic City Police Dep’t,

174 F.3d 95, 126 (3d Cir. 1999).................................................................................................. 27

InnomedLabs., LLC v. Alza Corp.,

368 F.3d 148,154 (2d Cir. 2004)...................................................

Johnson v. Zerbst,

304 U.S. 458, 464(1938)................................................................................................................9

Keepseagle v. Perdue,

856 F.3d 1039, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 2017)............................................................................................ 9

Kern v. Levolor Lortenzen, Inc.,

899 F.2d 772, 790-92 (9th Cir. 1990)........................................................................................... 26

Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,

579 U.S. 136 S. Ct. 1979,195 L. Ed. 2d 368 (2016)................................................................... 29

xiii

Knapp v. Ernst & Whinney,

90 F.3d 1431, 1439 (9th Cir. 1996).............................................................................................. 26

Kontrick v. Ryan,

540 U.S. 443, 458 n.13 (2004)....................................................................................................... 9

Kotteakos v. United States,

328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946)...........................................................................................................9,23

Lawson v. Trowbridge,

153 F.3d 368, 375-76 (7th Cir. 1998).......................................................................................... 13

Linda Gray v. Genlyte Group, Inc.,

306 F.3d 1151,1157 (1st Cir. 2002)............................................................................................. 12

Loesel v. City ofFrankenmuth,

692 F.3d 452, 468 (6th Cir. 2012).............................................................................................. 27

Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,

517 U.S. 370,376 (1996)...............................

Maryland v. Baldwin,

112 U.S. 490, 493 (1884)....................................................................................... 1,7,17,18,19,25

McGrath v. Zenith Radio Corp.,

651 F.2d 458, 464 (7th Cir. 1981).............................................................................................. 26

xiv

Memphis Community School District v. Stachura,

477 U.S. 299, 312-13 (1986)........................................................................................................ 18

Monomoy Fisheries, Inc. v. Bruno & Stillman Yacht Co.,

625 F.2d 1034 (1st Cir. 1980)......................................................................

Muth v. Ford Motor Co.,

461 F.3d 557, 564-65 (5th Cir. 2006)........................................................................................... 27

Myron Ray Ely v. Earl Blevins, Cora Blevins, and R.F. Sturgill, Joe Anderson,

706 F.2d 479,483 (4th Cir. 1983)................................................................................................. 25

N. Am. Graphite Corp. v. Allan,

184 F.2d 387, 389 (D.C. Cir. 1950)............................................................................................. 28

Nelson v. Adams USA, Inc.,

529 U.S. 460 (2000)..................................................................................................................... 7

Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc.,

453 U.S. 247,256 (1981)..................................................................................................

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,

376 U.S. 254, 284 (1964).............................................................................................................. 18

Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC,

138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018)................................................................................................................. 29

Patterson v. County of Oneida,

375 F.3d 206,229 (2d Cir. 2004).................

Perkinson v. Gilbert/Robinson, Inc.,

821 F.2d 686 (D.C. Cir. 1987)...........................

Pernell v. Southall Realty,

416U.S.363 (1974).................................................................................................................. 31

Portland Feminist Women’s Health Center v. Advocates for Life, Inc.,

62 F.3d 280, 285-86 (9th Cir. 1995)............................................................................................ 26

Preferred RX, Inc. v. American Prescription Plan, Inc.,

46 F.3d 535 (6th Cir. 1995).......................................................................................................... 13

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.,

530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000)........................................................................................................... 31

Russell v. Plano Bank & Trust,

130 F.3d 715 (5th Cir. 1997)....................................................................................................... 13

Schmitz v. Canadian Pacific Railway Co.,

454 F.3d 678, 682-83 (7th Cir. 2006)........................................................................................ 20

SEC v. Jarkesy, 603 U.S.

(197(2024)...................................................................................................................................30

xvi

Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate Ins. Co.,

559 U.S. 393, 402-^03 (2010)................................................................................................ 14,29

Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941)................................................................................ 13

Skidmore v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co.,

167 F.2d 54, 60 (2d Cir. 1948)..................................................................................................... 19

Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co.,

228 U.S. 364 (1913)..................................................................................................................... 31

Smith v. Borough of Wilkinsburg,

147 F.3d 272, 277 (3d Cir. 1998)........................................................................................

Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan,

506 U.S. 447, 459-60 (1993)........................................................................................................ 18

Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Winckler & Smith Citrus Products Co.,

370 U.S. 19 (1962)

i,1,6,7,13,18,19,25

Surprenant v. Rivas,

424 F.3d 5 (1st Cir. 2005)............................................................................................................ 12

Thornley v. Penton Publishing, Inc.,

104 F.3d 26 (2d Cir. 1997)........................................................................................................... 14

Tire Eng’g & Distribution, LLC v. ShandongLinglongRubber Co., Ltd.,

xvii

682 F.3d 292, 314 (4th Cir. 2012)............................................................................................... 27

Tomka v. Seiler Corp.,

66 F.3d 1295,1308 (2d Cir. 1995).......................................................................................... ...20

Traver v. Meshriy,

627 F.2d 934 (9th Cir. 1980)....................................................................................................... 26

Tull v. United States,

481 U.S. 412, 417 (1987)....................................................................................................... 23,30

United New York & New Jersey Sandy Hook Pilots Ass'n v. Halecki,

358 U.S. 613,619(1959)........................................................................................................... 18

United States v. Olano,

507 U.S. 725, 731-34 (1993)............................................................................................... 9,10,11

United States v. $11,500.00 U.S. Currency,

869 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2017).................................................................................................... 11

Virtual Maintenance, Inc. v. Prime Computer, Inc.,

11 F.3d 660, 667 (6th Cir. 1993).................................................................................................. 27

Walden v. United States Steel Corp.,

759 F.2d 834, 838 (11th Cir. 1985).............................................................................................. 28

xviii

Wilmington Star Mining Co. v. Fulton,

205 U.S. 60, 78-79(1907)............................................................................................................ 18

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Page(s)

U.S. Const, amend. VII

1,1,3,6,7,17,23,29,30,31,33

STATUTES

Page(s)

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1)........................................................................................................................ 2

28 U.S.C. § 1331..................................................................................................... ■...................... 3

28 U.S.C. § 1367......................

42 U.S.C. § 1981.................................................................................................................. 3,4,5,20

28 U.S.C. §2072........................................................................................................................... 14

N.Y. C. Admin. Code § 8-107 et seq.....................................................................................4,5,20

N.Y. Exec. Law § 296 et seq................................................................................................. 4,5,20

xix

RULES

Page(s)

Fed. R. Civ. P. 46

Fed. R. Civ. P. 51

5,6,7,11,12,13,14,16,17,23,29,33

Fed. R. Civ. P. 51(d)(1)(B)

i,8,15,21,22

Fed. R. Civ. P. 51(c)

i,12

Fed. R. Civ. P. 51(d)(2)

Fed. R. Civ. P. 51(d)(1)(B) (2003)

12,13,14,15

Fed. R. Civ. P. 61

i,23

Sup. Ct. R. 10(a)

........................................................................... 6,16

Sup. Ct. R. 10(c)

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

David Axelrad & Loren Kraus, The Federal General Verdict Rule: Conflict

in the Courts of Appeal, 43 Fed. Law. 43 (June 1996)................................................................ 16

Edson R. Sunderland, Verdicts, General and Special, 29 Yale L.J. 253, 258 (1920)....................19

Elizabeth C. Moore, Note, General Verdicts in Multi-Claim Litigation, 21

Mem. St. U. L. Rev. 705, 732 (1991)............................................................................................16

Ryan P. Phair, Appellate Review of Multi-Claim General Verdicts: The Life

and Premature Death of the Baldwin Principle, 4 J. App. Prac. & Process 89 (2002)........... 24,26

Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2501 (3d ed. Apr. 2020).......................... 16,23

xxi

INTRODUCTION

This case presents recurring and important questions concerning Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

51, the General Verdict Rule, harmless-error review, and the Seventh Amendment's guarantee

that civil liability be determined by a properly instructed jury.

The district court refused petitioner's properly requested jury instructions on individual and

aiding-and-abetting liability despite evidentiary support, submitted a general verdict form

omitting those legal standards, and the Second Circuit affirmed after treating preserved Rule 51

objections as forfeited and applying a restrictive harmless-error analysis.

The decision below conflicts with this Court's General Verdict Rule, which holds that a general

verdict cannot stand where it may rest on an invalid or legally unsupported theory because a

reviewing court cannot determine the basis for the jury's decision. Maryland v. Baldwin, 112

U.S. 490, 493 (1884); Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Winckler & Smith Citrus Products Co., 370 U.S.

19, 29 (1962). The same principle applies when the jury is never instructed on an essential theory

of liability. As the Fifth Circuit recognized, a new trial is required where instructional error

creates substantial doubt that the jury was properly guided. Banc One Capital Partners Corp. v.

Kneipper, 67F.3d 1187, 1193 (5th Cir. 1995).

The petition should be granted.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

The petitioner, Mehmet Emin Tatas, respectfully petitions for a writ of certiorari to review the

judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in this case.

OPINIONS BELOW

The order of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denying Petitioner's

combined petition for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc is unreported and is reproduced at

Pet. App. Ila.

The summary order of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is unreported

and is reproduced at Pet. App. la.

The judgment and related rulings of the United States District Court for the Southern District of

New York are reproduced at Pet. App. 13a.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the United States Comt of Appeals for the Second Circuit was entered on

November 6, 2025. A timely petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc was denied on March

11,2026. On April 10, 2026, Justice Sotomayor extended the time to file a petition for a writ of

certiorari to and including August 10, 2026 App. Pet. 83a. This Court’s jurisdiction is invoked

under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1)

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in relevant part: “In Suits at

common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by

jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall.. .be otherwise re-examined in any Court

of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.” U.S. CONST. AMEND.

VII.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Background

As required by Supreme Court Rule 14.1 (g)(ii), the United States District Court for the Southern

District of New York had subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because Petitioner's

claims arose under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The district court also exercised supplemental jurisdiction

over Petitioner's state- and city-law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Petitioner Mehmet Emin Tatas is of Kurdish ethnicity and Turkish nationality. He was employed

by Respondent Ali Baba's Terrace, Inc. from 2011 until May 27, 2016.

During Petitioner's employment, Respondents Senol Bakir and Tolghan Subakan repeatedly

subjected him to discrimination and harassment because of his Kurdish race and national origin.

They repeatedly accused Petitioner of being affiliated with the Partiya Karkeren Kurdistane

("PKK") and used those accusations as part of a pattern of discriminatory harassment based on

his Kurdish identity.

On February 16,2016, Respondent Senol Bakir referred to Petitioner as a "Kurdo terrorist" and

an "traitor so he deserves to be killed," threatened Petitioner with a butcher knife, and was

restrained by other employees. Petitioner immediately reported the incident to Respondent Ali

Riza Dogan. Rather than investigating or disciplining Bakir, Dogan ordered Petitioner to leave

the workplace, threatened to kill him, physically assaulted and called him terrorist because his

son refused to serve Turkish army. Pet. App. 86a-90a, 109a-130a.

The following day, February 17, 2016, Dogan again accused Petitioner of supporting the PKK

and directed him to remove certain Facebook posts because he did not want others to believe the

restaurant supported the organization. Although Petitioner denied that the posts referenced the

PKK, Dogan physically assaulted Petitioner and slapped him in the face. Pet. App. 9la-130a.

Respondents terminated Petitioner's employment on May 27, 2016. Following the termination,

Dogan again called Petitioner a terrorist and physically assaulted him by kicking him three times.

B. Proceedings Below

Petitioner commenced this action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of

New York asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the New York State Human Rights Law

("NYSHRL"), N.Y. Exec. Law § 296 et seq., and the New York City Human Rights Law

("NYCHRL"), N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107 et seq. Petitioner alleged discrimination, hostile

work environment, retaliation, individual liability, and aiding-and-abetting liability against the

individual Respondents. He also asserted state-law claims for assault and battery against

Respondent Dogan.

A jury trial was conducted from April 1 through April 9, 2024. The jury returned a verdict for

Respondents on Petitioner's discrimination, hostile-work-environment, retaliation, and related

statutory claims. The jury found in Petitioner's favor on his assault and battery claim against

Dogan and awarded $2,500 in compensatory damages and $1 in punitive damages. The jury also

rejected Respondents' counterclaim alleging breach of contract based on an alleged impaid loan.

Pet. App. 13a.Before the case was submitted to the jury, Petitioner requested jury instructions

defining the governing legal standards for individual liability and aiding-and-abetting liability

under § 1981, the NYSHRL, and the NYCHRL, as well as the governing standards applicable to

his hostile-work-environment and retaliation claims. The district court denied those requested

instructions but nevertheless submitted those theories to the jury through a general verdict form

identifying the individual defendants. As a result, the jury was asked to determine the liability of

the individual defendants without being instructed on the governing legal standards governing

those claims. Petitioner preserved his objections under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 51.

On appeal, Petitioner argued that the district court's refusal to instruct the jury on the governing

legal standards constituted reversible error. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second

Circuit nevertheless held that Petitioner's objections had been forfeited and affirmed the

judgment, reasoning that the verdict form sufficiently presented the liability questions and that

the omission of the requested instructions did not warrant a new trial. Pet. App. 7a-8a, Ila.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

This Court should grant review to resolve a deep and acknowledged conflict among the courts of

appeals regarding the proper application of harmless-error review to alternative-theory errors,

particularly where the invalid theory is legally rather than factually defective. See U.S. Sup. Ct.

R. 10(a). The decision below also presents an important question concerning the Seventh

Amendment's guarantee that liability be determined by a properly instructed jury. See U.S. Sup.

Ct. R. 10(c). By treating a general confirmation of jury instructions as a forfeiture of specific,

previously contested instructional objections and then deeming the resulting error harmless, the

Second Circuit adopted a rule that departs from accepted judicial proceedings and conflicts with

decisions of other courts of appeals. This case presents an ideal vehicle for clarifying both the

standards governing forfeiture and waiver under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 51 and the

application of Hedgpeth v. Pulido, 555 U.S. 57 (2008), to alternative-theory instructional errors.

For the reasons set forth below, certiorari should be granted.

The Second Circuit’s decision conflicts with other courts of appeals on two recurring questions

of exceptional importance governing civil jury trials.

First, the panel held that Petitioner’s challenge to the omission of individual-liability instructions

was forfeited because counsel later gave a general confirmation of the jury charge, even though

counsel had previously requested the omitted instructions and the district court had definitively

rejected that request. Pet. App. 7a-8a. That approach conflicts with decisions holding that a

timely and specific Rule 51 request remains preserved once the district court has definitively

ruled on the issue and does not require counsel to repeat the objection to avoid forfeiture. It also

conflicts with this Court’s preservation principles recognizing that an issue remains preserved

after the trial court has conclusively rejected the requested instruction. See Sunkist Growers, Inc.

v. Winckler & Smith Citrus Prods. Co., 370 U.S. 19 (1962). The conflict has produced

inconsistent standards governing preservation of instructional error and appellate review of civil

jury verdicts throughout the federal courts.

Second, the panel held that the omission of essential liability instructions was harmless because

the verdict form identified the individual defendants. In doing so, it permitted affirmance of a

general verdict despite the absence of legal instructions defining the standards governing

individual liability. That approach conflicts with decisions applying this Court’s General Verdict

Rule, which prohibits affirmance of a general verdict when it is impossible to determine whether

the jury relied upon a legally erroneous theory. Rather than applying the General Verdict Rule

established by Baldwin and Sunkist, the decision below employed a harmless-error analysis to

uphold the verdict despite omitted liability instructions. The decision also departs from the dueprocess and jury-trial principles recognized in Nelson v. Adams USA, Inc., 529 U.S. 460 (2000),

and presents the broader question whether Hedgpeth permits affirmance where the omitted issue

concerns the legal standards governing liability itself rather than merely the sufficiency of the

evidence supporting a particular theory.

Finally, the decision below implicates the Seventh Amendment itself. The constitutional right to

trial by jury preserves not merely the submission of factual disputes to a jury, but the jury’s

determination of those disputes under correct legal instructions. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S.

189, 194 (1974); Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376 (1996). By allowing

a general verdict to stand after essential liability instructions were omitted and Petitioner’s

preserved objections were deemed forfeited, the court of appeals effectively permitted appellate

review to substitute for the jury’s constitutionally assigned role. This Court’s intervention is

warranted to restore uniformity in the application of Rule 51, the General Verdict Rule, and the

Seventh Amendment.

The Court of Appeals Improperly Treated a Preserved Rule 51 Objection as

Forfeited and Affirmed Through Appellate Substitution of a Verdict Form for

Missing Legal Instructions

The Second Circuit held that Petitioner "forfeited" his objection to the omission of individual

liability instructions even though the district court had twice definitively rejected the requested

instruction on the merits, and even though the court of appeals acknowledged that counsel

"raised the issue of amending the jury instructions to include instructions on individual liability."

Pet. App. 7a-8a. That holding cannot be reconciled with the plain text of Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 51(d)(1)(B), this Court's preservation precedents, the Second Circuit's own established

decisions, or the consensus approach of the overwhelming majority of federal circuits.

Rule 51(d)(1)(B) expressly excuses a party from lodging a post-charge objection when "the court

made a definitive ruling on the record rejecting the request." Here, the district court did exactly

that. During the charge conference, counsel specifically requested instructions governing

individual liability. The court twice rejected the request on the merits: "I am not going to make

that change. "Pet. App. 70a-71a. Under the plain text of Rule 51(d)(1)(B), no further objection

was required. Repetition would have been futile.

The panel nevertheless deemed the objection forfeited because, after the court had moved on to

other topics, counsel stated she was "good" with the instructions and confirmed there were "no

other edits for the rest" of the enumerated subsections. Pet. App. 72a. Properly understood in

context, however, this was not a withdrawal of the objection. The "good" response occurred after

the court had already definitively ruled on individual liability and turned to formatting and

sequencing questions about unrelated subsections. Counsel's statement addressed only those

discrete, listed items—not the previously rejected and closed issue of individual-liability

instructions.

A litigant cannot relinquish a right that the court has already definitively denied. The Supreme

Court established in United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993), that "waiver is different

from forfeiture," explaining that "whereas forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of

a right, waiver is the 'intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.'" Id. (quoting

Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,464 (1938)). The Supreme Court further clarified this

distinction in Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 458 n.13 (2004), confirming that "forfeiture is the

failure to make the timely assertion of a right" while "waiver is the intentional relinquishment or

abandonment of a known right," and that the two concepts carry different consequences for

appellate review. Because waiver requires the intentional relinquishment of a known right, a

litigant cannot waive a right that the court has already denied, as no such "known right" remains

available for relinquishment.

This principle is uniformly recognized across the federal courts of appeals. The District of

Columbia Circuit held that "waiver of a right is distinct from forfeiture of a right," with the latter

being merely the "failure to make the timely assertion of a right." Keepseagle v. Perdue, 856

F.3d 1039, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 2017). This distinction is well-established in civil cases across

circuits. See, e.g., Gerber v. Riordan, 649 F.3d 514, 530 n.l (6th Cir. 2011) (Sutton, J.,

concurring) (recognizing in a civil case that "waiver is different from forfeiture" and that

"whereas forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right, waiver is the intentional

relinquishment or abandonment of a known right").

Moreover, where the record confirms that counsel never withdrew the objection or acquiesced in

the omission, neither waiver nor forfeiture applies. As the Supreme Court has explained, because

waivers require the intentional relinquishment of a known right, no waiver can occur where

counsel did not knowingly abandon a properly preserved objection. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 733.

Where, as here, the record demonstrates that counsel pressed the objection, secured a definitive

ruling, and never affirmatively withdrew it, the objection remains preserved, not forfeited. These

principles collectively confirm that a litigant cannot waive a right the court has already

definitively denied, and where counsel never withdrew an objection, the right is neither waived

nor forfeited.

Indeed, after the court’s definitive ruling, counsel immediately continued to litigate other

instructions, expressly linking the assault instruction to the hostile-work-environment theory

involving the individual defendants. The court agreed to that request, stating: "Generally

speaking, a court should include an instruction if it is requested and if there is a basis for it in

the evidence. There is a basis for assault in the evidence. "Pet. App. 73a. Counsel also objected

to the "litigation stress" damages instruction, Pet. App. 75a, and critiqued the wording of the

damages charge, Pet. App. 76a. That continued engagement confirms that counsel remained in

an adversarial posture and did not treat the charge conference as a wholesale endorsement of the

court's rulings.

Most tellingly, the charge conference concluded with this exchange:

COUNSEL: "Then we will be back on appeal." THE COURT: "Ithink that's right. "Pet. App.

78a.

This colloquy is a mutual acknowledgment that the instructional disputes—including the

individual-liability objection—were live, preserved, and unresolved. It forecloses any inference

that counsel intentionally relinquished a known right, which is the touchstone of forfeiture.

The distinction between preserved and forfeited error is therefore outcome-determinative. While

preserved errors are subject to de novo review and require reversal unless harmless, forfeited

errors receive only plain-error review. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731—34 (1993)

(distinguishing preserved error, forfeiture, and waiver); see also United States v. $11,500.00 in

U.S. Currency, 869 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2017) ("Nevertheless, under Rule 51(d)(2). By

treating this preserved objection as forfeited, the panel subjected Petitioner's instructional

challenge to plain-error review rather than de novo review, substantially altering the standard of

review and the likely outcome. See InnomedLabs., LLC v. Alza Corp., 368 F.3d 148, 154 (2d

Cir. 2004).

II.

The Decision Below Deepens an Active Inter-circuit Conflict Concerning Rule 51

Preservation and the Futility Principle

The decision below implicates a recurring and important division among the federal courts of

appeals concerning the preservation of jury-instruction objections under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 51. The question presented is whether a party forfeits a previously preserved objection

after the trial court has specifically considered and definitively rejected the requested instruction

merely because counsel later engaged in generalized procedural cooperation following the

charge.

Historically, the courts of appeals developed two competing approaches to Rule 51 preservation.

The First Circuit adopted a strict, formalistic approach requiring renewed objections after the

jury charge notwithstanding an earlier adverse ruling. See Bouley v. Continental Oil Co., 454

F.2d 85, 88 (1st Cir. 1972); Monomoy Fisheries, Inc. v. Bruno & Stillman Yacht Co., 625 F.2d

1034 (1st Cir. 1980), and Foley v. Commonwealth Electric Co., 312 F.3d 517(1 st Cir. 20Q2).

The First Circuit has continued to apply a stricter preservation approach after the 2003

amendments, creating continuing tension with Rule 51(c) (2)(B) and the functional uproar

adopted elsewhere in civil cases, continuing to apply Bouley and Foley. That refusal to follow

the 2003 amendment creates the split. See Surprenant v. Rivas, 424 F.3d 5 (1st Cir. 2005).The

First Circuit confirmed that "Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 51 prescribes a method for

preserving objections to jury instructions. Under this method, the trial court must inform the

parties of its proposed instructions, consider requested instructions, and take objections before

charging jury... A party's failure to adhere to the protocol specified in Rule 51 constitutes a

forfeiture and limits appellate review to plain error." This directly validates the formalistic

requirement that parties must strictly comply with Rule 51 's timeline and method.

By contrast, the overwhelming majority of circuits adopted a functional approach recognizing

that, once a party clearly requests an instruction and the trial court definitively rejects it, further

objection serves no practical purpose because repetition would be futile or merely formalistic.

Existence of this conflict has been explicitly recognized by federal courts themselves. In Linda

Gray v. Genlyte Group, Inc.,306 F.3d 1151, 1157 n. 11 (1st Cir. 2002), Judge Gertner, sitting by

designation, surveyed the federal circuits and observed that the Second through Eleventh Circuits

and the District of Columbia Circuit had, to varying degrees, recognized that objections need not

be mechanically restated where further objection would amount to little more than a formality.

Consistent with that understanding, numerous circuits have held that preservation is fully

satisfied when a party clearly presents a requested instruction, the trial court fully considers the

request, and the court definitively rejects it on the record. Under those decisions, a litigant need

not engage in ritualistic, post-charge repetition merely to preserve an issue already conclusively

decided by the court. See Smith v. Borough of Wilkinsburg, 147 F.3d 272 (3d Cir. 1998);

Eberhardt v. Integrated Design & Constr., Inc., 161 F.3d 861 (4th Cir. 1999); Russell v. Plano

Bank & Trust, 130 F.3d 715 (5th Cir. 1997); PreferredRX, Inc. v. American Prescription Plan,

Inc., 46 F.3d 535 (6th Cir. 1995); Lawson v. Trowbridge, 153 F.3d 368 (7th Cir. 1998); Brown v.

Sandals Resorts Int’l, 284 F.3d 949 (8th Cir. 2002); Gulliford v. Pierce County, 136 F.3d 1345

(9th Cir. 1998); Gunnell v. Utah Valley State College, 152 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 1998); Farley v.

Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 197 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. \999fPerkinson v.

Gilbert/Robinson, Inc., 821 F.2d 686 (D.C. Cir. 1987).

This functional approach is directly supported by this Court’s foundational precedent in Sunkist

Growers, Inc. v. Winckler & Smith Citrus Products Co., 370 U.S. 19, 27 (1962), (which held that

objections were preserved where counsel objected before the charge, the trial court consistently

ruled adversely, and subsequent acquiescence in the final layout of additional instructions did not

constitute a forfeiture of the core legal claim.)

The appellate landscape before the 2003 amendments to Rule 51, courts of appeals broadly

recognized that objections need not be endlessly renewed following a definitive adverse ruling.

That pragmatic approach remains reflected in the jurisprudence of numerous federal circuits

recognizing some form of futility principle or equivalent preservation doctrine.

Once effective, however, these rules have the full force of federal law. The Supreme Court held

in Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941), that Federal Rules promulgated under the Rules

Enabling Act "have the force of a federal statute. The Court reaffirmed in Shady Grove

Orthopedic Associates, P.A. V. Allstate Insurance Co., 559 U.S. 393 (2010), that rules adopted in

compliance with 28 U.S.C. § 2072 are "valid in all jurisdictions, with respect to all claims. So to

summarize: The 2003 amendments to Rule 51 are procedural rules prescribed by the Supreme

Court under congressionally delegated authority, which upon taking effect possess the binding

force of federal law throughout the federal courts.

The decision below departs from these established preservation principles and misapplies Rule

51. The Second Circuit adopted a hyper-formalistic rule under which routine courtroom

cooperation retroactively extinguishes a previously asserted, specifically requested, and

definitively rejected objection.

Petitioner expressly requested individual-liability instructions on the record, and the district court

unequivocally rejected those requests, stating: “lam not going to make that change. ” Under the

prevailing approach followed by the overwhelming majority of circuits, Petitioner's objection

was complete and preserved at that point because any further post-charge repetition would have

been futile.

The decision below cannot be reconciled with that prevailing approach, nor can it be reconciled

with the Second Circuit’s own traditional precedent in Thornley v. Penton Publishing, Inc., 104

F.3d 26 (2d Cir. 1997). Under Thornley, preservation is complete once the trial court has fully

considered and definitively rejected a party's position. Nevertheless, the panel held that

Petitioner's instructional challenge was forfeited because counsel later engaged in routine

cooperation concerning the final charge. By treating that generalized statement as a retroactive

waiver of a specific, rejected objection, the panel adopted a mechanistic preservation rule that

conflicts with the functional approach followed by other circuits.

Through this reasoning, the panel converted a preserved instructional challenge into a forfeited

claim subject only to the demanding plain-error standard of review. In doing so, the panel

effectively resurrected a brand of rigid, technical strict compliance that the 2003 amendments to

Rule 51—specifically the addition of the "definitive ruling" safe harbor under Rule

51 (c)(2)(B)—were explicitly designed to abolish.

This intra-circuit disruption reflects a broader inter-circuit conflict. When an appellate panel

departs from these preservation principles, the consequences for litigants are substantial.

Whether a litigant receives preserved-error review or the more demanding plain-error standard

depends on materially different preservation rules among the circuits. Litigants who fully litigate

requested instructions and obtain definitive rulings may nevertheless lose meaningful appellate

review in some jurisdictions based solely on later statements of procedural courtesy that other

circuits treat as legally insignificant.

This entrenched division among the federal circuits demonstrates that the courts of appeals

continue to apply materially different preservation standards despite the 2003 amendments to

Rule 51(d)(1)(B). The Rule was amended to codify the pragmatic futility principle that law and

procedure should not require pointless formalities. Circuits recognizing that principle faithfully

apply the Rule's text and purpose. Those rejecting or unduly narrowing the definitive-ruling

exception have departed from the accepted and usual course ofjudicial proceedings, creating

uncertainty for litigants and district courts.

The question presented concerns the governing preservation standard under Rule 51 and directly

affects federal civil litigation nationwide, regardless of the publication status of the decision

below. Litigants face conflicting procedural requirements, creating uncertainty over when a trial

objection is preserved. This Court's review is warranted under Rule 10(a) to resolve this conflict,

clarify the scope of a definitive adverse ruling under Rule 51, and restore nationwide uniformity

to this vital component of federal trial practice.

III.

Application Of The General Verdict Rule Presents An Exceptionally Important

Question of Post-Trial Procedure

The first question also warrants review because it presents an issue of exceptional nationwide

importance. “Whether an appellate court applies the correct or incorrect standard for reviewing a

general verdict may determine whether the judgment is affirmed or reversed and can affect the

outcome of an appeal more dramatically and fundamentally than virtually any other rule applied

in the course of the litigation.” Axelrad & Kraus, supra at 43; see also id. at 43-44 (“The problem

presented by the Second Circuit’s general verdict rule is of considerable importance. . . .At some

point, the Supreme Court should intervene and articulate a clear standard to guide the lower

courts’ implementation of this fundamental rule of federal procedure.”).

That every circuit has addressed this issue, often many times, demonstrates how frequently it

recurs. Rarely has a legal issue resulted in the circuits applying five conflicting rules. See

Elizabeth C. Moore, Note, General Verdicts in Multi-Claim Litigation, 21 Mem. St. U. L. Rev.

705, 732 (1991) (“Given this uncertainty among the circuits, the Supreme Court should resolve

this question ....”). Indeed, the majority of federal civil cases are decided by means of general

verdicts. See Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2501 (3d ed. Apr. 2020) (“Most

jury-tried civil cases in federal courts are resolved, and always have been, by a general

verdictf.]”). The federal rules’ permissive approach to joinder means that trials often involve

multiple claims for relief. The issue occurs especially frequently in civil cases because plaintiffs

often assert multiple claims. See City ofLos Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 106 S. Ct. 1571

(1986). Further, some portion of cases is very often vacated after trial or reversed on appeal.

The Decision Below Conflicts With This Court’s Precedent

This Court has long held that a general verdict cannot stand when one of the legal theories

submitted to the jury is erroneous or legally unsupported because a reviewing court cannot

determine the ground upon which the jury actually relied. Maryland v. Baldwin, 112 U.S. 490,

493 (1884). As Baldwin explained:

"[The verdict's] generality prevents us from perceiving upon which plea they found. If, therefore,

upon any one issue error was committed, either in the admission of evidence or the charge of the

court, the verdict cannot be upheld."

The general verdict rule is premised on the principle that only the jurors who rendered a verdict

understand the reasons behind it. Once one of the grounds upon which the jury could have relied

is rejected after trial, “it is impossible to know, in view of the general verdict returned whether

the jury-imposed liability on a permissible or an impermissible ground[.]” Exxon Shipping Co. v.

Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 482 n.3 (2008) (quoting Greenbelt Coop. Publ’gAss'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S.

6, 11 (1970)). Respect for the role of the jury under the Seventh Amendment thus dictates that

“the judgment be reversed and the case remanded.” Id. (quoting Greenbelt Coop. Publ’gAss’n,

398 U.S. at 482 n.3))

In the 142 years since Baldwin, this Court has repeatedly reaffirmed the general verdict rule in

civil cases. See, e.g., Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 459-60 (1993) (reversing

where general “verdict did not negate the possibility that [it] rested on” invalidated ground); City

of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver. Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 384 (1991) (“The jury’s general verdict

... cannot be permitted to stand (since it was based on instructions that erroneously permitted

liability ...).”); Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 312-13 (1986) (where “the

verdict does not reveal the means by which the jury calculated damages,” an error in one theory

supporting the verdict “‘is difficult, if not impossible, to correct without retrial, in light of the

jury’s general verdict’”) (quoting Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 256 n.12

(1981)); Greenbelt Coop. Publ’gAss’n, 398 U.S. at 11 (“[W]hen ‘it is impossible to know, in

view of the general verdict returned,’ whether the jury imposed liability on a permissible or an

impermissible ground, ‘the judgment must be reversed and the case remanded.’” (quoting New

York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 284 (1964)); New York Times, 376 U.S. at 284

(reversal of punitive damages award required vacatur of damages judgment, which did not

differentiate between punitive and compensatory damages);

Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Winckler & Smith Citrus Prods. Co., 370 U.S. 19, 29-30 (1962)

(reversing “one theory of liability upon which [] general verdict may have rested” and finding it

“unnecessary ... to explore the legality of the other theories” as a result); United New York &

New Jersey Sandy Hook Pilots Ass ’n v. Halecki, 358 U.S. 613, 619 (1959) (“a new trial will be

required, for there is no way to know that the invalid claim... was not the sole basis for the

verdict”); Wilmington Star Mining Co. v. Fulton, 205 U.S. 60, 78-79 (1907) (reversing general

verdict, reasoning it was “impossible to say that prejudicial effort did not result” even though no

evidence had been introduced to support the inadequate claims).

This Court has never held that harmless-error review permits affirmance where a reviewing court

cannot determine whether a general verdict rested on a legally valid theory. To the contrary, this

Court has stated that, “when it is impossible to know, in view of the general verdict returned

whether the jury-imposed liability on a permissible or an impermissible ground, the judgment

must be reversed and the case remanded.” Exxon Shipping, 554 U.S. at 482 n.3 (quoting

Greenbelt Coop. Publ’gAss ’n, 398 U.S. at 11 (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis

added)).

That principle applies equally to cases involving general verdicts premised in part on claims later

determined to be legally invalid. “No one but the jurors can tell what was put into it and the

jurors will not be heard to say. The general verdict is as inscrutable and essentially mysterious as

the judgment which issued from the ancient oracle of Delphi. ” Skidmore v. Baltimore & Ohio

R.R. Co., 167 F.2d 54, 60 (2d Cir. 1948) (quoting Edson R. Sunderland, Verdicts, General and

Special, 29 Yale L.J. 253, 258 (1920)).

The principle recognized in Baldwin applies with particular force here. Baldwin held that a

general verdict could not stand where an error on one of the issues submitted to the jury made it

impossible to determine the ground on which the jury relied. 112 U.S. at 493. This Court has

repeatedly applied that principle where a general verdict may have rested on an impermissible

legal ground. See, e.g., Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Winckler & Smith Citrus Prods. Co., 370 U.S.

19, 29-30 (1962); Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471,482 n.3 (2008). Here, the problem

arose at an earlier stage: the jury was not instructed on an essential legal theory of liability at all.

The resulting general verdict therefore does not reveal whether the jury rejected Petitioner’s

claims under the governing legal standards or never considered those theories under the

standards applicable to them. The problem intensifies when essential instructions are omitted.

This Court has likewise recognized that erroneous jury instructions are presumptively prejudicial

and warrant reversal unless the record affirmatively demonstrates harmlessness. Fillippon v.

Albion Vein Slate Co., 250 U.S. 76, 81-82 (1919). Consistent with that principle, the Court has

never recognized a harmless-error exception permitting appellate courts to uphold a general

verdict where it is impossible to determine whether the jury relied upon a legally valid theory.

See Exxon Shipping, 554 U.S. at 482 n.3; Greenbelt, 398 U.S. at 11.

The decision below departed from those settled principles.

The district court refused Petitioner's requested instructions defining the governing standards for

individual liability and aiding-and-abetting liability under § 1981, the NYSHRL, and the

NYCHRL, despite evidentiary support in the record and despite Second Circuit precedent

recognizing those theories of liability. See Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 158 (2d Cir.

2004); Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1308 (2d Cir. 1995); Patterson v. County of Oneida,

375 F.3d 206, 229 (2d Cir. 2004); Boonmalert v. City ofNew York, 721 Fed.Appx. 29, 34 (2d

Cir. 2018). Nor did the district court instruct the jury on the governing legal framework for

employer retaliation. Pet. App. 32a - 40a. Instead, the jury received only a general verdict form

identifying the individual defendants without any accompanying instruction explaining the

governing legal standards. Pet. App. 18a - 20a.

Although a verdict form is considered together with the jury charge, it cannot substitute for legal

instructions defining essential liability standards. See Schmitz v. Canadian Pacific Railway Co.,

454 F.3d 678, 682-83 (7th Cir. 2006). The court of appeals held that the verdict form cured the

omitted instructions and that Petitioner's Rule 51 objections were forfeited by counsel's later

approval of the remaining charge. Pet. App. 7a-8a.

Rule 51, construed in light of Rule 46’s discouragement of formality in procedures, does not

require formal objections, but the Rule is satisfied only if it is clear that the judge was made

aware of the possible error.” Gradsky v. Sperry Rand Corp., 489 F.2d 502, 506 (6th Cir. 1973)..

This functional approach is codified directly within the civil rules, which excuse a party's failure

to object on the record post-charge where "the court made a definitive ruling on the record

rejecting the request." Fed. R. Civ. P. 51(d)(1)(B).

That reasoning conflicts with this Court's General Verdict Rule. The relevant question is not

whether the verdict form identified the individual defendants, but whether the jury was instructed

on the governing legal standards. Because the jury received no such instructions, a reviewing

court cannot determine whether it rejected Petitioner's claims on the facts or simply lacked the

legal framework to evaluate them. The verdict therefore cannot reliably support appellate

affirmance.

Nor is this a case involving insufficient evidence or a request that this Court reweigh the jury’s

factual determinations. Respondents may attempt to characterize this case as a dispute over the

weight of the evidence. It is not. The sufficiency of the evidence is not presented. Rather, the

evidentiary record is relevant only because it demonstrates that Petitioner’s requested

instructions concerned viable, legally recognized theories of liability that were supported by trial

evidence, thereby making the instructional error consequential rather than hypothetical.

Respondents stipulated to the authenticity of Petitioner’s audio recordings and to the accuracy of

their English translations. Pet. App. 69a. Those recordings, together with corroborating witness

testimony, directly supported Petitioner’s theories that the individual defendants personally

participated in the alleged discrimination, hostile work environment, retaliation, and assault. Pet.

App. 86a-108a. Indeed, the jury found one individual defendant liable for assault Pet. App. 20a

- 22a, confirming that the record contained evidence of individual misconduct.

The issue, therefore, is not whether the evidence was sufficient to support Petitioner’s claims,

nor whether the jury should have reached a different factual verdict. The issue is whether the jury

could properly evaluate Petitioner’s legally recognized theories of liability after the district court

refused to instruct it on the governing legal standards and the court of appeals nevertheless

affirmed based on a general verdict form while reviewing the preserved instructional challenge

only for plain error. The questions presented are purely legal and concern the proper

interpretation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 51(d)(1)(B), the effect of a definitive adverse

ruling on preservation ofjury-instruction objections, and the permissible scope of appellate

review of general verdicts returned without essential liability instructions. These omissions

materially affected Petitioner's ability to obtain jury consideration of his theories that the

individual defendants personally participated in discrimination, hostile-work-environment

conduct, and retaliation, and that Respondents' asserted justification for termination was

pretextual. The omission fundamentally altered the legal framework through which the jury

evaluated the evidence and effectively withdrew recognized theories of liability from the jury's

informed deliberations.

Nor can the error be dismissed as harmless. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 61 requires

reviewing courts to assess the probable effect of the error in light of the entire record, not merely

whether the appellate court believes the verdict was correct. As Wright & Miller explain, "error

cannot be regarded as harmless merely because the trial judge or the appellate court thinks that

the result reached is correct." See also Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946)

(error is harmless only when the reviewing court can say, "with fair assurance," that the

judgment was not substantially swayed by the error).

This defect transcends ordinary instructional error. By permitting affirmance of a verdict

rendered without instructions defining essential liability standards, the decision below impaired

Petitioner's right to have liability determined by a properly instructed jury and diminished the

jury's historic constitutional function. See Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417 (1987); Hetzel

v. Prince William County, 523 U.S. 208 (1998). When atrial court omits essential liability

instructions and the jury returns only a general verdict, an appellate court cannot reconstruct or

"divine" the jury's reasoning without usurping the jury's constitutionally assigned role.

The decision below therefore presents an exceptionally important and recurring question

concerning the interaction between Rule 51, harmless-error review, the General Verdict Rule,

and the Seventh Amendment. By permitting appellate courts to uphold general verdicts despite

omitted liability instructions and by treating preserved objections as forfeited, the decision

threatens the constitutional guarantee that liability be determined by a properly instructed jury.

Certiorari is warranted.

The Circuits Are Deeply Divided On Application Of The General Verdict Rule

The courts of appeals are deeply divided over whether a general verdict may be sustained when

the jury was permitted to decide liability without being instructed on an essential legal theory.

Some circuits faithfully apply this Court's General Verdict Rule and require a new trial whenever

a reviewing court cannot determine whether the verdict rested on a legally valid ground. Others

have recognized varying harmless-error exceptions that permit affirmance despite uncertainty

concerning the legal basis of the jury's verdict. As one commentator observed, the lower courts'

approaches are "highly inconsistent in their reasoning." Ryan P. Phair, Appellate Review of

Multi-Claim General Verdicts: The Life and Premature Death of the Baldwin Principle, 4 J. App.

Prac. & Process 89, 111 (2002).

This case squarely conflicts with this Court's General Verdict Rule. The district court refused

Petitioner's requested instructions defining the standards for individual and aiding-and-abetting

liability, despite evidentiary support. Instead, those theories went to the jury only through a

general verdict form listing the individual defendants, without legal instructions. The court of

appeals affirmed reasoning that the verdict form alone permitted the jury to find the individual

defendants liable.

That reasoning departs from the rule followed by numerous courts of appeals. A verdict form

identifies the questions submitted to the jury; it does not instruct on the governing legal

standards. When essential liability instructions are omitted, a court’s reviewing cannot determine

whether the jury rejected the claims on the facts or lacked the legal framework to decide them.

By allowing the verdict form to substitute for omitted instructions instead of requiring a new

trial, the decision deepens the circuit conflict over the General Verdict Rule and harmless-error

review in civil jury trials.

The General Verdict Rule rests on a single principle: a reviewing court must be able to determine

that the jury found liability under a legally valid theory. Sunkist Growers, 370 U.S. at 29;

Marylandv. Baldwin, 112 U.S. 490, 493 (1884). That principle is violated not only when the jury

is instructed on a legally invalid theory, but also when the jury is asked to decide a recognized

theory of liability without being instructed on the governing legal standards. In either

circumstance, the general verdict prevents a reviewing court from determining whether the jury's

decision rested on a legally valid basis. As the Fourth Circuit observed, a verdict cannot stand

when it is impossible to know whether "the jurors did not take the wrong route." Myron Ray Ely

v. Earl Blevins, 706 F.2d 479,483 (4th Cir. 1983). Here, the district court submitted Petitioner's

individual-liability and aiding-and-abetting claims to the jury through a general verdict form

while refusing to instruct the jury on the governing legal standards, and the court of appeals

affirmed on the ground that the verdict form itself was sufficient. The resulting uncertainty is the

same as in this Court's general-verdict cases: no reviewing court can determine whether the jury

rejected Petitioner's claims on the facts or instead lacked the legal framework necessary to

evaluate them. Other circuits have adopted materially different approaches when reviewing

general verdicts affected by instructional error, underscoring the need for this Court to clarify

whether the general-verdict rule applies when essential legal instructions are omitted. Other

circuits have adopted materially different approaches when reviewing general verdicts affected

by instructional error. For example, the Ninth Circuit evaluates whether a new trial is required

by considering factors including: (1) the potential for jury confusion; (2) whether the prevailing

party's defenses apply equally to the remaining theories; (3) the strength of the evidence

supporting the theory that remains available; and (4) the extent to which the factual issues

overlap among the various legal theories. The Second Circuit's decision below did not undertake

that analysis but instead affirmed on the ground that the verdict form itself cured the omission of

the requested liability instructions, thereby presenting an important and recurring question

concerning the proper application of the General Verdict Rule. Portland Feminist Women’s

Health Center v. Advocates for Life, Inc., 62 F.3d 280, 285-86 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Traver v.

Meshriy, 627 F.2d 934 (9th Cir. 1980). When the Ninth Circuit announced this test in Traver, it

cited no relevant precedent from this Court. Unsurprisingly, the rule has been “controversial

from the start.” Phair, supra at 103. It has been criticized from within the Ninth Circuit as

contrary to this Court’s precedent, see Kern v. Levolor Lortenzen, Inc., 899 F.2d 772, 790-92

(9th Cir. 1990) (Kozinski, J., dissenting), and been “the target of vigorous and persuasive

criticism,” Knapp v. Ernst & Whinney, 90 F.3d 1431, 1439 (9th Cir. 1996). The Seventh Circuit

also imposes its own unique gloss on the general verdict rule. The Seventh Circuit places the

burden on the party seeking a new trial to show the absence of harmless error. See McGrath v.

Zenith Radio Corp., 651 F.2d 458, 464 (7th Cir. 1981) (jury verdict upheld unless defendant can

“show that under none of the [charged] rationales was plaintiff entitled to the award of...

damages”). This is “a maverick rule precisely the opposite of that repeatedly announced by the

Supreme Court,... makes no sense at all, never mind that it contravenes Supreme Court

authority,” Kern v. Levolor Lortenzen, Inc., 899 F.2d 772, 790—92 (9th Cir. 1990) (Kozinski, J.,

dissenting).

The Tenth and Third Circuits have adopted a narrower harmless error rule that applies only when

it is perfectly clear that the verdict did not rest on the invalid theory. See, e.g., Anixter v. Home-

Stake Prod. Co., 77 F.3d 1215, 1229-31 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that even “remote” chance that

jury was influenced by erroneous legal instruction compels remand under general verdict rule);

Farrell v. Klein Tools, Inc., 866 F.2d 1294, 1300-01 (10th Cir. 1989) (requiring a new trial in the

absence of “absolute certainty” that the invalid claim did not influence the verdict); Hurley v. All.

City Police Dep’t, 174 F.3d 95, 122 (3d Cir. 1999) (the general verdict may stand only where the

invalid theory “could not by any stretch of the imagination change the verdict”), abrogated on

other grounds by. This rule has been criticized as “contrary to precedent and exceedingly

unwise.” Hurley v. Atlantic City Police Dep't, 174 F.3d 126, 132 (3d Cir. 1999) (Cowen, J.,

concurring in part and dissenting in part).

The First, Second, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits apply a less stringent harmless error analysis. Those

courts affirm the judgment when they are “sufficiently confident” or “reasonably sure” that the

verdict was not affected by the invalid claim. See Chowdhury v. Worldtel Bangladesh Holding,

Ltd., 746 F.3d 42, 50 (2d Cir. 2014) (applying “sufficiently confident” standard); Davis v.

Rennie, 264 F.3d86, 106 (1st Cir. 2001) (applying “reasonably certain” standard); Tire Eng’g &

Distribution, LLC v. Shandong Linglong Rubber Co., Ltd., 682 F.3d 292, 314 (4th Cir. 2012)

(similar); Muth v. Ford Motor Co., 461 F.3d 557, 564-65 (5th Cir. 2006) (similar). Rather than

being a narrow exception to the general verdict rule, these courts “have generously applied the

harmless error concept to rescue verdicts.” Gillespie v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 386 F.3d 21, 30

(1st Cir. 2004).

The Sixth, Eighth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits, in contrast, apply this Court’s rule of automatic

reversal. For example, m Loesel v. City ofFrankenmuth, 692 F.3d 452, 468 (6th Cir. 2012), the

Sixth Circuit held that, when two claims were submitted to the jury, one of which was

insufficient, reversal was required. The court noted that it had “consistently adhered” to the

“longstanding civil general verdict rule.” Id. (quoting Virtual Maintenance, Inc. v. Prime

Computer, Inc., 11 F.3d 660, 667 (6th Cir. 1993). Similarly, in Friedman & Friedman, Ltd. v.

Tim McCandless, Inc., 606 F.3d 494, 502-03 (8th Cir. 2010), the court reversed a jury verdict in

which “the verdict form did not differentiate between damages for each of [the plaintiff s] two

claims,” stating that, “when one of two theories has erroneously been submitted to the jury, a

general verdict cannot stand.” Id. (quoting Dudley v. Dittmer, 795 F.2d 669, 673 (8th Cir. 1986)).

Accord Maccabees Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Morton, 941 F.2d 1181, 1184 (11th Cir. 1991) (reversing

and remanding where the jury returned a general verdict on three theories, and holding that “this

court must affirm that all three theories were properly submitted to the jury to sustain the court

below”) (quoting Walden v. United States Steel Corp., 759 F.2d 834, 838 (11th Cir. 1985)); N.

Am. Graphite Corp. v. Allan, 784 F.2d 387, 389 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (“[S]ince there was a verdict

without specification as to which of the two counts it rested upon plaintiff must be able to show

that it was proper to submit both counts to the jury; that is to say, failure to support either would

lead to reversal.”).

The circuits are, thus, applying five distinct standards to the question presented, four of which

are inconsistent with this Court’s precedent. Such conflict and the uncertainty it generates

warrant this Court’s review.

This Case Is an Ideal Vehicle to Address the Questions Presented

This case squarely presents the questions presented in a clean procedural posture, free from legal

or factual obstacles to this Court's review. Petitioner properly requested the omitted jury

instructions, preserved the instructional error under Rule 51, and the court of appeals expressly

affirmed the general verdict under a harmless-error analysis despite the omission of essential

liability instructions. The record contains stipulated translations of audio recordings and

corroborating testimony supporting the omitted theories of liability, leaving the questions

presented fully developed and outcome determinative.

This Court has repeatedly recognized the importance of clean procedural vehicles for resolving

recurring questions of federal practice. Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 84-85 (2010)

(granting certiorari where the case presented a "pure question of law" with "no disputed facts");

Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393,402-03 (2010) (case

"well-suited" for review because the legal issue was "squarely presented" without procedural

impediments). This case satisfies those criteria. The district court definitively ruled on

Petitioner's requested instructions on the record, the evidentiary record is fully developed, and

the Second Circuit squarely presents both the Rule 51 preservation issue and the General Verdict

Rule conflict without procedural impediments or disputed subsidiary facts.

The unpublished status of the decision below presents no barrier to review. This Court has

repeatedly reviewed important questions arising from unpublished or summary dispositions. Oil

States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene's Energy Group, LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018); Hughes v.

Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 6 (1980) (per curiam); Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 579 U.S. 197,

202 (2016) (granting certiorari to review a Second Circuit summary order "to resolve

disagreement in the lower courts").

This case is an ideal vehicle to clarify the interaction between Rule 51, the General Verdict Rule,

harmless-error review, and the Seventh Amendment. This Court consistently grants certiorari in

civil cases presenting important questions concerning jury instructions where the error was

preserved and implicates recurring issues of federal law. City ofSt. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S.

112(1988).

The petition therefore presents not a localized factual dispute, but an important question

concerning the proper application of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 51 and the preservation of

civil jury-instruction objections nationwide. Any vehicle objection based on the unpublished

status of the decision below is further defeated by the Second Circuit's denial of rehearing en

banc on March 11, 2026 (Pet. App. Ila). Petitioner has exhausted all lower-court avenues for

securing uniformity.

For those reasons, this case presents an ideal vehicle for the Court to resolve two acknowledged

conflicts of exceptional importance.

IV.

The Decision Below Violates the Seventh Amendment by Usurping the Jury's

Constitutional Function

The Seventh Amendment preserves the "substance" of the right to trial by jury by requiring that

disputed factual questions and legally cognizable theories of liability be determined by the jury,

not by judicial substitution. Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654 (1935);

Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340 (1998). The Amendment's purpose is

"to retain the common law distinction between the province of the court and that of the

jury." Redman, 295 U.S. at 657. Because the jury-trial guarantee occupies a central place in the

constitutional structure, any encroachment upon that right must be examined with "extreme

care." Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935).

This Court recently reaffirmed that the Seventh Amendment applies to actions involving claims

that are "legal in nature." SEC v. Jarkesy, 603 U.S. 197 (2024). That guarantee extends to the

jury's determination of the factual issues underlying liability. Gasoline Products Co. v. Champlin

Refining Co., 283 U.S. 494, 499-500 (1931). As this Court has explained, the Seventh

Amendment requires that liability be determined by a jury. Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412,

425-26(1987).

Central to that constitutional role is the jury's exclusive authority to resolve disputed facts.

" [Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence and the drawing of legitimate

inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge." Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing

Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

255 (1986)). But the jury cannot perform that function unless it is properly instructed on the

governing legal standards. The Seventh Amendment is not satisfied by merely empaneling a

jury; the jury must be given the legal framework necessary to decide liability. See Curtis v.

Loether, 415 U.S. 189,195-96 (1974); Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 383 (1974).

Yet the decision below allowed a general verdict to stand even though the jury was never

instructed on the elements governing the individual-liability theories submitted for its

consideration. In doing so, court of appeals effectively transferred to reviewing courts a function

the Seventh Amendment assigns to the jury itself.

Here, the district court refused to instruct the jury on essential theories of individual and aiding-

and-abetting liability, thereby withholding from the jury the governing legal framework

necessary to decide the claims presented. The jury was asked to return a verdict without the legal

standards required to determine liability. The court of appeals nevertheless affirmed. In doing so,

the panel preserved a verdict infected by instructional error through judicial reconstruction rather

than jury determination.

That result is incompatible with this Court's Seventh Amendment precedents. Under Slocum v.

New York Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364 (1913/ federal courts may not salvage verdicts tainted by

legal error through judicial substitution of their own assessment of the facts or legal theories.

Likewise, this Court has repeatedly emphasized that appellate courts may not reexamine matters

committed to the jury or substitute their own judgment for that of the jury. See Hetzel v. Prince

William County, 523 U.S. 208, 211 (1998) (per curiam) (reaffirming that the Seventh

Amendment limits judicial reexamination ofjury determinations). Where instructional defects

undermine the integrity of the verdict, the Constitution requires a new trial before a properly

instructed jury. Gasoline Products Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., 283 U.S. 494, 500 (1931).

By affirming a civil verdict notwithstanding the omission of essential liability instructions, the

decision below displaced the jury's constitutionally assigned role and permitted an appellate

court to sustain a judge-shaped outcome on legal claims reserved to the jury. That intrusion into

the jury's protected domain raises an important and recurring Seventh Amendment question

warranting this Court's review.

Certiorari is warranted because the decision below permits appellate courts to uphold civil

verdicts despite omitted instructions on essential liability theories, thereby undermining the

Seventh Amendment's guarantee that liability be determined by a properly instructed jury.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted. The decision

below conflicts with this Court's Seventh Amendment precedents governing the role of the jury

in civil cases, deepens an acknowledged division among the courts of appeals concerning

preservation of objections under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 51, and presents an important

and recurring question of federal law regarding whether a general verdict may stand when the

jury was not instructed on an essential legal theory. This Court's review is warranted to resolve

the conflict among the courts of appeals and to ensure the uniform administration of federal law.

Petitioner respectfully requests that the Court grant the petition for a writ of certiorari and, after

briefing and argument, reverse the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the

Second Circuit and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this Court's opinion.

Dated: August 17, 2026

Mehmet Emin Tatas

43 Vine Street Lynbrook,

NY 11563

Phone: 530-400-3340

juliomehmet@windowslive.com

*Petitioner Pro Se

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