Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Susan Lloyd, Petitioner v. Pennsylvania, et al.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

SUSAN LLOYD,

:

Plaintiff,

v.

:

CIVIL ACTION NO.22-5148

:

:

COMMONWEALTH OF

PENNSYLVANIA, etal.,

•'

Defendants.

ft

:

ORDER

/9' day of September, 2024, after considering Defendants

AND NOW, this / [

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and Pennsylvania State Board of Veterinary Medicine’s

(“Commonwealth Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 43, it is hereby ORDERED that the

motion is GRANTED and the counts against the Commonwealth Defendants are DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE.'

BY THE COURT

JE

1 The Court construes the Amended Complaint as asserting causes of action under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 against the Commonwealth Defendants, alleging violations of the First and

Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. Suits against such defendants are not cognizable

under § 1983. See Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989); Karns v.

Shanahan, 879 F.3d 504, 513 (3d Cir. 2018). Plaintiff’s claims are, moreover, barred by

sovereign immunity. See generally Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,712 (1999).

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

SUSAN LLOYD,

Plaintiff,

CIVIL ACTION NO. 22-S148

v.

COMMONWEALTH OF

PENNSYLVANIA, et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER

AND NOW, thisx’^'* day of September, 2024, after considering Defendants Sara Gray

and Bennett, Bricklin & Saltzburg LLC’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 15, it is hereby ORDERED

that the motion is GRANTED and the counts against the Defendants are DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.1

BY THE COURT:

1

Plaintiff first asserts 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against the attorney defendants, alleging First

and Fourteenth Amendment violations in connection with their work as defense counsel in related

state litigation. To sustain a § 1983 against private attorneys, the Plaintiff must show that the

attorney defendants acted under the color of law. “Attorneys performing their traditional functions

will not be considered state actors solely on the basis of their position as officers of the court.”

Angelico v. Lehigh Valley Hosp., Inc., 184 F.3d 268,277 (3d Cir. 1999). As Plaintiffmerely pleads

facts showing that the Defendants were performing functions common to private malpractice

defense, her § 1983 claims fail.

Plaintiff also asserts a violation of § 1985(2). Like before, her allegations relate to conduct

by the attorney defendants that falls within the normal scope of legal representation. As such,

Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to overcome the attorney defendants’ § 1985 immunity.

See Heffernan v. Hunter, 189 F.3d 405,413 (3d Cir. 1999).

Finally, Plaintiff alleges three state-law causes of action: (1) abuse of process; (2) negligent

infliction of emotional distress; and (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress.

To state a cause of action for abuse of process, the plaintiff must aver that the defendant:

“(1) used a legal process against the plaintiff, (2) primarily to accomplish a purpose for which the

process was not designed; and (3) harm has been caused to the plaintiff.” Lerner v. Lerner, 2008

954 A.2d 1229, 1238 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008) (citing Shiner v. Moriarty, 706 A.2d 1228,1236 (Pa.

Super. Ct. 1998)). As Plaintiff fails to allege any facts indicating that the attorney defendants used

Pennsylvania’s certificate-of-merit requirement, and related sanctions process, for a purpose for

which it was not intended, Plaintiff has failed to plead a claim for abuse of process.

To state a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress, Plaintiff must plead

one of the following situations: ‘“(1) the defendant had a contractual or fiduciary duty toward the

plaintiff; (2) the plaintiff was subjected to a physical impact; (3) the plaintiff was in a zone of

danger and reasonably feared impending physical injury; or (4) the plaintiff observed a tortious

injury to a close relative.’” Richardson v. United States, No. 23-2015, 2024 WL 3654018, at *5

(E.D. Pa. Aug. 5,2024) (citing Runner v. C.R. Bard, 108 F. Supp. 3d 261, 272 (E.D. Pa. 2015)).

Since Plaintiff does not plead any of those factual scenarios, she fails to establish a claim for

negligent infliction of emotional distress.

Finally, to state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, one must

allege: “(1) the conduct must be extreme and outrageous; (2) the conduct must be intentional or

reckless; (3) it must cause emotional distress; and (4) the distress must be severe.” Madreperla v.

Milliard Co., 606 F. Supp. 874, 879-80 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (citing Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles

Football Club, 595 F.2d 1265,1273 (3d Cir. 1979)). Here, Plaintiff merely avers that the attorney

defendants “caused Lloyd emotional distress by violating Lloyds [sic] civil rights.” Such an

averment falls well short of the extreme-and-outrageous standard required by Pennsylvania law.

See CloverleafDev., Inc. v. Horizon Fin. F.A., 500 A.2d 163,169 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (“Liability

can be found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree,

as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency and be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable

in a civilized community.”). Consequently, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for intentional infliction

of emotional distress.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

SUSAN LLOYD

Plaintiff,

CIVIL ACTION NO. 22-5148

COMMONWEALTH OF

PENNSYLVANIA, et (d,

Defendants.

ORDER

AND NOW, this**^** day of September, 2024, after considering Defendant Emily Ramos’

Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 84, it is hereby ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED and all

counts against the Defendant are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.'

It is FURTHER

ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Strike Proof of Service, ECF No. 55, is DENIED AS

MOOT.

BY THE COURT:

L. SCHMEHL, J.

1

Plaintiffs amended complaint asserts five counts against Defendant Emily Ramos: (1) 42

U.S.C. § 1983 claims; (2) a violation of id § 1985; (3) negligence; (4) negligent infliction of

emotional distress; and (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress. The amended complaint

avers that Defendant Ramos is a veterinary technician at a private veterinary clinic. Am. Compl.

H 6, ECF No. 13. Nowhere in the fifty-page complaint does the Plaintiff provide any facts that

remotely support a theory that Defendant Ramos acted “under the color of law” as defined by §

1983. Plaintiffs § 1983 claim thus fails. Likewise, Plaintiffs § 1985 claim, which cites to the

final clause of subparagraph (2), fails because Plaintiff does not allege the presence of “‘class­

based, invidiously discriminatory animus.’” Brawer v. Horowitz, 535 F.2d 830,840 (3d Cir. 1976)

(citing Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971)). Finally, the court declines to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law counts..

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

SUSAN LLOYD,

Plaintiff,

CIVIL ACTION NO. 22-5148

v.

COMMONWEALTH OF

PENNSYLVANIA, et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER

AND NOW, this>%7 day of September, 2024, after considering Defendants Exton Vet

Clinic and Shannon Stanek’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 23, it is hereby ORDERED that the

motion is GRANTED and the counts against the Defendants are DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.1

BY THE COURT:

L. SCHMEHL, J.

1

Plaintiffs amended complaint asserts six counts against Defendants Exton Vet Clinic and

Shannon Stanek: (1) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims alleging a violation of the First and Fourteenth

Amendments; (2) a violation of id. § 1985; (3) abuse of process; (4) negligence; (5) negligent

infliction of emotional distress; and (6) intentional infliction of emotional distress. The amended

complaint avers that Defendant Exton Vet Clinic is a private veterinary clinic and Defendant

Shannon Stanek is a private veterinarian. Am. Compl.

4-5, ECF No. 13. Since the Plaintiff

does not provide any facts to support a theory that the Defendants acted “under the color of law”

as defined by § 1983, the § 1983 claims fail. Likewise, Plaintiff’s § 1985 claim, which cites to the

final clause of subparagraph (2), fails because Plaintiff does not allege the presence of ‘“class­

based, invidiously discriminatory animus.’” Brawer v. Horowitz, 535 F.2d 830,840 (3d Cir. 1976)

(citing Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971)). The court declines to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law counts.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

SUSAN LLOYD,

Plaintiff,

CIVIL ACTION NO. 22-5148

v.

COMMONWEALTH OF

PENNSYLVANIA, et aL,

Defendants.

ORDER

AND NOW, this 30th day of September, 2024, after considering Defendants Uwchlan

Township Police Department, Maureen Evans, and Nicole Navarra’s motion for judgment on the •

pleadings, ECF No. 95, Plaintiff Susan Lloyd’s motion to deny Defendants’ motion for judgment

on the pleadings, ECF No. 98, Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 104, and the

responses thereto, it is hereby ORDERED as follows.

1. The Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings, ECF No. 95, is

GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.1

2. The motion is GRANTED IN PART with respect to the following claims,

which are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE:

(a) the official-capacity First Amendment claims against Defendants

Evans and Navarra;

(b) Plaintiffs Fourteenth Amendment claims against all Defendants;

(c) the 42 U.S.C. § 1985 claims against all Defendants;

(d) the intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claims against all

Defendants; and

DIx

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(e) the negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress claims against all

Defendants.

3. The motion is DENIED IN PART with respect to Plaintiff’s First Amendment

claims against Defendant Uwchlan Township Police Department and

Defendants Evans and Navarra in their individual capacities.

4. The Plaintiff’s motion to deny Defendants’ motion for judgment on the

pleadings, ECF No. 98, is DENIED.

5. The Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 104, is DENIED.

BY THE COURT:

Zs/ Jeffrey L. Schmehl

JEFFREY L. SCHMEHL, J.

1

The Court construes the amended complaint as asserting five causes of action against

Defendants Uwchlan Township Police Department, Lieutenant Maureen Evans, and Officer

Nicole Navarra. They are: (l)a42U.S.C. § 1983 First Amendment claim; (2)a§ 1983 Fourteenth

Amendment claim; (3) a § 1985(2) conspiracy claim; (4) an intentional-infliction-of-emotionaldistress claim; and (5) a negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim. The Plaintiff brings

these claims against the police-officer defendants in both their official and individual capacities.

With respect to the First Amendment claim, the Plaintiff alleges that she commented on

the Uwchlan Township Police Department’s public Facebook page, complaining about the

adequacy of the Department’s investigation into the death of her dog, Domino. After so

commenting- Plaintiff claims that she “was immediately blocked and her comments deleted.” Am.

Compl. 34, ECF No. 13. Plaintiff further avers that, “This page is censored by Nicole Navarra

and Maureen Evans and others from the Uwchlan Township Police Department.” Id.

Although inartful, the Court construes the Plaintiff’s complaint as alleging that Defendants

Evans and Navarra removed Plaintiff’s posts and blocked her Facebook account based upon the

viewpoint of Plaintiff’s comments and as part of a broader policy or custom of censorship. This

allegation presents a colorable First Amendment claim against both the police-officer defendants

and the municipal entity. See Miller v. Goggin, 672 F. Supp. 3d 14, 43-44 (E.D. Pa. 2023)

(collecting cases); see also Monell v. Dep’t ofSoc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).

In

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The Court concludes, however, that—as to the official-capacity aspect of these claims—

the police-officer defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. “Qualified immunity shields

federal and state officials from money damages” unless the official violated a statutory or

constitutional right that “was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.” Ashcroft

v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).

Absent controlling authority, a robust “consensus of cases of persuasive authority” is necessary to

clearly establish a right. Id. at 743 (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617 (1999)). Since,

at the time the alleged violations occurred, there was no such consensus establishing the unfettered

right to access, and post on, a police department’s Facebook page, the Court will grant the policeofficer defendants qualified immunity and dismiss the official-capacity First Amendment claims

against Defendants Evans and Navarra.

Finally, the Defendants urge the Court to fully dismiss Plaintiffs First Amendment claims,

arguing that her posts were never removed, and her account was never blocked. In support, the

Defendants have attached to their motion for judgment on the pleadings, ECF No. 95, an exhibit

purporting to show that Plaintiffs comments remain publicly visible. Assuming that the

screenshot indeed reflects Plaintiffs comments, but taking Plaintiffs averments as true, a dispute

of fact still remains as to whether the Defendants deleted any other posts and whether Plaintiff s

account was ever blocked. See, e.g., Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. 515, ECF No. 104; Pl. s Resp. to Defs.

Opp. to Pl.’s Mot. Summ J. 13, ECF No. 106. Defendants’ screenshot does not dispositively

resolve this lingering question. Now, if after discovery, no genuine dispute remains on this point,

the Defendants may move for summary judgment.

As to the Plaintiffs Fourteenth Amendment claims, Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants

violated her “due process rights of the law, by falsifying and concealing documents [and] also

refus[ing] to redress Lloyds grievances, reopen Lloyds complaint, transfer Lloyds complaint to

another district and/or open an investigation into Stanek inciting violence.” Am. Compl. 42, ECF

No. 13. To the extent that the Plaintiff makes a fabrication-of-evidence claim, the claim fails

because she was never the subject of a criminal conviction, much less a prosecution. See Black v.

Montgomery Cnty., 835 F.3d 358, 369 (3d Cir. 2016). To the extent that the Plaintiff makes an

inadequate-police-investigation claim, such a claim is not cognizable under the Fourteenth

Amendment. See Thomas v. City ofPhila., 290 F. Supp. 3d 371, 386 (E.D. Pa. 2018).

Turning to the Plaintiffs remaining counts, the Plaintiff asserts a 42 U.S.C. § 1985 claim,

citing to the final clause of subparagraph (2). To state a cause of action under that clause of §

1985(2), Plaintiff must aver facts showing that the conspiracy was bom out of a “‘class-based,

invidiously discriminatory animus.’” Brawer v. Horowitz, 535 F.2d 830, 840 (3d Cir. 1976) (citing

Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88,102 (1971)). As Plaintiff fails to aver such facts, her § 1985

claim fails.

To state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, one must allege:

“(1) the conduct must be extreme and outrageous; (2) the conduct must be intentional or reckless;

(3) it must cause emotional distress; and (4) the distress must be severe.” Madreperla v. Williard

Co., 606 F. Supp. 874, 879-80 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (citing Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club,

595 F.2d 1265, 1273 (3d Cir. 1979)). Here, Plaintiff merely avers that the Defendants “caused

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lloyd emotional distress by obstructing Lloyd justice, falsifying documents during criminal

investigation into dominos death and by refusing to open any investigation into Stanek and other

Defendants incitement of violence towards Lloyd.” Am Compl. 85, ECF No. 13. Such an

averment falls well short of establishing any facts that satisfy the extreme-and-outrageous standard

required by Pennsylvania law. See CloverleafDev., Inc. v. Horizon Fin. F.A., 500 A.2d 163, 169

(Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (“Liability can be found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in

character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency and be

regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.”). Plaintiff therefore fails

to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Lastly, to state a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress, Plaintiff must

plead one of the following situations: ‘“(1) the defendant had a contractual or fiduciary duty toward

the plaintiff; (2) the plaintiff was subjected to a physical impact; (3) the plaintiff was in a zone of

danger and reasonably feared impending physical injury; or (4) the plaintiff observed a tortious

injury to a close relative.’” Richardson v. United States, No. 23-2015, 2024 WL 3654018, at *5

(E.D. Pa. Aug. 5, 2024) (citing Runner v. C.R. Bard, 108 F. Supp. 3d 261, 272 (E.D. Pa. 2015)).

Since Plaintiff does not plead any of those factual scenarios with respect to the Defendants, she

fails to establish a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

SUSAN LLOYD,

Plaintiff,

v.

CIVIL ACTION

NO. 5:22-cv-05148-JLS

COMMONWEALTH OF

PENNSYLVANIA, et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER

AND NOW, this 25th day of August, 2025, upon consideration of the Motion for Summary

Judgment filed by Defendants Uwchlan Township Police Department, Maureen Evans, and Nicole

Navarra, ECF No. 167, the Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiff Susan Lloyd,

ECF No. 169, and Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration, ECF No. 140, and for the reasons set

forth in the accompanying Memorandum Opinion, it is hereby ORDERED as follows:

(1) Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED;

(2) Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED;

(3) Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED;

(4) JUDGMENT is ENTERED in favor of Defendants Uwchlan Township Police

Department, Maureen Evans, and Nicole Navarra and against Plaintiff Susan

Lloyd; and

(5) The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to CLOSE this case.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Jeffrey L. Schmehl

JEFFERY L. SCHMEHL, J.

Case: 25-2642

Document: 42

Page: 1

Date Filed: 03/30/2026

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 25-2642

SUSAN LLOYD,

Appellant

v.

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Official and Individual Capacity;

SARA GRAY, Official and Individual Capacity; BENNETT BRICKLIN AND

SALTZBURG, Official and Individual Capacity; PENNSYLVANIA STATE

BOARD OF VETERINARIAN MEDICINE; EXTON VET CLINIC; SHANNON

STANEK; EMILY BOURET a/k/a EMILY RAMOS; HEATHER WESTFALL, VMD;

HELENA DOMENIC; PEEJ DUKEY; JANE AND JOHN DOE PARMAR a/k/a

PARMAR FAMILY; CLERKS OFFICE, Official and Individual Capacity;

UWCHLAN TOWNSHIP POLICE DEPARTMENT, Official and Individual

Capacity; NICOLE NAVARRA, Official and Individual Capacity;

MAUREEN EVANS, Official and Individual Capacity; BRANDYWINE VALLEY

SPCA, Official and Individual Capacity; BRYAN JACKSON, Official

and Individual Capacity; DANIEL ACHUFF, Official and Individual Capacity

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(E.D. Pa. Civ. No. 5:22-cv-05148)

District Judge: Honorable Jeffrey L. Schmehl

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

March 24, 2026

Before: MATEY, MONTGOMERY-REEVES, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: March 30, 2026 )

Case: 25-2642

Document: 42

Page: 2

Date Filed: 03/30/2026

OPINION*

PER CURIAM

Pro se appellant Susan Lloyd seeks review of several orders of the District Court

in this civil rights action concerning the death of Lloyd’s service dog and comments left

by Lloyd on a government social media account. Those orders collectively rejected all of

Lloyd’s claims in response to defense motions under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), 12(c) (judgment on the pleadings), and 56(a) (summary

judgment). Discerning no reversible error by the District Court, we will affirm.

I.1

Lloyd brought her service dog, Domino, to defendant Exton Vet Clinic (EVC) to

obtain anti-inflammatory medicine. During the visit, Domino was administered

pentobarbital. He died. Outraged, Lloyd sued the clinic and its staff in the Court of

Common Pleas of Chester County, Pennsylvania.2 EVC was represented in that litigation

by defendants Sara Gray and her law firm, Bennett, Bricklin & Saltzburg LLC (BBS).

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not

constitute binding precedent.

1 The factual recitation that follows is drawn from Lloyd’s operative pleading—her first

amended complaint. None of Lloyd’s four subsequent attempts to amend was authorized.

2 Lloyd’s suit in state court ran into an obstacle: Pennsylvania’s certificate-of-merit

(COM) requirement. See Pa. R. Civ. P. 1042.3(a). Defendant clerk of the state court (the

Clerk’s Office) entered a judgment of non pros against Lloyd. Lloyd v. Veterinary

Orthopedic Servs., Ltd., 344 A.3d 1075 (Table), 2025 WL 1825123, at *7 (Pa. Super. Ct.

2025). Lloyd filed a substantially similar second suit, which also failed. See Lloyd v.

2

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Date Filed: 03/30/2026

In addition to suing EVC and its staff in state court, Lloyd reported their actions to

defendants Brandywine Valley SPCA (BV SPCA), the Pennsylvania State Board of

Veterinary Medicine (the Board), and the Uwchlan Township Police Department (the

Police Department). Lloyd found the responses to her reports to be unsatisfactory.

Lloyd voiced her displeasure with the Police Department’s investigation,

specifically, on a Facebook page managed by the Police Department and which linked

out to its official website. Lloyd’s comments were allegedly deleted by two officers—

defendants Nicole Navarra and Maureen Evans—and her Facebook account was blocked.

For relief, Lloyd requested money damages in excess of $75,000.3 She also

requested a declaration that Pennsylvania’s COM requirement is unconstitutional.4

The District Court stayed discovery pending disposition of the defendants’ various

dispositive motions. Then, in a series of orders, the District Court granted motions to

dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) filed by: the State and the Board, on the grounds that Lloyd’s

Stanek, No. 1006 EDA 2025, 2025 WL 3707695, at *2 (Pa. Super. Ct. Dec. 22, 2025)

(per curiam judgment order) (“[A]lthough Appellant may not like the result of her prior

litigation, she does not get a second bite at the apple[.]”).

3 That dollar amount suggests a nod to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). But it does not appear that

Lloyd sued any citizens of states diverse from her own state of citizenship; she predicated

jurisdiction on federal questions, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and the District Court’s authority

to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

4 Lloyd included as defendants the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (the State) and the

Clerk’s Office to face her claim that Rule 1042.3(a) is unconstitutional. Earlier this year,

the Supreme Court held that Delaware’s COM requirement is inapplicable in federal

court. See Berk v. Choy, No. 24-440, 2026 WL 135974, at *7 (U.S. Jan. 20, 2026).

3

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Date Filed: 03/30/2026

§ 1983 claims were not cognizable and the defendants were immune, in any event; an

EVC-affiliated veterinarian, on the ground that Lloyd failed to adequately plead state law

claims for negligence and emotional distress; Gray and BBS, on the ground that Lloyd

failed to adequately plead federal civil rights claims under §§ 1983 and 1985, and state

*

law claims for abuse of process and emotional distress; and EVC, its owner and a staff

member, on the grounds that Lloyd failed to adequately plead federal civil rights claims,

and that supplemental jurisdiction over her state law claims would not be exercised.5

As for the Rule 12(c) motion that was filed by the Police Department and the two

officers, the District Court granted the motion in large part. The District Court allowed

only Lloyd’s First Amendment claims—related to the Police Department’s Facebook

page—to proceed against the officers in their individual capacities, and against the Police

Department under Monell v. Department ofSocial Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

All of Lloyd’s other claims against those defendants were dismissed with

prejudice. The District Court determined, inter alia, that the officers were entitled to

qualified immunity with respect to their official-capacity liability6; that Lloyd’s

5 Lloyd voluntarily dismissed her claims against the Clerk’s Office, BV SPCA, and two

BV SPCA officers. Lloyd sued and served several other individuals (Helena Domenic,

Peej Dukey, and the “Parmar Family”), but it appears she abandoned her claims against

them. Lloyd raises no claims on appeal related to those unrepresented defendants.

6 The District Court misspoke. Qualified immunity is a defense to liability “in a personal­

capacity action,” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159,166 (1985), not an official-capacity

action. The error is harmless, because Lloyd’s claims against the officers in either

capacity were properly rejected for reasons we describe later in this opinion.

4

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Document: 42

Page: 5

Date Filed: 03/30/2026

inadequate-investigation claim was not cognizable under § 1983; and that Lloyd failed to

adequately plead emotional distress claims under Pennsylvania law.

Discovery, then competing motions for summary judgment under Rule 56(a),

followed. The parties stipulated that the Police Department’s Facebook page no longer

showed Lloyd’s comments, which were reproduced in the District Court’s written

decision. The District Court denied Lloyd’s motion, granted the motion filed by the

Police Department and the officers, and declined to allow Lloyd to further amend her

complaint. Key to the District Court’s ruling was Lloyd’s failure to adduce any evidence

that the officers were personally responsible for deleting Lloyd’s comments or blocking

her Facebook account. Lloyd also failed to adduce any evidence of a Police Department

policy or custom, or some other basis for establishing municipal liability under Monell.

n.

Lloyd timely filed this appeal. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

Insofar as we are reviewing orders granting motions under Rules 12(b)(6), 12(c), and

56(a), our review is de novo. See Barlow v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union Loc. 668, 90 F.4th

607, 615 (3d Cir. 2024) (Rule 12(c)); Ellis v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., LLC, 11 F.4th 221,

229 (3d Cir. 2021) (Rule 56(a)); United States ex rel. Bookwaiter v. UPMC, 946 F.3d

162, 168 (3d Cir. 2019) (Rule 12(b)(6)). The District Court’s rulings staying discovery,

declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, and declining to permit another pleading

amendment are all reviewed for abuse of discretion. See LabMD Inc. v. Boback, 47 F.4th

164, 192 n.22 (3d Cir. 2022) (amendment); Drippe v. Tobelinski, 604 F.3d 778, 783 (3d

5

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Page: 6

Date Filed: 03/30/2026

Cir. 2010) (case management); Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 123—24 (3d Cir. 2000)

(supplemental jurisdiction).

III.

Preliminarily, we reject Lloyd’s attempts to raise new claims based on post­

judgment conduct. See, e.g., Br. 21 (“On September 5, 2025, Lloyd attempted to make

public comments at a public open vet board meeting and was immediately cut off and her

microphone was muted in violation of the Sunshine Law and 1st amendment.”); Br. 42-

43 (“After [this] case was dismissed, Lloyd attempted to post a review on [the Police

Department’s] page under her real Facebook name, Sue [M]ichelle.”). “We generally do

not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal, and will not do so in this case.”

Gardner v. Grandolsky, 585 F.3d 786,793 (3d Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (citation omitted).

We also reject Lloyd’s challenge to the dismissal of her claims against the State

and the Board. Like the District Court, we find sovereign immunity readily applicable.

See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 754 (1999). Lloyd’s contention that sovereign

immunity is unconstitutional lacks merit. See id. at 713; U.S. CONST, amend. XL7

We further agree with the District Court that Lloyd failed to raise cognizable

claims under § 1983 against the private parties (e.g., EVC and its staff, Gray and BBS).

“[T]o state a claim of liability under § 1983,” the plaintiff “must allege that she was

7 Insofar as Lloyd’s challenge to the constitutionality of state rule 1042.3(a) was merely a

reassertion of her challenge in Lloyd, 2025 WL 1825123, supra, res judicata would also

be in play. See Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 277 (3d Cir. 2014).

6

M3

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deprived of a federal constitutional or statutory right by a state actor.” Leshko v. Servis,

423 F.3d 337,339 (3d Cir. 2005) (emphasis added). For example, and contrary to Lloyd’s

argument, private attorneys are not subject to § 1983 liability, even though they are often

called ‘officers of the court.’ See Angelico v. Lehigh Valley Hosp., Inc., 184 F.3d 268,

277 (3d Cir. 1999). Nor did Lloyd plausibly allege a conspiracy with a state actor, in the

manner prescribed by Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007).8

We turn next to the District Court’s order granting summary judgment to the

Police Department and its officers. Notably, Lloyd does not refute on appeal the District

Court’s assessment that she could have deposed the officers—to adduce evidence of their

personal involvement in any deprivation of First Amendment rights—but chose not to.

Without deposition testimony or other evidence that might have revealed the officers’

personal involvement, Lloyd’s § 1983 claims against them in their individual capacities

could not proceed any further in the litigation. Cf. Jutrowski v. Twp. ofRiverdale, 904

F.3d 280, 291 (3d Cir. 2018) (“[I]n the face of motion for summary judgment, a § 1983

plaintiff must produce evidence supporting each individual defendant’s personal

involvement in the alleged violation to bring that defendant to trial.”).

8 In granting the Rule 12(b)(6) motions filed by EVC, its owner and a staff member, the

District Court stated that it was declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

Lloyd’s state claims, seemingly because the federal claims against those particular

defendants were being dismissed. That action may have been premature, because the

District Court had not yet disposed of all Lloyd’s federal claims in the litigation.

However, the District Court ultimately did grant judgment to the defendants on all federal

claims, so any timing error was harmless. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); 28 U.S.C. § 2111.

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Lloyd’s Monell claim was also properly rejected at summary judgment. “Rule

56(a) requires a court to grant summary judgment when the movant establishes that there

is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law” Ames v. Ohio Dep’t of Youth Servs., 605 U.S. 303, 322 (2025) (Thomas,

J, concurring). The relevant “law” here (Monell} holds that municipalities can be sued

under § 1983 where “the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or

executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and

promulgated by that body’s officers.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 690.

The District Court observed that Lloyd “identifies no policy or custom, no failure

to train, and no other basis on which municipal liability might rest.” On appeal, Lloyd

offers nothing to impugn the observation. That Lloyd was able to adequately plead, for

purposes of the Rule 12(b)(6) standard, a First Amendment claim in separate litigation

involving an Ohio municipality’s blocking of her Facebook account, see Lloyd v. City of

Streetsboro, C.A. No. 18-3485, 2018 WL 11298664, at *4 (6th Cir. Dec. 20, 2018) (per

curiam order); Br. 32-33, is not dispositive of whether Lloyd was able to withstand

summary judgment in this matter. Lloyd had to back up her Monell claim with evidence

revealing a genuine dispute of material fact, and she did not. The Pol ice Department, and

the officers in their official capacities, were thus entitled to summary judgment.

Lloyd’s remaining arguments lack merit, for substantially the reasons given by the

District Court, and warrant little if any extra discussion. In particular: Lloyd has no

generalized Fourth Amendment right to “feel safe in her own home,” Br. 35—the

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amendment instead protects the citizenry from “unreasonable searches and seizures,”

Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296, 303 (2018); there is no evidence that the Police

Department “conspire[d] to falsify police reports,” Br. 40; the District Court did not

abuse its discretion in declining to allow Lloyd to file her fourth and fifth amended

complaints on the ground that the proposed amendments would not change the fortunes

of any claims that had succumbed to Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 12(c) motions; and the

District Court did not abuse its discretion when it temporarily stayed discovery.

Accordingly, for the reasons given above, the judgment of the District Court will

be affirmed.

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 25-2642

SUSAN LLOYD,

Appellant

v.

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Official and Individual Capacity;

SARA GRAY, Official and Individual Capacity; BENNETT BRICKLIN AND

SALTZBURG, Official and Individual Capacity; PENNSYLVANIA STATE

BOARD OF VETERINARIAN MEDICINE; EXTON VET CLINIC; SHANNON

STANEK; EMILY BOURET a/k/a EMILY RAMOS; HEATHER WESTFALL, VMD;

HELENA DOMENIC; PEEJ DUKEY; JANE AND JOHN DOE PARMAR a/k/a

PARMAR FAMILY; CLERKS OFFICE, Official and Individual Capacity;

UWCHLAN TOWNSHIP POLICE DEPARTMENT, Official and Individual

Capacity; NICOLE NAVARRA, Official and Individual Capacity;

MAUREEN EVANS, Official and Individual Capacity; BRANDYWINE VALLEY

SPCA, Official and Individual Capacity; BRYAN JACKSON, Official

and Individual Capacity; DANIEL ACHUFF, Official and Individual Capacity

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(E.D. Pa. Civ. No. 5:22-cv-05148)

District Judge: Honorable Jeffrey L. Schmehl

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

March 24, 2026

Before: MATEY, MONTGOMERY-REEVES, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges

JUDGMENT

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Page: 2

Date Filed: 03/30/2026

This cause came to be considered on the record from the United States District

Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and was submitted pursuant to Third

Circuit LAR 34.1(a) on March 24, 2026.

On consideration whereof, it is now hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED by this

Court that the judgment of the District Court entered August 25, 2025, is hereby

affirmed. Costs taxed against the Appellant. All of the above in accordance with the

opinion of this Court.

ATTEST:

s/ Patricia S. Dodszuweit

Clerk

Dated: March 30, 2026

Case: 25-2642

Document: 47

Page: 1

Date Filed: 06/10/2026

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 25-2642

SUSAN LLOYD,

Appellant

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Official and Individual Capacity;

SARA GRAY, Official and Individual Capacity; BENNETT BRICKLIN AND

SALTZBURG, Official and Individual Capacity; PENNSYLVANIA STATE

BOARD OF VETERINARIAN MEDICINE; EXTON VET CLINIC; SHANNON

STANEK; EMILY BOURET a/k/a EMILY RAMOS; HEATHER WESTFALL, VMD;

HELENA DOMENIC; PEEJ DUKEY; JANE AND JOHN DOE PARMAR a/k/a

PARMAR FAMIT Y; CLERKS OFFICE, Official and Individual Capacity;

UWCHLAN TOWNSHIP POLICE DEPARTMENT, Official and Individual

Capacity; NICOLE NAVARRA, Official and Individual Capacity;

MAUREEN EVANS, Official and Individual Capacity; BRANDYWINE VALLEY

SPCA, Official and Individual Capacity; BRYAN JACKSON, Official

and Individual Capacity; DANIEL ACHUFF, Official and Individual Capacity

(District Court Civil Action No. 5:22-cv-05148)

SUR PETITION FOR REHEARING

Present: CHAGARES, Chief Judge; HARDIMAN, SHWARTZ, KRAUSE, RESTREPO,

BIBAS, PORTER, MATEY, PHIPPS, FREEMAN, MONTGOMERY-REEVES,

CHUNG, BOVE, MASCOTT, and NYGAARD1, Circuit Judges

The petition for rehearing filed by Appellant in the above-entitled case having

been submitted to the judges who participated in the decision of this Court and to all the

1 Judge Nygaard’s vote is limited to panel rehearing.

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Date Filed: 06/10/2026

other available circuit judges of the circuit in regular active service, and no judge who

concurred in the decision having asked for rehearing, and a majority of the judges of the

circuit in regular service not having voted for rehearing, the petition for rehearing by the

panel and the Court en banc, is denied.

BY THE COURT,

s/ Tamika R. Montgomery-Reeves

Circuit Judge

Dated: June 10,2026

Lmr/cc: Susan Lloyd

All Counsel of Record

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

SUSAN LLOYD,

Plaintiff,

CIVIL ACTION

NO. 5:22-cv-05148-JLS

v.

COMMONWEALTH OF

PENNSYLVANIA, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

SCHMEHL, J. /s/JLS

AUGUST 25,2025

Now pending before the Court are cross-motions for summary judgment filed by Plaintiff

Susan Lloyd and by Defendants Uwchlan Township Police Department, Maureen Evans, and

Nicole Navarra, as well as Lloyd’s motion for reconsideration of the Court’s prior order denying

her leave to file a fifth amended complaint. The cross-motions concern Lloyd’s only remaining

claim, which is raised under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and alleges that Officers Evans and Navarra deleted

Lloyd’s posts from the Department’s Facebook page and blocked Lloyd’s Facebook account. For

the reasons that follow, the Court grants Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, denies

Lloyd’s cross-motion for summary judgment, and denies Lloyd’s motion for reconsideration.

I

Proceeding pro se, Lloyd alleges that on December 2, 2021, staff at Exton Vet Clinic

euthanized her dog, Domino, without her consent and purportedly by administering pentobarbital.

Lloyd first sought relief in the Chester County Court of Common Pleas, suing the veterinary clinic

and its personnel. But litigation does not always go as one hopes, and Lloyd’s state suit soon hit

a procedural snag. Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1042.3 requires that when pro se

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plaintiffs assert professional-malpractice claims, they must file a certificate of merit, which

includes a written statement from a qualified licensed professional opining that the care or skill at

issue probably fell below accepted professional standards. Evidently, Lloyd did not attach such a

written statement within the time required. The clinic’s defense team—Sara Gray and her firm,

Bennett, Bricklin & Saltzburg LLC—spotted the Rule 1042.3 deficiency. So, in September 2022,

defense counsel filed a notice of intent to enter judgment of non pros for Lloyd’s failure to comply

with the written-statement requirement. A month later, upon praecipe, the prothonotary entered

judgment of non pros against Lloyd on all claims.

Two days later, Lloyd petitioned the Court of Common Pleas to open or strike the

judgment. And while that petition was pending, Lloyd initiated this collateral federal action in

December of 2022 against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Bennett, Bricklin & Saltzburg

LLC, and Attorney Gray. Put simply, Lloyd contended that Gray and her firm violated Lloyd’s

constitutional rights by filing the praecipe for judgment of non pros, and that defense counsel’s

conduct also amounted to both the negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress and an

abuse of process. As to the Commonwealth, Lloyd’s § 1983 claim challenged the constitutionality

of Rule 1042.3 itself, asserting that the certificate-of-merit requirement violated her First and

Fourteenth Amendment rights.

In response to the federal complaint, the law firm and Gray moved to dismiss. Five days

later, Lloyd exercised her right under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(1)(B) to amend the

complaint, rendering the initial motion to dismiss moot. Thereafter, Lloyd filed an amended

complaint that substantially ballooned the case. Whereas the original complaint named only three

defendants, the new one named nineteen. In addition to those defendants previously identified,

Lloyd joined: the Pennsylvania State Board of Veterinary Medicine; the Exton Vet Clinic and its

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personnel; the Chester County Clerk’s Office; the Uwchlan Township Police Department and its

Officers Maureen Evans and Nicole Navarra; the Brandywine Valley SPCA and its Officers

Bryan Jackson and Daniel Achuff; and several private individuals who allegedly defamed or

threatened Lloyd after the dog’s death. See generally First Am. Compl. ^1-19, ECF No. 13.

Between March and May 2023, many of the newly named defendants appeared and filed

motions to dismiss or joined in motions previously filed. Lloyd responded to these motions with

a series of oppositions to the motions to dismiss, motions to compel discovery, and numerous

overlapping motions to amend the complaint. See, e.g., Mot. to File Second Am. Compl., ECF

No. 63; Mot. to Substitute Third Am. Compl., ECF No. 74; Mot. to File Fourth Am. Compl., ECF

No. 110; Mot. to File Fifth Am. Compl., ECF No. 120. On March 28, 2024, the Court entered an

omnibus order granting several motions to stay discovery, denying Lloyd’s various motions to

amend or extend deadlines, and deeming multiple motions moot. See Order, ECF No. 119.

Thereafter, the Court resolved a number of motions to dismiss, leaving only the Uwchlan

Township Police Department, Maureen Evans, and Nicole Navarra as active defendants.

The only claim that went forward was Lloyd’s § 1983 First Amendment claim alleging that

Officers Evans and Navarra deleted Lloyd’s posts on the Uwchlan Township Police Department’s

Facebook page and blocked Lloyd’s account. Presently, the parties have stipulated that, on

February 5,2023, Lloyd posted the following remarks on the Department’s Facebook page, which

are indeed no longer visible:

•

Officer Navarra committed perjury during a criminal investigation into Shannon

Stanek from Exton Vet Clinic killing my service dog with pentobarbital. Now

Shannon Stanek has begun to incite violence towards me and has many of her

friends threatening my life. This department decides to sit on their asses and do

nothing and allows a disabled person to be threatened. Shannon Stanek was in a

mental hospital and placed on psych meds and this department allows her to own a

gun anyways even though under federal law, any individual with a mental illness

is not allowed to own a gun. Uwchlan Township doesn’t care. They allow Shannon

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Stanek to kill a service dog and then to get her friends to threaten me while these

officers sit on their asses and literally do nothing. I am filing a federal lawsuit

against them for equal protection class of one violations. Its obvious that anybody

else would have been arrested when I showed them proof of what I say. The reason

why they do nothing is get this. They are buddy buddies with Shannon Stanek.

Shannon Stanek has a big mouth and likes to run it all over social media. So that’s

why she can get away with murder. This department knows we are involved in

litigation and I am entitled to discovery. Guess what they do. They conceal all

videos and records. No surprise there. These bad cops need more people to

challenge them in federal court and maybe things will begin to change. That’s why

im a big supporter of defunding the police. What good are they if they allow

Shannon Stanek and others to get away with murder.

•

You do not want to work there. They lie during criminal investigations and then

conceal records and body cameras even when involved in litigation. Says all you

need to know about this place. You can literally get away with murder in Uwchlan

Township and then get your buddies to threaten someone elses life.

•

Are they going to lie during criminal investigations like Officer Navarra and let

Shannon Stanek from Exton Vet Clinic get away with murder or are you actually

going to hire an officer who tells the truth. Guess only time will tell.

The period for discovery has now closed. And both sides have moved for summary judgment.

Lloyd has also moved for reconsideration of the Court’s prior order denying her leave to file a fifth

amended complaint. In what follows, the Court considers each of these pending motions in turn.

II

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) permits summary judgment when “there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of

law.” Initially, the moving party bears the burden of “identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’

which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once satisfied, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to go

beyond the pleadings and come forward with specific, material facts that present “a genuine issue

for trial.” Santini v. Fuentes, 795 F.3d 410, 416 (3d Cir. 2015) (internal citations omitted). A

dispute is “genuine” only if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for

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the non-moving party, and it is “material” only if it might affect the outcome under the applicable

law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In conducting this analysis,

the Court reviews the record as a whole and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the

non-movant. Hugh v. Butler Cnty. Family YMCA, 418 F.3d 265, 267 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal

citations omitted).

Here, Officers Evans and Navarra first contend that summary judgment is appropriate

because the record contains no evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that either

Officer Evans or Navarra personally deleted Lloyd’s Facebook posts or blocked her account. They

add that Lloyd named them as defendants only because they were the two officers who

communicated with her about her underlying allegations of criminal misconduct against the

veterinarian, Shannon Stanek. And they also point out that Lloyd elected to not depose either

officer. Finally, they cite Lloyd’s deposition testimony where Lloyd admitted that Facebook posts

may be removed in several ways—including by the user, by the platform, or by an unrelated third

party upon complaint.

In response, Lloyd does not identify any evidence linking either officer to the removal of

her posts or the blocking of her account. Instead, as was argued by Lloyd in her deposition, Lloyd

asserts that she has no reason to believe the officers did not take those actions, so they must have

done it. See Dep. of Susan Lloyd at 85, ECF No. 167-4. But this argument clearly lacks merit—

it is burden-shifting speculation, not actionable evidence. And mere speculation cannot defeat a

motion for summary judgment. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252 (1986).

Furthermore, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals requires that, in § 1983 claims such as

these, a plaintiff must present evidence establishing each defendant’s “direct responsibility” for

the asserted constitutional violation. See .Jutrowski v. Twp. ofRiverdale, 904 F.3d 280,289-93 (3d

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Cir. 2018) (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 376-77 (1976)). Purely collective or vicarious

theories simply will not do. The Supreme Court says the same: “[A] plaintiff must plead that each

Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the

Constitution,” and “each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for

his or her own misconduct.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676-77 (2009). Simply put,

Defendants cannot be held liable “merely because they were members of a group of which some

other members were guilty of abuses.” Anela v. City of Wildwood, 790 F.2d 1063, 1067-68 (3d

Cir. 1986) (citing Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 370-71).

Against that evidentiary and legal backdrop, Lloyd’s claim against Officers Evans and

Navarra suffers from a fundamental failure of proof. Discovery has yielded no evidence that either

Evans or Navarra removed Lloyd’s posts or blocked her account. The importance of offering some

evidence of such conduct is essential because, as Lloyd concedes, Facebook content may disappear

for many reasons independent of any Uwchlan Township Police Department action: the original

poster can delete it; Facebook can remove it under its rules; or another user can report it. Without

evidence tying the disappearance of Lloyd’s posts or the blocking of her account to these specific

defendants, a jury would have to guess who, if anyone, acted. And so, because the summary­

judgment record contains no evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that Officers Evans

or Navarra themselves deleted Lloyd’s posts or blocked her account, the Court will enter judgment

for Officers Evans and Navarra on the § 1983 claim.

What remains, then, is Lloyd’s § 1983 claim against the Uwchlan Township Police

Department. The Department contends that Lloyd has offered no evidence establishing municipal

liability and that the Department cannot be held liable merely on a theory of respondeat superior.

To this, Lloyd does not directly respond. And she identifies no policy or custom, no failure to

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train, and no other basis on which municipal liability might rest. The Court therefore construes

her claim as one sounding in respondeat superior. But as the Supreme Court has made clear, “a

municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor—or, in other words, a

municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory. ” Monell v. Dep’t

ofSoc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658,691 (1978). So, because Lloyd advances no other theory of municipal

liability, her claim against the Department fails. The Court will enter judgment in favor of the

Uwchlan Township Police Department on the § 1983 claim and, consequently, deny Lloyd’s cross­

motion for summary judgment.

Ill

The Court next takes up Lloyd’s motion to reconsider the Court’s previous order denying

her leave to file a fifth amended complaint. At the outset, the Court notes that reconsideration is

extraordinary, appropriate only upon an intervening change in controlling law, the availability of

new evidence, or the need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice. See Max’s Seafood

Cafe ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999). Here, Lloyd shows

none of those circumstances. So, reconsideration is inappropriate.

But even if the Court were to reconsider, the earlier denial resting on futility remains the

appropriate disposition. For although Rule 15 instructs that courts “should freely give leave [to

amend] when justice so requires,” it does not require leave when amendment would be futile. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2); Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). And an amendment is futile if it

could not survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 115-

17 (3d Cir. 2000). Here, Lloyd’s fifth proposed amended complaint remains futile.

For example, Lloyd’s proposed § 1983 claims against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

and the State Board of Veterinary Medicine fail as a matter of law because a state and its arms are

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not “persons” under § 1983 and, in any event, enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Will v.

Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64-71 (1989); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.

Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100-01 (1984). The § 1983 claims against the private defendants—

Shannon Stanek, Exton Vet Clinic, Sara Gray, and Bennett, Bricklin & Saltzburg LLC—also fail

because the proposed pleading alleges no facts plausibly showing state action. See Brentwood

Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288,295-96 (2001); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457

U.S. 991, 1004 (1982); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982).

As to the claim against the Chester County Prothonotary, court clerks performing tasks

integral to the judicial process are absolutely immune from suit. Lockhart v. Hoenstine, 411 F.2d

455, 460 (3d Cir. 1969); see also Gallas v. Supreme Court of Pa., 211 F.3d 760, 772-73 (3d Cir.

2000).

And Lloyd’s § 1985(2) conspiracy claim fails because Lloyd’s proposed amended

complaint continues to lack well-pleaded facts showing a conspiracy motivated by some ‘“class­

based, invidiously discriminatory animus.’” See Brawer v. Horowitz, 535 F.2d 830, 840 (3d Cir.

1976) (citing Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971)).

So, because the proposed

amendment would not cure the defects identified in the Court’s prior rulings, and as the Court

declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any remaining state-law claims,

reconsideration is unwarranted and leave to amend remains futile. The motion is denied.

IV

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted,

Plaintiffs cross-motion for summary judgment is denied, and Plaintiffs motion for

reconsideration of the denial of leave to file a fifth amended complaint is denied. Judgment will

be entered in favor of the Uwchlan Township Police Department, Maureen Evans, and Nicole

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Navarra and against Plaintiff Susan Lloyd. Any remaining requests for relief are denied as moot.

The Clerk of Court shall mark this case closed. An appropriate Order follows.

9