Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Clarence B. Jenkins, Jr., Petitioner v. South Carolina Department of Employment Workforce, et al.

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 25-2469

CLARENCE B. JENKINS, JR.,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT WORKFORCE;

SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at

Columbia. Jacquelyn Denise Austin, District Judge. (3:25-cv-12752-JDA)

Submitted: March 26, 2026

Decided: March 30, 2026

Before RICHARDSON and BERNER, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Clarence B. Jenkins, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Clarence B. Jenkins, Jr., appeals the district court’s order accepting the magistrate

judge’s recommendation and dismissing Jenkins’s employment-related action without

prejudice and without issuance and service of process.* See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm the

district court’s order. Jenkins v. S.C. Dep't of Emp. Workforce, No. 3:25-cv-12752-JDA

(D.S.C. Nov. 18, 2025). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would

not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

* The order is final and appealable because the district court did not grant Jenkins

leave to amend his complaint. See Britt t>. DeJoy, 45 F.4th 790, 796 (4th Cir. 2022) (en

banc) (order).

2

3:25-cv-12752-JDA

Date Piled 11/18/25

Entry Number 16

Page 1 of 3

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

COLUMBIA DIVISION

Clarence B. Jenkins, Jr.,

)

Case No. 3:25-cv-12752-JDA

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

)

v.

OPINION AND ORDER

)

South Carolina Department of

Employment Work, South Carolina

Department of Administration,

)

)

)

)

Defendants.

'

)

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs Complaint, a Report and

Recommendation (“Report”) of the Magistrate Judge, Plaintiffs motion to establish judicial

misconduct, and Plaintiffs motion to submit additional documented evidence to establish

justification. [Docs. 1; 8; 10; 15.] In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil

Rule 73.02(B)(2), D.S.C., this matter was referred to United States Magistrate Judge

Paige J. Gossett for pre-trial proceedings.

On October 21, 2025, Plaintiff filed a motion to establish judicial misconduct.

[Doc. 8.] On October 22, 2025, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report recommending that

this action be summarily dismissed without prejudice and without issuance and service of

process.

[Doc. 10.] The Magistrate Judge advised Plaintiff of the procedures and

requirements for filing objections to the Report and the serious consequences if he failed

to do so.

[Id. at 7.] On November 5, 2025, Plaintiff filed objections to the Report.

[Doc. 14.] On November 14, Plaintiff filed a motion to submit additional documented

evidence to establish justification. [Doc. 15.]

3:25-cv-12752-JDA

Date Filed 11/18/25

Entry Number 16

Page 2 Of 3

The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this Court.

The

recommendation has no presumptive weight, and the responsibility to make a final

determination remains with the Court. See Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270-71

(1976). The Court is charged with making a de novo determination of any portion of the

Report of the Magistrate Judge to which a specific objection is made. The Court may

accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation made by the Magistrate

Judge or recommit the matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b). The Court will review the Report only for clear error in the absence of an

objection. See Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir.

2005) (stating that “in the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not

conduct a de novo review, but instead must only satisfy itself that there is no clear error

on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation” (internal quotation marks

omitted)).

The Report explains that Plaintiffs Title VII and ADA claims against Defendant

South Carolina Department of Employment are duplicative and should be dismissed as

frivolous; that his “harassment” claim contains vague, conclusory allegations that do not

state a plausible federal cause of action; that Plaintiff fails to plausibly state any claim

against Defendant South Carolina Department of Administration; and that Plaintiff also

fails to state a claim pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment or 18 U.S.C. §242. [Doc. 10

at 1-6 & n. 1.] In his objections, Plaintiff does not engage the Magistrate Judge’s analysis.

[Doc. 14.]

Nevertheless, out of an abundance of caution for the pro se Plaintiff, the Court has

conducted a de novo review of the Report, the record, and the applicable law. Upon such

2

3:25-cv-12752-JDA

Date Filed 11/18/25

Entry Number 16

Page 3 of 3

review, the Court accepts the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge and

incorporates it by reference. Accordingly, this action is DISMISSED without prejudice and

without issuance and service of process. Plaintiffs motion to establish judicial misconduct

[Doc. 8] is DENIED.1 Plaintiffs motion to submit additional documented evidence to

establish justification [Doc. 15] is FOUND AS MOOT.2

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ Jacquelyn D. Austin

United States District Judge

November 18, 2025

Greenville, South Carolina

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL

Plaintiff is hereby notified of the right to appeal this order pursuant to Rules 3 and

4 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.

1 Plaintiffs motion merely alleges, in conclusory fashion, that the Magistrate Judge has

committed errors and misconduct in this and other particular cases and in dismissing

these cases without service of process. [Doc. 8.] He requests that this Court “accept this

RESPONSE to justify a lawsuit against All Defendants and to properly apply Justice

according to the law(s).” [Id. at 3.]

2 The motion is found as moot because consideration of the additional evidence would

not change the conclusion that this case is subject to summary dismissal.

3

3:25-cv-12752-JDA

Entry Number 10

Date Filed 10/23/25

Page 1 of 7

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

COLUMBIA DIVISION

)

Clarence B. Jenkins, Jr.,

C/A No. 3:25-12752-JDA-PJG

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

v.

South Carolina Department of Employment

Work; South Carolina Department of

Administration,

)

)

)

)

)

ORDER AND

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

Defendants.

)

)

Plaintiff Clarence B. Jenkins, Jr., proceeding pro se, brings this employment case pursuant

to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. and the

Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq.1 This matter is before the

court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.) for initial review

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Having reviewed the Complaint in accordance with applicable law,

the court concludes that the Complaint should be summarily dismissed without prejudice and

without issuance and service of process.2

1 Plaintiff also purports to bring claims pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment and the

“Deprivation Act,” 18 U.S.C. § 242. (See ECF No. 1 at 1.) However, even liberally construed,

the court is unable to discern a plausible Fourteenth Amendment claim from Plaintiff’s allegations

and there is no private right of action under 18 U.S.C. § 242. See Dingle v, Baggett, C/A No. 5:1934-D, 2019 WL 3194834, at *3 (E.D.N.C. July 12, 2019) (“[Njeither 18 U.S.C. § 241 nor 18

U.S.C. § 242 creates a private right of action.”).

2Plaintiff submitted an Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or

Costs (Form AO240), which the court construed as a motion for leave to proceed in forma

pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915. (ECFNo. 3.) A review ofthe motion reveals that Plaintiff should

be relieved ofthe obligation to prepay the full filing fee. Therefore, Plaintiff’s motion for leave to

proceed in forma pauperis is granted.

Page 1 of 7

3:25-cv-12752-JDA

I.

Date Filed 10/23/25

Entry Number 10

Page 2 of 7

Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff generally alleges that Defendant South Carolina Department of Employment and

Workforce (“SCDEW”) has barred him from submitting employment applications in retaliation

for submitting claims of discrimination against them to the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (“EEOC”). Plaintiff specifically alleges that SCDEW added a notation to his profile

within the online system for applying for jobs at South Carolina state agencies indicating that

Plaintiff is “barred from applying.” Plaintiff alleges that he has been receiving emails from

SCDEW since 2021 notifying Plaintiff of job referrals. He claims that he has unsuccessfully

requested to no longer receive these emails and that they are frequent and intimidating. Plaintiff

does not specify what relief he seeks.

II.

Discussion

A.

Standard of Review

Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made

of the pro se Complaint. The Complaint has been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which

permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the

administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. This statute allows a district court to dismiss

the case upon a finding that the action “is frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a claim on which

relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such

relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

To state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the plaintiff must do more than make

mere conclusory statements. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp, v.

Twomblv. 550 U.S. 544,555 (2007). Rather, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face. Iqbal. 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly,

Page 2 of 7

3:25-cv-12752-JDA

Date Filed 10/23/25

Entry Number 10

Page 3 of 7

550 U.S. at 570. The reviewing court need only accept as true the complaint’s factual allegations,

not its legal conclusions. Iqbal. 556 U.S. at 678; Twomblv. 550 U.S. at 555.

This court is required to liberally construe pro se complaints, which are held to a less

stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007);

King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal

construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts

which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,

901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal. 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (outlining

pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for “all civil actions”).

B.

Analysis

As detailed in the chart below, Plaintiff raised mostly identical claims in two previous

cases, Jenkins v. Office of the South Carolina Governor. C/A No. 3:23-4593-JDA (“Jenkins I”)

and Jenkins v. Office of South Carolina Governor, C/A No. 3:25-7256-JDA (“Jenkins II”).

Case

Jenkins v. Office

of the South

Carolina

Governor, et. al.

(“Jenkins I”)

Civil

Action Claims Alleged

Number

3:23-4593

• Title VII

discrimination

• Title VII

retaliation

• Age

Discrimination

in Employment

Act (“ADEA”),

29U.S.C. §§ 621

et seq.

Page 3 of7

Disposition

Plaintiff’s claims involved the same

allegations concerning a notation in

his electronic employment file and

SCDEW’s denial of an interview in

November 2022. The court

summarily dismissed the following

defendants: Office of the South

Carolina Governor, South Carolina

Department of Administration, South

Carolina Office of Inspector General,

South Carolina Human Affairs

Commission, South Carolina

Department of Public Safety,

Richland County Government, and

South Carolina Secretary of State.

(See ECF No. 72.) The court allowed

Plaintiff’s claims against SCDEW to

proceed but ultimately granted

3:25-cv-12752-JDA

Jenkins v.

Officer of the

South Carolina

Governor, et, al,

(“Jenkins 11”)

Date Filed 10/23/25

3:25-7256

•

•

•

•

•

Current

Complaint

Entry Number 10

Title VII

discrimination

Title VII

retaliation

Americans with

Disabilities Act

Fourteenth

Amendment

Deprivation Act,

18U.S.C. §242

Page 4 of 7

SCDEW’s motion for judgment on

the pleadings and dismissed

Plaintiff’s claims against SCDEW

with prejudice. (Id.) Plaintiff

moved for reconsideration, which the

court denied. Plaintiff then appealed

to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Fourth Circuit. The Fourth

Circuit affirmed the court’s decision

on January 27,2025 and issued the

mandate and judgment on March 5,

2025.

In

a

pending

Report

and

Recommendation,

the

court

recommends summarily dismissing

the case because: (1) Plaintiff’s Title

VII claims against SCDEW are

duplicative of those asserted in

Jenkins I, (2) Plaintiff fails to state a

plausible claim under the ADA, and

(3) Plaintiff fails to adequately allege

claims against the remaining

defendants. (See ECF No. 8.)

•

Title VII

discrimination

• Title VII

retaliation

• Americans with

Disabilities Act

• Fourteenth

Amendment

• Deprivation Act

• Harassment

1.

Duplicative Title VII and ADA Claims

The court concludes that Plaintiff’s Title VII and ADA claims against SCDEW are

duplicative and should be dismissed as frivolous. Generally, duplicative litigation within the

federal courts is disfavored. See generally Stone v. Dep’t of Aviation, 453 F.3d 1271,1278 (10th

Cir. 2006) (“A plaintiff’s obligation to bring all related claims together in the same action arises

under the common law rule of claim preclusion prohibiting the splitting of actions.”); Motley Rice,

Page 4 of 7

3:25-cv-12752-JDA

Date Filed 10/23/25

Entry Number 10

Page 5 of 7

1

LLC v. Baldwin & Baldwin. LLP. 518 F. Supp. 2d 688, 697 (D.S.C. 2007) (quoting Serlin v.

Arthur Andersen & Co.. 3 F.3d 221, 223 (7th Cir. 1993)). Therefore, courts should dismiss

successive actions that are duplicative or redundant of cases already filed in the same court. See

Cottle v. Bell, 229 F.3d 1142 (4th Cir. 2000) (“Because district courts are not required to entertain

duplicative or redundant lawsuits, they may dismiss such suits as frivolous pursuant to § 1915(e).”)

(citing Aziz v. Burrows, 976 F.2d 1158,1158 (8th Cir. 1992)); McWilliams v. State of Colo., 121

F.3d 573,574 (10th Cir. 1997) (“ ‘Repetitious litigation of virtually identical causes of action’ may

be dismissed under § 1915 as frivolous or malicious.”) (quoting Bailey v. Johnson. 846 F.2d 1019,

1021 (5th Cir. 1988)); Wilson v. Lynaugh, 878 F.2d 846, 850 (5th Cir. 1989) (“To this end, IFP

complaints may be dismissed as frivolous pursuant to § 1915(d) when they seek to relitigate claims

which allege substantially the same facts arising from a common series of events which have

already been unsuccessfully litigated by the IFP plaintiff.”); see also Brown v. Plansky, 24

F. App’x 26, 27-28 (2d Cir. 2001) (affirming the district court’s sua sponte dismissal of a

complaint that was duplicative of an action previously brought by the plaintiff). Here, Plaintiff

alleges the same set of facts against the same defendant and thus presents clearly duplicative

claims.

2.

New Allegations of Harassment

In the Complaint, Plaintiff includes a new claim for “harassment.” Plaintiff alleges that he

has received harassing and intimidating job referral emails from SCDEW through SC Works,

SCDEW’s employment portal. He alleges that he “would make requests to SCDEW Employees

of S. Richardson Sellers and D. Miller in 2025 by return emails to stop sending job referrals

because SCDEW has SECRETLY BLACKBALLED with ‘BARRED FROM APPLYING’ along

with an ADMISSION of taking action to deny employment opportunities . . . therefore this is

Page 5 of 7

3:25-cv-12752-JDA

Date Filed 10/23/25

Entry Number 10

Page 6 of 7

employment discrimination, harassment, retaliation and hostility.” (ECF No. 1 at 3.) These emails

formed the basis of PlaintifTs most recent complaint to the EEOC. However, the court cannot

discern a plausible federal cause of action from Plaintiffs vague, conclusory allegations. Plaintiff

merely alleges that he has unsuccessfully unsubscribed from an email list. He provides no legal

authority to support a claim for such alleged activity.

3.

Remaining Defendant - South Carolina Department of Administration

In Jenkins I. the court informed Plaintiff through an Order Regarding Amendment and

subsequent Report and Recommendation that he had failed to adequately allege claims against the

remaining defendants, including the South Carolina Department of Administration. Further, in

finding that the court properly summarily dismissed the remaining defendants in Jenkins I. the

Fourth Circuit noted that Plaintiff failed to allege that he applied for any positions with those

defendants. Despite these repeated warnings, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to allege facts plausibly

suggesting that he applied for and was denied positions with the South Carolina Department of

Administration. In fact, PlaintifT s Complaint does not contain any allegations of wrongdoing by

the Department of Administration.

III.

Conclusion

Accordingly, the court recommends that the Complaint be summarily dismissed without

prejudice and without issuance and service of process.

October 22,2025

Columbia, South Carolina

Paige J. GcrAett

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff’s attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.

Page 6 of 7

Additional material

from this filing is

available in the

Clerk's Office.