Petition for Writ of Certiorari — John Torsten Loop, Petitioner v. Washington, et al.

App-1

Appendix A

[Filed: Mar. 20, 2026]

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOHN TORSTEN LOOP,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

STATE OF WASHING­

TON; JAMS MEDIATION

ARBITRATION AND

ADR SERVICES; HELEN

L. HALPERT, Honorable

(Retired), JAMS Arbitra­

tor; BOB FERGUSON,

Washington State Attor­

ney General,

No. 24-5020

D. C. No. 2:24-cv—

00669-KKE

MEMORANDUM*

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

Kymberly K. Evanson, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted March 16, 2026**

Before: SILVERMAN, NGUYEN, and HURWITZ,

Circuit Judges.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not

precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for de­

cision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

App-2

John Torsten Loop appeals pro se from the district

court’s judgment dismissing Loop’s action alleging

constitutional claims arising from state court proceed­

ings confirming an arbitration order. We have juris­

diction under 28 U. S. C. § 1291. We review de novo a

dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for lack of sub­

ject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine. Noel v. Hall, 341 F. 3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir.

2003). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Loop’s action

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine because Loop’s claims are a

“de facto appeal” of a prior state court judgment or are

“inextricably intertwined” with that judgment. See

id. at 1163 (explaining that an action “is a forbidden

de facto appeal under Rooker-Feldman when the

plaintiff in federal district court complains of a legal

wrong allegedly committed by the state court, and

seeks relief from the judgment of that court”); see also

Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F. 3d 772, 782 (9th Cir. 2012)

(explaining that claims are “inextricably intertwined”

with state court decisions where federal adjudication

“would impermissibly undercut the state ruling on the

same issues” (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted)).

We do not consider matters not specifically and dis­

tinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or ar­

guments and allegations raised for the first time on

appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F. 3d 983, 985 n.2

(9th Cir. 2009).

All pending motions and requests are denied.

AFFIRMED.

App-3

Appendix B

[Filed: Aug. 8, 2024]

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

AT SEATTLE

JOHN TORSTEN LOOP,

Plaintiff(s),

CASE NO. C240669-KKE

ORDER GRANTING

MOTIONS TO DIS­

STATE OF WASHINGTON, MISS

et al.,

v.

Defendant(s).

Plaintiff John Torsten Loop and his wife agreed to

arbitrate the dissolution of their marriage, and De­

fendant Helen Halpert, a retired King County Supe­

rior Court judge now employed as an arbitrator with

Defendant JAMS Mediation, Arbitration and ADR

Services (“JAMS”), conducted arbitration proceedings

in April and May 2023. See Dkt. No. 6-5, Dkt. No.

18-1.1 Halpert’s June 2023 arbitration award in­

cluded a restraining order against Loop, requiring

him to avoid contact with his ex-wife and minor

daughter until September 1, 2025. See Dkt. No. 18—

1 at 61—65. The restraining order was approved and

entered by a King County Superior Court judge, over

Loop’s objection. See Dkt. Nos. 6-1, 6—3.

Loop, proceeding pro se, then filed this lawsuit

against Halpert, JAMS, the State of Washington, and

1 Defendants’ unopposed request for judicial notice of docu­

ments filed in the underlying state court action is granted.

Dkt. No. 18.

App-4

Washington’s Attorney General Bob Ferguson in his

official capacity, alleging that Loop’s constitutional

rights were violated as a result of the restraining or­

der. See Dkt. No. 6. Defendants have moved to dis­

miss Loop’s complaint on multiple grounds, including

lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state

a claim. Dkt. Nos. 16, 26. Because the Court agrees

with Defendants that Loop’s claims fail on multiple

grounds, the Court will grant Defendants’ motions to

dismiss Loop’s complaint.

I.

BACKGROUND & ANALYSIS

Loop’s operative complaint alleges that the re­

straining order violates his constitutional rights to

due process and equal protection. Dkt. No. 6 at 5.

According to Loop, Halpert exceeded her authority in

including a restraining order of more than one year’s

duration in her arbitration award, and the King

County Superior Court erred in entering it without

fully considering Loop’s objections and challenges.

Id. at 10-11. Loop also alleges that Defendants’ “ac­

tions disproportionately affected his parental rights

without a just basis, treating him differently than

other citizens without proper justification.” Id. at 14.

Loop appealed the restraining order to the Wash­

ington State Court of Appeals (Dkt. No. 6-8), and filed

this separate federal action also related to the entry of

the restraining order. Dkt. No. 1. Halpert and

JAMS timely filed a motion to dismiss, as did Fergu­

son and the State of Washington. Dkt. Nos. 16, 26.

Both motions to dismiss assert that the Court lacks

subject matter jurisdiction over Loop’s claims under

the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and that Loop’s claims

fail for other reasons as well. Id. Loop opposed

App-5

both motions to dismiss, characterizing his briefs as

cross-motions. Dkt. Nos. 19, 29. The Court now

turns to consider the merits of Defendants’ motions to

dismiss.

A.

Legal Standards

A complaint may be dismissed under Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) if “the allegations con­

tained in a complaint are insufficient on their face to

invoke federal jurisdiction.” Safe Air for Everyone v.

Meyer, 373 F. 3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004).

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine “stands for the rela­

tively straightforward principle that federal district

courts do not have jurisdiction to hear de facto appeals

from state court judgments.” Carmona v. Carmona,

603 F. 3d 1041, 1050 (9th Cir. 2010). The Ninth Cir­

cuit has explained how to determine whether a federal

action constitutes a “de facto appeal” barred under the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine:

A suit brought in federal district court is a “de

facto appeal” forbidden by Rooker-Feldman when

“a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an al­

legedly erroneous decision by a state court, and

seeks relief from a state court judgment based on

that decision.” In contrast, if a plaintiff “asserts

as a legal wrong an allegedly illegal act or omis­

sion by an adverse party, Rooker-Feldman does

not bar jurisdiction.”

Id. (quoting Noel v. Hall, 341 F. 3d 1148, 1164 (9th

Cir. 2003)). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies

even where a federal complaint challenges a state

court decision based on federal constitutional

grounds, and where the state court decision is

App-6

interlocutory rather than final. See Benavidez v.

Cnty. of San Diego, 993 F. 3d 1134, 1142-43 (9th Cir.

2021). Where federal constitutional claims are ‘“in­

extricably intertwined’” with a state court decision be­

cause the relief requested in the federal suit “‘would

effectively reverse the state court decision or void its

rulingf,]’” then the federal suit is barred under the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Hooper v. Brnovich, 56

F. 4th 619, 624-25 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Cooper v.

Ramos, 704 F. 3d 772, 778, 779 (9th Cir. 2012)).

B. Loop’s Claims Are Barred by the RookerFeldman Doctrine.

Loop’s operative complaint explicitly characterizes

this action as an appeal of a state court decision. See,

e. g., Dkt. No. 6 at 6 (“Mr. Loop is appealing to the US

District Court to review the Washington State deci­

sion that affirmed an arbitration award issued with­

out a proper de novo hearing.”). As such, and while

emphasizing that Loop is simultaneously pursuing a

direct appeal of the restraining order in the Washing­

ton State Court of Appeals (see Dkt. No. 6-8 (Loop’s

opening Division One brief attached to his operative

complaint)), the Defendants contend that the federal

action is prohibited under the Rooker-Feldman doc­

trine. Dkt. No. 16 at 4, Dkt. No. 26 at 4-6.

Loop addresses the Rooker-Feldman doctrine in his

opposition briefs, but his arguments only reinforce

that the doctrine prohibits this action. For example,

Loop concedes that this action “constitutes parallel lit­

igation” to his direct appeal in state court. Dkt. No.

29 at 3. Loop argues that this parallel litigation is

not prohibited by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine be­

cause the restraining order is consistent with state

App-7

law, but violates the federal constitution, and there­

fore he invokes this Court’s federal question jurisdic­

tion. Id. at 3-4, Dkt. No. 19 at 1. The Ninth Circuit

has rejected this contention, however. See Be­

navidez, 993 F. 3d at 1142-43. Even “where the chal­

lenge to the state court decision involves federal con­

stitutional issues[,]” federal district courts “must de­

cline jurisdiction whenever they are ‘in essence being

called upon to review the state court decision.’” Doe

& Assocs. Law Offs. v. Napolitano, 252 F. 3d 1026,

1029, 1030 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting D. C. Ct. ofApp. v.

Feldman, 460 U. S. 462, 482 n.16 (1983)).

The Court is persuaded that Loop’s complaint in­

vites it to review a state court decision: one of Loop’s

opposition briefs explicitly frames the issues before

the Court as assignments of error in the state court’s

decision (Dkt. No. 19 at 3-4), and the primary relief

Loop seeks is an injunction preventing enforcement of

the restraining order and a declaration that the re­

straining order is unconstitutional (Dkt. No. 6 at 14).

This action constitutes a de facto appeal of a state

court decision, alleging constitutional claims that are

inextricably intertwined with the state court decision.

As such, this action is prohibited under the RookerFeldman doctrine and must be dismissed.

As outlined by Defendants, Loop’s claims fail for

other reasons as well. Ferguson and Washington

State (to the extent that Loop intends to hold them

liable for the actions of the King County Superior

Court judge who entered the restraining order) have

absolute immunity for any damages sought arising

from an allegedly erroneous King County Superior

Court decision. See In re Castillo, 297 F. 3d 940, 947

(9th Cir. 2002) (“[A]bsolute immunity insulates judges

App-8

from charges of erroneous acts or irregular action,

even when it is alleged that such action was driven by

malicious or corrupt motives, or when the exercise of

judicial authority is flawed by the commission of grave

procedural

errors.”

(cleaned

up)). Similarly,

Halpert/JAMS enjoy arbitral immunity for claims

arising out of any decisional act. See Sacks v. Die­

trich, 663 F. 3d 1065, 1070 (9th Cir. 2011) (explaining

that arbitral immunity is available if a “claim, ‘regard­

less of its nominal title, effectively seekfs] to challenge

the decisional act of an arbitrator or arbitration panel

...’” (quoting Pfannenstiel v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,

Fenner & Smith, 477 F. 3d 1155, 1159 (10th Cir.

2007))).

Because Defendants are immune from civil liability

for any acts of a judicial nature or based on an arbitral

decision, and the claims Loop raises are entirely based

on judicial actions or arbitral decisionmaking, Loop

has failed to state a valid claim against Defendants.

This is another basis for dismissing Loop’s complaint.

See, e. g., Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F. 2d

696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988) (explaining that claims may

be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6) if they lack a “cognizable legal theory”).

These fundamental deficiencies in Loop’s complaint

cannot be cured via amendment of the complaint, and

therefore the complaint shall be dismissed with prej­

udice. See, e.g., Cooper, 704 F. 3d at 783 (“Dismissal

of a complaint without leave to amend is proper where

it is clear that the complaint could not be saved by

amendment.”).

App-9

IL

CONCLUSION

Because this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction

over this action, and because Plaintiff has failed to

state a valid claim against Defendants, the Court

GRANTS Defendants’ motions to dismiss. Dkt. Nos.

16, 26. Plaintiffs cross-motions and motion for dis­

covery are DENIED as moot. Dkt. Nos. 19, 29, 32.

Plaintiffs complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice.

Dated this 8th day of August, 2024.

/s/ Kymberlv K. Evanson

Kymberly K. Evanson

United States District Judge

App-10

Appendix C

[Filed: Feb. 23, 2024]

SUPERIOR COURT OF WASHINGTON FOR

KING COUNTY

In re the Marriage of:

NO. 21-3-00225-1 SEA

JOHN TORSTEN LOOP

RESTRAINING OR­

DER

|x| Final (RSTO)

Clerk’s action required:

6, 7

Surrender Weapons Or­

dered: 13 yes

no

PETITIONER

AND

LISA MICHELE LOOP

RESPONDENT

Restraining Order

This order replaces all earlier Restraining Orders

with the same Restrained Person, issued under this

case number.

1.

This Order restrains (name):

JOHN “JACK” TORSTEN LOOP

Restrained Party’s distinguishing features:

Sex

Hair

Race

MALE

CAUCASIAN

Silver

Height: 6'4"

Weight: 250

Eyes: Blues

Caution: Access to weapons:

known

yes

no E un­

App-11

2.

This Order protects (name/s): LISA

MICHELE LOOP

and the following children, who are under

18 (if any)__________________________ ________

Age

Child’s name

1. [Redaction added]

3.

16

To the Restrained Person listed in 1:

This Order starts immediately, and ends in 12

months or on (date): September 1, 2025.

Warning! You must obey this order. Violation of this

order with actual notice of its terms is a criminal of­

fense under Chapter 7.105 RCW and will subject the

violator to arrest (RCW 7.105.450). This order is en­

forceable in all 50 U.S. states, the District of Colum­

bia, and U.S. territories and tribal lands (18 U.S.C.

§2265).

4. Findings

Authority: The court has jurisdiction over the

parties, the child/ren listed in 2, and the subject

matter.

Notice: The Restrained Person had reasonable

notice and an opportunity to be heard. They were

notified of the hearing by

personal service

service by mail allowed by the court

service by

publication allowed by the court.

The Restrained Person was present at

the hearing.

The Restrained Person was not present

at the hearing.

App-12

□ The Restrained Person had actual notice

of the hearing.

13 other (specify): THIS ORDER IS EN­

TERED PURSUANT TO AN ARBITRA­

TION RULING BY HON. HELEN

HALPERT (RET.).

13 Credible Threat: The Restrained Person

represents a credible threat to the physical

safety of the Protected Persons.

13 Intimate Partner: The Restrained Per­

son and the Protected Person are/were inti­

mate partners because they are (check all

that apply):

13 current or former spouses or domestic

partners

(3 parents of a child-in-common (unless a

child was conceived through sexual assault).

5.

Court Orders to the Restrained Person

listed in 1:

Warning! You must obey this order until it ends.

If you know about this order but do not obey, you

may be arrested and charged with a crime.

13 Do not disturb

Do not disturb the peace of the Protected Per­

son or of any child listed in 2.

13 Stay away

Do not go onto the grounds of or enter the

Protected Person’s home, workplace, vehicle,

or school, or the daycare or school of any child

listed in 2.

13 Do not knowingly go or stay within 1000

feet of the Protected Person’s home, vehicle,

App-13

workplace, school, or the daycare or school

of any child listed in 2.

3 Do not hurt or threaten

Warning! If the court checks this box, the court

must consider if weapons restrictions are required

by state law; federal law may also prohibit the Re­

strained Person from possessing firearms or ammu­

nition.

Do not:

■ Assault, harass, stalk, or molest the Pro­

tected Person or any child listed in 2; or

■ Use, try to use, or threaten to use physical

force against the Protected Person or chil­

dren that would reasonably be expected to

cause bodily injury.

13 Prohibit weapons and order surrender

(separate order required)

The Restrained Person must:

■ Immediately surrender to law enforcement

and not access, possess, have in their custody

or control, purchase, receive, or attempt to

purchase or receive firearms, other danger­

ous weapons, or concealed pistol licenses;

and

■ Comply with the Order to Surrender and Pro­

hibit Weapons (form VPS 001) filed separately.

Findings — The court (check all that apply)'.

3 must issue the orders referred to above

because:

13 the court ordered the do not hurt or

threaten restraints above and the court

finds that the restrained person had actual

App-14

notice and an opportunity to participate.

AND:

■ the restrained person represents a cred­

ible threat to the physical safety of a pro­

tected person, OR

■ This order explicitly prohibits the use,

attempted use, or threatened use of

physical force against any protected per­

son.

Therefore, the weapons restrictions are re­

quired by state law. RCW 9.41.800(2).

□ the court finds by a preponderance of the

evidence that the restrained person:

□ has used, displayed, or threatened to

use a firearm or other dangerous

weapon in a felony; or

□ is ineligible to possess a firearm un­

der RCW 9.41.040.

□ may issue the orders referred to above

because the court finds by a preponder­

ance of evidence that the Restrained Per­

son presents a serious and imminent threat

to public health or safety, or the health or

safety of any individual by possessing a

firearm or other dangerous weapon.

□ Other restraining orders:

6. Washington Crime Information Center

(WACIC) and Other Data Entry

Clerk’s Action. The court clerk shall forward a

copy of this order immediately to the following

App-15

law enforcement agency {county or city) KING

COUNTY

(check only one): 1*1 Sheriff’s Office or U Po­

lice Department

(List the same agency that entered the tempo­

rary order, if any)

This agency shall enter this order into WACIC

and National Crime Info. Center (NCIC).

7.

Service

□ Required. The Restrained Person must

be served with a copy of this order.

Important! The Protected Person has a right to

have law enforcement serve this order free of

charge if the “Do not disturb,” “Stay away,” “Do not

hurt or threaten,” or “Prohibit weapons and order

surrender” boxes are checked above.

□ The law enforcement agency where the Re­

strained Person lives or can be served shall serve the

Restrained Person with a copy of this order and shall

promptly complete and return proof of service to this

court.

Law enforcement agency:

(county or city)

(check only one): LJSheriff’s Office or LJPolice Depart­

ment

□ The Protected Person shall make private ar­

rangements for service.

(This is only an option if surrender of weapons is

not ordered)

After serving, the server fills out a Proof of Personal

Service (form FL All Family 101) and gives it to you.

File the original Proof of Personal Service with the

App-16

court clerk, and give a copy to the law enforcement

agency listed in section 6 above.

Clerk’s Action. The court clerk shall forward a

copy of this order on or before the next judicial

day to the agency and/or person checked above.

The court clerk shall also provide a copy to the

Protected Person.

S Not required. The Restrained Person

does not have to be served because the Re­

strained Person or their lawyer signed this

order, or was at the hearing when this or­

der was made and the court finds sufficient

notice.

Ordered.

02/23/2024

Date

Time

11:53 /s/ Jason Holloway

Judge or Commissioner

App-17

Petitioner and Respondent or their lawyers fill

out below.

This order (check any This order (check any

that apply):

that apply):

□ is an agreement of the □ is an agreement of the

parties

parties

□ is presented by me

□ is presented by me

□ may be signed by the

□ may be signed by the

court without notice to

court without notice to

me

me

[Handwritten: Appear by ZsZ Elizabeth A. Bianchi

Elizabeth A. Bianchi

Zoom and shall be pro­

WSBA

No. 35823

vided an atty.]

Robert Parker? ZsZ John Attorney for Respondent

Loop

Attorney for Petitioner

Important! Protected Person: you must fill out a

Law Enforcement and Confidential Information form,

PO 003, and give it to the court clerk.

App-18

Appendix D

[Filed: Jun. 30, 2026]

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOHN TORSTEN LOOP,

No. 24-5020

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

D. C. No. 2:24-cv00669-KKE

STATE OF WASHING­

TON; et al.,

Western District of

Washington, Seattle

Defendants - Appellees.

ORDER

Before: SILVERMAN, NGUYEN, and HURWITZ,

Circuit Judges.

The panel has voted to deny the petition for panel

rehearing.

*

The full court has been advised of the petition for

rehearing en banc and no judge has requested a vote

on whether to rehear the matter en banc. See Fed.

R. App. P. 40.

The petition for panel rehearing and petition for re­

hearing en banc (Docket Entry No. 28) are denied.

This court will not entertain further filings in this

closed case.