Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Altrad Investment Authority S.A.S, et al., Petitioners v. Cape Intermediate Holdings Limited, Individually and as Successor in Interest to Cape Asbestos Company Limited, By and Through Its Receiver Peter D. Protopapas, et al.

Supreme Court briefSep 8, 2026

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No.

In the Supreme Court of the United States

ALTRAD INVESTMENT AUTHORITY S.A.S.;

MOHED ALTRAD, PETITIONERS

CAPE INTERMEDIATE HOLDINGS LIMITED,

INDIVIDUALLY AND AS SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST TO

CAPE ASBESTOS COMPANY LIMITED,

BY AND THROUGH ITS RECEIVER

PETER D. PROTOPAPAS, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

M. TODD CARROLL

KEVIN A. HALL

M. ELIZABETH O’NEILL

WOMBLE BOND

DICKINSON (US) LLP

1221 Main Street,

Suite 1600

Columbia, SC 29201

KANNON K. SHANMUGAM

Counsel of Record

JAMES DURLING

JAKE L. KRAMER

ELEANOR K. RITTER

DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP

1050 17th Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20036

(202) 962-7000

kshanmugam@davispolk.com

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the territorial limits on state courts’ power

embodied in the Due Process Clause, the Commerce

Clause, and principles of federalism prohibit a state-court

receiver from controlling the litigation decisions and other

internal affairs of an out-of-state corporation when the receiver has not been recognized in the corporation’s place

of incorporation.

(I)

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Petitioners are Altrad Investment Authority S.A.S.

(AIA) and Mohed Altrad. AIA is owned by Altrad Participations. No publicly held corporation owns 10% or more

of AIA or Altrad Participations.

Respondents are Cape Intermediate Holdings Limited (CIHL), individually and as successor in interest to

Cape Asbestos Company Limited, by and through its receiver Peter D. Protopapas; John A. Tibbs; and Margaret

Tibbs. A separate entity, Cape plc, was previously listed

as the entity in receivership, but it is not a party in interest to the proceedings; CIHL is the relevant party in receivership.

Charter Consolidated Ltd., ESAB Corporation, and

Central Mining & Investment Corporation Ltd. were appellants in the South Carolina Supreme Court and have

filed a separate petition for certiorari.

(II)

RELATED PROCEEDINGS

South Carolina Court of Common Pleas (S.C. Ct. Common Pleas):

Park v. Armstrong International, Inc.,

No. 2021-CP-40-02727 (Mar. 17, 2023)

(order appointing receiver)

Tibbs v. 3M Co., No. 2023-CP-40-1759 (Oct. 13, 2025)

(order confirming receiver)

South Carolina Supreme Court (S.C.):

Tibbs v. 3M Co., No. 2025-2104 (May 27, 2026)

(opinion affirming confirmation of receiver)

Tibbs v. 3M Co., No. 2025-2104 (Aug. 4, 2026)

(order denying rehearing)

Tibbs v. 3M Co., No. 2025-2104 (Aug. 25, 2026)

(order denying stay of remittitur)

(III)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Opinions below ................................................................................ 1

Jurisdiction ...................................................................................... 2

Constitutional provisions involved ............................................... 2

Statement ......................................................................................... 2

A. Factual background .......................................................... 3

B. Procedural history ............................................................. 4

Reasons for granting the petition............................................... 10

Conclusion ...................................................................................... 15

Appendix A .................................................................................... 1a

Appendix B .................................................................................. 31a

Appendix C .................................................................................. 91a

Appendix D .................................................................................. 94a

Appendix E .................................................................................. 96a

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Adams v. Cape Industries plc

[1990] 1 Ch 433 (CA) ............................................... 4, 6, 7, 9

Altrad Investment Authority S.A.S. v. Protopapas

[2025] EWHC 2470 (Ch) .................................................... 7

Asahi Metal Industries Co. v. Superior Court,

480 U.S. 102 (1987) ...................................................... 12, 13

Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court,

582 U.S. 255 (2017) ............................................................ 12

Cape plc v. Protopapas, No. DBYB-W-B7J-PM3N

(Montpellier Ct. App. Apr. 8, 2025) .................................. 7

CIHL v. Protopapas [2024] EWHC 2999 (Ch) ............ 6, 7, 9

CIHL v. Protopapas [2025] EWHC 2706 (Ch) .................... 8

Computer Associates International, Inc. v. Altai,

Inc., 126 F.3d 365 (2d Cir. 1997) ....................................... 8

(V)

Page

Cases—continued

Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,

420 U.S. 469 (1975) ........................................................ 2, 14

Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council,

530 U.S. 363, (2000)........................................................... 12

Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014) .................... 13

Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982) ................... 11, 12

Fuld v. Palestine Liberation Organization,

606 U.S. 1 (2025) ................................................................ 12

Mercantile National Bank v. Langdeau,

371 U.S. 555 (1963) ........................................................ 2, 14

National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Payne

& Keller Co., 731 S.W.3d 58 (Tex. Ct. App. 2026)......... 13

Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. Industrial

Accident Commission, 306 U.S. 493 (1939) .................. 11

Welch v. Advance Auto Parts, Inc.,

916 S.E.2d 320 (S.C. 2025),

cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 1497 (2026) ................................... 6

Whittaker Clark & Daniels Inc., In re,

176 F.4th 241 (3d Cir. 2026), petitions for cert.

pending, No. 26-159 (filed July 24, 2026),

No. 26-263 (filed Aug. 25, 2026)............................... 4, 9-14

World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,

444 U.S. 286 (1980). ......................................................... 12

Constitution and statutes:

U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ......................................... 2, 10-12

U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1 ...................................... 2, 10-12

28 U.S.C. 1257(a) ...................................................................... 2

Miscellaneous

Akiko Matsuda, Asbestos Bankruptcies Test Reach

of Frequent South Carolina Receiver,

Wall Street Journal Pro (Sept. 22, 2025)

<tinyurl.com/WSJAsbestos>......................................... 14

In the Supreme Court of the United States

No.

ALTRAD INVESTMENT AUTHORITY S.A.S.;

MOHED ALTRAD, PETITIONERS

CAPE INTERMEDIATE HOLDINGS LIMITED,

INDIVIDUALLY AND AS SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST TO

CAPE ASBESTOS COMPANY LIMITED,

BY AND THROUGH ITS RECEIVER

PETER D. PROTOPAPAS, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Altrad Investment Authority S.A.S. and Mohed Altrad respectfully petition for a writ of certiorari to review

the judgment of the South Carolina Supreme Court in this

case.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the South Carolina Supreme Court

(App., infra, 1a-30a) is reported at 933 S.E.2d 254. The

opinion of the South Carolina Court of Common Pleas

confirming the receivership in this case (App., infra, 31a90a) is unreported.

(1)

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the South Carolina Supreme Court

was entered on May 27, 2026. A petition for rehearing was

denied on August 4, 2026 (App., infra, 94a-95a). The jurisdiction of this Court rests on 28 U.S.C. 1257(a). See

Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 482-483

(1975); Mercantile National Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S.

555, 558 (1963).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution, Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, provides:

The Congress shall have Power * * * [t]o regulate

Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.

The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution provides, in relevant part:

[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.

STATEMENT

This case presents the same important question that

has divided federal and state courts as the concurrently

filed petition in Charter Consolidated, Ltd. v. Cape plc.

Both petitions arise from the same judgment of the South

Carolina Supreme Court and are brought by similarly situated petitioners. The question presented is whether the

territorial limits on state courts’ power embodied in the

Due Process Clause, the Commerce Clause, and principles of federalism prohibit a state-court receiver from

controlling the litigation decisions and other internal affairs of an out-of-state corporation when the receiver has

not been recognized in the corporation’s place of incorporation.

As explained below and in the petition in Charter, the

South Carolina Supreme Court’s decision conflicts with a

decision of the Third Circuit on that important question of

constitutional law. The decision also disregards this

Court’s precedents concerning the territorial limits on

state courts’ power. Because this case is an excellent vehicle to address the question presented, the petition for a

writ of certiorari should be granted, together with the petition in Charter.

A. Factual Background

Petitioners are Altrad Investment Authority S.A.S.

(AIA) and its owner, Mohed Altrad. AIA is a leading provider of industrial services; it is organized under the laws

of, and maintains its principal place of business in, France.

Mr. Altrad is a French citizen. In 2017, AIA acquired

Cape plc, an industrial services company based in the

United Kingdom. Cape plc is the parent company of Cape

Intermediate Holdings Limited (CIHL). CIHL, in turn,

was formerly the parent company of North American Asbestos Corporation (NAAC), an Illinois company that sold

asbestos in the United States. App., infra, 42a-43a; S.C.

App. 262.*

In the 1970s, American plaintiffs harmed by asbestos

products sued NAAC around the country. After settling

many of those claims, NAAC dissolved in 1978. Various

plaintiffs then began suing CIHL on the theory that it was

subject to personal jurisdiction in American courts by virtue of its contacts with NAAC; CIHL had no contacts with

the United States other than its ownership of shares in

Citations to “S.C. App.” refer to the record on appeal filed in the

South Carolina Supreme Court proceedings. See Tibbs v. 3M Co., No.

2025-2104 (filed Dec. 10, 2025).

NAAC. One of those cases resulted in a $15 million default judgment against CIHL in a Texas federal district

court. App., infra, 47a; S.C. App. 2590-2591, 2598, 2611.

Because CIHL is an English company, the plaintiffs in

that case initiated a judicial proceeding in the United

Kingdom to enforce the Texas judgment against CIHL.

In Adams v. Cape Industries plc [1990] 1 Ch 433 (CA), the

Court of Appeal of England and Wales held that the judgment against CIHL was unenforceable because CIHL

lacked a sufficient presence in the United States to establish personal jurisdiction. S.C. App. 2589-2728. In particular, the Court of Appeal rejected the plaintiffs’ argument

that NAAC’s presence in the United States should be imputed to CIHL on the theory that NAAC was CIHL’s alter ego. The Court of Appeal therefore concluded that the

Texas court lacked personal jurisdiction over CIHL, rendering the $15 million judgment unenforceable. Id. at

2591, 2687-2688, 2703, 2728; cf. App., infra, 13a, 16a.

B. Procedural History

1. In 2021, Isabella Park filed a lawsuit in South Carolina’s consolidated asbestos docket, naming Cape plc and

CIHL as two of over four dozen defendants. See Park v.

Armstrong International, Inc., No. 2021-CP-40-02727.

Cape plc and CIHL did not answer the complaint. Instead

of entering a default judgment, however, the state trial

court appointed a local attorney, Peter Protopapas, as a

receiver over Cape plc. App., infra, 3a, 92a; S.C. App. 850.

Mr. Protopapas has been appointed as receiver in numerous other asbestos-related cases. See, e.g., In re Whittaker Clark & Daniels Inc., 176 F.4th 241, 250 (3d Cir.

2026), petitions for cert. pending, No. 26-159 (filed July 24,

2026), No. 26-263 (filed Aug. 25, 2026). The appointment

order in Park purported to give the receiver “the power

and authority to fully administer all assets of Cape”; to

“accept service” and “engage counsel” on Cape’s behalf;

and to “take any and all steps necessary to protect” Cape’s

interests, “whatever they may be.” App., infra, 92a. The

order did not identify any specific property that would be

subject to the putative receivership, and it did not set a

statutorily required bond that would have allowed the receivership to be dissolved. Id. at 3a, 22a, 92a-93a. The

receivership order did not mention CIHL, but it was later

clarified that CIHL is the relevant entity in receivership.

Id. at 88a.

2. In 2023, John and Margaret Tibbs initiated this

case in South Carolina’s consolidated asbestos docket.

The plaintiffs named a litany of defendants, including

Cape plc. The receiver appointed in Park accepted service of the Tibbs complaint on behalf of Cape plc. App.,

infra, 37a.

Soon thereafter, the receiver, purporting to act on behalf of Cape plc, filed a third-party complaint against petitioners and other defendants. App., infra, 38a. The

third-party complaint fashioned its action as a “reckoning” against companies “responsible for the sale and use

of asbestos or asbestos-containing products throughout

the United States.” S.C. App. 258. The receiver alleged

that petitioners are liable to Cape because they were unjustly enriched as a result of a “litigation-avoidance

scheme,” and further alleged that they took possession of

funds that “should have remained available to bodily-injury claimants in the United States.” Id. at 308. In addition, the receiver alleged that petitioners were the alter

egos of Cape. Ibid. The receiver sought relief to compensate all claimants in South Carolina; the relief was not limited to the Tibbs’ claims. Id. at 309.

Petitioners moved to dismiss the third-party complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, arguing, inter alia,

that they lacked sufficient connections to South Carolina.

They argued that the third-party complaint and the putative receivership ran afoul of the English Court of Appeal’s decision in Adams and thus violated principles of

international comity. The trial court denied the motion.

App., infra, 4a, 38a.

After granting review, the South Carolina Supreme

Court held that a remand was necessary to confirm the

receiver’s appointment in the Tibbs case and to clarify the

scope of the receiver’s authority in light of that court’s intervening decision in Welch v. Advance Auto Parts, Inc.,

916 S.E.2d 320 (2025), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 1497 (2026).

App., infra, 4a.

3. While the South Carolina proceedings were ongoing, CIHL and petitioners commenced various foreign

proceedings to determine their rights with respect to the

receivership.

a. First, in 2024, CIHL commenced proceedings

against the receiver in the High Court of England and

Wales. See CIHL v. Protopapas [2024] EWHC 2999

(Mann I). CIHL sought an order declaring that the receiver lacked the authority to speak on its behalf, in part

because such a receivership would not be recognized under English law and because the receiver was simultaneously seeking to impose liability against it. See Mann I,

slip op. 1, 56-61. CIHL also sought a declaration that the

receiver’s appointment was invalid because South Carolina lacked personal jurisdiction over it. See id. at 60-61.

In a 73-page decision, the High Court held that the putative receiver lacked authority over CIHL and that the

appointment was void. See Mann I, slip op. 61-73. In particular, the court determined that CIHL had no actual

presence in the United States, including in South Carolina; that the relationship between NAAC and CIHL

could not establish CIHL’s presence in the United States

under the English Court of Appeal’s decision in Adams;

that the receiver’s duty to protect CIHL’s interests was

inconsistent with the allegations in the third-party complaint; and that the receiver was committing a tort against

CIHL under English law by acting without the consent of

CIHL’s board. See ibid. The court thus enjoined the receiver from taking any action in CIHL’s name. See ibid.

b. In April 2025, petitioners entered into a mutual release with CIHL of all claims that had arisen or could

arise from the allegations in the third-party complaint.

App., infra, 21a. When the receiver ignored that release

and continued to pursue the claims, petitioners brought

another proceeding in the English High Court seeking a

declaration as to the validity of the mutual release. See

Altrad Investment Authority S.A.S. v. Protopapas [2025]

EWHC 2470 (Ch) (Smith). The court affirmed the validity and enforceability of the release. See Smith, slip op.

29-33. The court recognized that, under Adams, any liability for the asbestos-related claims in the United States

“begins and ends with NAAC.” Ibid. The court also emphasized that decades of asbestos claims settlements and

corporate transactions, including AIA’s arm’s-length acquisition of CIHL, had been made in reliance on Adams.

See ibid.

c. During the same period, petitioners also initiated

enforcement proceedings in France—their country of citizenship—seeking an order acknowledging the validity of

Mann I. See Cape plc v. Protopapas, No. DBYB-W-B7JPM3N (Montpellier Ct. App. Apr. 8, 2025); S.C. App.

2930-2936. The French court determined that the English

court in Mann I had jurisdiction to render its decision;

that the decision did not violate international public policy; and that no fraud was involved in the proceedings.

S.C. App. 2932-2935. Accordingly, the French court

granted an exequatur—a legal document making the decision in Mann I enforceable in France. Id. at 2936; see,

e.g., Computer Associates International, Inc. v. Altai,

Inc., 126 F.3d 365, 368 (2d Cir. 1997).

d. Finally, in October 2025, a group of third-party defendants in this case—all of which were asbestos-producing entities controlled by or affiliated with a South African

family—announced that they had reached a settlement

with the receiver. Petitioners objected to that settlement

on the basis that the receiver lacked the authority to enter

into any agreement on behalf of a Cape entity. Petitioners

therefore returned to the English High Court to request

an order enjoining those defendants and the receiver from

entering the settlement agreement, on the ground that

the putative agreement violated the order in Mann I. See

CIHL v. Protopapas [2025] EWHC 2706 (Ch) (Mann II).

The court declined to grant that relief, but it reaffirmed

that the receiver lacked authority to bind CIHL to any

agreement. See Mann II, slip op. 15. The court thus determined that any payments to the receiver were effectively gratuitous and would not release the defendants

from liability; in fact, the payments could expose those defendants to additional liability for aiding the receiver’s

tortious conduct against CIHL. See ibid.

4. Just days after the English High Court’s decision

in Mann II, the South Carolina trial court—on remand

from the South Carolina Supreme Court—issued an order

reaffirming the Park receivership appointment, extending the appointment to the Tibbs case, and holding that

the receiver was authorized to accept service on CIHL’s

behalf and bring third-party claims against petitioners in

CIHL’s name. App., infra, 84a-90a.

The South Carolina Supreme Court granted review

and affirmed the confirmation order. App., infra, 1a-30a.

Among other things, the court concluded that none of the

decisions by the foreign tribunals—including the 1990 Adams decision and the four other decisions recognizing the

validity of Adams—was binding. Id. at 12a-15a. The

South Carolina Supreme Court recognized that the English High Court’s decision in Mann I expressly enjoined

the receiver “from acting on behalf of Cape anywhere in

the world,” but it nevertheless dismissed the decision as

“unaccompanied by any facts, logic, or law.” Id. at 13a.

The South Carolina Supreme Court also declined to

follow the Third Circuit’s decision in Whittaker, supra,

which involved a challenge to the authority of the same

receiver, appointed by the same South Carolina trial

court, as in this case. App., infra, 24a-25a. In Whittaker,

the Third Circuit held that the Constitution prohibited the

receiver from exercising authority so as to “dives[t]” a

New Jersey corporation’s control over its internal affairs,

including its ability to file for bankruptcy. See 176 F.4th

at 258-259. For South Carolina to grant the receiver such

authority, the court explained, would be “an unprecedented exertion of power over a foreign corporation” and

“a radical intrusion into the province of a co-equal sovereign.” Id. at 259.

The South Carolina Supreme Court nonetheless reasoned that Whittaker did not address the question

whether a South Carolina court could appoint a receiver

to control the litigation decisions and other internal affairs

of out-of-state corporations. App., infra, 25a. The court

further determined that the “pursuits” authorized by the

confirmation order in this case “do not tread on [CIHL’s]

internal affairs.” Ibid.

5. Petitioners sought rehearing and a stay or recall of

the mandate. The South Carolina Supreme Court denied

both requests. In denying a stay or recall of the mandate,

the court again rejected petitioners’ reliance on the Third

Circuit’s decision in Whittaker. The court further re-

jected the proposition that state courts lack power to control the internal affairs of foreign corporations, dismissing

it as “surreal.” App., infra, 101a.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

This petition presents the same question as the concurrently filed petition in Charter Consolidated, Ltd. v.

Cape plc: namely, whether the territorial limits on state

courts’ power embodied in the Due Process Clause, the

Commerce Clause, and principles of federalism prohibit a

state-court receiver from controlling the litigation decisions and other internal affairs of an out-of-state corporation when the receiver has not been recognized in the corporation’s place of incorporation. As explained below and

in the petition in Charter, that question warrants the

Court’s review.

1. The decision below conflicts with the Third Circuit’s decision in In re Whittaker Clark & Daniels Inc.,

176 F.4th 241 (2026), petitions for cert. pending, No. 26159 (filed July 24, 2026), No. 26-263 (filed Aug. 25, 2026).

There, the Third Circuit considered whether a materially

similar receivership order—issued by the same statecourt judge and involving the same receiver as in this

case—divested a New Jersey corporation’s board of the

authority to file bankruptcy. See id. at 253. The court

held that it did not, including on the ground that the order

would contravene the Constitution to the extent it gave

the receiver control over an out-of-state corporation’s internal affairs. See id. at 258-259.

As the Third Circuit explained, the Constitution “has

a great deal to say about the relations between [S]tates,

their authority to decide the rights of foreign parties, and

the application of their laws in instances of conflict.”

Whittaker, 176 F.4th at 258. Those limits follow from the

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the

dormant Commerce Clause, and “the very nature of the

federal union of states.” Id. at 258-259 (quoting Pacific

Employers Insurance Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 306 U.S. 493, 501 (1939)). Particularly relevant

here, the Third Circuit emphasized that the Constitution

“places limits on the authority a state court can exercise

over companies that are incorporated in a sister state,”

because a State “has no interest in regulating the internal

affairs of foreign corporations.” Id. at 258-259 (quoting

Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645-646 (1982)). The

Third Circuit concluded that those constitutional principles provided “an independent basis” to reject the receiver’s efforts to block the bankruptcy. Id. at 259.

In the decision below, the South Carolina Supreme

Court expressly declined to follow Whittaker. App., infra,

24a-25a; see id. at 98a-99a, 101a. Instead, the court reasoned that “litigation decisions, such as whether and how

to sue, defend a lawsuit, or accept service,” were not exclusively for CIHL’s board of directors, and it further reasoned that the receiver could seize control of that authority without “tread[ing]” on the corporation’s “internal affairs.” Id. at 23a, 25a. In passing, the court purported to

distinguish Whittaker as involving “a much narrower and

far different question.” Id. at 25a. But beyond that bare

assertion, the court did not explain how the constitutional

problems in Whittaker differ from those at issue in this

case.

2. The decision below also conflicts with this Court’s

precedents concerning the territorial limits on state

courts’ power. This Court has repeatedly recognized that

the Constitution places “territorial limitations on the

power of the respective States,” and it has explained that

those limits “ensure that the States, through their courts,

do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by

their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system.”

Fuld v. Palestine Liberation Organization, 606 U.S. 1, 14

(2025) (citations omitted). Those limits arise from various

constitutional sources, including the Due Process Clause

of the Fourteenth Amendment, see, e.g., Bristol-Myers

Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 582 U.S. 255, 263 (2017); the

dormant Commerce Clause, see, e.g., Edgar, 457 U.S. at

645-646; and constitutional principles of federalism, see,

e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.

286, 292 (1980). And they are particularly important when

state courts assert jurisdiction in the “international field,”

Asahi Metal Industries Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S.

102, 115 (1987) (citation omitted), because the federal government must speak “with one voice in dealing with other

governments,” Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 381 (2000).

The South Carolina Supreme Court disregarded those

precedents by upholding the receiver’s authority to control the litigation decisions and other internal affairs of

Cape, a British corporation. The court reasoned that “foreign corporations are not exempt from the reach of the

[State’s] receivership statute” as a matter of state law.

App., infra, 18a. But it did not explain how the purported

reach of South Carolina’s receivership statute comported

with the “territorial limitations” imposed by the Constitution. Fuld, 606 U.S. at 14 (citation omitted). As the Third

Circuit held in Whittaker, granting a South Carolina receiver such authority over an out-of-state corporation

would constitute “an unprecedented exertion of power”

and “a radical intrusion into the province” of other sovereigns. 176 F.4th at 259.

The constitutional concerns are particularly acute

here given that the decision below intrudes on “foreign relations” several times over. Asahi Metal Industries, 480

U.S. at 115. According to the South Carolina Supreme

Court, a South Carolina receiver may make decisions

about litigation and other internal affairs on behalf of a

British corporation, including by filing a third-party complaint against a French corporation and a French national

(and dozens of other foreign corporations). And he may

do so even in the face of clear rulings from courts in both

the United Kingdom and France holding that the receivership is invalid and enjoining him from engaging in those

activities. See pp. 4, 6-9, supra. The decision below thus

poses serious “risks to international comity,” Daimler AG

v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 141 (2014), and it fails to reflect

the “[g]reat care and reserve” that state courts are supposed to exercise in cases that implicate international interests, Asahi Metal Industries, 480 U.S. at 115 (citation

omitted).

3. The decision below implicates a critical question

about the extraterritorial scope of state power, both domestically and internationally, and this case is an excellent vehicle to consider the question.

In particular, this case highlights the concerns posed

by extraterritorial receiverships, especially in the realm

of foreign relations. South Carolina’s assertion of authority over foreign corporations stands out in this regard. In

fact, the same state court overseeing South Carolina’s asbestos docket has appointed receivers over twenty-four

other defendants, including sixteen out-of-state corporations. And the court has even gone so far as to appoint a

receiver over a Texas corporation that was dissolved in

1986; to revoke the corporation’s dissolution; and to permit the receiver to reincorporate the defunct Texas corporation in South Carolina for purposes of being sued before the South Carolina trial court that appointed the receiver. See National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Payne

& Keller Co., 731 S.W.3d 58, 61-62 (Tex. Ct. App. 2026).

Not coincidentally, while the number of new asbestos

suits has declined nationwide, it has more than tripled in

South Carolina. See Akiko Matsuda, Asbestos Bankruptcies Test Reach of Frequent South Carolina Receiver,

Wall Street Journal Pro (Sep. 22, 2025) <tinyurl.com/

WSJAsbestos>. Absent this Court’s intervention, it is

only a matter of time until other States begin to follow

South Carolina’s lead—both in asbestos-related cases and

others—as a way of hauling out-of-state and foreign corporations into their courts.

This case is also an excellent vehicle in which to address the question presented. The decision below expressly conflicts with the Third Circuit’s decision in Whittaker concerning the authority of a state receiver—indeed, the very same receiver—to exercise control over an

out-of-state corporation. And the Court should grant review now because the question presented is “a separate

and independent matter” and “not enmeshed in the factual and legal issues comprising” the merits of the personal-injury claim against CIHL or the third-party claims

against petitioners that are scheduled to be tried on remand. Mercantile National Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S.

555, 558 (1963); see Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420

U.S. 469, 482-483 (1975).

As noted, this Court has before it the petition in Charter Consolidated, Ltd. v. Cape plc, which presents the

same question and involves similarly situated petitioners.

This Court should grant both petitions and consolidate the

cases for purposes of briefing and oral argument.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted.