Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Dana F. Young, Petitioner v. Collin College

Supreme Court briefJun 16, 2026

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Appendix A

[Filed: Feb. 12, 2026]

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 25-40433

Dana F. Young,

Plaintiff—Appellant,

versus

Collin College,

Defendant—Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:24-CV-0979

Before GRAVES, Ho, and DOUGLAS, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Dana F. Young moves for leave to proceed in forma

pauperis (IFP) in her appeal from an interlocutory or

der dismissing her motion for summary judgment

without prejudice as premature. A motion for leave

to proceed IFP challenges the district court’s determi

nation that an appeal is not taken in good faith.

Baugh v. Taylor, 117 F.3d 197, 202 (5th Cir. 1997).

“This Court must examine the basis of its jurisdic

tion, on its own motion, if necessary.” Mosley v.

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5TH ClR.

R. 47.5.

App-2

Cozby, 813 F.2d 659, 660 (5th Cir. 1987). A timely

notice of appeal in a civil case is a prerequisite for ap

pellate jurisdiction. See Bowles v. Russell, 551 U. S.

205, 213-14 (2007).

We do not have jurisdiction over Young’s interlocu

tory appeal of the dismissal of her motion for sum

mary judgment. See Tamez v. City of San Marcos, 62

F. 3d 123, 124 (5th Cir. 1995). Further, “a notice of

appeal from a clearly interlocutory decision” does not

“serve as a notice of appeal from the final judgment.”

FirsTier Mortg. Co. v. Invs. Mortg. Ins. Co., 498 U. S.

269, 276 (1991). Because Young has not appealed

from the district court’s final judgment, which was en

tered on October 24, 2025, we lack jurisdiction over

the instant appeal. See Bowles, 551 U. S. at 213-14;

Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A).

Accordingly, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of

jurisdiction. The IFP motion is DENIED as moot.

App—3

Appendix B

[Filed: Apr. 16, 2025]

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

SHERMAN DIVISION

DANA F. YOUNG

COLLIN COLLEGE

§ NO. 4:24-CV-00979§ SDJ-BD

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Proceeding pro se, Dana Young sued Collin College

for employment discrimination. Dkt. 9 (operative

complaint). Before the parties’ deadline to exchange

initial disclosures, Young moved for summary judg

ment. Dkt. 21. Defendant Collin College filed a mo

tion asking the court to dismiss or deny the summary

judgment motion as premature or defer ruling on it.

Dkt. 28; Dkt. 30 (response). The court will recom

mend that Collin College’s motion be granted.

Collin College argues that Young’s motion for sum

mary judgment is premature because it was filed be

fore the parties engaged in any discovery. Collin Col

lege insists that it must be afforded the opportunity to

conduct discovery before it can adequately respond to

the motion.

In her response, Young reiterates and elaborates on

arguments made in her summary-judgment motion.

She also identifies four witnesses whose depositions,

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in her view, will lead to evidence to support her

claims. Dkt. 30 at 13-14.

“Summary judgment assumes some discovery,”

Brown v. Miss. Valley State Univ., 311 F. 3d 328, 333

(5th Cir. 2002), so a motion for summary judgment

should not “ordinarily be granted before discovery has

been completed,” Ala. Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Co. v.

Am. Fid. Life Ins. Co., 606 F. 2d 602, 609 (5th Cir.

1979). The court has discretion to deny a motion for

summary judgment as premature. See, e. g., Gabarick v. Laurin Mar. (Am.), Inc., 406F. App’x 883, 890

(5th Cir. 2010); Sunbelt Sav., FSB Dall., Tex. v.

Montross, 923F.2d 353, 358 (5th Cir. 1991). The

court also may dismiss a motion for summary judg

ment without prejudice if it is filed before any party

answers. Watkins v. Monroe, No. 6:18-CV-00347,

2019 WL 1869864, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 27, 2019), re

port and recommendation adopted, No. 6:18-CV—

00347, 2019 WL 1858100 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 25, 2019).

Young’s pre-discovery motion for summary judg

ment is premature. As her response to Collin College’s

motion notes, additional discovery will lead to rele

vant evidence. And as Collin College argues, it needs

additional discovery to support its defenses to Young’s

claims.

RECOMMENDATION

It is RECOMMENDED that the motion to dismiss

or defer ruling on the motion for summary judgment,

Dkt. 28, be GRANTED and the summary-judgment

motion, Dkt. 21, be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJ

UDICE as premature. Young may refile it or an

amended motion for summary judgment after the

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close of discovery but before the deadline set by the

scheduling order, Dkt. 26.

★

ife

Within 14 days after service of this report, any

party may serve and file written objections to the find

ings and recommendations of the magistrate judge.

28U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(C).

A party is entitled to a de novo review by the district

court of the findings and conclusions contained in this

report only if specific objections are made. Id.

§636(b)(1). Failure to timely file written objections to

any proposed findings, conclusions, and recommenda

tions contained in this report will bar an aggrieved

party from appellate review of those factual findings

and legal conclusions accepted by the district court,

except on grounds of plain error, provided that the

party has been served with notice that such conse

quences will result from a failure to object. Id.;

Thomas v. Am, 474 U.S. 140, 155 (1985); Douglass v.

United Servs. Auto Ass’n, 79F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir.

1996) (en banc), superseded by statute on other

grounds; 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(l) (extending the time to

file objections from 10 to 14 days).

So ORDERED and SIGNED this 16th day of April,

2025.

/s/ Bill Davis

Bill Davis

United States Magistrate Judge

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Appendix C

[Filed: Jul. 11, 2025]

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

SHERMAN DIVISION

DANA F. YOUNG

§ CIVIL NO. 4:24—

V§ CV-00979-SDJ-BD

COLLIN COLLEGE

MEMORANDUM ADOPTING REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES

MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Came on for consideration the report of the United

States Magistrate Judge in this action, this matter

having been heretofore referred to the Magistrate

Judge pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §636. On April 16, 2025,

the Magistrate Judge entered proposed findings of

fact and a recommendation (the “Report”), (Dkt. #31),

that Defendant Collin College’s Motion to Dismiss,

(Dkt. #28), be granted. Plaintiff Dana Young filed Ob

jections, (Dkt. #32), to the Report.

The Court conducted a de novo review of the Objec

tions and the portions of the Report to which Plaintiff

specifically objects, and the Court is of the opinion

that the findings and conclusions of the Magistrate

Judge are correct and that the Objections are without

merit as to the ultimate findings of the Magistrate

Judge. The Court hereby adopts the findings and

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conclusions of the Magistrate Judge as the findings

and conclusions of the Court.

IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss, (Dkt.

#28), is GRANTED and that Plaintiffs Motion for

Summary Judgment is DISMISSED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE as premature.

So ORDERED and SIGNED this 11th day of

July, 2025.

/s/ Sean D. Jordan

SEAN D. JORDAN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

App-8

Appendix D

[Filed: Aug. 11, 2025]

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

SHERMAN DIVISION

DANA F. YOUNG

§ NO. 4:24-CV-00979V’

§ SDJ-BD

COLLIN COLLEGE

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Pro se plaintiff Dana Young sued Collin College un

der 42 U. S. C. §§ 1981, 1983, and Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. §2000e et seq. Dkt. 9

(operative complaint). The college moved to dismiss.

Dkt. 11; see Dkts. 14 (response), 17 (reply). The court

will recommend that the motion be granted.

BACKGROUND

I. Factual Background

According to Young’s operative complaint, she was

terminated from her teaching job at the college after

an incident with a student who was also employed by

the college. During Young’s mediation class, she in

vited the students to give examples of “difficult labels

they think would challenge being impartial.” Dkt. 91 at 2. The student, who is Black, suggested the “N

word,” and Young, who is white, wrote it in full on the

App-9

board and discussed use of the word as part of the les

son.

The student complained to a dean, who instructed

Young to take the student aside and apologize.

Young alleges that when she followed the dean’s in

structions, the student became angry and threatened

to get her fired.

Young emailed the dean and asked that someone

else be present during the next class because Young

was concerned about the student’s threats. The as

sistant director for continuing education attended

part of the next class, at which Young screened ex

cerpts of “Remember the Titans,” a movie that in

cludes themes of racial bigotry. Before Young’s next

class, the assistant director called Young to tell her

that class was canceled.

Young was later terminated despite her insistence

that the college had not thoroughly investigated the

student’s complaint or given her an opportunity to re

spond to it. She also alleges that the college violated

its own procedures in her termination process.

II.

Procedural History

The college moved for dismissal of Young’s initial

complaint or, in the alternative, for a more definite

statement. Dkt. 6. The court ordered Young to file

either a response to the motion or an amended com

plaint. Dkt. 8. She filed an amended complaint,

Dkt. 9, which mooted the college’s motion, see Dkt. 42.

The college then moved to dismiss the amended com

plaint. Dkt. 11.

App-10

LAW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) authorizes

a pre-answer motion to dismiss for “failure to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted.” Motions un

der that rule “are viewed with disfavor and are rarely

granted.” Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc., 565 F. 3d

228, 232 (5th Cir. 2009). In considering such a mo

tion, the court must first identify and exclude legal

conclusions in the complaint that “are not entitled to

the assumption of truth,” then consider the remaining

“wellpleaded factual allegations.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U. S. 662, 679 (2009). The court must accept as

true all well-pleaded facts and view them in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff. Heinze v. Tesco Corp.,

971 F. 3d 475, 479 (5th Cir. 2020). The complaint

will survive the motion to dismiss if it alleges “enough

facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570

(2007). In considering the motion, the court may not

look beyond “the complaint, any documents attached

to the complaint, and any documents attached to the

motion to dismiss that are central to the claim and

referenced by the complaint.” Allen v. Vertafore, Inc.,

28 F. 4th 613, 616 (5th Cir. 2022). “[C]onclusory al

legations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual

conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to dis

miss” from being granted. Taylor v. Books A Million,

Inc., 296 F. 3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002) (quotation

marks omitted).

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DISCUSSION

Title VII

Young’s complaint alleges that she was terminated

because of her race and in retaliation for protected ac

tivity. The college argues that Young does not allege

facts sufficient to show that her termination was mo

tivated by race or that she engaged in any activity pro

tected by Title VII. It also argues, with respect to her

retaliation claim, that she failed to exhaust her ad

ministrative remedies with the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”).

In response, Young argues that her termination

was racially motivated because the college treated a

Black student more favorably than it treated her.

She also argues that her acts of complaining about the

college’s failure to follow its own procedures before

terminating her constituted protected activity.

Young fails to allege facts sufficient to show that the

college terminated her because of her race or that she

engaged in any protected activity that could support

her retaliation claim. And even if she could state a

claim for retaliation, she failed to exhaust her EEOC

remedy for that claim.

Disparate treatment

Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail

or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or oth

erwise to discriminate against any individual with re

spect to his [or her] compensation, terms, conditions,

or privileges of employment, because of such individ

ual’s . . . race.” 42U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)(l). At the

pleading stage, the plaintiff need not present evi

dence; she must only “plead sufficient facts on all of

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the ultimate elements of a disparate treatment claim

to make [her] case plausible.” Chhim v. Univ, of Tex.

at Austin, 836 F. 3d 467, 470 (5th Cir. 2016). An em

ployee claiming disparate treatment must plead “(1)

an adverse employment action, (2) taken against [her]

because of her protected status.” Hamilton v. Dallas

County, 79 F. 4th 494, 502 (5th Cir. 2023) (quotation

marks omitted).

To show that an adverse employment action was

taken “because of’ the plaintiffs protected status, the

plaintiff can rely on either direct or circumstantial ev

idence of discrimination. Cicalese v. Univ, of Tex.

Med. Branch, 924 F. 3d 762, 766 (5th Cir. 2019). “Di

rect evidence is evidence which, if believed, proves the

fact without inference or presumption.” Jones v.

Robinson Prop. Grp., L.P., 427 F. 3d 987, 992 (5th Cir.

2005). “When a plaintiff builds a case on circumstan

tial evidence, a court analyzes the plaintiffs claim un

der the McDonnell Douglas framework.” Cicalese,

924 F. 3d at 766 (referencing McDonnell Douglas

Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)). That means the

plaintiff must allege “facts, direct or circumstantial,

that would suggest [that the defendant’s] actions were

based on” the employee’s protected status or must al

lege that the employer “treated similarly situated em

ployees of other [protected classes] more favorably.”

Raj v. La. State Univ., 714 F.3d 322, 331 (5th Cir.

2013).

The college does not deny that it took an adverse

employment action by terminating Young’s employ

ment, so the only issue to resolve is whether Young

has alleged sufficient facts to show that the college did

so because of her race. She has not.

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Young does not allege any facts that, if true, would

amount to direct evidence of discriminatory animus.

She does not, for example, allege that any person in

volved in her termination ever mentioned her race.

See Cicalese, 924 F. 3d at 767—68 (explaining that al

legations of supervisors’ derogatory remarks about

the plaintiffs’ national origin showed sufficient dis

criminatory animus to overcome a motion to dismiss).

Nor does Young allege facts that, if true, would give

rise to an inference that the college treated her differ

ently because of her race (i.e., circumstantial evi

dence). To do so, she would need to allege that the

college treated similarly situated employees outside of

her protected class more favorably. Shahrashoob v.

Tex. A&M Univ., 125 F. 4th 641, 651 (5th Cir. 2025).

Employees are similarly situated when they “h[o]ld

the same job or responsibilities, share [] the same su

pervisor or ha[ve] their employment status deter

mined by the same person, and have essentially com

parable violation histories.” Id. (quotation marks

omitted). Young suggests that the student men

tioned in her complaint was similarly situated be

cause that student was also an employee of the col

lege. But Young does not allege that the student had

the same job title or duties or reported to the same

supervisor. Nor does she suggest that the student

had a comparable violation history. That means the

college’s treatment of her cannot give rise to an infer

ence of discrimination.

Retaliation

Title VII also prohibits an employer from discrimi

nating against an employee “because he has opposed

any practice made an unlawful employment practice

App-14

by [Title VII], or because he has made a charge, testi

fied, assisted, or participated in any manner in an in

vestigation, proceeding, or hearing under [Title VII].”

42 U. S. C. §2000e-3(a); see Brown v. Wal-Mart Stores

E., L.P., 969 F. 3d 571, 576-77 (5th Cir. 2020), as re

vised (Aug. 14, 2020) (cleaned up) (describing §2000e3(a) as Title VIPs antiretaliation provision). Retalia

tion claims brought under Title VII are analyzed un

der the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting frame

work, Johnson v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. State Univ.

& Agric. & Meeh. Coll., 90 F. 4th 449, 460 (5th Cir.

2024), and the elements of a prima facie case are: (1)

the plaintiff engaged in protected activity; (2) she suf

fered an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal

connection exists between the protected activity and

the adverse employment action, Lewis v. Bd. of Super

visors of La. State Univ. & Agric. & Meeh. Coll.,

134 F. 4th 286, 295 (5th Cir. 2025). An adverse em

ployment action in the retaliation context is one that

would dissuade a reasonable employee from making

or supporting a charge of discrimination. Burlington

N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U. S. 53, 68 (2006).

The college argues that Young cannot state a claim

for retaliation because her complaint does not allege

that she engaged in any activity protected by Title VII

before her termination. In response, Young argues

that her complaints about the college’s failure to

properly investigate the student complaint were pro

tected activity. The college is correct.

Young alleges that, after the student threatened to

get her fired, she “reported the incident” and “re

quested] personnel to be present at the next class for

safety concerns.” Dkt. 9 at 4. She was then re

moved from teaching “despite notifying both [the

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director] and [the assistant director] for HR/Employee

Relations about her concerns that a proper investiga

tion was not being conducted.” Id. She also alleges

that she appealed her termination and that, as a re

sult, “an internal faculty panel review found that [the

college] violated its own policies and due process.”

Id. Only after the appeals process had concluded did

Young file an EEOC charge. Id.', Dkt. 9-1 at 5-6.

For purposes of a retaliation claim, protected activ

ity is opposition to any practice made unlawful by Ti

tle VII. Lewis, 134 F. 4th at 295. It includes “making

a charge, testifying, assisting, or participating in any

investigation, proceeding, or hearing under Title VII.”

Id. “Importantly, a plaintiff need not demonstrate

that the practice was actually unlawful for his opposi

tion to be a protected activity; rather, it is enough that

the plaintiff reasonably believed the practice was un

lawful.” Scott v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 16 F.4th

1204, 1210 (5th Cir. 2021), as revised (Nov. 26, 2021)

(per curiam). That said, complaints about unfair

treatment “without any reference to an unlawful em

ployment practice under Title VII” are not protected

activity. Allen v. Envirogreen Landscape Pros., Inc.,

721 F. App’x 322, 326 (5th Cir. 2017), as revised (Dec.

7, 2017) (per curiam); see, e.g., Davis v. Dall. ISD,

448 F. App’x 485, 493 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam)

(finding that a statement complaining about a “hostile

work environment” did not constitute protected activ

ity under Title VII because it “lacked a racial or gen

der basis”); Tratree v. BPN. Am. Pipelines, Inc., 277 F.

App’x 390, 396 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (explain

ing that “[c]omplaining about unfair treatment with

out specifying why the treatment is unfair ... is not a

protected activity”); Turner v. Baylor Richardson

App—16

Med. Ctr., 476 F. 3d 337, 349 (5th Cir. 2007) (conclud

ing that a complaint that “contained] no reference to

conduct that could even plausibly be considered dis

criminatory in nature” was not protected activity);

Harris-Childs v. Medco Health Sols., Inc., 169 F.

App’x 913, 916 (5th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (finding

that an employee did not engage in protected activity

when she complained of harassment but did not men

tion race or sex).

Nothing in Young’s complaint suggests that the

practices she opposed—the college’s alleged failure to

properly investigate a student complaint and to follow

its own HR procedures—violated Title VII or that she

opposed them on that basis. Young’s filing of an

EEOC charge, on the other hand, was a protected ac

tivity. See DeHart v. Baker Hughes Oilfield Ops., Inc.,

214 F. App’x 437, 442 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam).

But she filed it after her termination, so it could not

have been the reason for the college’s decision.

Exhaustion of remedies

Title VII directs that a “charge . . . shall be filed”

with the EEOC “by or on behalf of a person claiming

to be aggrieved” within 180 days “after the alleged un

lawful employment practice occurfs].” 42U. S. C.

§2000e-5(b), (e)(1). That exhaustion requirement is

mandatory. Fort Bend County v. Davis, 587 U. S. 541,

551 (2019).

Because most Title VII complaints are pro se, “the

scope of an EEOC complaint should be construed lib

erally.” Pacheco v. Mineta, 448 F. 3d 783, 788 (5th

Cir. 2006). “Title VII clearly contemplates that no is

sue will be the subject of a civil action until the EEOC

has first had the opportunity to attempt to obtain

App-17

voluntary compliance.” Id. at 789. For those rea

sons, the court “interprets what is properly embraced

in review of a Title-VII claim somewhat broadly, not

solely by the scope of the administrative charge itself,

but by the scope of the EEOC investigation which can

reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of

discrimination” and “engage [s] in fact-intensive anal

ysis of the statement given by the plaintiff in the ad

ministrative charge, and lookfs] slightly beyond its

four corners, to its substance rather than its label.”

Id. (cleaned up).

The college argues that Young did not raise her re

taliation claim in her EEOC charge, so she has not

met the exhaustion requirement for that claim.

Young’s response does not engage that argument.

Young’s charge alleges that she “was terminated for

misconduct after a student complaint.” Dkt. 9-11 at

6. It explains the incident in which a student sug

gested a racially derogatory term and Young wrote it

on the board. It goes on to explain that, after the stu

dent complaint, a dean and an assistant director “took

by phone [Young’s] verbal description of the incident

and details of the lesson.” Id. The charge then ex

plains that, after Young’s next interaction with the

student, Young “emailed the dean and [assistant] di

rector informing them [she] no longer felt safety for

[her] students’ classroom learning environment or for

[her]self as the teacher with the student.” Id. The

charge describes the next class session, at which

Young showed movie clips, and alleges that the stu

dent made a second complaint. Young was then in

formed that class was canceled and that she had been

removed from teaching the class. Young “contacted

Tonya Jacobson by phone and by email, [stating] that

App-18

[she] believed a proper investigation was not being

conducted after a student complaint.” Id. at 7.

Young was then informed of her termination. After be

ing terminated, Young appealed the decision, and the

appeals panel determined that the college had vio

lated its Title VII policies.

Young’s charge does not include facts that would

“reasonably be expected to grow” into a retaliation

charge. Pacheco, 448 F. 3d at 789. The charge de

scribes only the sort of nonspecific complaints that are

not protected activity because they do not refer to any

employment practice prohibited by Title VII. See su

pra Part LB. The charge does not indicate that ei

ther the phone call or email to the dean and assistant

director included opposition to any practice made un

lawful by Title VII; instead, it shows that Young com

plained of her safety concerns about having the stu

dent in her classroom. Nor does the charge reflect

that the call to Jacobson constituted protected activ

ity. Young complained that a proper investigation

was not conducted into the student’s complaint, but

the charge makes no indication that Young’s concerns

conveyed in the call were about a perceived Title VII

violation. Finally, Young’s allegation that the review

panel concluded that the college did not follow its own

Title VII policies still does not indicate that Young’s

pre-termination complaints were protected activity.

The content of Young’s EEOC charge shows that she

did not exhaust her administrative remedies for her

retaliation claim. Dismissal without prejudice is the

proper disposition. Stray v. Gibson ex rel. Dep’t of

Veterans Affairs, 896 F. 3d 693, 698 n. 2 (5th Cir.

2018).

App-19

II.

42 U.S.C. §1981

Young’s complaint cites 42 U. S. C. § 1981 but does

not discuss it further. See Dkt. 9 at 1. That statute

provides that

[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United

States shall have the same right in every State

and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to

sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and

equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the

security of persons and property as is enjoyed by

white citizens, and shall be subject to like punish

ment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exac

tions of every kind, and to no other.

42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). Despite its guarantee that all

persons enjoy the same rights as “enjoyed by white cit

izens,” id., that statute applies equally to claims of ra

cial discrimination raised by white plaintiffs.

McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427U.S.

273, 286-87 (1976). Employment claims “brought

pursuant to Title VII and §1981 are governed by the

same evidentiary framework, such that the analyses

under both statutes are substantively the same.”

Ayorinde v. Team Indus. Servs. Inc., 121 F. 4th 500,

506 (5th Cir. 2024). The failure of Young’s Title VII

claim, see supra Part I, therefore means that any

§ 1981 claim she may have brought also fails.

III.

42U.S.C. §1983

In relevant part, 42 U. S. C. § 1983 provides that

[e]very person who, under color of any statute, or

dinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any

State or Territory or the District of Columbia,

App-20

subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of

the United States or other person within the ju

risdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the Consti

tution and laws, shall be liable to the party in

jured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other

proper proceeding for redress.

The provision “is not itself a source of substantive

rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating

federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Albright v. Oli

ver, 510 U. S. 266, 271 (1994) (quotation marks omit

ted). To state a § 1983 claim, “a plaintiff must allege

the violation of a right secured by the Constitution

and laws of the United States, and must show that the

alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting

under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U. S.

42, 48 (1988). And to survive a motion to dismiss, the

plaintiff “must enunciate a set of facts that illus

trate [s] the defendants’ participation in the wrong al

leged.” Jacquez v. Procunier, 801 F. 2d 789, 793 (5th

Cir. 1986).

Young alleges that the college’s failure to follow its

own HR policy violated her Fourteenth Amendment

due-process rights. The college argues that the alle

gations do not show that Young had a protected prop

erty interest that could support a due-process claim or

that it can be held liable for the alleged violations.

The college is correct on both counts.

Protected property interest

To state a procedural due-process claim under

§ 1983, the plaintiff must “identify a protected life, lib

erty, or property interest” and allege that the chal

lenged “governmental action resulted in a deprivation

App-21

of that interest.” Wilkerson v. Univ, of N. Tex.,

878 F. 3d 147, 155 (5th. Cir. 2017) (quotation marks

omitted). “If there is no protected property interest,

there is no process due.” Spider v. Pickar, 958 F. 2d

103, 106 (5th Cir. 1992).

A property interest is more than “an abstract need,”

a “desire,” or a “unilateral expectation.” Bd. of Re

gents of State Colls, v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 577 (1972).

The plaintiff must show “a legitimate claim of entitle

ment” created and defined by “existing rules or under

standings that stem from an independent source such

as state law.” Id. Although state law is typically

the source of the property interest supporting a dueprocess claim, whether that interest rises to the level

of a constitutionally protected interest is a question of

federal constitutional law. Town of Castle Rock v.

Gonzales, 545U.S. 748, 756-57 (2005); Stem v.

Gomez, 813 F. 3d 205, 211 (5th Cir. 2016).

Young alleges that she was an adjunct faculty in

structor at the college. She does not allege that she

had tenure or an ongoing employment contract when

she was terminated. Instead, she alleges that she

had a reasonable expectation that her employment

would continue “based on a nine-year record of excel

lent performance” and the college’s “pattern of behav

ior.” Dkt. 9 at 2. She does not allege specific facts

about the college’s pattern of behavior toward her dur

ing those nine years.

Young cites Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593

(1972), in support of her claimed property interest.

In that case, the Supreme Court explained that an ad

junct faculty member “who has held his position for a

number of years[] might be able to show from the cir

cumstances of this service— and from other relevant

App-22

facts—that he has a legitimate claim of entitlement”

to support a constitutionally protected property inter

est. Id. at 602. But the “other relevant facts” in

Perry included an alleged “de facto tenure program,”

as evidenced by a faculty guide stating that “[t]he Ad

ministration of the College wishes the faculty member

to feel that he has permanent tenure as long as his

teaching services are satisfactory and as long as he

displays a cooperative attitude toward his co-workers

and his superiors, and as long as he is happy in his

work.” Id. at 600. That was enough to create a fact

question about whether the adjunct faculty member

in Perry had a protected property interest.

“Texas law,” however, “imposes a strong presump

tion in favor of at-will employment.” Hegemeier v.

Caldwell County, 826 F. 3d 861, 870 (5th Cir. 2016)

(per curiam). That is apparent from Texas Educa

tion Code § 51.943(g), which provides that “[n]othing

in this section shall be deemed to provide a faculty

member who does not hold tenure additional rights,

privileges, or remedies or to provide an expectation of

continued employment beyond the period of a faculty

member’s current contract.” See Hiers v. Bd. of Re

gents of the Univ, of N. Tex. Sys., No. 4:20-CV-321—

SDJ, 2022 WL 748502, *5-19, 22-23 (E.D. Tex. Mar.

11, 2022) (rejecting a fired college professor’s due-pro

cess claim because he failed to allege a protected prop

erty interest but allowing his free-speech claim, which

does not require a protected property interest, to pro

ceed). That is essentially the opposite of the faculty

guide in Perry.

Given that backdrop, Young’s allegations do not cre

ate a protected property interest. Her history of ex

cellent performance and the college’s unspecified

App-23

pattern of behavior do not overcome Texas’s strong

presumption of at-will employment. And although

Young also alleges that the college failed to follow its

own established policies before terminating her em

ployment, a property interest “cannot be defined by

the procedures provided for its deprivation.” Cleve

land Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470U.S. 532, 541

(1985).

Entity liability

The college is a local governmental entity. See

Santoro v. Cnty. of Collin, Tex., No. 4:18-CV-00660ALM-CAN, 2019 WL 5692187, at *9 (E.D. Tex. Aug.

16, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, No.

4:18-CV—660, 2019 WL 4686361 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 26,

2019). As such, it is liable for the actions of its em

ployees only if an official policy or custom causes the

plaintiffs injury. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of

City of N.Y., 436U.S. 658, 691-94 (1978); see City of

St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485U.S. 112, 122 (1988).

“[T]he unconstitutional conduct must be directly at

tributable to the municipality through some sort of of

ficial action or imprimatur.” Piotrowski v. City of

Houston, 237 F. 3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001). Accord

ingly, to succeed on a § 1983 claim against a govern

mental entity, the plaintiff must show that “(1) an of

ficial policy (2) promulgated by the municipal policy

maker (3) was the moving force behind the violation

of a constitutional right.” Doe v. Burleson County,

86 F.4th 172, 176 (5th Cir. 2023) (citing Davidson v.

City of Stafford, 848 F. 3d 384, 395 (5th Cir. 2017)).

Determination of who may be found liable as a “pol

icymaker” is a matter of state law. Jett v. Dall. ISD,

491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989). The final policymaking

App-24

authority for the college is its board. See Tex. Educ.

Code §§130.082, .084; Saenz v. Dall. Cnty. Cmty. Coll.

Dist., No. 3:10-CV-742-O, 2011WL 1935742, at *4

(N.D. Tex. May 16, 2011).

The college argues that Young fails to state a § 1983

claim against it because she does not allege that any

official policy or custom was a moving force behind a

violation of her due-process rights. In response,

Young argues that the college’s failure to follow its

own policy demonstrates that it violated her due-process rights. Dkt. 14. at 7.

Young does not allege that the college’s board prom

ulgated any policy that was the moving force behind

her termination. Instead, she alleges that the college

deviated from official policy when it fired her without

thoroughly investigating the student’s complaint.

But “[t]he failure to follow procedural guidelines,

standing alone,” cannot give rise to entity liability.

Evans v. City of Marlin, 986 F. 2d 104, 108 n. 6 (5th

Cir. 1993); see Praprotnik, 485 U. S. at 127 (explaining

that “[w]hen an official’s discretionary decisions are

constrained by policies not of that official’s making,

those policies, rather than the subordinate’s depar

tures from them, are the act of the [entity]”). “Nor,

without more, would [an entity] automatically be lia

ble under § 1983 if one of its employees happened to

apply the policy in an unconstitutional manner, for li

ability would then rest on respondeat superior.” City

of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489U.S. 378, 387 (1989).

Young’s allegations therefore fail to show that an offi

cial policy was the moving force behind the alleged

constitutional violation.

App-25

IV.

Opportunity to Amend

Dismissal for failure to state a claim is typically

with prejudice. Memon v. Allied Domecq QSR,

385 F. 3d 871, 874 n. 6 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam).

But a pro se litigant should generally be offered an op

portunity to amend her complaint before it is dis

missed. Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F. 3d 764, 767-68

(5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). “Granting leave to

amend is not required, however, if the plaintiff has al

ready pleaded his [or her] ‘best case.’” Id. at 768

(quoting Bazrowx v. Scott, 136 F. 3d 1053, 1054 (5th

Cir. 1998)).

Young’s first complaint alleged a Title VII dispar

ate-treatment violation, which the college addressed

in its first motion to dismiss. Dkt. 6. Her amended

complaint still fails to address the deficiencies identi

fied by that motion. She has pled her best case, so

that claim should be dismissed with prejudice. But

to the extent Young may plead additional facts in sup

port of her due-process claim or intended to rely on

legal theories that have not previously been addressed

by the defendant or the court, further amendment

could conceivably allow her to state a claim. See

Morgan v. Chapman, 969 F. 3d 238, 247-48 (5th Cir.

2020) (noting that “a complaint need not specify legal

theories” and that amendment is not futile if the “fac

tual allegations state a claim for something,” even if

not the theory identified in the complaint). For that

reason, Young should be given leave to amend her

complaint a second time.

RECOMMENDATION

It is RECOMMENDED that the motion to dismiss,

Dkt. 11, be GRANTED. Young’s disparate-treatment

App-26

claim should be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

Her other claims should be DISMISSED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE, and Young should be given 21 days

from entry of a memorandum adopting this recom

mendation, if any, to file an amended complaint.

Within 14 days after service of this report, any

party may serve and file written objections to the find

ings and recommendations of the magistrate judge.

28U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).

A party is entitled to a de novo review by the district

court of the findings and conclusions contained in this

report only if specific objections are made. Id.

§ 636(b)(1). Failure to timely file written objections

to any proposed findings, conclusions, and recommen

dations contained in this report will bar an aggrieved

party from appellate review of those factual findings

and legal conclusions accepted by the district court,

except on grounds of plain error, provided that the

party has been served with notice that such conse

quences will result from a failure to object. Id.;

Thomas v. Am, 474 U. S. 140, 155 (1985); Douglass v.

United Servs. Auto Ass’n, 79 F. 3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir.

1996) (en banc), superseded by statute on other

grounds; 28 U. S. C. §636(b)(1) (extending the time to

file objections from 10 to 14 days).

So ORDERED and SIGNED this 11th day of Au

gust, 2025.

/s/ Bill Davis

Bill Davis

United States Magistrate Judge

App-27

Appendix E

[Filed: Oct. 20, 2025]

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

SHERMAN DIVISION

DANA F. YOUNG

§ CIVIL NO. 4:24-CVV’

§ 00979-SDJ-BD

COLLIN COLLEGE

MEMORANDUM ADOPTING REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES

MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Came on for consideration the report of the United

States Magistrate Judge in this action, this matter

having been heretofore referred to the Magistrate

Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636. On August 11,

2025, the Magistrate Judge entered proposed findings

of fact and a recommendation (the “Report”), (Dkt.

#44), that Defendant Collin College’s (“Defendant”)

Motion to Dismiss, (Dkt. #11), be granted. Defend

ant filed Objections, (Dkt. #46), to the Report.

The Court conducted a de novo review of the Objec

tions and the portions of the Report to which Defend

ant specifically objects, and the Court is of the opinion

that the findings and conclusions of the Magistrate

Judge are correct and that the Objections are without

merit as to the ultimate findings of the Magistrate

Judge. The Court hereby adopts the findings and

App-28

conclusions of the Magistrate Judge as the findings

and conclusions of the Court.

It is therefore ORDERED that the Motion to Dis

miss, (Dkt. #11), is GRANTED. Plaintiff Dana F.

Young’s (“Plaintiff’) disparate-treatment claim is

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE and her other

claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

It is further ORDERED that, within 21 days, Plain

tiff file an amended complaint that resolves the defi

ciencies identified in the Report. Failure to do so will

result in dismissal of her claims with prejudice.

So ORDERED and SIGNED this 20th day of

October, 2025.

/s/ Sean D. Jordan

SEAN D. JORDAN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

App-29

Appendix F

[Filed: Oct. 24, 2025]

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

SHERMAN DIVISION

DANA F. YOUNG

§ CIVIL NO. 4:24CVv.

§ 00979-SDJ-BD

COLLIN COLLEGE

FINAL JUDGMENT

Pursuant to the Memorandum Adopting Report and

Recommendation of the United States Magistrate

Judge filed in this matter on October 20, 2025, (Dkt.

50), and Plaintiff Dana F. Young’s notice that she does

not intend to file an amended complaint, (Dkt. 51), it

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that

Plaintiff Dana F. Young’s claims against Defendant

Collin College are DISMISSED WITH PREJU

DICE.

All relief not previously granted is hereby DE

NIED.

So ORDERED and SIGNED this 24th day of

October, 2025.

/s/ Sean D. Jordan

SEAN D. JORDAN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

App-30

Appendix G

[Filed: Mar. 18, 2026]

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 25-40433

Dana F. Young,

Plaintiff—Appellant,

versus

Collin College,

Defendant—Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:24-CV-0979

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING

Before GRAVES, Ho, and DOUGLAS, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:

IT IS ORDERED that Appellant’s motion for leave

to file petition for rehearing out of time is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the petition for

rehearing is DENIED.

App-31

Appendix H

[Filed: Apr. 23, 2025]

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

SHERMAN DIVISION

Dana F. Young

Plaintiff, Pro Se

§ Case No. 4:24-CVv.

§ 00979-SDJ-BD

Collin College

Defendant

PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTION TO THE REPORT

AND RECOMMENDATION OF

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff respectfully submits this Objection pursu

ant to 28U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(C) and Local Rule CV72(b), in response to the Report and Recommendation

of the United States Magistrate Judge (“R&R”) filed

April 16, 2025 (Dkt. 31), which recommends denying

or staying Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment

(Dkt. 21) as premature.

Plaintiff filed her Motion for Summary Judgment

(“MSJ”) after the Rule 26(f) conference because De

fendant had not presented undisputed facts, or evi

dentiary support and no substantive legal rebuttal in

its pleadings, despite having had procedural oppor

tunity to do so. Instead, Defendant has persisted in

attacking Plaintiffs character and credibility,

App-32

misrepresenting the law and statutory authority, and

showing the intent to continue doing so in disregard

of judicial efficiency and procedural fairness, rather

than addressing Plaintiffs claims.

Plaintiff then concluded that summary judgment

was appropriate. The MS J demonstrated there was

no genuine dispute of material fact and therefore is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

The magistrate judge’s R&R misinterprets Plain

tiffs position, misapplies Rule 56 of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure, and overlooks Defendant’s ongoing

noncompliance with court rules and orders. The

Plaintiff has presented the material facts necessary

for summary judgment. The Defendant has not sub

mitted any affidavits or evidence producing a genuine

dispute.

Access Mediquip L.L.C., v. United Healthcare

Ins. Co., 662 F. 3d 376, 381 (5th Cir. 2011)

Held “Discovery not required when nonmovant fails to

identify how it would create a genuine issue.”

Washington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 901F. 2d 1281,

1285 (5th Cir. 1990)

Held “General assertions of discovery need insuffi

cient absent Rule 56(d) affidavit.”

The magistrate judge’s R&R cites summary judg

ment precedent suggesting discovery must be allowed

before ruling. However, those cases do not apply

where one party has already submitted undisputed

evidence, and the opposing party has failed to produce

any record-based rebuttal. Defendant has not met this

standard.

Beattie v. Madison Cnty. Sch. Dist., 254 F. 3d 595,

606 (5th Cir. 2001)

App-33

Established “Summary judgment may be granted

prior to discovery when no specific discovery needs are

identified.”

Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F. 3d 1069, 1075 (5th

Cir. 1994)

Held “A party opposing summary judgment must go

beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”

OBJECTIONS

II.

Rule 72(b)(2): “Within 14 days after being served

with a copy of the recommended disposition, a party

may serve and file specific written objections to the

proposed findings and recommendations.

This objection is predicated on Defendant’s failure

to comply under Rule 56(d) of the Federal Civil Rules

of Procedure. The magistrate judge’s misreading

and misinterpretation of Plaintiffs MS J results in

misapplied law and therefore mischaracterizes Plain

tiff. Deference to non-compliance is subject to judi

cial error in discretion and cause for reversal upon ap

peal.

Plaintiffs statements are listed as OBJECTION

under each line below in response to the magistrate

judge’s full quote from his report and recommenda

tion, (Dkt. 31, p. 1):

Proceeding pro se, Dana Young sued Col

lin College for employment discrimina

tion Dkt. 9 (operative complaint).

CLARIFICATION: EEOC Right to Sue (See Exhibit

K, Dkt. 9) for wrongful termination and race discrim

ination. The record establishes violations under Title

VII, 42U. S. C. §1981, the 14th Amendment (U.S.

App-34

Const. Amend. XIV), and under 42U. S.C. §1983.

(Civil action brought under Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S.C. §2000e et seq., and

42 U. S.C. §1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866

(Amended 1991), and applicable state law.)

Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541U. S. 369,

383 (2004)

Held “Section 1981 applies to claims of hostile work

environment, wrongful termination, and failure to

transfer based on race.”

Baker v. McCollan, 443 U. S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979)

Held “Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive

rights but a method for vindicating federal rights.”

“Before the parties deadline to exchange

initial disclosures, Young moved for sum

mary judgment. Dkt. 21.

OBJECTION: Reframing context without legal appli

cation—Rule 56(b)

The magistrate judge uses the timeline (MSJ filed af

ter Rule 26(f) but before disclosures) as context to sup

port the view that the motion was premature. Plain

tiff complied with Rule 56(b) where no local rule bars

early filing and nothing in the Court’s scheduling or

der prohibits motions for summary judgment before

disclosures.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U. S. 317, 322 (1986)

Held “The plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the

entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for

discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails

to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence

of an element essential to that party’s case.”

Washington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 901F. 2d 1281,

1285 (5th Cir. 1990)

App-35

Held “Summary judgment may be appropriate, even

when discovery is incomplete, if the nonmoving party

has not diligently pursued discovery of the evidence.”

Brown v. Miss. Valley State Univ., 311 F. 3d 328,

333 (5th Cir. 2002)

Held “Summary judgment “assumes some discovery,”

but does not require it when a sufficient record exists.”

Gabarick v. Laurin Mar. (Am.), Inc., 406 F. App’x

883, 890 (5th Cir. 2010)

Held “Denial of a summary judgment motion filed pre

discovery is within the trial court’s discretion only

when justified by insufficiency of the record or a valid

Rule 56(d) declaration.”

“Defendant Collin College filed a motion

asking the court to dismiss or deny the

summary-judgment motion as premature

or defer ruling on it. Dkt. 28; Dkt. 30 (re

sponse).”

OBJECTION: Non-compliance with federal and local

rules. A party seeking denial or deferral of summary

judgment based on lack of discovery must comply with

Rule 56(d), requiring an affidavit or declaration ex

plaining why it cannot present facts essential to op

pose the motion. The record shows Defendant did

not provide a declaration showing a failure to comply

under Rule 56(d) their motion procedurally unsup

ported.

Raby v. Livingston, 600 F. 3d 552, 561 (5th Cir.

2010)

Held “To justify a continuance under Rule 56(d), the

nonmovant must present specific facts explaining the

inability to make a substantive response as required

by the rule.”

App-36

Access Mediquip, L.L.C., v. UnitedHealthcare

Ins. Co., 662 F. 3d 376, 392 (5th Cir. 2011)

Held “Summary judgment is appropriate when the

nonmovant fails to file the required affidavit or decla

ration under Rule 56(d).”

Washington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 901F. 2d 1281,

1285 (5th Cir. 1990)

Held “A nonmovant who does not diligently pursue

discovery or comply with Rule 56(d) cannot later claim

that summary judgment is premature.”

Humphreys v. Roche Biomedical Labs., Inc.,

990 F.2d 1078, 1081 (5th Cir. 1993)

Held “A party may not simply rely on vague assertions

that additional discovery will produce needed, but un

specified facts.”

The court will recommend that Collin Col

lege’s motion be granted.

OBJECTION: Misapplied law. A court may defer

summary judgment under Rule 56(d), but only when

the nonmovant complies with that rule. Here, Collin

College did not file the required affidavit or declara

tion, and did not identify specific facts it could obtain

through discovery to rebut the Plaintiffs evidence.

Granting the motion without requiring compliance

with Rule 56(d) represents a misapplication of judicial

discretion and law.

Raby v. Livingston, 600 F. 3d 552, 561 (5th Cir.

2010)

Held “Rule 56(d) requires a nonmovant to identify spe

cific evidence that it seeks to obtain and show how

that evidence will create a genuine issue of material

fact.”

App—37

Access Mediquip, L.L.C., v. UnitedHealthcare

Ins. Co., 662 F. 3d 376, 392 (5th Cir. 2011)

Held “Failure to comply with the procedural require

ments of Rule 56(d) is grounds for denying the request

to delay consideration of a summary judgment mo

tion.”

United States v. $92,203.00 in U.S. Currency,

537 F. 3d 504, 508 (5th Cir. 2008)

Held “District courts have discretion, but that discre

tion “must be exercised in accordance with the rule’s

requirements.”

Washington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 901F. 2d 1281,

1285 (5th Cir. 1990)

Held “A party who has not complied with Rule 56(d)

cannot later object that summary judgment was

premature.”

Collin College argues that Young’s motion

for summary judgment is premature be

cause it was filed before the parties en

gaged in any discovery.

OBJECTION: Failure to meet the burden under Rule

56(d). To claim the motion for summary judgment as

premature cannot be supported by the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure. The rules do not prohibit early

summary judgment. They permit it explicitly under

Rule 56(b), which allows a motion at any time. The

party in opposition to it must comply with Rule 56(d)

if it asserts discovery is needed. Collin College did

not comply.

Brown v. Mississippi Valley State Univ., 311 F. 3d

328, 333 (5th Cir. 2002)

Held “Summary judgment assumes some discovery,

but the rule does not forbid early motions; rather, it

App-38

permits courts to deny or defer them if the nonmovant

properly demonstrates the need.”

Gabarick v. Laurin Mar. (Am.), Inc., 406 F. App’x

883, 890 (5th Cir. 2010)

Held “Discretion to deny a motion as premature is not

automatic; the nonmovant must submit an affidavit

showing how discovery would defeat summary judg

ment.”

Am. Family Life Assurance Co. v. Biles, 714 F. 3d

887, 894-95 (5th Cir. 2013)

Held “Courts have “no obligation to consider a non

movant s request to defer ruling on summary judg

ment unless it is properly made under Rule 56(d).”

Raby v. Livingston, 600 F. 3d 552, 561 (5th Cir.

2010)

Held “A party opposing summary judgment must ex

plain how the requested discovery relates to the mo

tion and must do so through affidavit or declaration.”

“Collin College insists that it must be af

forded the opportunity to conduct discov

ery before it can adequately respond to

the motion.

OBJECTION: Failure to meet the burden under Rule

56(d).

Rule 56(d) provides that for a party to request discov

ery before responding to a motion for summary judg

ment it must show, via affidavit or declaration, spe

cific reasons discovery is necessary to oppose the mo

tion. Collin College submitted no such affidavit, and

therefore failed to retain its right to argue it “must be

afforded discovery.

Raby v. Livingston, 600 F. 3d 552, 561 (5th Cir.

2010)

App-39

Held “Rule 56(d) requires a nonmovant to explain, via

affidavit, how additional discovery will create a genu

ine issue of material fact. A non-movant may not

simply rely on vague assertions that additional dis

covery will produce needed, but unspecified, facts.”

Am. Family Life Assurance Co. v. Biles, 714 F. 3d

887, 894-95 (5th Cir. 2013)

Held “A request for relief under Rule 56(d) must be

made by affidavit or declaration, and the nonmovant

must explain why facts precluding summary judg

ment cannot be presented.”

Washington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 901F. 2d 1281,

1285 (5th Cir. 1990)

Held “Rule 56 does not require that discovery take

place before summary judgment can be granted. If the

nonmoving party fails to file affidavits setting forth

the particular facts expected from further discovery,

the court is not required to delay consideration of the

motion.”

In her response, Young reiterates and

elaborates on arguments made in her

summary-judgment motion.

CLARIFICATION: Plaintiffs Opposition (Dkt. 30)

was not repetitive but directly responded to Defend

ant’s arguments regarding prematurity and included

new legal citations addressing Rule 56(d) and added a

detailed procedural analysis demonstrating Plaintiffs

compliance with federal summary judgment stand

ards, also expanding on arguments raised in the MSJ

(Dkt. 21), procedural compliance, undisputed material

facts, and the sufficiency of the record.

“She also identifies four witnesses whose

depositions, in her view, will lead to

App-40

evidence to support her claims.

Dkt. 30

at 13-14.

OBJECTION: Incorrect statement, mischaracteriza

tion of Plaintiff, and misapplied law. The magistrate

judge’s mischaracterization gives the impression that

Plaintiff requested depositions to develop evidence

needed for summary judgment, which is incorrect.

The magistrate judge inaccurately summarizes Plain

tiffs Opposition (Dkt. 30, p 13—14). Plaintiff identified

three not four individuals as potential deponents. The

third reference as “a. under the College President

cites the College Executive Vice-President not as a po

tential deponent but evidenced in Exhibit H for entity

liability without the need for further discovery.

Plaintiff stated in her Motion for Summary Judg

ment, (Dkt. 21, p. 7):

Plaintiff respectfully maintains that sufficient evi

dence has been presented to warrant summary judg

ment, and that additional discovery including deposi

tions, electronic transmissions and hard copy records

would only further confirm Defendant’s violations...

This is not Plaintiffs request for discovery and is not

a concession that the record is incomplete. The state

ment shows that Plaintiff asserts the current record,

satisfies Rule 56, and that any future discovery would

be confirmatory, not foundational. The magistrate

judge’s framing suggests Plaintiff admits the record is

incomplete, which is a mischaracterization leading to

misapplied law regarding premature motions for sum

mary judgment. Plaintiff had already submitted ma

terial facts, undisputed and supported by evidence.

Brown v. Mississippi Valley State Univ., 311F.3d

328 (5th Cir. 2002), and Gabarick v. Laurin Maritime,

App-41

406 F. App’x 883 (5th Cir. 2010), apply where discov

ery is necessary to establish material facts.

Washington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 901F. 2d 1281,

1285 (5th Cir. 1990)

Held “Summary judgment may be appropriate even

before discovery if the nonmoving party has failed to

demonstrate how discovery would create a genuine is

sue of material fact.”

Robinson v. Cerenity Senior Care, 2022 WL

16744327, at 6 (D. Minn. Nov. 7, 2022)

Held “A motion is not premature where the movant

has submitted supporting evidence, and the opposing

party fails to comply with Rule 56(d) requirements.”

“Summary judgment assumes some dis

covery,” Brown v. Miss. Valley State Univ.,

311 F. 3d 328, 333 (5th Cir. 2002), so a motion

for summary judgment should not ordinarily be

granted before discovery has been completed,

Ala. Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Co. v. Am. Fid.

Life Ins. Co., 606 F.2d 602, 609 (5th Cir. 1979).

OBJECTION: Misapplied law. These precedents do

not establish an over-all rule prohibiting summary

judgment pre-discovery.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U. S. 317, 322-23

(1986)

Held “Rule 56 permits a summary judgment motion

at any time, and that the burden then shifts to the

nonmovant to “designate specific facts showing a gen

uine issue.”

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U. S. 242, 250

(1986)

App-42

Held “The sufficiency of the evidence determines

whether a trial is necessary not the timing of discov

ery.

The Fifth Circuit has established summary judgment

is not premature, even where discovery has not oc

curred, unless the nonmovant has properly complied

with Rule 56(d) and shown how discovery will produce

specific material facts. Brown and Ala. Farm Bu

reau misapplies the law if the magistrate judge con

cludes discovery is required without first considering

whether sufficient evidence was already submitted

and whether Rule 56(d) was followed.”

Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F. 3d 1069, 1075 (5th

Cir. 1994)

Held “Conclusory allegations and unsubstantiated as

sertions are insufficient to defeat summary judg

ment.”

10. “The court has discretion to deny a mo

tion for summary judgment as premature.

See, e. g., Gabarick v. Laurin Mar. (Am.),

Inc., 406F. App’x 883, 890 (5th Cir. 2010);

Sunbelt Sav., FSB Dall., Tex. v. Montross,

923 F. 2d 353, 358 (5th Cir. 1991).”

OBJECTION: Misapplied law.

Court discretion must be grounded in the standards

and structure of Rule 56.

Defendant did not satisfy the procedural requirement

set by Rule 56(d), which the magistrate judge’s discre

tion cannot override. Gabarick and Sunbelt both

involved a proper calling upon procedure for discovery

needs, not a failure to follow the rules.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477U.S. 317, 322-23

(1986)

App-43

Held “Rule 56 does not require discovery before a

court may rule on summary judgment only that the

nonmovant be afforded the procedural mechanisms to

respond.”

Brown v. Miss. Valley State Univ., 311 F. 3d 328,

333 (5th Cir. 2002)

Established “If the nonmovant needs discovery, they

must file a Rule 56(d) affidavit or declaration showing

why they cannot present facts essential to justify their

opposition.”

Access Mediquip, L.L.C., v. UnitedHealthcare

Ins. Co., 662 F. 3d 376, 392 (5th Cir. 2011)

Held “Rule 56(d) motions must be specific and sup

ported by facts, not general assertions.”

11. The court also may dismiss a motion for

summary judgment without prejudice if it

is filed before any party answers. Watkins

v. Monroe, No. 6:18-CV-00347, 2019 WL

1869864, at 1 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 27, 2019), report

and recommendation adopted, No. 6:18CV00347, 2019 WL 1858100 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 25,

2019).

OBJECTION: Misapplied law.

The Watkins dismissal was based on the defendant’s

having not yet answered the complaint, and no adver

sarial process had begun. In Plaintiffs case, Defend

ant Collin College has answered and actively partici

pated in motion practice, including opposing the sum

mary judgment motion. The magistrate judge’s use

of Watkins as legal precedent misapplies the proce

dural standard and introduces error. The Plaintiffs

MSJ was filed in compliance with Rule 56(b), which

allows for its filing at any time until 30 days after the

App-44

close of all discovery, absent an otherwise court-im

posed order.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U. S. 317, 322 (1986)

Held “Summary judgment is an integral part of fed

eral procedure and is proper when the movant shows

the absence of a genuine issue, regardless of discovery

stage.”

Washington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 901F. 2d 1281,

1285 (5th Cir. 1990)

Held “Summary judgment may be granted early

where the opposing party fails to demonstrate with

specificity, under Rule 56(d), why discovery is neces

sary.”

Brown v. Miss. Valley State Univ., 311F. 3d 328,

333 (5th Cir. 2002)

Held “Exceptions apply where sufficient evidence has

already been submitted.”

12. “Young’s pre-discovery motion for sum

mary judgment is premature.

OBJECTION: Disregard for Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure—Rule 56(b).

Plaintiff demonstrated evidentiary sufficiency, and

Defendant failed to comply with Rule 56(d). No discov

ery was pending under court order, and Defendant did

not justify its delay.

Labeling Plaintiff s MS J as premature mischaracter

izes a properly filed motion under Rule 56(b), which

allows summary judgment motions at any time until

30 days after the close of all discovery.

The magistrate judge’s application of the term “pre

discovery suggests that discovery is a procedural pre

requisite, which contradicts legal precedent that the

App-45

necessity of discovery depends on whether the non

moving party complies with Rule 56(d).

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U. S. 317, 322 (1986)

Held “Rule 56 “mandates the entry of summary judg

ment” where the nonmovant fails to make a sufficient

showing, regardless of discovery status.”

Parsons v. United States DOJ, 801 F. 3d 701, 709

(6th Cir. 2015)

Held “Summary judgment prior to discovery is not im

proper where the movant produces sufficient undis

puted facts and the nonmovant fails to comply with

Rule 56(d).”

Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F. 3d 1069, 1075 (5th

Cir. 1994)

Held “Nonmovants may not “simply rely on vague as

sertions” to postpone summary judgment without

meeting Rule 56(d) s standards.”

13. As her response to Collin College’s motion

notes, additional discovery will lead to

relevant evidence.

OBJECTION: Mischaracterization and misapplied

law. Plaintiffs MS J states that discovery would con

firm the violations not that it is necessary to establish

them. The magistrate judge’s summary reframes

this into a concession that discovery is needed to lead

to relevant evidence, which contradicts the premise

and purpose of the motion for summary judgment.

That is a material misreading of what Plaintiff wrote

and presents a lower evidentiary position than the one

asserted. Plaintiff stated in the Motion for Summary

Judgment, (Dkt. 21, p. 7):

“Plaintiff respectfully maintains that sufficient

evidence has been presented to warrant summary

App-46

judgment, and that additional discovery includ

ing depositions, electronic transmissions and

hard copy records would only further confirm De

fendant’s violations...”

The mischaracterization directly affects how the

magistrate judge determines the MSJ as premature,

leading to a misapplication of the law. The reword

ing reverses Plaintiffs position from asserting that

summary judgment is proper now, to appearing to ad

mit that discovery is required. That false premise is

then used to justify the motion to dismiss/stay.. .as

premature, despite Plaintiffs submitted evidence ar

guing it is already sufficient under Rule 56. A mo

tion cannot be deemed premature based on a misread

concession.

Roberts v. Louisiana Downs, Inc., 742 F. 2d 221,

223 (5th Cir. 1984)

Held “Summary judgment should not be denied

merely to allow discovery if the discovery would not

change the outcome.”

Access Telecom, Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp.,

197 F. 3d 694, 719 (5th Cir. 1999)

Held “Denial based on discovery is improper where

the party opposing summary judgment fails to specify

how additional discovery would create a genuine issue

of material fact.”

Brown v. Mississippi Valley State Univ., 311 F. 3d

328, 333 (5th Cir. 2002)

Held “Summary judgment is proper where the moving

party supports their position with evidence and the

nonmovant fails to meet the Rule 56(d) burden, even

if discovery has not occurred.”

App-47

14. “And as Collin College argues, it needs ad

ditional discovery to support its defenses

to Young’s claims.”

OBJECTION: Misapplied law. Judicial error in dis

cretion overlooking Defendant’s failure to comply un

der Federal Rules of Civil Procedure—Rule 56(d).

“Additional discovery presumes that some discovery

has already taken place or that Defendant has suffi

ciently provided procedural justification for needing

more. Defendant submitted no affidavit or declara

tion required under Rule 56(d) to justify its continuing

delays. The magistrate judge’s acceptance of De

fendant’s claim passes over this requirement and mis

applies the law in the absence of a showing of compli

ance.

The magistrate judge’s deference to Defendant’s un

supported assertion improperly shifts the burden onto

the Plaintiff to overcome speculative or future de

fenses. It is the nonmovant’s responsibility, under

Rule 56(d), to identify specific material facts they can

not present and explain why discovery is necessary.

Defendant failed to comply. Therefore, concluding

that Defendant needs additional discovery is without

a legal foundation. The magistrate judge’s recom

mendation neglects to observe procedural rules and

fairness.

Washington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 901F. 2d 1281,

1285 (5th Cir. 1990)

Held “Rule 56(d) requires a nonmovant to present a

valid affidavit explaining why they cannot present

facts essential to oppose summary judgment.”

Raby v. Livingston, 600 F. 3d 552, 561 (5th Cir.

2010)

App-48

Established “Vague assertions about discovery needs

are insufficient; the party must demonstrate how dis

covery would create a genuine issue of material fact.”

Campbell v. Eastland, 307 F. 2d 478, 491 (5th Cir.

1962)

Held “The discovery process is not to be used to delay

proper disposition of cases when no valid procedural

basis is presented.”

III.

RULE 56(d)

Rule 56(d) allows a court to defer or deny summary

judgment only when the nonmovant shows by affida

vit or declaration that it cannot present facts essential

to justify its opposition. If a nonmovant shows by af

fidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, it

cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition,

the court may: 1—defer considering the motion or

deny it. 2—allow time to obtain affidavits or declara

tions or to take discovery; or 3—issue any other appro

priate order. While discretion exists, it is procedur

ally conditioned on a proper showing.

Plaintiff, in full compliance with 56(d), filed her

MSJ after the Rule 26(f) conference, which permits fil

ing at any time unless otherwise ordered. No such

order restriction existed in this case. Defendant failed

to comply and did not provide a proper showing under

Rule 56(d).

IV.

APPLICABLE FEDERAL AND

RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

LOCAL

The following provisions of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure and the Local Civil Rules of the

United States District Court for the Eastern District

of Texas, Sherman Division (E.D. Tex. Civ. R.) apply

App-49

to this Objection. All rules are cited in their most re

cent versions.

FEDERAL (Amended Dec. 1,2024)

Rule 1 “These rules govern the procedure in all civil

actions and proceedings in the United States district

courts... They should be construed, administered,

and employed by the court and the parties to secure

the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of

every action and proceeding.”

Rule 56(a) '“A party may move for summary judg

ment, identifying each claim or defense—or the part

of each claim or defense—on which summary judg

ment is sought. The court shall grant summary

judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is en

titled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Rule 56(c)(1) “A party asserting that a fact cannot

be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion

by: (A) citing to particular parts of materials in the

record... or (B) showing that the materials cited do not

establish the absence or presence of a genuine dis

pute...”

Rule 56(d) “If a nonmovant shows by affidavit or

declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot pre

sent facts essential to justify its opposition, the court

may: (1) defer considering the motion or deny it; (2)

allow time to obtain affidavits or declarations or to

take discovery; or (3) issue any other appropriate or

der.”

LOCAL (Effective Dec. 1, 2023)

Local Rule CV-1 “(a) The rules of procedure in any

proceeding in this court are those prescribed by the

App-50

laws of the United States, the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, these local rules, and any orders entered

by the court. These local rules shall be construed as

consistent with Acts of Congress and rules of practice

and procedure prescribed by the Supreme Court of the

United States and the United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit.”

Local Rule CV-7 “(a) Generally. An application to

the court for an order shall be by motion, which, un

less made during a hearing or trial, shall be in writing

and shall set forth with particularity the grounds

therefor and the relief or order sought.”

Local Rule CV-7 “(d) Responses to motions must

include a brief setting forth the party’s contentions of

fact and/or law, and argument and authorities.”

Local Rule CV-7(e) “Responses shall contain a

concise statement of the facts and supporting argu

ments. All evidence must be included in an appendix

and properly cited.”

Local Rule CV-56 “(a) Motion. Any motion for

summary judgment must include a statement of the

issues to be decided by the court and, separately, a

statement of each material fact as to which the mov

ing party contends there is no genuine issue.

Local Rule CV-56(c) “Any party opposing a sum

mary judgment motion shall file a response that in

cludes: (1) a response to the movant s statement of un

disputed facts; and (2) a statement of material facts as

to which a genuine issue exists, with citations to

proper summary judgment evidence.

JUDICIAL DISCRETION

The magistrate judge exercises discretion as if Rule

56(d) applied, but the Defendant never submitted an

App-51

affidavit or declaration, making it a procedural failure

under Rule 56(d). The magistrate judge may exer

cise discretion upon a proper showing by affidavit or

declaration that discovery is necessary to oppose the

motion. Neither were submitted by the Defendant.

Judicial discretion overlooking Rule 56(d) noncompli

ance is misapplied law.

Am. Family Life Assurance Co. v. Biles, 714 F. 3d

887, 894 (5th Cir. 2013)

Held “Without the required affidavit, the district

court abused its discretion in deferring summary

judgment.”

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U. S. 317, 326 (1986)

Held “Judicial discretion must be exercised consistent

with procedural fairness to both parties.”

Washington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 901F. 2d 1281,

1285 (5th Cir. 1990)

Held “The failure to file an affidavit under Rule 56(d)

justifies denial of relief; a court granting relief anyway

exceeds its discretion.”

Access Telecom, Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp.,

197 F. 3d 694 719 (5th Cir. 1999)

Established “Relief under Rule 56(d) requires strict

compliance. Courts err by granting additional time or

deferring judgment without it.”

VI.

REPUTATIONAL HARM—PUBLIC

RECORD

Defendant’s repeated attacks on Plaintiffs charac

ter, submitted through formal filings and now part of

the public record, continue to cause reputational and

emotional harm. The impact is not only historical. It

carries forward, shaping how others perceive Plain

tiffs integrity and affecting future professional and

App-52

relational opportunities. It extends a wrongful ter

mination past economic loss into public and profes

sional standing. Terms such as heinous used to de

scribe Plaintiff are unsupported by material facts and

were presented to justify alleged unlawful actions and

federal violations.

While no separate claim for defamation has been

brought, these public record statements support

Plaintiffs argument for damages as part of the

broader harm suffered and perpetuating into the fu

ture. Plaintiff has had to endure traumatic stress.

Her termination also damaged her reputation with

her students where she was highly regarded, well-re

spected and known for her uprightness and compe

tence.

Collin College’s institutional ills from systemic er

ror that this case exposes through the rule of law re

veal that the intent was not only to terminate Plain

tiffs job but to terminate her career signaling the im

pact of permanence beyond employment to identity,

livelihood, and opportunity. Personal harm has been

compounded by litigation filings uncorrected by the

magistrate judge to this point with ongoing and unjust

consequences affecting more than just the Plaintiff

but also students and colleagues, even the public who

might be encounter similar circumstances; those

whose trust and pride were injured, and those whose

continued respect for and association with Plaintiff

are diminished by the public course of this case, where

the full harm cannot be undone.

Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323, 350

(1974)

App-53

Held “The legitimate state interest underlying the law

of libel is the compensation of individuals for the harm

inflicted on them by defamatory falsehoods.”

VII.

REQUEST FOR DE NOVO REVIEW

For the reasons presented in this filing, Plaintiff re

spectfully objects to the Report and Recommendation

of the United States Magistrate Judge and requests

that the District Court:

• Conduct a de novo review under Rule 72(b)(3) and

28U.S.C. §636(b)(l).

• Reject the Court’s Report and Recommendation

to grant Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss or Stay

Plaintiffs MS J as premature.

• Deny Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss or Stay

Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment as

Premature

• Reaffirm that Plaintiffs MS J should be consid

ered on the merits, not deferred based on proce

dural misapplications.

• Proceed to decision on the record already submit

ted.

• Note that the mischaracterization of Plaintiffs

position and disregard for Rule 56(d) failure to

comply creates grounds for reversal upon appeal.

VIII.

DAMAGES AND RELIEF

Plaintiff respectfully refers the Court to her Motion

for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 21) and Plaintiffs Op

position (Dkt. 30), in which all claims and supporting

exhibits, including the claim for wrongful termination

and Title VII statutory authority, are identified and

preserved. Any omissions in summary form were not

App-54

intended to waive those claims, and Plaintiff relies on

the full record previously submitted.

IX.

CONCLUSION

This Objection is respectfully submitted to correct a

misapplication of law and to also reinforce the value

of fair and equal rule enforcement in all federal pro

ceedings.

The clarity of the record, the absence of any mate

rial dispute from Defendant, and Plaintiffs consistent

adherence to governing rules, including Rule 56, offer

this Court a meaningful example and opportunity to

affirm the principle that justice is not determined by

party status, but by procedural and factual integrity.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Dana F. Young 4-23—25

Dana F. Young

Plaintiff, Pro Se

App-55

Appendix I

[Filed: Oct 8, 2025]

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS, SHERMAN

DIVISION

Dana F. Young,

Plaintiff, Pro Se

§ Case No. 4:24-CVV‘

§ 00979-SDJ-BD

Collin College,

Defendant

OBJECTION TO MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S OR

DER (DKT 44)

Dana F. Young, Plaintiff Pro Se, respectfully objects

to the Magistrate Judge’s Order (Dkt. 44) under Fed.

R. Civ. P. 72(a), because the Order advocates argu

ments for Defendant that the Defendant never raised

and claims Defendant failed to rebut in litigation. The

Order misapplies Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d) standards gov

erning summary judgment procedure.

1. Rule 56(d) requires that a party opposing sum

mary judgment must file an affidavit or declara

tion specifying why it cannot present facts essen

tial to justify its opposition. Washington v. All

state Ins. Co., 901 F.2d 1281, 1285 (5th Cir. 1990).

HELD: Rule 56(d) party opposing summary judg

ment must file an affidavit setting forth specific

reasons why it cannot present facts essential to

justify its opposition. Absent this affidavit, there

is no basis for a continuance.

2. Defendant filed no Rule 56(d) affidavit and of

fered no admissible evidence to create a genuine

App-56

dispute of material fact. The Magistrate Judge’s

Order exceeds permissible discretion by advanc

ing Defendant’s position and recommending de

nial of Plaintiffs motion as “premature.”

3. Plaintiff previously preserved these issues in her

Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 29) and Ob

jection to Report and Recommendation (Dkt. 32),

which cite Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

322 (1986) and Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 251—52 (1986) requiring entry of

summary judgment where no genuine dispute ex

ists

Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court uphold

this Objection, vacating the Magistrate Judge’s Order

(Dkt. 44), and pursuant to Rule 58(a), enter a Final

Judgment.

Respectfully submitted,

ZsZ Dana F. Young

Dana F. Young, Plaintiff Pro Se

5200 S. Colony Blvd. #560512

The Colony, TX 75056

DFLY812@gmail.com

Date: October 8, 2025

App-57

Appendix J

DFLY <dfly812@gmail.com>

Activity in Case 4:24-cv-00979-SDJ-BD Young v.

Collin College Memorandum & Opinion

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***NOTE TO PUBLIC ACCESS USERS*** There

is no charge for viewing opinions.

U.S. District Court

Eastern District of TEXAS [LIVE]

Notice of Electronic Filing

The following transaction was entered on 7/11/2025

at 5:07 PM CDT and filed on 7/11/2025

Case Name: Young v. Collin College

Case Number: 4:24-cv-00979-SDJ-BD

Filer:

WARNING: CASE CLOSED on 07/11/2025

Document Number: 35

Docket Text:

MEMORANDUM ADOPTING REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES

MAGISTRATE JUDGE for [31] Report and Rec

ommendations. IT IS ORDERED that the Motion

App—58

to Dismiss, (Dkt. #28), is GRANTED and that

Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as prema

ture. Signed by District Judge Sean D. Jordan

on 7/11/2025. (knp)

4:24-cv-00979-SDJ-BD Notice has been electron

ically mailed to:-----Kathryn Elizabeth Long klong@thompsonhorton.com, dcampbell@thompsonhorton.com,

hsenter@thompsonhorton.com, iyaseen@thompsonhorton. com, lgary@thomp sonhorton. com,

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fyaredes@thompsonhorton.com , leilausvi@gmail.com ,

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Dana F. Young dfly812@gmail.com

4:24-cv-00979-SDJ-BD Notice will not be elec

tronically mailed to:

The following document(s) are associated with this

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App-59

Appendix K

[Filed: Jul. 14, 2025]

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

SHERMANJDJYISION

DANA F. YOUNG,

Plaintiff- Appellant,

——"

§ Case No. 4:24—cv—

§ 00979-SDJ-BD

COLLIN COLLEGE,

Defendant-Appellee.

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Notice is hereby given that Plaintiff-Appellant, Dana

F. Young, appeals to the United States Court of Ap

peals for the Fifth Circuit from the final judgment en

tered on July 11, 2025 (Dkt. 35), and all other appeal

able orders made part of that judgment.

Zs/ Dana F. Young

Dated: 7-14—25

Dana F. Young, Pro Se

MAILING ADDRESS: P.O. Box 560512, The Colony,

TX 75056

5005 Whitestone Lane #133

Plano, TX 75024

(972) 679-8744

dfly812@gmail.com

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