Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Neil Paul Noble, Petitioner v. Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles

App-i

APPENDIX

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Appendix A

Opinion [not precedential], United States Court

of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Neil Paul Noble

v. Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles; Texas De­

partment of Criminal Justice,

No. 25-50809 (May 5, 2026)............................ App-1

Appendix B

Order [dismissal of complaint], United States

District Court for the Western District of Texas,

Neil Paul Noble v. Texas Board of Pardons and

Paroles; Texas Department of Criminal Justice,

No. l:25-cv-01303-ADA (Sep. 17, 2025) ....App-5

App-1

Appendix A

[Filed: May 5, 2026]

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 25-50809

Neil Paul Noble,

Plaintiff—Appellant,

versus

Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles; Texas De­

partment of Criminal Justice,

Defendants-—Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. l:25-CV-1303

Before CLEMENT, SOUTHWICK, and OLDHAM, Circuit

Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Neil Paul Noble was convicted in Texas state court

of stalking under TEXAS PENAL CODE §42.072 and was

sentenced to four years of probation. Noble later vio­

lated the terms of his probation, so the court revoked

it and sentenced him to ten years of imprisonment.

After Noble served a portion of this sentence, the

Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles (“TBPP”) notified

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5TH ClR.

R. 47.5.

App-2

him that it would review whether to release him from

prison and place him on mandatory supervision for

the remainder of his sentence. Noble then submitted

written materials to the TBPP.

The TBPP determined that Noble was ineligible for

mandatory supervision. In a written notice, the TBPP

stated that Noble’s release would endanger the public

and his accrued good conduct time was not an accu­

rate reflection of his potential for rehabilitation. See

Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 508.149(b).

Noble then filed a pro se complaint in federal court

against the TBPP and the Texas Department of Crim­

inal Justice (“TDCJ”). He brought claims under 42

U. S. C. § 1983, alleging that the TBPP and the TDCJ

violated his due process rights by denying his release

to mandatory supervision and failing to provide access

to a computer with word-processing software, a

printer, and a copier. The district court screened No­

ble’s complaint pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §1915A and

dismissed it without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction

and failure to state a claim. Noble timely appealed.

After submitting a merits brief, Noble moved to file

several supplemental briefs. Those motions are

GRANTED.

On appeal, Noble only challenges the dismissal of

his claims against the TBPP. He expressly abandons

his claims against the TDCJ.

We review de novo a district court’s dismissal for

failure to state a claim under §1915A(b)(l), applying

the same standard as when we review a dismissal un­

der Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). DeMarco

v. Davis, 914 F. 3d 383, 386 (5th Cir. 2019). Dismissal

is appropriate where a complaint does not “contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a

App-3

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft

v. Iqbal, 556 U. S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U. S. 544, 570 (2007)).

Subject to certain exceptions, see Tex. Gov’t Code

Ann. § 508.149, Texas’s mandatory supervision

scheme requires the TBPP to release eligible inmates

to mandatory supervision “when the actual calendar

time the inmate has served plus any accrued good con­

duct time equals the term to which the inmate was

sentenced,” id. §508.147(a). So, inmates have a con­

stitutional expectancy of early release and a protected

liberty interest that Texas may not deny without due

process. See Teague v. Quarterman, 482 F. 3d 769,

774^77 (5th Cir. 2007); Boss v. Quarterman, 552 F. 3d

425, 427, 429 n.24 (5th Cir. 2008); of. Halley v. Lump­

kin, No. 23-10473, 2023 WL 4351242, at *1 (5th Cir.

July 5, 2023) (concluding that due process concerns

are not implicated where an inmate is ineligible for

mandatory supervision because he was previously

convicted of an enumerated crime in §508.149(a)). In

this context, due process requires that the inmate be

provided with advance notice, an opportunity to be

heard, and a statement of reasons for the denial of re­

lease. See Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr.

Complex, 442 U. S. 1, 14-16 (1979); Boss, 552 F. 3d at

428-30.

Noble’s complaint reflects that the TBPP satisfied

these procedural requirements. Moreover, his allega­

tions also fail to show that the TBPP acted in an arbi­

trary manner in the constitutional sense. See Cole­

man v. Dretke, 395 F. 3d 216, 224 (5th Cir. 2004)

(“While the core of substantive due process is protec­

tion from arbitrary government action, ‘only the most

egregious official conduct’ is arbitrary in the

App-4

constitutional sense.” (quoting Cnty. of Sacramento v.

Lewis, 523 U. S. 833, 846 (1998))). Thus, the district

court did not err in dismissing Noble’s complaint for

failure to state a claim. See Iqbal, 556 U. S. at 678.

And the district court did not abuse its discretion in

deciding that permitting Noble to amend his com­

plaint would be futile. See Legate v. Livingston, 822

F. 3d 207, 211-12 (5th Cir. 2016).

We AFFIRM.

App-5

Appendix B

[Filed: Sep. 17, 2025]

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AUSTIN DIVISION

NEIL NOBLE #02473212 §

§

v.

§

§

TEXAS BOARD OF

§

PARDONS AND PA§

ROLES and TEXAS DE- §

PARTMENT OF CRIMI- §

NAL JUSTICE

§

A-25-CV01303-ADA

ORDER

Before the Court are Plaintiff Neil Noble’s com­

plaint and supporting briefs. Plaintiff, proceeding pro

se, has paid the full filing fee for this case. For the

reasons discussed below, the Court dismisses Plain­

tiffs complaint.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

At the time he filed his complaint pursuant to 42

U. S. C. § 1983, Plaintiff was confined in the Duncan

Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice Correctional Institutions Division. Plaintiff was con­

victed of stalking in Dallas County, Texas. He was

sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment on May 3, 2021.

Plaintiff was denied release on mandatory supervi­

sion in June 2025.

App-6

Plaintiff sues the Texas Board of Pardons and Pa­

roles (the “Board”). He claims the Board denied him

due process when it reviewed him for mandatory su­

pervision in 2025. Specifically, he claims:

1.

2.

3.

4.

The Board arbitrarily and capriciously deter­

mined that Plaintiffs 2021 stalking convic­

tion constituted a crime of violence and/or

had a vulnerable victim and therefore deter­

mined that Plaintiffs release would endan­

ger the public under Tex. Gov’t CODE §

508.149(b)(2).

Section 508.149(b)(2) does not provide suffi­

cient criteria for the Board to use in deter­

mining whether an inmate’s release would

endanger the public and permits the Board

to arbitrarily and capriciously deny an in­

mate’s release to mandatory supervision.

The Board arbitrarily and capriciously con­

sidered Plaintiffs prior criminal convictions

when determining that his release to manda­

tory supervision would endanger the public.

He contends his prior convictions were for

“non-aggravated” crimes and are too old to be

indicative of whether his release would en­

danger the public.

The Board arbitrarily and capriciously con­

sidered Plaintiffs 2023 probation revocation

on his current stalking charge. Plaintiff ex­

plains his probation was revoked because he

cut off his ankle monitor. He contends the

ankle monitor was likely an unconstitutional

condition of probation and he was unable to

App-7

5.

6.

7.

8.

get adequate cardiovascular exercise with it

in place.

The Board improperly considered Plaintiffs

1998 arrest for assault with a deadly weapon

in California. According to Plaintiff, he

pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor battery and

explains he had gotten into a fight with his

roommate and threw a pan of hot water on

his roommate’s leg because his roommate

threw a glass of wine at his head.

The Board improperly considered Plaintiffs

inability to find suitable employment. Plain­

tiff contends there is reason to believe that

his chronic unemployment problems are

linked to the promotion of Plaintiffs great

uncle, Ulysses Grant, to General-in-Chief of

the U.S. Armies in 1864.

The Board arbitrarily and capriciously con­

sidered Plaintiffs prior arrests for which the

charges were subsequently dismissed. Plain­

tiff asserts the arrests were for misdemean­

ors and were too old to be indicative of

whether Plaintiffs release would endanger

the public.

The Board did not approve Plaintiffs post-release residence in Dallas, Texas and failed to

make an appointment to inspect the property.

Plaintiff also sues the Texas Department of Crimi­

nal Justice (“TDCJ”). He claims TDCJ violated his

due process rights by not providing clerical assistance

to inmates in the form of word processing software,

printers, and copy machines.

App-8

For relief, Plaintiff requests the Court to prohibit

the Board from considering his 2021 stalking convic­

tion as a crime of violence. He also requests the Court

to define criteria for the Board to use when determin­

ing whether an inmate’s release would endanger the

public under section 508.149(b)(2), including whether

a mental health evaluation should be required before

finding an inmate’s release would endanger public

safety. He additionally requests the Court to prohibit

the Board from considering the following when deter­

mining whether Plaintiffs release would endanger

the public:

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

Plaintiffs three prior convictions;

Plaintiffs 2023 probation revocation;

Plaintiffs 1998 arrest in California;

Plaintiffs inability to find suitable employ­

ment; and

Plaintiffs three arrests for which the charges

were subsequently dismissed.

Plaintiff also requests the Court to order the Board to

permit parolees to live alone if the location is suitable,

order the Board to schedule appointments for inside

inspections of post-release residences, and determine

that his residence in Dallas is a suitable post-release

address for Plaintiff. Plaintiff requests the Court to

order TDCJ to provide inmates with access to a com­

puter with word processing software, a printer, and a

copy machine. Finally, Plaintiff requests the Court to

order the Board to reconsider him for mandatory su­

pervision within 30 days, taking into consideration

any newly prescribed procedures and prohibitions

presumably established by this Court.

App-9

DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

A.

Standard Under 28 U. S. C. S1915A

Although Plaintiff paid the full filing fee for this

case, his claims must be screened pursuant to 28

U. S. C. §1915A. On review, the Court must dismiss

the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the

complaint is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted or seeks mon­

etary relief from a defendant who is immune from

such relief. See Martin v. Scott, 156 F. 3d 578 (5th Cir.

1998).

When reviewing a plaintiffs complaint, the court

must construe plaintiffs allegations as liberally as

possible. Haines u. Kerner, 404 U. S. 519 (1972). How­

ever, the plaintiffs pro se status does not offer him “an

impenetrable shield, for one acting pro se has no li­

cense to harass others, clog the judicial machinery

with meritless litigation and abuse already over­

loaded court dockets.” Farguson v. MBank Houston,

NA.., 808 F. 2d 358, 359 (5th Cir. 1986).

B.

Eleventh Amendment Immunity

Plaintiffs claims against the Board and TDCJ are

barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Elev­

enth Amendment generally divests federal courts of

jurisdiction to entertain suits directed against states.

Port Auth. Trans-Hudson v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 304

(1990). The Eleventh Amendment may not be evaded

by suing state agencies or state employees in their of­

ficial capacity because such an indirect pleading re­

mains in essence a claim upon the state treasury.

Green v. State Bar of Texas, 27 F. 3d 1083, 1087 (5th

Cir. 1994). Ordinarily, the Court would allow Plaintiff

App-10

an opportunity to amend his complaint to name ap­

propriate defendants. However, an amendment in

this case would be futile.

C.

Mandatory Supervision

“Mandatory supervision” is “the release of an eligi­

ble inmate so that the inmate may serve the remain­

der of the inmate’s sentence not on parole but under

the supervision of the pardons and paroles division.”

TEX. GOV’T. Code §508.001(5). Whereas an inmate’s

release on parole is wholly discretionary, an inmate’s

release on mandatory supervision is required, sub­

ject to certain exceptions,1 when the “actual calendar

time the inmate has served plus any accrued good con­

duct time equals the term to which the inmate was

sentenced.” Id. at § 508.147(a); Jackson v. Johnson,

475 F. 3d 261, 263, n. 1 (5th Cir. 2007). As a matter of

state law, good and work time credits apply only to

eligibility for parole or mandatory supervision and do

not otherwise have any effect on the length of sentence

imposed on an inmate. See Ex parte Hallmark, 883

S. W. 2d 672, 674 (Tex. Crim. App.1994); Tex. Gov’t

Code Ann. § 498.003(a).

Both the Fifth Circuit and the Texas courts have

held Texas’s post-September 1, 1996 mandatory su­

pervision scheme (outlined above) does create a pro­

tected liberty interest. Teague v. Quarterman, 482

F. 3d 769, 777 (5th Cir. 2007); Ex parte Geiken, 28

S. W. 3d 553, 558 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Therefore,

1 Section 508.149(b) provides that “[a]n inmate may not be re­

leased to mandatory supervision if a parole panel determines

that: (1) the inmate’s accrued good conduct time is not an accu­

rate reflection of the inmate’s potential for rehabilitation; and (2)

the inmate’s release would endanger the public.”

App-11

Plaintiff has a protected liberty interest and is enti­

tled to due process protection with respect to the deci­

sions to deny him mandatory supervision. However,

this simply means certain procedural due process pro­

tections must be afforded Plaintiff by the Board before

it decides whether to release him on mandatory

supervision. Procedural due process requires, essen­

tially, that Plaintiff be given notice and a meaningful

opportunity to be heard. Geiken, 28 S. W. 3d at 560.

Additionally, if release is denied, “the inmate must be

informed in what respects he falls short of qualifying

for early release.” Id. (citing Greenholtz v. Inmates of

Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U. S.

1, 16 (1979)).

Plaintiff has failed to show he was not provided with

timely notice that he was to be considered for manda­

tory supervision release, that he was not given a

meaningful opportunity to tender information to the

Board in support of his release, or that the Board

failed to inform him in what respects he fell short of

qualifying for early release. Plaintiffs allegations in­

dicate he has previously received the process to which

he was due under the law with regard to the denial of

mandatory supervision and there is no reason to think

he will not be afforded those same protections in the

future.

To the extent Plaintiff complains the Board’s rea­

soning or the guidelines it follows are too vague or ar­

bitrary, the Court of Criminal Appeals has considered

this argument and rejected it. Geiken, 28 S.W.3d at

557. In Geiken, the applicant argued the statutory cri­

teria directing the Board to evaluate the inmate’s po­

tential for rehabilitation and whether his release

would endanger the public “are too vague to provide

App-12

any guidance to the Board in making its decision

and ... this Court should, because of this vagueness,

hold this portion of the statute unconstitutional.” Id.

The Court of Criminal Appeals rejected the argument,

explaining the factors in question represent “valid

concerns in making the release decision,” and “are not

so vague as to provide the Board with no guidance in

their decision.” Id. The Geiken court concluded, “the

early release decision is necessarily subjective and

cannot be limited to rigidly defined factors. In creating

a parole or other early release system, ‘the state may

be specific or general in defining the conditions for re­

lease and the factors that should be considered by the

parole authority.’” Id. (citing Greenholtz, 442 U. S. at

8). Therefore, Plaintiffs constitutional challenge is

without merit, and he fails to state a federal claim

upon which relief can be granted.

D.

Office Equipment

Plaintiff asserts library resources are inadequate

because word processing software, printers, and copy

machines are not available. Plaintiff contends the

lack of access to modern productivity equipment hin­

ders an inmate’s ability to submit professional quality

court filings and parole packages. Plaintiff maintains

handwriting or use of a typewriter are not adequate

substitutes. However, Plaintiff does not claim he is

unable to file handwritten pleadings in federal court

or parole packages at the Board. He simply believes

he would be more successful if his filings were typed.

Plaintiff fails to allege a valid constitutional right.

It is beyond dispute that prison inmates do not have a

free-standing, federally protected right to use office

equipment to carry out their litigation. See Beck v.

App-13

Lynaugh, 842 F.2d 759, 762 (5th Cir.1988); see also In

re Maxy, 674 F.3d 658, 661 (7th Cir.2012); Taylor v.

Coughlin, 29 F.3d 39, 40 (2d Cir. 1994) (acknowledging

that there is “no constitutional right to a typewriter

as an incident to the right of access to the courts”);

Stubblefield v. Henderson, 475 F.2d 26, 26—27 (5th

Cir. 1973) (“no federally protected right to the use of

typewriters”); Lehn v. Hartwig, 13 F. App’x 389, 392

(7th Cir. 2001) (holding, in a section 1983 action, “If

prisoners have no constitutional right to a typewriter,

they certainly do not have one to a computer”).

CONCLUSION

Plaintiffs claims against the Board and TDCJ are

barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity. Amending

Plaintiffs complaint to name the Board or TDCJ offi­

cials as defendants would be futile, as Plaintiff has

failed to allege a valid constitutional violation.

It is ORDERED that Plaintiff s Motion for Leave to

File Supplemental Brief, filed on September 12, 2025,

is GRANTED.

It is further ORDERED that Plaintiffs complaint

is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for want

of jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U. S. C.

§1915A.

It is further ORDERED that the Clerk of Court

shall forward a copy of the Court’s order and j udgment

to the keeper of the three-strikes list.

SIGNED on September 17, 2025.

/s/ Alan D Albright

ALAN D ALBRIGHT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE