Amicus Curiae Brief — Broadcast Music, Inc., Petitioner v. North American Concert Promoters Association
Supreme Court briefSep 9, 2026
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No. 26-238
In the Supreme Court of the United States
BROADCAST MUSIC, INC., PETITIONER
v.
NORTH AMERICAN CONCERT PROMOTERS ASSOCIATION
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF
COMPOSERS, AUTHORS AND PUBLISHERS
AS AMICUS CURIAE SUPPORTING PETITIONER
WILLIAM M. JAY
JAY COHEN
S. CONRAD SCOTT
Counsel of Record
PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND,
PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND,
WHARTON & GARRISON LLP
WHARTON & GARRISON LLP
1285 Avenue of the Americas
2001 K Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20006
New York, NY 10019
(202) 223-7300
wjay@paulweiss.com
CLARA KIM
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF
COMPOSERS, AUTHORS AND
PUBLISHERS
250 West 57th Street
New York, NY 10107
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Interest of amicus curiae ............................................................. 1
Argument....................................................................................... 4
I. The Second Circuit’s decision is incorrect. ................... 4
A. The Second Circuit erred in substituting its own
judgment about how to determine a “reasonable”
rate. ............................................................................. 4
B. The Second Circuit likewise erred in limiting the
fee and the revenue base. ......................................... 5
II. This case is important and warrants this court’s
review. ............................................................................... 8
Conclusion ................................................................................... 11
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual
Arts, Inc. v. Goldsmith, 598 U.S. 508
(2023) ............................................................................... 11
ASCAP v. Showtime/The Movie Channel, Inc.,
912 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1990) ......................................... 4, 5
State of New York v. Live Nation Entertainment, Inc., No. 24-cv-3973 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 15, 2026).................................................................... 7
United States v. ASCAP, 627 F.3d 64 (2d
Cir. 2010)........................................................................... 6
United States v. ASCAP, No. 41-1395, 2001
WL 1589999 (S.D.N.Y. June 11, 2001) ........................... 2
U.S. Bank N.A. ex rel. CWCapital Asset
Management LLC v. Village at
Lakeridge, LLC, 583 U.S. 387 (2018) ............................. 5
Other authorities:
ASCAP, ASCAP Payment System ...................................... 2
(I)
II
Page
Other authorities—continued:
Makan Delrahim, “And the Beat Goes On”:
The Future of the ASCAP/BMI Consent
Decrees, Remarks as Prepared for
Delivery, Virtual Event Hosted by
Vanderbilt Law School (Jan. 15, 2021) ....................... 11
Chris Williams, BMI Wins Court Victory in
Revenue Dispute with Top Concert
Promoters, Says Its Writers Will Get a
138% Raise, Variety (Mar. 28, 2023)............................ 10
In the Supreme Court of the United States
BROADCAST MUSIC, INC.,
PETITIONER
v.
NORTH AMERICAN CONCERT PROMOTERS ASSOCIATION
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF
COMPOSERS, AUTHORS AND PUBLISHERS
AS AMICUS CURIAE SUPPORTING PETITIONER
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE
The American Society of Composers, Authors and
Publishers (“ASCAP”) is an unincorporated membership
association of more than 1.1 million songwriters, composers, lyricists, and music publishers, who together have
created and own the copyrights to more than 20 million
works. 1 Founded in 1914, ASCAP is the oldest performing rights organization (or “PRO”) in the United States.
1
Pursuant to Rule 37.6, amicus affirms that no counsel for a party
authored this brief in whole or in part; no such counsel or party made
a monetary contribution to fund its preparation or submission; and no
person other than amicus, its members, or its counsel made such a
monetary contribution. This brief is being filed more than ten days
(1)
2
It has numbered among its members legendary songwriters like Irving Berlin and Cole Porter, global superstars
like Sir Paul McCartney and Stevie Wonder, and contemporary icons like Beyoncé and Noah Kahan. ASCAP’s
members depend on ASCAP to negotiate licenses with
music users, track public performances, distribute royalties, and advocate on their behalf. ASCAP has granted
more than 700,000 businesses blanket licenses to perform
ASCAP members’ copyrighted works throughout the
public places and media in which music is played in America.
ASCAP,
ASCAP
Payment
System,
https://www.ascap.com/help/royalties-and-payment/payment/whocollect (last accessed September 8, 2026).
ASCAP has a substantial interest in the outcome of
this case. Like BMI, ASCAP has long operated under a
consent decree, the operative version of which requires
ASCAP to grant users blanket licenses upon request in
exchange for a “reasonable fee.” These mandatory licenses allow music users to play all of ASCAP’s music
even when the parties do not agree on the fee. When the
parties cannot agree on a fee, a party may initiate expensive “rate court” proceedings in the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of New York, which, under a
longstanding consent decree, is exclusively authorized to
act as a rate court and set a “reasonable fee.” 2d Am. Final J. ¶¶ VI, IX, United States v. ASCAP, No. 41-1395,
2001 WL 1589999 (S.D.N.Y. June 11, 2001).
The Second Circuit’s decision with respect to the scope
of appellate review of the rate court’s decisions directly
affects ASCAP as well as future rate-court litigants. Although the decision below addresses BMI’s agreement
with respondent the North American Concert Promoters
Association (“NACPA”), the district court and Second
before the due date, satisfying the notice requirement under
Rule 37.2.
3
Circuit have frequently treated the ASCAP and BMI consent decrees as equivalent. The Second Circuit’s prescriptions about setting a “reasonable” fee thus will likely
be cited in disputes between ASCAP and its licensees. In
the decision below, the Second Circuit concluded that the
district court erred by not setting a fee more closely tied
to ASCAP’s and BMI’s historical rates and by taking account of rates negotiated by PROs that are not subject to
consent decrees. Should that decision remain binding
precedent in the only court of appeals to hear disputes under the ASCAP and BMI consent decrees, those flawed
conclusions will infect future ASCAP rate-court proceedings and spill over into ASCAP’s negotiations with licensees.
ASCAP also has a substantial interest in this case because the Second Circuit’s decision will lead to longer and
costlier license-fee disputes. Despite relying on economic
theory about “efficient” contract terms, the Second Circuit’s decision will undermine efficiency by discouraging
settlement and leading to protracted rate-court appeals.
ASCAP operates on a not-for-profit basis and distributes
all of the royalties it collects to its members, less administrative expenses. Those added litigation burdens will
therefore reduce the royalties that can be passed on to its
members. ASCAP files this brief as amicus curiae to vindicate its—and its members’—strong interest in the correct determination of reasonable license rates under the
consent decrees.
4
ARGUMENT
I.
THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S DECISION IS INCORRECT.
A. The Second Circuit Erred In Substituting Its Own
Judgment About How To Determine A “Reasonable” Rate.
Two years after oral argument and after a recusal, a
two-judge quorum of the Second Circuit brushed aside
the district court’s extensive and careful fact-finding
based on its own review of a cold record. The district court
determined a reasonable rate for NACPA’s BMI license
after it conducted a bench trial that ran five weeks, admitted more than 300 exhibits into evidence, and considered
the testimony of two experts and 12 fact witnesses. Pet.
App. 13a, 66a-67a, 79a-89a; Pet. 12. Following further
post-trial briefing, the district court issued a 37-page
opinion identifying the relevant revenue base, setting reasonable retrospective and prospective rates, and explaining the findings of fact and conclusions of law supporting
that decision. See Pet. App. 58a-89a.
The panel afforded no deference to the district court’s
conclusions because, in its view, the district court’s determination of the correct revenue base, choices about which
licenses were sufficiently comparable to the BMI/NACPA
license, and selection of a reasonable rate “at the high end
of the benchmark range” all presented questions of law
reviewed de novo. Pet. App. 22a-23a.
The Second Circuit erred in substituting its own judgment for the district court’s in disapproving these building
blocks supporting the choice of a “reasonable” rate. “Fair
market value is a factual matter,” as are numerous components of the rate determination, including “the competitiveness of a market and the market power of a seller.”
ASCAP v. Showtime/The Movie Channel, Inc. (Showtime
II), 912 F.2d 563, 569 (2d Cir. 1990). Here, the district
5
court’s determinations about the reasonable rate and revenue base turned on “case-specific factual issues” such as
changes in the market for live-music performances and
details about the current and historic relationship between various PROs and music users. See Pet. App. 66a89a. The court also examined how the market has evolved
since the last license negotiation in 1998—literally a bygone era in which live concerts were used as promotional
tools to sell albums and CDs, rather than valuable and exclusive experiences in their own right. To make those determinations, the district court immersed itself in evidence and live-witness testimony. The Second Circuit
should have recognized that primary responsibility for
those determinations lay “in the court that has presided
over the presentation of evidence, that has heard all the
witnesses, and that has both the closest and the deepest
understanding of the record,” U.S. Bank N.A. ex rel.
CWCapital Asset Management LLC v. Village at Lakeridge, LLC, 583 U.S. 387, 398 (2018), rather than substituting its own views of the record for the district court’s
considered judgment.
B. The Second Circuit Likewise Erred In Limiting
The Fee And The Revenue Base.
In second-guessing the district court’s well-reasoned
decision, the Second Circuit went astray in several key respects. As a result, that court failed to set a “reasonable”
rate approximating the fair market value of a license to
perform the works in BMI’s catalog.
1. To begin with, the Second Circuit erred by downplaying the significance of licensing agreements executed
by PROs that best “approximate[] the rates that would be
set in a competitive market.” Showtime II, 912 F.2d at
576. ASCAP and BMI are subject to aggressive competition from two other PROs—Global Music Rights LLC
6
(“GMR”) and SESAC LLC (“SESAC”)—which have market shares of 4% and 5%, respectively. Pet. App. 61a.
GMR and SESAC are not subject to a consent decree and
are thus not required to issue blanket licenses upon user
requests. Accordingly, the licenses they voluntarily enter
into provide the best evidence of the price that willing licensees and licensors would agree to in arm’s-length
transactions in a competitive free market. As BMI
demonstrated below, these licenses, when adjusted to account for differences in contract terms, market share, and
other factors, imply rates that are in some cases meaningfully higher than those ASCAP and BMI currently receive. Pet. App. 70a-75a, 82a-86a.
The district court properly concluded that SESAC and
GMR licenses were appropriate benchmarks. Pet. App.
83a-86a. While the Second Circuit did not conclude that
these benchmarks were categorically irrelevant, it nevertheless found that the district court should have placed
less weight on these free-market licenses and more on the
rates previously paid to the regulated PROs. Pet. App.
41a-46a. In support of that conclusion, the court of appeals explained in error that the rate court’s job is to serve
as a “moderating influence” on ASCAP and BMI, and
speculated that GMR and SESAC might themselves be
charging supracompetitive fees. Pet. App. 42a-44a.
That reasoning is fundamentally flawed in multiple respects. To begin with, it inverts the proper role of rate
courts. The ASCAP and BMI consent decrees exist to ensure that the regulated PROs charge and obtain on behalf
of their creator members reasonable rates, based on “fair
market value” and approximating “what an applicant
would pay in a competitive market.” United States v.
ASCAP, 627 F.3d 64, 76 (2d Cir. 2010). But the Second
Circuit’s decision, which is couched as a legal conclusion,
would require future rate courts to downplay the best
available evidence of the price at which willing market
7
participants agree to enter into license agreements: GMR
and SESAC rates, which reflect market values because
those PROs can exercise their free-market right not to enter into agreements if the price is insufficient. Moreover,
the Second Circuit’s decision would require rate courts to
place more emphasis on the rates previously charged by
ASCAP and BMI, neither of which is a willing seller because each is sometimes compelled by its consent decree
to enter into licenses at below-market rates. That incorrectly privileges as a matter of law rates set by, or negotiated in the shadow of, the rate courts over those to which
willing buyers and sellers would agree.
That result is not only backwards, but risks locking in
artificially depressed historical rates and creating a feedback loop in which those rates drag down future rates and
prevent them from keeping pace with increased rates in
the private market. And it fetters rate courts’ ability to
adjust rates to account for market shifts. As NACPA
members Live Nation and AEG consolidate the market
for live-music performances and technology disrupts how
Americans access music, rate courts need the flexibility to
set fees that are fair in light of changed industry dynamics. 2 The Second Circuit’s undue focus on historical rates
in the regulated sector as a matter of law deprives rate
courts of the flexibility to consider those changed industry
dynamics when appropriate.
2. The Second Circuit similarly erred in concluding
(Pet. App. 28a-40a) that the district court could not decide
to base royalty payments on revenue streams other than
ticket sales. That conclusion—based on a theory supported by a law-review article and raised by the court sua
2
A jury recently found that Live Nation and its subsidiary Ticketmaster monopolized trade in violation of the Sherman Act. Verdict
Form, State of New York v. Live Nation Entertainment, Inc., No. 24cv-3973 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2026), ECF No. 1417.
8
sponte—defied expert testimony, not to mention common
sense. As with its fee determination, the Second Circuit’s
revenue-base decision inordinately privileges past practice over the real-world market dynamics the district
court carefully identified. At a minimum, the court’s overturning of the revenue-base determination as a matter of
law, too, heightens the significance of the question presented to this case and future rate-court litigation.
II. THIS CASE IS IMPORTANT AND WARRANTS THIS
COURT’S REVIEW.
The Second Circuit’s legal conclusion will have farreaching consequences that heighten the need for this
Court’s review. Even if one set aside the circuit conflict
that petitioner describes (Pet. 17-23), the Second Circuit’s
holding is effectively a nationwide judgment governing an
important industry. Well beyond the rate determination
in this case, the Second Circuit’s decision will substantially affect how these determinations are made going forward.
1. The centralization of rate litigation in the Southern
District of New York gives the Second Circuit essentially
nationwide jurisdiction over the substance and procedure
of rate determinations. This Court has not hesitated to
review decisions by the Federal Circuit and D.C. Circuit
where they exercise nationwide jurisdiction, because such
a decision may satisfy the criteria for certiorari even without a circuit conflict. That is the case here as well. A
wrongheaded decision by the Second Circuit that will apply to rate-court adjudications going forward is exactly
the type of nationally important decision that this Court
should review.
2. The implications of this case sweep more broadly
than a contract dispute between two parties. Insofar as
the Second Circuit has concluded that a “reasonable” rate
is presumptively based primarily on historical rates paid
9
to regulated PROs by comparable licensees, calculated on
a revenue base presumptively based on previous license
agreements, that conclusion will loom large over future
negotiations and litigations in which ASCAP and BMI
seek to obtain fair compensation for their members and
affiliates. This decision will shape at a fundamental level
how all those determinations will be made.
Nor will this case solely affect license fees for live-music concerts. ASCAP and BMI provide public-performance licenses to all manner of businesses that publicly
perform music. Whether it is a radio station broadcasting
Top 40 hits, a TV station airing a show that contains music
for dramatic effect, an internet service that lets users
stream their favorite albums, or just a bar or hotel playing
background music—each must obtain ASCAP and BMI
licenses to play music in those PROs’ catalogs. And the
process for obtaining those licenses is much the same as
when a concert presenter wants to ensure that artists
have the right to perform copyrighted works: The user
requests a license from the PRO, which must issue a blanket license at a reasonable rate that is either negotiated
by the parties or set by the rate court under the terms of
the consent decrees. While this case directly affects only
the BMI/NACPA agreement, the Second Circuit’s reasoning threatens to spill over into other licensees and performance categories, unfairly anchoring the fees ASCAP
can obtain in the future to the rates it and BMI have
charged in the past even when there clearly have been
changes in industry circumstances that warrant an increase in rates. Small wonder, then, that trade associations representing the film, commercial and local radio,
digital-music, trade-show, and other industries all appeared as amici in the Second Circuit to argue that the
court should disregard the licenses actually set in a free
market—the GMR and SESAC licenses—when determining the fair market value of the BMI/NACPA license.
10
Br. of Amici Curiae MPA, Inc., et al., at 8, 19-26, BMI v.
NACPA, No. 23-935 (2d Cir. Oct. 11, 2023), 2023 WL
6879421.
The decision below also threatens to prolong and proliferate licensing disputes. Subjecting the building blocks
of “reasonable” fee determinations to de novo review
threatens to extend already-protracted and resource-intensive litigation. Take this case for example: BMI petitioned for a reasonable rate in 2018, yet the rate was not
determined until after a five-week trial held in 2022. The
appeal then lasted three years. Pet. App. 2a. Now, because the Second Circuit reviewed the trial court’s decision de novo, Pet. App. 22a-23a, BMI and NACPA can
look forward to retrial and presumably years of further
litigation. Despite the Second Circuit’s emphasis on efficiency and “administrative cost,” e.g., Pet. App. 33a-34a,
38a, that court’s decision on the standard of review stands
to undermine the former and increase the latter.
3. The losers in all this will be the songwriters who
rely on performance royalties, often as their primary income. The Second Circuit’s decision threatens to depress
the rates that ASCAP and BMI can obtain from users and
pass on to their rights-holding members and affiliates.
Respondent’s member Live Nation has contended that
millions of dollars are at stake just from this one rate dispute with one PRO. Chris Williams, BMI Wins Court
Victory in Revenue Dispute with Top Concert Promoters,
Says Its Writers Will Get a 138% Raise, Variety (Mar. 28,
2023),
https://variety.com/2023/music/news/bmi-winscourt-victory-concert-promoters-songwriters-raise-livenation-aeg-1235567435/. The number presumably increases when amounts to be paid by NACPA members
other than BMI members are considered.
That is not all. The Second Circuit’s holding on the
standard of review threatens to increase the number and
cost of rate-court disputes. And every increase in
11
ASCAP’s administrative costs reduces the amount it can
pass through to its members as compensation for their
creative effort.
* * * * *
In discussing the ASCAP and BMI consent decrees,
former Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Division Makan Delrahim commented that the “ultimate goal”
of the Antitrust Division “should be a market-based solution that ensures songwriters, publishers, and other artists are compensated fully for their creative efforts at
market rates” and warned that the Division should ensure
that creators “are not shortchanged by the non-market effects” of the consent decrees. Makan Delrahim, “And the
Beat Goes On”: The Future of the ASCAP/BMI Consent
Decrees, Remarks as Prepared for Delivery, Virtual
Event Hosted by Vanderbilt Law School (Jan. 15, 2021),
https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/speech/file/
1355241/dl. Unfortunately, the Second Circuit’s decision
threatens to do just that. This Court’s review is necessary
to avoid undercompensating songwriters and thereby destroying the “incentive to create” that copyright law seeks
to protect. Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts,
Inc. v. Goldsmith, 598 U.S. 508, 531 (2023).
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted.
JAY COHEN
WILLIAM M. JAY
S. CONRAD SCOTT
PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND,
PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND,
WHARTON & GARRISON LLP
WHARTON & GARRISON LLP
2001 K Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20006
1285 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10019
(202) 223-7300
wjay@paulweiss.com
CLARA KIM
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF
COMPOSERS, AUTHORS AND
PUBLISHERS
250 West 57th Street
New York, NY 10107
SEPTEMBER 2026
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.