Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Rosmeri Adaluz Miranda-Lopez, Petitioner v. ICE Orlando Field Office Director

CASE NO.: 26-________

_________________________________________________

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________________________________________

ROSMERI ADALUZ MIRANDA-LOPEZ,

Petitioner,

vs.

ICE ORLANDO FIELD OFFICE

DIRECTOR,

Respondent.

_________________________________________________

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to

the United States Court of Appeals

for the Eleventh Circuit

_________________________________________________

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Nicole M. Diaz, Esq.

SCOTUS Bar No.: 328467

3127 Ponce de Leon Blvd

Coral Gables, FL 33134

Email: nicoled@rjdpa.com

Attorney for Petitioner

1 June 2026

QUESTION PRESENTED

Where a U-Visa applicant has been granted a

favorable “Bona-Fide Determination” by USCIS, do

courts have jurisdiction to review ICE’s subsequent

detention and deportation or does 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g)

bar judicial review?

LIST OF PARTIES

Petitioner Rosmeri Adaluz Miranda-Lopez, a

natural person and citizen of Florida, was a plaintiff

and appellant below.

Respondent ICE Orlando Field Director, an

agent of a federal administrative agency in his official

capacity, was a defendant and appellee below.

i

STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES

Esvin Juarez-Lopez v. Angel Garite, Assistant

Field Office Director, et. al., No. 3:25-cv-00202, United

States District Court for the Western District of

Texas. Voluntarily Dismissed on June 9, 2025.

Miranda-Lopez v. Dean, No. 6:25-cv-01015CEM-LHP, United States District Court for the

Middle District of Florida. Judgment entered June 11,

2025.

Rosmeri Miranda-Lopez v. ICE Orlando Field

Officer Director, No. 25-12007, United States Court of

Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Judgment entered

March 3, 2026.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Authorities…...........................................v-viii

Opinions Below.........................................................1-2

Jurisdictional Statement.….………....….…….…….....2

Constitutional & Statutory Provisions Involved.....3-4

Statement of the Case............................................4-10

Basis for Writ of Certiorari..................................10-11

Standard of Review…...........................................11-12

Summary of the Argument........................................12

Reasons for Granting the Petition............................13

I. Legal Framework…...………..................13-16

II. Appellant’s Habeas Corpus Petition Was

Based Upon Administrative Conduct, Not the

Exercise of the Attorney General’s

Discretion.…………………………………....16-24

III. The Statute’s Plain Language Supports

Petitioner’s Position……............................24-30

IV. Although the Statutory Language Is

Unambiguous, The Legislative Intent is Also

Informative and Supports Petitioner’s

Claim…………...…………………………….30-32

V. Conclusion………………..…………...….32-33

iii

INDEX TO APPENDICES

Appendix A: Opinion on Appellant’s Motion for

Reconsideration, Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals

Appending B: Final Ruling on Defendant’s Motion to

Dismiss, District Court for the Middle District of

Florida

Appendix C: Order Granting Appellant’s Motion for

Reconsideration, Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals

Appendix D: Final Judgment, Eleventh Circuit Court

of Appeals

Appendix E: Constitutional Provisions Cited

Appending F: Statutes Cited

Appendix G: Administrative Rules Cited

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Page(s)

Alegria-Zamora v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.

No. 18-2102-DDC-GLR, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

34851, 2018 WL 1138280 (D. Kan. Mar. 2,

2018)………………………………………………23

Al Najjar v. Ashcroft

273 F.3d 1330 (11th Cir. 2001) ......................19

Ali v. U.S. Att’y Gen.

443 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2006).........................16

Arce v. United States

899 F. 3d 796 (9th Cir. 2018)...............14, 18, 20

Ayala v. Bondi

No. 2:25-cv-01063-JNW-TLF, 2025 LEXIS

244310 *1 (W.D. Wash. July 24,

2025)………………...………………….…….18, 22

Barahona-Gomez v. Reno

167 F. 3d 1228 (9th Cir. 1999)..........................28

B.D.A.A. v. Bostock

No. 6:25-cv-02062-AA, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

250425, 2025 WL 3484912 (D. Ore. Dec. 4,

2025)………………………………………………22

Bowrin v. INS, 194 F. 3d 483

488 (4th Cir. 1999)............................................17

Bridges v. Wixon

326 U.S. 135 (1945)..........................................16

Bunthoeun Kong v. United States

62 F.4th 608 (1st Cir. 2023)………….. ………..21

Camarena v. Director, Immigration & Customs

Enforcement

988 F. 3d 1268 (11th Cir. 2021)….......….……...8

v

Canal A Media Holding, LLC v. United States

Citizenship & Immigration Servs.

964 F. 3d 1250, 1257-58 (11th Cir. 2020)........27

Catholic Charities CYO v. Chertoff

622 F. Supp. 2d 865 (N.D. Cal. 2008)……......23

Derrick v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.

616 Fed. Appx. 958 (11th Cir. 2015)……...15, 31

E.F.L. V. Prim

986 F.3d 959, 965-6 (7th Cir. 2021)…...………21

Enriquez-Perdomo v. Newman

54 F.4th 855 (6th Cir. 2022)………….….....21, 26

Fernandez-Bernal v. U.S. Att’y Gen.

257 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2001)………………..17

Fugon v. Chestnut

2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70337, 2026 WL

878616 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2026)…………….22

Gomez-Velazco v. Sessions

879 F.3d 989, 992 (11th Cir. 2018)…………...16

Guerra-Castaneda v. United States

656 F. Supp. 3d 356 (D. Mass. Feb. 16,

2023)……………………….……………………..22

Ibarra-Perez v. United States

2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 22089 *1 (9th Cir. Aug.

27, 2025) ……………….……………….……14, 27

INS v. St. Cyr

533 U.S. 289 (2001) ……..…………….……….15

Jennings v. Rodriguez

583 U.S. 281, 294 (2018).…………..….………14

Jurado v. Freden

813 F. Supp.3d 376 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 19,

2025) ……………………………………………..22

Kale v. United States INS,

vi

2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 29129 *1 (5th Cir.

2002)...……………………………………………21

Lee v. Holder

855 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2017)……..…...……….21

Madu v. U.S. Att’y Gen.

470 F.3d 1362 (11th Cir. 2006)……………….19

Medina v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.

No. C17-0218RSM, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

185367, 2017 WL 5176720 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 8,

2017)………………………………………………23

Morales v. Acting Sec’y, United States Dep’t of

Homeland Sec.

No. 21-10835, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 564 *1

(11th Cir. Jan 7, 2022)..……………………..….29

Palacios-Bernal v. Barr

No. 5:19-cv-1963, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

182818, 2019 WL 5394019 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 22,

2019)………………………………………….…..23

Pillow v. Bechtel Constr.

201 F. 3d 1348 (11th Cir. 2000)…………....…12

Pulido v. Cuccinelli

497 F. Supp. 3d 79 (D.S.C. 2020)……………..23

Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm.

525 U.S. 471 (1999)………………………...20, 31

Singh v. Gonzales

499 F.3d 969 (9th Cir. 2007)…………………..16

SoUSA v. Dir. of U.S. Citizenship and Immigr. Servs.

755 F. Supp. 3d 1266 (N.D. Cal. 2024)…..…..22

United States v. Hovsepian

359 F. 3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2004)…………...........23

United States v. Mendoza-Lopez

481 U.S. 828 (1987).……………………............18

vii

Victor G. v. Lyons

2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9549 (D. Minn. Jan. 17,

2026)………………………….………………......22

Velarde-Flores v. Whitaker,

750 F. App’x 606, 607 (9th Cir. 2019)…...20, 29

Walter v. Reno

145 F. 3d 1032 (9th Cir. 1998)………….…….28

Constitutional Provisions

United States Constitution, Amendment V….…5, 12,

16, 17, 19, 20, 24, 25, 33, 34

United States Constitution, Amendment XIV…5, 12,

16, 17, 19, 20, 24, 25, 33, 34

Statutes

8 U.S.C. § 1252 (g)…….……9, 13-14, 18-20, 23, 26-29,

31-32, 34

8 U.S.C. §101................................................................6

6 U.S.C §291 (471)(b)…………………………………..32

Regulations

8 C.F.R. § 214.14........................................................25

Other Authorities

USCIS Policy Manual, Vol. 3, Pt. C, Ch. 5 (June 14,

2021)……………………………………………....….…....7

USCIS Memorandum, Policy Alert: Victims of Crime

(June 14, 2021)……………………………………...…....7

viii

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED

STATES

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner respectfully prays that a writ of

certiorari issue to review the judgment below.

OPINIONS BELOW

Miranda-Lopez initially filed a Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus in the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida. That opinion is

reported as Miranda-Lopez v. Dean, No. 6:25-cv-01015

(M.D. Fla. June 11, 2025).

The decision by the Eleventh Circuit Court of

Appeals is reported as Rosmeri Miranda-Lopez v. ICE

Orlando Field Officer Director, No. 25-12007, 2026

U.S. App. LEXIS 6226 (11th Cir. Mar. 3, 2026). The

appellate court granted Petitioner’s Petition for

Rehearing and subsequently affirmed its prior

decision.

1

Trial Court: Miranda-Lopez v. Dean, No. 6:25-cv01015-CEM-LHP, United States District Court for the

Middle District of Florida. Judgment entered June 11,

2025.

Appellate Court: Rosmeri Miranda-Lopez v. ICE

Orlando Field Officer Director, No. 25-12007, United

States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.

Judgment entered March 3, 2026.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

On March 3, 2026, the appellate court affirmed

dismissal of Ms. Miranda-Lopez’s claim for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction. Petitioner therefore

invokes this Court’s jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §

1257, having timely filed this Petition for a Writ of

Certiorari within ninety (90) days of the Eleventh

Circuit Court of Appeals Order.

2

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The Fifth Amendment to the United States

Constitution provides in relevant part: “No person

shall…be deprived of life, liberty, or property,

without due process of law.

Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment to

the United States Constitution provides in relevant

part: “No State shall…deprive any person of life,

liberty, or property without due process of law; nor

deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal

protection of the laws.”

STATUTORY PROVISION INVOLVED

Section 1252, Subsection g, Title 8 of the U.S. Code

provides:

(g) Exclusive jurisdiction. Except as provided in this

section and notwithstanding any other provision of

law (statutory or nonstatutory), including section

3

2241 of title 28, United States Code [28 USCS § 2241],

or any other habeas corpus provision, and sections

1361 and 1651 of such title [28 USCS §§ 1361 and

1651], no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any

cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from

the decision or action by the Attorney General to

commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute

removal orders against any alien under this Act.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner, Rosmeri Adaluz Miranda-Lopez,

seeks review of the U.S. District Court for the Middle

District of Florida’s dismissal of her Emergency

Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, Emergency

Motion to Stay Deportation, and Amended Emergency

Motion to Stay Deportation for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction. [DC D.E. 5].

On May 30, 2025, U.S. Immigration and

Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) placed Petitioner on an

4

ankle monitor and ordered her to surrender for

removal on June 12, 2025. [DC D.E. 3 at 1]. Shortly

thereafter, on June 7, 2025, Petitioner’s husband was

deported. [DC DE 3 at 2]. On June 9, 2025, Petitioner,

through counsel, filed an Emergency Petition for a

Writ of Habeas Corpus, along with an Emergency

Motion to Stay Deportation and an Amended

Emergency Motion to Stay Deportation. [R. D.E. 1-3].

In these filings, Petitioner argued 1) USCIS’s Bona

Fide Determination Notice received on December 20,

2024, created a vested liberty interested and conferred

deferred action protections, and 2) ICE failed to

comply with administrative procedures and deported

Petitioner in violation of her substantive due process

rights. [R. DE 3 at 3]. On June 11, 2025, the District

Court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction. [DC D.E. 5].

5

Petitioner is a Guatemalan citizen who entered

the United States without inspection and has resided

in Florida since 2001. She lived in the United States

for more than twenty-four years, during which she

and her family built a successful business became

homeowners, and raised four children between the

ages of nine and twenty-one. [R. DE 3 at 2]. In 2003,

Petitioner and her husband, Esvin Juarez-Lopez,

received removal orders. Both complied with the

requirements

to

appear

under

the

Orders

of

Supervision and reported to ICE as directed since

then. Years later, Petitioner’s husband was the victim

of a serious assault, qualifying Petitioner for a U-Visa

as derivative beneficiaries under Category 14.1 [R. DE

1 See Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 101(a)(15)(U)

(establishing U nonimmigrant status for victims of certain

crimes who have suffered substantial physical or mental abuse

6

3 at 2]. Petitioner and her husband submitted their UVisa applications, and both received Bona Fide

Determinations, which, although not granting the

visa itself due to the statutory cap of 10,000 per year,

conferred significant protections. Pursuant to those

determinations, Petitioner filed her application for

employment authorization (EAD) on February 5,

2025, and awaited adjudication.2 [R. DE 3 at 2].

and are helpful to law enforcement in the investigation or

prosecution of such crimes).

2 See USCIS Policy Manual, Vol. 3, Pt. C, Ch. 5 (June 14, 2021),

https://www.uscis.gov/policy-manual/volume-3-part-c-chapter-5

(“The BFD process provides an opportunity for certain

petitioners to receive BFD EADs and deferred action while their

petitions are pending”); USCIS Memorandum, Policy Alert:

Victims of Crime (June 14, 2021),

https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/policymanual-updates/20210614-VictimsOfCrimes.pdf (“USCIS… will

7

Despite these determinations, on May 30, 2025,

ICE placed Petitioner on an ankle monitor and

scheduled her surrender for removal on June 12, 2025,

with removal to follow as early as June 14, 2025. [R.

DE 3 at 1].

On June 9, 2025, Ms. Miranda-Lopez filed her

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the District

Court for the Middle District of Florida. That initial

filing preserved the federal question raised herein. On

June 11, 2025, District Court Judge Carlos Mendoza

dismissed the matter for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction. [DC D.E. 5]. That same day, Ms.

Miranda-Lopez filed her notice of appeal. [App. D.E.

1]. On June 13, 2025, the Eleventh Circuit Court of

Appeals denied her Emergency Motion to Stay

issue BFD EADs and deferred action for 4 years to petitioners…

if USCIS deems their petition bona fide.”).

8

Deportation and denied further request for relief

based on the Court’s decision in Camarena v. Director,

Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 988 F. 3d 1268

(11th Cir. 2021). [App. D.E. 10]. On July 11, 2025, Ms.

Miranda-Lopez filed a Motion for Rehearing on the

issue of subject matter jurisdiction. [App. D.E. 12].

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals invited both

parties to submit briefs, which were submitted on

September

23,

2025,

and

October

21,

2025,

respectively. [App. D.E. 22, 25, 29]. On March 3, 2026,

the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed its

decision and entered a judgment dismissing the case

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. [App. D.E. 34.

35]. Essentially, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that

Ms. Miranda-Lopez’s petition “challenges the decision

to execute a removal order” because one form of relief

she requested was a stay of removal. [App. D.E. 34, p.

3-4]. The appellate court did not address the legal

9

effect of the Bona Fide Determination Notice,

reasoning that because neither the agency nor

Congress have explicitly created an “exception” to 8

U.S.C. § 1252(g). This argument plainly fails to

reconcile the material inconsistencies created by the

appellate court’s own interpretation. As discussed

further below, courts across this country have rejected

this interpretation, thus yielding incompatible results

across jurisdictions. For these reasons, as discussed

further below, a Writ of Certiorari is appropriate in

this case.

BASIS FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Rosmeri Miranda-Lopez, a beneficiary of her

husband’s U-Visa application, respectfully petitions

this Honorable Court for a Writ of Certiorari to review

the judgment of the United States Circuit Court of

Appeals in and for the Eleventh Circuit. First, the

Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has entered a

10

decision in this matter that conflicts with decisions of

other circuit courts, such as the Ninth and Sixth

Circuit Courts of Appeals, on an important federal

question that has not been settled by this Court.

Additionally, district courts across the country are

confronting

this

same

question

and

reaching

irreconcilable conclusions and disparate results as

discussed further herein. Consequently, Ms. MirandaLopez seeks review by the United States Supreme

Court to determine this important question of public

importance.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Middle District of Florida’s determination

that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over a

habeas petition seeking release and an emergency to

stay deportation is a question of law, as it concerns

an alleged violation of due process, thus triggering

the de novo review standard of appellate courts.

11

Pillow v. Betchel Constr., 201 F.3d 1348, 1351 (11th

Cir. 2000) (“We review the dismissal of an action for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction de novo.”).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

In response to the District Court’s dismissal of

Petitioner’s Habeas Corpus Petition for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction, Petitioner argues that her claim

does not “arise from” execution of an order of removal;

it arises from USCIS’s Bona Fide Determination

Notice to Petitioner and the rights and guarantees

that vested pursuant thereto. Resultantly, her claim

is not barred by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g)’s jurisdictional

limitation and is subject to judicial review.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

I.

Legal Framework

As an initial matter, this Honorable Court

should apply “the general rule to resolve any

ambiguities in a jurisdiction-stripping statute in favor

12

of the narrower interpretation.” Arce v. United States,

899 F. 3d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 2018). With respect to 8

U.S.C. § 1252(g), appellate courts have narrowly

applied the statute “only to three discrete actions that

the

Attorney

General

may

take”:

commencing

proceedings, adjudicating cases, or executing removal

orders. Ibarra-Perez v. United States, 2025 U.S. App.

LEXIS 22089 *1, *16-18 (9th Cir. Aug. 27, 2025).

Indeed, rather than generally sweep any claim that is

technically or tangentially related to any of these

listed actions, the Supreme Court has referred

specifically to cases involving those three distinct

circumstances alone. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S.

281, 294 (2018).3 Other courts have distinguished the

3

The Supreme Court provided the following examles of actions

that fall under the statute: decisions to open an investigation, to

surveil the suspected violator, to reschedule the deportation

hearing, to include various provisions in the final order that is

13

legislative intent of the statute—to “impose judicial

constraints on prosecutorial discretion”—from cases

that raise “purely legal questions” and “do not

challenge

the

Attorney

General’s

discretionary

authority.” United States v. Hovsepian, 359 F. 3d

1144, 1155 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Derrick v. Sec’y,

U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 616 Fed. Appx. 958 (11th

Cir. 2015); INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 308 (2001)

(preserving habeas review over pure questions of law

and constitutional claims).4

the product of the adjudication, and to refuse reconsideration of

that order. The agency action challenged here presents a

distinction with significance.

4 Courts

consistently recognize that due process, even in the

immigration context, is a matter of law, as reflected in the de

novo standard of review. Gomez-Velazco v. Sessions, 879 F.3d

989, 992 (11th Cir. 2018); Ali v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 443 F.3d 804, 808

(11th Cir. 2006). Constitutional due process protections in

14

Furthermore,

the

Supreme

Court

has

emphasized that administrative authorities must

exercise meticulous care to ensure that the procedures

for deportation provide due process of law. Bridges v.

Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945). Even when the

Attorney General exercises discretion in immigration

matters,

due

constitutional

process

remains

guarantee,

and

a

compulsory

courts

retain

jurisdiction to enforce it. Fernandez-Bernal v. U.S.

Att’y Gen., 257 F.3d 1304, 1311 n.8 (11th Cir. 2001).

Moreover, even when the Attorney General will later

exercise discretion, that relationship does not bar a

court’s jurisdiction to consider “underlying legal cases

for those discretionary decisions and actions” even if

removal proceedings cannot be overridden by jurisdictionstripping provisions of immigration law. Singh v. Gonzales, 499

F.3d 969, 974 (9th Cir. 2007).

15

they are causally and/or temporally intertwined.

Bowrin v. INS, 194 F. 3d 483, 488 (4th Cir. 1999).

II.

Appellant’s Habeas Corpus Petition Was

Based Upon Administrative Conduct, Not

the Exercise of the Attorney General’s

Discretion

The issue before the Middle District of Florida

(“District Court”) involved a violation of due process

in a habeas corpus context—not the initiation,

adjudication, or execution of removal. The Supreme

Court is clear that administrative actions that, in

form or substance, preclude a detainee’s right to

obtain judicial review are due process violations. See

United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 838

(1987).

As argued further herein, §1252(g) bars

discretionary determinations of relief, but it does not

bar a court from reviewing an agency’s violation of

relief after discretion has been exercised. Arce, 899 F.

3d at 801. Ms. Miranda-Lopez’s claims “arise from”

16

USCIC’s grant of an affirmative immigration benefit

and ICE’s subsequent violation of the rights and

guarantees that flow therefrom. Discretion had

already been favorably exercised by way of the Bona

Fide Determination letter. Therefore, ICE’s detention

and expedited removal of Ms. Miranda-Lopez were

legally questionable and are subject to judicial review.

See generally Ayala v. Bondi, No. 2:25-cv-01063-JNWTLF, 2025 LEXIS 244310 *1 (W.D. Wash. July 24,

2025). To characterize Ms. Miranda-Lopez’s detention

as execution of a removal order is to essentially nullify

USCIS’s policies involving deferred action.

The Eleventh Circuit has expressly recognized

this distinction, finding that while challenges to the

removal order itself fall within the jurisdictionstripping provisions of § 1252(g), habeas review of

detention and related constitutional concerns remains

available in federal courts. Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 273

17

F.3d 1330, 1339 (11th Cir. 2001). Likewise, in Madu,

the Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed that habeas petitions

may proceed where they do not directly attack the

validity of the removal order under § 1252 but instead

it raises collateral due process or detention-related

claims. Madu v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 470 F.3d 1362 (11th

Cir. 2006). Petitioner’s claim arises not from

discretionary government action but from ICE’s

stampede

over

USCIS’s

favorable

exercise

of

discretion and the mandatory benefits conferred

therefrom. This claim does not question whether

removal should occur; it challenges whether ICE’s

actions violated Ms. Miranda-Lopez’s substantive due

process rights.

To the extent that the United States Supreme

Court has interpreted § 1252(g)’s jurisdictional

limitation, it has rejected the all-encompassing

interpretation now accepted by the Eleventh Circuit

18

Court of Appeals and called it “implausible.” See Reno

v. American-Arab Anti Discrimination Comm., 525

U.S. 471, 482 (1999). When faced with a similar

question, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found

that “placement on a waitlist for a U-visa can entitle

an applicant to deferred action.” Velarde-Flores v.

Whitaker, 750 Fed. Appx. 606, 607 (9th Cir. 2019); see

also Arce, 899 F.d at 796. Unlike the detainee in that

case, Ms. Miranda-Lopez and her husband were both

placed on a waitlist and were therefore entitled

deferred action on their removal orders. The Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals has also found that deferred

action pursuant to U-visa applicants prevents

removal. Lee v. Holder, 855 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2017).

The First Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit Court

of Appeals, and Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals have

adopted similar interpretations. See Bunthoeun Kong

v. United States, 62 F.4th 608 (1st Cir. 2023); Enriquez19

Perdomo v. Newman, 54 F.4th 855 (6th Cir. 2022); Kale

v. United States INS, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 29129 *1

(5th Cir. 2002). Differently, the Seventh Circuit Court

of Appeals expressly avoided answering this question.

See E.F.L. V. Prim, 986 F.3d 959, 965-6 (7th Cir. 2021)

(challenging DHS’s execution of a removal order while

the detainee sought administrative relief without

challenging the legality of the removal order or

subsequent detention).

Additionally, many district courts are facing

this same question with respect to favorable bona-fide

determinations for U-visa applicants and their

holdings directly conflict with the Eleventh Circuit

Court of Appeals’ holding in this case. See Fugon v.

Chestnut, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70337, 2026 WL

878616 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2026); Victor G. v. Lyons,

2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9549 (D. Minn. Jan. 17, 2026);

Jurado v. Freden, 813 F. Supp.3d 376 (W.D.N.Y. Dec.

20

19, 2025); B.D.A.A. v. Bostock, No. 6:25-cv-02062-AA,

2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 250425, 2025 WL 3484912 (D.

Ore. Dec. 4, 2025); Ayala v. Bondi, 794 F. Supp.3d 901

(W.D. Wash. July 24, 2025); De SoUSA v. Dir. of U.S.

Citizenship and Immigr. Servs., 755 F. Supp. 3d 1266

(N.D. Cal. 2024); Guerra-Castaneda v. United States,

656 F. Supp. 3d 356 (D. Mass. Feb. 16, 2023); AlegriaZamora v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 18-2102DDC-GLR, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34851, 2018 WL

1138280 (D. Kan. Mar. 2, 2018); Medina v. U.S. Dep’t

of Homeland Sec., No. C17-0218RSM, 2017 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 185367, 2017 WL 5176720 (W.D. Wash. Nov.

8, 2017).

In cases where the government had not granted

bona-fide determinations, courts have found § 1252(g)

bars the exercise of jurisdiction. See Pulido v.

Cuccinelli, 497 F. Supp. 3d 79 (D.S.C. 2020); PalaciosBernal v. Barr, No. 5:19-cv-1963, 2019 U.S. Dist.

21

LEXIS 182818, 2019 WL 5394019 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 22,

2019); Catholic Charities CYO v. Chertoff, 622 F.

Supp. 2d 865 (N.D. Cal. 2008). Those cases are

inapposite.

The Ninth Court of Appeals has aptly defined

the parameters of the excersie of jurisdiction in cases

where

legal

questions

implicate

or

involve

administrative action. United States v. Hovsepian,

359 F. 3d 1144, 1155 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The district

court may consider a purely legal question that does

not challenge the Attorney General's discretionary

authority, even if the answer to that legal question-a

description of the relevant law-forms the backdrop

against which the Attorney General later will exercise

discretionary authority.”). By dismissing her claim for

lack of jurisdiction, the District Court effectively

insulated ICE from judicial oversight at the precise

moment due process protections were most critical

22

and despite discretion that had already been exercised

in her favor. That ruling cannot stand. Habeas corpus

has historically functioned to ensure that government

action does not trample fundamental constitutional

rights, particularly when liberty interests are at

stake.

The Petitioner does not seek to invalidate the

removal order itself. Instead, the claim asserts that

the process by which the order was carried out

violated the petitioner’s constitutional right to due

process. Such claims fall squarely within the historic

core of habeas review. Ms. Miranda-Lopez relied on

her U-Visa protections and filed her EAD application

in February 2025. Yet, and even though a liberty

interested vested in December 2024, ICE placed her

on an ankle monitor, ordered her to surrender for

deportation, and removed her from the United States

just 48 hours after her detention. All of this occurred

23

after she had received a favorable Bona-Fide

Determination notice.

III.

The Statute’s Plain Language Supports

Petitioner’s Position

This Court should consider the language of the

statute that empowers USCIS to grant U-Visas. See 8

C.F.R. § 214.14. Subsection (2)(d)(2) of that statute

specifically outlines the process of U-Visa designation,

acknowledging that there is an annual cap of those

visas and requiring that eligible petitioners be placed

on

a

waiting

list

subject

to

approval.

Most

importantly, this subsection guarantees that USCIS

“will grant deferred action or parole to U-1 petitioners

and qualifying family members while the U-1

petitioners are on the waiting list.” See 8 C.F.R.

§214.14 (2)(d)(2). It is clear from the plain language of

the statute that deferred action is not discretionary

and that it vests at the time a petitioner is placed on

24

the waitlist. Here, the December 2024 Bona Fide

Determination letter provides that guarantee.

Looking further at the statutory language,

Section 1252(g) only refers to executable removal

orders, “that is, existing and enforceable removal

orders subject to execution.” Enriquez-Perdomo v.

Newman, 54 F. 4th 855, 863 (6th Cir. 2022). In

Enriquez-Perdomo, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals

concluded that a removal order is “not subject to

execution because [petitioner] had deferred action

pursuant to DACA.” Id. Moreover, the Sixth Circuit

reasoned that DACA “is not a mere non-enforcement

policy; it is a clear and efficient process for identifying

individuals who me[e]t the enumerated criteria that

established an adjudicative process for conferring

affirmative immigration relief.” Id. USCIS had the

authority to terminate that relief, and it did not.

Therefore, the legal question before this Court is

25

whether ICE’s arrest and detention, despite USCIS’s

conferral

of

an

administrative

benefit,

was

unauthorized.

In Ibarra-Perez, ICE officials removed IbarraPerez to Mexico without notice and an opportunity to

be heard on his fear-based claims regarding the lastminute country of removal designation. Ibarra-Perez,

2025 U.S. App. at *18-19. The Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals emphatically concluded that § 1252(g) does

not bar “challenges to unlawful practices merely

because they are in some fashion connected to removal

orders” if they do not arise from the Attorney

General’s actions. Id. at *20. Ms. Miranda-Lopez’s

claims arise from ICE’s unconstitutional practices and

policies. 5 See also Canal A Media Holding, LLC v.

5 “Although the constitutional violations ultimately may have

led to the plaintiffs’ erroneous deportation, the resulting

26

United States Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 964

F. 3d 1250, 1257-58 (11th Cir. 2020) (“When asking if

a claim is barred by § 1252(g), courts must focus on

the action being challenged. Because the I-129 denial

‘is not a decision to “commencing proceedings,” much

less to “adjudicate” a case or “execute” a removal

order,’ the plaintiffs’ challenge to it is not barred.”).

Similarly, in Barahona-Gomez, the certified

class there sought a stay pending resolution of their

constitutional claims. Barahona-Gomez v. Reno, 167

F. 3d 1228, 1234 (9th Cir. 1999). Their claims stemmed

from the BIA’s and IJ’s directives to halt consideration

of applications for suspension of deportation. Id.

Rather than categorize these administrative actions

removal orders were simply a consequence of the violations, not

the basis of the claims.” (quoting Walter v. Reno, 145 F. 3d 1032,

1052 (9th Cir. 1998).

27

as discretionary acts, the Ninth Circuit distinguished

claims arising from “general collateral challenges to

unconstitutional practices and policies used by the

agency.” Id.

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has

drawn the same lines. In Morales, DHS terminated

the plaintiff’s DACA status. Morales v. Acting Sec’y,

United States Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 21-10835,

2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 564 *1, *13 (11th Cir. Jan 7,

2022). This Court reasoned that “revoking a deferred

action program with associated benefits” did not

invoke § 1252(g). While it is true that a pending

application does not confer a liberty interest, the Bona

Fide Determination letter and Ms. Miranda-Lopez’s

placement on the U-Visa waitlist did. See generally

Velarde-Flores v. Whitaker, 750 F. App’x 606, 607 (9th

Cir. 2019). The Bona Fide Determination Notice here,

like DACA, is not merely a non-enforcement policy; it

28

is an administrative process for crime victims and

their families to seek temporary relief and confers

associated

benefits

such

as

employment

authorization.

Consequently, because Ms. Miranda-Lopez

challenges not the removal order itself, but the

unconstitutional way it was executed by ICE in

disregard of her Bona Fide Determination protections,

her habeas petition lies at the core of what district

courts are empowered to review. The district court

erred in dismissing her case for lack of jurisdiction,

and this Court should reverse and remand for further

proceedings on the merits.

Consequently, because Ms. Miranda-Lopez

challenges not the removal order itself, but the

unconstitutional way it was executed by ICE in

disregard of her Bona Fide Determination protections,

her habeas petition lies at the core of what district

29

courts are empowered to review. The district court

erred in dismissing her case for lack of jurisdiction,

and this Court should reverse and remand for further

proceedings on the merits.

IV.

Although The Statutory Language Is

Unambiguous, The Legislative Intent is

Also

Informative

and

Supports

Petitioner’s Claim

Congress enacted 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) to limit

judicial review over the Executive’s discretionary

decisions to “commence proceedings, adjudicate cases,

or execute removal orders.” Reno v. American-Arab

Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999).

In other words, courts may not entertain suits that

directly challenge the government’s decision to

initiate, process, or carry out deportation proceedings.

In Derrick, the plaintiff challenged the agency’s

failure to issue a notice to appear, which denied him

the procedural remedy to renew his previously denied

application for adjustment of status. Derrick, 616 Fed.

30

App’x at 959. In that case, this Court held that §

1252(g)’s “enumerated discrete acts…were those that

the government had been engaging in as regular

practice and for which it had the discretion to abandon

its endeavors on such grounds as humanitarianism

and its own convenience.” Id. at 960. Accordingly,

while USCIS had discretion to abandon its grant of

affirmative administrative relief, ICE did not have

discretionary authority to abandon an endeavor and a

procedure that was not theirs. Importantly, when

Congress created the Department of Homeland

Security,

it

explicitly

prohibited

DHS

from

“reorganiz[ing] functions or organizational units” of

ICE, Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”), and

USCIS to avoid conflicts of interest between the

adjudicatory and enforcement bodies within DHS. See

Homeland Security Act 2002, 6 U.S.C §291 (471)(b). It

31

is clear, then, that the legislative intent of the statute

was to prohibit the exact conduct at issue herein.

The jurisdictional bar is not absolute: it does

not displace habeas corpus review of constitutional

claims, especially those that arise from violating a

favorable exercise of discretion in violation of due

process, rather than the order of removal. The legal,

logical, and material inconsistency presented by ICE’s

removal after USCIS’s granting of a Bona-Fide

Determination is at issue here. Accordingly, the

central action in question is whether Ms. MirandaLopez’s favorable Bona-Fide Determination entitled

her to constitutional protections, including deferred

action,

and

vested

constitutional

rights

and

guarantees preventing her detention and subsequent

deportation.

V.

Conclusion

Ms. Miranda-Lopez’s claim arises from ICE’s

decision to intervene in and disrupt USCIS’s authority

32

in its administrative processes. That usurpation of

authority resulted in a violation of Ms. MirandaLopez’s vested liberty interest and, accordingly, her

substantive due process rights. Because her claim

arises from that decision, and not the execution of an

order of removal, her claims are not barred by 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(g) and the case should be remanded for

proceedings on the merits.

Respectfully submitted,

Nicole M. Diaz, Esq.

SCOTUS Bar No.: 328467

3127 Ponce de Leon Blvd

Coral Gables, FL 33134

Email: nicoled@rjdpa.com

Attorney for Petitioner

33