Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Meta Platforms, Inc., et al., Petitioners v. Massachusetts

No.

In the Supreme Court of the United States

META PLATFORMS, INC. AND INSTAGRAM, LLC,

PETITIONERS ,

v.

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT

OF MASSACHUSETTS

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

MARK W. MOSIER

KENDALL T. BURCHARD

COVINGTON &

BURLING LLP

850 Tenth Street, NW

Washington, DC 20001

KRISTIN A. L INSLEY

GIBSON, DUNN

& CRUTCHER LLP

One Embarcadero Center

Suite 2600

San Francisco, CA 94111

JEFFREY B. WALL

Counsel of Record

JONATHAN C. BOND

MORGAN L. RATNER

JESSICA L. WAGNER

JEFF L IU

GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP

1700 M Street NW

Washington, DC 20036

(202) 955-8500

jwall@gibsondunn.com

PATRICK J. FUSTER

GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP

333 South Grand Avenue

Los Angeles, CA 90071

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the prohibition in Section 230(c)(1) of the

Communications Decency Act on “treat[ing]” an online

service provider “as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content

provider” bars claims that would impose liability for

editorial decisions about how to publish third-party

content.

(I)

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Petitioners Meta Platforms, Inc. and Instagram, LLC

are defendants in the trial court and were appellants in

the state supreme court. Respondent Commonwealth of

Massachusetts is plaintiff in the trial court and was appellee in the state supreme court.

(II)

RULE 29.6 DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Petitioner Meta Platforms, Inc. is a publicly traded

company (NASDAQ: META). Meta Platforms, Inc. has

no parent company, and no publicly held corporation

owns 10% or more of its stock. Petitioner Instagram,

LLC is a wholly owned subsidiary of Meta Platforms, Inc.

(III)

RELATED PROCEEDINGS

Superior Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk County:

Commonwealth v. Meta Platforms, Inc.,

No. 23-2397-BLS1 (Oct. 17, 2024)

(order denying motion to dismiss)

Appeals Court of Massachusetts:

Commonwealth v. Meta Platforms, Inc.,

No. 2024-J-0724 (Mar. 12, 2025)

(Supreme Judicial Court order granting

application for direct appellate review)

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts:

Commonwealth v. Meta Platforms, Inc.,

No. SJC-13747 (Apr. 10, 2026)

(IV)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Introduction ................................................................... 1

Opinions below ............................................................... 4

Jurisdiction .................................................................... 4

Statutory provision involved ........................................ 4

Statement of the case .................................................... 5

A. Factual background ............................................ 5

B. Proceedings below ............................................... 6

Reasons for granting the petition .............................. 10

I. The decision below is wrong ................................ 11

II. The decision below deepens an open and

entrenched conflict on the scope of

Section 230 ............................................................ 20

III. The question presented is exceptionally

important, and this case is a suitable vehicle for

resolving it ............................................................ 25

Conclusion .................................................................... 29

Appendix A — State supreme court opinion

(Apr. 10, 2026).......................................................... 1a

Appendix B — State supreme court order

granting direct review (Mar. 12, 2025) ................ 40a

Appendix C — Superior court order on motion

to dismiss (Oct. 17, 2024) ...................................... 43a

Appendix D — Complaint (Oct. 24, 2023) ............... 76a

Appendix E — Statutory provision involved .........194a

(V)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases:

Anderson v. TikTok, Inc.,

116 F.4th 180 (3d Cir. 2024) ................................ 24

Bragdon v. Abbott,

524 U.S. 624 (1998) ............................................... 15

Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co.,

553 U.S. 639 (2008) ............................................... 19

Carter v. United States,

530 U.S. 255 (2000) ............................................... 17

Chicago Lawyers’ Committee for Civil

Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc.,

519 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2008) ................................ 19

Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,

420 U.S. 469 (1975) ................................................. 4

Daniel v. Armslist, LLC,

926 N.W.2d 710 (Wis. 2019)................................. 23

Doe v. Grindr Inc.,

128 F.4th 1148 (9th Cir. 2025) ............................. 21

Doe v. MySpace, Inc.,

528 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2008) .......................... 22, 25

Dyroff v. Ultimate Software Group, Inc.,

934 F.3d 1093 (9th Cir. 2019) ........................ 21, 25

EPA v. Calumet Shreveport Refining, L.L.C.,

605 U.S. 627 (2025) ............................................... 12

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Corporación

Cimex, S.A. (Cuba),

146 S. Ct. 1909 (2026) ........................................... 14

In re Facebook, Inc.,

625 S.W.3d 80 (Tex. 2021) ................................... 22

(VI)

VII

FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild,

450 U.S. 582 (1981) ............................................... 13

Food Marketing Institute v. Argus

Leader Media,

588 U.S. 427 (2019) ............................................... 18

Force v. Facebook, Inc.,

934 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2019) ................... 8, 13, 21, 25

Henderson v. Source for Public Data, L.P.,

53 F.4th 110 (4th Cir. 2022)............................. 8, 23

Jam v. International Finance Corp.,

586 U.S. 199 (2019) ............................................... 19

Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC,

817 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2016) ............................ 13, 22

Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.,

465 U.S. 770 (1984) ............................................... 12

Klayman v. Zuckerberg,

753 F.3d 1354 (D.C. Cir. 2014) ............................ 22

Malwarebytes, Inc. v. Enigma

Software Group USA, LLC,

141 S. Ct. 13 (2020) ............................................... 15

Marshall’s Locksmith Service Inc. v.

Google, LLC,

925 F.3d 1263 (D.C. Cir. 2019) ............................ 22

Meta Platforms, Inc. v. Eighth Judicial

District Court of Nevada, Clark County,

2026 WL 1129147 (Nev. Apr. 24, 2026) .......... 6, 24

Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,

418 U.S. 241 (1974) ............................................... 12

Moody v. NetChoice, LLC,

603 U.S. 707 (2024) ................................... 24, 26, 28

Mullin v. Doe,

146 S. Ct. 2121 (2026) ..................................... 17, 18

VIII

Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,

523 U.S. 75 (1998) ................................................. 19

Patterson v. Meta Platforms, Inc.,

239 N.Y.S.3d 726 (App. Div. 2025)...................... 23

Snyder v. United States,

603 U.S. 1 (2024) ................................................... 14

TikTok, Inc. v. Eighth Judicial District

Court of Nevada, Clark County,

578 P.3d 640 (Nev. 2025) ............................... 23, 24

United States v. Turley,

352 U.S. 407 (1957) ............................................... 18

United States v. Wells,

519 U.S. 482 (1997) ............................................... 20

Yellen v. Confederated Tribes of

Chehalis Reservation,

594 U.S. 338 (2021) ............................................... 13

Zeran v. America Online, Inc.,

129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997) ................................ 15

Statutes:

Allow States & Victims to Fight Online Sex

Trafficking Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-164,

§ 4(a), 132 Stat. 1254 (2018)

(47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(5)) .......................................... 15

28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) ...................................................... 4

47 U.S.C. § 230(b) ...................................................... 26

47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) ................ 9-11, 13, 14, 16, 17, 19

47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3) ..................................... 14, 19, 26

47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2) .................................................. 14

47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(4) .................................................. 14

IX

Other Authorities:

Cambridge Business English Dictionary (2011) .. 12

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 558 (1977) .......... 18

Webster’s Third New International

Dictionary (1993) ........................................... 12, 13

In the Supreme Court of the United States

No.

META PLATFORMS, INC. AND INSTAGRAM, LLC,

PETITIONERS ,

v.

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT

OF MASSACHUSETTS

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

INTRODUCTION

As explained in greater detail in Meta Platforms,

Inc. v. Eighth Judicial District Court of Nevada, Clark

County, No. 26-__ (filed Aug. 7, 2026), the dual protections of Section 230 of the Communications Decency

Act and the First Amendment are under attack. Many

States and thousands of individual plaintiffs, local governments, and school districts have brought suits

claiming that social media has “addicted” teenagers,

who allegedly are harmed by what they encounter

online. These suits seek staggering damages for, and

sweeping changes to, the design of social-media services. The plaintiffs purport to sidestep Section 230’s

(1)

2

protection for publishing third-party content by casting their claims as targeting online service providers’

“design features”—e.g., how much content they display, how long the content appears, what specific content is accessible to younger users, and whether and

how services apprise users of content of potential interest to them. But those challenged functions are a

necessary part of how services display third-party content. They reflect editorial decisions that publishers,

both historical and modern, have always made.

Along with Nevada, this case is another prime example. Massachusetts seeks damages based on the editorial decisions that shape Instagram, a social-media

service operated by Meta Platforms, Inc. The Commonwealth alleges that certain choices Meta makes in

how it displays third-party content—how much, for

how long, and to whom—have led some young users to

“spend more time on Instagram than they otherwise

would.” App., infra, 105a. Branding this spend-moretime outcome as “social media addiction,” e.g., id. at 4a,

115a-118a, the Commonwealth claims that Meta violated Massachusetts law by using those design features

to display third-party content to young users.

Those claims run headlong into Section 230. Section 230 immunizes an online service provider from

claims that “trea[t]” it as “the publisher” of “any information” provided by a third party—i.e., that impose liability for publishing others’ content. That protection

insulates from state-law liability the myriad choices

providers necessarily make to determine which content

to present, how to present it, to whom, and for how

long.

In the decision below, however, the Massachusetts

Supreme Judicial Court held Section 230 inapplicable

3

because (it said) the Commonwealth’s claims seek to

impose liability not for the content of any third-party

posts but for Meta’s own “design” choices. App., infra,

33a-34a. That holding illogically limits Section 230’s

protections to a publisher’s binary decision whether to

display a specific piece of content at all. But publishers

must make many decisions about how to present that

content to their audience. The Commonwealth’s claims

challenging those decisions equally seek to hold Meta

liable as a publisher. The court’s contrary approach

finds no support in statutory text or context.

That issue warrants this Court’s review. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s decision—like the

Nevada Supreme Court’s—places it on the short side

of an 8-4 conflict among federal courts of appeals and

state courts on the scope of Section 230’s protections.

Confusion in the lower courts about the scope of Section 230 has invited the proliferation of suits seeking to

impose liability for online publishers’ editorial decisions. The resulting patchwork of conflicting obligations is untenable and at odds with Congress’s judgment in Section 230.

Meta has asked this Court to resolve that important

split of authority in Nevada, in which Meta is filing a

certiorari petition contemporaneously with this one.

Nevada presents the Section 230 issue in an ideal posture because it also presents an inextricably interrelated question—whether the First Amendment bars

States’ efforts to impose liability for a publisher’s exercise of editorial functions. This case provides an additional illustration of how some courts have permitted

States to evade Section 230’s protections and comprehensively airs the arguments on both sides of the split.

4

Meta urges the Court to grant both petitions and

consolidate this case with Nevada. Alternatively, the

Court should grant Nevada and hold this case pending

resolution of Nevada on the merits. Either way, the

Court should review and resolve the question presented, which has divided courts across the country

and is enormously consequential to the operation of

social-media services and the hundreds of millions of

people who use those services every day.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the state supreme court (App., infra,

1a-39a) is reported at 277 N.E.3d 166. The order of the

state supreme court granting Meta’s application for direct appellate review (App., infra, 40a-42a) is not reported. The order of the trial court denying Meta’s motion to dismiss (id. at 43a-75a) is not reported but is

available at 2024 WL 4648435.

JURISDICTION

The state supreme court issued its judgment on

April 10, 2026. On July 7, 2026, Justice Jackson extended the time within which to file a petition for a writ

of certiorari to and including August 10, 2026. This

Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a). See

Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 477-480

(1975).

STATUTORY PROVISION INVOLVED

Title 47, Section 230, of the United States Code is

reproduced in the appendix. App., infra, 194a-198a.

5

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Factual Background

Meta owns and operates Instagram, a service that

organizes and displays a diverse array of usergenerated content. App., infra, 76a-81a. Instagram

permits users to share their own photos, videos, and

thoughts for others to see. Id. at 93a. Users can also

explore content posted by other users and interact with

that content by, for example, liking or commenting on

posts or following other users. Id. at 93a-95a.

Because over a billion people use Instagram every

month, Meta must constantly organize a massive

amount of third-party content. App., infra, 81a. Meta

does not publish a jumbled hodgepodge of posts on

every conceivable topic from every user (and would not

be very popular if it did). It instead exercises editorial

judgment about how to organize and prioritize the content and to which users it will be displayed.

Meta makes further editorial judgments through

“publishing tools that control how Meta publishes content to users of its platform.” App., infra, 35a n.31.

For example, instead of imposing an arbitrary “ending” (say, 20 photos or 15 videos) that limits what users

can view in one sitting, Meta displays content with

“endless scroll” and “autoplay” features that enable users to view content in a “continuous slideshow format”

without taking any special action (beyond scrolling

down or keeping a video player open). Id. at 5a; see id.

at 106a-108a. Meta also presents some user content indefinitely while publishing other content for a “limited

amount of time before vanishing,” allowing users to

time-limit their contributions. Id. at 5a; see id. at

110a-111a (Instagram users may post “Stories” that

6

“disappea[r]” “24 hours” after they are posted). And

Meta sends notifications to users that particular thirdparty content has become available. Id. at 5a; see id. at

100a-103a.

B. Proceedings Below

1. Since 2022, nearly every State, the District of

Columbia, numerous local governments and school districts, and private plaintiffs across the country have

filed lawsuits against social-media companies, alleging

that various design features have caused young users

to become addicted to social media. Some States filed

suit together in federal court (now coordinated with

other cases in multidistrict litigation). Compl., Arizona v. Meta Platforms, Inc., No. 23-cv-5448 (N.D. Cal.

Oct. 24, 2023); In re Social Media Adolescent Addiction/

Personal Injury Products Liability Litigation,

No. 22-md-3047 (N.D. Cal.). Other States have chosen

to bring individual suits in their own courts. E.g., Meta

Platforms, Inc. v. Eighth Judicial District Court of

Nevada, Clark County, 2026 WL 1129147, at *1 (Nev.

Apr. 24, 2026).

Massachusetts chose the latter course. In 2023, it

filed a complaint against Meta and a subsidiary, Instagram, LLC, in Massachusetts state court. App., infra,

76a. The Commonwealth alleged (as relevant) that

Meta had “designed” Instagram’s “features” to make

that service “addictive,” meaning that “young users

spend more time on Instagram than they otherwise

would.” Id. at 76a-77a, 105a. According to the Commonwealth, those design elements—including endless

scroll, autoplay, “ephemeral” content that appears for

only a short period, the display of user “likes” and

7

other reactions, the use of notifications, and the “refresh function” for the content feed—harmed the wellbeing of young users. Id. at 4a-6a; see id. at 97a-118a.

The Commonwealth further alleged that Meta’s design

choices led to greater “ ‘exposure’ ” for some young users to “harmful posts” and “sensitive content.” Id. at

143a-146a. On that basis, the Commonwealth asserted

two claims for unfair practices and public nuisance. Id.

at 178a-182a, 187a-191a. It also asserted a claim for

unfair practices based on Meta’s purportedly inadequate age-gating measures to prevent underage users

from accessing Instagram, and two claims for deceptive practices based on Meta’s allegedly deceptive

statements about the safety of its platform for young

people. Id. at 182a-187a.

2. Meta moved to dismiss, contending that Section 230 and the First Amendment bar the Commonwealth’s design-based claims because they seek to impose liability on Meta for its editorial decisions in

curating third-party content. App., infra, 48a-49a, 63a.

The trial court denied Meta’s motion. App., infra,

43a-75a. The court deemed Section 230 inapplicable

because the Commonwealth’s claims challenged Meta’s

“design features themselves” rather than “any specific

third-party content.” Id. at 57a, 62a. The court then

rejected Meta’s First Amendment defense on the

ground that Meta’s “product design” did not involve

“expressive content.” Id. at 64a.

3. Meta simultaneously filed a petition for relief

from the trial court’s order to the Massachusetts Appeals Court and sought direct appellate review in the

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. App., infra,

7a-8a; see id. at 40a. The Supreme Judicial Court allowed Meta’s application for direct appellate review,

8

transferred the petition for relief from the Appeals

Court, and consolidated that petition with the pending

direct appeal proceeding. Id. at 40a-42a. After briefing and argument, the Supreme Judicial Court held

that the doctrine of present execution (the Massachusetts version of the collateral-order doctrine) permitted an immediate appeal of the trial court’s Section 230

ruling. See id. at 11a-15a.

The Supreme Judicial Court then affirmed the trial

court’s denial of Meta’s motion to dismiss the claims

under Section 230 without addressing the First Amendment. App., infra, 15a-39a. Canvassing the landscape

of precedent, it acknowledged that courts across the

country had taken “different approach[es]” to Section 230. Id. at 19a. Some courts interpret the statute

based on “the plain meaning of ‘publisher’” to “bar

claims that implicate a provider’s role as a publisher,

including its editorial choices concerning whether,

how, when, for how long, and to whom to publish information.” Id. at 17a-18a (citing, inter alia, Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2019)). But others

have relied on “the common law of information-based

torts such as defamation” to narrow Section 230 to

claims that “see[k] to impose liability based on the content” of third-party speech. Id. at 19a-20a (citing, inter

alia, Henderson v. Source for Public Data, L.P.,

53 F.4th 110 (4th Cir. 2022)). For those courts, the Supreme Judicial Court explained, “[e]ngaging in traditional publishing activity ‘alone is not enough.’” Id. at

24a (citation omitted).

The Supreme Judicial Court aligned itself with the

second camp, interpreting Section 230 to apply only to

claims that impose liability based on the specific con-

9

tent. The court acknowledged the “commonsense appeal” of the plain-meaning interpretation that Section 230 bars claims based on “editorial choices,” which

“are part and parcel of the business of publication.”

App., infra, 18a-19a. But it nonetheless adopted the

purported “common-law construction.” Id. at 22a, 25a.

The court grounded that narrow approach in the statute “as a whole” and the “legislative history.” Id. at

25a-27a, 30a-31a. In its view, Congress’s enactment of

Section 230 to abrogate a pair of New York trial-court

decisions concerning defamation justified a commonlaw-based limitation, even though “the language of the

statute does not limit its application to defamation

cases.” Id. at 30a & n.26.

Based on that understanding, the Supreme Judicial

Court held that Section 230 does not bar Massachusetts’s claims because the Commonwealth “does not

seek to hold Meta liable based on the content of the information Meta publishes.” App., infra, 33a-34a. The

court acknowledged that “[t]he challenged design features (e.g., infinite scroll, autoplay, IVR [intermittent

variable rewards], and ephemeral content) concern

how, whether, and for how long information is published.” Id. at 34a. And the court recognized that these

“challenged features are publishing tools that control

how Meta publishes content to users of its platform.”

Id. at 35a n.31. But the court held that the Commonwealth’s attempt to target these “publishing activities”

alone does not “bring the claim[s] within the immunity

provided by § 230(c)(1)” because “the published information itself is not the source of the harm alleged.” Id.

at 35a-36a.

10

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

The decision below warrants this Court’s review, in

conjunction with the overlapping pending petition in

Meta Platforms, Inc. v. Eighth Judicial District Court

of Nevada, Clark County, No. 26-__ (filed Aug. 7, 2026).

Section 230 bars claims that “trea[t]” an online service

provider as a “publisher or speaker of any information

provided” by a third party. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). The

statute thus protects a provider from liability for thirdparty content and its publication. But the court below

narrowed Section 230’s express protections to claims

that seek to impose liability for harms from the specific

third-party content an online service provider publishes. The state supreme court’s atextual view that

“[e]ngaging in traditional publishing activity ‘alone is

not enough’” to trigger Section 230’s protections, App.,

infra, 24a (citation omitted), is irreconcilable with the

ordinary meaning of “publisher,” the statutory context,

and the then-prevailing judicial consensus that Congress ratified in 2018 through subsequent legislation.

The Supreme Judicial Court’s decision deepens an

open conflict on the scope of Section 230. That question

affects pending suits brought by nearly every State

and thousands of plaintiffs in courts across the country,

many of which may not make their way to this Court

cleanly. Uncertainty on this issue has created disarray

and confusion as Meta and other online service providers face rapidly proliferating lawsuits under the laws

of dozens of States, without the nationally uniform protections Section 230 should guarantee. That uncertainty and disuniformity should not be allowed to persist.

11

In short, this Court should grant certiorari to resolve a highly consequential circuit split, provide muchneeded guidance about Section 230’s scope, and curb

the efforts of States to dictate the editorial choices of

online service providers. The concurrently filed petition in Nevada presents the same Section 230 issue

alongside a critical complementary First Amendment

issue. The Court should grant both petitions and consolidate the cases for briefing and argument. Alternatively, the Court should grant Nevada alone and hold

this petition pending disposition of Nevada.

I. THE DECISION BELOW IS WRONG.

Section 230 protects the online presentation of

third-party content. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court curtailed this protection on the theory that

Section 230 bars only attempts to impose liability for

binary decisions about whether to publish third-party

content—not any of the choices publishers make regarding how to present the content, including how

much, for how long, and to whom. In reducing Meta’s

protection to the up-or-down decision whether to publish specific third-party content on Instagram, the

state supreme court defied Section 230’s language.

Section 230 forecloses attempts to commandeer editorial decisions about the arrangement, organization, and

display of third-party content.

A. Section 230 states that “[n]o provider or user of

an interactive computer service shall be treated as the

publisher or speaker of any information provided by

another information content provider.” 47 U.S.C.

§ 230(c)(1). Because the statute does not define what

it means to “treat” a provider as a “publisher or

speaker,” the words bear their ordinary meaning. See

12

EPA v. Calumet Shreveport Refining, L.L.C., 605 U.S.

627, 638 (2025). A “publisher” is “one that makes public” or “reproduce[s] . . . a work intended for public consumption.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1837 (1993) (Webster’s); see ibid. (defining

“publish” as “to declare publicly” or “make generally

known”). And to “treat,” when used with “as,” means

to “regard (as something or in a particular way) and act

toward or deal with accordingly.” Webster’s 2434. Section 230 thus bars claims that would impose liability on

a defendant for how it does (or does not) display information provided by third parties.

Publishers must make many decisions about how to

display content—in what format, where, when, for how

long, and to whom. Newspaper editors, for example,

place “above the fold” the stories they think “will sell

the newspaper.” Cambridge Business English Dictionary 2 (2011). As even the court below recognized,

“editorial choices” involving “whether, how, when, for

how long, and to whom to publish information” are

“part and parcel of the business of publication.” App.,

infra, 18a.

That understanding of a publisher’s role is consistent with this Court’s precedent. In the First

Amendment context, the Court has explained that “editorial control and judgment” extend beyond the

“choice of material” to other “decisions made as to limitations on the size and content of the [publication].”

Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S.

241, 258 (1974). Publishers make decisions to tailor the

publication to the intended audience—whether nationwide, local, or (as with social media) individualized. See

Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 781

(1984). And publishers’ “broad discretion in selecting

13

[content]” includes the authority to discontinue offerings or change their format. FCC v. WNCN Listeners

Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 602 (1981); see id. at 600.

As further evidence that Congress used the ordinary meaning of publisher, Section 230 bars claims that

treat a provider as either “the publisher or speaker” of

third-party content. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (emphasis

added). The term “speaker” already prevents providers from being treated as the one who “ma[d]e a written statement,” protecting them from liability for

third-party content itself. Webster’s 2185. The term

“publisher” would be redundant if it did not cover a

broader range of editorial functions that make thirdparty content available to the public. See Yellen v. Confederated Tribes of Chehalis Reservation, 594 U.S. 338,

360 (2021).

The plain meaning of Section 230 thus bars any

claim that would impose liability on online service providers for the way they publish third-party information, including the many decisions they must make

about not only whether to display others’ content but

also “where on their sites” content should appear, “to

whom it should be shown,” and “what type and format

of third-party content they will display.” Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53, 66-67 (2d Cir. 2019). Such

claims “treat” providers as “publishers” by trying to

hold them responsible for the “form” in which they

make third-party content available. Jane Doe No. 1 v.

Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 21-22 (1st Cir. 2016).

Instead of limiting that protection to claims that impose liability for publishing only certain kinds of information (such as defamation), Congress cast a wide net

for any claim that regards an online service provider

as a publisher. The statutory prohibition applies to

14

“any information provided by another information content provider”—not just to specific kinds of content,

harmful or otherwise. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (emphasis

added). And “[n]o cause of action may be brought and

no liability may be imposed under any State or local law

that is inconsistent with this section.” Id. § 230(e)(3).

Section 230 thus ensures that state law cannot control

how service providers present any third-party content

online, just as state law cannot control whether the

content appears to begin with.

The statutory context further confirms that Section 230(c)(1) insulates online service providers from liability for decisions concerning how—and not merely

whether—to publish content. See Snyder v. United

States, 603 U.S. 1, 12-13 (2024). Congress expressly

defined the “interactive computer service[s]” entitled

to protection under subsection (c)(1) to include “access

software provider[s],” 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2), which offer

“software” or “tools” that “filter,” “screen,” “display,”

“pick,” “choose,” “digest,” “organize,” or “reorganize”

content, id. § 230(f)(4). That breadth of coverage

makes sense. After all, if subsection (c)(1) did not protect decisions about how to display content, then plaintiffs could evade the statute by targeting interactive

computer services for functions that they necessarily

and predictably perform. Congress did not extend Section 230 protection to such entities “with one hand, only

to bar it with the other.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Corporación Cimex, S.A. (Cuba), 146 S. Ct. 1909, 1919 (2026)

(citation omitted).

Congress dispelled any possible ambiguity through

subsequent legislation. Lower courts had (until recently) uniformly understood subsection (c)(1) to “protec[t] the ‘exercise of a publisher’s traditional editorial

15

functions.’” Malwarebytes, Inc. v. Enigma Software

Group USA, LLC, 141 S. Ct. 13, 16 (2020) (Thomas, J.,

statement respecting the denial of certiorari) (quoting

Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th

Cir. 1997)). Congress ratified that consensus interpretation by amending Section 230 to exempt certain sextrafficking claims, without modifying subsection (c)(1).

Allow States & Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking

Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-164, § 4(a), 132 Stat. 1254

(2018) (47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(5)). When Congress amends

a statute but leaves untouched language construed in

an “unwavering line of . . . judicial interpretation,”

Congress is presumed “to ratify” the judicial construction of the unamended provision. Bragdon v. Abbott,

524 U.S. 624, 645 (1998).

Here, the design features targeted by the Commonwealth are integral to publication of third-party content. The Commonwealth challenges endless scroll and

autoplay, faulting Meta for how much content it publishes. App., infra, 106a-110a. The Commonwealth alleges that “ephemeral” content shown for only 24 hours

draws users back to social media on a daily basis, faulting Meta for how long content is made available. Id. at

110a-113a. The Commonwealth alleges that Meta

should not have displayed reactions (such as likes and

comments) to young users, faulting Meta for publishing a specific type of third-party content to a particular

audience. Id. at 98a-99a. And the Commonwealth alleges that Meta should not have sent notifications,

faulting Meta for informing users about available content. Id. at 100a-106a.

Each of those functions—how much content to publish in a given format, how long the content stays up,

and to whom to publish the content—is necessarily

16

part of the presentation of third-party content. Meta

must post the content for either a short period or a long

period. It must post either a lot of content or a little

bit. And it must post the content to either a small audience or a large audience. There is no way to remain

agnostic about these judgments and to publish thirdparty content without deciding how that content will be

presented.

The court below acknowledged as

much: “The challenged design features (e.g., infinite

scroll, autoplay, IVR, and ephemeral content) concern

how, whether, and for how long information is published.” App., infra, 34a. And it recognized that these

“challenged features are publishing tools that control

how Meta publishes content to users of its platform.”

Id. at 35a n.31. Section 230(c)(1) leaves those decisions

about organization and display to online publishers, not

to 50 different States, thousands of school districts, and

millions of individual users.

B. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

nonetheless engrafted an additional requirement on

Section 230. In its view, Section 230 does not protect

against “all claims that implicate publishing activities,”

but rather only a narrower set of claims that implicate

publishing activity and “seek to hold the service provider liable for the content of the information published.” App., infra, 30a; see id. at 20a-21a. That latter

requirement finds no footing in the statute or in the

common-law canon that the court invoked.

Section 230’s text forecloses the Supreme Judicial

Court’s attempt to read a requirement of “harmful content” into the word “publisher.” App., infra, 21a. Section 230 already has a different content element: that

an online service provider shall not be “treated as the

publisher or speaker of any information provided by

17

another information content provider.” 47 U.S.C.

§ 230(c)(1) (emphasis added). That language ensures

that a provider may not be held liable for publishing

third-party content, including making editorial decisions that are integral to how the content is displayed.

See pp. 12-13, supra. Because this protection extends to

publication of “any information,” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1)

(emphasis added), there is no textual basis for limiting

Section 230 to claims based on “harmful content,” App.,

infra, 21a.

Even though Congress expressly addressed how

content factors into the analysis, the Supreme Judicial

Court purported to derive its additional “harmful content element” by construing the term “publisher”

based on “the common law of information-based torts

such as defamation,” which “impose[d] liability based

on the content of the information published.” App., infra, 20a. But the court had no basis to ignore the plain

meaning of “publisher” and “any information” in favor

of a purported common-law understanding of when a

publisher might most often face liability.

Ordinary meaning is the default approach to interpreting statutes. Unless a statute “provide[s] expressly” or “signal[s] in some other clear way” that the

statute “departs from its ordinary meaning,” “the assumption” is that Congress “intend[ed] its terms to

mean what they mean in ordinary usage.” Mullin v.

Doe, 146 S. Ct. 2121, 2135 (2026). This Court has thus

been “wary of giving common terms technical meanings.” Ibid. By the same token, “the common law

should be imported into statutory text only when Congress employs a common-law term, and not when, as

here, Congress simply” uses an “analogous” phrase

“without using common-law terms.” Carter v. United

18

States, 530 U.S. 255, 265 (2000); see United States v.

Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 411-412 (1957). This Court does

not “ordinarily imbue statutory terms with a specialized common law meaning” when Congress has not invoked the specific “terms of art associated with that

meaning.” Food Marketing Institute v. Argus Leader

Media, 588 U.S. 427, 438 (2019).

Here, the Supreme Judicial Court identified no

“clear” indication that Congress intended a “departure” from the ordinary meaning of “publisher.”

Mullin, 146 S. Ct. at 2135. No such indication can be

found in the statutory text, context, or history.

Starting with the text, the Supreme Judicial Court

suggested that the statutory language is a roundabout way of capturing the “publication” element of a

common-law defamation claim. App., infra, 21a (citation omitted). But there is no evidence that commonlaw courts ever used the phrase “treated as the publisher or speaker” to describe that element. Each of

the cited common-law sources simply defined the distinct, standalone term “publication,” a term that Congress did not borrow verbatim. Ibid. (citing, inter alia,

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 558 (1977)). Because

Congress did not transplant a common-law term of art

but rather selected its own words, those words bear

their ordinary meaning. Food Marketing, 588 U.S. at

438.

The Supreme Judicial Court also overlooked context that confirms that Congress did not imbue Section 230 with any specialized common-law meaning.

Congress paired the term “publisher” in the disjunctive with “speaker.” No one has ever argued that

“speaker” has an established common-law meaning.

And Congress expressly declined to limit Section 230

19

to “information-based torts,” App., infra, 20a, instead

providing that “[n]o cause of action may be brought

and no liability may be imposed,” 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3)

(emphases added), that treats an online service provider as a “publisher or speaker” of third-party content, id. § 230(c)(1). “In these circumstances, the presumption that Congress intends to adopt the settled

meaning of common-law terms has little pull.” Bridge

v. Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co., 553 U.S. 639, 652

(2008).

The Supreme Judicial Court also tried to justify its

resort to the common law by turning to legislative history, noting that Congress enacted Section 230 in response to two New York trial-court decisions addressing common-law defamation claims. App., infra,

26a-30a. But “a law’s scope often differs from its genesis.” Chicago Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights

Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 671

(7th Cir. 2008) (Easterbrook, C.J.). Because “statutory

prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover

reasonably comparable evils,” what matters “is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators.” Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998).

The Supreme Judicial Court misunderstood the

common-law canon in any event. While “[t]he meaning

of well-defined common law words” sometimes “carries

over to statutes,” App., infra, 20a (emphasis added),

the court did not suggest that the term “publisher” literally “mean[s]” one who may be held liable only for

disseminating harmful content, Jam v. International

Finance Corp., 586 U.S. 199, 210-211 (2019). The court

instead reasoned that the term “publisher” refers to

the publication element of “information-based torts,”

20

which in turn carry with them the distinct element of

“improper,” “offensive,” “unlawful,” or “defamatory”

content. App., infra, 20a-21a (citation and emphasis

omitted). But this Court has rejected the notion that

“any term that is an element of a common-law crime

carries with it every other aspect of that common-law

crime when the term is used in a statute.” United

States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 492 n.10 (1997). So too

for torts. “It is impossible to believe that Congress intended to impose such restrictions sub silentio,” and

this Court’s “rule on imputing common-law meaning to

statutory terms does not sweep so broadly.” Ibid. Neither the statutory text nor its common-law backdrop

supports a “harmful content” requirement.

II. THE DECISION BELOW DEEPENS AN OPEN

AND ENTRENCHED CONFLICT ON THE

SCOPE OF SECTION 230.

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court aligned

itself with the wrong side of an acknowledged 8-4 split

among the courts of appeals and state courts over Section 230’s application to an online service provider’s decisions regarding how to publish content. Had the

state supreme court adopted the majority rule, it would

have held that Section 230 bars many or all of the Commonwealth’s claims.

A. The First, Second, Fifth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits, and the Texas Supreme Court, Wisconsin Supreme Court, and the New York Appellate Division

have all rejected attempts to divorce design choices

from the content whose publication they facilitate.

The Second Circuit’s decision in Force is illustrative.

There, the plaintiffs sued Facebook (now Meta) for al-

21

legedly providing Hamas with a communications platform that enabled attacks on U.S. citizens. 934 F.3d at

57. The Second Circuit applied Section 230 to bar the

claims that Facebook should have “delete[d] content

from Hamas members’ Facebook pages.” Id. at 65.

But the court went further, holding that Section 230

also protects “arranging and distributing third-party

information” as an “essential result of publishing.” Id.

at 66. From “the early days of the Internet,” online

service providers have always made “editorial decisions” beyond “the decision to host third-party content

in the first place,” such as “where on their sites” content should appear, “to whom it should be shown,” and

“what type and format of third-party content they will

display.” Id. at 66-67.

The Ninth Circuit reached the same conclusion in

Dyroff v. Ultimate Software Group, Inc., 934 F.3d 1093

(9th Cir. 2019). The website there allowed users to post

anonymously and notified users when someone in their

group responded to a post. Id. at 1094-1095. The plaintiff’s son overdosed after buying drugs through the

website. Id. at 1095. Although the plaintiff framed her

claims as challenges to the website’s design features—

including anonymous posting and the notification to

her son that someone had responded to his solicitation

for drugs—the Ninth Circuit held that she could not

“plead around Section 230 immunity” by attacking design features that are “tools meant to facilitate the

communication and content of others.” Id. at 1098. By

using these features, the online service provider “was

acting as a publisher of others’ content.” Ibid.; accord

Doe v. Grindr Inc., 128 F.4th 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 2025)

(design claims treat defendant as publisher when

22

“challenged features” are not “independent of [defendant’s] role as a facilitator and publisher of third-party

content”).

Other courts of appeals have likewise rebuffed attempts to hold online service providers liable for publishing decisions about how, or to whom, to present or

organize third-party content. The First Circuit has

held that Section 230 protects “the structure and operation” of a website, including the ability for users to

post anonymously, decisions on who may or may not

post, and rules for uploading photographs. Backpage.com, 817 F.3d at 21. The Fifth Circuit has applied

Section 230 to bar a claim that a service provider was

liable for failing to “implemen[t] safety technologies”

to protect minors from communicating with adults.

Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 419-421 (5th Cir.

2008). And the D.C. Circuit agrees that, under Section 230, “[s]tate law cannot predicate liability for publishing decisions,” Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d

1354, 1360 (D.C. Cir. 2014), including the “choice” to

present “third-party data in a particular format,” such

as “a website design that” takes location information

provided by third parties and portrays it “pictorially,”

Marshall’s Locksmith Service Inc. v. Google, LLC,

925 F.3d 1263, 1269-1270 (D.C. Cir. 2019).

Three state courts have rejected attempts to evade

Section 230 by challenging design features. The Texas

Supreme Court has interpreted Section 230 to bar

claims that are “couched as complaints about Facebook’s ‘design and operation’ of its platforms” if those

design features would have prevented the alleged harm

only by eliminating or reducing content. In re Facebook, Inc., 625 S.W.3d 80, 93 (Tex. 2021) (citation omitted). The Wisconsin Supreme Court has held that a

23

claim that an online provider negligently “design[ed] a

website that could be used to facilitate illegal sales”

still “derives from its role as a publisher.” Daniel v.

Armslist, LLC, 926 N.W.2d 710, 725-726 (Wis. 2019).

And the New York Appellate Division has reasoned

that a claim of defective design was “‘inextricably intertwined’ with the social media defendants’ role as

publishers of third-party content.” Patterson v. Meta

Platforms, Inc., 239 N.Y.S.3d 726, 735 (App. Div. 2025)

(citation omitted).

B. By contrast, the Third and Fourth Circuits and

the Nevada Supreme Court have limited Section 230’s

coverage to claims that hold online service providers

liable for harmful or improper third-party content.

The Fourth Circuit has held that Section 230 allows

liability for publishing third-party content unless liability would be “based on the information’s improper

content.” Henderson v. Source for Public Data, L.P.,

53 F.4th 110, 123 (4th Cir. 2022). The court reasoned

that historically “defamation required publishing a

‘false and defamatory statement,’” so the “publisher

was held liable because of the improper nature of the

content of the published information.” Id. at 122 (citation omitted). Based on its understanding of the common law, the court adopted a two-part test: a claim

treats a defendant as a publisher or speaker “when it

(1) makes the defendant liable for publishing certain

information to third parties, and (2) seeks to impose liability based on that information’s improper content.”

Id. at 120-121.

The Nevada Supreme Court agrees that Section 230

does not bar claims challenging design features if the

claims would not hold the service provider “liable for

any third-party content that it publishes.” TikTok,

24

Inc. v. Eighth Judicial District Court of Nevada, Clark

County, 578 P.3d 640, 651 (Nev. 2025); see Meta Platforms, Inc. v. Eighth Judicial District Court of Nevada, Clark County, 2026 WL 1129147, at *3 (Nev.

Apr. 24, 2026). Like the Commonwealth here, Nevada

has sought to hold Meta liable for how it publishes information, challenging the same features the Commonwealth challenges in this case. 2026 WL 1129147, at *3.

The Nevada Supreme Court withheld protection from

Meta under Section 230 because the claims did not seek

to hold Meta liable for “the content of posted videos”

but rather for “the design of [Meta]’s platforms.” Ibid.

(quoting TikTok, 578 P.3d at 651) (brackets in original).

The Third Circuit has likewise held that Section 230

does not protect editorial choices about how to display

content, albeit with a different rationale. In Anderson

v. TikTok, Inc., 116 F.4th 180 (3d Cir. 2024), the court

concluded that Section 230 does not protect an online

service provider’s decisions about how to “curate compilations of others’ content” because such editorial decisions constitute the provider’s own “protected firstparty speech” under this Court’s decision in Moody v.

NetChoice, LLC, 603 U.S. 707 (2024). Anderson, 116

F.4th at 184. The court stated, echoing the Fourth Circuit and the Nevada Supreme Court, that Section 230

applies only when service providers “are sued for

someone else’s expressive activity or content.” Id. at

183. At the same time, the Third Circuit acknowledged

that its decision “may depart from” the majority view

reflected in decisions like Force, Dyroff, Backpage.com,

MySpace, and Klayman. Id. at 184 n.13.

C. In the decision at issue, the Supreme Judicial

Court explicitly sided with the Fourth Circuit’s minor-

25

ity view that Section 230 does not bar claims challenging design features so long as those claims would not

“hold the service provider liable for the content of the

information published.” App., infra, 30a.

Meta would have prevailed under the majority view

of Section 230 for many or all of the Commonwealth’s

claims. The features determining how much or how

long Meta displays content (such as endless scroll and

24-hour stories) are classic editorial decisions about

“where” content should appear, “to whom it should be

shown,” and “what type and format” it should come in.

Force, 934 F.3d at 66-67. The allegations that Meta

failed to “implement basic safety measures to protect

minors” (such as hiding the number of likes on posts)

are “merely another way of claiming that [Meta] was

liable for publishing” third-party content. MySpace,

528 F.3d at 419-420. And Meta’s notifications about the

availability of content are “tools meant to facilitate the

communication and content of others” that Section 230

shields. Dyroff, 934 F.3d at 1098. None of those other

courts would have been swayed by Massachusetts’s attempt to plead around Section 230.

III. THE QUESTION PRESENTED IS EXCEPTIONALLY IMPORTANT, AND THIS CASE IS A

SUITABLE VEHICLE FOR RESOLVING IT.

A. This case presents a question of great legal and

practical importance. For hundreds of millions of

Americans, social media is now an integral part of daily

life. But a plethora of States, local governments, school

districts, and individual plaintiffs have taken aim at

those online forums—and with them, our longstanding

national commitment to freedom of expression—

26

through thousands of lawsuits seeking to impose liability for social-media services’ presentation of thirdparty content. The decision below tears down statutory safeguards for online publication and undermines

protections that Congress promised.

The adverse impact of that error and of the uncertainty from the lower-court conflict is hard to overstate. As the Court has observed, social-media services

are “inescapable,” “structur[ing] how we relate to family and friends, as well as to businesses, civic organizations, and governments.” Moody, 603 U.S. at 716.

They “create unparalleled opportunities” to “make our

lives better.” Ibid. Yet online providers—from Meta

to Google, ByteDance, Snap, and Discord, all of which

have been sued—can operate only by “cull[ing] and organiz[ing]” the “staggering amount of content” that users create every day. Id. at 719. The decisions they

must make about “what third-party speech to display

and how to display it” are critical editorial choices that

define their respective services. Id. at 716.

This Court need not and should not let lower courts

remain fractured on Section 230’s scope. Congress created a nationally uniform rule by displacing “State

[and] local law.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3). But the reasoning of the decision below allows a host of public and private plaintiffs to wield state law to commandeer editorial decisions concerning how to organize and display

content on all manner of online services. Permitting

States to apply their own laws to impose potentially inconsistent duties on Meta regarding its traditional editorial functions will replace the uniform “policy of the

United States,” 47 U.S.C. § 230(b), with an untenable

patchwork of conflicting obligations. Ultimately, it

27

could allow individual States to reshape online platforms through state tort law and work a seismic change

in the way this Nation communicates.

This Court’s intervention is needed now. Backed by

private plaintiffs and local governments, many States

have launched a coordinated assault under their own

tort laws against Congress’s considered decision to

protect editorial decisions. See p. 6, supra. Without

clear guidance from this Court, lower courts will continue to reach inconsistent decisions imposing incompatible obligations on Meta regarding its editorial decisions on how to display third-party content on its services.

B. The Court should grant this petition and consolidate the case for briefing and argument with Meta

Platforms, Inc. v. Eighth Judicial District Court of

Nevada, Clark County, No. 26-__ (filed Aug. 7, 2026).

This case is a suitable vehicle for the Court to consider

Section 230’s scope and a clean companion to Nevada.

In a detailed opinion, the Supreme Judicial Court

acknowledged an open conflict among courts on the

question presented, and it consciously joined the short

side of the split. App., infra, 17a-26a, 30a-31a. No factual disputes would impede this Court’s review of that

purely legal ruling. As in Nevada, the state supreme

court resolved the Section 230 issue in an as-applied

posture based solely on the court’s narrow construction

of Section 230. The two cases construe Section 230 in

similarly erroneous ways to permit the same theories

of liability to proceed against the same social-media

service for the same editorial choices.

Nevada, however, is the better vehicle because it

addressed Meta’s defenses under both Section 230 and

the First Amendment. Although Meta raised a First

28

Amendment defense in Massachusetts, the Supreme

Judicial Court reached only the Section 230 issue.

App., infra, 8a n.7, 41a. The difference matters because the First Amendment offers overlapping protection for Meta’s editorial and publishing decisions regarding how, when, for how long, and to whom to publish third-party content. See Moody, 603 U.S. at 716.

To the extent the Commonwealth seeks to hold Meta

liable as the publisher of third-party speech, Section 230 bars its claims. And to the extent the Commonwealth can avoid Section 230 by attacking Meta’s

own editorial choices, the First Amendment bars its

claims. Having both theories before the Court is critical to resolving the overriding question whether state

law can shape social media’s publishing decisions.

For these reasons, the Court should grant both petitions and consolidate them for briefing and argument.

The decision below complements Nevada by comprehensively ventilating the arguments on both sides of

the split and providing another concrete illustration of

the minority view’s narrow application of Section 230.

At a minimum, the Court should grant the petition

in Nevada and hold this petition pending its disposition

of Nevada. Whether the Court grants certiorari in just

Nevada or in both cases, the Court should not delay

reviewing a question of surpassing importance to the

Nation’s communications sector and the hundreds of

millions of Americans who use social media every day.

29

CONCLUSION

This Court should grant the petition for a writ of

certiorari and consolidate the case with Meta Platforms, Inc. v. Eighth Judicial District Court of Nevada, Clark County, No. 26-__ (filed Aug. 7, 2026), for

briefing and argument. Alternatively, the Court

should hold this petition pending disposition of Nevada.

Respectfully submitted.

MARK W. MOSIER

KENDALL T. BURCHARD

COVINGTON &

BURLING LLP

850 Tenth Street, NW

Washington, DC 20001

KRISTIN A. L INSLEY

GIBSON, DUNN

& CRUTCHER LLP

One Embarcadero Center

Suite 2600

San Francisco, CA 94111

JEFFREY B. WALL

Counsel of Record

JONATHAN C. BOND

MORGAN L. RATNER

JESSICA L. WAGNER

JEFF LIU

GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP

1700 M Street NW

Washington, DC 20036

(202) 955-8500

jwall@gibsondunn.com

PATRICK J. FUSTER

GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP

333 South Grand Avenue

Los Angeles, CA 90071

Counsel for Meta Platforms, Inc. and Instagram, LLC

AUGUST 7, 2026