Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Allison Nguyen, Petitioner v. Louisiana

APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS

OPINIONS AND ORDERS

Order Denying Writ Application, Supreme Court

of the State of Louisiana (May 12, 2026) ........... 1a

Opinion, Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal, State of

Louisiana (November 12, 2025) ......................... 3a

Order Denying Application for Supervisory

Writs, Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal, State of

Louisiana (June 13, 2025) ................................ 43a

Minute Order Denying Motion for Jury Trial,

24th Judicial District Court, Parish of

Jefferson – State of Louisiana (May 14, 2025) 47a

Louisiana Uniform Abuse Prevention Order

(October 23, 2024) ............................................ 49a

TRIAL AND HEARING PROCEEDINGS

Sentencing Minutes, 24th Judicial District

Court, Parish of Jefferson – State of

Louisiana (June 25, 2025) ................................ 64a

Trial Minutes, 24th Judicial District Court,

Parish of Jefferson – State of Louisiana

(June 18, 2025) ................................................. 67a

Arraignment Minutes Plea of Not Guilty

(January 17, 2025)............................................ 71a

APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont.)

OTHER DOCUMENTS

Proof of Transfer/ Declaration of Non-Possession

(October 23, 2024) ............................................ 73a

Motion for Jury Trial

(May 13, 2025) .................................................. 78a

Information for Domestic Abuse Battery ............... 80a

App.1a

ORDER DENYING WRIT APPLICATION,

SUPREME COURT OF THE

STATE OF LOUISIANA

(MAY 12, 2026)

THE SUPREME COURT OF

THE STATE OF LOUISIANA

________________________

STATE OF LOUISIANA

vs.

ALLISON NGUYEN

________________________

No. 2025-K-01475

IN RE: Allison Nguyen - Applicant Defendant;

Applying For Writ Of Certiorari, Parish of Jefferson,

24th Judicial District Court Number(s) 24-5360,

Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, Number(s) 25-KP-312;

Writ application denied.

JBM

JLW

PDG

JMG

CRC

AHP

Hughes, J., would grant.

App.2a

Supreme Court of Louisiana

May 12, 2026

/s/ Katie Marjanouic

For the Court

App.3a

OPINION, FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT OF

APPEAL, STATE OF LOUISIANA

(NOVEMBER 12, 2025)

FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF LOUISIANA

________________________

STATE OF LOUISIANA

v.

ALLISON NGUYEN

________________________

NO. 25-KP-312

On Application for Supervisory Review

from the Twenty-Fourth Judicial District Court

Parish of Jefferson, State of Louisiana

No. 24-5360, Division “P”

Honorable Lee V. Faulkner, Jr., Judge Presiding

Before: Jude G. GRAVOIS, Marc E. JOHNSON,

and John J. MOLAISON, JR., Judges.

JOHNSON, J.

Defendant, Allison Nguyen, seeks review of her

misdemeanor conviction for domestic abuse battery

rendered in the 24th Judicial District Court, Division

“P”. For the following reasons, we affirm Defendant’s

conviction and remand the matter with instructions.

App.4a

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On December 19, 2024, the Jefferson Parish

District Attorney filed a bill of information charging

Defendant with domestic abuse battery, in violation of

La. R.S. 14:35.3. Defendant pleaded not guilty on

January 17, 2025.

On March 7, 2025, defense counsel filed a “Notice

of Intent to Admit Evidence Pursuant to La Code of

Evidence 404 (2) and Expert Testimony.” On March

10, 2025, the State filed the “State’s Notice of Intent

to Introduce Evidence Under La. C.E. Article 412.4 or

in the Alternative 404(B).” Defense counsel filed a

motion for jury trial on May 13, 2025. The motion was

denied at a hearing on May 14, 2025. A writ on the

matter was filed by defense counsel on June 10, 2025

and was denied on June 13, 2025. State v. Nguyen, 25255 (La. App. 5 Cir. 6/13/25), 2025 WL 1672963.

On June 12, 2025, defense counsel filed a motion

to continue. The following day, the State filed an

opposition to the motion to continue. The order at the

bottom of the defense’s motion is dated June 12, 2025,

and it set a hearing for June 18, 2025. However,

“Denied” also appears to be typed below the order.

On June 18, 2025, defense counsel orally moved for

a jury trial, which was denied. A bench trial was held

that day. At trial, Officer Arianna Heard with the

Gretna Police Department explained that on October

20, 2024, she responded to a Planet Fitness regarding a

female striking a male covered in blood.1 Upon arriving,

1 In the 9-1-1 call, a Planet Fitness employee requested the police

and an ambulance because a man was bleeding after a woman

punched him.

App.5a

she encountered Randy Le, who was standing outside

with a laceration on his forehead and blood on his shirt.

His injury was photographed. Officer Heard testified

that EMS was automatically dispatched because of

the nature of the call. After she declared that the scene

was safe, Mr. Le was transported by EMS for medical

assistance.

Officer Heard stated she also spoke to Defendant,

who did not have any injuries. Officer Heard explained

that, when she arrived, Defendant was already secured

in handcuffs by the first responding officer. After

advising Defendant of her Miranda2 rights, she spoke

to Defendant as she sat in the back of another officer’s

car. Defendant agreed to speak to the officer, and their

entire interaction was captured on Officer Heard’s

body-worn camera.

Officer Heard’s body-camera footage was played

during the trial. Starting at 27:57 in the video,3

Officer Heard approached Defendant in the back of a

police vehicle and advised her of her rights. Defendant

relayed that she was in the corner of the gym near the

weights. She said it was supposed to be just her and

her friend but that Mr. Le wanted to come as well.

Defendant stated she entered the gym as a guest of

her friend, who was a member. However, Officer

Heard informed Defendant that she had a

membership, and Defendant agreed but qualified that

2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d

694 (1966).

3 The prosecutor played the video at trial starting at 27:57. She

then played it again at 28:46. It is unclear if a part was skipped

or if it was just paused due to an objection by the defense. The

video was continued until 37:14.

App.6a

“it had been a long time.” Defendant explained that

Mr. Le “snuck in.”

In the body-camera video, Officer Heard asked

Defendant why she hit Mr. Le. She replied that she

told Mr. Le, “Let’s go home.” He wanted his air pods

back. She indicated that Mr. Le was being disrespectful and “talking s**t” in Vietnamese, so she

“slapped the s**t out of him” in front of everyone.

Another officer asked what Mr. Le said in Vietnamese.

Defendant explained that he called her a “dumb ho.”

She said, “Leave me alone. Like, what the f**k? Are

you serious? So I slapped the s**t out of him. But I

didn’t know that my phone would actually cut his

face.” The second officer asked if she had her phone in

her hand when it happened. Defendant agreed and

said, “[U]sually at home when we hit each other, well

he hits me too at home, yeah he gives bruises to me,

but when I hit him, he doesn’t get a cut mark or

bruises.” Officer Heard asked Defendant what she did

after she hit Mr. Le, and Defendant replied that she

went back to her friend and continued working out.

She reiterated that she hit him with her phone and

then left.

In the video, the second officer began to ask

Defendant if it was normal, but she interrupted him

to say this was not the first time this happened. The

officer then asked if it was normal for them to degrade

or belittle each other in public or at home and if it

“went one way.” She indicated that Mr. Le did the

same thing, and that it was aggravating. The second

officer asked her, considering this had happened

before, what happened that night that made her have

enough. She said she just wanted to slap him.

Defendant stated Mr. Le was not invited to the gym,

App.7a

and he had an attitude. She said he was “talking s**t”

about her and calling her a “dumb ho” in front of

others. Defendant explained that it was supposed to

only be her and her friend. She acknowledged that

they were in the car together and he was supposed to

take a bus downtown. Defendant said she did not

know Mr. Le was inside of the gym, and that is why

she got mad. Officer Heard moved Defendant to a

different police vehicle. The officer and Defendant

talked as the vehicle moved. Defendant confirmed that

she and Mr. Le were together for seven years and

living together for four years.

On cross-examination, the video was played,

starting at 19:19:47.4 Officer Heard testified that Mr.

Le used the alias Andy and Randy and said his name

was Andy Le. She was asked if she was aware that

Andy Le was Mr. Le’s brother and that he gave his

brother’s date of birth. Officer Heard answered

negatively. Officer Heard stated that Mr. Le clarified

that his name was Randy when he was in the back of

the ambulance.

4 It appears that this timestamp, unlike the earlier one, referred

to the time in the video itself, not the time based on the length of

the video. This video timestamp corresponds to forty-four

seconds into the video. Officer Heard approached a man who was

bleeding from his head. He stated his name was Andy Le and

provided a birthday. The man said he was there working out. He

went there with his girlfriend, who hit him in the head with a

phone. EMS personnel arrived and assessed his injury. While in

the ambulance, the man gave an EMT his license and clarified to

Officer Heard that his name was Randy. He stated he and

Defendant were together three years. He described that she

needed discipline but not jail. He provided that they lived

together and that she was on probation. Officer Heard then left

the ambulance.

App.8a

Officer Heard testified that Defendant did not say

that she was afraid of Mr. Le, but she said they had

incidents in the past. The officer further explained

that Defendant did not say that Mr. Le threatened her

at Planet Fitness, or that he told Defendant, “Wait

until we get home.” Officer Heard also said Defendant

did not say she was in imminent fear of Mr. Le or that

she acted in self-defense.

Officer Heard recalled that she went into Planet

Fitness to gather evidence. She obtained surveillance

footage of the incident. In the video, Mr. Le sat alone

on a piece of gym equipment. He appeared to have air

pods in his ears. Defendant approached him from out

of frame; she had several items in one hand and held

out her other hand. He removed his air pods and stood

up. They briefly talked. Defendant appeared to then

strike Mr. Le while being slightly out of frame of the

video before they both are out of frame entirely.

Defendant then walked away.

Officer Heard stated she did not observe Mr. Le

move aggressively toward Defendant. Officer Heard

provided that the video did not have audio. She agreed

that there was a moment where Defendant and Mr.

Le interacted and spoke. She described that there was

a very brief interaction before Defendant hit Mr. Le

with a phone. Officer Heard explained that employees

had already started cleaning up Mr. Le’s blood but

that there was a trail of blood from the bathroom to

the front desk. The officer stated that, after the

investigation, Defendant was arrested for domestic

abuse battery.

Officer Heard acknowledged that she ran Mr.

Le’s criminal record and saw charges for possession of

marijuana and battery of a police officer. The officer

App.9a

was shown a certified copy of convictions for possession

of marijuana, drug paraphernalia, battery of a police

officer, and resisting arrest. She was also shown a

conviction for Mr. Le for possession of marijuana

within one thousand feet of a school zone, which she

agreed she saw when she ran his record.5

Body-camera footage from another officer was

admitted into evidence by defense counsel and

published.6 Officer Heard acknowledged that Defend5 The prosecutor objected to the admission of multiple exhibits

related to Mr. Le’s criminal record. The judge sustained the

objections, and the defense proffered them into the record.

6 The record does not specify what portion of the 39-minute-long

video was played. In the beginning of the video, Mr. Le identified

Defendant as the person that hit him and said she did it because

she thought he was looking at girls. Defendant and her friend

then exited the Planet Fitness. Defendant told the officer that

Mr. Le was disrespecting her so she hit him. She stated, “He

always hits me at home, though. That’s the thing. He hits me at

home. He abuses me at home. I’m tired of his s**t.” The officer

then placed Defendant in handcuffs. Defendant repeated that Mr.

Le was being disrespectful and that she hit him because he hits

her at home. She admitted that she slapped him. When the

officer asked how Mr. Le was bleeding, Defendant stated she hit

him with her phone. She indicated that she had done it before a

few times and that he hit her. She said, “That boy’s not innocent.”

The officer said she did not have the right to do it, and Defendant

replied that she should have hit him outside. The officer clarified

that she should not have hit him at all. Defendant stated he hits

her too and asked if it was okay for him to hit her. The officer

asked if she reports it; she stated they live together. She then

acknowledged that she does not report it. She indicated that she

previously reported it and that she was told they could not live

together. Defendant explained that it was her mother’s house

and that Mr. Le was supposed to have left. As she was placed in

the back of a police vehicle, the officer asked if Mr. Le was being

disrespectful by looking at other girls. Defendant replied that it

was not just looking at other girls but that he was also cursing

App.10a

ant appeared to say, “[H]e hits me at home.” She

explained that it was not said to her and that it

occurred before she arrived. The officer explained that

she found “one previous JP report where there was a

domestic disturbance” between Defendant and Mr. Le.

Defendant called the police on Mr. Le.

Melinda Nguyen, Defendant’s mother, stated she

lived at 7424 Jessup Drive with Defendant,

Defendant’s father, and Defendant’s brother. She stated

that at the time of the incident, Mr. Le, Defendant’s

ex-boyfriend, was also living there. She agreed that

she was trying to get him out of the house. She

described that Defendant and Mr. Le dated off and on

for seven years and that she did not know if they were

dating on the day of the incident. Ms. Nguyen stated

she saw bruising on Defendant’s face, and that

Defendant and Mr. Le fought each other. Ms. Nguyen

stated Mr. Le did not hit Defendant in front of her; she

never saw Defendant abuse Mr. Le. She stated

Defendant was afraid of Mr. Le. She stated that

Defendant and Mr. Le were no longer together at the

time of trial. Ms. Nguyen testified that she received a

text message from Mr. Le three or four weeks before

trial asking if Defendant was there. Ms. Nguyen did

not respond to the message.

Defendant, who was 28 years old at the time of

trial, testified that she lived at 7424 Jessup Drive with

her parents and brother. She recalled that she and a

friend went to Planet Fitness. Mr. Le was her

boyfriend at the time. She acknowledged that in the

video previously played, Mr. Le lied when he said he

her in front of everybody. She indicated that she and Mr. Le were

not dating but that they were living together.

App.11a

was Andy Le. She explained that her friend was a

member of Planet Fitness. Mr. Le was not a member

and snuck in. He was not supposed to go with

Defendant. Defendant agreed that video showed her

approach Mr. Le. She indicated that she asked him

about air pods and that he gave them to her.

Defendant testified that Mr. Le then said to her,

“You’re a dumb ho. Watch when we get home.” She

stated she took his statement to mean that he was

going to hit her because he had done so previously.

Defendant acknowledged that Mr. Le was her

boyfriend in October 2024. She agreed that she and

Mr. Le were in the car together when they went to

Planet Fitness.

She stated she was telling the truth when she

said in the video that Mr. Le hits her. Defendant

recalled that he previously hit her many times.

Defendant indicated that at one point, she and Mr. Le

lived in Houston. While there, he hit her because he

did not want to take her to work. She recalled that she

took the key, Mr. Le became angry, and he grabbed

her hair and hit her. She said he hit her another time

in Houston.

Defendant stated she has known Mr. Le since

middle school, and they dated for four years. She

testified that he had choked her a few times. When

asked if she ever lost consciousness, Defendant stated

that the first time she passed out, Mr. Le was scared.

Defendant testified that she put up with it because

Mr. Le had a car, and she did not. Defendant was

asked if she remembered another fight “when he was

going to, he was harassing [her] and going to put [her]

on social media and said, ‘Look at this whore.’” She

indicated that she remembered the incident, and that

App.12a

he dragged her out of a car, scraping her leg.

Defendant was asked if she ever tried to press charges

against Mr. Le. She replied, “Um, I did at one point.

But I didn’t get a chance to do it.”

Defendant identified a text message from Mr. Le

sent several weeks prior. She stated he said “not,”

explaining that this is another term for “ho.”7

Defendant acknowledged that she pleaded guilty to

aggravated battery on October 10, 2023, and was

sentenced to “three years at hard labor suspended,

three years active probation” for an offense on July 4,

2022. She agreed that the current charge was not the

first time she was arrested for domestic abuse against

Mr. Le.

Defendant was asked why she did not tell the

police about Mr. Le calling her a “ho” or threatening

her. She replied, “At that time, I couldn’t really like

say everything that I needed to say to the cop, because

everything happened like so fast.” She said she could

have informed the officers about a threat of harm by

Mr. Le but did not tell them. Defendant acknowledged

that the Planet Fitness video showed her hit Mr. Le.

At the conclusion of the presentation of evidence,

the trial judge found Defendant guilty of domestic

abuse battery.

On June 23, 2025, defense counsel filed a “Motion

for New Trial and Incorporated Memorandum.” The

trial court denied the motion on June 25, 2025. The

trial court then sentenced Defendant to six months in

parish prison. Defense filed a motion for a writ of

7 This text message was identified as an exhibit at trial, but it

was not offered to be admitted into evidence.

App.13a

review on the same day. On July 17, 2025, Defendant

timely filed the instant writ application.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

In her writ application, Defendant alleges that

the trial court erred when: 1) it required a hostile

demonstration or an overt act to apply the justification of self-defense; 2) failed to acquit Defendant

or grant a new trial under the uncalled witness rule;

3) failed to allow evidence under La. C.E. art. 404(B)

relative to the alleged victim; 4) sentenced Defendant

to the maximum six-month sentence; and 5) failed to

grant a jury trial.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

Self-Defense

Defendant alleges that the trial court erred when

it required a hostile demonstration or an overt act

occur for the justification of self-defense to be

applicable to this matter. Defendant contends that

there was unrebutted evidence of abuse by the victim

against her. She asserts that the prosecutor argued

and the court accepted the “hostile demonstration rule”

and was unfamiliar with “La. R.S. [sic] 404 (B) (2).”

The State argues that Defendant misunderstands

La. C.E. art. 404(B)(2). The State explains that,

despite Defendant’s claim, defense counsel was allowed

to admit evidence under La. C.E. art. 404(B)(2) that

the victim allegedly abused her in the past. It

maintains that the Article governs the admissibility

of evidence and is not a substantive theory of selfdefense. The State contends that it did not argue that

there was not an overt act or hostile demonstration;

App.14a

but rather, it said the video did not show someone in

imminent danger of receiving a battery.

On March 7, 2025, defense counsel filed a “Notice

of Intent to Admit Evidence Pursuant to La [sic] Code

of Evidence 404 (2) and Expert Testimony.” In part, he

explained that “[D]efendant pleads self-defense but is

not required to show an overt act on the part of the

victim because there is a history of assaultive behavior

by the victim and will show specific instances of

domestic abuse.”

On June 23, 2025, Defendant filed a “Motion for

New Trial and Incorporated Memorandum.” In part,

she stated the State argued that the defense must

show an overt act or a hostile demonstration by the

victim at the time of the offense. She argued that the

trial court agreed with the State and improperly ruled

that self-defense requires a hostile demonstration or

overt act by the victim at the time of the offense, citing

to La. C.E. art. 404(B)(2). She stated a new trial was

required as a result of that ruling.

At a hearing on June 25, 2025, defense counsel

argued that an overt act or hostile demonstration was

not necessary for a domestic case. He stated, “A

woman can live with a man for a long period of time

and get beaten up every day and one day wake up in

the morning, look over at him while he’s fast asleep

and slit his throat and claim self-defense under the

law as it is now.” He pointed out that Defendant said

Mr. Le hit her at home. Counsel argued that the court

would not consider self-defense and ruled against

Defendant because there was no overt act by the

victim at the time of the offense. He asserted that the

victim told Defendant to wait until they got home.

Counsel stated there was a history of assaultive

App.15a

behavior. He contended that self-defense could be

raised when there is a history of assaultive behavior

within a domestic situation.

The trial judge explained that he did not recall

sustaining an objection relative to that position and

allowed defense counsel to present that position. The

judge explained, “So because of my ruling as to her

guilt does not mean that I did not consider what you

put before the Court, Counsel.” The judge stated that

counsel presented pictures and was allowed to present

that defense. Counsel replied that during trial, the

prosecutor argued that there was not a hostile

demonstration or overt act. The judge responded that

he listened to all of the arguments, and defense

counsel’s assertion that the court did not allow him to

present that position was false. Defense counsel

stated, “Well, then if we did present that position, I

don’t see how you could have possibly found her guilty,

unless you just discounted anything she had to say.

And there was nothing, no rebuttal.” The judge agreed.

The trial judge explained:

I discounted what she said, Counsel, because

I heard what she said relative to, “He beats

me at home.” And I also heard her say that,

“He was disrespectful. And I wanted to slap

the s**t out of him.” She never said anything

about being in any danger or anything,

Counsel. Let’s present the whole picture

here, okay? Let’s not cherrypick what’s good

for us and what’s not good for us we ignore.

So don’t try to put the Court in the position

– . . . —where the Court has, basically,

ignored evidence, which I didn’t.

App.16a

The trial judge stated that he heard the defense,

weighed it, and ruled. Counsel asserted that Defendant

did not have to be in any immediate danger to use selfdefense if she is an abused person. The judge said he

heard it, and the prosecutor said she does not have to.

The judge repeated his assertion that he heard the

defense, weighed it, and ruled. The prosecutor

contended that the State “never argued there was an

overt act that needed to be necessary because it is a

domestic relationship.” She asserted the State argued

that Defendant was not in imminent harm of receiving

a battery at the time she attacked the victim. The

prosecutor further averred that, even if the court

believed that the victim verbally threatened Defendant,

it was clear that the threat was not immediate and

that Defendant’s actions were unreasonable. The

court denied the motion for new trial.

La. C.E. art. 404(B)(2) states:

In the absence of evidence of a hostile demonstration or an overt act on the part of the

victim at the time of the offense charged,

evidence of the victim’s prior threats against

the accused or the accused’s state of mind as

to the victim’s dangerous character is not

admissible; provided that when the accused

pleads self-defense and there is a history of

assaultive behavior between the victim and

the accused and the accused lived in a

familial or intimate relationship such as, but

not limited to, the husband-wife, parentchild, or concubinage relationship, it shall

not be necessary to first show a hostile

demonstration or overt act on the part of the

victim in order to introduce evidence of

App.17a

the dangerous character of the victim,

including specific instances of conduct and

domestic violence; and further provided that

an expert’s opinion as to the effects of the

prior assaultive acts on the accused’s state of

mind is admissible.

(Emphasis added).

Here, there was evidence presented of prior abuse

by the victim towards Defendant. Defendant and her

mother testified about the abuse. The transcript

reflects that the judge said he considered the evidence

presented. We find that Defendant’s contention that

the judge was not familiar with La. C.E. art. 404(B)(2)

or that the judge required a hostile demonstration or

overt act to determine Defendant acted in self-defense

was misplaced. As pointed out by the State, La. C.E.

art. 404(B)(2) relates to the admissibility of evidence.

The judge allowed the introduction of evidence of the

victim’s dangerous character into evidence, considered

the claim of self-defense, and rejected it. We find that

this assignment of error lacks merit.

Motion for New Trial

Defendant alleges that the trial court erred when

it failed to acquit Defendant or grant a new trial under

the uncalled witness rule. She asserts that the State

had control of the victim and quotes the prosecutor as

having said on June 13, 2025, that it had a cooperative

witness who was not out-of-state and was

incarcerated. Defendant explains that the State did

not notify the court or the defense that it did not have

the witness, and that the State failed to call him.

Defendant states that she argued at trial that his lack

of presence inhibited her ability to introduce

App.18a

impeachment evidence into the record. She concludes

that the case should be reversed.

The State explains that it is unclear whether the

uncalled witness rule applies to Louisiana criminal

cases and contends that this is not the case to make

that determination. It points out that the issue was

not raised prior to the verdict and was, therefore, not

preserved for review. It also asserts that in its

opposition to the motion to continue, the State said

the victim was not located out of state and was not

incarcerated. The State contends that it was prohibited

by La. R.S. 15:257.1(B) from obtaining a material

witness warrant for the victim because this is a

domestic abuse battery case. It asserts the victim was

not in the State’s control. The State argues that, even

if the uncalled witness rule applied, the presumption

was rebuttable, and enough evidence was presented

to prove the case.

In her rebuttal, Defendant argues again that the

State said it had the witness, but that was not an

accurate statement. She asserts that the State needed

“him to rebut Mr. [sic] Nguyen testimony.” She contends that the State’s brief is purposefully ambiguous

about the victim’s availability because he would not

have helped the State’s case.

On June 12, 2025, defense counsel filed a motion

to continue, wherein he asked that the matter be

continued without date because the defense’s writ to

this Court would probably have to be filed with the

Louisiana Supreme Court. He asserted that it was in

everyone’s best interest for this Court to have time to

rule.

App.19a

On June 13, 2025, the State filed an opposition to

the motion to continue. In pertinent part, the State

asserted that it had a “cooperative victim in this

matter who is not located out of state and is also not

incarcerated.” It further provided, “Part of the basis for

Defense’s writ seems to be that we should not

prosecute cases where the victim is uncooperative;

however, at this time and to the State’s knowledge,

there is a cooperative victim in this case.” The State

said the victim and several witnesses were coordinated

for trial on June 18, 2025, and that the trial should

proceed as planned. The court ultimately denied the

motion. The matter proceeded to trial on June 18,

2025, and the court found Defendant guilty of domestic

abuse battery.

On June 23, 2025, Defendant filed a “Motion for

New Trial and Incorporated Memorandum.” In part,

she asserted that the State failed to produce the

victim, who would have provided exculpatory evidence

regarding his abuse of Defendant and of his threat

toward her at the time of the offense. Defendant

argued that the State purposefully failed to produce

the victim. She said that the State asserted the

witness was cooperative, he was not out-of-state, and

he was incarcerated. Defendant explained that two

days before trial, the State requested a subpoena for

the victim. She argued that the State had a duty to

disclose to the defense and the court if the witness was

not cooperating, and the State misled the defense and

the court. Defendant explained that, if the State was

purposefully being misleading, and the information

was exculpatory, then the State had a duty to produce

it. She referenced the “uncalled witness rule.”

Defendant asked for a new trial.

App.20a

On June 25, 2025, defense counsel stated that he

filed a motion to continue several days before trial,

and the State filed a “scathing objection.” He

explained that the State said it had the victim, that

he was cooperating, and that the trial should not be

continued. Counsel asserted that the State did not

present the victim, and posited that he was not cooperating or that he would give exculpatory evidence. He

explained that the State filed a subpoena for the

victim two days before trial. Defense counsel said that

the State called him a liar. He opined that the State

had an obligation to notify him and the court that the

victim was no longer cooperating.

Defense counsel then explained the uncalled

witness rule. He provided, “If you have a witness

under your control, and that was this witness, and you

don’t call him, there’s a presumption that that witness

would not help you.” Counsel said the witness had

three outstanding warrants and that the State could

have sent the police to pick him up. He reiterated that

by not appearing, there is a presumption that his

testimony would not help the State’s case.

The prosecutor questioned the existence of the

uncalled witness rule. She explained that, at the time

the State filed its opposition to the continuance, it

believed the victim was cooperative and that there

were documented phone calls. The prosecutor stated

that three days after filing the opposition, the victim

failed to appear at an agreed-upon meeting. She

summarized that the victim was contacted, and he

stated that he went to Texas and forgot about the

trial. She explained that the victim said he would try

to make arrangements. The prosecutor asserted that

it was not accurate that the State did not try to get the

App.21a

victim there and referenced the subpoena. She stated

the victim was contacted multiple times, but his phone

eventually no longer accepted calls. She said they tried

calling him from different phone numbers but none

went through. The prosecutor asserted that the State

did not know why he became uncooperative. She

contended that, when the victim did not appear, the

State proceeded with the evidence it had.

Defense counsel read aloud from the State’s prior

response and asserted that the victim was not

cooperative if he left the state. He argued that the

State had a duty to provide notice that the victim was

not present, once it became aware that he would not

appear. He averred that it was obvious the victim

would not appear for the trial. Counsel stated the

victim was in another state and in jail but that the

State disagreed. He argued that the State never had

the victim. The trial court denied the motion for new

trial.

La. C.Cr.P. art. 841(A) provides, in pertinent part:

“An irregularity or error cannot be availed of after

verdict unless it was objected to at the time of

occurrence.” To seek appellate review of an alleged

trial court error, a party must make a contemporaneous objection at trial and must state the

grounds for the objection. State v. Nix, 22-446 (La.

App. 5 Cir. 10/31/23), 374 So.3d 212, 216, writ denied,

23-1540 (La. 4/23/24), 383 So.3d 604; State v.

Williams, 20-46 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/30/20), 308 So.3d

791, 838. The purpose of the requirement of a contemporaneous objection is to put the trial judge on notice

of an alleged irregularity, so that he or she may cure

a legitimate problem and prevent the defendant from

gambling for a favorable verdict and then resorting to

App.22a

appeal on errors that might easily have been corrected

by an objection. State v. Patin, 13-618 (La. App. 5 Cir.

9/24/14), 150 So.3d 435, 441. A contemporaneous

objection allows opposing counsel to reply or to correct

the problem, and may also prevent the error entirely.

Id. at 441-42.

Here, because Defendant failed to raise her

uncalled witness rule objection prior to the rendition

of the verdict by the trial judge, we find that she is

precluded from raising the issue on appeal. (See, State

v. Chester, 19-363 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/3/21), 314 So.3d

914, 975, writ denied, 21-350 (La. 6/8/21), 317 So.3d

321, holding, “we find that Defendant raising his

claim in his motion for new trial does not suffice as a

contemporaneous objection under La. C.Cr.P. art.

841.”)

La. C.E. art. 404(B) Evidence

Defendant explains that she attempted to

introduce the victim’s criminal history of violence and

drugs into evidence under La. C.E. art. 404(B), but the

judge prompted the State to object. She says that the

defense was not permitted to introduce the convictions,

which would have proven the victim’s intent and

motive to beat her when they got home. She argues

that, if the State had produced the witness, the

convictions would have been admissible for impeachment purposes.

The State asserts that Defendant mischaracterized how its objection occurred. It argues that the

defense sought to introduce the evidence at issue

under “reverse 404(B).” The State points out that

Defendant did not provide notice of the reverse 404(B)

evidence, and as such, it was inadmissible. It argues

App.23a

that regardless of the untimeliness and lack of notice,

the victim’s prior offenses might have been relevant if

they were for domestic violence; however, they were

actually for marijuana crimes and battering/resisting a

police officer. The State contends that defense counsel’s

response to its objection demonstrates that the

evidence was forbidden propensity evidence.

In response, Defendant reiterated that the court

should have allowed the evidence under La. C.E. art.

404(B) to show the victim’s intent. At trial, while

cross-examining Officer Heard, defense counsel showed

her Defense Exhibit 1, which he characterized as a

certified copy of convictions for possession of marijuana,

drug paraphernalia, battery of a police officer, and

resisting arrest. He then showed her Defense Exhibit

2, which he described as a conviction in case number

16-1116 for possession of marijuana within one

thousand feet of a school zone. When counsel offered

the exhibits into evidence, the judge asked if there

was an objection to the exhibits. The prosecutor

objected based on the relevance of the victim’s prior

convictions. When asked for the relevancy of the

evidence, defense counsel replied, “It’s a violent offense.

He’s a violent person. He’s a weed smoker which

means he was probably loaded that night.” The judge

sustained the objection as to both exhibits.

Defense counsel then offered into evidence Defense

Exhibit 3, characterized as a certified copy relating to

possession of marijuana in a school zone associated

with case number 16-116. The prosecutor objected

based on relevance, and the court sustained the objection. Counsel stated, “I’m going to show and we’re

going to proffer these, Judge. And D 4, we’re going to

show you an objection, another objection to third

App.24a

offense marijuana, a felony. I offer, file and introduce

D 4.” The judge said there was no testimony. Defense

counsel stated it was self-authenticating and asked

Officer Heard if Defense Exhibit 4 was a conviction.

She answered affirmatively. Counsel then indicated

that it was a certified copy and offered it into evidence.

The prosecutor again objected based on relevance, and

the judge sustained the objection.

Defense counsel proffered Defense Exhibit 5. He

asked Officer Heard if Mr. Le was convicted of another

third offense possession of marijuana. She agreed.

Counsel asked if it was a conviction. Officer Heard

pointed out that it appeared to be a duplicate and that

Defense Exhibits 2 and 3 also appeared to be the

same. Counsel said, “Let’s go with D 4. How about 18411, another possession of marijuana, third offense.”

The judge asked what exhibit he was on; counsel

replied Defense Exhibit 6. The judge asked what was

Exhibit 5. Counsel replied that Defense Exhibit 5 was

a conviction for case number 17-2049. The judge

explained that he thought Defense Exhibit 5 was a

duplicate. Officer Heard clarified that Defense Exhibit

5 was a duplicate of 4 and that Defense Exhibit 3 was

a duplicate of Defense Exhibit 2. Defense counsel

stated, “1 is 16-116. I mean 2 is 16-116. And 1 is 154766, a conviction. D 3 is one — no. That’s right. Never

mind. D 3 will be 17-2049, a conviction, possession of

marijuana, third offense, a felony.” The judge asked

what counsel was handing the officer. He replied

Defense Exhibit 3. The judge then indicated that it was

case number 17-2449. Counsel stated it was a certified

copy and offered Defense Exhibit 3 into evidence. The

prosecutor again objected based on relevance. Id. at

46.

App.25a

The judge stated he wanted to get the record

straight. He explained, “D 1 is 15-4766; D 2 is 16-1166

[sic]; D 3 is 17-2049. The Court previously sustained

the objections by the State.” Defense counsel noted his

objection and proffers. He then showed Officer Heard

Defense Exhibit 4, associated with 18-4811, which the

officer agreed was a conviction. Counsel offered it into

evidence, the prosecutor objected, and the judge

sustained the objection. Counsel proffered it into the

record. He then stated Defense Exhibit 5 was 17-2049

and directed the officer to look at it. The judge then

asked what Defense Exhibit 3 was. Counsel replied

that it was 17-2049. Officer Heard answered

affirmatively when she was asked if she was the

investigating officer. Defense counsel asked her if she

looked at his record, and she replied that she looked

at both of their records. Counsel stated he wanted to

show her “18-2998” and asked if it was a conviction.

The prosecutor asked what exhibit it was. Counsel

stated it was Defense Exhibit 5. Counsel asked Officer

Heard if she was aware of the conviction in 18-2998.

She stated she was aware of the charge but not the

conviction.8

In her writ application, Defendant included several

exhibits related to Mr. Le’s prior convictions. A minute

entry for case number 15-4766 dated November 30,

2015, shows that on that day, Randy Le pleaded guilty

8 The minute entry for trial and the list of evidence provided by

the trial court in response to this Court’s order to supplement

reflects that only four exhibits were proffered into evidence:

Defense Exhibit 1 (certified copy of minute entry for 15-4766),

Defense Exhibit 2 (certified copy of minute entry for 16-1116),

Defense Exhibit 3 (certified copy of minute entry for 17-2049),

and Defense Exhibit 4 (certified copy of minute entry for 18-4811).

App.26a

to possession of marijuana weighing less than

fourteen grams, in violation of La. R.S. 40:966(C);

possession of drug paraphernalia, in violation of La.

R.S. 40:1023; battery of a police officer, in violation of

La. R.S. 14:34.2; and resisting an officer, in violation

of La. R.S. 14:108. This minute entry was proffered at

trial as Defense Exhibit 1.

A minute entry for case number 16-1116 dated

June 20, 2018, reflects that Randy Le had his probation

revoked related to a guilty plea entered on October 31,

2016, for possession of marijuana within 1000 feet of

a school or church, in violation of La. R.S. 40:981.3.

This minute entry was proffered at trial as Defense

Exhibit 2.

A minute entry for case number 17-2049 dated

July 9, 2018, showed that Randy Le pleaded guilty

that day to possession of marijuana third offense, in

violation of La. R.S. 40:966(C). This minute entry was

proffered at trial as Defense Exhibit 3.

In a minute entry for case number 18-4811 dated

September 13, 2018, Randy Le pleaded guilty to

possession of marijuana third offense, in violation of

La. R.S. 40:966(C). This was proffered at trial as

Defense Exhibit 4.

A separate minute entry also dated July 9, 2018,

but in case number 18-2998 showed that Randy Le

pleaded guilty that day to possession of marijuana

third offense, in violation of La. R.S. 40:966(C). It

appears this exhibit was intended to be Defense

Exhibit 5, but it was not offered to be admitted into

evidence at trial.

Exhibits and attachments not properly and

officially offered and admitted into evidence cannot be

App.27a

considered, even if it is physically filed into the trial

court record. State v. Leggett, 18-647, (La. App. 5 Cir.

3/18/19), 2019 WL 1246911; State v. Whitley, 14-737

(La. App. 5 Cir. 3/25/15), 169 So.3d 658, 660 n.1 (citing

Denoux v. Vessel Mgmt. Services, Inc., 07-2143 (La.

5/21/08), 983 So.2d 84, 88). Documents attached to

memoranda do not constitute evidence and cannot be

considered as such on appeal. Denoux, 983 So.2d at

88.9 Thus, we find that Exhibits J and K attached to

the instant writ application will not be considered.

In a minute entry for case number 19-624 dated

September 6, 2022, Randy Le had his probation

revoked for guilty pleas (entered on February 24,

2021) to prostitution, in violation of La. R.S. 14:82,

and possession of marijuana, in violation of La. R.S.

40:966(C). Based on the case number, this minute

entry was not proffered into evidence at trial.

To understand the admissibility of “reverse

404(B)” evidence used against a victim, it is helpful to

first consider Article 404(B) evidence as used against a

defendant. In Louisiana, the fundamental rule

governing the use of evidence of other crimes, wrongs,

or acts is that such evidence is not admissible to prove

that the accused committed the charged crime

because he has committed other such crimes in the

past. La. C.E. art. 404(B)(1); State v. Perez-Espinosa,

23-353 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/22/24), 389 So.3d 284, 292,

writs denied, 24-431 (La. 10/15/24), 394 So.3d 812, and

24-811 (La. 10/15/24), 394 So.3d 818, and 24-464 (La.

9 Although this is a writ application on a “misdemeanor appeal,”

this Court has cited the aforementioned jurisprudence in a prior

writ application regarding misdemeanor convictions. See State v.

Winstead, 16-217 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/26/16), 193 So.3d 565, 574.

App.28a

10/15/24), 394 So.3d 823. The prosecution is not

allowed to suggest to the jury that because the

defendant has a “propensity” to do certain criminal

things, the defendant is guilty in the case before the

jury. See Art. 404. Character evidence generally not

admissible in civil or criminal trial to prove conduct;

exceptions; other criminal acts, La. Prac. Evidence

Art. 404 (2024 ed.). This is the so called “propensity

bar.” The propensity bar in Article 404 prohibits any

evidence that is introduced to portray the defendant

in a negative light. Additionally, the propensity bar

should prevent any party in a criminal case from

introducing character to prove conduct. See id. Evidence

of other crimes, wrongs, or acts committed by the

defendant is generally inadmissible because of the

“substantial risk of grave prejudice to the defendant.”

Perez-Espinosa, 389 So.3d at 292.

However, while the State may not admit evidence

of other crimes to prove the defendant is a person of bad

character, evidence of prior crimes may be admitted if

the State establishes an independent relevance aside

from proving the defendant’s criminal character. Id.

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is allowed to

prove motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,

knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident,

or when it relates to conduct, formerly referred to as

res gestae, that constitutes an integral part of the act

or transaction that is the subject of the present

proceeding. La. C.E. art. 404(B)(1); Perez-Espinosa,

389 So.3d at 292.

This Court has previously determined that a

defendant may utilize La. C.E. art. 404(B) in the same

manner that the State may seek to introduce evidence

under the article, sometimes referred to as “reverse

App.29a

404(B)” evidence. State v. Terrio, 18-421 (La. App. 5 Cir.

8/7/18), 2018 WL 3748409. See also State v. Beal, 15-806

(La. App. 5 Cir. 4/11/16) (unpublished writ disposition).

“In contrast to ordinary ‘other crimes’ evidence, which

is used to incriminate criminal defendants, ‘reverse

404(b)’ evidence is utilized to exonerate defendants.”

United States v. Dabit, No. CR 19-143-JWD-RLB,

2023 WL 334782 (M.D. La. Jan. 20, 2023).

“All relevant evidence is admissible, except as

otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United

States, the Constitution of Louisiana, this Code of

Evidence, or other legislation. Evidence which is not

relevant is not admissible.” La. C.E. art. 402. Although

relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative

value is substantially outweighed by the danger of

unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading

the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, or waste

of time. La. C.E. art. 403. A district court’s ruling on the

admissibility of evidence will not be reversed absent

an abuse of discretion. State v. Expose, 24-498 (La.

App. 5 Cir. 5/21/25), 2025 WL 1452955.

In her brief, Defendant asserts that the proffered

minute entries would have shown that Mr. Le was a

violent drug user with outstanding warrants. She

asserts that they would have “proven his intents,

among other motivations to beat her again when they

got home.” Defendant vaguely references La. C.E. art.

404(B) but does not cite to specific case law. She does

not explain how guilty pleas from 2015 and 2018

relating to possession of marijuana, possession of drug

paraphernalia, and battery of a police officer form a

motivation for Mr. Le to hurt or threaten to hurt

Defendant in 2024. On the showing made, we find that

the trial judge did not err in finding that the victim’s

App.30a

prior convictions were not relevant and in excluding

them from trial.

Excessive Sentence

Defendant argues that the court erred in imposing

a maximum sentence because she only has one prior

arrest that resulted in a deferred sentence and that

she has a perfect probationary record. She references

La. C.Cr.P. art. 894.1(26) and La. C.Cr.P. art. 894.1(C).

She contends that the trial court failed to consider

that the victim’s conduct included or facilitated its

commission and that the victim provoked her by

physically abusing her.

The State avers that the sentence was not

excessive. It explains that the judge was aware of

Defendant’s additional background, as set out in the

State’s notice of intent to introduce evidence under La.

C.E. art. 412.2. Specifically, the State informed the

judge via its notice that Defendant previously attacked

her aunt, “accidentally” struck a child that her aunt

was holding, grabbed a knife, and struck her aunt in

the face with the knife multiple times. The State

opines that the sentence in this matter was justified.

In her rebuttal, Defendant reiterated that she

had one prior conviction. Here, she asserts for the first

time that the trial court did not specify any grounds

under La. C.Cr.P. art. 894.1 and states the sentence

was not particularized.

La. C.Cr.P. art. 881.1(B) provides that a motion

for reconsideration of sentence “shall be oral at the

time of sentence or shall be in writing thereafter and

shall set forth the specific grounds on which the

motion is based.” La. C.Cr.P. art. 881.1(E) provides

that “failure to make or file a motion to reconsider

App.31a

sentence or to include a specific ground upon which a

motion to reconsider sentence may be based, including

a claim of excessiveness, shall preclude the state or

the defendant from raising an objection to the sentence

or from urging any ground not raised in the motion on

appeal or review.”

This Court has held that the failure to file a

motion to reconsider sentence, or to state the specific

grounds upon which the motion is based, limits a

defendant to a bare review of the sentence for

constitutional excessiveness. State v. Manuel, 20 172

(La. App. 5 Cir. 6/2/21), 325 So.3d 513, 568, writ

denied, 21-926 (La. 10/12/21), 325 So.3d 1071. This

Court has held that when the specific grounds for

objection to the sentences, including alleged noncompliance with La. C.Cr.P. art. 894.1, are not

specifically raised in the trial court, then these issues

are not included in the bare review for constitutional

excessiveness, and the defendant is precluded from

raising these issues on appeal. State v. Robertson, 23525 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/23/24), 398 So.3d 767, 775.10

Here, Defendant has not included or stated that

a motion to reconsider sentence was filed. Further, the

transcript from the sentencing hearing does not show

that Defendant objected to the sentence at the time it

was imposed. Accordingly, we find that Defendant is

limited to a review for constitutional excessiveness.

The Eighth Amendment to the United States

Constitution prohibits cruel and unusual punishment.

10 La. C.Cr.P. art. 894.1(A) states in part, “When a defendant

has been convicted of a felony or misdemeanor, the court should

impose a sentence of imprisonment if any of the following

occurs . . . [.]”

App.32a

Article I, § 20 of the Louisiana Constitution also

prohibits cruel and unusual punishment but further

explicitly prohibits excessive punishment. State v. Ford,

24-197 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/26/25), 406 So.3d 652, 680,

writ denied, 25-356 (La. 5/20/25), 409 So.3d 216. A

sentence is considered excessive, even when it is

within the applicable statutory range “if it makes no

measurable contribution to acceptable goals of

punishment and is nothing more than the purposeless

imposition of pain and suffering and is grossly out of

proportion to the severity of the crime.” Id. A sentence

is grossly disproportionate if, when the crime and

punishment are considered in light of the harm done

to society, it shocks the sense of justice. State v.

Beckendorf, 24-242 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/26/25), 406 So.3d

729, 733, writ denied, 25-379 (La. 5/20/25), 409 So.3d

222.

A trial judge is in the best position to consider the

aggravating and mitigating circumstances of a

particular case and, therefore, is given broad discretion when imposing a sentence. Ford, 406 So.3d at

680. “The issue on appeal is whether the trial court

abused its discretion, not whether another sentence

might have been more appropriate.” State v. Hidalgo,

20-89 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/18/20), 293 So.3d 780, 789.11

The review of sentences under La. Const. art. 1, § 20

does not provide an appellate court with a vehicle for

substituting its judgment for that of a trial judge as to

what punishment is most appropriate in a given case.

Ford, 406 So.3d at 680. Generally, courts reserve

maximum sentences for cases involving the most

11 In Hidalgo, this Court referenced an appeal; however, it is

noted that the matter was a writ for a misdemeanor conviction.

App.33a

serious violations of the offense charged and the worst

type of offender. Beckendorf, 406 So.3d at 734.

The appellate court shall not set aside a sentence

for excessiveness if the record supports the sentence

imposed. La. C.Cr.P. art. 881.4(D); State v. Reed, 24

59 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/30/24), 409 So.3d 980, 1007. In

reviewing a sentence for excessiveness, the reviewing

court shall consider the crime and the punishment in

light of the harm to society and gauge whether the

penalty is so disproportionate as to shock the court’s

sense of justice, while recognizing the trial court’s

wide discretion. Id. In reviewing a trial court’s

sentencing discretion, three factors are considered: 1)

the nature of the crime; 2) the nature and background

of the offender; and 3) the sentence imposed for

similar crimes by the same court and other courts.

However, there is no requirement that specific

matters be given any particular weight at sentencing.

Id.

Here, Defendant was convicted of domestic abuse

battery, in violation of La. R.S. 14:35.3. Pursuant to

R.S. 14:35.3(C), “On a first conviction, notwithstanding

any other provision of law to the contrary, the offender

shall be fined not less than three hundred dollars nor

more than one thousand dollars and shall be

imprisoned for not less than thirty days nor more than

six months.” The statute further specifies that at least

48 hours of the sentence imposed shall be served

without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of

sentence.

On June 25, 2025, the judge sentenced Defendant

to six months in parish prison. The judge stated that

he considered the sentencing guidelines in accordance

with Article 894.1. He also acknowledged Defendant’s

App.34a

criminal history and that she was on probation for the

crime of aggravated battery.

Considering the nature of the crime, we acknowledge that the video of the incident showed that the

victim was keeping to himself when Defendant

approached him and hit him in the head with her cell

phone. After Defendant hit him, she walked away,

apparently unconcerned for his well-being. The victim

suffered from a laceration to his head, requiring

medical attention. Defendant told officers at the scene

that the victim was “talking s**t” about her and that

she wanted to slap him. Evidence at trial established

that Defendant and Mr. Le dated off and on for years

and lived together with Defendant’s family. Defendant

described that they both hit each other at home.

However, she did not testify that the victim threatened

her or that she feared him.

We next consider the nature and background of

Defendant. Defendant’s background was not extensively addressed at trial or at sentencing. We find that

Defendant has a history of engaging in violence not

only with the victim here but also with another family

member. Additionally, in the incident involving Defendant’s aunt, Defendant used a dangerous weapon and

showed a disregard for the safety of a child in her

aunt’s arms. At the time of the charged offense,

Defendant was on probation for that aggravated

battery. We find that committing this offense while on

probation for another offense demonstrates a general

disregard for the sentence previously imposed. Based

on the foregoing, we find that the trial court did not

err in imposing the sentence. We conclude that the

sentence is not excessive and that this assignment of

error lacks merit.

App.35a

Jury Trial

Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in

failing to grant her a jury trial because domestic

violence is a serious offense. She contends that because

a domestic violence conviction limits a person’s gun

rights, she was entitled to a jury trial.

The State argues that because this Court already

denied a writ application on this issue, this Court

should decline to revisit this issue under the law of the

case doctrine. It provides that, alternatively,

Defendant was not entitled to a jury trial. The State

explains that Defendant makes a constitutional

challenge to La. C.Cr.P. art. 779, but she did not

particularize this argument; instead, she filed a

boilerplate motion before trial. It also points out that

Defendant did not serve the attorney general as

required for such a challenge. As such, the State

contends that the claim is not properly before this

Court. It further asserts that, even if it is properly

before this Court, it lacks merit.

In Defendant’s rebuttal, she restated that domestic

violence is a serious offense and that this Court

characterized it as such in its prior writ disposition.

She explains that such a conviction cannot be expunged

and impacts her gun rights.

In defense counsel’s motion for a jury trial, which

was filed on May 13, 2025, he stated that Defendant

was charged with La. R.S. 14:35.3. He alleged that the

victim would not appear and was in another state. He

said that Defendant was on felony probation, and a

potential conviction was “so grievous” that she should

be afforded a jury trial.

App.36a

At the motion hearing held on May 14, 2025,12

defense counsel argued that “in Duncan13 and in some

of the refining cases of Duncan they talk about serious

-- it has to be serious to get a jury trial.” He argued

that, once a person was convicted of domestic violence,

under federal law, one could not own a gun or have the

conviction expunged. He compared the limitation of

jury trials for certain misdemeanors to the Ramos14

court’s ruling. He explained that, at the time that

“they” went to a “ten-two” verdict, was around the

same time that “the African-Americans” were going to

start getting on juries. He explained that the

motivation for the rule of judge or misdemeanor trials

excluding a jury was for the same reason and stated,

“And they have, basically, an all-white judiciary

deciding your decision.” He asserted that certain

precedents needed to be overruled.

Defense counsel explained that he requested a

jury trial for Defendant because constitutionally, one

could not get a fair trial before the court. He asserted

that the victim was not there and was in Houston. He

stated that the victim was texting Defendant’s mother

to try to contact her. He alleged that video evidence

did not have audio and it was not known what

occurred before the incident. Defense counsel averred

12 According to Uniform Rule – Courts of Appeal, Rule 2-1.14,

“Any record lodged in this court may, with leave of court, be used,

without necessity of duplication, in any other case on appeal or

on writ.”

13 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d

491 (1968).

14 Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U.S. 83, 140 S.Ct. 1390, 206 L.Ed.2d

583 (2020).

App.37a

that the State would not try the case if it was before a

jury and alleged that the State thought it could “sneak

it past the judge.” He argued that the State would be

embarrassed if it had to try the case before a jury.

The State responded that Defendant was charged

with one count of misdemeanor domestic abuse battery.

It stated that Ramos did not apply and argued that

Duncan, which said that a defendant is not entitled to

a jury trial for a misdemeanor charge, was applicable.

It asked for Defendant’s motion to be denied. Defense

counsel responded that Duncan “set it at six months,”

and he believed it was ultimately reversed. He stated,

“And he got his jury trial because it was down in

Plaquemines Parish.” He also informed the court that

the instant charge had “broader implications” because

Defendant was on probation. The trial court denied the

motion, and defense counsel noted an objection and

stated his intent to file a writ.

On May 28, 2025, defense counsel filed a “Notice

of Intent to File Writ of Certiorari” and “Motion to Set

Return Date.” The trial court set a return date of June

12, 2025. He filed a writ application on June 10, 2025.

On June 13, 2025, this Court denied the writ.

This Court explained that, although Defendant was

charged with a serious offense, because it is not

punishable by more than six months imprisonment,

she is not entitled to a trial by jury. This Court stated

that “the provisions of La. C.Cr.P. are mandatory.”

This Court found that the district court’s decision was

correct and denied the writ. Nguyen, 25-255, 2025 WL

1672963.

Defense counsel raised the issue again prior to

trial on June 18, 2025. He orally moved for a jury trial,

App.38a

and the judge asked if it was the same issue that was

already before this Court. Counsel acknowledged that

it was but that he wanted to make a record for it in

the event that the issue is appealed. The judge replied

that this Court had already ruled on it and that he did

not need to “re-rule on a motion.” Counsel verified that

the court’s “ruling is going to be the same,” and the

judge answered affirmatively. Defense counsel

objected.

On June 23, 2025, Defendant filed a “Motion for

New Trial and Incorporated Memorandum.” In part,

she asserted that the trial court erred in failing to

grant a jury trial. She stated she was entitled to a jury

trial because domestic violence is a serious offense that

takes away a person’s second amendment rights and

has other serious repercussions. Defendant acknowledged that this Court denied her pretrial writ on the

matter but pointed out that this Court labeled it a

“serious offense.” She stated a six-person jury would

have found her not guilty. Defendant requested a new

trial.

On June 25, 2025, the defense orally argued the

motion for new trial. In relevant part, defense counsel

stated that the court should have granted the motion

for a jury trial and that a jury would have quickly

found Defendant not guilty. Counsel explained that a

domestic violence conviction stays on a person’s record

for life and impedes a person’s second amendment

rights. He asserted that the constitution “doesn’t say

six months” and that it provides a right to a jury trial.

The judge stated there was already a ruling from

a higher court but that defense counsel could make his

record. The judge noted that he already denied it. The

prosecutor similarly explained that the matter was

App.39a

already ruled on by this Court. She stated that while

counsel might not like the law, it is what it is. The

judge then denied the motion for new trial.

“Under the doctrine of the ‘law of the case,’ an

appellate court will generally decline to consider its

own rulings of law on a subsequent appeal in the same

case.”15 State v. Perilloux, 21-448 (La. App. 5 Cir.

12/20/23), 378 So.3d 280, 308, writ denied, 24-104 (La.

9/4/24), 391 So.3d 1055. One reason for imposition of

the doctrine is the avoidance of indefinite re-litigation

of the same issue, but it will not be applied in cases of

palpable former error. State v. Sly, 23-60 (La. App. 5

Cir. 11/2/23), 376 So.3d 1047, 1079, writ denied, 231588 (La. 4/23/24), 383 So.3d 608. The law of the case

doctrine is discretionary. Reconsideration of a prior

ruling is warranted when, in light of a subsequent

trial record, it is apparent that the determination was

patently erroneous and produced unjust results.

Perilloux, 378 So.3d at 308.

We find that, by this assignment of error, Defendant seeks to have this Court reconsider its prior ruling

finding that she was not entitled to a jury trial.

However, Defendant’s writ application does not allege

new facts or additional jurisprudence. Therefore, we

find that Defendant has not shown that, in light of a

subsequent trial record, reconsideration is warranted

or that this Court’s prior determination was patently

erroneous or produced unjust results. As such, we find

that this assignment of error lacks merit.

15 The instant matter is not a subsequent appeal; rather, it is a

writ for a misdemeanor conviction.

App.40a

Errors Patent Discussion

Generally, an errors patent review is not conducted on misdemeanor convictions. Nevertheless,

this Court has on occasion considered a “misdemeanor

appeal” as an application for supervisory review of the

case and has conducted an errors patent review. See

State v. Jones, 12-640 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/30/13), 128

So.3d 436, 443 n.4.16

A review for errors patent according to La.

C.Cr.P. art. 920;17 State v. Oliveaux, 312 So.2d 337

(La. 1975); and State v. Weiland, 556 So.2d 175 (La.

App. 5th Cir. 1990), was conducted on the record

presented before us.

La. R.S. 14:35.3(C) states that at least 48 hours

of the sentence imposed shall be served without benefit

of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. The

sentencing transcript does not indicate that the trial

court restricted benefits for any period of time.

Generally, when a trial court does not mention the

restriction of benefits, such conditions are deemed to

exist by operation of law under La. R.S. 15:301.1. State

v. Cepriano, 21-262 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/30/22), 339 So.3d

32, 47; State v. Williams, 00-1725 (La. 11/28/01), 800

So.2d 790, 801. However, in this case, the trial court’s

failure to impose the statutory restrictions is not

cured by La. R.S. 15:301.1 because the portion of the

sentence to be served without benefits is left to the

16 See also State v. Dufrene, 20-290 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/9/20), 307

So.3d 1182.

17 La. C.Cr.P. art. 920(2) states that an errors patent is “[a]n

error that is discoverable by an inspection of the pleadings and

proceedings and without inspection of the evidence.”

App.41a

discretion of the trial court. See State v. Smith, 23-399

(La. App. 5 Cir. 12/27/23), 380 So.3d 109, 117.18

Accordingly, we remand the case for resentencing

with instructions to the district court to impose

Defendant’s sentence in accordance with the provisions

of La. R.S. 14:35.3(C), as it relates to the restriction of

benefits. See State in Interest of J.R., 22-339 (La. App.

5 Cir. 11/30/22), 354 So.3d 172, 179-80 (where J.R.

admitted to the allegations of battery of a dating

partner, in violation of La R.S. 14:34.9. This Court

found that the juvenile court failed to order that at

least 48 hours of the disposition be served without the

benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence

as set forth in the statute. Because the language of the

sentencing provision gave the trial judge discretion in

determining the exact length of time that benefits are

to be restricted, this Court remanded this matter and

instructed the juvenile court to impose at least 48

hours of the disposition without the benefit of parole,

probation, or suspension of sentence.).

Additionally, the transcript does not show that

Defendant was advised pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art.

930.8. If a trial court fails to advise, or provides an

18 In Smith, 380 So.3d at 117, this Court applied La. R.S.

15:301.1 to a “misdemeanor appeal” wherein the sentence required

that at least 48 hours of the sentence be imposed without the

benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. The court

sentenced the defendant to serve six months in the parish prison

with all but 48 hours suspended and further placed the defendant

on active probation with certain conditions. However, the sentencing

transcript reflected that the trial court did not specify the period

of time during which the defendant’s sentence was imposed

without the benefit of parole. As such, this Court remanded the

matter and instructed the trial court to impose at least 48 hours

of the sentence without the benefit of parole.

App.42a

incomplete advisal, pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8,

the appellate court may correct this error by informing

the defendant of the applicable prescriptive period for

post-conviction relief by means of its opinion. State v.

Little, 24-82 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/30/24), 398 So.3d 846,

858. Accordingly, we advise Defendant by way of its

opinion, that no application for post-conviction relief,

including applications which seek an out-of-time appeal,

shall be considered if it is filed more than two years

after the judgment of conviction and sentence has

become final under the provisions of La. C.Cr.P. arts.

914 or 922. See Smith, 380 So.3d at 117.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Defendant’s

conviction. We remand the matter to the district court

for imposition of Defendant’s sentence in accordance

with the provisions of La. R.S. 14:35.3(C), as it relates

to the restriction of benefits.

CONVICTION AFFIRMED;

REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS

App.43a

ORDER DENYING APPLICATION FOR

SUPERVISORY WRITS, FIFTH CIRCUIT

COURT OF APPEAL, STATE OF LOUISIANA

(JUNE 13, 2025)

FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF LOUISIANA

________________________

STATE OF LOUISIANA

v.

ALLISON NGUYEN

________________________

No. 25-K-255

________________________

APPLYING FOR SUPERVISORY WRIT FROM THE TWENTYFOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,

PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA,

DIRECTED TO THE HONORABLE LEE V. FAULKNER , JR.,

DIVISION "P", NUMBER 24 -53 60

________________________

Before: Fredericka HOMBERG WICKER, John J.

MOLAISON, Jr., and Timothy S. MARCEL, Judges.

WRIT DENIED

This matter comes before us on an Application for

Supervisory Writs filed herein by Relator, Allison

Nguyen, who seeks supervisory review of the trial

court’s May 14, 2025 ruling denying her Motion for

Jury Trial in this misdemeanor criminal case. Trial is

App.44a

scheduled to begin on June 18, 2025. For the reasons

discussed herein, this writ is denied.

Relator is charged with a violation of La. R.S.

14:35.3, Domestic Abuse Battery, first offense. This

offense is a misdemeanor punishable on a first offense

as provided in La. R.S. 14:35.3(C), which provides:

C. On a first conviction, notwithstanding any other

provision of law to the contrary, the offender shall

be fined not less than three hundred dollars nor

more than one thousand dollars and shall be

imprisoned for not less than thirty days nor more

than six months. At least forty-eight hours of the

sentence imposed shall be served without benefit

of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

Imposition or execution of the remainder of the

sentence shall not be suspended unless either of

the following occurs:

(1) The offender is placed on probation with a

minimum condition that he serve four days

in jail and complete a court-monitored domestic abuse intervention program, and the

offender shall not own or possess a firearm

throughout the entirety of the sentence.

(2) The offender is placed on probation with a

minimum condition that he perform eight,

eight-hour days of court-approved community

service activities and complete a court-monitored domestic abuse intervention program,

and the offender shall not own or possess a

firearm throughout the entirety of the

sentence.

Article 1, § 17 of the Louisiana Constitution

guarantees criminal defendants the right to trial by

App.45a

jury. With respect to misdemeanor charges, such as

Section 14:35.3(C), Article 1, § 17, states that “[a] case

in which the punishment may be confinement at hard

labor or confinement without hard labor for more than

six months shall be tried before a jury of six persons,

all of whom must concur to render a verdict.” This

provision aligns with the United States Constitution’s

Sixth Amendment, which reserves the right to a jury

trial for “serious” offenses, defined as those subject to

imprisonment for more than six months State v.

Acevedo, 18-683 (La. App. 5 Cir. 6/30/20), 307 So. 3d

322; Duncan v. State of La., 391 U.S. 145 (1968). The

statutory right to a trial by jury in misdemeanor cases

is set forth in La. C.Cr.P. art. 779, which provides:

A.

A defendant charged with a misdemeanor in

which the punishment, as set forth in the

statute defining the offense, may be a fine in

excess of one thousand dollars or

imprisonment for more than six months

shall be tried by a jury of six jurors, all of

whom must concur to render a verdict.

B.

The defendant charged with any other

misdemeanor shall be tried by the court

without a jury.

(Emphasis added).

Therefore, although the offense with which Relator

is charged is a serious offense, it is not punishable by

more than six months imprisonment, she is not entitled

to a trial by jury. The provisions of La. C.Cr.P. are

mandatory. The district court’s decision was correct.

Accordingly, Relator’s Application for Supervisory

Writs is denied.

Gretna, Louisiana, this 13th day of June, 2025.

App.46a

FHW

JJM

TSM

App.47a

MINUTE ORDER DENYING MOTION

FOR JURY TRIAL, 24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

COURT, PARISH OF JEFFERSON –

STATE OF LOUISIANA

(MAY 14, 2025)

24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

PARISH OF JEFFERSON – STATE OF LOUISIANA

________________________

STATE OF LOUISIANA

v.

ALLISON NGUYEN

________________________

DOB:

Judge:

ADA:

Case Number:

Division:

Complaint:

Date:

Court Reporter:

01/15/1997

LEE V. FAULKNER

Piper Didier

24-5360

P

J6163124

05/14/2025

Brian Salzer

The Defendant, ALLISON NGUYEN, appeared

before the bar of the Court this day for a motion

hearing.

The Defendant was represented by BRUCE

NETTERVILLE.

Motions taken up:

Motion for Jury Trial (11:54 AM - 12:00 PM)

App.48a

Motion for Jury Trial - DENIED. Defense’s objection noted for the record.

Defense requests 30 days to seek a writ. The Court

gives the Defense a file by date of June 13, 2025.

The Trial date currently set of June 18, 2025 is to

maintained.

Oral notice was given to the Defendant.

/s/ Griffen G. Gaudet

Deputy Clerk

App.49a

LOUISIANA UNIFORM

ABUSE PREVENTION ORDER

(OCTOBER 23, 2024)

Case/Docket #: 22411195

Arrest/Booking #: 22411195

Item #: J6163124

Court: 24th Judicial District Court

Div. CC

City/Parish: Jefferson Parish

State: Louisiana

Order of Protection



Bail Restrictions/Conditions of Release

PROTECTED PERSON: RANDY LE

PROTECTED PERSON IDENTIFIERS

Date of Birth: 06/10/1997

Race: A

Sex: M

__________________________

State of Louisiana

v.

__________________________

DEFENDANT’S NAME AND ADDRESS

ALLISON NGUYEN

7424 JESSUP DRV

MARRERO LA 70072

DEFENDANT IDENTIFIERS

SEX:

F

App.50a

RACE:

DOB:

HT:

WT:

EYES:

HAIR:

A

01/15/1997

5’02

120

BRO

BLN

THE COURT HEREBY FINDS:

That it has jurisdiction over the parties and

subject matter, and the defendant has been or will be

provided with reasonable notice and opportunity to be

heard. Additional findings of this court are as set forth

on the following pages.

THE COURT HEREBY ORDERS:

That the above-named defendant be restrained

from committing further acts of abuse or threats of

abuse, stalking or sexual assault. Additional terms of

this order are as set forth on the following pages.

EXPIRATION: This order shall be effective

through 11:59 PM on

Until final disposition including Refusal,

Dismissal, Acquittal. or Sentencing

ENFORCEMENT:

This order shall be enforced, even without registration, by the courts of any state, the District of

Columbia, any U.S. Territory, and may be enforced by

Tribal Lands (18 U.S.C. Section 2265).

WARNINGS TO DEFENDANT:

Crossing state, territorial, or tribal boundaries to

violate this order may result in federal imprisonment

(18 U.S.C. Section 2262).

App.51a

Federal law provides penalties for possessing,

transporting, shipping, or receiving any firearm or

ammunition (18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(8)). See further

notice on pages 5.6 of this Order.

ONLY THE COURT CAN CHANGE THIS ORDER.

App.52a

Criminal Order of Protection

# of Counts: 1

Criminal Charge (Code #): 14:35.3

__________________________

State of Louisiana

v.

DEFENDANT’S NAME: ALLISON NGUYEN

__________________________

A



BAIL RESTRICTIONS

[...]

The protected person(s) is related to the defendant as:

(check all that apply)

C



2. current or former intimate cohabitant



1. current or former dating partner

D

[...]

ONLY ORDERS INITIALED BY A JUDGE

SHALL APPLY

F



THE COURT FINDS THAT THE DEFENDANT REPRESENTS A CREDIBLE THREAT

OR DANGER TO THE PHYSICAL SAFETY

OF THE PROTECTED PERSON(S), HAS

App.53a

BEEN CHARGED WITH A CRIME

AGAINST A FAMILY MEMBER, HOUSEHOLD MEMBER OR DATING PARTNER

ANDIOR HAS BEEN CHARGED WITH

THE CRIME OF BATTERY OF A DATING

PARTNER (R.S. 14:34.9), OR OF DOMESTIC

ABUSE BATTERY (R.S. 14:35.3), OR OF

STALKING (14:40.2), OR OF CYBERSTALKING (R.S. 14:40.3), OR OF VIOLATION OF

PROTECTIVE ORDERS (R.S. 14:79), OR OF

UNLAWFUL COMMUNICATION (R.S.

14:285), OR OF A SEXUAL ASSAULT (as

defined in R.S. 46:2184), OR R.S. 46:1846

APPLIES. THUS, THE DEFENDANT IS

PROHIBITED FROM POSSESSING A

FIREARM PURSUANT TO LA. C.CR.P.

ARTICLE 313, AND/OR 320(H) AND THE

COURT ISSUES THE FOLLOWING

ORDERS:



AFTER A HEARING

THE DEFENDANT IS HEREBY ORDERED TO

TRANSFER ANY AND ALL FIREARMS OWNED

OR POSSESSED; ANY CONCEALED HANDGUN PERMIT IS HEREBY SUSPENDED

PURSUANT TO LA. C.CR.P. ARTICLE 1001 ET

SEQ. See timeframes and details on page 6 of this

Order.

[...]

App.54a

H

ONLY ORDERS INITIALED BY A JUDGE

SHALL APPLY

PS  1. YOU ARE ORDERED NOT TO abuse,

harass, assault, stalk, follow, track, monitor,

or threaten the protected person, RANDYLE

This prohibition includes the use, attempted

use, or threatened use of physical force that

would reasonably be expected to cause bodily

injury.

PS  2. YOU ARE ORDERED NOT TO contact the

protected person personally, through a third

party, or via public posting, by any means,

including written, telephone, or electronic

(text, email, messaging, or social media)

communication.

PS  3. YOU ARE ORDERED NOT TO go within 200

FT (distance) of the protected person.

PS  4. YOU ARE ORDERED NOT TO abuse,

harass, assault, stalk, follow, track, monitor,

or threaten the child(ren) of the protected

person.

PS  5. YOU ARE ORDERED NOT TO contact the

protected

person’s

immediate

family*

personally, through a third party, or via

public posting, by any means, including

written, telephone, or electronic (text, email,

messaging, or social media) communication

(*immediate family = spouse, mother, father,

aunt, uncle, sibling, or child of the protected

App.55a

person whether related by blood, marriage, or

adoption)

PS  6. YOU ARE ORDERED NOT TO go within one

hundred (.100) yards of the residence or

household of the protected person.

PS  7. YOU ARE ORDERED NOT TO go to the

protected person’s school, or the protected

person’s place of employment.

FULL FAITH AND CREDIT

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2265

This Order meets all requirements of the Violence

Against Women Act (VAWA)18 U.S.C. Section 2265.

This court has jurisdiction over the parties and the

subject matter under the laws of the State of Louisiana;

the defendant was given reasonable notice and an

opportunity to be heard sufficient to protect the

defendant’s right to due process before this order was

issued; or if the order was issued ex parte, the court

ordered that the defendant be given reasonable notice

and an opportunity to be heard within the time

required by the laws of the State of Louisiana, and in

any event, within a reasonable time after the order

was issued, sufficient to protect the defendant’s due

process rights.

THIS ORDER SHALL BE PRESUMED VALID

AND ENFORCEABLE IN ALL 50 STATES, THE

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, TRIBAL LANDS, U.S.

TERRITORIES, AND COMMONWEALTHS.

App.56a

Date of Order: 10/23/2024

Until final disposition including Refusal, Dismissal, Acquittal, or Sentencing

/s/ Paul H. Schneider

Signature of Judge

Paul H. Schneider

Print or Stamp Judge’s Name

NOTICE TO DEFENDANT – VIOLATION OF ORDER

VIOLATION OF THIS ORDER MAY RESULT

IN FORFEITURE OF BOND, REVOCATION OF

PROBATION OR PAROLE, IMPRISONMENT AND

A FINE. A PERSON WHO VIOLATES THIS ORDER

MAY BE IMMEDIATELY ARRESTED, JAILED, AND

PROSECUTED PURSUANT TO LA. R.S. 14:79 AND/

OR 14:95.10, MAY BE FINED UP TO $5,000.00 AND

IMPRISONED WITH OR WITHOUT HARD LABOR

FOR UP TO FIVE YEARS. A PERSON WHO

VIOLATES THIS ORDER MAY BE FURTHER

PUNISHED UNDER OTHER CRIMINAL LAWS OF

THE STATE OF LOUISIANA.

NOTICE TO DEFENDANT – FIREARM POSSESSION

AS A RESULT OF THIS ORDER, IT MAY BE

UNLAWFUL FOR YOU TO POSSESS, RECEIVE,

SHIP, TRANSPORT OR PURCHASE A FIREARM,

INCLUDING A RIFLE, PISTOL, OR REVOLVER,

OR AMMUNITION, FOR THE DURATION OF THIS

App.57a

ORDER OR LONGER, PURSUANT TO STATE

AND/OR FEDERAL LAW.

If you have any questions whether these laws

make it illegal for you to possess or purchase

a firearm or ammunition, consult an

attorney.

Federal law: 18 U.S.C. 922 (q)(8) prohibits a

defendant from purchasing, possessing, shipping,

transporting, or receiving firearms or ammunition*

for the duration of this order if the following

conditions apply:

-

Victim/protected person(s)’ relationship to

defendant is checked in Box C on page 2 of

this order

AND

-

Notice and opportunity for a hearing

provided (Box G or Box H on page 3 of this

order)

AND

-

EITHER Judicial finding of credible threat

(Box G or Box H on page 3 of this order)

OR Certain behaviors are prohibited (item 1

on page 3 of this order is initialed)

Federal law: 18 U.S.C. 922 (q)(9) prohibits a

defendant from purchasing, possessing, shipping,

transporting, or receiving firearms or ammunition* if

the following conditions apply:

* 18 U.S.C. 921: the term “firearm” means (A) any weapon

(including a starter gun) which will or is designed to or may

readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an

App.58a

-

Defendant has been CONVICTED of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence**

AND

-

Victim/protected person(s)’ relationship to

defendant is checked in Box C on page 2 of

this order or Number 1 or Number 4 in Box

D on page 2 of this order.

Louisiana law: C.Cr.P. Art. 320(H) prohibits the

possession of a firearm* for the duration of this order

when issued as a bail restriction.

Louisiana law: R.S. 14:95.10 prohibits possession

of a firearm* or carrying of a concealed weapon by a

explosive; (B) the frame or receiver of any such weapon; (C) any

firearm muffler or firearm silencer; or (D) any destructive device,

Such term does not include an antique firearm. The term

“ammunition” means ammunition or cartridge cases, primers,

bullets, or propellant powder designed for use in any firearm.

** 18 U.S.C. 921: the term “misdemeanor crime of domestic

violence” means an offense that is a misdemeanor under Federal,

State, or Tribal law; and has, as an element, the use or attempted

use of physical force, or the threatened use of a deadly weapon,

committed by a current or former spouse, parent, or guardian of

the victim, by a person with whom the victim shares a child in

common, by a person who is cohabiting with or has cohabited

with the victim as a spouse, parent, or guardian, by a person

similarly situated to a spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim,

or by a person who has a current or recent former dating

relationship with the victim. In Louisiana, a “misdemeanor crime

of domestic violence” may include R.S. 14:35 (simple battery), R.S.

35.3 (domestic abuse battery), R.S. 14:36 (assault), R.S. 14:37

(aggravated assault), R.S. 14:38 (simple assault), R.S.

14:103(A)(1) (disturbing the peace by fistic encounter) and R.S.

14:103(A)(4) (disturbing the peace by engaging in any act in a

violent or tumultuous manner by any three or more persons).

App.59a

defendant CONVICTED of domestic abuse battery

(R.S. 14:35.3), battery of a dating partner if the

battery involves strangulation or burning, and second

and subsequent convictions of battery of a dating

partner (R.S. 14:34.9) —

IF

-

Defendant was represented by counsel In the

case or knowingly and intelligently waived

the right to counsel in the case (item in Box

8 on page 2 is checked)

AND

-

Defendant, if entitled to a trial by jury in the

case , was tried by a jury or knowingly and

intelligently waived the right to be tried by a

jury, by guilty plea or otherwise (item in Box

B on page 2 is checked).

Louisiana law: R.S. 46:2136.3 prohibits the

possession of a firearm* for the duration of this order

if both of the following occur:

-

The order includes a finding that the person

subject to the order represents a credible

threat to the physical safety of the protected

person(s) (Box C or D on page 3 of this order)

and the protected person(s) is a family or

household member or dating partner

AND

-

The order informs the person subject to the

order that the person is prohibited from

possessing a firearm pursuant to the provisions of 18 U.S.C. 922(g) (8) and R.S.

46:2136.3.

App.60a

Louisiana Law: R.S. 46:1846 prohibits the

possession of a firearm* for the duration of this order

if:

-

The defendant has been charged by bill of

information/indictment with any felony sex

offense as defined in R.S. 46:1844(W) committed against any person or any offense

that is a felony committed upon a family

member, household member or dating

partner.

OR

-

The defendant has been sentenced or found

not guilty by reason of insanity for any felony

sex offense as defined in R.S. 46:1844(W)

committed upon any person, or any offense

that is a felony committed upon a family

member, household member, or dating

partner.

AND

-

The defendant is prohibited from communicating with a person listed above.

Louisiana law: R.S. 14:40.2 (F)(5) (crime of

stalking) prohibits the possession of a firearm*for the

duration of this order.

Louisiana Law: R.S. 15:574.4.2 prohibits the

possession of a firearm* for the duration of this order

* Under these statutes, “firearm” means any pistol, revolver, rifle,

shotgun, machine gun, submachine gun, black powder weapon,

or assault rifle which is designed to fire or is capable of firing

fixed cartridge ammunition or from which a shot or projectile is

discharged by an explosive.

App.61a

if: the defendant is being paroled and was convicted of

(remove language) any felony sex offense as defined in

R.S. 46:1844(W) committed upon any person, (remove

language) or any offense, that is a felony, committed

upon a family member, household member, or dating

partner, as those terms are defined by R.S. 46:2132.

NOTICE TO DEFENDANT – FIREARM TRANSFER

AND SUSPENSION OF CONCEALED HANDGUN PERMIT

AS A RESULT OF THIS ORDER, YOU MAY BE

REQUIRED TO TRANSFER ANY AND ALL FIREARMS

OWNED OR POSSESSED BY YOU AND SURRENDER

YOUR CONCEALED HANDGUN PERMIT

Louisiana law: C.Cr.P. Art. 1001 et seq. requires

the transfer of all firearms owned or possessed and

the suspension of a concealed handgun permit:

-

When a person is convicted of domestic abuse

battery (R.S. 14:35.3), second or subsequent

conviction of battery of a dating partner

(R.S. 14:34.9), battery of a dating partner

that involves strangulation (R.S. 14:34.9(K)),

battery of a dating partner when the offense

involves burning (R.S. 14:34.9), domestic

abuse aggravated assault (R.S. 14:37.7),

aggravated assault upon a dating partner

(R.S. 14:34.9.1), or any felony crime of

violence enumerated or defined in R.S.

14:2(B) for which a person would be

prohibited from possessing a firearm pursuant

to R.S. 14:95.1 and either has as an

element of the crime that the victim was or

the victim has been determined to be a

family member, household member, or

App.62a

dating. partner; possession of a firearm or

carrying a concealed weapon by a person

convicted of domestic abuse battery and

certain offenses of battery of a dating partner

(R.S. 14:95.10).

OR

-

When a person is subject to a Uniform Abuse

Prevention Order issued pursuant to C.Cr.P.

Articles 30, 320, or 871.1.

OR

-

When a person is subject to a Uniform Abuse

Prevention Order that includes terms

prohibiting possession of a firearm or carrying

a concealed weapon.

Firearms transfer shall occur within 48 hours, exclusive of legal holidays. If firearms are sold or transferred

prior to issuance of transfer order, you must provide a

proof of transfer form signed by the receiver and a

witness, within 10 days.

I have read and fully understand all conditions of

this order.

/s/ Allison Nguyen

Signature of Defendant

DATE: 10/23/24

NOTICE TO LAW ENFORCEMENT

Pursuant to La. R.S. 14:79 – the crime of violation of

protective orders – you shall use every reasonable

App.63a

means to enforce this order. La. Code of Criminal

Procedure Article 211 provides that when you have

reasonable grounds to believe a person committed the

offense of domestic abuse battery, battery of a dating

partner, violation of protective orders, stalking, or any

other offense involving the use or threatened use of

force or a deadly weapon upon the defendant’s family

member, household member, or dating partner, the

officer shall make a CUSTODIAL arrest.

Defendant provided with a copy of this order on:

10/23/2024 (Date)

By: /s/ Tonjaie Elmore

Signature

Tonjaie Elmore

Print Name

Agency: JPSO

Faxed or electronically transmitted to the Louisiana

Protective Order Registry

DATE: 10/23/24

CLERK: {Illegible}

App.64a

SENTENCING MINUTES,

24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH

OF JEFFERSON – STATE OF LOUISIANA

(JUNE 25, 2025)

24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

PARISH OF JEFFERSON – STATE OF LOUISIANA

________________________

STATE OF LOUISIANA

v.

ALLISON NGUYEN

________________________

DOB:

Judge:

ADA:

Case Number:

Division:

Complaint:

Date:

Court Reporter:

01/15/1997

LEE V. FAULKNER

Lindsay L. Truhe

24-5360

P

J6163124

06/25/2025

Brian Salzer

The Defendant, ALLISON NGUYEN, appeared

before the bar of the Court this day for sentencing. The

Defendant was represented by BRUCE NETTERVILLE.

On July 18, 2025, the Defendant was found

GUILTY by a Judge on count 1) 14:35.3 M IV Domestic

Abuse Battery.

Motion for New Trial (9:17 AM - 9:30 AM)

App.65a

Motion denied by the Court. Defense’s objection

noted.

The Court ruled on the Motion to Suppress

Statement that was simultaneously taken up during

the trial. There were no questions asked pertaining to

the Motion to Suppress Statement therefore the Court

denies the motion. Defense’s objection noted.

The Court sentenced the Defendant to imprisonment in the Parish Prison for a term of 6 months.

Defendant is given credit for time served pursuant to

C.Cr.P. 880 from date of initial arrest until today for

each day defendant actually served. The Defendant is

committed to Jefferson Parish Prison for execution of

said sentence.

A Form 18 was filed to dissolve the stay away

order under the ATN as a bail restriction.

The Defendant reported her birthdate as January

15, 1997 and age as 28 years.

The Court informed the Defendant she has thirty

(30) days from today’s date to appeal this conviction,

and two (2) years after judgement of conviction and

sentence has become final to seek post-conviction

relief.

The Defense then filed a Motion for Writ of Review

and Motion for bond pending writ of review.

The Court will e-sign the order of the Defense’s

Motion for Writ of Review.

Motion for bond pending writ of review (10:55 AM

- 10:56 AM)

App.66a

As to R.S. 14:35.3, the Court set a Post Conviction

Bond (Cash or Commercial), in the amount of

$50,000.00.

Defense’s objection to the excessiveness of the

bond was noted.

If the Defendant is to make bond, the Defendant

is to be placed on GRETNA HIP.

The Defendant was remanded to Jefferson Parish

Prison.

/s/ Griffen G. Gaudet

Deputy Clerk

Now, therefore, you, the said Sheriff, are hereby

commanded to carry out in full every part of the

aforesaid sentence. And for so doing this shall be your

sufficient warrant and authority.

Witness, the Honorable LEE V. FAULKNER,

Judge presiding in the 24th Judicial District Court,

Division P, Parish of Jefferson, at the hall of sitting of

the same, in the City of Gretna, this 25 day of June in

the year 2025.

/s/ Lee V. Faulkner

Judge

App.67a

TRIAL MINUTES,

24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH

OF JEFFERSON – STATE OF LOUISIANA

(JUNE 18, 2025)

24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

PARISH OF JEFFERSON – STATE OF LOUISIANA

________________________

STATE OF LOUISIANA

v.

ALLISON NGUYEN

________________________

DOB:

Judge:

ADA:

Case Number:

Division:

Complaint:

Date:

Court Reporter:

01/15/1997

LEE V. FAULKNER

Mallory Grefer, Sarah Helmstetter

24-5360

P

J6163124

06/18/2025

Brian Salzer

The Defendant, ALLISON NGUYEN, appeared

before the bar of the Court this day, June 18, 2025 at

02:12 PM , for the Court to take up the judge trial of

matter 24-5360, entitled State of Louisiana (vs)

ALLISON NGUYEN, for the charge:

COUNT: 1 Domestic Abuse Battery (14:35.3)

Present were:

ALLISON NGUYEN - Defendant

BRUCE NETTERVILLE - Counsel for the defendant

App.68a

Sarah Helmstetter Assistant District Attorney

for the State of Louisiana

Mallory Grefer Assistant District Attorney

for the State of Louisiana

At the hour of 2:12 PM, the Trial begins.

At the hour of 2:12 PM, Defense orally re-iterated

its motion for jury trial. Motion DENIED by the Court.

Defense’s objection noted for the record. The Court

had previously denied this motion and the 5th Circuit

Court of Appeals has denied the defense’s writ application.

At the hour of 2:12 PM, the State gave opening

statements.

At the hour of 2:13 PM, the Defense gave opening

statements.

State’s exhibit 1 - Verbatim CD-R containing 911

call (Admitted over defense objection)

State’s exhibit 2 - City of Gretna Police Department Records Certification of 911 call (Admitted over

defense objection)

State’s exhibit 3 - Detailed History for Police Event

#G242940045 (Admitted over defense objection)

State Witness 1: Ofc. Arianna Heard (2:22 PM 3:10 PM)

State’s exhibit 4 - Color copy of photo

State’s exhibit 5 - Color copy of photo

Positive identification of the Defendant was made

by the witness.

App.69a

State’s exhibit 6 - Verbatim DVD-R containing Ofc.

Arianna Heard body camera footage

State’s exhibit 7 - Verbatim DVD-R containing

Planet Fitness video camera footage

Defense’s proffered exhibit 1 - Certified copy of

minute entry (15-4766)

State’s objection to the admission of the exhibit

was sustained. Defense objection noted.

Defense’s proffered exhibit 2 - Certified copy of

minute entry (16-1116)

State’s objection to the admission of the exhibit

was sustained. Defense objection noted.

Defense’s proffered exhibit 3 - Certified copy of

minute entry (17-2049)

State’s objection to the admission of the exhibit

was sustained. Defense objection noted.

Defense’s proffered exhibit 4 - Certified copy of

minute entry (18-4811)

State’s objection to the admission of the exhibit

was sustained. Defense objection noted.

Defense’ s exhibit 6 - PNY USB containing Ofc.

Arianna Heard body camera footage

At the hour of 3: 10 PM , the State rests.

At the hour of 3: 10 PM , the Defense moved for a

directed verdict. Motion DENIED by the Court.

Defense objection noted.

Defense Witness 1: Melinda Nguyen (3:1 2 PM3:21 PM)

Defense’s exhibit 7 - Color copy of photo

App.70a

Defense’s exhibit 8 - Color copy of photo

Defense Witness 2: Defendant - Allison Nguyen

(3:21 PM - 3:36 PM)

At the hour of 3:37 PM, the Defense rests.

The State did not give closing arguments.

At the hour of 3:37 PM, the Defense gives closing

arguments.

At the hour of 3:43 PM, the State gives rebuttal

closing arguments.

At approximately the hour of 3:44 PM, the Judge

returned with a verdict - GUILTY AS CHARGED.

Oral notice was given to the Defendant.

Sentencing is set for June 25, 2025 at 09:00 AM.

The Defendant was not remanded and ordered

released on her original bond.

/s/ Griffen G. Gaudet

Deputy Clerk

App.71a

ARRAIGNMENT MINUTES

PLEA OF NOT GUILTY

(JANUARY 17, 2025)

24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

PARISH OF JEFFERSON – STATE OF LOUISIANA

________________________

STATE OF LOUISIANA

v.

ALLISON NGUYEN

________________________

DOB:

Commissioner:

ADA:

Case Number:

Division:

Complaint:

Date:

Court Reporter:

01/15/1997

Paul H. Schneider

Edward C. Milner

24-5360

P

J6163124

01/17/2025

Snannon S. Chase

The Defendant, ALLISON NGUYEN, appeared

before the bar of the Court this day for arraignment.

The Defendant was represented by KEVIN

PHILLIPS for the arraignment only.

Reading of the Bill of Information was waived.

A plea of NOT GUILTY was entered, which plea

was ordered recorded.

App.72a

The court granted 30 days after receipt of initial

discovery for the defendant’s counsel of record to file

responsive pleadings.

Pre-Trial Conference set for Wednesday, January

22, 2025 09:00 AM.

The Defendant asserted his/her 5th and 6th

Amendment Rights.

The Court ordered a PDO appointed attorney.

Oral notice was given to the Defendant.

Written notice was given to the Defendant.

/s/ Leshawna W. Johnson

Deputy Clerk

App.73a

PROOF OF TRANSFER/

DECLARATION OF NON-POSSESSION

(OCTOBER 23, 2024)

24th JDC Court

 Criminal

Parish/City of Jefferson

Division: CC

Docket: 22411195

DEFENDANT (PRINT NAME): ALLISON NGUYEN

DATE OF BIRTH: 01/15/1997

RACE: A

SEX:  F

This form is:



Declaration of non-possession

DECLARATION OF NON-POSSESSION

(Completed in Court)

  I have been court ordered to transfer any firearm(s) that I possess. I hereby declare, under

penalty of law, that I do not possess any

firearm(s).

[...]

CONCEALED HANDGUN PERMIT

(Completed in Court)

  I do not have a concealed handgun permit.

App.74a

***IMPORTANT NOTICE***

Pursuant to LA C.Cr. P, Art. 1001, the defendant shall

within 10 days file this Proof of Transfer/Declaration

of Non-Possession with the Clerk of Court of the

parish or city in which the order was issued. Failure

to do so is punishable by contempt of court, and/or

violation of applicable State and/or Federal laws, If

the court believes probable cause exists to search for

additional firearms, it may grant a court order for a

search to be conducted.

/s/ Allison Nguyen

Signature of Transferor

App.75a

IMPORTANT INSTRUCTIONS TO DEFENDANT

Pursuant to a court order, you must transfer all

firearm(s) in your possession and the transfer of

firearms must be supervised by the Jefferson Parish

Sheriff’s Office (JPSO). If you do not possess firearms

or transferred all firearms in your possession prior to

the issuance of the order to transfer, you must complete

a Declaration of Non-Possession of Firearm(s).

FOLLOW THESE INSTRUCTIONS TO TRANSFER FIREARMS:

DO NOT BRING FIREARMS INTO

SHERIFF’S OFFICE BUILDINGS

1. Immediately contact JPSO by dialing 911 to

initiate the “Proof of Transfer” process. Inform the call

taker that the court has ordered you to transfer your

firearm(s) and that you are requesting a deputy to

oversee the transfer. You must disclose the following:

a.

Full name and date of birth

b.

The method of transfer you wish to utilize

c.

The number and brief description of guns to

be transferred

d.

Your contact information, so that you may be

reached by the responding deputy

e.

The location in which you request the transfer

to take place

2. When you contact the JPSO to schedule your

transfer you must be prepared to choose from the

following transfer options:

App.76a

a.

Allow the Sheriff’s Office to oversee a third

party transfer of firearms.

b.

Allow the Sheriff’s Office to oversee the legal

sale of the transferred firearms to a third

party through a licensed firearms dealer.

c.

Sheriff’s Office may store the transferred

firearms for a fee that must be paid prior to

the firearms being returned.

i.

Fee of $200 for 1-10 guns

ii.

Fee of $100 for each group of 10 guns

beyond the first 10 guns

Based on the method of transfer chosen, the call

taker or responding deputy will provide you with

additional information.

A fee will be assessed by the JPSO to store any

firearms, oversee the legal sale of the transferred firearms, or to transfer firearms to a contracted storage

facility. Transferred firearms may be held until all

outstanding fees are collected.

If a third party transfer option is chosen pursuant

to state law, a Third Party Transfer of Firearm(s)

Acknowledgement form must be completed and provided to JPSO at the time of transfer. This form notifies

the third party of the relevant state and federal laws

and consequences for noncompliance.

For the safety of the deputy and all those involved

in any transfer, the following must occur:

a.

All firearms shall be unloaded prior to the

deputy’s arrival.

App.77a

b.

The transferor or any third party shall not

be in possession of any firearm when the

deputy arrives on scene.

c.

The transferor or any third party shall not

attempt to handle any firearm while the

deputy is on scene.

d.

The transferor or any third party shall listen

and adhere to all lawful instructions given

by the deputy throughout the transaction.

3. If you choose to transfer firearms to JPSO,

follow the procedures below:

a.

You will be given specific instructions by the

responding deputy, prior to the deputy’s

arrival. You must comply with all lawful

instructions prior to and throughout the

transfer.

If you possess a Concealed Handgun Permit you

must contact the Louisiana State Police so that permit

can be suspended.

YOU are required to file the Proof of Transfer

Form with the issuing Clerk of Court within ten days

of the transfer (exclusive of legal holidays only).

YOU ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR COMPLYING

WITH THE CONDITIONS OF THE COURT ORDER

WITHIN 48 HOURS.

/s/ Allison Nguyen

Signature Defendant

DATE: 10/23/24

App.78a

MOTION FOR JURY TRIAL

(MAY 13, 2025)

24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

PARISH OF JEFFERSON

STATE OF LOUISIANA

________________________

STATE OF LOUISIANA

v.

ALLISON NGUYEN

________________________

NO. 24-05360

DIVISION: “P”

MOTION FOR JURY TRIAL

NOW INTO COURT, through undersigned

counsel, comes the defendant who respectfully avers:

1.

The defendant is charged with La. R.S. 14:35.3.

2.

The victim will not appear and is in another state.

3.

The defendant is on felony probation.

4.

A potential conviction is so grievous that she

should be afforded a jury trial.

App.79a

WHEREFORE, the defendant prays that this

court order a hearing and after said hearing grant the

defendant a jury trial.

Respectfully Submitted,

/s/ Bruce Netterville

Bruce Netterville #9947

929 4th Street

Gretna, LA 70053

(504) 368-1540

App.80a

INFORMATION FOR

DOMESTIC ABUSE BATTERY

. . . the state of Louisiana, in and for the PARISH OF

JEFFERSON gives this Honorable Court here to

understand and be informed that:

ALLISON NGUYEN

late of the Parish aforesaid, on or about October 20th

in the year of our Lord, Two Thousand Twenty Four

with force of arms, in the parish aforesaid, and within

the jurisdiction of the Twenty-Fourth Judicial District

Court of Louisiana, in and for the Parish aforesaid,

violated La.R.S.14:35.3 in that she did commit battery

by the intentional use of force or violence upon the

person of another household member, to wit:

Randy Le,

contrary to the law of the state of Louisiana and

against the peace and dignity of the same.

/s/ Alicia L. Bennette

Assistant District Attorney