Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Paul Clark, Petitioner v. Supreme Court of New Jersey

In the Supreme Court of the United States

filed

JUN 1 8 2026

Paul Clark,

Petitioner,

v.

Supreme Court of Nev:, Jersey,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT

Paul Clark, pro se

10 Huron Ave, Suite IN

Jersey City, NJ-07306

pclark@pclarklegal.cpm

(202)368-5435

RECEIVED

AUG - 3 2026

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

May a state sanction an attorney for criticizing the

government, such as offering opinions in interviews

with the press, or is such speech constitutionally

protected?

May a state add additional sanctions to an attorney

under the heading of “refusal to accept responsibility”

for nothing more than the attorney defending against

the allegations, or does such an “aggravating factor”

constitute an unconstitutional “trial penalty.”

PARTIES TO PROCEEDING AND RELATED CASES

The underlying family court case that gave rise

to the ethics complaint (Malhan v. Myronova) as of

this filing, currently has pending a petition for

certiorari before this Court.

A list of all parties to the proceeding in the court

whose judgment is the subject of this petition is as

follows:

1. Paul Clark, Petitioner.

2. New Jersey Office of Attorney Ethics, Respondent

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Questions Presented........................................................ i

Parties to Proceeding and Related Cases................... ii

Index of Appendices........................................................ v

Table of Authorities....................................................... vi

I. Petition for Writ of Certiorari............................. 1

II. Opinions below ................................................... 1

III. Jurisdiction...... .....................................................1

IV. Constitutional and Statutory provisions

involved........................................................... 1

V. Statement of the Case.......................................... 2

A. Background.................................................................. 2

B. Procedural history...................................................... 5

1. Hearing before Special Ethics Adjudicator..... 5

2. Disciplinary Review Board (“DRB”)................ 11

3. Supreme Court of New Jersey......................... 13

IV. Reasons for granting the petition.................. 14

1. Free Speech is under assault in this Country

and, moreover, in the last several years States

have been using ethics complaints to silence

and/or punish attorneys who challenge the

powers that be........................................................... 14

2. Punishing an attorney for merely offering a

defense, that is, calling it an aggravating

iii

factor of refusing to admit guilt is a

violation of fundamental due process............. 17

Conclusion...................................................................... 22

INDEX OF APPENDICES

APPENDIX A - Order of the New Jersey Supreme

Court denying petition for review (4/9/2026)............ la

APPENDIX B - Order of the New Jersey Supreme

Court adopting Disciplinary Review Board

recommendations (4/9/2026)........................................ 2a

APPENDIX C - Decision of the New Jersey

Disciplinary Review Board (1/05/2026) ..................... 5a

APPENDIX D - Final Opinion of the Special

Ethics Adjudicator (undated).................................. 112a

APPENDIX E — CrimeWire interview (6/10/2020). 134a

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978).......... 17

Chiles v. Salizar, Executive Director of the

Colorado Dep’t of Regulatory Agencies, 607

U.S.

(2026)............................................................... 14

In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544 (1968).............................. 17

Nell v. United States, 450 F.2d 1090 (4th Cir. 1971). 19

Other Authority:

U. S. Sentencing Guidelines......................................... 18

v

L PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Paul Clark, pro se, respectfully petitions for a

writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the New

Jersey Supreme Court and New Jersey’s Disciplinary

Review Board in this case.

IL OPINIONS BELOW

The order of the New Jersey Supreme Court

denying the petition for certification (App. la, 2a) is

not officially reported.

The opinion/recommendation of the New Jersey

Disciplinary Review Board (App. 5a) is not officially

reported.

The Final Opinion of the Special Ethics

Adjudicator in this case is not reported. 112a.

III. JURISDICTION

The Order of the New Jersey Supreme Court

denying the petition for certification was filed on April

9, 2026. (App. la). The jurisdiction of this Court is

invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1257.

IV. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The Fourteenth Amendment to the United

States’ Constitution guarantees no state shall deprive

any person of life, liberty or property without due

process of law.

The First Amendment (made applicable to the

States via the Fourteenth Amendment provides that

“Congress shall make no law ... restricting freedom of

speech.”

1

V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Background

Petitioner Paul Clark represented Surender

Malhan in a custody dispute with Malhan’s putative

wife Alina Myronova. During this litigation Malhan

was denied custody of his children with a hearing

based on false and contested allegations. Malhan v.

Sec’y United States Dep’t of State, 938 F.3d 453 (3d

Cir. 2019).

During this litigation Malhan (upset at his loss

of custody without due process) made a variety of posts

on FaceBook criticizing the New Jersey court system

and specific judges by name—including the later

instigator of the ethics complaint against Clark, Judge

David Katz. 26a. The opposing side, Myronova

(“A.M.”) through counsel repeatedly brought these

FaceBook post to the attention of Judge Katz who

appeared to be furious at Malhan for the posts. 46a

(n.9). Judge Katz was apparently angry at Clark as

well for not stopping Malhan from making such posts.

Malhan, by and through counsel Clark, motioned for

Judge Katz to disqualify himself. Eventually the

Assignment Judge directed Judge Katz to recuse

himself and he was removed from the case.

During this period when all this was pending

before Judge Katz (2017-2021) Clark gave a number of

interviews in the media. Clark, who in addition to a

J.D. has a Ph.D. and is a college professor, has given

many interviews in the press over the years. 135a

Two interviews in particular became topics of

the instant suit. In June 2020, while in Alaska, Clark

was interviewed by a podcast called “Crime Wire.”

2

135a. In August 2020, Clark was interviewed by

Family Court TV.

The Crime Wire interview in particular was

wide ranging covering many different issues including

judicial corruption. The interview began with Clark

explaining:

There was a notorious scandal in Pennsylvania

about a decade ago, you may remember,

sometimes referred to as The Kids for cash

scandal. But pretty much the same thing goes

on in New Jersey and, you know, a lot of other

states. And the reason that corruption can

flourish is that they keep these proceedings

secret; they try and do everything secret.

Pet.App.136a.

Exhibit 17 that was submitted by the OAE was

redacted so that is the copy included in Appendix E.

Clark later added:

And these judges made millions of dollars for

years locking up innocent people and getting

the state to pay for the incarceration in the

place that they - they owned. And of course

nobody wanted to believe the judges are corrupt.

Nobody wants to believe judges are correct [sic],

but lots of judges are corrupt.

Pet.App.138a

Clark was sanctioned for this statement that

lots of judges are corrupt. 124a.

Another part of the interview discussed a

$200,000 assignment of claim from a bank in New

York that was arranged by Malhan’s putative wife,

Alina Myropnova, but the $200,000 disappeared and

3

Judge Katz quashed the subpoena to the bank to trace

what happened to the money. 139-145a.

Clark concluded by very carefully avoiding any

outright accusations of illegal conduct but stated that

the judge’s action were “incredibility suspicious”:

[T]he idea that a judge would - would

allow hundreds of thousands of dollars to

disappear into thin air without a trace,

not allowing people to get to the bottom of

it, is just incredibility suspicious.

Pet App. 145a.

A bit later Clark added:

[T]his $200,000 disappeared into thin air,

we don't know where -- what happened to

it. This was two years ago, this $200,000.

And, you know, whether it went to the

judge or went to, I don't know, his family,

again we're--it just disappeared into thin

air.

Pet.App.156a.

Both the DRB would later—falsely—claim

unambiguously that Clark had accused Judge Katz of

“accepting a bribe”:

Respondent further demonstrated his

contempt for Superior Court Judge 4

outside the court during appearances on

podcasts, during which he reiterated his

accusations that Superior Court Judge 4

(1) was corrupt; (2) accepted a bribe: (3)...

4

Pet.App.85a (emphasis added). See also 29a in which

the DRB went even further and claimed (again falsely)

that Clark “had accused Judge Katz “as having been

‘bribed on several occasions.’ ” Emphasis added.

Judge Katz, after he was ordered removed from

the underlying case by the Presiding Judge of the

vicinage, Sallyanne Floria, A.J.S.C (114a) directed the

Trial Court Administrator to submit an ethics

complaint against Clark. 24a.

B. Procedural History

1. Hearing before Special Ethics Adjudicator

A hearing took place before a Special Ethics

Adjudicator covering 10 days. Clark was limited in

what arguments were allowed and what witnesses

could be called: “five of Respondent’s proposed

witnesses, [including] the Hon. Sallyanne Floria,

A.J.S.C. (ret.) were stricken and barred from

testifying at the hearing. 56a.

The Adjudicator did not permit Clark to call

some witnesses or to “attack” the main accuser, (Judge

David Katz) which resulted in a denial of due process

and failure to allow Respondent to fully present a

defense. Decision page 2 (113a) states: “the Hon.

Sallyanne Floria, A.J.S.C. (ret.) [was] stricken and

barred from testifying at the hearing. Those barred

witnesses were determined not to have any evidence

that bore directly on the charges pending against

respondent.” Yet the decision says:

Judge Katz testified that as he was handling the

case there was a significant amount of conduct

by Respondent that concerned him. Judge Katz

was in contact with his assignment judge

[Floria] ... throughout the time he presided over

5

the case with respect to Respondent’s

statements that he thought were problematic.

App.App.124a.

In the final decision (Appendix C) the

Adjudicator recommended “at least a three-month

suspension.” 132a.

Pages 4 through 8 of the Opinion (Pet.App.116124a) contain a list of thirty specific findings of fact”

but none of these “findings” are correlated to an

alleged RPC. The Adjudicator did not address any

constitutional arguments. Findings #14 through #28

refer to interviews with Journalists, specifically:

[141 Respondent appeared on a podcast entitled,

Family Court TV, and during that interview he

referred to Judge Katz as a liar, above the law, and a

petty tyrant.

[15] During the Family Court TV interview

Respondent referred to Judge Katz as directing his

“cronies” at the State Police to go get these guys,

meaning Respondent and Malhan, with the purpose to

intimidate and harass.

[161 During the Family Court TV podcast Respondent

accused Judge Katz of using his office to lash out

against people he does not like due to retaliation and

spite.

[171 During the Family Court TV interview.

Respondent referred to Juge Katz that he should not

be a liar like this.

[18] Respondent indicated again that Judge Katz

called up his buddies, his cronies at the State Police

and directed them to check these guys out.

[191 During the Family Court TV podcast Respondent

indicated that Judge Katz abused his office.

6

[201 During that same Family Court TV podcast

Respondent indicated that, “Judges, they’re all part of

this crony system.”

[211 During that same podcast Respondent stated that

Judge Katz was clearly abusing his position.

[22] During a podcast interview entitled “Crime Wire,

Family Court Child Protective Service,” dated June 16,

2020, Respondent referred to Judge Katz as “crooked

Katz.”

[23] During the June 16, 2020, podcast Respondent

referred to Judge Katz as “crooked Katz.”

[24] During the June 16, 2020, podcast Respondent

referred to “crooked judge.”

[25] During the June 16, 2020, podcast Respondent

referred to Judge Katz as “crooked Katz.”

[26] During the June 16, 2020, podcast Respondent

said, “...lots of judges are crooked.”

[271 During the same podcast, Respondent indicated

that a strong argument can be made that the judge

deliberately concealed what happened to the $200,000.

[281 During that same podcast Respondent told

listeners that you should follow the judge wherever he

goes, and to find out what they are doing, and he

asserted that he knows a lot of these judges are

crooked.

116-124a. Emphasis added, internal citations omitted.

The above are paraphrases, and often not fully

accurate to the original. Moreover, without a full

explanation of the background a full comprehension of

the meaning is impossible. However, what is clear

from the above, is that the main issue drawing the ire

of the New Jersey court system was interviews with

established journalists on podcasts. A full transcript

7

of the CrimeWire podcast is included as Appendix E so

this Court can see for itself. 134a.

Moreover, several of the “findings” refer to

comments made not by Clark at all but by his client

Surender Malhan. who often posted comments on

FaceBook critical of the Court system—which

comments were then sent to the judge by Malhan’s

opponents in an attempt to make the judge angry at

Malhan. 46a (n.9). According here are those findings:

[1] During a May 29, 2019, court proceeding

Respondent read from an internet post of his client, ...

[3] Respondent submitted a certification dated October

18, 2019, to the court from his client,

[12] In a certification of Respondent’s client filed under

Respondent’s Bar ID., Malhan described a sadistic evil

game,

[13] In a certification of Respondent’s client filed under

Respondent’s Bar ID., Malhan made the statement, ...

These statements were comments of the client,

and while, first, an attorney is not responsible for what

a client expresses as an opinion, these statements

implicate the right to counsel and fundamental rights

of access to the Court. It is unclear how an attorney

would censor one’s own client, but just as in a criminal

case an attorney has a right to testify and tell his side

of the story, litigants like Malhan have a

constitutional right to express their frustration to the

court.

As yet another example, Finding #28 reads:

During that same podcast Respondent

told listeners that you should follow the

judge wherever he goes, and to find out

what they are doing, and he asserted that

8

he knows a lot of these judges are

crooked.

OAE Exhibit P-17, P. 44, L. 1-2; Exhibit

P-17A.

The actual quote does not correspond to the

description:

I tell people, if, you know, you think your

judge is crooked, investigate yourself; try

to get a copy of the financial disclosures,

which are supposed to be public. ... But I

tell people, look, if you have a judge you

think is crooked, get a copy of their

financial disclosure, write to the

administrative office of the court to say, I

want a copy of the financial disclosure,

you know, check that judge out, go to that

judge's house, follow the judge around,

find what's happening.

Now, they'll say, oh, you' re following the

judge. Well, tough luck, judge, you're a

public figure [.].

Needless to say, none of the above even suggests

anything illegal or immoral—despite the attempt to

suggest otherwise. Again, it is not clear what RPC

this is even supposed to violate—it does not violate

any of them, but is undoubtedly constitutionally

protected speech.

Remarkably, the Adjudicator then went a step

further through the looking glass, writing:

I find by clear and convincing evidence

that Respondent knowingly attempted to

inflame members of the public into

following Judge Katz in his personal life

9

and disclosing the town in which Judge

Katz lived to the public, all with the

intent to engage in conduct intended to

disrupt the tribunal.

Pet.App.131a (emphasis added).

Needless to say, even the Adjudicator’s own

previous “finding” agrees that Clark did urge anyone

to specifically follow Judge Katz. (Perhaps this was an

attempt to create an “imminent threat” that did not

exist, perhaps out of fear of First Amendment issues.)

Notably, the issue that the Adjudicator seems to

think was most serious was that Clark had a process

server personally serve Judge Katz in a federal law

suit. 125a-127a. The Adjudicator spent multiple

pages discussing this issue and described service of

process as “the incident that "really shook.’ ” However,

the DRB ultimately concluded that service of legal

process was not a violation of any ethics rules. 89-90a.

The Adjudicator concluded the decision by

emphasizing the need to punish Clark for “lack of

contrition” (a.k.a, presenting a defense):

PRESENTER’S ALLEGED

AGGRAVATING FACTORS

Respondent’s lack of remorse and

Respondent’s continuing attacks on Judge

Katz in the presentation of his defense.

FINDINGS OF MITIGATING AND

AGGRAVATING FACTORS

I find that the mitigating factors as

deserving of some weight. Respondent’s

service to his country is commendable, his

10

lack of a disciplinary record is notable.

However, the depth and breadth of

Respondent’s continuing conduct and the

lack of contrition outweigh the mitigating

factors.

RECOMMENDATION FOR

DISCIPLINE

I recommend at least a three-month

suspension.

It is notable that the Adjudicator recommended

a three-month suspension, and of course, twice

emphasized lack of remorse and lack of contrition.

Even with the service of process still “on the table” at

that point, the Adjudicator recommended a three

month suspension—and yet when the DRB dismissed

this it substantially increased the sanction.

Finally as to constitutional issues the

Adjudicator stated:

Although not fully expressed in his

written submission, Respondent has

repeatedly made known his position: That

his comments are constitutionally

protected speech. That position is not

under consideration herein.

Pet.App.116a.

2. Disciplinary Review Board (“DRB”)

Notably, while the Adjudicator seemed focus on

service of process, the DRB concluded:

11

[W]e determine that respondent’s isolated

act of serving the complaint at Superior

Court Judge 4’s home did not touch on

the improper behavior or the waste of

judicial resources generally associated

with violations of those Rules.

Accordingly, we dismiss the charged

violations of RPC 3.1, RPC 3.5(c), and

RPC 8.4(d) under the OAE’s theory.

Pet.App.89-90 (Emphasis added).

Before the DRB, Clark raised the constitutional

issue of free speech, but the DRB never did address

any Free Speech or other Constitutional issues. The

written decision of the DRB states:

Finally, to the extent that respondent raised

constitutional challenges to this disciplinary

matter, those objections are reserved for the

Court. See R. 1:20-15(h).

Pet.App.90a.

The DRB decision made no attempt to disguise

the fact that it was punishing Clark for criticizing the

government—and that this was the main reason Clark

was being punished:

The record is replete with examples of the level

of his disrespect, not just for Superior Court

Judge 4, but for the New Jersey Family Court

system and, arguably, the entire New Jersey

Judiciary. He repeated his claims during his

podcast appearances in which he alleged that

the New Jersey Family Courts were corruptf.]

12

... We accord significant weight to respondent’s

contemptuous attitude towards the judiciary!.!

Pet.App.109a. Emphasis added.

Indeed, the DRB decision is replete with

examples of the DRB’s disgust at Clark for criticizing

the entire New Jersey Judiciary. The DRB further

wrote:

In aggravation, respondent has failed to

demonstrate any contrition or remorse for his

misconduct and, in fact, maintains that he did

not violate any Rules of Professional Conduct.

Indeed, in response to our questioning during

oral argument, he refused to acknowledge

having engaged in any misconduct whatsoever.

His behavior reveals a disdain for the judicial

system and signals to us that he is incapable of

conforming his conduct with the rule of law or

the standards of the legal profession.

Pet.App. 105a (emphasis added).

Again it is clear that a person merely offering a

defense to allegations (maintains that he did not

violate any Rules of Professional Conduct”) is an

“aggravating factor.”

Yet again the DRB wrote:

Although respondent’s misconduct was

dissimilar to that of the attorney in

Harmon, the underlying disdain for the

judiciary and the Court’s role in the

oversight and regulation of the bar is

equally alarming.

Pet App. 106a. Emphasis added.

This quote should dispel any lingering doubt

that Clark is being punished for what he thinks—a

13

thought crime! Clark is being sanctioned for

expressing “disdain” for the judiciary in interviews.

The quantum of punishment is also telling. A

suspension of at least four years, plus some sort of

medical exam (itself without explanation) is ludicrous.

3a. Indeed the recommendation went from three

months to four years—indeed, it seems quite clear that

the suspension is effectively permanent.

3. Supreme Court of New Jersey

Given that the DRB refused to address

Constitutional issues, Clark filed a Petition for Review

with the New Jersey Supreme Court, but that court

denied the petition for review without comment or oral

argument, la.

VI. REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

1. Free Speech is under assault in this country

and, moreover, in the last several years States

have been using ethics complaints to silence

and/or punish attorneys who challenge the

powers that be.

Just last term in Chiles v. Salizar, Executive

Director of the Colorado Dep’t of Regulatory Agencies

this Court re-affirmed that “professional speech” does

not have “diminished constitutional protection.” Slip

Op. 14-15. This case is the perfect follow-up to Chiles.

States are restricting speech under the pretext of

regulating “professional speech” of lawyers.

As this Court is undoubtedly aware, there are

widespread allegations that state disciplinary

determinations have been “weaponized” against

attorneys who represent unpopular clients. For

14

example, on May 13, 2026, the U.S. Department of

Justice filed suit in D.C. District Court accusing the

District of “Weaponizing state bar discipline against

Executive Branch attorneys.” United States v.

Hamilton Fox, et al Case l:26-cv-01658, ECF # 1 at

K 1. The specific argument in that case is that

“Weaponizing state bar discipline against Executive

Branch attorneys in this way chills them from giving

candid legal advice to others in the Executive

Branch[.]” Id.

The DOJ case mentioned is premised primarily

on the Supremacy Clause, but the larger issue is more

profound. As the DOJ illustrates, state bar discipline

procedures are being used selectively to punish

particular lawyers—those who represent politically

unpopular or “politically incorrect” clients.

That case illustrates how a double standard is

applied to “politically correct” as opposed to “politically

incorrect” lawyers. For example, the DOJ Complaint

noted that “while serving as Assistant Disciplinary

Counsel, Mr. Metzler ... Called Justice Alito a ‘Natural

Born Fool.’ ” Id. at 2, 98. Metzler had a social media

post stating: “The Worst April Fools prank of all time

occurred on April 1, 1950 when Samuel Alino was

born.” Id. at 99. Metzer’s social media post

contained a manufactured image of Justice Clarence

Thomas being handed a huge wad of cash—apparently

suggested that Justice Thomas is “on the take.” Id. at

U 96. While the undersigned agrees that a counsel has

a First Amendment right to call a Supreme Court

Justice a “fool,” in the instant case, Clark was

sanctioned for criticizing judges in less insulting

language than Mr. Metzler. But Mr. Metzler will not

be sanctioned for calling Justice Alito a ‘Natural

Born Fool.’ Indeed, lawyers across the country have

falsely accused Justice Kavanaugh of being a child

15

rapist, but to the knowledge of the undesigned, no

lawyer has ever been punished for such assertions.

For example, Kamala Harris (Ca. Bar #146672) is a

member of the California bar. <https://apps.calbar.ca.

gov/attorney/Licensee/Detail/146672> Harris has said

she believes Justice Kavanaugh is guilty of sexual

assault and said “Brett Kavanaugh’s confirmation to

the Supreme Court was a ‘sham.’ ”

<https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/410353-kamalaharris-kavanaughs-confirmation-was-a-denial-ofjustice-for-sexual/> But don’t expect California to

sanction Harris any time soon.

Again the DOJ Complaint lists numerous

specifics of this sort of selective weaponization

including the allegation that:

“Defendants ... are prosecuting another Federal

Government official, Mr. Edward R. Martin, Jr.,

on the theory that he violated his oath to

support the U.S. Constitution by sending a

letter to Georgetown University Law School

about its teaching and promotion of Diversity,

Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) ideology[.]

25.

We point this out to illustrate that the

treatment of Clark in this case is part of a larger and

disturbing trend: the weaponization of the ethics

procedures against those who not “tow the party line.”

Accordingly, this weaponization is a matter of national

importance. A healthy legal system requires lawyers

who are free, independent, and able to advocate for

controversial views and controversial clients. In Henry

VI, part II, Shakespeare famously has Dick the

butcher say “First thing we do, let’s kill all the

lawyers.” Shakespeare’s point was that a group of

Id. at

16

independent lawyers provides a check on abusive

government. But today the legal “profession” is held in

very low esteem—precisely because lawyers are now

seen as by the Wikipedia entry discussing the phrase,

let’s kill all the lawyers. Wikipedia says the phrase, is

seen as, “in the criticism of how lawyers use the law to

maintain the privileges and perquisites of the rich and

the ruling class.”

If an attorney (like Clark) can be sanctioned for

criticizing the government in the media and for

representing clients who have controversial views then

an independent bar is seriously jeopardized. This is

why First Amendment protection for the speech of

lawyers is so crucial. This is why the issue in this case

is so crucial.

2. Punishing an attorney for merely offering

a defense, that is, calling it an aggravating

factor of refusing to admit guilt is a

violation of fundamental due process.

The DRB in this case explicitly states: “In

aggravation, respondent... maintains that he did not

violate any Rules of Professional Conduct.” 105a. This

is a “trial penalty.”

In the case In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 551

(1968) this Court held that attorney disciplinary

proceedings “are adversary proceedings of a quasi­

criminal nature.” (citing In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, 387

U. S. 33. Moreover, as this Court held in

Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978):

To punish a person because he has done

what the law plainly allows him to do is a

due process violation of the most basic

17

sort, see North Carolina v. Pearce, supra

at 397 U. S. 738 (opinion of Black, J.), and

for an agent of the State to pursue a

course of action whose objective is to

penalize a person's reliance on his legal

rights is "patently unconstitutional."

Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, supra at 412 U.

S. 32-33, n. 20.

This is what is happening here: punishing a

person because he has done what the law plainly

allows him. Regardless, or perhaps, especially in light

of the total refusal to address any Constitutional

defenses, it cannot seriously be disputed that Clark

had every legal right to raise these challenges. The

Adjudicator and the DRB decisions both acknowledge

this. Pet.App.116a; Pet.App.90a.

For years, New Jersey (and other jurisdictions)

have used the threat of additional sanction to

discourage accused persons from presenting a defense.

Pet.App.104, noting an earlier case where “the Court

emphasized the attorney’s lack of remorse or

contrition.”

It is one thing to grant clemency or mitigation

for acceptance of responsibility, but it is quite another

thing to punish a litigant for asserting a defense.

Under the federal sentencing Guidelines (cited

as persuasive authority) while acceptance of

responsibility is a mitigating factor, refusal to accept

responsibility is never an aggravating factor.

<https://www.ussc.gov/guidelines/guidelinesarchive/2011-3ell> Even under the sentencing

Guidelines, a criminal may still be eligible for a

reduction: “where a defendant goes to trial to assert

and preserve issues that do not relate to factual guilt

(e.g., to make a constitutional challenge to a statute or

18

a challenge to the applicability of a statute to his

conduct). ”

Indeed, it is remarkable here that Clark’s

constitutional arguments were entirely ignored at

every level of the proceedings. Clark’s invocation of

Constitutional rights (never adjudicated) is largely the

basis of the enhancement—insofar as the Constitution

was one of the primary defenses. In other words, the

New Jersey system calls it an aggravating factor to

litigate a legal question that remains open and

unaddressed. But what the Sentencing Commission’s

comment clearly shows is that to make a constitutional

challenge to a statute or a challenge to the

applicability of a statute to his conduct is entirely

appropriate.

Again, the DOJ Complaint discussed above

shows that lawyers who fail to “tow the party line”

receive far harsher treatment than even convicted

felons—but convicted felons who are obedient servant

of the system. As the DOJ Complaint referenced

earlier pointed out:

Defendants treated convicted felon and former

FBI attorney Kevin Clinesmith far more

leniently than Mr. Clark even though Mr.

Clinesmith pled guilty to falsifying a document

used to obtain a surveillance warrant against a

political campaign advisor, Carter Page ....

Defendants recommended that Mr. Clinesmith

get a slap on the wrist (a retroactive one-year

suspension) [.]

Id. at 13.

Punishing a litigant for “failure to accept

responsibility” further runs afoul of due process by

19

denying notice and an opportunity to be heard. Nell v.

United States, 450 F.2d 1090 (4th Cir. 1971). Here (as

show in all the comments from the DRB about “failure

to accept responsibility” the so-called aggravating

factor has become the tail wagging the dog.

But the State appears not to need to prove this

aggravating factor—much less allow Clark to respond

to it. For example, the DRB Decision openly admitted

applying a trial penalty writing and continued to

criticize Clark for conducting a defense calling Clark’s

defense “a waste of judicial resources”:

He [so-called Judge 5] found that

respondent’s “abuses” resulted in a waste

of judicial resources.

Respondent’s conduct in that regard

continued in the instant disciplinary

matter through his presentation of more

than five thousand pages of irrelevant

transcripts, certifications, and documents

from the underlying divorce litigation;

including ... thousands of pages of motion

transcripts, which respondent failed to

connect to the charged RPC violations.

Pet.App.107a.

The DRB repeatedly accused Clark of violating

RPC and/or subject to increased penalty for “frivolous”

filings and “waste of judicial resources.” Yet Clark

provided the Master with “certifications, and ...

thousands of pages of motion transcripts.” Amazingly,

the DRB cited no evidence in these thousands of pages

of motion transcripts, and thus called them

“irrelevant” and failed to see any connection to alleged

violations.

20

The thousands of pages of transcripts showed

that allegations of misconduct in the Court room were

false. Had there been evidence of such conduct in the

thousands of pages of transcripts, then the Special

Master of the DRB would have cited it. The fact that

neither the Special Master nor the DRB was able to

use these thousands of pages to attack Clark is evident

from the fact that the DRB called these “thousand

pages of irrelevant transcripts.” (DRBOp 100-101).

This is clear example of a “trial penalty.” Clark

was sanctioned for defending himself. Moreover, the

DRB increased the penalty on Clark (the initial

Special Master recommendation was at least three

months), because Clark “wasted the time”

documenting the false testimony offered against him

such as the above.

But to return to the due process claim, this

assertion that Clark wasted judicial resources

“through his presentation of more than five thousand

pages of ... transcripts.” Surfaced for the first time in

the DRB decision. If the Board (incredibly) was unable

to fathom the importance of the thousands of pages of

transcripts, then surely due process required the State

to allow Clark an opportunity to respond.

Of course, perhaps what the DRB pieant by

calling the thousand pages of transcripts “irrelevant”

is that they were irrelevant insofar as the case really

revolved around punishing Clark for comments made

to the media—not about what happened in court.

Again, look at the “findings” of the Adjudicator that

are mostly about media appearances and service of

process.

A trial penalty is an important question of due

process—especially in light of the weaponization of

ethics matters on the State level. This issue does not

21

appear to have ever been addressed by this Court but

should be clarified for posterity.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writpf (jertiorari should be

granted.

June 17, 2026

Date

Paul Clark,.pro se

22