Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Bonnie Townsend, as Executrix of the Estate of Linda Elam, Petitioner v. BLC Lexington SNF, LLC, et al.

Supreme Court briefJul 27, 2026

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No. ______

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

BONNIE TOWNSEND, EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF

LINDA ELAM,

Petitioner,

v.

BLC LEXINGTON SNF, LLC D/B/A

BROOKDALE RICHMOND PLACE SNF, et al.,

Respondents.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the

Sixth Circuit

APPENDIX

D. TODD VARELLAS

Counsel of Record

SANDRA M. VARELLAS

VARELLAS &

VARELLAS PLLC

360 E. Vine St., Ste. 320

Lexington, KY 40507

(859) 252-4473

tvarellas@varellaslaw.com

Counsel for Petitioner

July 27, 2026

i

APPENDIX

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Appendix A

Opinion Affirming, U.S. Court of Appeals

for the Sixth Circuit, BLC Lexington

SNF v. Townsend, 171 F.4th 788 (6th

Cir. 2026), No. 25-5675

(March 26, 2026) ... .................... .......... App 1

Appendix B

Eastern District of Kentucky Order

denying Petitioner’s Motion to Alter,

Amend, or Vacate Arbitration Award,

BLC Lexington SNF v. Townsend, 5:21cv-223-KKC, 2025 WL 2181407

(June 27, 2025) ...... .................... .......... App 18

Appendix C

Eastern District of Kentucky modified

Order compelling arbitration, BLC

Lexington SNF v. Townsend, 5:21-cv223-KKC,

2022

WL

23038738

(September 28, 2022) ................. .......... App 34

Appendix D

Order denying Petition for Rehearing,

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth

Circuit, BLC Lexington SNF v.

Townsend, No. 25-5675

(April 27, 2026)...... .................... .......... App 41

Appendix E

Arbitration Award . .................... .......... App 43

(June 24, 2024)

Appendix F

Petitioner’s (plaintiff in the arbitration)

Proposed Findings of Fact and

ii

Conclusions of Law in the arbitration

(submitted May 15, 2024) .......... .......... App 85

Appendix G

Order of Public Censure of Thomas

E. McDonald, III .... .................... .. … …App 131

(September 7, 1990)

Appendix H

Kentucky Court of Appeals Opinion

Affirming in state court companion case,

BLC Lexington SNF v. Townsend,

719 S.W. 3d 48 (Ky. App. 2025) . .......... App 135

Appendix I

Constitutional and statutory

provisions .......... .................... .......... App 147

FAA 9 U.S.C. § 9 .............. .......... App 147

FAA 9 U.S.C. § 10 ............ .......... App 148

Pet. App. 1

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

_________________

No. 25-5675

BLC LEXINGTON SNF, LLC; BROOKDALE

SENIOR

LIVING

COMMUNITIES,

INC.;

BROOKDALE SENIOR LIVING INC.; AMERICAN

RETIREMENT CORPORATION,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

BONNIE TOWNSEND, Executrix of the Estate of

Linda Elam,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Kentucky at Lexington.

No. 5:21-cv-00223—Karen K. Caldwell, District

Judge.

Decided and Filed: March 26, 2026

Before: BATCHELDER, THAPAR, and

MATHIS, Circuit Judges.

_________________

COUNSEL

ON BRIEF: D. Todd Varellas, Sandra M. Varellas,

VARELLAS & VARELLAS, Lexington, Kentucky, for

Pet. App. 2

Appellant. Kif H. Skidmore, Connor B. Egan, STOLL

KEENON OGDEN PLLC, Lexington, Kentucky, for

Appellees.

_________________

OPINION

_________________

MATHIS, Circuit Judge. Linda Elam resided at

a nursing home in Lexington, Kentucky, in the weeks

leading up to her death. Shortly before she died, Elam

was diagnosed with several serious illnesses. Bonnie

Townsend, Elam’s sister and estate executor, sued

BLC Lexington SNF, LLC, Brookdale Senior Living

Communities, Inc., Brookdale Senior Living Inc., and

American Retirement Corporation (collectively, “BLC

Lexington”) in Kentucky state court, bringing claims

related to Elam’s care and death. BLC Lexington then

filed a complaint in federal court, asking the district

court to enjoin the state-court proceedings and compel

Townsend to arbitrate her claims. The district court

found the parties’ arbitration agreement enforceable

and compelled arbitration for nearly all of Townsend’s

claims. After a week-long arbitration, the arbitrator

ruled in BLC Lexington’s favor on all claims. The

district court confirmed the arbitration award.

Because we agree with the district court’s decisions

compelling arbitration and confirming the arbitration

award, we affirm.

I.

From June to July 2020, Linda Elam resided at

Brookdale Richmond Place SNF (“Brookdale”), a

nursing home operated by BLC Lexington. Before her

admission, Elam developed serious medical issues.

Pet. App. 3

She was diagnosed with uterine cancer and treated

with a radioactive implant, which caused severe pelvic

complications. Then in May 2020, she suffered a

stroke. The stroke caused paralysis, confusion,

difficulty swallowing, and incontinence. The following

month, Elam was transferred to Brookdale for shortterm rehabilitation and nursing care.

A few years before her stroke, Elam appointed

her sister, Bonnie Townsend, as her attorney-in-fact

to manage her “business of every kind,” including her

health care. R. 1-3, PageID 32. Townsend handled

Elam’s admission to Brookdale. That process required

Townsend to execute an admission agreement. As part

of Elam’s admission agreement, Townsend signed an

optional arbitration agreement, which required the

arbitration of “[a]ny and all claims or controversies

arising out of” the arbitration agreement or Elam’s

stay at Brookdale. R. 1-1, PageID 9.

Elam’s health deteriorated while at Brookdale.

She developed respiratory failure and her cognition

continued to decline. When she went into severe

respiratory distress, Brookdale transported her to the

hospital. Elam was then diagnosed with sepsis,

pneumonia, dehydration, severe malnutrition, and

multiple ulcers. She died a few days later in hospice

care. Her death certificate lists multiple causes of

death, including sepsis, pneumonia, and stroke.

In 2021, Townsend, in her capacity as executor

of Elam’s estate, sued BLC Lexington and Betty

Stocker, Brookdale’s former administrator, in

Kentucky state court. She asserted claims for

Wrongful death, negligence, and violations of statelaw statutory rights. BLC Lexington then sued

Pet. App. 4

Townsend in federal court, seeking to compel

arbitration and enjoin Townsend from pursuing her

claims in state court. The district court granted BLC

Lexington’s request and compelled Townsend to

arbitrate nearly every claim, except for the wrongfuldeath claims of nonsignatories to the arbitration

agreement.

Retired judge Thomas E. McDonald III

presided over the arbitration and held a weeklong

final hearing in April 2024. During the hearing, he

heard arguments from both sides, listened to

testimony from 14 witnesses, and admitted 98

exhibits into evidence. The arbitrator ultimately ruled

in BLC Lexington’s favor on all claims because

Townsend failed to meet her burden of proof.

Following

this,

Townsend

moved

for

reconsideration of the district court’s order compelling

arbitration. She argued, for the first time, that the

power of attorney did not authorize her to enter into

an arbitration agreement on Elam’s behalf. And she

moved separately to vacate the arbitration award.

BLC Lexington then moved to confirm the award. The

district court denied Townsend’s motions, granted

BLC Lexington’s motion, and confirmed the

arbitration award.

This appeal followed. On appeal, Townsend

argues that the district court erred in three ways: (1)

by granting BLC Lexington’s motion to compel

arbitration; (2) by denying Townsend’s motion to

reconsider the order granting the motion to compel

arbitration; and (3) by denying Townsend’s motion to

vacate the arbitration award. We address each

argument in turn.

Pet. App. 5

II.

We start with Townsend’s challenge to the

district court’s order compelling arbitration.

Townsend argues that the district court erred in

granting BLC Lexington’s motion to compel

arbitration because: (1) she did not act as Elam’s

attorney-in-fact when she signed the arbitration

agreement, and (2) key terms of the arbitration

agreement are indefinite, rendering it unenforceable.

We review the district court’s decision to compel

arbitration de novo. McGee v. Armstrong, 941 F.3d

859, 865 (6th Cir. 2019).

The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) governs

arbitration agreements. Congress enacted the FAA “in

response to widespread judicial hostility to

arbitration agreements.” AT&T Mobility LLC v.

Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011). The

“overarching purpose of the FAA . . . is to ensure the

enforcement of arbitration agreements according to

their terms so as to facilitate streamlined

proceedings.” Id. at 344.

Under the FAA, arbitration agreements “shall

be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such

grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation

of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2. The Supreme Court has

described § 2 as reflecting a “liberal federal policy

favoring arbitration.” Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 339

(quotation omitted). To that end, “any doubts

concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be

resolved in favor of arbitration.” Moses H. Cone Mem’l

Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25

(1983).

To eliminate (or at least diminish) the expense

Pet. App. 6

and delay of extended court proceedings before

arbitration, § 4 of the FAA outlines the abbreviated

procedures for obtaining enforcement of arbitration

agreements. Section 4 explains that if the “making of

the agreement for arbitration . . . is not in issue,” then

courts must direct “the parties to proceed to

arbitration.” 9 U.S.C. § 4. But “[i]f the making of the

arbitration agreement . . . be in issue, the court shall

proceed summarily to the trial thereof.” Id. To decide

whether the formation of an arbitration agreement is

“in issue,” courts apply the summary-judgment

standard. In re StockX Customer Data Sec. Breach

Litig., 19 F.4th 873, 881 (6th Cir. 2021) (quoting 9

U.S.C. § 4). A party seeking to compel arbitration

bears the initial burden of providing evidence, such as

a signed arbitration agreement, that would allow a

reasonable jury to find that a valid agreement to

arbitrate exists. GGNSC Louisville Hillcreek, LLC v.

Est. of Bramer ex rel. Bramer, 932 F.3d 480, 484 (6th

Cir. 2019).

In our analysis, we “apply ordinary state-law

principles that govern the formation of contracts.” In

re Auto. Parts Antitrust Litig., 951 F.3d 377, 381 (6th

Cir. 2020) (quoting First Options of Chi., Inc. v.

Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995)). And the parties

agree that Kentucky contract law applies to this

dispute. Under Kentucky law, a valid, enforceable

contract requires “voluntary, complete assent by the

parties having capacity to contract.” Baumann Paper

Co. v. Holland, 554 S.W.3d 845, 848 (Ky. 2018)

(quotation omitted). BLC Lexington met its prima

facie burden of showing an agreement exists by

providing a copy of the signed arbitration agreement.

Pet. App. 7

Elam’s admission documents show that

Townsend signed the documents as “Resident

Representative” for Elam. R. 7-2, PageID 170.

Townsend does not dispute BLC Lexington’s assertion

that she provided the nursing home with a copy of the

power of attorney.

In the arbitration agreement, Townsend signed

her name on the line designated for the

“Resident/Resident Representative.” R. 1-1, PageID

11. And directly above the signature line, the

agreement states, “The Resident hereby represents

and warrants that they have fully read, understand

and consent to the terms of this Arbitration

Agreement by their signature below.” Id. Townsend

did not check the box that states, “Resident has

declined to sign arbitration agreement.” Id. Still, she

contends that the

arbitration agreement is

unenforceable because she signed the agreement in

her individual capacity, not as Elam’s attorney-infact.

But “Kentucky law does not require a party to

explicitly state they are acting as an attorney-in-fact.”

Cambridge Place Grp., LLC v. Mundy, 617 S.W.3d

838, 841 (Ky. Ct. App. 2021). On this point, LP

Louisville Quinn Drive, LLC v. Leonard-Ray is

instructive. 704 S.W.3d 386 (Ky. Ct. App. 2025).

There, a nursing-home resident had appointed his

sister as his attorney-in-fact through a power of

attorney. Id. at 388. When the resident was admitted

to a nursing home, his sister signed a pre-admission

arbitration agreement “on the line designated for

‘Resident’s Authorized Representative/Individual*

Signature.’” Id. at 388–90. The court rejected the

Pet. App. 8

sister’s argument that she signed the agreement in

her personal capacity. Id. at 391–92. It reasoned that

she need not expressly state that she was acting as

her brother’s attorney-in-fact for the arbitration

agreement to be enforceable. Id. It sufficed that “[s]he

did indicate that she was acting as his authorized

representative.” Id. at 392. And “[s]he did not

affirmatively hold herself out as signing in a capacity

which would not allow her to enter into an arbitration

agreement.” Id.

The same rationale applies here. Townsend did

not need to identify herself as Elam’s attorney-in-fact

when she signed the arbitration agreement for it to be

enforceable. It suffices that she specified that she was

acting as Elam’s representative. And just as

important, Townsend did not represent herself as

signing the agreement in a different capacity, like as

a family member or in her sole personal capacity. See

id. Like the attorney-in-fact in Leonard-Ray,

Townsend never suggested that she was signing the

document in a capacity that would prevent her from

entering into an arbitration agreement on Elam’s

behalf. See id.

Townsend relies primarily on Cambridge Place

Group v. Mundy to argue otherwise. But that case

does not help her. In Mundy, the court held that an

arbitration agreement was unenforceable where the

signer executed the agreement in her capacity as

spouse, not as attorney-in-fact. 617 S.W.3d at 841. A

wife admitted her husband to a nursing home, signing

an arbitration agreement as part of that process. Id.

at 839–41. The wife was the resident’s attorney-infact, but in the arbitration agreement she signed her

Pet. App. 9

name and wrote “wife” on the line titled “Legal

Representative Capacity.” Id. at 840. The nursing

home argued that the plaintiff’s signature made the

arbitration agreement enforceable. Id. The court

rebuffed the nursing home’s argument, concluding

that although the wife did not need to state that she

was acting as her husband’s attorney-in-fact, the issue

was not her “silence but rather her affirmative avowal

that she was acting in a separate capacity. In her

capacity as wife, [she] was authorized to make limited

decisions on behalf of [her husband]; however, the predispute arbitration agreement was outside that

scope.” Id. at 841.

Mundy is distinguishable. Unlike the plaintiff

in Mundy, Townsend signed the arbitration

agreement as Elam’s authorized representative. And

she did not indicate that she was acting in any other

capacity. The issue here is Townsend’s silence—not a

declaration that she was acting in a separate capacity.

See id.

Townsend also asserts that the arbitrate on

agreement is unenforceable because the terms

“Resident” and “Resident Representative” are

indefinite. But this argument ignores that the

arbitration agreement is just one part of the

admission agreement between the nursing home and

Elam. The admission agreement identifies Elam as

the “Resident” and Townsend as the “Resident

Representative.” Townsend does not dispute that she

provided Brookdale with a copy of the power of

attorney that identifies her as Elam’s attorney-in-fact.

Relying on our decision in Glazer v. Lehman

Brothers, Inc., 394 F.3d 444 (6th Cir. 2005), Townsend

Pet. App. 10

argues that the arbitration agreement must be

considered separate from the rest of the admission

paperwork. But her reliance on Glazer is misplaced.

In Glazer, we determined that “arbitration clauses

should not be considered ‘separate contracts’ at all.

Rather, . . . arbitration agreements contained in larger

contracts should be considered ‘separate’ from the

contract only insofar as a federal court (as opposed to

the arbitrator) can examine whether the arbitration

clause was fraudulently induced or is otherwise

unenforceable.” 394 F.3d at 454. Glazer does not

prohibit us from carrying out the uncontroversial task

of reviewing other provisions in a contract to ascertain

the meaning of important or ambiguous terms and

phrases. See, e.g., Benjamin v. JP Morgan Chase

Bank, N.A., 305 S.W.3d 446, 452 (Ky. Ct. App. 2010)

(“Courts should not examine each provision of the

instrument in isolation but should instead construe

the drafter’s intent from a consideration of the whole

document.” (citation modified)).

The district court thus did not err in granting

BLC Lexington’s motion to compel arbitration.

III.

We turn next to the denial of Townsend’s

motion for reconsideration. In that motion, Townsend

argued, for the first time, that the arbitration

agreement is unenforceable because the power of

attorney did not grant her the authority to enter into

such an agreement on Elam’s behalf. Because

Townsend sought reconsideration of an interlocutory

order, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) governs.

See Adkisson v. Jacobs Eng’g Grp., Inc., 36 F.4th 686,

694 (6th Cir. 2022). We review a district court’s denial

Pet. App. 11

of a motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory

order for an abuse of discretion. State Farm Mut. Auto.

Ins. Co. v. Angelo, 95 F.4th 419, 435 (6th Cir. 2024). “A

district court abuses its discretion when it relies on a

clearly erroneous factual determination, applies the

wrong legal standard, misapplies the correct one, or

makes a clear error of judgment.” In re FirstEnergy

Corp. Sec. Litig., 149 F.4th 587, 601 (6th Cir. 2025)

(quotation omitted). District courts have discretion to

reconsider “interlocutory orders where there is (1) an

intervening change of controlling law; (2) new

evidence available; or (3) a need to correct a clear error

or prevent manifest injustice.” Luna v. Bell, 887 F.3d

290, 297 (6th Cir. 2018) (citation modified).

Townsend makes an intervening-change-ofcontrolling-law argument. Specifically, she argues

that LP Louisville Lynn Way, LLC v. Woford, 701

S.W.3d 836 (Ky. Ct. App. 2024), established that Elam

did not imbue Townsend with authority to enter an

arbitration agreement on Elam’s behalf. In denying

the motion for reconsideration, the district court

rejected Townsend’s contention that Woford

constituted an intervening change in the law.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in

denying Townsend’s motion. Woford did not change

the controlling law; it applied the controlling law. In

Woford, the court considered whether a power of

attorney authorized an attorney-in-fact to execute an

arbitration agreement with a nursing home on behalf

of a nursing-home resident. 701 S.W.3d at 838–41.

The court noted that the Kentucky Supreme Court, in

Ping v. Beverly Enterprises, Inc., 376 S.W.3d 581 (Ky.

2012), set forth the guidance for construing powers of

Pet. App. 12

attorney. Id. at 841. Woford then proceeded to “apply[]

the[] principles” from Ping and other Kentucky

Supreme Court cases to the arguments the parties

raised. Id. at 841–42. Woford did not overturn any

prior caselaw, nor did it change the general principles

used in evaluating powers of attorney. See id. at 839–

43.

The district court thus did not err in denying

Townsend’s motion for reconsideration.

IV.

Townsend also contends that the district court

erred in confirming the arbitration award because the

arbitrator: (1) failed to disclose prior misconduct, and

(2) applied the wrong legal standard in evaluating her

burden of proof. When reviewing a district court’s

decision confirming an arbitration award, we review

questions of law de novo and factual findings for clear

error. Holtec Int’l Corp. v. Mich. State Util. Workers

Council, 160 F.4th 723, 727 (6th Cir. 2025). When

reviewing an arbitrator’s decision, we apply “one of

the narrowest standards of judicial review in all of

American jurisprudence.” McGee, 941 F.3d at 867

(quotation omitted).

Under that narrow standard, a court “must

refrain from reversing an arbitrator simply because

the court disagrees with the result or believes the

arbitrator made a serious legal or factual error.”

Samaan v. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc., 835 F.3d

593, 600 (6th Cir. 2016) (quotation omitted). Our

review is necessarily narrow because the parties

bargained for “the arbitrator’s construction” of the

issue, not for “layers of federal judicial review.” Mich.

Fam. Res., Inc. v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union Loc. 517M,

Pet. App. 13

475 F.3d 746, 756 (6th Cir. 2007) (en banc).

A.

Under the FAA, courts can vacate an

arbitration award in four circumstances:

(1) where the award was procured by

corruption, fraud, or undue means;

(2) where there was evident partiality or

corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them;

(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of

misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing,

upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to

hear evidence pertinent and material to the

controversy; or of any other misbehavior by

which the rights of any party have been

prejudiced; or

(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their

powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a

mutual, final, and definite award upon the

subject matter submitted was not made.

9 U.S.C. § 10(a). A party must give “[n]otice of a

motion to vacate” “within three months after the

award is filed or delivered.” Id. § 12.

Townsend claims the arbitrator was not

impartial because he had been publicly censured in

1990 when he was a state court judge. “To establish

evident partiality, the challenging party must show

that a reasonable person would have to conclude that

an arbitrator was partial to one party to the

arbitration.” Thomas Kinkade Co. v. White, 711 F.3d

719, 723–24 (6th Cir. 2013) (citation modified).

Townsend raised her evident-partiality challenge in a

“supplemental filing” filed well over three months

Pet. App. 14

after the arbitration award was filed or delivered.

Without

deciding

whether

Townsend’s

“supplemental filing” can relate back to her motion to

vacate, her argument fails on the merits. “[N]ot every

nondisclosure violates the FAA.” Uhl v. Komatsu

Forklift Co., 512 F.3d 294, 306 (6th Cir. 2008).

Instead, Townsend “must show that a reasonable

person would have to conclude that” the arbitrator

was partial to BLC Lexington. Id. (citation modified).

To meet that burden, Townsend needed to point to

“specific facts that indicate improper motives on the

part of the arbitrator.” Id. (quotation omitted).

Townsend failed to satisfy her burden. The

arbitrator’s three-decade-old public censure over

improper campaign contributions does not show that

he was partial to BLC Lexington. The mere failure to

disclose the censure thus does not, on its own, warrant

vacating the arbitration award. See ANR Coal Co. v.

Cogentrix of N.C., Inc., 173 F.3d 493, 500 (4th Cir.

1999).

B.

Townsend also argues that the arbitrator

applied the wrong legal standard in evaluating the

evidence. Specifically, she claims that the arbitrator

applied a “certainty” standard rather than evaluating

whether she proved her claims by a preponderance of

the evidence.

Essentially, Townsend asserts that the

arbitrator exceeded his powers. See 9 U.S.C. §

10(a)(4). Arbitrators exceed their authority only when

“they display a manifest disregard of the law.” In re

Romanzi, 31 F.4th 367, 375 (6th Cir. 2022) (quotation

Pet. App. 15

omitted).

Townsend’s argument finds no support in the

record. In the award, the arbitrator recited the correct

legal standard: to prevail on her claims, Townsend

must establish each element by a preponderance of

the evidence. Nothing suggests that the arbitrator

failed to apply this standard in his analysis. The

arbitration award comprehensively evaluates each

issue based on the evidentiary record.

V.

For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district

court’s judgment

Pet. App. 16

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

No. 25-5675

FILED Mar 26, 2026, Kelly L. Stephens, Clerk

BLC LEXINGTON SNF, LLC; BROOKDALE

SENIOR

LIVING

COMMUNITIES,

INC.;

BROOKDALE SENIOR LIVING INC.; AMERICAN

RETIREMENT CORPORATION,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

BONNIE TOWNSEND, Executrix of the Estate of

Linda Elam,

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: BATCHELDER, THAPAR, and

MATHIS, Circuit Judges.

JUDGMENT

On Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky at

Lexington.

THIS CAUSE was heard on the record from the

Pet. App. 17

district court and was submitted on the briefs without

oral argument.

IN CONSIDERATION THEREOF, it is

ORDERED that the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT

/s/ Kelly L. Stephens

Kelly L. Stephens, Clerk

Pet. App. 18

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY

CENTRAL DIVISION AT LEXINGTONCASE

NO. 5:21-CV-223-KKC

BLC LEXINGTON SNF, LLC d/b/a

BROOKDALE RICHMOND PLACE SNF;

BROOKDALE SENIOR LIVING

COMMUNITIES, INC.; BROOKDALE

SENIOR LIVING INC.; and AMERICAN

RETIREMENT CORPORATION,

Plaintiffs,

v.

BONNIE TOWNSEND, Executrix of the

Estate of LINDA ELAM,

Defendant.

ORDER

*** *** ***

This matter is before the Court on Bonnie

Townsend’s Motion to Reconsider Order Compelling

Arbitration (DE 35) and Motion to Amend, Modify,

Correct, or Vacate Arbitration Award and Order

Rehearing. (DE 38.) Also pending is a Motion to

Confirm Arbitration Award (DE 70) filed by American

Retirement Corporation, BLC Lexington SNF, LLC,

Pet. App. 19

Brookdale Senior Living Communities, Inc., and

Brookdale

Senior

Living

Inc.

(collectively,

“Plaintiffs”). The Court will discuss each motion in

turn.

I. BACKGROUND

This case arises from the alleged wrongful death of

Linda Elam (“Elam”). Elam was a resident at

Plaintiffs’ nursing home, Brookdale Richmond Place,

in Lexington, Kentucky (hereinafter, “the facility”)

from June 15, 2020 through July 8, 2020. On July 8,

2020, Elam was hospitalized and diagnosed with

“multiple pressure ulcers, sepsis, dehydration, and

malnutrition[.]” (DE 35 at 1-2). She subsequently died

on July 13, 2020. (Id. at 2.)

Elam’s sister and Attorney-in-Fact, Bonnie Townsend

(“Townsend”), filed an initial Complaint in Fayette

Circuit Court against Plaintiffs and Becky Stocker, in

her capacity as Administrator of the facility, seeking

compensatory and punitive damages. (Id.) Plaintiffs

later filed a Complaint in this Court, asking that that

the Court compel arbitration of the

state court action and enter an order enjoining

Townsend from advancing the state court claims.

While Townsend argued that the relevant arbitration

agreement was not valid nor legally enforceable, the

Court (following a successful motion to reconsider)

ultimately compelled arbitration on all claims except

for the wrongful death claims of the nonsignatory

beneficiaries. (DE 15.)

Arbitration in this matter, directed by retired

Judge Thomas E. McDonald, III (hereinafter, “the

Arbitrator”), took place from April 22, 2024 to April

Pet. App. 20

29, 2024. Following the submission of proposed

findings of fact and conclusions of law by the parties,

the Arbitrator issued his Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law on June 24, 2024. His conclusions

found in favor of Plaintiffs on all claims. Now that

arbitration has concluded, Townsend asks the Court

to reconsider its prior order compelling arbitration

and/or vacate the arbitration award in this matter.

(DEs 35, 38.) Plaintiffs ask that the Court confirm the

arbitration award. (DE 70.)

II. ANALYSIS

A. Motion to Reconsider

Motions to reconsider are construed as motions

to alter, amend, or vacate pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 59(e). Moody v. Pepsi-Cola Metro.

Bottling Co., 915 F.2d 201, 206 (6th Cir. 1990). The

standard for a motion under Rule 59(e) is “necessarily

high.” Hewitt v. W. & S. Fin. Grp. Flexibly Benefits

Plan, CIVIL ACTION NO. 16-120-HRW, 2017 WL

2927472, at *1 (E.D. Ky. July 7, 2017). The moving

party may not use a Rule 59(e) motion as a tool to “relitigate issues the Court previously considered.” Id. at

*1. A court may only grant a Rule 59(e) motion if the

moving party sets forth: (1) a clear error of law; (2)

newly discovered evidence; (3) an intervening change

in the controlling law; or (4) a manifest injustice.

GenCorp, Inc. v. Am. Int’l Underwriters, 178 F.3d 804,

834 (6th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). Further, “Rule

59(e) motions cannot be used to present new

arguments that could have been raised prior to

judgment.” Howard v. U.S., 533 F.3d 472, 475 (6th

Cir. 2008). It “allows for reconsideration; it does not

permit parties to effectively ‘re-argue a case.’” Id.

Pet. App. 21

(quoting Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians

v. Engler, 146 F.3d 367, 374 (6th Cir. 1998)

(explaining that a district court “may well deny the

Rule 59(e) motion on that ground.”)). Plaintiffs do not

dispute

Townsend’s

ability

to

move

for

reconsideration but rather address her arguments on

the merits.

Townsend argues the following in support of

her motion to reconsider: (1) that it was clear error

and a manifest injustice to compel her to arbitrate and

waive her rights and access to the courts; and (2) that

there has been an intervening change in controlling

law, found in LP Louisville Lynn Way, LLC v. Woford,

701 S.W.3d 836 (Ky. Ct. App. 2024). Yet a review of

the record and Townsend’s motion shows that her

former arguments are attempts to relitigate

arguments that the Court previously addressed. (DEs

15, 19.) The Court has already discussed the general

validity of the arbitration agreement and the issue of

the capacity of Townsend’s signature in a previous

opinion. (DE 15 at 4-7.) It is clear that the primary

focus of her motion to reconsider is the assertion that

the Kentucky Court of Appeals has changed the

controlling law on the power of attorney issue.

Accordingly, the Court will limit its analysis to the

argument that Townsend did not have the proper

delegated authority to enter into an arbitration

agreement on behalf of Elam pursuant to the relevant

power of attorney instrument (hereinafter, “the Elam

POA”) and Woford.1

1 At the time of the filing of the motion to reconsider, Woford was

not a final opinion and pending the Kentucky Supreme Court’s

Pet. App. 22

The Court must first decide whether Woford

constitutes an intervening change in controlling law.

An “intervening change in law” means a change in

underlying principles. United States v. Campbell, 168

F.3d 263, 269 (6th Cir. 1999) (explaining that a

clarification of the law does not constitute a change in

the underlying principles of the law). “Where a

movant points to a “new” holding that merely reflects

the basis for the court’s previous ruling, there is no

intervening change in law.” Brookdale Senior Living,

Inc. v. Caudill, No. 5:14-098-DCR, 2015 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 134912, at *5 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 1, 2015) (citing

United States ex rel. SNAPP, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.,

618 F.3d 505, 513 (6th Cir. 2010)).

Here, the Court is unconvinced that Woford

constitutes an intervening change in controlling law.

The primary issue that Woford discussed was whether

the relevant POA instrument authorized the

Attorney-in-Fact to sign and effectuate a valid

arbitration agreement. Woford, 701 S.W.3d at 840.

The Kentucky Court of Appeals emphasized,

consistent with prior case law, that “[a]n attorney-infact can assent on the principal’s behalf only if the

POA instrument confers the authority to do so.” Id. at

841. It restates the Kentucky Supreme Court’s

guidance regarding the construction of a POA, which

“is consistent with section 37 of the Restatement

(Second) of Agency,” and applies that guidance to the

underlying facts. Id. Specifically, the appeals court

decision to grant discretionary review. The Kentucky Supreme

Court has since declined to grant discretionary review. Thus, the

Woford opinion is now final and this Court will consider it as

such.

Pet. App. 23

found that because the Woford POA identified specific

acts, it found that the POA’s general expressions of

authority were limited to the type of transactions or

business to which the POA primarily relates. Id.

Because the Woford POA related to managing

property and financial affairs, it noted that Kentucky

courts “have repeatedly held that a pre-dispute

arbitration agreement waiving the principal’s

constitutional rights does not fall within [that]

authority.” Id. at 842.

Nothing in the Kentucky Court of Appeals’

Woford opinion seeks to change the underlying

principles of the construction of POA instruments. It

does not indicate that the appeals court is overturning

or abrogating any prior case law. It simply applies the

relevant principles regarding POA construction to the

facts and finds that the arbitration agreement was not

valid because the attorney-in-fact was not authorized

to execute such an agreement. Accordingly,

Townsend’s argument for reconsideration on the basis

of Woford being an intervening change in controlling

law fails.

Even if the Court were to address the

applicability of Woford to the instant case, it does not

support Townsend’s argument and demonstrate a

clear error of law. First, the POA in Woford is

distinguishable from the Elam POA. In Woford, it is

clear from the plain language of the instrument that

the primary purpose was to manage relating to “real

estate or personal property”. (DE 65-4 at 1.) It states

as much in the very first sentence. The Elam POA is

not so limited—directing Townsend to “manage and

control all of my property and business of every

Pet. App. 24

kind, with full power and authority to act for me and

in my name and stead, and to act for me in every

lawful way as I might or could do personally,

including the following specific powers which are

not to be construed in any way as limiting or

restricting the general powers granted to my

attorney-in-fact[.]” (DE 65-1 at 1 (emphasis added).)

While Woford stands for the conclusion that

“[u]nless otherwise agreed, general expressions

used in authorizing an agent are limited in application

to acts done in connection with the act or business to

which the authority primarily relates[,]” the Elam

POA falls squarely within the rule’s exception. See

Restatement (Second) of Agency § 37 (1958). Here,

Elam and Townsend agreed in the plain language of

the contract that the enumerated specific powers

would not “be construed in any way as limiting or

restricting the general powers granted to my attorneyin-fact[.]” Although the Elam POA does not expressly

authorize Townsend to enter into arbitration

agreements, the Court can find no reasonable

interpretation of it that would limit her authority to

do so on Elam’s behalf. Accordingly, the Court will

deny Townsend’s motion to reconsider.

B. Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award

Next, Townsend contests the arbitration

proceedings by arguing that: (1) the award was

procured by undue means; (2) the Arbitrator

demonstrated evident partiality; (3) her rights were

prejudiced by other misbehavior; (4) the Arbitrator

exceeded his powers and so imperfectly executed them

that a proper award was not made; (5) there was a

material mistake in the description of a person, thing,

Pet. App. 25

or property referred to in the award; and (6) the award

was made in manifest disregard of the law. (DE 38 at

9-10.) Specifically, Townsend argues that the

Arbitrator abdicated his role and acted improperly by:

(1) imposing an improper “certainty” burden of proof

on Townsend; (2) holding that Plaintiffs could not be

responsible for the care provided at their facility so

long as there were agents who were not employees

involved in the care; (3) ruling that Plaintiffs could not

be responsible for their own failure to follow clear

orders when they claimed they ran out of appropriate

air mattresses to prevent pressure injuries; and (4)

construing nearly every issue against Townsend. (DE

38 at 5.)

The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) lays out

various instances in which courts may vacate an

arbitration award. These include, as Townsend

argues, “where the award was procured by . . . undue

means;” “where there was evident partiality . . . in the

arbitrators[;]” “where the arbitrators were guilty of

misconduct . . . in refusing to hear evidence pertinent

and material to the controversy; or of any other

misbehavior by which the rights of any party have

been prejudiced;” or “where the arbitrators exceeded

their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a

mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject

matter submitted was not made.” 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1)(4). The Kentucky Arbitration Act, KRS §

417.160(1)(a)-(d), lists similar reasons to vacate an

arbitration award.

Yet “[w]hen courts are called on to review an

arbitrator’s decision, the review is very narrow; it is

one of the narrowest standards of judicial review in all

Pet. App. 26

of American jurisprudence.” Samaan v. Gen.

Dynamics Land Sys., 835 F.3d 593, 600 (6th Cir. 2016)

(quoting Uhl v. Komatsu Forklift Co., Ltd., 512 F.3d

294, 305 (6th Cir. 2008)). “Courts must refrain from

reversing an arbitrator simply because the court

disagrees with the result or believes the arbitrator

made a serious legal or factual error.” Solvay Pharms.,

Inc. v. Duramed Pharms., Inc., 442 F.3d 471, 476 (6th

Cir. 2006) (brackets, citation, and emphasis omitted).

In fact, there is a “presumption that arbitration

awards will be confirmed.” Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.

v. Home Ins. Co., 429 F.3d 640, 643 (6th Cir. 2005).

First, a quick review of the record shows that

the Arbitrator did not apply the incorrect burden of

proof. Townsend focuses on the Arbitrator’s passing

use of the phrase “cannot be certain” during his

analysis of the negligence and wrongful death claims

to argue that he used a “certainty” standard of proof

rather than a “preponderance of the evidence” one. Yet

the Arbitrator explains that Townsend “must prove,

by a preponderance of the evidence,” the existence of

the relevant elements. (DE 46-1 at 24.) When read in

context, it is clear that the Arbitrator’s statement that

he “cannot be certain that Ms. Elam had developed the

precise wounds shown in the photographs taken by

the hospital staff at UK Medical Center on July 9,

2020 during her residency at Brookdale Richmond

Place” was not him imposing a higher standard of

proof, but instead conveying his doubt regarding proof

of the causation element. (Id. at 28-29.) The

Arbitrator, in his analysis, reviewed the record and

found that Townsend failed to prove her claims by a

preponderance of the evidence. One word does not

Pet. App. 27

convince this Court that the arbitrator disregarded

the relevant standard of proof and employed a higher

one.

Second, Townsend argues that the Arbitrator

incorrectly held that the nursing home cannot be

responsible for certain nursing home agents—

specifically, the primary care physicians in charge of

Elam’s care. (DE 38 at 16.) The Court is persuaded

that regardless of whether the Arbitrator’s statement

was a misstatement of law, it amounts to harmless

error. Plaintiffs correctly point out that Townsend

“did not name the primary care providers in the

Arbitration or the State Action, nor did she direct

allegations of negligence toward them during

discovery or at the Final Hearing.” (DE 48 at 22.)

Townsend was primarily focused on alleged

misconduct of the nursing team; she did not allege

misconduct of the primary care providers. Further,

the Arbitrator separately found that Townsend’s

experts did not show that the providers “would or

could have done anything differently” if the nursing

staff had communicated what Townsend argues was

absent from its documentation. (DE 46-1 at 27.) Even

if this was a misstatement of the law, it did not affect

the Arbitrator’s underlying decision and does not

constitute a “manifest injustice.”

Third, Townsend argues that the Arbitrator

incorrectly held that there was no liability when

Plaintiffs disregarded their own care plan and failed

to put Elam on an appropriate air mattress. (DE 38 at

20.) This argument boils down to Townsend

disagreeing with how the arbitrator weighed the

evidence, finding there was likely a mattress

Pet. App. 28

malfunction when Elam was not using an air

mattress. Townsend further claims that the

Arbitrator “completely dismiss[ed]” Dr. Barzyk’s

opinions about the delay in providing a proper air

mattress, but a review of the arbitration award shows

that claim is demonstrably false. The Arbitrator

explained that he found Dr. Barzyk’s opinions not “to

be any more credible than that of several other

witnesses who stated that the static foam mattresses

. . . do provide pressure redistribution.” 2 It is not this

Court’s duty to fight against the factual findings of the

Arbitrator. Further, the Court is persuaded that even

if the Arbitrator should have found a breach on this

issue, he found that Townsend’s claim fails on the

causation element. Such an error would be harmless.

Fourth,

Townsend

presents

a

broad

argument—claiming that the Arbitrator “slanted

every material issue against” her and in favor of

Plaintiffs. (DE 54 at 12.) Yet this, too, is another

argument asking the Court to review the underlying

issues of the arbitration. The Court “must refrain from

reversing an arbitrator simply because the court

disagrees with the result or believes the arbitrator

made a serious legal or factual error.” Solvay Pharms.,

Inc. v. Duramed Pharms., Inc., 442 F.3d 471, 476 (6th

Cir. 2006) (brackets, citation, and emphasis omitted).

Townsend defends herself by claiming that this

argument is not an attack on the factual findings

because “every single material fact, inference and

2 Contrary to Townsend’s claim, the arbitrator makes this point

to explain that the foam mattress may have provided the

pressure redistribution Elam needed under her care plan.

Pet. App. 29

opinion was construed and slanted in favor of

Plaintiffs.” (DE 54 at 13.) This, she claims, shows

partiality on the part of the Arbitrator.

“[E]vident partiality will be found where a

reasonable person would have to conclude that an

arbitrator was partial to one party to the arbitration.”

Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 429 F.3d

640, 645 (6th Cir. 2005) (quotation marks and citation

omitted). “[T]he party seeking invalidation must

demonstrate more than an amorphous institutional

predisposition towards the other side; a lesser

showing would be tantamount to an ‘appearance of

bias’ standard.” Id. “The alleged partiality must be

direct, definite, and capable of demonstration, and the

party asserting [it] . . . must establish specific facts

that indicate improper motives on the part of the

arbitrator.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). This is a

case-by-case objective inquiry. Id.

Here, Townsend does not allege a substantial

prior relationship between the Arbitrator and

Plaintiffs. Despite her claims otherwise, her argument

focuses solely on the findings of the Arbitrator and his

weighing of the evidence. Townsend provides no

authority that disagreement with the findings and

conclusions of the Arbitrator, without more, is enough

to find evident partiality and vacate the arbitration

award. Accordingly, the Court finds that Townsend

has failed to show evident partiality that is direct,

definite, and capable of demonstration, nor has

Townsend established specific facts indicating

improper motives on the part of the Arbitrator.

Finally, in a supplemental briefing, Townsend

points to the Arbitrator’s prior public censure in

Pet. App. 30

arguing for renewed arbitration. She claims that she

learned of the public censure, relating to “moral

turpitude and dishonesty in [the Arbitrator’s] judicial

capacity,” only after the filing of her motion to vacate

the arbitration award. (DE 58 at 2.) She asserts that

the failure of the Arbitrator to disclose this

information should require that the arbitration be

vacated in its entirety and conducted before a

different arbitrator. (Id.)

In 1990, the Commonwealth of Kentucky

Judicial Retirement and Removal Commission

(JRRC) found that the Arbitrator “campaign

contributions from attorneys in private practice in

Jefferson County” and “solicited contributions from

certain attorneys in connection with their

appointment as guardian ad litem in juvenile cases in

his court.” (DE 58-1 at 1.) Finding that his actions

amounted to judicial misconduct, the JRRC chose to

publicly censure the Arbitrator after he withdrew

from a judicial campaign for a seat on the Kentucky

Court of Appeals, returned all contributions, and

provided the JRRC with evidence of the refunds.

Townsend argues that the failure to disclose this

misconduct meets the criteria to vacate an arbitration

award under 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1)-(3).

However, Townsend fails to explain how a

public censure from 35 years ago has any bearing on

the underlying arbitration proceedings. She appears

to argue, without evidence, that “economic theory”

might support the Arbitrator being “either consciously

or subconsciously” biased against her. (DE 58 at 8.)

She asserts, without evidence, that Plaintiffs “provide

a reasonable likelihood of repeat financial and

Pet. App. 31

political reward” to the Arbitrator if he gives them

favorable outcomes. (Id.) Townsend attempts to

invoke Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l Cas.

Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968) in support of its disclosure

argument, but its facts are wholly dissimilar to the

instant case. In Commonwealth Coatings Corp., the

arbitration award was set aside because the arbitrator

did not disclose a prior financial relationship

between the arbitrator and one of the parties.

393 U.S. at 146, 150. The United States Supreme

Court stressed that “an atmosphere of frankness at

the outset” is best, “through disclosure by the

arbitrator of any financial transactions which he had

had or is negotiating with either of the parties.” Id.

at 151 (White, J., and Marshall, J., concurring)

(emphasis added). In other words, the Supreme Court

was primarily concerned about the undisclosed

relationships between arbitrators and parties. This

type of disclosure issue in not implicated in regard to

the public censure.

Townsend, in her supplemental reply, asserts

that the Arbitrator has worked on a similar case with

Plaintiffs that settled back in July 2021. Yet this

apparent nondisclosure is still not enough to violate

the FAA. The Sixth Circuit has explained that “not

every nondisclosure violates the FAA” and a

challenging party “must show that a reasonable

person would have to conclude that an arbitrator was

partial to the other party to the arbitration.” Uhl v.

Komatsu Forklift Co., 512 F.3d 294, 306 (6th Cir.

2008) (citing Apperson v. Fleet Carrier Corp., 879 F.2d

1344, 1358 (6th Cir. 1989)) (quotation marks omitted).

Here, Townsend points to a case that settled before an

Pet. App. 32

arbitration award could be handed down. Perhaps

Townsend’s argument might have held some weight if

the Arbitrator issued an uneven award in favor of

Plaintiffs—but that is not the case. A reasonable

person would not have to conclude that an arbitrator

was partial to Plaintiffs because they presided over a

previous arbitration that settled before an award

could be issued. Accordingly, the Court finds that any

nondisclosures by the Arbitrator in this matter are not

enough to warrant vacating the arbitration award.

C. Motion to Confirm Arbitration Award

For the reasons stated in Section II.B, the

Court declined to vacate the arbitration award in this

matter. On application of one of the parties, a district

court possessing a basis for subject-matter jurisdiction

independent of the FAA must issue an order

confirming an arbitration award “unless the award is

vacated, modified, or corrected as prescribed in” 9

U.S.C. §§ 10 and 11. 9 U.S.C. § 9. While this motion is

not fully briefed, the Court finds briefing unnecessary

because it does not present new arguments.

Accordingly, having declined to vacate the arbitration

award pursuant to the FAA, the Court will confirm the

arbitration award in this matter.

III. CONCLUSION

For the aforementioned reasons, the Court

hereby ORDERS as follows:

1) Townsend’s Motion to Reconsider Order

Compelling Arbitration (DE 35) is

DENIED;

2) Townsend’s Motion to Amend, Modify,

Correct, or Vacate Arbitration Award and

Pet. App. 33

Order Rehearing (DE 38) is DENIED; and

3) Plaintiffs’ Motion to Confirm Arbitration

Award (DE 70) is GRANTED, in that the

June 24, 2024 arbitration award entered by

arbitrator Thomas E. McDonald, III is

CONFIRMED pursuant to the Federal

Arbitration Act.

June 27, 2025

/s/ Karen L. Caldwell

Karen L. Caldwell

United

States

District

Judge

Eastern

District

of

Kentucky

Pet. App. 34

APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY

CENTRAL DIVISION AT LEXINGTONCASE

NO. 5:21-CV-223-KKC

BLC LEXINGTON SNF, LLC d/b/a

BROOKDALE RICHMOND PLACE SNF;

BROOKDALE SENIOR LIVING

COMMUNITIES, INC.; BROOKDALE

SENIOR LIVING INC.; and AMERICAN

RETIREMENT CORPORATION,

Plaintiffs,

v.

BONNIE TOWNSEND, Executrix of the

Estate of LINDA ELAM,

Defendant.

ORDER

*** *** ***

This matter is before the Court on defendant

Bonnie Townsend’s motion for reconsideration and

modification of order (DE 16). The Court ORDERS

Townsend’s motion is GRANTED and the Opinion and

Order (DE 15) is amended as follows.

I.

On July 2, 2021 Townsend, acting as executrix

Pet. App. 35

of the estate of Linda Elam, filed a complaint against

BLC Lexington SNF, et al., in Fayette Circuit Court.

The complaint alleged medical negligence, corporate

negligence, and statutory rights violations, all

stemming from Elam’s care and eventual death at

Brookdale Richmond Place, a long-term care facility

owned, operated, and managed by plaintiffs. Notably,

this original complaint did not include a cause of

action for wrongful death. (DE 1, #2).

On August 26, 2021, BLC filed an action in this

Court to compel arbitration and enjoin Townsend

from pursuing her action in state court (DE 1).

Townsend subsequently moved to dismiss and

plaintiffs again moved to compel arbitration and

enjoin Townsend’s state court action. (DE 6, 7). On

May 27, 2022, the Court entered its opinion and order

denying Townsend’s motion to dismiss and granting

plaintiffs’ motion to compel arbitration and enjoin the

state court action. (DE 15). The Court addressed (and

rejected) Townsend’s numerous arguments, including

lack of subject matter jurisdiction, failure to join an

indispensable party, and the invalidity of the

underlying arbitration agreement. The Court did not

consider one of Townsend’s arguments, however.

Townsend argued that the arbitration agreement did

not bind the wrongful death beneficiaries in this case.

The Court, correctly noting that Townsend’s original

state court

complaint did not contain any wrongful death claims,

refused to consider the issue. (DE 15, at 6).

On May 6, 2022, three weeks before the Court

issued its opinion and order in this matter, Townsend

filed an amended complaint in Fayette Circuit Court.

Pet. App. 36

Townsend amended the complaint to include the

wrongful death claims she argued in her original

motion to dismiss but that were inexplicably absent

from her original state court complaint. (DE 14, #1).

This first amended complaint did not appear on the

Court’s docket until May 27, 2022, when Townsend

filed a supplemental reply to her motion to dismiss,

attaching the amended complaint. (DE 14). This

happened on the same day that the Court issued its

opinion and order. Thus, the Court was unaware of

this amended complaint when it rightfully refused to

consider Townsend’s wrongful death arguments.

This timely motion to reconsider followed.

II.

“[D]istrict courts have inherent power to

reconsider interlocutory orders and reopen any part of

a case before entry of a final judgment.” In re Saffady,

524 F.3d 799, 803 (6th Cir. 2008). Motions to

reconsider are generally construed as motions to alter

or amend a judgment under Rule 59(e) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure. Moody v. Pepsi-Cola Metro.

Bottling Co., 915 F.2d 201, 206 (6th Cir. 1990).

Because such motions are not opportunities to reargue a case, a court may only grant a Rule 59(e)

motion if the moving party shows (1) a clear error of

law; (2) newly discovered evidence; (3) an intervening

change in the controlling law; or (4) a manifest

injustice. GenCorp, Inc. v. Am. Int’l Underwriters, 178

F.3d 804, 834 (6th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted).

Though Townsend argues the Court should modify its

order under Rule 54(b), “the standard for

reconsidering interlocutory orders under Rule 54(b) is

the same as the standard under Rule 59(e).”

Pet. App. 37

Brookdale Senior Living, Inc. v. Caudill, No. CV 5: 14098-DCR, 2015 WL 5822633, at *2 n.2 (E.D. Ky. Oct.

1, 2015).

III.

Townsend’s one and only argument is that the

Court should reconsider and modify its opinion and

order to allow her to proceed with any existing

wrongful death claims in state court. The Court issued

its original opinion and order without any knowledge

of Townsend’s amended complaint. But the complaint

now includes the appropriate wrongful death claims.

These claims were added (and granted by the state

court), weeks before this Court issued the relevant

order. Because it would be manifestly unjust to refuse

to consider arguments regarding existing claims in a

proper complaint3, the Court will now consider the

wrongful death claims.

Under Kentucky law, a decedent or

representative of a decedent cannot bind a wrongful

death beneficiary to an arbitration agreement. Ping v.

Beverly Enters., Inc., 376 S.W.3d 581, 597–99 (Ky.

2012); “Whenever the death of a person results from

an injury inflicted by the negligence or wrongful act of

another” a representative of the decedent can bring a

claim for damages against the person or agent who

caused the death. Ky. Rev. Stat. § 411.130(1). “[T]he

Plaintiffs argue that Townsend’s wrongful death claims are

time-barred pursuant to KRS 413.140. This issue is not before

the Court. The Court is only considering whether Townsend’s

particular claims are compelled to arbitration and enjoined in the

state court. The Court notes, however, that the Fayette Circuit

Court granted Townsend’s motion to file the amended complaint

on May 2, 2022. (DE 14, #2).

3

Pet. App. 38

wrongful death claim is not derived through or on

behalf of the [decedent] but accrues separately to the

wrongful death beneficiaries and is meant to

compensate them for their own pecuniary loss.” Ping,

376 S.W.3d at 599. Thus, wrongful death beneficiaries

who do not sign the arbitration agreement are not

parties to the agreement and their claims are not

subject to an order compelling arbitration. See

Richmond Health Facilities-Madison, L.P. v. Shearer,

No. CV 5:17-255-KKC, 2017 WL 3273381, at *6 (E.D.

Ky. Aug. 1, 2017).

But statutory beneficiaries who do sign an

arbitration agreement do elect to arbitrate their

wrongful

death

claims—because

resident

representatives are in fact parties to the contract. See

BLC Lexington SNF, LLC v. Oatis, No. CV 5:19-284DCR, 2019 WL 6221006, at *14 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 20,

2019) (daughters who signed a care facility arbitration

agreement as representatives bound to arbitrate their

wrongful death claims); Diversicare Leasing Corp. v.

Hall, No. CV 15-29-HRW, 2016 WL 10654078, at *1

(E.D. Ky. Aug. 8, 2016) (a wrongful death beneficiary

who signed a valid arbitration agreement “was thus a

party to it”); BLC Lexington SNF, LLC v. Petersen, No.

CV 5:19-465-GFVT, 2020 WL 3130292, at *10 (E.D.

Ky. June 12, 2020) (citing Richmond Health Facilities

v. Nichols, 811 F.3d 192, 199 (6th Cir. 2016)).

Townsend is Elam’s surviving sibling. Because

Elam left no surviving spouse, children, or parents,

Townsend is a beneficiary under KRS 411.130(e).

Townsend signed the arbitration agreement acting as

resident representative and is therefore a party to the

agreement. Townsend, in her capacity as a wrongful

Pet. App. 39

death beneficiary herself, is bound to commit her own

wrongful death claims to arbitration. Though

plaintiffs seem to suggest that this ends the inquiry,

there remains the matter of the additional wrongful

death beneficiaries, as outlined in Townsend’s

amended state court complaint and her pleadings to

this Court (DE 6, 11, 16). As to the non-signatory

wrongful death beneficiaries, the law is clear: they are

not parties to the arbitration agreement. Townsend

may pursue their claims in court. The opinion and

order (DE 15) is modified only as to the issue of the

wrongful death claims.

IV.

Accordingly, for the reasons set forth herein,

the Court hereby ORDERS that the motion to

reconsider is GRANTED. The Court’s May 27, 2022

Opinion and Order (DE 15) is MODIFIED as follows:

(1) Defendant’s motion to dismiss (DE 6) is

DENIED IN PART and GRANTED IN PART. The

motion to dismiss is GRANTED as to the claim to

compel arbitration in the wrongful death claims of the

non-signatory

beneficiaries,

which

are

not

encompassed by the arbitration agreement. The

motion to dismiss is DENIED in all other respects.

(2) Plaintiffs’ motion to compel arbitration and

to enjoin Defendant (DE 7) is GRANTED IN PART

and DENIED IN PART. The motion to compel is

DENIED as to the wrongful death claims of the nonsignatory beneficiaries but is GRANTED in all other

respects.

(3) Defendant is ENJOINED from pursuing

any potential wrongful death claim as a beneficiary

Pet. App. 40

herself, as well as all other claims in Fayette Circuit

Court, except for the wrongful death claims of the

other, non-signatory beneficiaries.

(4) Pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 3, further

proceedings in this matter are STAYED until the

conclusion of the ordered arbitration; and

(5) The parties SHALL file a joint status report

regarding the progress of arbitration by

January 7, 2023

/s/ Karen L. Caldwell

Karen L. Caldwell

United

States

District

Judge

Eastern

District

of

Kentucky

Pet. App. 41

APPENDIX D

No. 25-5675

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

_________________

BLC LEXINGTON SNF, LLC; BROOKDALE

SENIOR

LIVING

COMMUNITIES,

INC.;

BROOKDALE SENIOR LIVING INC.; AMERICAN

RETIREMENT CORPORATION,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

BONNIE TOWNSEND, Executrix of the Estate of

Linda Elam,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER

FILED

Apr 27, 2026

KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk

BEFORE: BATCHELDER, THAPAR, and MATHIS,

Circuit Judges.

The court received a petition for rehearing en

banc. The original panel has reviewed the petition for

rehearing and concludes that the issues raised in

the petition were fully considered upon the original

Pet. App. 42

submission and decision of the case. The petition then

was circulated to the full court. No judge has

requested a vote on the suggestion for rehearing en

banc.

Therefore, the petition is denied.

ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT

/s/ Kelly L. Stephens

Kelly L. Stephens, Clerk

Pet. App. 43

APPENDIX E

IN RE ARBITRATION OF

BONNIE TOWNSEND, EXECUTRIX,

ESTATE OF LINDA ELAM

PLAINTIFF

BLC LEXINGTON SNF, LLC d/b/a BROOKDALE

RICHMOND PLACE SNF d/b/a RICHMOND PLACE

REHABILITATION AND HEALTH CENTER, et al.

DEFENDANT

*****

I. Introduction

This matter came before the Arbitrator for a

final hearing that began on April 22 and ended on

April 29,2024. The Plaintiff was represented by Todd

Varellas and Jeremy Prichard of Varellas & Varellas

PLLC. The Defendants were represented by Kif

Skidmore and Connor Egan of Stoll Keenon Ogden

PLLC.

After a few preliminary matters were

addressed, the final hearing began with opening

statements from counsel. The Arbitrator then heard

testimony from seven fact witnesses, including Becky

Stocker, Breanne Lutes, Steven Richardson, Amber

Hinkle a/k/a Amber Moon, Karen Hatfield, Lisa

Dotson, and Bonnie Townsend, and seven expert

witnesses, including Tisha Barzyk, D.N.P, John

Cascone, M.D., Byron Arbeit, Melissa Todd, Martha

Kelso, Mark Elam, M.D., and Rodney Whittington.

The Arbitrator also admitted 98 exhibits into

evidence. The final hearing concluded with closing

Pet. App. 44

statements from counsel.

At the conclusion of closing statements,

counsel agreed to submit proposed findings of fact and

conclusions of law. Counsel submitted their proposed

findings of fact and conclusions of law on May 15,

2024. This matter is now ripe for a decision.

II. Findings of Fact4

A. The Parties

The Plaintiff is Bonnie Townsend, the sister of

Linda Elam and the executrix of Ms. Elam's estate.

Ms. Townsend asserts claims arising out of Ms. Elam'

s residency at a skilled nursing facility operated by

Defendant BLC Lexington SNF, LLC d/b/a Brookdale

Richmond Place d/b/a Richmond Place Rehabilitation

and Health Center ("Brookdale Richmond Place"). Ms.

Elam resided at Brookdale Richmond Place from June

15 until July 8, 2020. Ms. Elam passed away while in

hospice care on July 13, 2020.

The Defendants are (1) Brookdale Richmond

Place, (2) ARC Richmond Place, LLC d/b/a Brookdale

Richmond Place PCH, Brookdale Senior Living

Communities, Inc., Brookdale Senior Living, Inc.,

American Retirement Corporation (the "Non-Facility

Defendants"), and (3) Becky Stocker, in her capacity

as the administrator of Brookdale Richmond Place.

Ms. Stocker was the administrator of Brookdale

Richmond Place during Ms. Elam' s residency. Ms.

Stocker testified that she has worked in nursing

4 The Arbitrator bases his findings of fact on the testimony and

exhibits from the final hearing. In preparing this section, the

Arbitrator was assisted greatly by the parties' proposed findings

of fact.

Pet. App. 45

homes for 37 years and as an administrator of nursing

homes for 23 years. Ms. Stocker further testified that,

as the administrator of Brookdale Richmond Place,

she had the responsibility of overseeing directors of

various departments, including the clinical services or

nursing department, who, in turn, managed

employees working within those departments.

B. Ms. Elam's Prior Medical History

Prior to her admission at Brookdale Richmond

Place in June 2020, Ms. Elam had developed a

complicated and extensive medical history. Ms. Elam

had suffered from uterine cancer, for which she was

treated with a radioactive implant. Ms. Elam

thereafter was plagued by pelvic complications, which

her treating physicians attributed to her prior

radiation treatment.Ms. Elam also experienced

chronic

urinary

tract

infections

("UTIs"),

hydronephrosis (i.e. swelling of the kidneys) requiring

ureteral stents to drain urine, hernia repair,

gastroesophageal reflux disease, and a colectomy with

removal of twelve inches of her colon from radium

exposure.

On January 3, 2020, Ms. Elam was hospitalized

at Clark Regional Medical Center ("CRMC") for a

bowel obstruction and Clostridium difficile ("C. diff')

infection. On April 17, 2020, Ms. Elam visited CRMC

again for a UTI. On April 27, 2020, Ms. Elam returned

to CRMC and was transferred emergently to the

University of Kentucky Medical Center ("UK Medical

Center) to have her ureteral stents replaced, a

procedure which had been delayed by the COVID-19

pandemic. On April 28, 2020, Ms. Elam' s treating

physicians at UK Medical Center found "[c]opious

Pet. App. 46

debris and purulent urine" in Ms. Elam's bladder and

aspirated a combined 50 milliliters (mL) of "frank pus"

from her kidneys. From April 28 to May 6, 2020, Ms.

Elam remained hospitalized at UK Medical Center

with urosepsis (i.e. sepsis from a UTI) caused by a

vesicovaginal fistula, an abnormality that allows fluid

and material to pass between the vagina and the

bladder. Ms. Elam's treating physicians attributed the

fistula to prior radiation treatment and expressed

concern for continued infections because the fistula

was causing continuous "translocation of bacteria." An

earlier CT scan at CRMC also revealed an enlarging

lower abdominal density that had increased in size

since Ms. Elam's last scan and was described by her

treating physicians as a possible abnormal retrocaval

lymph node. Ms. Elam' s treating physicians

recommended a follow-up appointment and biopsy to

evaluate the suspected node, which was scheduled

with a gyn-oncologist on May 21, 2020.

Within a week after being discharged from UK

Medical Center on May 6, 2020, Ms. Elam, who was

76 years old, suffered a cerebrovascular accident or

stroke. Ms. Elam was readmitted to UK Medical

Center on May 13, 2020 with paralysis, dysphagia (i.e.

difficulty swallowing), confusion, and incontinence of

bowel and bladder. Ms. Elam's dysphagia required her

to establish an alternative feeding method through

the placement of a feeding tube. Ms. Townsend

testified that Ms. Elam had a living will expressing

her desire not to have a feeding tube, so she and other

members of Ms. Elam' s family requested that Ms.

Elam be placed in hospice care. Ms. Elam then

verbally indicated that she wanted a feeding tube and,

Pet. App. 47

on May 23, 2020, one was placed in her. On May 26,

2020, Ms. Elam was discharged from UK Medical

Center

and

transferred

to

Cardinal

Hill

Rehabilitation Hospital ("Cardinal Hill"). As shown by

her neurological exam, at the time of her discharge

from UK Medical Center, Ms. Elam was exhibiting no

spontaneous movement in her right upper and lower

extremities. Ms. Elam was in stable condition and

oriented to time, place, and self and able to follow

commands and had increased wakefulness with

improvement in her speech and the ability to

communicate her needs. Both Breanne Lutes and

Steven Richardson, Ms. Elam' s grandchildren,

testified that they either visited or spoke to Ms. Elam

on multiple occasions during her stay at UK Medical

Center and that, while there, Ms. Elam continued to

improve and was able to ambulate and communicate

coherently. Ms. Elam was not diagnosed with any

terminal illnesses or conditions during her stay at UK

Medical Center.

From May 26 to June 15, 2020, Ms. Elam

remained at Cardinal Hill for temporary acute

rehabilitation following her stroke. During her

residency at Cardinal Hill, Ms. Elam suffered from

diarrhea and incontinence associated with C. diff,

which began as early as May 30, 2020. Ms. Elam also

received treatment for two other UTls on June 1 and

14, 2020. The diarrhea and incontinence resulted in

skin breakdown in Ms. Elam's perineal and gluteal

areas, which were described by her treatment

providers as "badly excoriated," "extremely excoriated

from diarrhea despite attempts at multiple creams

and medicated creams," "evidence of healing

Pet. App. 48

breakdown," and "diffuse areas of MASD [(i.e.

moisture-associated skin damage)] with clusters of

broken skin." Ms. Elam's records from Cardinal Hill

indicate that Ms. Elam was experiencing some

discomfort as a result of the skin breakdown, noting

that she was, on various occasions, "in excruciating

pain," "screaming in burning pain," and expressing

that her "butt hurts" and was "raw." Those same

records, however, also indicate that Ms. Elam was

tolerating up to three hours of physical therapy per

day, although she did resist therapy at times, that she

was alert with appropriate conversation, and that she

was able to communicate her needs, oriented to

herself and surroundings, and able to follow

commands. Though Ms. Elam was still using a feeding

tube at night to supplement her oral intake, she was

able to eat during the day. By the time of her

discharge, Ms. Elam's weight was around 140 to 145

pounds. Ms. Elam's creatinine and blood urea

nitrogen (BUN) levels also had declined, reflecting

that her renal failure from sepsis had returned back

to baseline and that she was receiving proper

hydration. Ms. Townsend, Ms. Lutes, and Mr.

Richardson all testified that they were able to visit or

speak to Ms. Elam on multiple occasions during her

stay at Cardinal Hill and that, while there, Ms. Elam

continued to progress, seemed noticeably better, and

did not voice any complaints about her physical

wellbeing.

C. Ms. Elam's Residency at Brookdale

Richmond Place

1. Ms. Elam’s Admission, Care Plan,

and Primary Care Providers

Pet. App. 49

On June 15, 2020, Ms. Elam was transferred

from Cardinal Hill and admitted to Brookdale

Richmond Place for short-term skilled rehabilitation

and nursing care, including physical, occupational,

and speech therapy, with the ultimate goal of

returning home. Ms. Elam' s admission to Brookdale

Richmond Place occurred during the first few months

of the COVID-19 pandemic. Ms. Townsend testified

that Brookdale Richmond Place was particularly

suitable for Ms. Elam because of her fear of

contracting COVID-19, given that Brookdale

Richmond Place had experienced no facility-acquired

cases of COVID-19. Throughout Ms. Elam's residency,

Brookdale

Richmond

Place

operated

under

government-mandated restrictions on visitations,

which limited family members to window visits and

FaceTime audio or video calls with residents. Because

of those restrictions, members of Ms. Elam's family

were unable to observe in person any changes in her

condition or treatment.

Throughout her residency at Brookdale

Richmond Place, Ms. Elam was under the care of her

own primary care providers, including Dr. Davanand

Doodnauth, Dr. Jesus Tovar, Arnie Osbourne, Stacy

Mills, and Patricia Garrett. Ms. Elam' s primary care

providers and their team members were independent

contractors and not employees of Brookdale Richmond

Place. Ms. Elam also was attended to, cared for,

observed, and evaluated by members of the nursing

staff at Brookdale Richmond Place, including Lisa

Dotson, the director of nursing, Amber Hinkle a/k/a

Amber Moon, a registered nurse who specializes in

infection control and wound care, and Karen Hatfield,

Pet. App. 50

a nurse manager.

Ms. Hatfield completed an assessment of Ms.

Elam upon her admission to Brookdale Richmond

Place on June 15, 2020. Ms. Hatfield's assessment

incorporated information from Cardinal Hill, as well

as her own assessment of and discussion with Ms.

Elam. Ms. Hatfield noted that Ms. Elam had

"macerated

associated

dermatitis/incontinent

associated dermatitis" on her left and right gluteal

folds related to an active C. diff infection. Ms. Hatfield

used the Braden Scale to assess Ms. Elam' s risk for

skin breakdown and placed her at high risk (i.e. she

had a score of nine on the Braden Scale) for developing

pressure injuries and as needing appropriate

planning and intervention. Ms. Hatfield did not

document Ms. Elam as having a history of skin issues,

any pressure sores, or a terminal diagnosis at the time

of her admission. Ms. Hatfield did note that Ms. Elam

appeared to be alert, had okay short- and long-term

memory, did not exhibit any inattention, disorganized

thinking, or altered consciousness, and was eating

50% of her meals consistently. Ms. Hatfield, however,

also noted that Ms. Elam reported blurred vision in

her right eye, feeling confused on occasion, and having

difficulty finding words, that Ms. Elam was able to

make her needs known but was required to repeat

herself on account of using the wrong words or

occasional slurring, that Ms. Elam was incontinent of

bowel and bladder, and that the incontinence was the

cause of the excoriation to Ms. Elam' s buttocks and

perineum. Ms. Hatfield's assessment also indicates an

awareness that Ms. Elam had received the following

diagnoses: hypertension; hyperlipidemia; dysphagia

Pet. App. 51

following stroke; hydronephrosis with renal and

ureteral calculous obstruction; artificial openings of

the digestive tract; dysarthria and anarthria; cerebral

infarction from an unspecified occlusion or stenosis of

the left cerebral artery; neuromuscular dysfunction of

the bladder; recurrent enterocolitis from C. diff; longterm use of aspirin; hemiplegia and hemiparesis

following cerebrovascular disease; and muscle

weakness. No information appears to have been

shared with Ms. Hatfield or any other member of

Brookdale Richmond Place's nursing staff concerning

the following: Ms. Elam's hospitalization for sepsis

from late April to early May 2020; Ms. Elam's

diagnosis for a vesicovaginal fistula; Ms. Elam's

enlarging lower abdominal density or the

recommendation for a follow-up biopsy; Ms. Elam' s

appointments with an infectious disease clinic and a

gyn-oncologist to evaluate her fistula and enlarging

lower abdominal density; or Ms. Elam's recent

consultation for hospice care.

In conjunction with her admission assessment,

Ms. Hatfield developed an interim care plan for Ms.

Elam, which included interventions for bathing, fall

risk, skin, communication deficits, visual function,

cognitive loss, and a feeding tube for nutrition and

hydration, among others. By June 18, 2020, Ms. Elam

had a comprehensive care plan in place, which

included areas of focus around infection, skin

integrity, COVID-19, bowel and bladder issues, fall

risk, diet, functional ability, advanced directives,

medication, mobility, and complications associated

with stroke. A sample of the interventions called for

by Ms. Elam' s care plan, both initial and as revised,

Pet. App. 52

included a right elbow protector, a pressure

redistribution mattress, seat cushions, an evaluation

of her skin conditions on a daily and weekly basis

(along with communication with her treating

physicians in the event of any complications),

assistance with turning and repositioning as needed,

the use of lift and transfer sheets to reduce friction

and shearing, and keeping her skin clean and dry.

In addition to developing and implementing a

care plan for Ms. Elam, the nursing staff at Brookdale

conducted numerous assessments and observations of

her during her residency through daily comprehensive

nursing notes, collaborative care reviews, change-incondition evaluations, and multidisciplinary progress

notes. The nursing staff completed comprehensive

nursing notes every day of Ms. Elam' s residency.

Those daily notes were reviewed regularly by

supervisory nurses and clinical management in daily

morning meetings and by Ms. Elam' s primary care

providers. A multidisciplinary team at Brookdale

Richmond Place, which included Gayla Smith, a

licensed practical nurse, Heather Richmond, the

social services coordinator at Brookdale Richmond

Place, Ms. Dotson, Rena Cochran, a registered nurse,

and Ms. Hinkle, also met on multiple occasions during

Ms. Elam' s residency to review her condition and

care, received regular updates concerning the same,

and made numerous revisions to her care plan based

on her needs. Ms. Elam' s care plan for skin integrity,

for example, was updated no less than six times

during her residency, including on June 18, June 19,

June 23, July 1, July 4, and July 6, 2020. Ms. Elam

also met regularly in person with her primary care

Pet. App. 53

providers, including Dr. Tovar, Ms. Osbourne, and

Ms. Mills. In total, Ms. Elam met in person with her

primary care providers on seven different occasions,

including on June 16, June 18, June 22, June 25, June

29, July 1, and July 7, 2020. Ms. Elam's primary care

providers

also

reviewed

notes

and

other

documentation completed daily by nursing staff at

Brookdale Richmond Place and received frequent

updates from them concerning changes in Ms. Elam's

condition, including on June 20, June 24, June 26,

June 27, June 29, July 1, July 3, July 4, July 6, and

July 8, 2020.

2. Interventions by the Nursing Staff

and Primary Care Providers

Throughout Ms. ELam's residency, the nursing

staff at Brookdale Richmond Place followed all orders

by her primary care providers, including with respect

to enteral and supplemental feedings and the

administration of fluids. On June 16, 2020, Ms. Elam's

feeding and dietary regimen was changed by her

nutritionist to only one can of Nepro, a nutritional

supplement, with 50 mL of free water on each occasion

that she ate less than 50% of her meal. Ms. Elam

previously had been receiving Nepro continuously

after each meal. By June 22, 2022, Ms. Elam's weight

had dropped to 132 pounds from 140 to 145 pounds

while she was at Cardinal Hill. Ms. Elam also was

suffering from bouts of diarrhea attributable to her C.

diff infection during this time. Under the

circumstances, Ms. Elam' s dietician updated her

previous order to provide for Nepro with

CARBSTEADY. From then on, Ms. Elam's weight

remained stable.

Pet. App. 54

With respect to hydration, the nursing staff at

Brookdale Richmond Place was under orders by Ms.

Elam's primary care providers to provide 300 mL free

water flushes every six hours. Accordingly, Ms. Elam

received 1200 mL of free water flushes per day. Ms.

Elam also received 50 mL of water before and after

each tube feeding. Combined with a can of Nepro,

which contains 172 mL of water, Ms. Elam received

over two liters of water each day that she failed to

consume at least 50% of her meals.

In terms of skin care and personal care and

hygiene, the nursing staff at Brookdale Richmond

Place conducted weekly skin integrity reviews and

followed its protocol of turning and repositioning or,

at the very least, offering to turn and position Ms.

Elam every two hours. Such turning and repositioning

would occur in a variety of ways, including when the

nursing staff checked or changed Ms. Elam's

underwear, applied ointment to Ms. Elam's excoriated

areas, or assisted Ms. Elam to move in her bed so she

could receive physical, occupational, and speech

therapy. Ms. Elam also regularly received baths,

which were normally scheduled every Tuesday and

Friday. Ms. Elam received almost twice the number of

baths called for by Brookdale Richmond Place's

policies from June 16 through June 30, 2020. From

July 1 until her discharge on July 8, 2020, Ms. Elam

received twice the number of baths called for by

Brookdale Richmond Place's policies.

Upon admission, Ms. Elam received a static

foam mattress for pressure redistribution, which, as

mentioned above, was an intervention called for by

her care plan. On June 30, 2020, Ms. Dotson entered

Pet. App. 55

an order for Ms. Elam to receive an air (or low air loss)

mattress after she refused to be turned and

repositioned and to participate in therapy. On the

following day, July 1, 2020, Ms. Dotson's order was

discontinued and replaced by another order for an air

mattress by Ms. Osbourne, who had met with Ms.

Elam the same day and observed that she had

"decreased mobility with skin impairment." At least

seven different nurses at Brookdale Richmond Place

later documented that Ms. Elam was on an air

mattress each day from July 2 until the evening of

July 6, 2020. From the night of July 6 until July

8,2020, Ms. Elam was not on an air mattress for some

unknown reason, although multiple witnesses

testified that it was likely because her air mattress

had malfunctioned. By the morning of July 8, 2020,

Ms. Elam was back on an air mattress.

3. Deterioration

in

Ms.

Elam's

Condition

Despite the interventions by the nursing staff

and her primary care providers, Ms. Elam's health

deteriorated significantly during her residency at

Brookdale Richmond Place. As early as as June 18 and

19, 2020, Ms. Elam reported pain in her belly and legs,

exhibited poor oral intake, and voiced concerns about

her mood. On June 20, 2020, Jade Parris, a nurse at

Brookdale Richmond Place, documented Ms. Elam as

having frequent diarrhea and continuing to have

excoriation to her perineum and buttocks. Ms. Parris

notified Ms. Elam' s primary care provider that she

would no longer be receiving vancomycin at the end of

her shift and received an order from the primary care

provider to obtain a stool sample and continue with

Pet. App. 56

contact precautions for C. diff until her lab results

were available. On June 22, 2020, Ms. Elam's lab

results showed that she no longer had C. diff. Ms.

Elam's weight, however, had dropped to 132 pounds

by this time, as mentioned above, and her buttocks

continued to be "very red but blanche [ d]" with the

skin intact. Ms. Elam met with Dr. Tovar, who noted

that she appeared to be somewhat confused and

that her dinner tray was untouched. Ms. Elam also

met with Ms. Richmond on June 23, 2020. Ms.

Richardson noted that Ms. Elam expressed

frustration about her lack of progress with therapy

and stated that she would like to "die and go to

heaven." Ms. Richmond explored with Ms. Elam the

risk of self-harm, offered counseling services, and

discussed the possibility of taking an antidepressant.

On June 24, 2020, Donna Collins, a nurse at

Brookdale Richmond Place, reported Ms. Elam's

negative lab results for C. diff to Dr. Doodnauth, who

ordered the discontinuance of all contact precautions.

Ms. Collins also documented that Ms. Elam ate less

than 25% of her meals that day and received

encouragement and assistance with her meals. On

June 25, 2020, Ms. Elam was visited by Ms. Mills, who

documented her as being confused and uncomfortable.

Though lab results showed that Ms. Elam' s kidney

function had worsened by this time, Ms. Mills did not

change her treatment plan to include intravenous

fluids or tube feeding at night. June 25, 2020 also was

the last day that Ms. Elam was willing to participate

in physical therapy. Prior to that time, Ms. Elam had

received physical therapy on June 17, 18, 19, 22, and

23, 2020.

Pet. App. 57

On June 26, 2020, Ms. Paris documented a

change in Ms. Elam's condition related to worsening

diarrhea. Ms. Paris noted that Ms. Elam had

approximately five episodes of loose, watery stools and

that her oral intake was poor. Ms. Paris notified Ms.

Elam's primary care provider of the change in her

condition and received new orders to place her on

Xifaxan for her worsening diarrhea. On June 27, 2020,

Angela Young, a nurse at Brookdale Richmond Place,

documented that Ms. Elam continued to have

diarrhea and sought pre-authorization for the

medication ordered by her primary care provider. Ms.

Young noted that Ms. Elam was "restless, crying and

yelling out from time to time," that Ms. Elam's

buttocks were "very red and excoriated" and had

"creams in place," and that Ms. Elam was being

"turned and repositioned as she will allow." On June

28, 2020, Ms. Young noted that Ms. Elam had been

restless and yelling out loudly and refused to get out

of bed for a window visit with her family and to sit in

a chair. Ms. Young further noted that Ms. Elam' s oral

intake was poor, that Ms. Elam denied experiencing

any pain except for the redness to her buttocks, and

that Ms. Elam had been turned side to side. Ms.

Townsend testified that she recalled trying to visit Ms.

Elam with her sisters on this day and that Ms. Elam

refused to come to the window to see them.

By June 29, 2020, records from Brookdale

Richmond Place indicate that the skin was no longer

intact on Ms. Elam' s coccyx and the area had redness

related to incontinence-associated dermatitis, neither

of which was documented by the nursing staff as a

new finding. On the same day, Ms. Elam was visited

Pet. App. 58

by Dr. Tovar after one of her nurses reported that she

has "a lot of diarrhea and her bottom is excoriated."

Dr. Tovar noted that Ms. Elam was lethargic and

complained that her "bottom is hurting." Dr. Tovar

examined Ms. Elam's buttocks and perineum and

noted his observation of "excoriation to buttocks and

peri-area," without reporting any palpation or

visualization of an internal abscess. Dr. Tovar ordered

another round of labs and for Mylanta to be applied to

Ms. Elam's excoriated skin. Chasidy Wicks, a nurse at

Brookdale Richmond Place, documented that staff had

notified Ms. Townsend of Dr. Tovar's new orders and

complied with them. Members of the interdisciplinary

team at Brookdale Richmond Place also exchanged

emails about identifying ways to keep Ms. Elam in

therapy after she refused to participate in it and

scheduled a conference to discuss Ms. Elam' s care for

the next day.

By June 30, 2020, records from Brookdale

Richmond Place indicate that Ms. Elam had developed

leukocytosis (i.e. a high white blood count) and

elevated BUN and creatinine levels, which led to an

acute kidney injury. On the same day, Ms. Townsend

met with members of the nursing staff to discuss Ms.

Elam' s care plan, her recent refusal to participate in

therapy, and the sufficiency of tube feeding to her

overall care. Though Ms. Townsend could not recall

this meeting at the final hearing, she testified that she

knew at this time that Ms. Elam was sick, did not

want to participate in therapy, and never wanted to

be on tube feeding long term. As mentioned above,

June 30, 2020 also was the day that Ms. Dotson

entered an order for Ms. Elam to receive an air

Pet. App. 59

mattress for the first time. Kenneth Yeaples, a nurse

at Brookdale Richmond Place, documented that, in

accordance with Ms. Dotson's order, Ms. Elam was on

an air mattress during the night shift on June 30,

2020.

On July 1, 2020, records from Brookdale

Richmond Place indicate that Ms. Elam had three

open areas on her buttocks, was loud and yelling, and

did not take a sufficient amount of fluids. Ms. Elam

was visited by Ms. Osbourne after the nursing staff at

Brookdale Richmond Place reported that she had

developed skin breakdown on her buttocks and that

her family was conflicted about continuing her tube

feeding. Ms. Osbourne observed that Ms. Elam was

"[p]alliative, but she may be Hospice appropriate at

this time given decline ... [and] she is not eating for

the last few days." Ms. Osbourne also noted that Ms.

Elam was starting to develop skin breakdown "not

just from recent diarrhea but also from decline and

immobility and decreased nutrition outside of [tube

feeding]." After examining the areas of skin

breakdown, Ms. Osbourne identified them as

"[e]xcoriation/yeast to buttocks/groin/inner things

with multiple slough/unstageable areas to buttocks

from combo of immobility and moisture 2/2 to

diarrhea." Ms. Osbourne gave Ms. Elam a diagnosis of

"Failure to Thrive" and did not report palpation or

visualization of an internal abscess. Based on her

observations, Ms. Osbourne issued new orders for

medication, cleansing, topical treatments, and, as

mentioned above, an air mattress. Ms. Osbourne

attempted to contact Ms. Elam' s family to discuss her

visit but was unsuccessful, so she left a voicemail with

Pet. App. 60

Ms. Townsend. On the same day as Ms. Osbourne's

visit, members of the interdisciplinary team at

Brookdale Richmond Place conducted another review

of Ms. Elam's care plan and made updates to it. Mr.

Yeaples also placed a catheter in Ms. Elam to obtain a

culture because of her increased white blood cell count

without reporting any palpation or visualization of an

internal abscess.

On July 2, 2020, records from Brookdale

Richmond Place indicate that Ms. Elam was again

yelling loudly, had unclear or slurred speech, and

continued not to eat or drink. On the following day,

July 3, 2020, the nursing staff at Brookdale Richmond

Place received and reported to Ms. Elam' s primary

care providers lab results showing that she had

another UTI and received orders to administer an

antibiotic. In accordance with Ms. Osbourne's new

orders, Ms. Hinkle cleansed and applied medicated

ointment to areas around Ms. Elam' s sacrum,

perineum, groin, and inner thighs. Ms. Hinkle did not

report any palpation or visualization of an internal

abscess.

On July 4, 2020, Geneva Crawford, a nurse at

Brookdale Richmond Place, documented another

change in Ms. Elam' s condition related to worsening

urinary incontinence. Ms. Crawford reported the

change in Ms. Elam' s condition to her primary care

providers on the same day. On July 5, 2020, records

from Brookdale Richmond Place indicate that Ms.

Elam's cognition and ability to communicate

continued to decline. On July 6, 2020, the same

records indicate that Ms. Elam developed acute

hypoxic respiratory failure, with her oxygen

Pet. App. 61

saturation level dropping to as low as 85%. Ms. Elam'

s weekly skin integrity review also identified three

open wounds on her buttocks with multiple areas of

slough, redness, and yellow tissues. Ms. Young

contacted Dr. Doodnauth and obtained an order for

oxygen to maintain Ms. Elam's saturation level above

90%. After carrying out Dr. Doodnauth's order, Ms.

Young documented that Ms. Elam's oxygen saturation

level increased to 90 to 92% with no cyanosis or

labored breathing. As mentioned above, the night of

July 6, 2020 also appears to have been the first night

since June 30 that Ms. Elam was not on an air

mattress.

On July 7, 2020, records from Brookdale

Richmond Place indicate that Ms. Elam continued not

to eat or drink, exhibited confusion, disorientation,

and lethargy, was yelling out in pain, and had a strong

odor of urine. Ms. Elam met with Ms. Garrett for a

follow-up visit. Ms. Garrett documented a

conversation with Ms. Elam' s sister during which the

sister stated that Ms. Elam never wanted to be on

tube feeding long term or to live the way she was

living and that Ms. Elam's family wanted to receive

consultation for hospice care. Ms. Garrett entered an

order for the nursing staff at Brookdale Richmond

Place to request consultation for hospice care soon

given Ms. Elam' s hyponatremia (i. e. a low level of

sodium in the blood) and acute kidney injury, which

was carried out promptly by Ms. Young on the same

day. As mentioned above, Ms. Young was not on an air

mattress at all on July 7, 2020.

On July 8, 2020, records from Brookdale

Richmond Place indicate that Ms. Elam continued to

Pet. App. 62

have diarrhea, which she also had had on July 1, 2, 4,

6, and 7, with large bowel movements during both the

morning and afternoon shifts. Ms. Elam was back on

an air mattress by morning and had her tube feedings

and water flushes as scheduled, with the last

supplemental feeding and water flush occurring at or

around 6:00 p.m. In the late evening, Ms. Elam went

into pulmonary distress with a drop in her oxygen

saturation level. Ms. Elam's primary care providers

and family were notified by the nursing staff at

Brookdale Richmond Place, and an order was entered

by Ms. Elam' s primary care providers to send her to

the hospital. At approximately 10: 12 p.m., Ms. Elam

left Brookdale Richmond Place and was transported

by ambulance to UK Medical Center. EMS personnel

noted that Ms. Elam had altered mental status and

used a non-breather mask to deliver high

concentrations of oxygen to her while in transit to UK

Medical Center.

D. Ms. Elam's Final Hospitalization and

Death

Ms. Elam arrived at UK Medical Center on July

8, 2020 at 10:27 p.m. Ms. Elam was first evaluated by

a physician in the emergency department at 11 :55

p.m., over 90 minutes after her departure from

Brookdale Richmond Place and at least six hours after

she had last received any hydration or nutrition

intake. The physician noted that Ms. Elam had

"impressively dry" mucous membranes at the time of

his evaluation. Between July 8 and 9, 2020, Ms.

Elam's treating physicians at UK Medical Center

diagnosed her with sepsis, a "purulent" UTI,

pneumonia, "severe protein calorie malnutrition," and

Pet. App. 63

multiple pressure ulcers on areas around her sacrum

and buttocks. A CT scan also revealed that Ms. Elam

had a perirectal abscess. Records from UK Medical

Center indicate that Ms. Elam had "frank puss"

coming out of her bladder, along with "[m]ixed

urogenital, fecal or skin flora" in her bladder.

Photographs of the areas where Ms. Elam was

experiencing skin breakdown were taken by hospital

staff almost 18 hours after she left Brookdale

Richmond Place.

On July 9, 2020, Ms. Elam was admitted to

hospice care. According to Ms. Townsend, Ms. Elam

mostly slept and was comfortable while in hospice

care. On July 13, 2020, Ms. Elam passed away. Ms.

Elam' s certificate of death lists several causes of

death, including sepsis, pneumonia, and stroke. All of

the parties' experts agreed that sepsis was the

immediate cause of Ms. Elam' s death.

In total, Ms. Elam's medical expenses for the

period from June 15 to July 13, 2020 were $48,115.47.

Those expenses are for Ms. Elam' s residency at

Brookdale Richmond Place, her hospitalization at UK

Medical Center, and hospice care. Ms. Elam's funeral

and burial expenses amounted to $5,079.19.

E. Expert Opinions

As mentioned above, the Arbitrator heard

testimony during the final hearing from seven expert

witnesses, including Dr. Tisha Barzyk, Dr. John

Cascone, Byron Arbeit, Melissa Todd, Martha Kelso,

Dr. Mark Elam, and Rodney Whittington. Dr. Barzyk

testified on behalf of Ms. Townsend as an expert in

nursing. Dr. Barzyk stated that the nursing staff at

Brookdale Richmond Place failed in its role of acting

Pet. App. 64

as the "eyes and ears" of Ms. Elam' s primary care

providers by failing to detail and document

adequately Mr. Elam's condition, which, she stated,

had a direct impact on the care that Ms. Elam

received. Dr. Barzyk stated that the nursing staffs

documentation was not reflective of what was later

found by Ms. Elam's treating physicians at UK

Medical Center. Dr. Barzyk was critical of the nursing

staffs use of standard wound care terminology in its

initial assessment of Ms. Elam's skin, specifically its

description of the skin breakdown that Ms. Elam was

experiencing as "excoriation" rather than denuded

skin. Dr. Barzyk also was critical of Ms. Elam's skin

assessments not always being signed off by registered

nurses. Dr. Barzyk opined that the static foam

mattress initially provided to Ms. Elam by the nursing

staff was insufficient for pressure redistribution, that

the delay in providing Ms. Elam an air mattress fell

below the standard of care, and that the nursing staff

failed to assess, document, and update the

interventions called for by its care plan for Ms. Elam

based on changes in her condition. Dr. Barzyk was

critical of the nursing staffs concurrent use of multiple

creams and topical ointments on Ms. Elam' s skin,

which, she stated, effectively cancelled each other out

and might have impaired Ms. Elam's skin further. Dr.

Barzyk opined that the nursing staff failed to identify,

assess, and document Ms. Elam' s skin breakdown as

pressure ulcers or as being avoidable and that such

failure disregarded Ms. Elam' s wellbeing and

prevented her from receiving the remedial care that

she needed. Dr. Barzyk also stated that the nursing

staff provided Ms. Elam with an inadequate amount

Pet. App. 65

of fluids daily and failed to document how much fluid

or food that she was actually ingesting.

Dr. Cascone testified on behalf of Ms. Townsend

as an expert in internal medicine and infectious

disease. Dr. Cascone characterized Ms. Elam's

condition upon admission to Brookdale Richmond

Place as normal for residents at nursing homes and

"par for the course." Dr. Cascone opined that the skin

issues identified by the nursing staff at Brookdale

Richmond Place upon Ms. Elam's admission were

different from what is depicted in the photographs

taken by hospital staff at UK Medical Center on July

9, 2020 and that Ms. Elam developed five unstageable

pressure ulcers during her residency at Brookdale

Richmond Place. In addition, Dr. Cascone testified

that Ms. Elam also developed malnutrition,

dehydration, and a perirectal abscess during her

residency at Brookdale Richmond Place, which, he

stated, were all missed by the nursing staff and

allowed to flourish until she went to UK Medical

Center, by which time she already had developed

sepsis. Dr. Cascone stated that Ms. Elam entered

Brookdale

Richmond

Place

for

short-term

rehabilitation, speech, and occupational care with the

goal of returning home but had a significant decline in

her health that was manifested by severe pain and

yelling, which distracted her from her therapy, and

that the nursing staff failed to evaluate Ms. Elam

thoroughly to see why she continued to yell and

scream in pain. Dr. Cascone testified that the nursing

staff could have taken several simple measures to

prevent injury and harm to Ms. Elam, including

providing her with the hydration and nutrition she

Pet. App. 66

required, evaluating her on a daily basis,

investigating why she was screaming and yelling,

examining her perineum and buttocks after she

complained of pain in those areas, reporting her dusky

skin and labored respirations to her primary care

providers, assessing her caloric intake, and

recommending feedings at night to her primary care

providers to address her lack of oral and dietary

intake, but failed to do so. Dr. Cascone stated that the

nursing staff failed to measure, describe, and stage

Ms. Elam' s wounds and that those failures prevented

it from communicating her overall condition and the

downward trajectory of her health to her primary care

providers effectively. Dr. Cascone was critical of the

way that the nursing staff documented changes in Ms.

Elam's behavior and stated that the nursing staff

failed to advocate for Ms. Elam or to inform her

primary care providers adequately concerning the

dramatic decline in her health. Similar to Dr. Barzyk,

Dr. Cascone testified that, as the "eyes and ears" of

Ms. Elam's primary care providers, the nursing staff

had a duty to relay adequate information to her

primary care providers between visits and that the

nursing staff most likely

failed to fulfill this duty because of inaccuracies in

their nursing notes. Dr. Cascone testified that the

hypoxic respiratory failure experienced by Ms. Elam

on July 6, 2020 was indicative of organ dysfunction

and most likely caused by sepsis and that the nursing

staff should have sent Ms. Elam to the hospital

immediately for an evaluation. Dr. Cascone also

stated that the 60-hour delay in sending Ms. Elam to

UK Medical Center affected her mortality directly and

Pet. App. 67

that, if Ms. Elam had gone to the hospital on July 6,

2020, she more likely than not would have survived

given that the mortality of sepsis functions on an

exponential curve, with every minute of delay

significantly increasing the risk of mortality.

Mr. Arbeit testified on behalf of Ms. Townsend

as an expert in the administration of nursing homes.

Mr. Arbeit stated that an administrator of a nursing

home is the last line of internal defense and protection

of residents' rights and care. Mr. Arbeit opined that,

as the administrator of Brookdale Richmond Place,

Ms. Stocker failed in her role and responsibility to

monitor, coordinate, and evaluate the quality of care

of each resident, appropriately tailor discipline or

terminate the practice of anybody in the nursing

home, clinician or otherwise, who

compromises the nursing home's policies or

governmental regulations, and to ensure a safe

environment for residents, competent staff, and an

efficient and effective nursing home. Mr. Arbeit

testified that the Defendants committed a plethora of

violations of state and federal regulations during Ms.

Elam's residency, including those regarding skin care,

nutritional care, hydrational care, abuse and neglect,

and inadequate care. Mr. Arbeit criticized the

accuracy and consistency of the documentation in Ms.

Elam' s records from Brookdale Richmond Place. Mr.

Arbeit also was highly critical of Ms. Stocker's

testimony, stating that it displayed a lack of basic

understanding of the duties and standards applicable

to her administrative role.

Ms. Todd testified on behalf of the Defendants

as an expert in nursing. Ms. Todd opined that the care

Pet. App. 68

plan developed for Ms. Elam by the nursing staff at

Brookdale Richmond Place was appropriate and

addressed all known areas of concern, including Ms.

Elam's skin breakdown and persistent diarrhea. Ms.

Todd stated that the nursing staff complied with all

orders from Ms. Elam's primary care providers and

categorized the frequent contact between the nursing

staff and Ms. Elam' s primary care providers as very

good, particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Ms. Todd testified that the standard of care requires

an individualized plan for turning and

repositioning each resident and that both Ms. Elam' s

care plan and the nursing staff met this standard. Ms.

Todd stated that the nursing staff communicated Ms.

Elam's skin breakdown to her primary care providers

effectively and that the nursing staffs failure to use

the term "pressure ulcer" did not alter the impression

created by its communications. Ms. Todd stated that

the nursing staff would not have been able to palpate

or visualize the perirectal abscess later identified by

Ms. Elam's treating physicians at UK Medical Center.

Ms. Todd testified that all skin care provided to Ms.

Elam by the nursing staff was appropriate, including

the use of

multiple creams and topical ointments in accordance

with orders by Ms. Elam's primary care providers. Ms.

Todd stated that the nursing staff met the standard of

care related to nutritional and hydrational care, that

Ms. Elam' s primary care providers were aware of her

intake and entered appropriate orders, and that the

nursing staff were not allowed to change any orders

from Ms. Elam's primary care providers and did not

need to push back against them. Ms. Todd also

Pet. App. 69

testified that the nursing staff acted appropriately in

investigating instances of Ms. Elam yelling and

screaming and in contacting her primary care

providers to report that she was in pain.

Ms. Kelso testified on behalf of the Defendants

as an expert in wound care. Ms. Kelso stated that

pressure, radiation, and end of life all contributed to

the wounds characterized by Ms. Elam's treating

physicians at UK Medical Center as pressure ulcers.

Ms. Kelso testified that the nursing staff at Brookdale

Richmond Place complied with and, in some instances,

exceeded the standard of care in treating Ms. Elam' s

skin breakdown. Ms. Kelso stated that the

photographs of Ms. Elam's wounds from UK Medical

Center on July 9, 2020 depict a horseshoe pattern that

is prevalent in end-of- life wounds and that such

wounds are no longer referred to as pressure wounds.

Ms. Kelso testified that the nursing staff followed all

orders from Ms. Elam's primary care providers related

to skin care and that she saw no reason for

challenging any of those orders. Ms. Kelso stated that

the nursing staff documented adequately the changes

in Ms. Elam' s

behavior and cognition and acted appropriately in not

labeling Ms. Elam' s skin breakdown as pressure

ulcers. Ms. Kelso testified that pressure ulcers can

develop in as little as two hours and Ms. Elam' s

wounds were unavoidable. Ms. Kelso also noted that

no member of the nursing staff or any of Ms. Elam's

primary care providers palpated or visualized the

perirectal abscess later identified by CT scan at UK

Medical Center.

Dr. Elam testified on behalf of the Defendants

Pet. App. 70

as an expert in internal, geriatric, and hospice

medicine. Dr. Elam stated that the nursing staff at

Brookdale Richmond Place met all applicable

standards of care during Ms. Elam' s residency. Dr.

Elam testified that the care plan for Ms. Elam and all

assessments and interventions by the nursing staff

were appropriate. Dr. Elam testified that he was very

impressed by the communication between the nursing

staff and Ms. Elam's primary care providers and by

the number of times that Ms. Elam's primary care

providers visited her in person. Dr. Elam stated that

Ms. Elam's primary care providers were aware of her

significant skin breakdown, knew exactly what was

going on with her, and gave her a high level of care

through their orders to the nursing staff. Dr. Elam

testified that the pause in Ms. Elam's being on an air

mattress from the night of July 6 to the morning of

July 8, 2020 was not likely to have resulted in any

harm to her. Dr. Elam stated that all orders from Ms.

Elam's primary care providers related to nutrition

and hydration were adequate, that Ms. Elam was

receiving at least two liters of fluid daily, and that the

nursing staff acted reasonably in following and not

challenging the orders from Ms. Elam's primary care

providers. Dr. Elam stated that Ms. Elam did not need

to go to the hospital immediately after she

experienced hypoxic respiratory failure on July 6,

2020. Though agreeing with Dr. Cascone's conclusion

that sepsis was the immediate cause of Ms. Elam's

death, Dr. Elam noted that none of Ms. Elam's

treating physicians at UK Medical Center associated

it with her wounds. Dr. Elam stated that he believed

that Ms. Elam' s fistula contributed to the infection

Pet. App. 71

that resulted in her becoming septic. Dr. Elam also

testified that Ms. Elam was in a gradual decline and

severely debilitated after her stroke in mid-May 2020,

that Ms. Elam did not get better during her stay at

Cardinal Hill, and that the nursing staff at Brookdale

Richmond Place did nothing to contribute to Ms.

Elam' s death.

Lastly, Mr. Whittington testified on behalf of

the Defendants as an expert in the administration of

nursing homes. Mr. Whittington described how, in a

nursing home, the nursing staff communicates

upwards to the primary care providers, that the

primary care providers issue orders for managing a

resident's health, and that the nursing staff should

follow the orders issued by the primary care providers.

Mr. Whittington testified that, within this framework,

the nursing staff at Brookdale Richmond Place

communicated well with and followed all orders

issued by Ms. Elam's primary care providers. Mr.

Whittington testified that, under the circumstances,

Ms. Stocker's administrative responsibilities did not

call for her to intervene in Ms. Elam's care.

III. Conclusions of Law

Ms. Townsend asserts claims against the

Defendants for negligence, medical negligence,

corporate negligence, wrongful death, violations of

Kentucky's long-term care residents' rights statute,

KRS 216.515, and punitive damages arising from Ms.

Elam's residency at Brookdale Richmond Place.

A. Negligence and Wrongful Death

To prevail on her claims for negligence, Ms.

Townsend must prove, by a preponderance of the

Pet. App. 72

evidence, the existence of a duty, breach of that duty,

and an injury resulting from the breach. Blankenship

v. Collier, 302 S.W.3d 665, 675 (Ky. 2010); Keaton v.

G.C. Williams Funeral Home, Inc., 436 S.W.3d 538,

542 (Ky. App. 2013). The duty of care owed by a

nursing home to a resident consists of that level of

care that one would expect from a reasonably prudent

nursing home or medical provider. Lake Cumberland

Reg 'I Hosp., LLC v. Adams, 536 S.W.3d 683,695 (Ky.

2017); Wright v. House o/Imports, Inc., 381 S.W.3d

209, 213 (Ky. 2012).

Under Kentucky law, an employer may be held

vicariously liable for the negligent acts of his or her

agent but generally is not liable for the conduct of an

independent contractor. Nazar v. Branham, 291

S.W.3d 599, 606-07 (Ky. 2009). An employer can be

liable for its failure to exercise ordinary care in the

management and supervision of employees and

activities when that management or supervision

causes harm to someone else. Smith v. Isaacs, 777

S.W.2d 912, 914 (Ky. 1989) (citing Restatement

(Second) of Agency § 213). See also McDonald's Corp.

v. Ogborn, 309 S.W.3d 274, 291 (Ky. 2009); Oakley v.

Flor-Shin, Inc., 964 S.W.2d 438, 442 (Ky. App. 1998).

A tortfeasor "takes the claimant as he finds him and

is entitled neither a credit nor setoff against the

amount of the claimant's damages because of

preexisting physical conditions which make the

claimant more susceptible to injury, or to greater

injury, than would have been the case with better

health." Morgan v. Scott, 291 S.W.3d 622, 640-41 (Ky.

2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

And, where "a substantial personal injury is

Pet. App. 73

sustained, suffering is presumed and need not be

proven." Schriewer v. Schworer, 178 S.W.2d 598, 599

(Ky. 1944).

To recover for wrongful death, Ms. Townsend

must prove that the "death of a person results from an

injury inflicted by the negligence or wrongful act of

another." KRS 411.130(1). Funeral expenses,

including the cost of a tombstone, are recoverable in

an action for wrongful death. See KRS 395.370;

Square Deal Cartage Co. v. Smith's Adm'r, 210

S.W.2d 340,345-46 (Ky. 1948).

Based on his review of the record and relevant

legal authorities, the Arbitrator must hold that Ms.

Townsend has failed to meet her burden of proving her

claims for negligence and wrongful death. The

Arbitrator cannot conclude that the Defendants

breached any of their duties to Ms. Elam. Even if the

Arbitrator could conclude that the Defendants

breached one or more of their duties, Ms. Townsend

has failed to prove that Ms. Elam' s death resulted

from the breach. The absence of proof on anyone of the

required elements is fatal to a claim for negligence. M

& T Chemicals, Inc. v. Westrick, 525 S.W.2d 740,741

(Ky. 1974).

The testimony and documentary evidence

demonstrate that the nursing staff at Brookdale

Richmond Place developed and implemented an

appropriate care plan for Ms. Elam. Upon Ms. Elam's

admission on June 15, 2020, Ms. Hatfield completed

an interim care plan for Ms. Elam with interventions

based on her needs, including bathing, fall risk, skin,

communication deficits, visual function, cognitive

loss, and feeding tube for nutrition and hydration. By

Pet. App. 74

June 18, 2020, Ms. Elam had a comprehensive care

plan in place with focus areas and interventions for

infection, mood, skin integrity, COVID-19, bowel and

bladder issues, fall risk, altered diet, impaired

functional ability, advanced directives, medications,

impaired mobility, and stroke related complications.

The testimony and documentary evidence show that

the nursing staff implemented all of the interventions

called for by Ms. Elam' s care plan and that Ms. Elam'

scare plan was updated regularly based on changes in

her condition. Ms. Elam' s care plan for skin integrity,

for example, was updated no less than six times

during her residency, including on June 18, June 19,

June 23, July 1, July 4, and July 6, 2020. In light of

these well documented changes, the Arbitrator was

not persuaded by Dr. Barzyk's testimony concerning

the inadequacy of the nursing staff s updates to Ms.

Elam' s care plan.

The testimony and documentary evidence also

demonstrate that the nursing staff at Brookdale

Richmond Place completed adequate assessments and

observations of Ms. Elam, including upon admission,

in daily comprehensive nursing notes, and through

collaborative care reviews, change-in-condition

evaluations, and multidisciplinary progress notes.

The nursing staff completed comprehensive nursing

notes every day of Ms. Elam's residency. Those daily

notes were reviewed regularly by supervisory nurses

and clinical management in daily morning meetings

and by Ms. Elam' s primary care providers. The

assessments and ongoing observations established a

baseline and documented developments with respect

to Ms. Elam's skin breakdown, incontinence, and

Pet. App. 75

stroke-related deficits affecting her mobility, speech,

and cognition, and nutritional and hydrational status,

among other issues.

The Arbitrator finds the testimony of the

Defendants' experts to be more credible on the issue of

whether the nursing staff at Brookdale Richmond

Place communicated effectively with Ms. Elam's

primary care providers concerning her condition and

changes therein. The testimony and documentary

evidence demonstrate that the nursing staff provided

frequent updates to Ms. Elam's primary care

providers concerning changes in her condition,

including on June 20, June 24, June 26, June 27, June

29, July 1, July 3, July 4, July 6, and July 8, 2020. Ms.

Elam's primary care providers also met with her in

person on seven different occasions, including on June

16, June 18, June 22, June 25, June 29, July 1, and

July 7, 2020. The Arbitrator can find nothing in the

record to support the suggestion by Ms. Townsend's

experts that Ms. Elam's primary care providers were

unaware of the true state of her condition. The

documentation completed by Ms. Elam's primary care

providers, including Dr. Tovar, Ms. Mills, and Ms.

Osbourne, show an awareness of the major issues

facing her, including her diarrhea and incontinence,

her skin breakdown, the alterations in her cognition

and mood, and the challenges associated with

ensuring that she was receiving adequate nutrition

and hydration. Ms. Townsend's experts also failed to

convince the Arbitrator that Ms. Elam's primary care

providers would or could have done anything

differently in their care and treatment of Ms. Elam if

the nursing staff had supplied the information that

Pet. App. 76

they claimed was missing from its communications

and documentation.

With respect to nutritional and hydrational

care, the testimony and documentary evidence

demonstrate that the nursing staff at Brookdale

Richmond Place complied with all orders from Ms.

Elam's primary care providers as required by federal

and state regulations. See 42 C.F.R 483.25(h); 902

KAR 20:048 § 4(11 )(a). The nursing staff provided all

enteral and supplemental feeding and hydration

called for by the orders of Ms. Elam' s primary care

providers. On numerous occasions, the nursing staff

documented and communicated to Ms. Elam' s

primary care providers that her oral intake was poor

and that she was refusing to eat and drink. The

documentation completed by Ms. Elam' s primary care

providers demonstrate that they were well aware of

the problems that she was facing in terms of receiving

adequate nutrition and hydration. Given the variety

of factors complicating Ms. Elam' s nutritional and

hydrational care, including her diarrhea, her repeated

refusal to eat and drink, and her family's reluctance

to continue with tube feeding, Ms. Townsend's experts

failed to convince the Arbitrator that the nursing staff

had any reason to question the orders of her primary

care physicians or could have done anything

differently to ensure that she received adequate

nutrition and hydration.

With respect to skin care, the testimony and

documentary evidence demonstrate that Ms. Elam

was assessed correctly upon admission by the nursing

staff at Brookdale Richmond Place as being at high

risk for skin breakdown. Ms. Elam received a care

Pet. App. 77

plan with interventions for skin breakdown associated

with moisture and incontinence, which was updated

regularly during her residency based on changes in

her condition. The nursing staff implemented all of

the interventions called for by Ms. Elam' s care plan

related to turning, repositioning, and bathing and

complied with all orders from Ms. Elam' s primary

care providers related to the application of creams and

topical ointments to and the cleansing of areas where

she was experiencing skin breakdown. The nursing

staff also monitored and documented Ms. Elam' s skin

breakdown and communicated their observations to

her primary care providers. Though the nursing staff

might not have used the terminology preferred by Ms.

Townsend's experts, the documentation completed by

Ms. Elam' s primary care providers show that they

were well aware of the problems that she was facing

with skin breakdown. The Arbitrator also cannot be

certain that Ms. Elam had developed the precise

wounds shown in the photographs taken by the

hospital staff at UK Medical Center on July 9, 2020

during her residency at Brookdale Richmond Place.

Given her expertise in wound care, the Arbitrator

finds Ms. Kelso's testimony concerning these issues to

be highly compelling.

The only questionable issue related to the skin

care received by Ms. Elam during her residency at

Brookdale Richmond Place pertains to the nursing

staff s provision of a mattress for pressure

redistribution. The Arbitrator heard conflicting

testimony as to whether the static foam mattress

initially given to Ms. Elam by the nursing staff

provided any pressure redistribution as called for by

Pet. App. 78

her care plan. The Arbitrator does not find Dr.

Barzyk's testimony concerning this issue to be any

more credible than that of several other witnesses who

stated that the static foam mattresses utilized by

Brookdale Richmond Place, including the one initially

given to Ms. Elam, do provide pressure redistribution.

The testimony and documentary evidence do show

unequivocally that the nursing staff did provide Ms.

Elam with an air mattress eventually, which is what

Dr. Barzyk testified was the standard of care. The

testimony and documentary evidence are inconclusive

in terms of showing what caused Ms. Elam not to be

on an air mattress from the night of July 6 to the

morning of July 8, 2020, with multiple witnesses

stating that it likely was because the air mattress

malfunctioned, which, if true, would not necessarily

involve any violation of the standard of care by

Brookdale Richmond Place or its nursing staff. Under

the circumstances, the Arbitrator cannot conclude

that Brookdale Richmond Place violated the standard

of care by failing to provide Ms. Elam an appropriate

mattress for pressure redistribution at any time

during her residency.

The Arbitrator also cannot conclude that the

nursing staff at Brookdale Richmond Place violated

the standard of care by failing to transfer Ms. Elam to

the hospital when she experienced

hypoxic respiratory failure on July 6, 2020 or by

failing to identify her perirectal abscess. As Ms.

Dotson testified, except in the case of emergencies,

state regulations required the nursing staff to consult

with a physician before transferring or discharging

Ms. Elam. See 902 KAR 20:048 § 3(8)( d). The

Pet. App. 79

testimony and documentary evidence demonstrate

that the nursing staff communicated the drop in Ms.

Elam's oxygen saturation level to her primary care

providers promptly after it occurred. The nursing staff

then received and followed all orders from Ms. Elam's

primary care provider, who did not consider Ms. Elam'

s condition to be serious enough for her to be

transferred to the hospital. Ms. Elam's oxygen

saturation level then increased to 90 to 92% with no

cyanosis or labored breathing. Under the

circumstances, the Arbitrator finds Dr. Elam's

testimony more compelling than that of Dr. Cascone

on the issue of whether the nursing staff violated the

standard of care by failing to transfer Ms. Elam to the

hospital immediately after she started experiencing

hypoxic respiratory failure.

With respect to the perirectal abscess, the

Arbitrator finds little credibility in Dr. Cascone's

assertion that it should have been discovered by the

nursing staff at Brookdale Richmond Place prior to

her final hospitalization at UK Medical Center. The

testimony and documentary evidence demonstrate

that several members of the nursing staff and Ms.

Elam' s primary care providers examined and

palpated the area where the perirectal abscess was

later identified by CT scan without discovering it. For

example, Dr. Tovar examined the area on June 29,

2020 when Ms. Elam told him that her bottom was

hurting and did not discover a perirectal abscess. Ms.

Osbourne examined the area on July 1, 2020 and did

not discover a perirectal abscess. Mr. Yeaples placed

a catheter in Ms. Elam later on the same day and did

not discover a perirectal abscess. Neither Ms. Hinkle

Pet. App. 80

nor any of the several other nurses who administered

wound care to Ms. Elam, including cleansing and

applying creams and topical ointments in the areas of

her skin breakdown, documented the existence of a

perirectal abscess. Not even Ms. Elam's treating

physicians at UK Medical Center diagnosed her with

a perirectal abscess by palpation or visualization

alone. Based on the evidence In the record, the

Arbitrator finds substantial merit in the testimony of

the Defendants' experts that the nursing staff at

Brookdale Richmond Place met all applicable

standards of care during Ms. Elam' s residency. Any

deficiencies iri the care and treatment provided to Ms.

Elam by her primary care providers cannot be the

basis for imposing liability on Brookdale Richmond

Place because Ms. Elam' s primary care providers

acted as independent contractors, not agents of

Brookdale Richmond Place. In the absence of any

substandard care on the part of the nursing staff, the

Arbitrator finds no credibility in Mr. Arbeit's

testimony that Ms. Stocker breached her duties as the

last line of defense and protector of Ms. Elam's rights.

Ms. Townsend also failed to put forth any evidence

that Brookdale Richmond Place was understaffed or

lacked the resources to provide care for Ms. Elam.

None of the witnesses testified that they had any

concerns about Brookdale Richmond Place's staffing

or resources. Ms. Townsend did not identify any

policies of Brookdale Richmond Place with which any

member of its staff failed to comply during Ms. Elam's

residency. Nor did Ms. Townsend present any

evidence from which the Arbitrator could conclude

that the Non-Facility Defendants had any

Pet. App. 81

involvement in Ms. Elam's care, much less breached

any duties to her.

Even if the Arbitrator could find that the

Defendants breached one or more duties to Ms. Elam,

Ms. Townsend has failed to prove that Ms. Elam' s

death was caused by the breach. The parties' experts

agreed that the immediate cause of Ms. Elam's death

was sepsis. No treating provider or expert has

suggested or opined that any conduct by the

Defendants caused Ms. Elam to develop the infection

that was the source of her sepsis. The testimony and

documentary evidence also demonstrate that Ms.

Elam had a vesicovaginal fistula that was not known

by the nursing staff at Brookdale Richmond Place and

could very well have been the cause of the infection

that resulted in her sepsis in early July 2020. Ms.

Elam's fistula had even been identified by her treating

physicians as the cause of her sepsis in late April and

early May 2020, which preceded her residency at

Brookdale Richmond Place. The symptoms associated

with Ms. Elam's fistula-caused sepsis in late April and

early May 2020 also were strikingly similar to what

she experienced after her discharge from Brookdale

Richmond Place in early July of the same year.

For the foregoing reasons, the Arbitrator holds

that Ms. Townsend has failed to meet her burden of

proving her claims for negligence and wrongful death.

B. Violations of Kentucky's Long-Term

Care Residents' Rights Statute

KRS 216.515 provides a cause of action for the

violation of a long-term care residents' rights, as

enumerated under its 26 subsections. The only claims

under KRS 216.515 that survive the death of a

Pet. App. 82

resident are those that are indistinguishable from

traditional claims for personal injury under the

common law. See Overstreet v. Kindred Nursing Ctrs.

Ltd. P'ship, 479 S.W.3d 69, 78 (Ky. 2015). Having

concluded that Ms. Townsend has failed to establish

any negligence on the part of the Defendants, the

Arbitrator also must conclude that her claims under

KRS 216.515 fail as well. The testimony and

documentary evidence do not permit the conclusion

that the Defendants violated any of Ms. Elam's rights

under KRS 216.515. For that reason, the Arbitrator

holds that Ms. Townsend has failed to meet her

burden of proving her claims under KRS 216.515.

C. Punitive Damages

The purpose of punitive damages is to "punish

and discourage [the defendant] and others from

similar conduct in the future." Osborne v. Keeney, 399

S.W.3d 1, 20 (Ky. 2012). In contrast, the purpose of

compensatory damages is to "make the injured party

whole to the extent that it is possible to measure his

injury in terms of money." Id. (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted). Punitive damages

therefore have "nothing to do with a plaintiffs loss or

making the plaintiff whole." Id Rather, punitive

damages "serve a broader function ... aimed at

deterrence and retribution." Id (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted). In matters involving

allegations of gross negligence, punitive damages

require a showing of "wanton or reckless disregard for

the lives, safety, or property of others." Horton v.

Union Light, Heat & Power Co., 690 S.W.2d 382, 38788 (Ky. 1985) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Gross negligence may result from several acts, even if

Pet. App. 83

a single act might not itself constitute gross

negligence. Id. at 388. By statute, the following factors

must be considered by the finder of fact in determining

the amount of punitive damages to assess: (1) the

likelihood at the relevant time that serious harm

would arise from the defendant's misconduct; (2) the

degree of the defendant's awareness of that likelihood;

(3) the profitability of the misconduct to the

defendant; (4) the duration of the misconduct and any

concealment of it by the defendant; and (5) any actions

by the defendant to remedy the misconduct once it

became known to the defendant. KRS 411.186.

Having concluded that Ms. Townsend has

failed to prove any negligence on the part of the

Defendants, the Arbitrator also must conclude that

her claim for punitive damages fails as well. The

testimony and documentary do not permit the

conclusion that the Defendants acted with wanton or

reckless disregard of Ms. Elam's health and wellbeing.

For that reason, the Arbitrator holds that an award of

punitive damages is not appropriate under the

circumstances.

IV. Judgment

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND

ADJUDGED that the Defendants are entitled to

judgment in their favor on all claims asserted against

them by Ms. Townsend arising from Ms. Elam's

residency at Brookdale Richmond Place from June 15

to July 8, 2020.

As set forth in section 13 of the parties'

arbitration

agreement

(the

"Confidentiality

Provision'} this "arbitration proceeding shall remain

Pet. App. 84

confidential in all respects." The Confidentiality

Provision applies to "all arbitration filings, deposition

transcripts, documents produced or obtained in

discovery, or other material provided by and

exchanged between the parties and the arbitrator's

findings of fact and conclusions of law." The

Confidentiality Provision also applies to "the amount

of the arbitration award or any settlement, the names

of the parties, or the name/location of the [facility]

except as required by law." Unless and until the

Arbitrator or a court of law shall make an additional

or contrary ruling, no party or their agent shall

disclose such confidential records for any purpose

other than this arbitration.

These Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,

and .Judgment are final and appealable.

/s/ Tom McDonald

TOM MCDONALD

ARBITRATOR

Date Signed: 6/24/24

Pet. App. 85

APPENDIX F

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT

DIVISION 7

CIVIL ACTION NO.: 21-CI-01993

In Arbitration

BONNIE TOWNSEND, EXECUTRIX,

ESTATE OF LINDA ELAM

PLAINTIFF

v.

PLAINTIFF’S PROPOSED

FINDINGS OF FACT,

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND

JUDGMENT

[served May 15, 2024]

BLC LEXINGTON SNF,

LLC d/b/a BROOKDALE

RICHMOND PLACE SNF

d/b/a RICHMOND PLACE

REHABILITATION AND

HEALTH

CENTER;

BECKY STOCKER, in her

capacity as Administrator

of

BROOKDALE

RICHMOND PLACE SNF;

et al.

DEFENDANTS

Pet. App. 86

This matter came on for Arbitration from April

22, 2024, to April 29, 2024 at the office of Stoll Keenon

Ogden PLLC, 300 West Vine Street, Suite 2100,

Lexington, Kentucky 40507.

The Plaintiff was represented by Todd Varellas

and Jeremy Prichard of Varellas & Varellas PLLC.

The Defendants were represented by Kif Skidmore

and Connor Egan of Stoll Keenon Ogden PLLC. The

presiding Arbitrator was the Honorable Judge (Ret.)

Tom McDonald.

The parties presented evidence and made

arguments concerning the claims made by Plaintiff

Bonnie Townsend, Executrix of the Estate of Linda

Elam (“Plaintiff”) against Defendant BLC Lexington

SNF, LLC d/b/a Brookdale Richmond Place SNF d/b/a

Richmond Place Rehabilitation and Health Center

(Defendant “Brookdale Richmond Place” or the

“facility”) and Defendant Becky Stocker, in her

capacity as Administrator of Brookdale Richmond

Place SNF (both collectively sometimes referred to as

“Defendants”).

The Arbitrator requested that the parties

submit their respective Proposed Findings of Fact,

Conclusions of Law, and Judgment.

The Arbitrator having heard the testimony,

reviewed the record, and being otherwise sufficiently

advised, enters the following Findings of Fact,

Conclusions of Law, and Judgment.

BURDEN OF PROOF

In civil actions, the plaintiff must prove her

claims by a preponderance of the evidence,

CertainTeed v. Dexter, 330 S.W.3d 64, 73 (Ky. 2010),

Pet. App. 87

which is a more likely than not standard. See, e.g.,

Strong v. Gary, 673 S.W. 3d 77, 80 (Ky. App. 2023).

Under this standard, the Arbitrator finds and

concludes as follows:

FINDINGS OF FACT

1.

The Plaintiff is Bonnie Townsend,

Executrix of the Estate of Linda Elam (“Plaintiff”).

2.

The

parties

introduced

evidence

regarding claims against Defendant BLC Lexington

SNF, LLC d/b/a Brookdale Richmond Place SNF d/b/a

Richmond Place Rehabilitation and Health Center

(Defendant “Brookdale Richmond Place” or the

“facility”) and Defendant Becky Stocker, in her

capacity as Administrator of Brookdale Richmond

Place SNF (both collectively sometimes referred to as

“Defendants”).

3.

Brookdale Richmond Place is a skilled

nursing home facility, providing total needs care to

residents including Linda Elam.

4.

Linda Elam was a resident at the

Brookdale Richmond Place facility from June 15, 2020

to July 8, 2020.

5.

Defendant administrator Becky Stocker

was the administrator of the facility during the period

of Linda Elam’s residency.

6.

902

KAR

20:048

pertaining

to

“Operation and services; nursing homes,” provides as

follows: “Section 3. Administration and Operation. . .

. (2) Administrator. (a) All facilities shall have an

administrator who is responsible for the operation of

the facility.”

A.

Linda Elam’s UK HealthCare Treatment

from May 13, 2020 through May 26, 2020

Pet. App. 88

7.

Linda Elam, who was 76 years old, was

admitted to UK HealthCare from May 13, 2020,

through May 26, 2020, for a cerebrovascular incident

(“CVA”).

8.

Ms. Elam was discharged from UK

HealthCare with a PEG tube in place with her

consent. She was diagnosed with acute ischemic

stroke, left MCA—embolic, dysphagia, and acute

injury.

9.

Upon discharge from UK HealthCare,

Ms. Elam’s neurologic exam revealed no spontaneous

right upper and lower extremities movements. She

was noted to be oriented time, place, and self, and able

to follow commands.

10.

Ms. Elam’s granddaughter, Breanne

Lutes, testified that Ms. Elam was able to ambulate

and communicate while she was recovering at UK

Healthcare on multiple occasions while visiting her.

She also testified that Ms. Elam was cognitive

throughout their conversations during Ms. Elam’s

stay at UK HealthCare during the month of May 2020.

She further testified that her grandmother had a

strong spirit and desire to return home to her family

and dog.

11.

Ms.

Elam’s

grandson,

Steven

Richardson, testified that his grandmother was able

to ambulate and communicate while she was

recovering at UK Healthcare on multiple occasions

while seeing her through FaceTime video. He further

testified that Ms. Elam was cognitive throughout

their conversations during Ms. Elam’s stay at UK

HealthCare during the month of May 2020.

12.

Upon discharge, UK HealthCare noted

Pet. App. 89

that Ms. Elam had increased wakefulness during her

stay with speech improvement and the ability to

communicate her needs. She was discharged to

Cardinal Hill Rehabilitation Hospital (“Cardinal

Hill”) for acute rehabilitation in stable condition. (Pl.’s

Exhibit 1).

13.

Ms. Elam was not diagnosed with any

terminal illnesses or conditions during her UK

HealthCare treatment during the month of May 2020.

B.

Linda Elam’s Cardinal Hill Treatment from

May 26, 2020 to June 15, 2020

14.

Upon discharge from UK HealthCare,

Ms. Elam was admitted to Cardinal Hill from May 26,

2020, through June 15, 2020, for temporary acute

rehabilitation following her stroke.

15.

During Ms. Elam’s stay at Cardinal Hill,

it was noted that she was compliant with all therapies

with skin improvement in her perirectal area.

16.

Dr. John Cascone, M.D. testified that

Ms. Elam’s June 12, 2020 progress note documented

Ms. Elam was appropriate with conversation and able

to make her needs known. Additionally, the same

record indicated that Ms. Elam’s skin around the

inner thighs was improving. (Pl.’s Exhibit 34).

17.

On June 12, 2020, while staying at

Cardinal Hill, nurse Amanda Helton documented that

Ms. Elam was more alert with appropriate

conversation.

18.

On June 13, 2020, while staying at

Cardinal Hill, Ms. Elam received nepro continuous

PEG feeds at 35 ml/hour, and free water flushes at 300

cc every 6 hours. According to Dr. Cascone, the nepro

feeding was only at night, she would eat during the

Pet. App. 90

day, and the free water and PEG feedings were

supplementing Ms. Elam’s oral intake.

19.

Ms. Elam’s granddaughter, Breanne

Lutes, testified that she visited Ms. Elam on multiple

occasions during her stay at Cardinal Hill. She also

testified that Ms. Elam continued to improve in

regards to her ambulation, cognition, and speech

while at Cardinal Hill and did not hear Ms. Elam voice

any complaints to her physical well-being.

20.

Ms.

Elam’s

grandson,

Steven

Richardson, testified that at Cardinal Hill she

continued to improve regarding her ambulation,

cognition, and speech. He also testified that during

her stay at Cardinal Hill he did not hear Ms. Elam

voice any complaints regarding her physical wellbeing.

21.

Bonnie Townsend, Ms. Elam’s sister and

her power of attorney, testified that she would visit

Ms. Elam while she was at Cardinal Hill, and she was

noticeably better and progressing there.

22.

On June 15, 2020, Ms. Elam’s laboratory

records at Cardinal Hill showed the following: sodium

134 (reference range: 138-146), BUN 35, Creatinine

1.48, Albumin 2.4 (referenced range: 3.5-5.0), WBC

6.3, and Hemoglobin 9.9. (Pl.’s Exhibit 5).

23.

Dr. Cascone noted that during the time

Ms. Elam was at Cardinal Hill, she was able to

communicate her needs, oriented to herself and

surroundings, able to follow commands, and

participated in physical therapy three hours a day and

five days a week, with appropriate progress.

24.

Dr. Cascone noted that Ms. Elam’s

creatinine levels went from 1.58 on May 26, 2020

Pet. App. 91

while at UK HealthCare (Pl.’s Exhibit 2), to 1.48 on

June 12, 2020 while at Cardinal Hill (Pl.’s Exhibit 5).

Dr. Cascone testified that this signified Ms. Elam’s

prior renal failure due to sepsis had returned back to

baseline. Additionally, Dr. Cascone noted that Ms.

Elam’s BUN levels were decreasing from her stay at

UK HealthCare, (Pl.’s Exhibit 2), and reflected

positive hydration.

25.

Ms. Elam’s weight at the time of

discharge from Cardinal Hill was between 140 to 145

pounds.

26.

Dr. Cascone noted that Ms. Elam’s

discharge summary from Cardinal Hill documented

her as having Clostridium Difficile (“C. Difficile” or “C

Diff.”), which can cause diarrhea.

C.

Linda Elam’s Brookdale Richmond Place

Residency from June 15, 2020 to July 8,

2020

27.

On June 15, 2020, Ms. Elam was

discharged from care at Cardinal Hill to Defendant

Brookdale Richmond Place.

28.

Ms. Elam was admitted to Brookdale

Richmond Place on June 15, 2020 for short-term

skilled rehabilitation services due to her CVA,

including total needs care. Brookdale Richmond Place

was to deliver skilled nursing care to Ms. Elam,

including physical therapy, occupational therapy, and

speech therapy with the goal to discharge home.

29.

Brookdale Richmond Place reaped

financial compensation from Ms. Elam’s admission

and it billed her for the nursing home residency. (Pl.’s

Exhibit 58).

Pet. App. 92

30.

On June 15, 2020, Ms. Elam’s nursing

admission data collection sheet documented the

following: level of consciousness—alert, okay shortterm memory, okay long-term memory, bilateral

gluteal

fold

“macerated

associated

dermatitis/incontinent associated dermatitis” related

to an active C. Diff., no history of skin issues, (Pl.’s

Exhibit 54), no pressure injuries were noted, no

terminal diagnosis, no pain, was eating consistently

50% of her meals, buttock excoriations were noted,

and she was not receiving hospice care services.

31.

According to Dr. Cascone, Brookdale

Richmond Place’s minimum data set for Ms. Elam

from June 15, 2020 reflected that she did not have

inattention, disorganized thinking, or altered

consciousness, nor any pressure wounds, and she was

not considered terminal.

32.

Dr. Cascone noted that Ms. Elam’s

medical conditions on admission to Brookdale

Richmond Place were normal for nursing home

residents and “par for the course.”

33.

Ms.

Elam’s

Brookdale

admission

evaluation sheet noted that she had a Braden score of

9, which according to Dr. Tisha Barzyk, D.N.P., meant

Ms. Elam was at a very high risk for the development

of pressure injuries and required appropriate

planning and intervention.

34.

Dr. Barzyk testified that it is standard

practice and care for a routine skin check assessment

to be conducted by nurses during every shift, and it is

required under Medicare and Medicaid conditions for

funding nursing facilities, and also under Kentucky

state rules and regulations.

Pet. App. 93

35.

To prevent pressure ulcers, Brookdale

Richmond staff were required to turn over and

reposition residents every two hours.

36.

Residents would be turned over and

repositioned by nursing assistance and nurse aides.

37.

Lisa Dotson, Brookdale Richmond

Place’s Director or Nursing (“DON”), testified that she

had no way of knowing whether or not the nursing

assistance and aides would actually turn over and

reposition residents every two hours.

38.

Dr. Cascone noted that the only skin

issues referenced in the Brookdale Richmond Place

nursing admission data collection sheet upon Ms.

Elam’s admission to Brookdale Richmond Place was

regarding a right gluteal fold with moistureassociated skin dermatitis (“MASD”) and some

excoriation of the skin. Multiple witnesses and

experts testified that this was not the same skin

issues that she developed while at Brookdale

Richmond Place.

39.

Dr. Cascone distinguished the right

gluteal fold with moisture from the pressure ulcers

noted by UK HealthCare in July 2020 by stating the

latter was unstageable devitalized tissue wounds and

not moisture associated skin damage, and these are

not in the same area.

40.

Dr. Barzyk noted that Ms. Elam’s skin

condition related to C diff. was the result of a caustic

breakdown of the epidermal skin layer.

41.

Dr. Barzyk was critical of Brookdale

Richmond Place’s incorrect use of standard wound

care terminology—specifically, calling Ms. Elam’s C

diff. infection “excoriation” when it should have been

Pet. App. 94

noted as denuded skin, since denuded skin is a

breakdown of the epidermal skin layer due to urine

and feces.

42.

DON Lisa Dotson testified that she had

found charting errors in residents’ records previously.

43.

The Brookdale Richmond Place nursing

admission data collection, stating “no history of skin

issues,” (Pl.’s Exhibit 8, at p. 2 of 32), identified the

needs for a right elbow protector, a pressure

redistribution mattress, seat cushions, evaluation of

skin conditions on a daily and weekly basis with

weekly assessments to be performed “per licensed

nurse,” informing MD of any concerns, assisting with

turning and repositioning as needed, and reduced

friction and shearing with use of lift and transfer

sheets, keeping skin clean and dry, (Pl.’s Exhibit 8, at

p. 26 of 32), that Ms. Elam did not have a terminal

diagnosis and was not receiving hospice or palliative

services, (Pl.’s Exhibit 8, at p. 13 of 32), and the

admission mobility evaluation records stated that Ms.

Elam needed assistance with dressing, bathing,

turning and repositioning in her bed, (Pl.’s Exhibit 8,

at p. 25 of 32).

44.

Dr. Barzyk noted that Brookdale

Richmond Place records documented Ms. Elam was

provided with a “static foam mattress” for pressure

redistribution, which, according to Dr. Barzyk, is a

standard mattress and insufficient for proper

pressure redistribution.

45.

Numerous witnesses testified that the

static foam mattress is merely the mattress used for

all residents at the facility and is not a specific

mattress used for the prevention of pressure injuries.

Pet. App. 95

46.

On June 16, 2020, Ms. Elam’s tube feeds

and diet orders were abruptly changed with the

nutritionist recommending stopping a continuous

Nepro order and providing one can of Nepro after

meals with 50 ml of free water if she eats less than

50% of her meals.

47.

On June 20, 2020, the Brookdale

Richmond Place Minimum Data Set (“MDS”)

documented that Ms. Elam had no disorganized

thinking, no altered consciousness, and no unhealed

pressure ulcers/injuries.

48.

On June 22, 2020, Ms. Elam’s Brookdale

Richmond Place providers noted that her C. Difficile

PCR test was negative. (Pl.’s Exhibit 11).

49.

Dr. Cascone testified that Ms. Elam no

longer had C diff. as of June 22, 2020.

50.

Ms. Elam’s June 22, 2020 records

indicate that she had “buttocks very red but blanches”

with skin intact.

51.

Dr. Cascone noted that on June 22, 2020,

the first date for her weight in Brookdale Richmond

Place’s records, Ms. Elam’s weight had dropped to 132

pounds. (Pl.’s Exhibit 12).

52.

Dr. Cascone noted that this weight drop

to 132 pounds within a week at Brookdale Richmond

Place from 140 to 145 pounds at Cardinal Hill was a

significant drop in weight in a short amount of time.

53.

According to Dr. Cascone, Ms. Elam had

recorded five diarrhea stools noted on June 22, 2020,

and that it could be concluded that she was having

volume loss.

54.

Consequently, Dr. Cascone testified that

the five diarrhea stools was something that the

Pet. App. 96

Brookdale Richmond staff nurses should have noted

and planned for.

55.

A week later, June 29, 2020, Ms. Elam’s

medical records indicated that the skin was no longer

intact with redness related to incontinence-associated

dermatitis (“IAD”) located on her coccyx, and this was

documented as not being a new finding.

56.

On June 30, 2020, Brookdale Richmond

Place providers noted that Ms. Elam had an acute

kidney injury with elevated BUN levels of 45 and

elevated creatinine levels of 2.1, as well as

leukocytosis.

57.

Dr. Cascone testified that Ms. Elam

started developing a kidney injury on June 30, 2020

due to the creatinine and BUN levels and

leukocytosis, which was due to a lack of hydration.

58.

On June 30, 2020, there was an order for

a low air loss mattress for Ms. Elam.

59.

The June 30, 2020 order for a low air loss

mattress was discontinued the following day on July

1, 2020 by Amber Moon, Brookdale Richmond Place’s

wound care nurse, and replaced with an order for a

pressure redistribution mattress. (Pl.’s Exhibit 53).

60.

DON Lisa Dotson could not explain why

the low air loss mattress order was discontinued on

July 1, 2020.

61.

DON Dotson testified that a pressure

redistribution mattress (also known as a static foam

mattress) is a standard mattress provided to all

residents at Brookdale Richmond Place and, unlike a

low air loss mattress, it does not have air that relieves

pressure and pressure points.

62.

DON Dotson testified that a low air loss

Pet. App. 97

mattress helps prevent pressure ulcers or the

progression of pressure ulcers.

63.

DON Dotson testified that she authored

a record in Ms. Elam’s nursing home chart that stated

“DON is awaiting to be ordered and to be delivered on

July 7, 2020”, and then on July 8, 2020 that the low

air loss pressure mattress was “waiting for delivery.”

(Pl.’s Exhibit 48).

64.

There is not adequate documentation

that Ms. Elam was ever on a low loss air mattress

from July 1, 2020 to the time she was discharged to

UK Hospital.

65.

Brookdale Richmond Place’s medical

bills state that Ms. Elam only had a low air loss

mattress for one day, the last day of her residency at

the facility. (Pl.’s Exhibits 40, 58).

66.

Brookdale Richmond Place conceded

that at the very least, Ms. Elam was not on a low air

mattress from July 6 to July 8, 2020, and the facility’s

documentation does not substantiate a reason for her

not being on a low air loss mattress for this period of

time.

67.

DON Dotson testified that low air loss

mattresses were important for residents at high risk

for pressure ulcer development, like Ms. Elam.

68.

DON Dotson testified that there were no

records regarding the issue for the need to change the

low air loss mattress for Ms. Elam.

69.

DON Dotson testified that on the night

she was caring for Ms. Elam, July 7, 2020, Ms. Elam

did not have a low air loss mattress.

70.

Dr. Barzyk testified that the delay that

occurred in receiving a low air loss mattress was below

Pet. App. 98

the standard of care.

71.

On July 1, 2020, it was documented that

Ms. Elam was loud and yelling with three open areas

on her buttocks. It was further documented that she

did not take sufficient amount of oral fluids. (Pl.’s

Exhibit 16).

72.

On July 1, 2020, Ms. Elam’s medical

records documented the presence of significant

excoriation/yeast/redness noted to her groins, inner

thighs, and buttocks, with multiple areas of slough.

Additionally, her mouth was noted as being dry.

73.

Ms. Elam was given multiple topical

treatments, including steroid creams to combat her

denuded and inflamed skin.

74.

Dr. Barzyk was critical of the usage of

these multiple creams as having the effect of

“cancelling” each other out in concurrent usage, and

further noted that topical treatments including

steroids can actually further impair the skin. (Pl.’s

Exhibit 38).

75.

Dr. Barzyk criticized the failure to

diagnose Ms. Elam’s skin condition properly and the

failure to document any ICD-10 diagnosis codes in her

medical record.

76.

Dr. Barzyk testified that nurse

practitioner Amie Osborne had noted on July 1, 2020

that Ms. Elam had excoriation redness and open skin,

along with multiple areas of slough, but failed to

identify the wounds as pressure ulcers.

77.

Dr. Barzyk was critical of Brookdale

Richmond Place’s nurses never identifying Ms. Elam’s

pressure wounds, even though Osborne identified that

Ms. Elam’s skin had issues including slough on her

Pet. App. 99

wounds and open skin.

78.

Dr. Barzyk noted that Ms. Elam’s

pressure wounds were finally identified at UK

Hospital, after Mrs. Elam was transferred from

Brookdale Richmond Place.

79.

Dr. Barzyk testified that it is below the

standard of care not to properly identify, assess,

document, and provide care plans for pressure

wounds.

80.

DON Dotson testified that the standard

of care required appropriate revisions to a patient’s

care plan if necessary for effective care.

81.

Dr. Barzyk noted that a RN nurse had to

perform Ms. Elam’s skin assessment and that a LPN

nurse or nurse aide could not. However, the nursing

home records do not have documented RN nurses’

signatures as required.

82.

Dr. Barzyk testified that there are

regulatory and penalty concerns which would provide

a motive for Defendants not to identify the pressure

ulcers.

83.

Dr. Barzyk noted that nurses tend to get

in trouble when patients develop facility acquired

wounds and will as a result sometimes try to hide

them.

84.

Dr. Barzyk stated another potential

reason that the nursing home’s documentation is

inaccurate is due to lack of proper education.

85.

Dr. Barzyk noted that there was only one

instance in Ms. Elam’s Brookdale Richmond Place

medical record of her actually refusing to turn and

reposition, immediately after she had a urethral

catheterization placed in her, and further noted that

Pet. App. 100

her mental status, which was becoming altered and

not oriented, could not adequately be characterized as

“refusing.”

86.

Dr. Barzyk noted that there was no

record found in Cardinal Hill’s records of Ms. Elam

refusing to turn, which was only one month prior, and

the July 12, 2020 progress note at Cardinal Hill states

“Patient compliant with all therapies.” (Pl.’s Exhibit

3).

87.

On July 2, 2020, it was again

documented that Ms. Elam was yelling loudly and

continued not eating and drinking. (Pl.’s Exhibit 17).

88.

The July 2, 2020 functional abilities and

goals record states that Ms. Elam required

“substantial/maximal assistance” for eating. (Pl.’s

Exhibit 39).

89.

The Brookdale Richmond Place nursing

home records had multiple entries of Ms. Elam having

unclear speech and/or slurred speech and then,

simultaneously, other records claimed she had clear

speech.

90.

Dr. Cascone testified that within the last

week she was at Brookdale Richmond Place, Ms. Elam

experienced a dramatic decline in oral intake, eating

nothing for breakfast, lunch, or dinner for seven days,

except for in the evening.

91.

According to Dr. Cascone, this lack of

oral intake was not enough to maintain adequate

nutrition or to fight off infection.

92.

DON Lisa Dotson conceded that risk

factors for pressure ulcers include lack of cushioning,

lack of turning and repositioning, malnutrition, and

dehydration.

Pet. App. 101

93.

On July 5, 2020, Dr. Cascone noted that

Ms. Elam had a continued decline in her cognition and

ability to communicate. (Pl.’s Exhibit 19). Ms. Elam

was again yelling out most of the day. (Pl.’s Exhibit

46).

94.

On July 6, 2020, it was documented that

Ms. Elam had acute hypoxic respiratory failure (O2

oxygen level dropping to 85%) with an altered mental

status and there were three open wounds on her

buttocks. The wounds were not measured, described,

or staged as required. (Pl.’s Exhibits 19, 47).

95.

Dr. Cascone testified that Ms. Elam’s

wounds should have been measured, described, and

staged. There was no note detailing what was

conveyed to her primary care provider in terms of her

overall condition and the downward trajectory of her

health.

96.

Dr. Cascone testified that Ms. Elam’s

drop in oxygen on July 6, 2020 was a new finding

which showed evidence of organ dysfunction.

97.

Defendant’s expert Dr. Mark Elam

agreed that one of the ways to diagnose sepsis was by

organ failure.

98.

Dr. Cascone testified that the acute

hypoxic respiratory failure detailed on July 6, 2020,

was more likely than not caused by sepsis.

99.

The Brookdale Richmond Place weight

and vitals summary dated July 9, 2020 at 1:41 a.m.

(recorded and documented as taking place after her

discharge, which expert Byron Arbeit testified was

below the standard of care for required

documentation), stated that Ms. Elam’s O2 oxygen

level had dropped to 76%. (Pl.’s Exhibit 20).

Pet. App. 102

100. On July 6, 2020, Ms. Elam’s weekly skin

integrity review identified three open areas to her

buttocks with yellow tissues and buttocks red followed

by wound care nurse. This was also identified as not

being a new finding.

101. Dr. Barzyk testified that Brookdale

Richmond

Place’s

nursing

home

chart’s

documentation of open wounds on the coccyx and

yellow tissue on the buttocks with the noted presence

of multiple areas of slough was conclusive evidence of

the existence of full thickness wounds on Ms. Elam’s

coccyx at Brookdale Richmond Place, which developed

during her residency there.

102. Dr. Barzyk testified that Brookdale

Richmond Place’s documentation of Ms. Elam only

having skin damage from MASD (“moistureassociated skin damage”) and IAD, which both

produce only partial thickness skin damage to the

epidermal and dermal skin layers, was not consistent

with her slough, which can only be developed by full

thickness wounds.

103. Dr.

Barzyk

testified

that

the

development of pressure ulcers was a “never event,”

meaning that these were serious, preventable, and

should never occur.

104. Dr. Cascone testified that Ms. Elam’s

Brookdale Richmond Place admission notes from June

15, 2020, which noted “macerated associated

dermatitis/incontinent associated dermatitis” was

completely different than her five unstageable

pressure wounds. Specifically, Dr. Cascone stated that

her pressure wounds were devitalized tissue wounds

on her bilateral buttocks and not moisture associated

Pet. App. 103

skin damage.

105. On July 7, 2020, Ms. Elam was further

documented to have confusion, disorientation,

lethargy, yelling out in pain, strong urine odor, not

eating or drinking with the progression of multi organ

failure. (Pl.’s Exhibit 21).

106. Dr. Cascone stated that Ms. Elam should

have been sent to the hospital immediately for an

evaluation once she had hypoxic respiratory failure on

July 6, 2020.

107. Despite the requirement that Ms. Elam

be immediately transferred for urgent hospital care,

there was a delay in transferring her of approximately

60 hours.

108. Dr. Cascone testified that this 60-hour

delay directly affected her mortality, and if she had

been sent to UK Hospital on July 6, 2020, she more

likely than not would have survived due to the

mortality of sepsis functioning on an exponential

curve.

109. Dr. Cascone testified that every minute

that Ms. Elam failed to be sent to the hospital

significantly increased her risk of mortality.

110. Dr. Cascone was critical of Ms. Elam’s

July 8, 2020 Brookdale Richmond Place nursing home

chart because it did not detail skin issues, despite the

open areas on her buttocks, it did not detail behavioral

changes, despite her detailed mental status changes,

and it did not have pain documentation, despite her

having been documented as screaming out in pain for

several consecutive days. (Pl.’s Exhibit 22).

111. Ms. Elam’s granddaughter Breanne

Lutes testified that she never saw her grandmother

Pet. App. 104

while she was at Brookdale Richmond Place.

112. Ms. Elam’s grandson Steven Richardson

testified that he never spoke to his grandmother while

she was at Brookdale Richmond Place.

113. Breanne Lutes and Steven Richardson

both testified that they were never contacted by

Brookdale

Richmond

Place

regarding

their

grandmother’s health status and health changes.

114. Breanne Lutes and Steven Richardson

both testified that they never received any

communication whatsoever from Brookdale Richmond

Place.

115. Breanne Lutes testified that, on multiple

occasions, she would try to reach her grandmother

through Brookdale Richmond Place but would be

constantly re-directed and placed on hold to the point

that she would have to hang up.

116. Ms. Elam’s sister and power of attorney

Bonnie Townsend testified that the only contact she

remembered receiving from Brookdale Richmond

Place was when she signed the admission documents

from Brookdale Richmond Place.

117. Bonnie Townsend testified that she could

not recall any communications from Brookdale

Richmond Place regarding Ms. Elam’s care and

treatment at Brookdale Richmond Place until the

night she was transferred to UK Hospital on July 8,

2020.

118. Defendant’s nurse administrator expert

Rodney Whittington admitted that communication

with the family of residents is required by government

regulation, is part of the standard of care, and is “good

practice.”

Pet. App. 105

119. Dr. Barzyk testified that due to

Brookdale Richmond Place records having no

documentation nor records regarding Ms. Elam’s

integumentary skin assessment, Brookdale Richmond

Place did not comply with the requirement for

documentation regarding the admission data

collection of weekly skin integrity review.

120. Dr. Barzyk testified that there were

inconsistent medical records regarding the completion

of turning and repositioning flow sheets and bathing

frequency recordation.

121. Dr. Barzyk was critical of Brookdale

Richmond Place staff for their lack of recording Ms.

Elam’s pressure ulcers.

122. Dr. Barzyk testified that Ms. Elam’s full

body skin assessment documentation was not

completed and a form regarding it (entitled “Skin &

Wound Evaluation”) was blank and simply stated “No

Data Found.” (Pl.’s Exhibit 41). No appropriate skin

and wound evaluation was performed for Ms. Elam.

123. Dr. Barzyk testified that weekly skin

reviews were for documenting wounds on the skin,

detailing if the wound is new or not new, and that as

a result a care plan would be started, but even when

Brookdale Richmond Place nurses found open wounds

on Ms. Elam they did not detail those as new which

affected the care plan.

124. Dr. Barzyk testified that not adequately

documenting Ms. Elam’s pressure wounds would

affect the ability of nutritionists, social workers,

physicians, and other nurses to provide the

appropriate interventions and care plans.

125. The Brookdale Richmond Place form for

Pet. App. 106

“Unavoidable Pressure Ulcer” is blank and states “No

Data Found.” (Pl.’s Exhibit 41). Defendants did not

conclude that Ms. Elam’s pressure ulcers were

“unavoidable.”

126. Nursing home administration expert

Byron Arbeit testified that the nursing home

administrator is the last line of internal defense and

protection of a resident’s rights and care.

127. Arbeit

testified

that

Defendant

Brookdale Richmond Place, and also specifically

Defendant-administrator Becky Stocker, failed in

their role and responsibility in the administration of a

nursing home to monitor, coordinate, and evaluate the

quality of care of each resident; appropriately modify

discipline, or terminate the practice of anybody in the

nursing home, clinician or otherwise, if the practice

compromises the nursing home facility’s policies or

governmental regulations; to ensure a safe

environment for residents; ensuring competent staff

at the nursing home facility; and to ensure the nursing

home is run efficiently and effectively.

128. Defendants’ expert Rodney Whittington

agreed that there were numerous federal standards

known as “F-Tags” which govern nursing homes,

including many “Substandard Quality of Care”

requirements and obligations with which Defendants

were required to comply. (Pl.’s Exhibit 50).

129. Arbeit also testified that in this case

there are a plethora of violations of governmental

state and federal regulations including the F-Tags

and vitally important Substandard of Care

requirements, which have a special meaning in

nursing home administration and can result in

Pet. App. 107

reporting of an administrator to his or her state board

of licensure.

130. Arbeit testified that numerous F-Tags

were violated by Defendants in this case, including

those regarding skin care, nutritional care,

hydrational care, abuse and neglect and inadequate

care.

131. Arbeit testified that the administrator

should be automatically reported to the state

licensure board if there is substandard skin care,

nutritional care, or hydrational care at a nursing

home facility.

132. Arbeit testified that the “buck stops”

with the administrator.

133. Defendants’ nursing home administrator

Defendant Becky Stocker also admitted that, as the

administrator of Brookdale Richmond Place, the

“buck stops” with her.

134. Becky Stocker testified that she believed

an administrator should not conduct charting audits

unless there was a complaint or regulatory issue.

135. Specifically, Stocker stated that she

would not intervene in charting unless it was brought

to her attention through a complaint.

136. Arbeit testified that as part of their

oversight role, administrators are required to be

competent regarding and to investigate care issues

and to review nursing home records at their facility,

and that Defendant Becky Stocker failed this

requirement.

137. Stocker testified that neither the staff

nor Ms. Elam’s family brought any issues to her

attention despite Breanne Lutes, Steven Richardson,

Pet. App. 108

and Bonnie Townsend testifying they had virtually no

contact with Brookdale Richmond Place and were not

informed of changes in her condition, and they

thereafter filed a lawsuit on her behalf.

138. Stocker admitted that during her

previous sworn deposition she did not know if the

standard of care of nursing home staff required

assessment.

139. However, at the Arbitration, Stocker

admitted that assessment by nursing home staff was

important and was required by state and federal

regulation.

140. Stocker testified that she could not give

a definition for the term “substandard quality of care.”

(See Pl.’s Exhibit 50).

141. Nursing home administration experts for

both the Plaintiff and Defendants testified that the

regulations and requirements regarding substandard

quality of care are very important to appropriately

running a nursing home and providing care.

142. Stocker admitted that, during her

previous sworn deposition, she did not know if

charting was an important tool for looking back to see

what had happened and to prevent the same problems

in the future.

143. However, at the Arbitration, Stocker

admitted that charting was very important.

144. Stocker testified that she did not know

what “charting by exception” meant.

145. Stocker testified that during her two

years at

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