Amicus Curiae Brief — Donald J. Trump, Petitioner v. E. Jean Carroll
Supreme Court briefAug 11, 2026
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No. 26-141
In the Supreme Court
of the United States
________________
DONALD J. TRUMP, PETITIONER
v.
E. JEAN CARROLL, RESPONDENT
_______________
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
________________
BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE DAVID BOYLE
IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT
_________________
David Boyle
Counsel of Record
P.O. Box 15143
Long Beach, CA 90815
dbo@boyleslaw.org
(734) 904-6132
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES…..………………………iii
AMICUS CURIAE STATEMENT OF INTEREST…1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT.....................................3
ARGUMENT……………………………………………...4
I.
TRUMP’S RAPE LIABILITY IS ARGUABLY
SETTLED, SINCE HE PRESENTS NO NEW
INFORMATION CHALLENGING IT….…….4
II.
THE 25-573 CERTIORARI PETITION
KNEW OF IMMUNITY ISSUES, BUT
DIDN’T CLAIM IMMUNITY FOR THE
STATEMENTS (STATEMENTS THE
CARROLL II JURY WAS FORBIDDEN TO
CONSIDER), AND DELAYED UNTIL THE
REHEARING PETITION TO EXPLOIT
IMMUNITY ISSUES…………………………...5
III. PETITIONER MAY HAVE FORFEITED
IMMUNITY-BASED “QUESTIONS
PRESENTED” PERMANENTLY, BY NOT
BRINGING THEM UP IN 25-573.…………...9
IV. COULD TRUMP HAVE MADE
ACCEPTABLE STATEMENTS DEFENDING
HIMSELF, NOT ATTACKING CARROLL?
ONE EXAMPLE TO CONSIDER,
ALONGSIDE HIS ACTUAL AGGRESSIVE
STATEMENTS………………………..………..10
ii
V.
CAN ANY PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT
BE IMMUNIZED BY TOSSING IN SOME
MENTION OF AMERICANS, AND A TINY
NOD TO “IMPORTANT ISSUES”?..........…..18
VI.
TRUMP V. UNITED STATES IS ABOUT
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS, THUS, NOT
FULLY RELEVANT HERE..........................20
VII.
EVEN IF TRUMP DID NOT EXPLICITLY
WAIVE IMMUNITY, QUESTION
PRESENTED 1 DOES NOT DESERVE
CERTIORARI, DUE TO HIS
STATEMENTS’ MALICE, AND THE
TAINTED VEHICLE THIS CASE
PROVIDES……...........................................21
VIII. THE WESTFALL ACT, EVEN IF NOT
STATUTORILY LIMITED IN TIME,
MAY BE LIMITED OTHERWISE, AND
UNAVAILABLE TO GIVE TRUMP
IMMUNITY.……........................................24
(ANTECONCLUSION)………………………….…..25
CONCLUSION……………………………………….26
iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225 (2007)……………….25
Trump v. Carroll (“Carroll II”), 25-573, cert. denied
June 29, 2026, pet. for reh’g (July 8, 2026)
pending…………………………..1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9
Trump v. United States, 603 U.S. 593
(2024)……………………………….4, 20, 21, 22, 23
United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477
(1979)…………………………………..21, 22, 23, 24
STATUTES
Fed. Emps. Liab. Reform and Tort Comp. Act of 1988
(“Westfall Act”), 28 U.S.C. § 2679…….4, 6, 24, 25
RULES
S. Ct. R. 37………………………………..………….1 n.1
OTHER AUTHORITIES
(All Internet links below were last visited August
10, 2026.)
Access Hollywood (NBC Studios/NBCUniversal
iv
Syndication Studios 1996-present), Trump
Videotape (Sept. 2005)……………………….11, 12
Br. of Amicus Curiae David Boyle in Supp. of Resp’t
in 25-573 (2026)……………………………………..1
Br. of Pl.-Appellee E. Jean Carroll in Opp’n to Mot.
for a Stay or Inj. Pending Appeal, https://tinyurl.
com/bdcxj9w7, 26-1840 (2nd Cir.), July 20,
2026……………………………………………...……8
Will Neal, Elite Law Firm in Civil War Over Trump
Sex Abuse Case, The Daily Beast, July 10,
2026, 7:16 a.m., https://tinyurl.com/
yc8vndr3.............................................................1-2
Pet. for Reh’g in 25-573, Donald J. Trump,
Pet’r v. E. Jean Carroll
(2026)……………………………….2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9
Pet. for Writ of Cert. in 25-573, Donald J. Trump,
Pet’r v. E. Jean Carroll
(2025)……………………………….2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9
Justin D. Smith, Letter in 25-573, June 2, 2026…8, 9
The Odyssey (Syncopy 2026; based on Homer’s
Odyssey (c. 800 B.C.))………………………….1, 25
Donald J. Trump, Truth Social, June 29, 2026, 8:16
a.m., https://truthsocial.com/@realDonald
Trump/posts/116834055569312013………...25-26
1
AMICUS CURIAE STATEMENT OF INTEREST
The present amicus curiae, David Boyle
(hereinafter, “Amicus”),1 following up on his amicus
brief in 25-573, Trump v. Carroll (“Carroll II”),
respectfully supports Respondent, Elizabeth Jean
(“E. Jean”) Carroll, against Petitioner Donald J.
Trump’s hateful government-powered libels. While
Amicus believes a President should have copious
power as Chief Executive, that does not mean
unlimited power, especially power to abuse someone
he raped (“digital rape” being rape by common-sense
terms) and defamed, and still defames.
Indeed, Trump’s 2019 “official statement” attacks
on Carroll (“the Statements”) are like a Trojan horse,
see the current Christopher Nolan film The Odyssey
(Syncopy 2026; based on Homer’s Odyssey (c. 800
B.C.)) (condemning immorality of wooden-horse ruse
used to invade and butcher Troy). Even if official
presidential statements have possible immunity
from defamation suits, that immunity may not apply
here, especially if Trump’s attacks are but rants and
venom, merely pretending to be legitimate official
statements—just as the Trojan Horse pretended to
be an offering to the gods, when it was actually a
receptacle for Greek assassins, treachery, and death.
Trump’s sordid conduct has even occasioned
shock that someone would represent him in court
here, see, e.g., Will Neal, Elite Law Firm in Civil War
Over Trump Sex Abuse Case, The Daily Beast, July
10, 2026, 7:16 a.m., https://tinyurl.com/yc8vndr3, re
Sullivan & Cromwell, whose “move has sparked
1 No party or its counsel wrote or helped write this brief or gave
money for its writing or submission, see S. Ct. R. 37.
2
uproar among the firm’s top ranks. ‘The Carroll
cases were of particular concern for some lawyers
because of the nature of Carroll’s allegations,’ the
[Wall Street Journal] writes, adding that firms of
this size ‘rarely take on such cases for fear of
reputational damage.’” Id.
Of course, the President can choose any counsel,
and no law firm is here disparaged; Amicus is merely
noting the hideousness of the subject matter,
Trump’s raping/battering/defaming a now-elderly
woman, Carroll, and seeking to escape punishment.
Thus, even though some Questions Presented
here may be interesting in the abstract, this case,
“Carroll I” (26-141), is a very poor vehicle for
considering them. The messy, maybe bad-faith, way
Trump has handled the case, radiating “reputational
damage”, Daily Beast Article, supra, hardly provides
a clean vehicle. And if Trump’s statements are not
only outrageous but ultra vires, immunity might not
even be claimable here.
Finally, and shockingly, Trump should have
brought up the present Questions Presented, back
during his 25-573 certiorari petition, given his
assertion in his petition for rehearing, see id. at 3-5,
that the Statements shouldn’t have been accepted as
evidence in Carroll II, due to immunity issues. If he
knew back in 2025 that immunity was an issue, he
delayed hugely by not offering immunity-themed
Questions Presented until now: hence, the present
Questions are, arguably, highly untimely and have
thus abandoned any right to certiorari.
Following the Summary of Argument, then, we
start with the “old business” of 25-573, old wineskins
3
which may mix badly with the new, 26-141:
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Trump has essentially waived his denial of raping
Carroll, since he did not present here or in his 25573 rehearing petition, new information favoring
that denial (as opposed to denying defamationliability).
The 25-573 certiorari petition should have
litigated immunity issues (e.g., in Questions
Presented), instead of waiting for the rehearing
petition to do so by saying the Statements were
immune and should not have been evidence in 25573, since Petitioner had previously known that
immunity issues were crucial. Moreover, the Carroll
II jury was not even allowed to consider the
Statements, see the 26-141 certiorari petition’s
appendix (“App.”), at 231a. This all does not
recommend rehearing 25-573.
Moreover, by not litigating immunity issues early
in 25-573, when he knew of them, Petitioner has
arguably waived those issues now, which should
prevent certiorari here.
A sample statement shows how Trump could
possibly have defended himself and denied Carroll’s
claims, without making ugly ultra vires attacks upon
her which misused state power, as a sort of Trojan
horse. Trump’s actual, hateful and defamatory
Statements are then analyzed, showing their evils.
The Statements name Justice Kavanaugh, see id. for
each, which may counsel special arrangements.
4
Amicus asks whether any presidential statement
with “official” fig leaves, mentioning serving America
and/or some public-concern issue, could putatively
immunize anything, even, say, calls for racist
violence.
Trump v. United States, 603 U.S. 593 (2024)
(“Trump”), is about criminal immunity, so doesn’t
merit certiorari for Question Presented 2, though
Trump’s observations on official statements, say,
could be considered in other ways.
Question Presented 1, on, see id., a supposed need
for a President to waive immunity explicitly, should
not receive certiorari, since Trump may have waived
immunity, either explicitly or not. Even if waiver
must be explicit, that may not call for certiorari,
given the Statements’ indefensibility under any
circumstances, and the “unclean hands”, twisted
vehicle this case would present.
Question Presented 3, on, see id., immunity under
the Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort
Compensation Act of 1988 (“Westfall Act”), 28 U.S.C.
§ 2679, does not deserve certiorari, since other
sources may limit immunity, even if the statute itself
somehow has no time limit for substituting the
United States for Petitioner.
Finally, Trump’s continuing vicious attacks on
Carroll threaten American democracy, as the State
should serve the People, not abuse them.
ARGUMENT
I. TRUMP’S RAPE LIABILITY IS ARGUABLY
5
SETTLED, SINCE HE PRESENTS NO NEW
INFORMATION CHALLENGING IT
First off: the instant certiorari petition and its
Questions Presented do not really challenge the
issue of Trump’s rape/sexual-battery liability,
especially since the words “rape” and “sexual” don’t
appear in the petition, id.; just as the 25-573 petition
for rehearing did not challenge Trump’s rape/sexual
battery liability, since that petition, see id. at 1,
mentions only immunity and the then-pending
Carroll I “cert” petition as reasons for rehearing.
Thus, Trump’s liability for raping Carroll (as
opposed to defamation-liability) may be regarded as
settled.
II. THE 25-573 CERTIORARI PETITION KNEW
OF IMMUNITY ISSUES, BUT DIDN’T CLAIM
IMMUNITY FOR THE STATEMENTS
(STATEMENTS THE CARROLL II JURY
WAS FORBIDDEN TO CONSIDER),
AND DELAYED UNTIL THE REHEARING
PETITION TO EXPLOIT IMMUNITY ISSUES
As for immunity issues: the 25-573 rehearing
petition asks the Court “either [to] grant the petition
in this case, or hold it pending the disposition of the
petition in Carroll I”, id. at 1. Trump thus desires,
see id., linkage of 25-573 to 26-141; indeed, Trump
says Carroll “improperly introduced and relied on
President Trump’s 2019 official statements at the
Carroll II trial. Exhibits 1 and 2 admitted into
evidence at that trial were th[os]e statements[.]” Pet.
for Reh’g at 2-3. But this poses a problem for Trump.
6
First: as the rehearing petition doesn’t tell
readers, see id., “[T]he Court instructed the jury in
Carroll II not to consider the 2019 statements”, App.
at 231a. This is a gross, even titanic material
omission by that petition; if the jury was ordered
“not to consider the 2019 statements”, id., the
Statements’ mere presence as exhibits in Carroll II
may not be important, thus, not a reason to grant
the petition or hold the case.
(And were the Statements the only exhibits in
that case, or were there many other exhibits? Again,
there seems little reason to grant rehearing in 25573.)
Moreover, as for immunity: the 25-573 certiorari
petition explicitly mentions, “Carroll I was delayed
because of proceedings concerning President
Trump’s presidential immunity defense and whether
the United States should be substituted as a party
for President Trump[, and] the Westfall Act”, id. at
10. However, nowhere in that petition does Trump
employ those immunity/Westfall Act issues as a
reason for certiorari, or suggest that the Statements
shouldn’t have been allowed in Carroll II.
Instead, Trump waited until his July 2026
rehearing petition, as noted supra, to weaponize
those immunity issues, which he could have brought
up in the November cert petition: issues he must
have known about at that earlier time, since he
explicitly mentions immunity and Westfall there, id.
at 10.
This may be seriously bad-faith litigation. If the
Statements were so sacrosanct, immune, thus unfit
as evidence in Carroll II, then Trump should have
mentioned that in the Carroll II cert petition, not
7
hidden the issues until the rehearing petition. Was
the hiding done deliberately, so as to provide a false
excuse for rehearing if needed, some might ask?
The rehearing petition says, “Rehearing is
warranted because President Trump will
imminently file a petition for a writ of certiorari in
… (“Carroll I”), which will present vital questions
concerning Presidential immunity for official
statements.” Id. at 1. But Trump didn’t have to wait
for a Carroll I pending cert petition to bring up
immunity for the Statements; he could’ve done that
in the Carroll II cert petition the previous year.
As Carroll somewhat similarly observed,
If successful petitions for rehearing
are “rare birds,” … Defendant’s pending
petition cannot possibly get off the
ground. The Supreme Court limits
rehearing to two bases: “intervening
circumstances of a substantial or
controlling effect” or “other substantial
grounds not previously presented.” …
Defendant’s petition satisfies neither,
since the only “intervening
circumstance” it identifies is
Defendant’s “forthcoming petition in
[the related case].” … But Defendant
previously told the Court about that in
a letter dated June 2, 2026, suggesting
that “the Court may wish to consider
the petitions together.” … The sole
ground for rehearing was therefore
already before the Supreme Court when
it denied certiorari.
8
Br. of Pl.-Appellee E. Jean Carroll in Opp’n to Mot.
for a Stay or Inj. Pending Appeal, https://tinyurl.
com/bdcxj9w7, 26-1840 (2nd Cir.), July 20, 2026, at 17
(citations omitted). Thus, see id., if the Court already
rejected Trump’s June 2 letter’s idea when refusing
certiorari on June 29, there may be little left to fuel
Trump’s quest for rehearing.
And there may be even less fuel than Carroll
noted, since, as observed supra, Trump should have
offered immunity-related Questions Presented back
on November 10, 2025, in his 25-573 cert petition,
not waited until July 28, 2026, and the present cert
petition. (Not to mention the Carroll II jury’s not
considering the Statements.)
True, there is one source, App. at 57a, the courtof-appeals denial of rehearing en banc, dated April
29, 2026, which is well after November 2025. Still,
there were many sources, App. at 1a-56a, 146a-287a,
from before November 2025, that the 25-573 cert
petition could have drawn upon, to discuss immunity
issues. And after April 29, 2026, the denial of
rehearing en banc, supra, could have been
mentioned in a 25-573 supplemental brief or letter.
Even if Trump had waited until April 29 itself to
claim immunity for the Statements, that still
would’ve been c. 4 months before now, and c. 2
months before his June 2 letter; and the Court could
have considered those issues at that time, instead of
waiting for the July petition for rehearing to exploit
those issues.
…Petitions for rehearing are very rarely granted;
they should be granted even less often, when
somebody arguably tries to “hide the ball” from the
Court, by not litigating issues (e.g., immunity) in the
9
certiorari petition, that they should have litigated
and offered as Questions Presented then, instead of
waiting for the rehearing petition to exploit them;
and when a petitioner neglects to mention the jury
was forbidden to consider his supposedly-immune
Statements.
III. PETITIONER MAY HAVE FORFEITED
IMMUNITY-BASED “QUESTIONS
PRESENTED” PERMANENTLY, BY
NOT BRINGING THEM UP IN 25-573
Moreover, as implied supra at 2, Petitioner may
be in a trap of his own devising. That is, by
adamantly asserting, in his rehearing petition, see
id. at 1, that the Statements’ immunity is enough to
demand rehearing of 25-573 (since the Statements
were exhibits in Carroll II), Trump inadvertently
raises the question of why he didn’t raise questions,
especially Questions Presented, about immunity
during 25-573, whether in the cert petition, or just
after April 29, 2026, until his June 2 letter (which,
see id., didn’t even raise immunity directly, but just
mentioned the upcoming Carroll I petition)—a letter
the Court disregarded when he asked to consider
Carroll I and Carroll II together.
So, since Trump claims that immunity was
actually an issue in 25-573, but he didn’t raise that
issue in his 25-573 Questions Presented, see id. for
each, then he arguably has forfeited that issue or
issues permanently, and is futilely raising them now.
Cf. “‘Immunity-related issues’ under the [Westfall]
Act ‘should be decided at the earliest opportunity.’
Osborn [v. Haley], 549 U.S. [225,] 253 [(2007)]”, App.
at 129a (some brackets removed); i.e., to delay
10
litigation of immunity issues may be fatal to the
delayer’s case.
However, given the viciousness and excess of
Trump’s Statements, no immunity provision may
help him in any case, as we now explore.
IV. COULD TRUMP HAVE MADE
ACCEPTABLE STATEMENTS DEFENDING
HIMSELF, NOT ATTACKING CARROLL? ONE
EXAMPLE TO CONSIDER, ALONGSIDE
HIS ACTUAL AGGRESSIVE STATEMENTS
First, let us examine what a possibly-immune
statement from Trump might have looked like.
There is, perhaps sadly, some possible immunity for
public officials purporting to serve the public good,
who make statements with some false components
(the legal theory will be discussed later). The
example below may follow those standards:
A writer, E. Jean Carroll, recently
accused me of raping her at Bergdorf
Goodman in 1996. I strongly deny this.
I certainly do not remember that
happening, and do not recall ever even
meeting her. To be fair, I am not calling
her a liar, since she may somehow
believe this false story. Maybe she was
thinking of another man. Her book
accuses other men of similar acts.
I hope she is not telling this story to
sell her new book; I’m not saying she is,
and I can’t see into her mind, so I’m not
going to accuse her. But I am obliged to
defend my reputation, so my family will
11
know I am not guilty of her terrible
accusation. Also, this accusation may
distract from my time and effort to be a
good President and serve the American
people, so I strongly deny it.
Lastly, I apologize for any disrespect
or mistreatment of women people think
I may have ever done, such as the
unwise words I chose on the Access
Hollywood tape from 2005. We should
all speak out against assaults on
women, or disrespect for women. If I
want to serve the American people, I
myself have to be a role model they can
trust. Thank you for listening.
That model statement supra still has various lies
by Trump (that the rape/sexual battery didn’t
happen, and that he never met Carroll), see id.; but
at least the statement is in defensive mode—
protecting himself against Carroll’s accusation—, not
a bag of vile attacks on Carroll, who is, after all, his
employer, i.e., an American taxpayer. He specifically
does not call her a liar, and doesn’t say she made up
the story to sell her book (even if he brings up the
hypothetical possibility), and doesn’t say she falsely
accused other men (even if he mentions the
accusations).
Too, he explicitly mentions his “masters” (re
respondeat superior), the American people, who
employ him, so he could argue that at least part of
his statement serves Americans. And finally, he
shows actual contrition and self-awareness,
mentioning his vile words, e.g., “[g]rab[bing]
[women] by the pu[denda]”) from the infamous
12
Access Hollywood tape, id.; purports to respect
women and their right not to be raped/abused—but
without calling Carroll a liar; confirms he has
responsibilities, not just rights; and ends with a
polite “Thank you”, id.
It is a sin to lie, but even despite Trump’s lies (no
rape, never met Carroll) in the model statement
above, he might not have broken any earthly laws,
possibly, in that defensive statement which tries to
protect him, and asserts an American public
interest, but without per se attacking Carroll at all.
Now let’s see the real Statements, starting with
the first, from June 21, 2019:
Regarding the “story” by E. Jean
Carroll, claiming she once encountered
me at Bergdorf Goodman 23 years ago.
I’ve never met this person in my life.
She is trying to sell a new book -- that
should indicate her motivation. It
should be sold in the fiction section.
Shame on those who make up false
stories of assault to try to get publicity
for themselves, or sell a book, or carry
out a political agenda -- like Julie
Swetnick who falsely accused Justice
Brett Kavanaugh. It’s just as bad for
people to believe it, particularly when
there is zero evidence. Worse still for a
dying publication to try to prop itself up
by peddling fake news -- it’s an
epidemic.
Ms. Carroll & New York Magazine:
No pictures? No surveillance? No video?
13
No reports? No sales attendants
around?? I would like to thank Bergdorf
Goodman for confirming they have no
video footage of any such incident,
because it never happened.
False accusations diminish the
severity of real assault. All should
condemn false accusations and any
actual assault in the strongest possible
terms.
If anyone has information that the
Democratic Party is working with Ms.
Carroll or New York Magazine, please
notify us as soon as possible. The world
should know what’s really going on. It
is a disgrace and people should pay
dearly for such false accusations.
App. at 4a-5a (citation omitted).
This Statement is aggressive and attacks Carroll
ceaselessly, see id., rather than just defending
Trump. It puts Carroll’s story in quotes (“story”), id.,
which is derisive and implies Carroll is a liar. It
falsely says he never met Carroll; and claims and/or
implies, without evidence, that she made up the
story to get herself publicity, sell books, and serve “a
political agenda”, which may include “the
Democratic Party”, id.
While “All should condemn false accusations and
any actual assault in the strongest possible terms”,
id., may be in itself a worthwhile sentiment: in
context here, it seems a mere fig leaf, de minimis, or
even a Trojan horse, being tainted by Trump’s
saying, falsely, that Carroll’s accusation is false. And
14
the Statement doesn’t mention the American people
in particular, the “masters” of their employee
Trump, so his words do not purport to serve them.
As well, there is no apology for his own abusive
behavior/words towards women; and “people should
pay dearly for such false accusations”, id., is a
vengeful and threatening way to end—again, an
attack on Carroll, not a moderate defense of himself.
Finally, note that Trump spoke recklessly or
intentionally falsely, lacking knowledge of Carroll’s
affairs:
Trump acted with, at a minimum,
reckless disregard for the truth. In his
deposition testimony, Trump admitted
that prior to making his 2019
statements, he never read Carroll’s
book or the New York magazine
publication, never contacted Bergdorf
Goodman’s, never did any research on
Carroll, and never had anyone working
for him research Carroll. He also
admitted that, before issuing his 2019
statements, he had no knowledge of
Carroll’s book deal, financial
circumstances, or political affiliation.
App. at 28a (footnote omitted).
The next Statement is from June 22, 2019:
Reporter: Mr. President, you had
said earlier that you never met E. Jean
Carroll. There was a photograph of you
and her in the late 1980’s –
15
Trump: I have no idea who this
woman is. It is a totally false
accusation. I think she was married -as I read; I have no idea who she is -but she was married to a, actually, nice
guy, Johnson -- a newscaster.
Reporter: You were in a
photograph with her.
Trump: Standing with [my] coat on
in a line -- give me a break -- with my
back to the camera. I have no idea who
she is. What she did is -- it’s terrible,
what’s going on. So it’s a total false
accusation and I don’t know anything
about her.
And, you know, people have to be
careful because they’re playing with
very dangerous territory. And when
they do that -- and it’s happening more
and more. When you look at what
happened to Justice Kavanaugh and
you look at what’s happening to others,
you can’t do that for the sake of
publicity.
New York Magazine is a failing
magazine. It’s ready to go out of
business, from what I hear. They’ll do
anything they can. But this was about
many men, and I was one of the many
men that she wrote about. It’s a totally
false accusation. I have absolutely no
idea who she is. There’s some picture
where we’re shaking hands. It looks like
at some kind of event. I have my coat
16
on. I have my wife standing next to me.
And I didn’t know her husband, but he
was a newscaster. But I have no idea
who she is -- none whatsoever.
It’s a false accusation and it’s a
disgrace that a magazine like New York
-- which is one of the reasons it’s failing.
People don’t read it anymore, so they’re
trying to get readership by using me.
It’s not good.
You know, there were cases that the
mainstream media didn’t pick up. And I
don’t know if you’ve seen them. And
they were put on Fox. But there were
numerous cases where women were
paid money to say bad things about me.
You can’t do that. You can’t do that.
And those women did wrong things -that women were actually paid money
to say bad things about me.
But here’s a case, it’s an absolute
disgrace that she’s allowed to do that.
App. at 5a-6a (citation omitted). This Statement, like
the previous one, aggressively attacks Carroll
ceaselessly, see id., rather than only defending
Trump. Trump repeatedly, falsely says he doesn’t
know who Carroll is or “know anything about her”,
id. (he certainly knows she’s suing him, and that she
is a book-writer, once married to John Johnson),
even after, see id., the 1980’s photograph of him with
her has surfaced. He again claims and/or implies,
without evidence, that she made up the story to get
publicity; and he now even claims, evidence-free,
that she was paid to fabricate the story, see id., an
17
exceptionally corrosive claim.
And this time, Trump doesn’t even bother to say
“All should condemn false accusations and any
actual assault in the strongest possible terms”, but
just offers, “And, you know, people have to be careful
because they’re playing with very dangerous
territory” (which could be seen as a threat to
Carroll), and “When you look at what happened to
Justice Kavanaugh and you look at what’s
happening to others, you can’t do that for the sake of
publicity.” Id. So, condemning “actual assault” has
disappeared, making one wonder if the first
Statement’s mentioning it was even sincere, or just,
again, a fig leaf or worse.
Too, once again, the Statement has no mention of
the American people as a whole, his employers.
And Trump’s last words, “But here’s a case, it’s an
absolute disgrace that she’s allowed to do that”, id.,
sound vengeful and oppressive, maybe even a call for
a prior restraint on Carroll’s free speech—once more,
attacking Carroll, not defending himself in a
moderate way.
Finally, on June 24, 2019, Trump said, “I’ll say it
with great respect: Number one, she’s not my type.
Number two, it never happened. It never happened,
OK?” App. at 6a (citation omitted). Though it still
commits the falsehood of denying the assault, this
statement may be considered more defensive, less
attack-oriented, than the previous Statements, see
id. for each; and indeed, “Carroll withdrew her
defamation claim based on this statement, but she
maintained … it was relevant to … punitive
damages”, App. at 6a n.4.
18
In all, the first two Statements are vicious, false,
and attack Carroll rather than defending Trump.
Amicus is not sure how they can be within the outer
perimeter of Trump’s presidential duties, or how
they serve any public interest except in a “drive-by”,
de minimis, hypocritical, or Trojan-horse way.
(By the way, Trump mentions Justice
Kavanaugh—seeking Kavanaugh’s favor?— in both
long Statements, portraying him as someone falsely
accused of assault, see id. for each. Without saying
this should, or shouldn’t, call, say, for that Justice’s
recusal from this case, or part of it—e.g., recusing
from considering the content of the Statements, as
opposed to theoretical legal issues of immunity—, it
would be remiss not to bring up the idea of
appropriate consideration, when the Statements
specifically name one sitting Justice, twice, whose
history has some resemblance, alleged or real, to
that of Trump. Sensitivity and neutrality are
important here, in seeking justice and fairness.)
V. CAN ANY PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT
BE IMMUNIZED BY TOSSING IN SOME
MENTION OF AMERICANS, AND A
TINY NOD TO “IMPORTANT ISSUES”?
On that note, Amicus wonders if Presidents may
dare to make any abusive verbal attack they want,
as long as they “tick off the boxes” of a) some quick
mention of serving the American people, and b) an
also-quick reference to some “issue of public
concern”.
If so, that may be a problem, since a President
could make a quick (or long) mention of those two
19
things, and then speak any evil with impunity. He
could use the phrase “enemy of the people”, as one
can imagine North Korea, Iran, or Nazi Germany
doing, in a statement, and say that since it mentions
the people, his employers, he is immune.
Consider this sample statement: “Haitians are
from a sh[]thole country. Too many are here,
straining our resources. But I’m not saying all of
them should be beaten or killed: there are some good
Haitians, they voted for me. FIGHT ENEMIES OF
THE PEOPLE!”
Following this statement, in the next 24 hours,
dozens of Haitians are beaten, and several killed.
Their families sue Trump for defamation, and his
lawyer says the statement mentions serving the
American people, and says “there are some good
Haitians”, which is an issue of public importance
(and a backhanded compliment of sorts, even), and
demands immunity from defamation (or any other
punishment) for the statement.
Is immunity a good idea, under these
circumstances? The two boxes (serving Americans;
public-interest issue) were ticked, hypertechnically.
(And some might argue that even ticking only one of
those boxes may be enough for immunity.)
Indeed, the district court notes a similarly
unpleasant hypothetical: “At a rally promoting his
reelection, an incumbent President touts his policy
accomplishments[,] but during his speech he
instructs members of the crowd to ‘punch’ a protester
‘in the face right now.’” App. 260a (citation omitted).
Amicus adds that even an “official
20
communication” which isn’t during a possiblyunofficial event like an election rally, may be subject
to the common-sense consideration above, i.e., that
presidential communications shouldn’t be immune
from punishment for non-presidential (not within
the President’s core power/concerns) messages like
“Punch someone in the face.”
In that line, the district court observes, “Mr.
Trump does not identify any connection between the
allegedly defamatory content of his statements –
that Ms. Carroll fabricated her sexual assault
accusation and did so for financial and personal gain
– to any official responsibility of the president. Nor
can the Court think of any possible connection.” App.
261a.
Thus, it may be pointless even to bother
pretending the Statements can be defended by legal
immunity; though, for completeness’ sake, we now
explore legal immunity.
VI. TRUMP V. UNITED STATES IS
ABOUT CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS,
THUS, NOT FULLY RELEVANT HERE
The second Question Presented—which, being
muddled, should be disposed of first—evokes, id.,
Trump, supra at 4, which involves “immunity from
criminal prosecution”, id. at 602 (Roberts, C.J.)
(emphasis added), not civil suits. Mirabile dictu,
Trump’s petition gives no indication of this. (The
very-brief “Trump, 603 U.S. at 609 (courts cannot
‘adjudicate a criminal prosecution that examines’
official acts)”, id. at 30, doesn’t openly admit Trump
is not really about civil-suit immunity.)
21
So, Question Presented 2, “Whether a sitting
President’s public statements … are official acts
protected by Presidential immunity under Trump
[etc.]”, borders on incoherence. The supposed “official
acts” in Carroll I aren’t about criminal matters, but
are some statements attacking Carroll, for which
Trump alleges he can’t be sued. Even if Trump
expands presidential immunity vis-à-vis criminal
matters, that case, Trump, is hardly germane to civil
suits. The Court should not waste its time by
granting cert on the second Question Presented.
(If the Court wishes, say, to “fold in” Petitioner’s
using Trump to claim that an “‘aspect of Presidential
power is using the office’s “bully pulpit”’ … on
‘matters of public concern’”, Pet. at 4 (citation
omitted), that can be done without granting cert to a
Question Presented revolving around Trump. Any
unnecessary Question Presented is an unfair/
duplicative/wasteful “extra bite at the apple” for a
petitioner.)
VII. EVEN IF TRUMP DID NOT EXPLICITLY
WAIVE IMMUNITY, QUESTION PRESENTED 1
DOES NOT DESERVE CERTIORARI, DUE TO
HIS STATEMENTS’ MALICE, AND THE
TAINTED VEHICLE THIS CASE PROVIDES
Question Presented 1 is, “Whether a President
can be found to have forfeited[/]waived Presidential
immunity without ever expressly renouncing such
immunity, solely because his first responsive
pleading did not invoke Presidential immunity by
name”, id.; and Trump invokes United States v.
Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477, 490-491 (1979), noting “that
a Member of Congress cannot be found to have
22
forfeited or waived legislative immunity absent an
‘explicit and unequivocal renunciation,’ ‘assuming
[waiver] is possible’ at all.” Pet. at (I).
Trump may have never used the exact words, “I
explicitly and unequivocally renounce my
immunity”, but lower courts have found he
renounced it, see, e.g., the Second Circuit’s
“h[o]ld[ing] that Trump waived his immunity
defense here by, among other things, failing to assert
it in his answer to Carroll’s complaint in state court
and conceding to it at oral argument.” App. at 133a134a (citation omitted).
That Circuit also ruled that Trump “did not alter
the prevailing law on whether presidential immunity
can be waived”, and thus “does not constitute an
intervening change of law justifying reconsideration
of our earlier decision [against immunity].” App. at
17a-18a.
That lower court also doubts that Helstoski,
supra, helps Trump: “Trump’s second argument -that a waiver of presidential immunity requires an
‘explicit and unequivocal renunciation,’ Helstoski,
442 U.S. at 491, … -- is also foreclosed because it was
‘ripe for review at the time of [Trump’s] initial
appeal but . . . nonetheless foregone’”, id. at 18a
(citation omitted) (brackets in original).
Then that court asserts Trump “did not announce
new law when it observed that presidential
immunity is rooted in the structural separation of
powers”, so that there is no change in law which
would let Helstoski, which upheld legislators’
immunity and required “explicit and unequivocal
renunciation” of immunity, drag presidential-
23
immunity law into its ambit and mandate “explicit
and unequivocal renunciation” of immunity for
Presidents too, see App. at 18a-19a.
Thus, it seems Helstoski is helpless to aid Trump.
However, even if, say, Petitioner is somehow right
about Helstoski and a need for Presidents to
renounce immunity expressly, there may be no
immunity anyway, since, as noted supra, Section IV,
Trump’s Statements go beyond his putative rights of
self-defense into unconscionable attacks on Carroll.
The malicious quality of his Statements (malice in
the sense of viciousness, and also untruthfulness
either deliberate or reckless, so, maybe both
“common-law malice” and “actual malice”), far
exceeds the needs of true defense.
Moreover, even if Trump were right about
Helstoski, what about the following, from the Statecourt period of the case, where Trump
expressly noted, however, that he was
only seeking “temporary” immunity
from suit. Id. at 21 (July 16, 2020
Letter to the Court) (“[N]o one is
seeking to ‘escape accountability’ here .
. . . [Carroll] is free to pursue this action
when the President is no longer in
office.”).
App. at 7a. That, see id., looks very explicit in
renouncing immunity, at least as soon as January
20, 2021, when Trump left office. And it says nothing
about demanding immunity again if he gets
reelected, as he did. And notably, it says he isn’t
trying to “‘escape accountability’”, id., which doesn’t
24
match the idea that he is forever immune to
defamation liability for the Statements.
Thus, for that and other reasons listed here, this
case is an incredibly tainted vehicle for certiorari for
Question Presented 1, Helstoski or not. The Court
should not grant cert.
VIII. THE WESTFALL ACT, EVEN IF NOT
STATUTORILY LIMITED IN TIME, MAY BE
LIMITED OTHERWISE, AND UNAVAILABLE
TO GIVE TRUMP IMMUNITY
The final Question Presented, see id., essentially
asks whether the Westfall Act, supra at 4, should
have let ex-Attorney General Pam Bondi substitute
the United States for Trump as defendant.
Even if there may be no limitation in the statute
itself on the time when Attorneys General may do
such things (and the Second Circuit did think there
was a limitation, see, e.g., App. at 122a), there may
be other limits pertinent here, e.g., once again,
“‘Immunity-related issues’ under the [Westfall] Act
‘should be decided at the earliest opportunity.’
Osborn [v. Haley], 549 U.S. [225,] 253 [(2007)]”,
App. at 129a (some brackets removed).
When Bondi re-certified Trump for substitution,
she did not do so “at the earliest opportunity”, id.
Not in January 2025; or February; or March. She
waited 3 months, until April, as the Second Circuit
notes: “April 11, 2025 – when Trump had been
President for nearly three months and this appeal
had been fully briefed for nearly two months”, App.
at 150a. In other words, she could have certified
Trump before the “appeal had been fully briefed”,
25
id., with all the time spent and expectations raised
by full briefing; but she didn’t. (Her predecessor
William Barr certified Trump on the same day,
September 8, 2020, that the case was removed to
federal court, see App. at 147a-148a (citations
omitted); it seems, then, that Bondi should have
moved much quicker.)
Thus, Bondi ran afoul of this Court’s command to
resolve Westfall Act issues immediately, see Osborn,
supra, at 253. Certiorari should not be granted.
* * *
Nolan’s The Odyssey not only emphasizes how the
Trojan Horse let Greeks in to butcher Trojans,
including women—and one Greek woman, Penelope,
is brutally harassed by men for decades, not unlike
what Trump has done to Carroll—, but also shows
that the Greeks’ brutal and deceptive actions led to
the collapse of the Bronze Age and fall of civilization,
see id. On that note, the Westfall Act’s being called
“Westfall” makes Amicus think that if America is the
leading nation of the “West”, it might indeed help
make the “West fall”, if America’s executive leader,
Trump, can misuse state power, employing it as a
Trojan horse, with immunity from punishment for
abusing whomever he wants, whenever he wants—
including those he has already abused for decades,
such as Carroll.
How will democracy, the West, and America
appear to people, if this kind of outrage can occur
with impunity? The U.S.A. is the Land of Liberty,
not the land of libel and lawless leaders.
And Trump still continues to abuse Carroll,
ceaselessly, lessening her life’s liberty to pursue
happiness; see, e.g., his untruthful June 29, 2026,
26
8:16 a.m. “Truth Social” post, https://truthsocial.com/
@realDonaldTrump/posts/116834055569312013:
Surprisingly, the Supreme Court
declined to “review” a Fake Case
brought against me by a woman I never
met (Decades old celebrity photo line,
standing with her husband, does not
count!). I will continue the fight against
this Weaponization and Lawfare Case
against me, including the ridiculous
claim of Defamation, with all of my
power and strength. [etc.]
Id. It is time for this obscenity to stop, despite
Trump’s false claims of “immunity”. And even if the
Court cannot stop it, it can certainly help make sure
that Trump pays for his defamation of his victim,
whose odyssey of misery has gone on far too long.
CONCLUSION
Amicus respectfully asks the Court to affirm the
decision below; and humbly thanks the Court for its
time and consideration.
August 11, 2026
Respectfully submitted,
David Boyle
Counsel of Record
P.O. Box 15143
Long Beach, CA 90815
dbo@boyleslaw.org
(734) 904-6132
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.