Amicus Curiae Brief — Donald J. Trump, Petitioner v. E. Jean Carroll

Supreme Court briefAug 11, 2026

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Text

No. 26-141

In the Supreme Court

of the United States

________________

DONALD J. TRUMP, PETITIONER

v.

E. JEAN CARROLL, RESPONDENT

_______________

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

________________

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE DAVID BOYLE

IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT

_________________

David Boyle

Counsel of Record

P.O. Box 15143

Long Beach, CA 90815

dbo@boyleslaw.org

(734) 904-6132

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES…..………………………iii

AMICUS CURIAE STATEMENT OF INTEREST…1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT.....................................3

ARGUMENT……………………………………………...4

I.

TRUMP’S RAPE LIABILITY IS ARGUABLY

SETTLED, SINCE HE PRESENTS NO NEW

INFORMATION CHALLENGING IT….…….4

II.

THE 25-573 CERTIORARI PETITION

KNEW OF IMMUNITY ISSUES, BUT

DIDN’T CLAIM IMMUNITY FOR THE

STATEMENTS (STATEMENTS THE

CARROLL II JURY WAS FORBIDDEN TO

CONSIDER), AND DELAYED UNTIL THE

REHEARING PETITION TO EXPLOIT

IMMUNITY ISSUES…………………………...5

III. PETITIONER MAY HAVE FORFEITED

IMMUNITY-BASED “QUESTIONS

PRESENTED” PERMANENTLY, BY NOT

BRINGING THEM UP IN 25-573.…………...9

IV. COULD TRUMP HAVE MADE

ACCEPTABLE STATEMENTS DEFENDING

HIMSELF, NOT ATTACKING CARROLL?

ONE EXAMPLE TO CONSIDER,

ALONGSIDE HIS ACTUAL AGGRESSIVE

STATEMENTS………………………..………..10

ii

V.

CAN ANY PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT

BE IMMUNIZED BY TOSSING IN SOME

MENTION OF AMERICANS, AND A TINY

NOD TO “IMPORTANT ISSUES”?..........…..18

VI.

TRUMP V. UNITED STATES IS ABOUT

CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS, THUS, NOT

FULLY RELEVANT HERE..........................20

VII.

EVEN IF TRUMP DID NOT EXPLICITLY

WAIVE IMMUNITY, QUESTION

PRESENTED 1 DOES NOT DESERVE

CERTIORARI, DUE TO HIS

STATEMENTS’ MALICE, AND THE

TAINTED VEHICLE THIS CASE

PROVIDES……...........................................21

VIII. THE WESTFALL ACT, EVEN IF NOT

STATUTORILY LIMITED IN TIME,

MAY BE LIMITED OTHERWISE, AND

UNAVAILABLE TO GIVE TRUMP

IMMUNITY.……........................................24

(ANTECONCLUSION)………………………….…..25

CONCLUSION……………………………………….26

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225 (2007)……………….25

Trump v. Carroll (“Carroll II”), 25-573, cert. denied

June 29, 2026, pet. for reh’g (July 8, 2026)

pending…………………………..1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9

Trump v. United States, 603 U.S. 593

(2024)……………………………….4, 20, 21, 22, 23

United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477

(1979)…………………………………..21, 22, 23, 24

STATUTES

Fed. Emps. Liab. Reform and Tort Comp. Act of 1988

(“Westfall Act”), 28 U.S.C. § 2679…….4, 6, 24, 25

RULES

S. Ct. R. 37………………………………..………….1 n.1

OTHER AUTHORITIES

(All Internet links below were last visited August

10, 2026.)

Access Hollywood (NBC Studios/NBCUniversal

iv

Syndication Studios 1996-present), Trump

Videotape (Sept. 2005)……………………….11, 12

Br. of Amicus Curiae David Boyle in Supp. of Resp’t

in 25-573 (2026)……………………………………..1

Br. of Pl.-Appellee E. Jean Carroll in Opp’n to Mot.

for a Stay or Inj. Pending Appeal, https://tinyurl.

com/bdcxj9w7, 26-1840 (2nd Cir.), July 20,

2026……………………………………………...……8

Will Neal, Elite Law Firm in Civil War Over Trump

Sex Abuse Case, The Daily Beast, July 10,

2026, 7:16 a.m., https://tinyurl.com/

yc8vndr3.............................................................1-2

Pet. for Reh’g in 25-573, Donald J. Trump,

Pet’r v. E. Jean Carroll

(2026)……………………………….2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9

Pet. for Writ of Cert. in 25-573, Donald J. Trump,

Pet’r v. E. Jean Carroll

(2025)……………………………….2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9

Justin D. Smith, Letter in 25-573, June 2, 2026…8, 9

The Odyssey (Syncopy 2026; based on Homer’s

Odyssey (c. 800 B.C.))………………………….1, 25

Donald J. Trump, Truth Social, June 29, 2026, 8:16

a.m., https://truthsocial.com/@realDonald

Trump/posts/116834055569312013………...25-26

1

AMICUS CURIAE STATEMENT OF INTEREST

The present amicus curiae, David Boyle

(hereinafter, “Amicus”),1 following up on his amicus

brief in 25-573, Trump v. Carroll (“Carroll II”),

respectfully supports Respondent, Elizabeth Jean

(“E. Jean”) Carroll, against Petitioner Donald J.

Trump’s hateful government-powered libels. While

Amicus believes a President should have copious

power as Chief Executive, that does not mean

unlimited power, especially power to abuse someone

he raped (“digital rape” being rape by common-sense

terms) and defamed, and still defames.

Indeed, Trump’s 2019 “official statement” attacks

on Carroll (“the Statements”) are like a Trojan horse,

see the current Christopher Nolan film The Odyssey

(Syncopy 2026; based on Homer’s Odyssey (c. 800

B.C.)) (condemning immorality of wooden-horse ruse

used to invade and butcher Troy). Even if official

presidential statements have possible immunity

from defamation suits, that immunity may not apply

here, especially if Trump’s attacks are but rants and

venom, merely pretending to be legitimate official

statements—just as the Trojan Horse pretended to

be an offering to the gods, when it was actually a

receptacle for Greek assassins, treachery, and death.

Trump’s sordid conduct has even occasioned

shock that someone would represent him in court

here, see, e.g., Will Neal, Elite Law Firm in Civil War

Over Trump Sex Abuse Case, The Daily Beast, July

10, 2026, 7:16 a.m., https://tinyurl.com/yc8vndr3, re

Sullivan & Cromwell, whose “move has sparked

1 No party or its counsel wrote or helped write this brief or gave

money for its writing or submission, see S. Ct. R. 37.

2

uproar among the firm’s top ranks. ‘The Carroll

cases were of particular concern for some lawyers

because of the nature of Carroll’s allegations,’ the

[Wall Street Journal] writes, adding that firms of

this size ‘rarely take on such cases for fear of

reputational damage.’” Id.

Of course, the President can choose any counsel,

and no law firm is here disparaged; Amicus is merely

noting the hideousness of the subject matter,

Trump’s raping/battering/defaming a now-elderly

woman, Carroll, and seeking to escape punishment.

Thus, even though some Questions Presented

here may be interesting in the abstract, this case,

“Carroll I” (26-141), is a very poor vehicle for

considering them. The messy, maybe bad-faith, way

Trump has handled the case, radiating “reputational

damage”, Daily Beast Article, supra, hardly provides

a clean vehicle. And if Trump’s statements are not

only outrageous but ultra vires, immunity might not

even be claimable here.

Finally, and shockingly, Trump should have

brought up the present Questions Presented, back

during his 25-573 certiorari petition, given his

assertion in his petition for rehearing, see id. at 3-5,

that the Statements shouldn’t have been accepted as

evidence in Carroll II, due to immunity issues. If he

knew back in 2025 that immunity was an issue, he

delayed hugely by not offering immunity-themed

Questions Presented until now: hence, the present

Questions are, arguably, highly untimely and have

thus abandoned any right to certiorari.

Following the Summary of Argument, then, we

start with the “old business” of 25-573, old wineskins

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which may mix badly with the new, 26-141:

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Trump has essentially waived his denial of raping

Carroll, since he did not present here or in his 25573 rehearing petition, new information favoring

that denial (as opposed to denying defamationliability).

The 25-573 certiorari petition should have

litigated immunity issues (e.g., in Questions

Presented), instead of waiting for the rehearing

petition to do so by saying the Statements were

immune and should not have been evidence in 25573, since Petitioner had previously known that

immunity issues were crucial. Moreover, the Carroll

II jury was not even allowed to consider the

Statements, see the 26-141 certiorari petition’s

appendix (“App.”), at 231a. This all does not

recommend rehearing 25-573.

Moreover, by not litigating immunity issues early

in 25-573, when he knew of them, Petitioner has

arguably waived those issues now, which should

prevent certiorari here.

A sample statement shows how Trump could

possibly have defended himself and denied Carroll’s

claims, without making ugly ultra vires attacks upon

her which misused state power, as a sort of Trojan

horse. Trump’s actual, hateful and defamatory

Statements are then analyzed, showing their evils.

The Statements name Justice Kavanaugh, see id. for

each, which may counsel special arrangements.

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Amicus asks whether any presidential statement

with “official” fig leaves, mentioning serving America

and/or some public-concern issue, could putatively

immunize anything, even, say, calls for racist

violence.

Trump v. United States, 603 U.S. 593 (2024)

(“Trump”), is about criminal immunity, so doesn’t

merit certiorari for Question Presented 2, though

Trump’s observations on official statements, say,

could be considered in other ways.

Question Presented 1, on, see id., a supposed need

for a President to waive immunity explicitly, should

not receive certiorari, since Trump may have waived

immunity, either explicitly or not. Even if waiver

must be explicit, that may not call for certiorari,

given the Statements’ indefensibility under any

circumstances, and the “unclean hands”, twisted

vehicle this case would present.

Question Presented 3, on, see id., immunity under

the Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort

Compensation Act of 1988 (“Westfall Act”), 28 U.S.C.

§ 2679, does not deserve certiorari, since other

sources may limit immunity, even if the statute itself

somehow has no time limit for substituting the

United States for Petitioner.

Finally, Trump’s continuing vicious attacks on

Carroll threaten American democracy, as the State

should serve the People, not abuse them.

ARGUMENT

I. TRUMP’S RAPE LIABILITY IS ARGUABLY

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SETTLED, SINCE HE PRESENTS NO NEW

INFORMATION CHALLENGING IT

First off: the instant certiorari petition and its

Questions Presented do not really challenge the

issue of Trump’s rape/sexual-battery liability,

especially since the words “rape” and “sexual” don’t

appear in the petition, id.; just as the 25-573 petition

for rehearing did not challenge Trump’s rape/sexual

battery liability, since that petition, see id. at 1,

mentions only immunity and the then-pending

Carroll I “cert” petition as reasons for rehearing.

Thus, Trump’s liability for raping Carroll (as

opposed to defamation-liability) may be regarded as

settled.

II. THE 25-573 CERTIORARI PETITION KNEW

OF IMMUNITY ISSUES, BUT DIDN’T CLAIM

IMMUNITY FOR THE STATEMENTS

(STATEMENTS THE CARROLL II JURY

WAS FORBIDDEN TO CONSIDER),

AND DELAYED UNTIL THE REHEARING

PETITION TO EXPLOIT IMMUNITY ISSUES

As for immunity issues: the 25-573 rehearing

petition asks the Court “either [to] grant the petition

in this case, or hold it pending the disposition of the

petition in Carroll I”, id. at 1. Trump thus desires,

see id., linkage of 25-573 to 26-141; indeed, Trump

says Carroll “improperly introduced and relied on

President Trump’s 2019 official statements at the

Carroll II trial. Exhibits 1 and 2 admitted into

evidence at that trial were th[os]e statements[.]” Pet.

for Reh’g at 2-3. But this poses a problem for Trump.

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First: as the rehearing petition doesn’t tell

readers, see id., “[T]he Court instructed the jury in

Carroll II not to consider the 2019 statements”, App.

at 231a. This is a gross, even titanic material

omission by that petition; if the jury was ordered

“not to consider the 2019 statements”, id., the

Statements’ mere presence as exhibits in Carroll II

may not be important, thus, not a reason to grant

the petition or hold the case.

(And were the Statements the only exhibits in

that case, or were there many other exhibits? Again,

there seems little reason to grant rehearing in 25573.)

Moreover, as for immunity: the 25-573 certiorari

petition explicitly mentions, “Carroll I was delayed

because of proceedings concerning President

Trump’s presidential immunity defense and whether

the United States should be substituted as a party

for President Trump[, and] the Westfall Act”, id. at

10. However, nowhere in that petition does Trump

employ those immunity/Westfall Act issues as a

reason for certiorari, or suggest that the Statements

shouldn’t have been allowed in Carroll II.

Instead, Trump waited until his July 2026

rehearing petition, as noted supra, to weaponize

those immunity issues, which he could have brought

up in the November cert petition: issues he must

have known about at that earlier time, since he

explicitly mentions immunity and Westfall there, id.

at 10.

This may be seriously bad-faith litigation. If the

Statements were so sacrosanct, immune, thus unfit

as evidence in Carroll II, then Trump should have

mentioned that in the Carroll II cert petition, not

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hidden the issues until the rehearing petition. Was

the hiding done deliberately, so as to provide a false

excuse for rehearing if needed, some might ask?

The rehearing petition says, “Rehearing is

warranted because President Trump will

imminently file a petition for a writ of certiorari in

… (“Carroll I”), which will present vital questions

concerning Presidential immunity for official

statements.” Id. at 1. But Trump didn’t have to wait

for a Carroll I pending cert petition to bring up

immunity for the Statements; he could’ve done that

in the Carroll II cert petition the previous year.

As Carroll somewhat similarly observed,

If successful petitions for rehearing

are “rare birds,” … Defendant’s pending

petition cannot possibly get off the

ground. The Supreme Court limits

rehearing to two bases: “intervening

circumstances of a substantial or

controlling effect” or “other substantial

grounds not previously presented.” …

Defendant’s petition satisfies neither,

since the only “intervening

circumstance” it identifies is

Defendant’s “forthcoming petition in

[the related case].” … But Defendant

previously told the Court about that in

a letter dated June 2, 2026, suggesting

that “the Court may wish to consider

the petitions together.” … The sole

ground for rehearing was therefore

already before the Supreme Court when

it denied certiorari.

8

Br. of Pl.-Appellee E. Jean Carroll in Opp’n to Mot.

for a Stay or Inj. Pending Appeal, https://tinyurl.

com/bdcxj9w7, 26-1840 (2nd Cir.), July 20, 2026, at 17

(citations omitted). Thus, see id., if the Court already

rejected Trump’s June 2 letter’s idea when refusing

certiorari on June 29, there may be little left to fuel

Trump’s quest for rehearing.

And there may be even less fuel than Carroll

noted, since, as observed supra, Trump should have

offered immunity-related Questions Presented back

on November 10, 2025, in his 25-573 cert petition,

not waited until July 28, 2026, and the present cert

petition. (Not to mention the Carroll II jury’s not

considering the Statements.)

True, there is one source, App. at 57a, the courtof-appeals denial of rehearing en banc, dated April

29, 2026, which is well after November 2025. Still,

there were many sources, App. at 1a-56a, 146a-287a,

from before November 2025, that the 25-573 cert

petition could have drawn upon, to discuss immunity

issues. And after April 29, 2026, the denial of

rehearing en banc, supra, could have been

mentioned in a 25-573 supplemental brief or letter.

Even if Trump had waited until April 29 itself to

claim immunity for the Statements, that still

would’ve been c. 4 months before now, and c. 2

months before his June 2 letter; and the Court could

have considered those issues at that time, instead of

waiting for the July petition for rehearing to exploit

those issues.

…Petitions for rehearing are very rarely granted;

they should be granted even less often, when

somebody arguably tries to “hide the ball” from the

Court, by not litigating issues (e.g., immunity) in the

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certiorari petition, that they should have litigated

and offered as Questions Presented then, instead of

waiting for the rehearing petition to exploit them;

and when a petitioner neglects to mention the jury

was forbidden to consider his supposedly-immune

Statements.

III. PETITIONER MAY HAVE FORFEITED

IMMUNITY-BASED “QUESTIONS

PRESENTED” PERMANENTLY, BY

NOT BRINGING THEM UP IN 25-573

Moreover, as implied supra at 2, Petitioner may

be in a trap of his own devising. That is, by

adamantly asserting, in his rehearing petition, see

id. at 1, that the Statements’ immunity is enough to

demand rehearing of 25-573 (since the Statements

were exhibits in Carroll II), Trump inadvertently

raises the question of why he didn’t raise questions,

especially Questions Presented, about immunity

during 25-573, whether in the cert petition, or just

after April 29, 2026, until his June 2 letter (which,

see id., didn’t even raise immunity directly, but just

mentioned the upcoming Carroll I petition)—a letter

the Court disregarded when he asked to consider

Carroll I and Carroll II together.

So, since Trump claims that immunity was

actually an issue in 25-573, but he didn’t raise that

issue in his 25-573 Questions Presented, see id. for

each, then he arguably has forfeited that issue or

issues permanently, and is futilely raising them now.

Cf. “‘Immunity-related issues’ under the [Westfall]

Act ‘should be decided at the earliest opportunity.’

Osborn [v. Haley], 549 U.S. [225,] 253 [(2007)]”, App.

at 129a (some brackets removed); i.e., to delay

10

litigation of immunity issues may be fatal to the

delayer’s case.

However, given the viciousness and excess of

Trump’s Statements, no immunity provision may

help him in any case, as we now explore.

IV. COULD TRUMP HAVE MADE

ACCEPTABLE STATEMENTS DEFENDING

HIMSELF, NOT ATTACKING CARROLL? ONE

EXAMPLE TO CONSIDER, ALONGSIDE

HIS ACTUAL AGGRESSIVE STATEMENTS

First, let us examine what a possibly-immune

statement from Trump might have looked like.

There is, perhaps sadly, some possible immunity for

public officials purporting to serve the public good,

who make statements with some false components

(the legal theory will be discussed later). The

example below may follow those standards:

A writer, E. Jean Carroll, recently

accused me of raping her at Bergdorf

Goodman in 1996. I strongly deny this.

I certainly do not remember that

happening, and do not recall ever even

meeting her. To be fair, I am not calling

her a liar, since she may somehow

believe this false story. Maybe she was

thinking of another man. Her book

accuses other men of similar acts.

I hope she is not telling this story to

sell her new book; I’m not saying she is,

and I can’t see into her mind, so I’m not

going to accuse her. But I am obliged to

defend my reputation, so my family will

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know I am not guilty of her terrible

accusation. Also, this accusation may

distract from my time and effort to be a

good President and serve the American

people, so I strongly deny it.

Lastly, I apologize for any disrespect

or mistreatment of women people think

I may have ever done, such as the

unwise words I chose on the Access

Hollywood tape from 2005. We should

all speak out against assaults on

women, or disrespect for women. If I

want to serve the American people, I

myself have to be a role model they can

trust. Thank you for listening.

That model statement supra still has various lies

by Trump (that the rape/sexual battery didn’t

happen, and that he never met Carroll), see id.; but

at least the statement is in defensive mode—

protecting himself against Carroll’s accusation—, not

a bag of vile attacks on Carroll, who is, after all, his

employer, i.e., an American taxpayer. He specifically

does not call her a liar, and doesn’t say she made up

the story to sell her book (even if he brings up the

hypothetical possibility), and doesn’t say she falsely

accused other men (even if he mentions the

accusations).

Too, he explicitly mentions his “masters” (re

respondeat superior), the American people, who

employ him, so he could argue that at least part of

his statement serves Americans. And finally, he

shows actual contrition and self-awareness,

mentioning his vile words, e.g., “[g]rab[bing]

[women] by the pu[denda]”) from the infamous

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Access Hollywood tape, id.; purports to respect

women and their right not to be raped/abused—but

without calling Carroll a liar; confirms he has

responsibilities, not just rights; and ends with a

polite “Thank you”, id.

It is a sin to lie, but even despite Trump’s lies (no

rape, never met Carroll) in the model statement

above, he might not have broken any earthly laws,

possibly, in that defensive statement which tries to

protect him, and asserts an American public

interest, but without per se attacking Carroll at all.

Now let’s see the real Statements, starting with

the first, from June 21, 2019:

Regarding the “story” by E. Jean

Carroll, claiming she once encountered

me at Bergdorf Goodman 23 years ago.

I’ve never met this person in my life.

She is trying to sell a new book -- that

should indicate her motivation. It

should be sold in the fiction section.

Shame on those who make up false

stories of assault to try to get publicity

for themselves, or sell a book, or carry

out a political agenda -- like Julie

Swetnick who falsely accused Justice

Brett Kavanaugh. It’s just as bad for

people to believe it, particularly when

there is zero evidence. Worse still for a

dying publication to try to prop itself up

by peddling fake news -- it’s an

epidemic.

Ms. Carroll & New York Magazine:

No pictures? No surveillance? No video?

13

No reports? No sales attendants

around?? I would like to thank Bergdorf

Goodman for confirming they have no

video footage of any such incident,

because it never happened.

False accusations diminish the

severity of real assault. All should

condemn false accusations and any

actual assault in the strongest possible

terms.

If anyone has information that the

Democratic Party is working with Ms.

Carroll or New York Magazine, please

notify us as soon as possible. The world

should know what’s really going on. It

is a disgrace and people should pay

dearly for such false accusations.

App. at 4a-5a (citation omitted).

This Statement is aggressive and attacks Carroll

ceaselessly, see id., rather than just defending

Trump. It puts Carroll’s story in quotes (“story”), id.,

which is derisive and implies Carroll is a liar. It

falsely says he never met Carroll; and claims and/or

implies, without evidence, that she made up the

story to get herself publicity, sell books, and serve “a

political agenda”, which may include “the

Democratic Party”, id.

While “All should condemn false accusations and

any actual assault in the strongest possible terms”,

id., may be in itself a worthwhile sentiment: in

context here, it seems a mere fig leaf, de minimis, or

even a Trojan horse, being tainted by Trump’s

saying, falsely, that Carroll’s accusation is false. And

14

the Statement doesn’t mention the American people

in particular, the “masters” of their employee

Trump, so his words do not purport to serve them.

As well, there is no apology for his own abusive

behavior/words towards women; and “people should

pay dearly for such false accusations”, id., is a

vengeful and threatening way to end—again, an

attack on Carroll, not a moderate defense of himself.

Finally, note that Trump spoke recklessly or

intentionally falsely, lacking knowledge of Carroll’s

affairs:

Trump acted with, at a minimum,

reckless disregard for the truth. In his

deposition testimony, Trump admitted

that prior to making his 2019

statements, he never read Carroll’s

book or the New York magazine

publication, never contacted Bergdorf

Goodman’s, never did any research on

Carroll, and never had anyone working

for him research Carroll. He also

admitted that, before issuing his 2019

statements, he had no knowledge of

Carroll’s book deal, financial

circumstances, or political affiliation.

App. at 28a (footnote omitted).

The next Statement is from June 22, 2019:

Reporter: Mr. President, you had

said earlier that you never met E. Jean

Carroll. There was a photograph of you

and her in the late 1980’s –

15

Trump: I have no idea who this

woman is. It is a totally false

accusation. I think she was married -as I read; I have no idea who she is -but she was married to a, actually, nice

guy, Johnson -- a newscaster.

Reporter: You were in a

photograph with her.

Trump: Standing with [my] coat on

in a line -- give me a break -- with my

back to the camera. I have no idea who

she is. What she did is -- it’s terrible,

what’s going on. So it’s a total false

accusation and I don’t know anything

about her.

And, you know, people have to be

careful because they’re playing with

very dangerous territory. And when

they do that -- and it’s happening more

and more. When you look at what

happened to Justice Kavanaugh and

you look at what’s happening to others,

you can’t do that for the sake of

publicity.

New York Magazine is a failing

magazine. It’s ready to go out of

business, from what I hear. They’ll do

anything they can. But this was about

many men, and I was one of the many

men that she wrote about. It’s a totally

false accusation. I have absolutely no

idea who she is. There’s some picture

where we’re shaking hands. It looks like

at some kind of event. I have my coat

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on. I have my wife standing next to me.

And I didn’t know her husband, but he

was a newscaster. But I have no idea

who she is -- none whatsoever.

It’s a false accusation and it’s a

disgrace that a magazine like New York

-- which is one of the reasons it’s failing.

People don’t read it anymore, so they’re

trying to get readership by using me.

It’s not good.

You know, there were cases that the

mainstream media didn’t pick up. And I

don’t know if you’ve seen them. And

they were put on Fox. But there were

numerous cases where women were

paid money to say bad things about me.

You can’t do that. You can’t do that.

And those women did wrong things -that women were actually paid money

to say bad things about me.

But here’s a case, it’s an absolute

disgrace that she’s allowed to do that.

App. at 5a-6a (citation omitted). This Statement, like

the previous one, aggressively attacks Carroll

ceaselessly, see id., rather than only defending

Trump. Trump repeatedly, falsely says he doesn’t

know who Carroll is or “know anything about her”,

id. (he certainly knows she’s suing him, and that she

is a book-writer, once married to John Johnson),

even after, see id., the 1980’s photograph of him with

her has surfaced. He again claims and/or implies,

without evidence, that she made up the story to get

publicity; and he now even claims, evidence-free,

that she was paid to fabricate the story, see id., an

17

exceptionally corrosive claim.

And this time, Trump doesn’t even bother to say

“All should condemn false accusations and any

actual assault in the strongest possible terms”, but

just offers, “And, you know, people have to be careful

because they’re playing with very dangerous

territory” (which could be seen as a threat to

Carroll), and “When you look at what happened to

Justice Kavanaugh and you look at what’s

happening to others, you can’t do that for the sake of

publicity.” Id. So, condemning “actual assault” has

disappeared, making one wonder if the first

Statement’s mentioning it was even sincere, or just,

again, a fig leaf or worse.

Too, once again, the Statement has no mention of

the American people as a whole, his employers.

And Trump’s last words, “But here’s a case, it’s an

absolute disgrace that she’s allowed to do that”, id.,

sound vengeful and oppressive, maybe even a call for

a prior restraint on Carroll’s free speech—once more,

attacking Carroll, not defending himself in a

moderate way.

Finally, on June 24, 2019, Trump said, “I’ll say it

with great respect: Number one, she’s not my type.

Number two, it never happened. It never happened,

OK?” App. at 6a (citation omitted). Though it still

commits the falsehood of denying the assault, this

statement may be considered more defensive, less

attack-oriented, than the previous Statements, see

id. for each; and indeed, “Carroll withdrew her

defamation claim based on this statement, but she

maintained … it was relevant to … punitive

damages”, App. at 6a n.4.

18

In all, the first two Statements are vicious, false,

and attack Carroll rather than defending Trump.

Amicus is not sure how they can be within the outer

perimeter of Trump’s presidential duties, or how

they serve any public interest except in a “drive-by”,

de minimis, hypocritical, or Trojan-horse way.

(By the way, Trump mentions Justice

Kavanaugh—seeking Kavanaugh’s favor?— in both

long Statements, portraying him as someone falsely

accused of assault, see id. for each. Without saying

this should, or shouldn’t, call, say, for that Justice’s

recusal from this case, or part of it—e.g., recusing

from considering the content of the Statements, as

opposed to theoretical legal issues of immunity—, it

would be remiss not to bring up the idea of

appropriate consideration, when the Statements

specifically name one sitting Justice, twice, whose

history has some resemblance, alleged or real, to

that of Trump. Sensitivity and neutrality are

important here, in seeking justice and fairness.)

V. CAN ANY PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT

BE IMMUNIZED BY TOSSING IN SOME

MENTION OF AMERICANS, AND A

TINY NOD TO “IMPORTANT ISSUES”?

On that note, Amicus wonders if Presidents may

dare to make any abusive verbal attack they want,

as long as they “tick off the boxes” of a) some quick

mention of serving the American people, and b) an

also-quick reference to some “issue of public

concern”.

If so, that may be a problem, since a President

could make a quick (or long) mention of those two

19

things, and then speak any evil with impunity. He

could use the phrase “enemy of the people”, as one

can imagine North Korea, Iran, or Nazi Germany

doing, in a statement, and say that since it mentions

the people, his employers, he is immune.

Consider this sample statement: “Haitians are

from a sh[]thole country. Too many are here,

straining our resources. But I’m not saying all of

them should be beaten or killed: there are some good

Haitians, they voted for me. FIGHT ENEMIES OF

THE PEOPLE!”

Following this statement, in the next 24 hours,

dozens of Haitians are beaten, and several killed.

Their families sue Trump for defamation, and his

lawyer says the statement mentions serving the

American people, and says “there are some good

Haitians”, which is an issue of public importance

(and a backhanded compliment of sorts, even), and

demands immunity from defamation (or any other

punishment) for the statement.

Is immunity a good idea, under these

circumstances? The two boxes (serving Americans;

public-interest issue) were ticked, hypertechnically.

(And some might argue that even ticking only one of

those boxes may be enough for immunity.)

Indeed, the district court notes a similarly

unpleasant hypothetical: “At a rally promoting his

reelection, an incumbent President touts his policy

accomplishments[,] but during his speech he

instructs members of the crowd to ‘punch’ a protester

‘in the face right now.’” App. 260a (citation omitted).

Amicus adds that even an “official

20

communication” which isn’t during a possiblyunofficial event like an election rally, may be subject

to the common-sense consideration above, i.e., that

presidential communications shouldn’t be immune

from punishment for non-presidential (not within

the President’s core power/concerns) messages like

“Punch someone in the face.”

In that line, the district court observes, “Mr.

Trump does not identify any connection between the

allegedly defamatory content of his statements –

that Ms. Carroll fabricated her sexual assault

accusation and did so for financial and personal gain

– to any official responsibility of the president. Nor

can the Court think of any possible connection.” App.

261a.

Thus, it may be pointless even to bother

pretending the Statements can be defended by legal

immunity; though, for completeness’ sake, we now

explore legal immunity.

VI. TRUMP V. UNITED STATES IS

ABOUT CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS,

THUS, NOT FULLY RELEVANT HERE

The second Question Presented—which, being

muddled, should be disposed of first—evokes, id.,

Trump, supra at 4, which involves “immunity from

criminal prosecution”, id. at 602 (Roberts, C.J.)

(emphasis added), not civil suits. Mirabile dictu,

Trump’s petition gives no indication of this. (The

very-brief “Trump, 603 U.S. at 609 (courts cannot

‘adjudicate a criminal prosecution that examines’

official acts)”, id. at 30, doesn’t openly admit Trump

is not really about civil-suit immunity.)

21

So, Question Presented 2, “Whether a sitting

President’s public statements … are official acts

protected by Presidential immunity under Trump

[etc.]”, borders on incoherence. The supposed “official

acts” in Carroll I aren’t about criminal matters, but

are some statements attacking Carroll, for which

Trump alleges he can’t be sued. Even if Trump

expands presidential immunity vis-à-vis criminal

matters, that case, Trump, is hardly germane to civil

suits. The Court should not waste its time by

granting cert on the second Question Presented.

(If the Court wishes, say, to “fold in” Petitioner’s

using Trump to claim that an “‘aspect of Presidential

power is using the office’s “bully pulpit”’ … on

‘matters of public concern’”, Pet. at 4 (citation

omitted), that can be done without granting cert to a

Question Presented revolving around Trump. Any

unnecessary Question Presented is an unfair/

duplicative/wasteful “extra bite at the apple” for a

petitioner.)

VII. EVEN IF TRUMP DID NOT EXPLICITLY

WAIVE IMMUNITY, QUESTION PRESENTED 1

DOES NOT DESERVE CERTIORARI, DUE TO

HIS STATEMENTS’ MALICE, AND THE

TAINTED VEHICLE THIS CASE PROVIDES

Question Presented 1 is, “Whether a President

can be found to have forfeited[/]waived Presidential

immunity without ever expressly renouncing such

immunity, solely because his first responsive

pleading did not invoke Presidential immunity by

name”, id.; and Trump invokes United States v.

Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477, 490-491 (1979), noting “that

a Member of Congress cannot be found to have

22

forfeited or waived legislative immunity absent an

‘explicit and unequivocal renunciation,’ ‘assuming

[waiver] is possible’ at all.” Pet. at (I).

Trump may have never used the exact words, “I

explicitly and unequivocally renounce my

immunity”, but lower courts have found he

renounced it, see, e.g., the Second Circuit’s

“h[o]ld[ing] that Trump waived his immunity

defense here by, among other things, failing to assert

it in his answer to Carroll’s complaint in state court

and conceding to it at oral argument.” App. at 133a134a (citation omitted).

That Circuit also ruled that Trump “did not alter

the prevailing law on whether presidential immunity

can be waived”, and thus “does not constitute an

intervening change of law justifying reconsideration

of our earlier decision [against immunity].” App. at

17a-18a.

That lower court also doubts that Helstoski,

supra, helps Trump: “Trump’s second argument -that a waiver of presidential immunity requires an

‘explicit and unequivocal renunciation,’ Helstoski,

442 U.S. at 491, … -- is also foreclosed because it was

‘ripe for review at the time of [Trump’s] initial

appeal but . . . nonetheless foregone’”, id. at 18a

(citation omitted) (brackets in original).

Then that court asserts Trump “did not announce

new law when it observed that presidential

immunity is rooted in the structural separation of

powers”, so that there is no change in law which

would let Helstoski, which upheld legislators’

immunity and required “explicit and unequivocal

renunciation” of immunity, drag presidential-

23

immunity law into its ambit and mandate “explicit

and unequivocal renunciation” of immunity for

Presidents too, see App. at 18a-19a.

Thus, it seems Helstoski is helpless to aid Trump.

However, even if, say, Petitioner is somehow right

about Helstoski and a need for Presidents to

renounce immunity expressly, there may be no

immunity anyway, since, as noted supra, Section IV,

Trump’s Statements go beyond his putative rights of

self-defense into unconscionable attacks on Carroll.

The malicious quality of his Statements (malice in

the sense of viciousness, and also untruthfulness

either deliberate or reckless, so, maybe both

“common-law malice” and “actual malice”), far

exceeds the needs of true defense.

Moreover, even if Trump were right about

Helstoski, what about the following, from the Statecourt period of the case, where Trump

expressly noted, however, that he was

only seeking “temporary” immunity

from suit. Id. at 21 (July 16, 2020

Letter to the Court) (“[N]o one is

seeking to ‘escape accountability’ here .

. . . [Carroll] is free to pursue this action

when the President is no longer in

office.”).

App. at 7a. That, see id., looks very explicit in

renouncing immunity, at least as soon as January

20, 2021, when Trump left office. And it says nothing

about demanding immunity again if he gets

reelected, as he did. And notably, it says he isn’t

trying to “‘escape accountability’”, id., which doesn’t

24

match the idea that he is forever immune to

defamation liability for the Statements.

Thus, for that and other reasons listed here, this

case is an incredibly tainted vehicle for certiorari for

Question Presented 1, Helstoski or not. The Court

should not grant cert.

VIII. THE WESTFALL ACT, EVEN IF NOT

STATUTORILY LIMITED IN TIME, MAY BE

LIMITED OTHERWISE, AND UNAVAILABLE

TO GIVE TRUMP IMMUNITY

The final Question Presented, see id., essentially

asks whether the Westfall Act, supra at 4, should

have let ex-Attorney General Pam Bondi substitute

the United States for Trump as defendant.

Even if there may be no limitation in the statute

itself on the time when Attorneys General may do

such things (and the Second Circuit did think there

was a limitation, see, e.g., App. at 122a), there may

be other limits pertinent here, e.g., once again,

“‘Immunity-related issues’ under the [Westfall] Act

‘should be decided at the earliest opportunity.’

Osborn [v. Haley], 549 U.S. [225,] 253 [(2007)]”,

App. at 129a (some brackets removed).

When Bondi re-certified Trump for substitution,

she did not do so “at the earliest opportunity”, id.

Not in January 2025; or February; or March. She

waited 3 months, until April, as the Second Circuit

notes: “April 11, 2025 – when Trump had been

President for nearly three months and this appeal

had been fully briefed for nearly two months”, App.

at 150a. In other words, she could have certified

Trump before the “appeal had been fully briefed”,

25

id., with all the time spent and expectations raised

by full briefing; but she didn’t. (Her predecessor

William Barr certified Trump on the same day,

September 8, 2020, that the case was removed to

federal court, see App. at 147a-148a (citations

omitted); it seems, then, that Bondi should have

moved much quicker.)

Thus, Bondi ran afoul of this Court’s command to

resolve Westfall Act issues immediately, see Osborn,

supra, at 253. Certiorari should not be granted.

* * *

Nolan’s The Odyssey not only emphasizes how the

Trojan Horse let Greeks in to butcher Trojans,

including women—and one Greek woman, Penelope,

is brutally harassed by men for decades, not unlike

what Trump has done to Carroll—, but also shows

that the Greeks’ brutal and deceptive actions led to

the collapse of the Bronze Age and fall of civilization,

see id. On that note, the Westfall Act’s being called

“Westfall” makes Amicus think that if America is the

leading nation of the “West”, it might indeed help

make the “West fall”, if America’s executive leader,

Trump, can misuse state power, employing it as a

Trojan horse, with immunity from punishment for

abusing whomever he wants, whenever he wants—

including those he has already abused for decades,

such as Carroll.

How will democracy, the West, and America

appear to people, if this kind of outrage can occur

with impunity? The U.S.A. is the Land of Liberty,

not the land of libel and lawless leaders.

And Trump still continues to abuse Carroll,

ceaselessly, lessening her life’s liberty to pursue

happiness; see, e.g., his untruthful June 29, 2026,

26

8:16 a.m. “Truth Social” post, https://truthsocial.com/

@realDonaldTrump/posts/116834055569312013:

Surprisingly, the Supreme Court

declined to “review” a Fake Case

brought against me by a woman I never

met (Decades old celebrity photo line,

standing with her husband, does not

count!). I will continue the fight against

this Weaponization and Lawfare Case

against me, including the ridiculous

claim of Defamation, with all of my

power and strength. [etc.]

Id. It is time for this obscenity to stop, despite

Trump’s false claims of “immunity”. And even if the

Court cannot stop it, it can certainly help make sure

that Trump pays for his defamation of his victim,

whose odyssey of misery has gone on far too long.

CONCLUSION

Amicus respectfully asks the Court to affirm the

decision below; and humbly thanks the Court for its

time and consideration.

August 11, 2026

Respectfully submitted,

David Boyle

Counsel of Record

P.O. Box 15143

Long Beach, CA 90815

dbo@boyleslaw.org

(734) 904-6132

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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