Emergency Application — Masahide Kanayama, Applicant v. Scott Kowal, Chief of U.S. Pretrial Services SDNY
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NO. __________
___________________________________
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
____________________________________
MASAHIDE KANAYAMA,
Petitioner,
vs.
SCOTT KOWAL, CHIEF OF U.S. PRE-TRIAL SERVICES SDNY,
Respondent.
__________
Emergency Motion for Stay of Extradition: Appendix
___________
Walter Roesch, Esq.
Attorneys for Petitioner
Law Offices of Robert Tsigler
299 Broadway Ste 1400
New York, New York 10007
(718) 878-3781
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Petitioner’s Habeas Corpus Petition…………………………………………………….….. App. 1
District Court Order Certifying Extradition………………………………………………. App. 14
District Court Denial of Emergency Motion to Stay Extradition ……………………….... App. 26
District Court Denial of Emergency Motion to Stay Extradition Pending Appeal……..… App. 35
State Department Affidavit………………………………………………………………... App. 36
Hyuk Kee Yoo v. United States, No. 20-cv-6161,
2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 222067 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2021) …………………...……….…. App. 38
Court of Appeals Denial of Administrative Stay of Extradition……………………..…… App. 41
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
IN THE MATTER OF THE EXTRADITION
OF MASAHIDE KANA YAMA
ORDER
---
Ramos, DJ.:
The Government of Japan formally requested the extradition of Masahide Kanayama, a
Japanese national living in New York, on December 12, 2016, through a diplomatic note (the
"Extradition Request") in connection to two incidents of vandalism at two historic and culturally
significant sites in Japan: the Narita-san Shinsho-ji Temple and Katori Jingu Shrine. GX-2 at
21-29. 1 Before the Court is the motion of the United States Government for certification of the
Extradition Request. 2 For the reasons set forth below, the Government' s request is GRANTED.
I.
THE EXTRADITION REQUEST
On April 9, 2015 , Japanese police officials commenced an investigation into two reported
instances of vandalism that occurred on March 25 , 2015 at the Narita-san Shinsho-ji Temple in
Narita City (the "Temple") and the Katori Jingu Shrine in Katori City (the "Shrine"). Both the
Temple and the Shrine bear significant historical, religious, and cultural value. Founded in 940,
the Temple is a Buddhist place of worship that attracts approximately 10 million visitors each
year. Supp. at Ex. 3. The Shrine was founded during the reign of Japan ' s first emperor and is
1
Citations to " GX" documents refer to the government exhibits filed with the Court in advance of the December 6,
2022 extradition hearing. Citations to " Gov. Supp." refer to the supplemental exhibits filed with the Court in
response to Kanayama' s opposition memorandum.
2
In accordance with Article XIV of the March 3, 1978 Treaty on Extradition between Japan and the United States
(the "Treaty" ), the United States provides Japan legal representation in U.S. courts in Japan' s extradition requests.
See GX-1 at 15 .
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one of the few remaining Shinto places of worship connected with the Japanese Imperial Family;
it attracts approximately two million worshippers per year. Id. at Ex. 4.
On March 25, 2015 , at approximately 4:06 p.m., surveillance cameras installed at the
Temple filmed a man suspiciously roaming the premises and touching three wooden poles on the
east side of the So-mon (the "Main Gate"). Id. at 52, 62. The man had black, thinning hair and
wore the following: a gray jacket; black, hooded, long-sleeved windbreaker; white, collared
undershirt; dark blue jeans; and black shoes. Id. Security footage did not show any other
persons touching the wooden poles in this timeframe. Id. Photographs taken of the Main Gate
by a tourist at approximately 2:24 p.m. showed the cite free of oil stains; another taken by an
employee of the Temple at 4:07 p.m. showed poles on the east side of the Main Gate defaced
with an oily substance.3 Id. at 62-64.
That same day-at 4:57 p.m., approximately 51 minutes later-surveillance cameras
installed at the Shrine filmed a man dressed in the same clothes, with similar physical
characteristics, touching the right and left wooden poles of the Hoden (the "Main Hall") and
splashing liquid on an offertory box, the wooden stairs in front of it, and adjacent poles.4 Id. at
26-27, 52. Japanese officials reviewed the security footage from both locations and concluded
that the same person appeared to have committed both acts of vandalism . Id. at 52.
After conducting simulation tests for three different routes from the Temple to the Shrine,
which are located approximately 17 miles apart, the police investigators concluded that it was
possible for the same person to commit the offenses at both locations during the 51-minute
3
In 2017, a restoration company specializing in the restoration of temples and shrines, estimated that the cost to
restore the Temple would total 120,500 yen . 120,500 yen converts to approximately $932 U.S. currency. GX-3 at
299--304.
4
In 2017, a restoration company specializing in the restoration of temples and shrines, estimated that the cost to
restore the Shrine would total 2,423 ,248 yen . 2,423,248 yen converts to approximately $18,747 U.S. currency. id.
at 305-310 .
2
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timeframe using a car. Id. at 53. Based on the characteristics of the suspect captured by the
security cameras at the Temple and Shrine, investigators reviewed footage recorded by a security
camera installed at the Sawara-Katori Tollgate-an expressway tollgate near the Shrine. Id. The
investigation revealed that a man resembling the suspect, who drove a gray Toyota Prius, paid
the toll on March 25, 2015 at 4:41 p.m., approximately 35 minutes after the Temple was defaced,
and 15 minutes before the Shrine was defaced. Id. At that point, the investigators did not know
the license plate number of the car. Id.
The authorities thereafter obtained and examined 36 expressway tickets collected at the
Sawara-Katori Tollgate around 4:41 p.m. Id. Their review of the expressway ticket issued to the
gray Prius revealed that the vehicle had a license plate number ending in " 14" and that the driver
first collected the ticket when passing through the Narita Tollgate-an expressway tollgate
located near the Temple-at 4:30 p.m,. approximately twenty minutes after the Temple was
defaced. Id. The officials then examined images captured by a security camera at the Narita
Tollgate and identified a person resembling the suspect driving a gray Prius through the gate at
4:30 p.m. Id. at 53-54.
In furtherance of their investigation into the gray Prius, the investigators made inquiries
with car rental companies in the vicinity of the Narita International Airport and ultimately
identified a gray Prius with the license plate number "Narita300Wa414." Id. at 54. Upon
reviewing the records of the rental company, the police learned that an individual named
Masahide Kanayama rented the vehicle from 2:30 p.m. on March 25 to 9:30 a.m. on March 26,
2015. Id. at 54. To obtain the rental car, Kanayama provided the agency a copy of his Japanese
passport. Id. at 54-55. The investigators determined that the man in the passport photo
resembled the suspect shown in the surveillance footage at the Temple and Shrine. Id. at 55.
3
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To pay for the rental car, Kanayama used an American Express card. Id. at 57. After
contacting the credit card company and obtaining the billing records, the investigators further
found that from March 21 to April 7, 2015, Kanayama made 24 purchases across seven Japanese
prefectures, including the prefectures where the Temple and Shrine are located. Id.
The Japanese officials thereafter contacted hotels located near the Shrine to see if
Kanayama stayed at one overnight on March 25, 2015. A register of the Spa & Resort Inubosaki
Taiyonosato, revealed that Kanayama checked into the hotel on March 25, 2015 at 6:47 p.m. Id.
Security cameras at the hotel also captured video of a man checking into the hotel at 6:47 p.m.
who looked similar to the suspect recorded at the Temple and Shrine. Id. The hotel's employees
further confirmed that Kanayama's car was a gray Toyota Prius. Id.
The Japanese authorities, working with the Customer Service Department of the Narita
International Airport, also procured Kanayama's flight records for the relevant period. Id. at 56.
The records showed that Kanayama departed John F. Kennedy International Airport in New
York on March 20, 2016 and entered Japan via the Narita International Airport on March 21,
2015. Id. at 56. On April 1, 2015 , Kanayama departed Japan through Narita Airport and arrived
in Delhi, India that same day. Id. He departed India on April 7, 2015 , had a brief layover at the
Narita Airport, and then returned to the United States. Id.
The investigators further retained Professor Masatsugu Hashimoto of Tokyo Dental
College to perform a facial comparison between Kanayama's passport photo and the suspect's
images taken by the security cameras at the Temple and Shrine. Id. at 233-253. Examining,
among other things, facial and morphologic features , Hashimoto concluded in an April 25 , 2015
report that there was a "very high possibility" that the individual depicted in the footage obtained
from the Narita Temple and Katori Shrine and in Kanayama's passport were the same person.
4
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Id. Hashimoto also observed that the colors of the suspect' s jacket, shirt, pants, and shoes in the
Narita Temple footage were identical to those captured in the video surveillance from the Katori
Shrine. See id.
Online investigation into Kanayama showed that he lived in New York, where he worked
as a board-certified obstetrician-gynecologist, but that he was permanently domiciled in Tokyo,
Japan. Id. at 55-56. Kanayama regularly traveled from the United States to Japan and other
countries, giving lectures and engaging in missionary activities through the Christian non-profit
organization that he founded , the International Marketplace Ministry ("IMM"). Id. at 28, 55-56.
Two Y ouTube videos posted on IMMs website feature Kanayama presenting lectures on
November 3 and December 31 , 2012, wherein he admits to having "anointed" other Japanese
shrines with oil for religious purposes. See id. at Exs. 17-19.
In connection with the March 25 , 2015 acts of vandalism, on April 28, 2015 and
December 8, 2015 , the Sakura Summary Court issued arrest warrants for Kanayama for two
counts of damage of a structure in violation of Article 260 of the Japanese Penal Code, an
offense punishable by more than one year in prison. The warrants have since been renewed on a
yearly basis. Id. at 26; see also 2022 Warrant Renewals.
According to the General Affairs Section Chief of the Temple, as of October 18, 2017,
the oil on the three east poles of the Main Gate of the Temple has been absorbed by the
unvarnished wood. The stains, however, remain visible but are less prominent than at the time
the vandalism occurred. See Supp. at Ex. 3. Similarly, as of November 17, 2017, the oil stains
on the poles, stairs, and offertory box of the Shrine have faded but can still be seen at close
range. See id. at Exs. 4, 6, 8.
II.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
5
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On December 12, 2016, the Government of Japan formally requested the extradition of
Masahide Kanayama. See GX-2 at 21-29. On May 30, 2017, the United States filed a complaint
for the extradition of Kanayama at the request of the Government of Japan pursuant to the Treaty
on Extradition Between the United States and Japan, U.S.-Japan, Mar. 26, 1980, 31 U.S.T. 892
(the "Treaty"). On June 2, 2017, U.S. authorities arrested Kanayama in New York City. He is
currently released with bail conditions. See Memo in Support at 6, n. 2. On August 17, 2022,
the Government filed notice of its intention to move to certify the extraditability of Kanayama,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3184, which is currently before the Court. On December 6, 2022, the
Court held an extradition hearing.
III.
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EXTRADITION
Upon the filing of a formal complaint, the federal extradition statute allows an extradition
officer-who can be any judge of the United States-to hear and consider the "evidence of
criminality" of an accused individual. 18 U .S.C. § 3184; see Skaftouros v. United States, 667
F.3d 144, 154 (2d Cir. 2011). The presiding Court must also hold personal jurisdiction over the
accused person. Pettit v. Walshe, 194 U.S. 205, 219 (1904). The role of the judicial officer is
limited to determining whether to certify to the U.S. Secretary of State that the accused person is
extraditable. 18 U.S.C. § 3184. The judicial officer must certify extraditability if he finds the
following to be true: (1) a valid treaty exists; (2) the crime charged is covered by the relevant
treaty; and (3) the evidence marshaled in support of the complaint for extradition is sufficient to
sustain the charge. Id.; see Skaftouros, 667 F.3d at 154-55 (citing Cheung v. United States, 213
F.3d 82, 88 (2d Cir. 2000)). This analysis is exceedingly narrow; the court does not decide guilt
or innocence, as that question is reserved for the foreign court. See In re Extradition of Ernst,
No. 97 Crim. Misc. 1, 1998 WL 395267, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 1998).
6
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As to the second element, in deciding whether a treaty covers the crime charged, the
presiding court should liberally construe the treaty. See Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276,
298 (1933) (An extradition treaty "should be construed more liberally than a criminal statute or
the technical requirements of criminal procedure."). Moreover, the court should award "great
weight" to "the meaning attributed to treaty provisions by the Government agencies charged with
their negotiation and enforcement." Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176,
184-85 (1982).
As to the third element, evidence in support of extradition is "sufficient" so long as the
court finds probable cause. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235 (1983) (A § 3184 motion to
extradite must establish " only the probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal
activity."); see also Lo Duca v. United States, 93 F.3d 1100, 1102-04 (2d Cir. 1996). In
determining probable cause, courts primarily rely on the extradition request. Ahmad v. Wigen,
726 F. Supp. 389, 399-400 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (citation omitted), afj'd, 910 F.2d 1063 (2d Cir.
1990). A court must further "accept as true all of the statements and offers of proof by the
demanding state[.]" In re Extradition of Marzook, 924 F. Supp. 565, 592 (S.D.N .Y. 1996); see
also In re Extradition ofAtta, 706 F. Supp. 1032, 1050-51 (E.D.N.Y. 1989)("The primary
source of evidence for the probable cause determination is the extradition request, and any
evidence submitted in it is deemed truthful for the purposes of this determination.") . And the
Government may rely upon hearsay evidence. 18 U .S.C. § 3184.
At an extradition hearing, the accused individual is not entitled to the rights available to a
defendant at criminal trial pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or Federal Rules
of Evidence. See Fed. R. Crim. P. l(a)(5); Fed. R. Evid. 110l(d)(3). Additionally, the accused
person has no right to discovery, to cross-examine witnesses, or to speedy trial. Messina v.
7
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United States, 728 F.2d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 1984). "Evidence that explains away or completely
obliterates probable cause is the only evidence admissible at an extradition hearing[.]" United
States v. Amabile, No. 14 M 1043 (VMS), 2015 WL 4478466, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. July 16, 2015) .
Evidence that merely raises doubts about the reliability of the government's proof is insufficient
to defeat an extradition request." United States v. Pena-Bencosme, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
82579, *35 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2007).
If a judicial officer certifies that an accused person is extraditable, he must commit the
individual to the custody of the United States Marshal to await further determination by the
Secretary regarding his surrender to the requesting state. Cheung, 213 F .3d at 88 (citing 18
U.S.C. § 3184). This Order constitutes the written findings of fact and conclusions of law as to
the extraditability of Kanayama.
IV.
DISCUSSION
This Case is Properly Before This Court.
As a preliminary matter, the extradition statute authorizes this Court to preside over this
matter as a court of the United States. 18 U.S.C. § 3184. Furthermore, this Court has
jurisdiction over Kanayama, as he was located and arrested in the Southern District of New
York.
A Treaty in Effect Encompasses the Alleged Crimes.
Section 3184 provides for extradition when a treaty is in force between the requesting
state and the United States. Id. Courts generally defer to the executive branch on whether a
treaty is in force. See NY Chinese TV Programs, Inc. v. UE. Enterprises Inc., 954 F.2 847, 852
(2d Cir. 1992). Here, the Government has submitted the declaration of Elizabeth M. M.
8
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O'Connor, an attorney in the Office of the Legal Advisor for the Department of State, attesting to
the fact the Treaty between Japan and the United States is in full force and effect. GX-1 at 2.
The Treaty allows extradition for offenses relating to the damage of property, so long as
the offense would constitute a crime in both Japan and the United States, and is a felony, i.e. ,
punishable by more than one year of imprisonment. See id. at 8, Art. II~ 1; 17, App'x Sched.
19. Kanayama has been charged in Japan with two counts of damage or destruction of structure
(vandalism) in violation of Article 260 of the Japanese Penal Code. See GX-1 at Ex. 20,
Testimony of Director of the Criminal Affairs Burau of the Ministry of Justice of Japan. Under
Japanese law, violating Article 260 is an offense relating to the damage of property punishable
by more than one year in prison. Id. Accordingly, with respect to Japanese law, the alleged
crimes fall within the scope of the Treaty. 5
The next question is whether the alleged conduct would constitute a felony in the United
States or New York. See Hu Yau-Leung v. Soscia, 649 F.2d 914, 918 n.4 (2d Cir. 1981) (noting
that dual criminality is established if the conduct underlying the foreign offense would be
criminal under federal law, the law of the state in which the extradition hearing is held, or the
5
Kanayama claims that the Government has failed to demonstrate that the acts of vandalism occurred to a structure
as defined by Japanese law, since merely poles, stairs, and an offertory box were damaged. With respect to the
Temple, the Government of Japan asserts that poles of the Main Gate constitute buildings within the meaning of
Article 260 since they are part of a grounded two-story building and create interior space enforced by walls into
which individuals can enter and exit. See Supp. Ex. 1. With respect to the Katori Shrine, the Government of Japan
similarly contends that the damaged stairs and offertory box qualify as objects under Article 260 because they are
part of the structure with a roof, supported by walls and poles, fixed to the ground, and with an interior space into
which individuals can enter and exit. See Supp. Ex. 2. The Court defers to the Japanese Government's
interpretation of Article 260. See Skaftouros, 667 F.3d at 156 ("[I]t has long been recognized that an extradition
judge should avoid making determinations regarding foreign law. "); see also Marzook v. Christopher, No. 96 Civ.
4107 (KMW), 1996 WL 583378, at *5 n. 4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 1996) ("In the context of extradition proceedings, it
would be inappropriate for a court to review the demanding state's analysis of its own law.").
Kanayama also claims that no "damage" occurred as a matter of Japanese law. Again, the Government of Japan has
explained that total damage or destruction to a building is not required in order to satisfy the damages element of
Article 260. Partial damage, like that perpetrated on March 25, 2015 against the Temple and Shrine, suffices. See
Supp. Exs. 1, 2. The Court, again, defers to the Japanese Government's interpretation of Japanese law for purposes
of the instant proceedings.
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law of a preponderance of the states). The alleged conduct, if committed here, would violate
New York Penal law§ 145.05, a felony . Section 145.05 criminalizes intentionally damaging the
property of another person in an amount exceeding $250 as criminal mischief in the third degree.
N.Y. Pen. Law§ 145.05. The total damages caused by the alleged vandalism amount to
approximately $20,000. And the video surveillance footage-which shows an individual
touching and gesturing towards the affected sites-would enable a reasonable trier of fact to
determine that the damage was done not by mistake, but with intent. Hence, the element of dual
criminality is satisfied. 6
Probable Cause is Established.
As noted, the standard of proof to find evidence "sufficient to sustain the charge"
pursuant to § 3184 is probable cause. See, e.g., Ahmad v. Wigen, 399-400. There is probable
cause to extradite if a person ordinarily prudence and caution can conscientiously entertain a
reasonable belief that the accused is guilty. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111 (1975). Here,
the evidence set forth by the Government that Katayama has committed the charged offense is
substantial.
The Government has produced video evidence obtained at both the Temple and Shrine,
showing the same man, bearing similar physical attributes as Kanayama, touching or throwing
6
Kanayama argues that the stains to both the Temple and the Shrine are no longer visible, and hence that no
punishable felony occurred. See Sur-Reply at 2-3; United States v. Murtari, No. 7 Cr. 387, 2007 WL 3046746, at
*4-5 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2017) (finding that defacement by use of chalk does not constitute damage to property
because it eventually goes away). Kanayama bases this claim on photo evidence obtained from the Temple and
Shrine in December 2017, along with the testimony of his counsel, who took the photos. This evidence may call
into question the conclusions reached by the Japanese authorities who revisited the Temple and Shrine in October
2017 and determined that the stains were still visible. However, "the existence of evidence contradicting or calling
into question the requesting state' s primary evidence ordinarily has no import as it does not vitiate or obliterate
probable cause, but rather merely poses a conflict of credibility that generally should properly await trial " in the
requesting country. United States v. Pena-Bencosme, o. 08-1990-pr, 2009 WL 2030129, at *l (2d Cir. July 9,
2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Accordingly, Kanayama remains extraditable despite this
possibility.
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liquid towards the vandalized areas of the sites. The Government has also proffered car rental
records, video footage, and expressway toll tickets, which show that Kanayama entered an
expressway near the Temple approximately twenty minutes after the first act of vandalism
occurred and exited the expressway through a toll near the Shrine approximately fifteen minutes
before the second act of vandalism occurred. Working with Narita Airport, the Japanese
authorities were also able to determine the dates that Kanayama entered and left Japan, which are
consistent with the date the offenses occurred. Additionally, the Government has provided video
and documentary evidence that Kanayama checked into a hotel near the Shrine shortly after the
Shrine was defaced. A report by Professor Masatsugu Hashimoto of Tokyo Dental College
moreover supports the conclusion that the suspect depicted in the video footage at the Temple
and Shrine is indeed Kanayama. Japanese officials, furthermore, have identified YouTube
videos from 2012, in which Kanayama discusses having "anointed" Japanese Shrines with oil in
connection with his Christian non-profit work. Reports from as recent as fall 2017 show that the
damage to the Temple and Shrine is still visible and would cost approximately $20,000 to repair.
Kanayama has not set forth any evidence that "obliterates" or "explains away" a finding
of probable clause. Amabile, 2015 WL 4478466, at *8. Kanayama challenges the qualifications
of Professor Hashimoto to conclude that the person captured on the surveillance footage is
indeed Kanayama. However, even assuming that Kanayama raises some doubt as to the
conclusions of Professor Hashimoto, the evidence proffered by the Government, taken in its
entirety, nonetheless permits a person of ordinary prudence to entertain a reasonable belief that
Kanayama is guilty of the charged offenses. 7 Absent any other "reasonably clear-cut proof' to
7
At trial, the Court did not permit Kanayama to introduce his own expert testimony to rebut the testimony offered
by the Government by Professor Masatsugu Hashimoto. See Kapoor v. Dunne, No. 14 1699-pr, 606 Fed. Appx. 11 ,
at *13 (2d Cir. June 2, 2015); See also Gillv. Jmundi, 747 F. Supp. 1028, 1040-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (The accused
individual introducing his own handwriting expe1t would not serve to "explain" or "obliterate" the government's
11
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negate the evidence offered by the Government, the Court concludes that there is probable cause
to extradite Kanayama for the vandalism charges. 8 In re Extradition of Sindona, 450 F. Supp. 672,
685 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (emphasis added), ajfd, 619 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1980).
V.
CONCLUSION
Pursuant to the foregoing and in accordance with 18 U.S.C § 3184, the Court hereby
certifies the extradition of Masahide Kanayama on the offenses for which the Extradition
Request was made. A warrant may issue for the surrender of Kanayama to the proper authorities
of Japan in accordance with the Treaty. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to forward a
certified copy of this Certification and Committal for Extradition, together with a copy of the
evidence presented in this case, including the formal extradition documents received in evidence
and any testimony received in this case, to the Secretary of State.
It is SO ORDERED.
Dated:
January 26, 2023
New York, New York
Edgardo ftamos , U.S.D.J
evidence, so much as to pose a conflict in the testimony of two handwriting experts by discrediting the methodology
of the expert who had identified the accused person's authorship).
8
As a final matter, the Court notes that the claim that Kanayama will suffer persecution due to anti-Christian bias if
he is returned to Japan is not subject to judicial review. See Ahmad, 910 F .2d at 1067 ("It is the function of the
Secretary of State to determine whether extradition should be denied on humanitarian grounds."); see also Jhirad v.
Ferrandina, 536 F.2d 478 , 484-85 (2d Cir. 1976) (" It is not the business of our courts to assume the responsibility
for supervising the integrity of the judicial system of another sovereign nation . Such an assumption would directly
conflict with the principle of comity upon which extradition is based.").
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
MASAHIDE KANAYAMA,
Petitioner,
26-CV-1402 (JPO)
-vOPINION AND ORDER
SCOTT KOWAL,
Respondent.
J. PAUL OETKEN, District Judge:
Before the Court is Petitioner Masahide Kanayama’s emergency motion to stay his
extradition pending adjudication of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241. For the reasons that follow, Kanayama’s emergency motion to stay is denied.
I.
Factual and Procedural Background
On March 25, 2015, Petitioner Masahide Kanayama allegedly touched parts of a Shinto
shrine near Katori, Japan and a Buddhist temple in Narita, Japan with vegetable oil. (ECF No. 1
(“Pet.”) ¶ 26.) Following this incident, the Japanese police issued arrest warrants for Kanayama
for vandalism in violation of Article 260 of the Japanese penal code. (Id. ¶¶ 9, 28.) On
December 12, 2016, the Japanese government contacted the U.S. State Department to request
Kanayama’s extradition, and the State Department referred the matter to the Department of
Justice (“DOJ”). (Id. ¶ 10.) After the DOJ filed an extradition complaint, Kanayama was
arrested on June 2, 2017, and later released from custody on certain conditions pending the
resolution of the extradition complaint. (Id. ¶¶ 11-13.)
On December 6, 2022, after receiving briefing from the parties on Japan’s extradition
request, Judge Edgardo Ramos presided over a formal extradition hearing; he then issued a
written order certifying Kanayama for extradition on January 26, 2023. (Id. ¶¶ 18-19.) On April
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25, 2023, Kanayama filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus contesting Judge Ramos’s
extradition certification, which was denied by Judge Colleen McMahon on April 11, 2024. See
Kanayama v. Kowal, No. 23-CV-3469, 2024 WL 1587489, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 2024).
Kanayama appealed, and the Second Circuit denied Kanayama’s application for a stay and
affirmed Judge McMahon’s decision. See Kanayama v. Kowal, No. 24-1340, 2025 WL
3210986, at *2 (2d Cir. Nov. 18, 2025). In the following weeks, the Supreme Court denied
Kanayama’s multiple applications for a stay. See Kanayama v. Kowal, No. 25A633, 2025 WL
3619532, at *1 (U.S. Dec. 12, 2025); Kanayama v. Kowal, No. 25A633, 2026 WL 135702, at *1
(U.S. Jan. 20, 2026). On February 23, 2026, the Supreme Court also denied Kanayama’s petition
for a writ of certiorari. Kanayama v. Kowal, No. 25-715, 2026 WL 490775 (U.S. Feb. 23, 2026).
On October 16, 2025, the State Department authorized Kanayama’s extradition to Japan.
(Pet. ¶ 38.) In its letter, the State Department stated: “In reaching a decision in any extradition
case, the Department carefully and thoroughly considers all claims submitted and takes
appropriate steps, which may include obtaining information or commitments from the requesting
government, to address the identified concerns.” (ECF No. 1-1 at 41.) Kanayama is currently
required to surrender on March 2, 2026, for extradition to Japan.
On December 29, 2025, Kanayama applied for asylum and relief under the Convention
Against Torture (“CAT”), alleging that the Japanese government has attempted to imprison him
due to his political opinions and religious and ethnic background. (Pet. ¶ 30.)
Kanayama filed a second petition for a writ of habeas corpus (Pet.), as well as an
emergency motion to stay his extradition (ECF No. 2 (“Stay Mot.”)), with this Court on February
19, 2026. The Government filed its response to Kanayama’s emergency motion to stay on
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February 24, 2026 (ECF No. 10 (“Opp.”)), and the Court held an in-person conference with the
parties on February 25, 2026.
II.
Legal Standard
When evaluating a motion to stay extradition, the Court considers four factors: “(1)
whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits;
(2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the
stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the
public interest lies.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009) (quotation marks omitted). Of
these factors, “[t]he first two . . . are the most critical.” Id. When the Government is an
opposing party, the third and fourth factors merge. Id. at 435.
III.
Discussion
A.
Likelihood of Success on the Merits
1.
Habeas Jurisdiction
“The statutes governing extradition create a multi-step procedure that divides
responsibility for extradition between the Secretary of State and the courts.” Kapoor v.
DeMarco, 132 F.4th 595, 599 (2d Cir. 2025), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 325 (2025). After a district
court issues an order certifying extradition, as Judge Ramos did on January 26, 2023, “the
Secretary of State must then decide whether to order the person extradited.” Id. at 601. By
regulation, “[i]n each case where allegations relating to torture are made or the issue is otherwise
brought to the [State] Department’s attention, appropriate policy and legal offices review and
analyze information relevant to the case in preparing a recommendation to the Secretary as to
whether or not to sign the surrender warrant.” 22 C.F.R. § 95.3(a). Moreover, when determining
whether an individual should be extradited, the Secretary of State (the “Secretary”) “considers
the question of whether a person facing extradition from the U.S. is more likely than not to be
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tortured in the State requesting extradition.” Id. § 95.2(b). These regulatory requirements, first
codified at Section 2242 of the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act (“FARRA”),
implement the United States’ treaty obligations under CAT, which provides, in turn, that “[n]o
State Party shall expel, return (‘refouler’) or extradite a person to another State where there are
substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.” CAT,
art. III, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (1984).
Kanayama asserts that the State Department failed to meet its statutory obligations under
Section 2242 of FARRA by neglecting to determine on the record whether Kanayama “is more
likely than not to be tortured” upon extradition to Japan. (Pet. ¶ 33; Stay Mot. at 3-4.) The
generalized language of the State Department’s letter authorizing extradition, Kanayama argues,
makes no mention of the possibility of torture at all; nor does it consider “the pattern of abusive
treatment of detainees in the Japanese prison system” or “the Japanese government’s evidence of
animus against Petitioner.” (Pet. ¶ 38.) As a factual matter, however, the Government offered
evidence—and Kanayama conceded at the conference before the Court—that Kanayama never
argued in his submission to the State Department that he would be subject to torture under CAT
if he were extradited to Japan. (See ECF No. 10-3.) The Court is also not persuaded by
Kanayama’s contention that the State Department is required to consider the risk of torture in
every extradition case, regardless of whether the issue is raised. To the contrary, the regulations
suggest that State Department officials must evaluate materials about an extraditee’s risk of
torture only in cases “where allegations relating to torture are made or the issue is otherwise
brought to the Department’s attention.” 22 C.F.R. § 95.3(a). It is thus difficult to see how
Kanayama can fault the State Department for failing to consider arguments that he did not
explicitly surface in the first place.
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The Court is also not persuaded, as a legal matter, that it has jurisdiction to adjudicate
Kanayama’s habeas claims. As Kanayama acknowledges, the Second Circuit recently held that
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(4), enacted through the REAL ID Act of 2005, “bars courts from exercising
habeas jurisdiction over CAT claims raised by individuals facing extradition.” Kapoor, 132
F.4th at 614. That statutory provision reads:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), including
section 2241 of title 28, or any other habeas corpus provision, and sections 1361
and 1651 of such title, a petition for review filed with an appropriate court of
appeals in accordance with this section shall be the sole and exclusive means for
judicial review of any cause or claim under the United Nations Convention Against
Torture and Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, except as provided in subsection (e).
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(4). Because Kanayama is pursuing a CAT claim by means of a habeas
petition, Kapoor appears to squarely foreclose the Court’s jurisdiction to hear this case.
Kanayama argues that his case is distinguishable because, unlike in Kapoor, where the
petitioner took issue with the substance of the State Department’s finding that she was unlikely
to be tortured, here the State Department made no determination as to risk of torture at all. (Pet.
¶ 41.) As noted above, it is unlikely that any failure by the State Department to consider or
address Kanayama’s claims of torture under CAT could amount to a procedural error where
Kanayama never presented those claims to the State Department in the first place. But in any
event, the language of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(4) is also not so circumscribed. It strips district courts
of habeas jurisdiction over “any cause or claim” under CAT, rather than particular decisions or
determinations. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(4) (emphasis added). A plain reading of this language
suggests that it encompasses “cause[s] or claim[s]” arguing the very thing that Kayanama presses
here—namely, that the State Department erred by making no finding about whether Kanayama is
likely to face torture upon his extradition.
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Kanayama urges the Court to follow the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Trinidad y Garcia v.
Thomas, which held that district courts have habeas jurisdiction to review claims of the kind that
Kanayama presses here. 683 F.3d 952, 956-57 (9th Cir. 2012). (Pet. ¶ 39; Stay Mot. at 3.) But
the Second Circuit firmly rejected Trinidad y Garcia in Kapoor. See 132 F.4th at 609-10 (“[W]e
are unpersuaded by the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the REAL ID Act. We read the plain
language of Section 1242(a)(4) to unequivocally bar any habeas review of CAT claims in
extradition proceedings, and thus we (like the D.C. and Fourth Circuits) part ways with our sister
Circuit.”). Given this Court’s duty to follow the dictates of the Second Circuit, it appears clear
that jurisdiction is lacking.
Finally, Kanayama claims that “[t]he State Department’s failure to make the necessary
determination is an independent violation of FARRA” and therefore does not qualify as a “cause
or claim under the United Nations Convention Against Torture” under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(4).
(Pet. ¶ 43.) The Second Circuit, however, expressly declined to address whether, absent
Congress’s bar of federal habeas review of extradition-based CAT claims, “an extraditee could
nonetheless bring a CAT claim under FARRA.” Kapoor, 132 F.4th at 610 n.14. The court’s
reasoning thus necessarily construed Section 1252(a)(4)’s jurisdictional bar as encompassing
FARRA claims. Nor is it clear as a matter of law whether any daylight exists between FARRA
and CAT for the purposes of Section 1252(a)(4), as FARRA simply codifies the United States’
existing treaty obligations under CAT. See id. at 601-02. Rejecting a similar argument, the D.C.
Circuit held in Omar v. McHugh that “a claim under [FARRA] is a claim under the Convention
Against Torture and is barred by the REAL ID Act.” 646 F.3d 13, 18 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2013)
(Kavanaugh, J.). Absent any case law or other authority suggesting that FARRA confers a
substantive right on extraditees separate and apart from CAT for the purpose of federal habeas
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jurisdiction, the Court cannot conclude that Kanayama has demonstrated a likelihood of success
on this issue. See Nken, 556 U.S. at 434 (demonstrating a likelihood of success on the merits
requires “more than a mere possibility of relief” (cleaned up)).
Because habeas jurisdiction over Kanayama’s CAT claim is barred by 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(4) under Kapoor, Kanayama is unlikely to succeed on that claim.
2.
Kanayama’s Pending Asylum Application
In the alternative, Kanayama argues that he cannot be extradited while his asylum
application remains pending because his extradition “would vitiate his right to adjudication of
the asylum petition” under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a). (Pet. ¶ 47; Stay Mot. at 4.) But Kanayama cites
no case law indicating that a petitioner has an absolute right to remain in the United States while
his asylum application is adjudicated. And while Section 1158(a) states that individuals
physically present in the country “may apply for asylum,” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1) (emphasis
added), neither that language nor the regulations outlining asylum procedures suggest that, in
situations where a petitioner is to be extradited, he may delay those proceedings simply by filing
an application for asylum.
Additionally, as the Government points out, other circuits have held that immigration
proceedings have no collateral or preclusive effect on extradition proceedings. See, e.g.,
Castaneda-Castillo v. Holder, 638 F.3d 354, 360 (1st Cir. 2011) (“[A]sylum and extradition
proceedings are separate and distinct, in the sense that the resolution of even a common issue in
one proceeding is not binding in the other.” (quotation marks omitted)); Aguasvivas v. Pompeo,
984 F.3d 1047, 1053 (1st Cir. 2021) (holding that the BIA’s finding that the petitioner was likely
to face torture in his home country did not collaterally estop the Secretary of State from making a
contrary determination for the purposes of extradition proceedings); see also Kapoor, 132 F.4th
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at 599 n.2 (“The extradition process should not be confused with the immigration removal
process.”).
In light of this case law, as well as Kanayama’s failure to marshal authorities in support
of his position, Kanayama has not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of this
claim.
B.
Irreparable Injury
Kanayama contends that he will suffer irreparable harm absent a stay because
“extradition will expose [him] to years of incarceration in Japan and lead to the lapse of his
Legal Permanent Resident status.” (Stay Mot. at 5.) There is little doubt that denial of a stay
would impose a serious burden on Kanayama, given the imminence of his extradition and the
likely difficulty of undoing such a removal. Cf. Nken, 556 U.S. at 435 (stating that removal in
the immigration context is “not categorically irreparable” since petitioners who are removed and
later “prevail can be afforded effective relief by facilitation of their return”). Kanayama’s
extradition, however, does not preordain a guilty verdict: It merely allows Japan to begin the
process of adjudicating Kanayama’s guilt or innocence. Moreover, other courts have denied a
stay, even assuming the existence of irreparable harm arising from extradition, where the
petitioner has not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of his claims. See, e.g.,
Moshir v. Salina, No. 17-CV-55, 2018 WL 1940259, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2018) (“Even
assuming that extradition pending appeal of the Court’s denial of habeas corpus relief would
constitute irreparable harm, a stay of extradition pending appeal is unwarranted because
Petitioner has not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of his appeal.”); Quintanilla
v. United States, 582 Fed. Appx. 412, 414 (5th Cir. 2014) (“Although we assume that extradition
while an appeal of the denial of habeas corpus is pending would constitute irreparable harm, a
stay is not warranted because [the petitioner] has not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the
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merits of her appeal.”); Demjanjuk v. Meese, 784 F.2d 1114, 1118 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (“While the
imminent extradition of petitioner to Israel may qualify as a threat of irreparable harm, petitioner,
as shown above, fails to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits.”).
The same result obtains here. Although Kanayama has arguably shown irreparable harm
absent a stay, he has not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of any of his claims.
This factor, without more, therefore does not warrant the imposition of a stay.
C.
Remaining Factors
The two remaining factors—whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the
other parties interested in the proceeding and where the public interest lies—weigh in favor of
denying the stay. This case has wended its way through all three levels of the federal court
system, sometimes multiple times, for nearly a decade. It has received ample and thoughtful
consideration from several judges. Staying Kanayama’s extradition at this juncture, on the eve
of his long-pending removal to Japan, would certainly prejudice the Government. This is
especially so given the United States’ “strong interest in having extradition requests submitted by
our treaty partners . . . resolved without undue delay.” (Opp. at 21.)
Accordingly, the Court concludes that the remaining Nken factors counsel against issuing
a stay.
IV.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Kanayama’s emergency motion to stay his extradition to Japan
is DENIED.
The Clerk of Court is directed to close the motion at Docket Number 2.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: February 26, 2026
New York, New York
9
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
MASAHIDE KANAYAMA,
Petitioner,
26-CV-1402 (JPO)
-vORDER
SCOTT KOWAL,
Respondent.
J. PAUL OETKEN, District Judge:
Petitioner Masahide Kanayama moves for a stay of extradition pending interlocutory
appeal to the Second Circuit of this Court’s prior opinion and order denying Kayanama’s
emergency motion to stay extradition. (ECF No. 13.) For the reasons stated in the Court’s
opinion at Docket Number 11, Kanayama’s motion for a stay of extradition pending
interlocutory appeal is DENIED.
The Clerk of Court is directed to close the motion at Docket Number 13.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: February 27, 2026
New York, New York
____________________________________
J. PAUL OETKEN
United States District Judge
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Document 10-3
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Hyuk Kee Yoo v. United States
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
November 16, 2021, Decided; November 16, 2021, Filed
No. 21-CV-6184 (CS)
Reporter
2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 222067 *
HYUK KEE YOO, a/k/a "KEITH YOO," Petitioner, - against-UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.
Prior History: Hyuk Kee Yoo v. United States, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 210586 (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 1, 2021)
Counsel: [*1] For Petitioner: Paul Shechtman, Bracewell LLP, New York, New York, Shawn Naunton, Zuckerman
Spaeder LLP, New York, New York,.
For Respondent: Derek Wikstrom, Assistant United States Attorney, Southern District of New York, White Plains,
New York.
Judges: CATHY SEIBEL, United States District Judge.
Opinion by: CATHY SEIBEL
Opinion
OPINION & ORDER
Seibel, J.
Before the Court is Petitioner's motion to stay extradition pending his appeal of this Court's November 1, 2021
Order denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. For the reasons stated below, the motion is GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
The Court sets forth here only the factual and procedural background relevant to this motion.
On May 8, 2014, after Petitioner was charged with seven counts of embezzlement, a judge of the Incheon District
Court in the Republic of Korea ("Korea") issued a warrant for his arrest. (ECF No. 15 ("Nov. 1 Order") at 2.) On May
28, 2014, Korea sent the first of a series of diplomatic notes to the United States Government seeking Petitioner's
extradition to Korea under the Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Republic of Korea, K.-U.S., June 9, 1998, T.I.A.S. No. 12,962 (the "Treaty"). [*2] (Id.) It was not
until February 27, 2020, that the Government filed a complaint commencing extradition proceedings. (Id.)
On July 2, 2021, Magistrate Judge Judith C. McCarthy issued an Order certifying Petitioner as extraditable to
Korea. In re Extradition of Hyuk Kee Yoo, No. 20-MJ-2252, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124402, 2021 WL 2784836
(S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2021). Petitioner subsequently sought a writ of habeas corpus, (ECF No. 1), and on November 1,
2021, this Court denied his petition, (Nov. 1 Order; ECF No. 16). On the same day, Petitioner filed a Notice of
Appeal. (ECF No. 17.) On November 10, 2021, Petitioner moved for an Order staying his extradition to Korea
pending his appeal. (ECF No. 18.)
App. 38
2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 222067, *2
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Courts consider four factors when deciding whether to issue a stay pending appeal:
(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2)
whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will
substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.
In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 503 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 2007) (cleaned up). The likelihood of success
on the merits and irreparable injury are the most critical factors, Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434, 129 S. Ct.
1749, 173 L. Ed. 2d 550 (2009), and "the degree to which a factor must be present varies with the strength of the
other factors, [*3] meaning that more of one factor excuses less of the other," In re World Trade Ctr., 503 F.3d at
170 (cleaned up). "The party requesting a stay bears the burden of showing that the circumstances justify an
exercise of that discretion." Nken, 556 U.S. at 433-34.
III. DISCUSSION
Petitioner argues that the issues of who (between the judiciary and the executive branches) may or must consider
the timeliness of charges under the Treaty, and how the statute of limitations should be analyzed, are "'serious and
difficult questions of law in an area where the law is somewhat unclear.'" (ECF No. 19 ("Pet. Br.") at 3) (quoting In
re Extradition of Hilton, No. 13-MJ-7043, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89692, 2013 WL 3282864, at *2 (D. Mass. June 26,
2013)). The Government responds that the handful of courts to address the first issue have uniformly ruled, as this
Court did, that the statute-of-limitations question is discretionary under the Treaty and thus committed to the
executive branch. (ECF No. 21 ("Gov. Opp.") at 2.) While the Court naturally believes that its resolution of this issue
is correct, in this context Petitioner need only show "a substantial possibility, although less than a likelihood, of
success" - that is, "something less than 50 percent." Mohammed v. Reno, 309 F.3d 95, 101-02 (2d Cir. 2002)
(cleaned up). Because Petitioner's appeal raises issues that the Second Circuit has not yet considered, upon which
there are non-frivolous [*4] grounds for disagreement, in the circumstances this factor weighs in favor of a stay.
The Government concedes that the second factor, irreparable harm, weighs in Petitioner's favor because absent a
stay Petitioner would likely be removed from the United States before his appeal is decided. (Gov. Opp. at 2.)
Removal from the United States would unquestionably cause irreparable injury by mooting Petitioner's appeal
before it can be heard, and this factor weighs strongly in favor of a stay. See Artukovic v. Rison, 784 F.2d 1354,
1356 (9th Cir. 1986) ("The possibility of irreparable injury to [Petitioner] if we deny his motion is evident: his appeal
will become moot and will be dismissed since the extradition will have been carried out.").
Because the Government is the opposing party, the third and fourth factors (harm to the opposing party and the
public interest) merge. Nken, 556 U.S. at 435. In the context of extradition proceedings these factors often weigh in
the Government's favor. See id. at 436 ("There is always a public interest in prompt execution of removal orders . . .
."); Artukovic, 784 F.2d at 1356 (compliance with valid extradition applications advances the public interest by
strengthening international relations). But here, the Korean government made its first request for extradition [*5] on
May 28, 2014, and the United States did not commence the extradition case until February 27, 2020, after a series
of supplemental submissions. (See Nov. 1 Order at 2.) Given this delay, the public interest in prompt execution of
removal orders and international relations is largely neutralized, and in any case is not so urgent that it should
outweigh Petitioner's interest in having a "full [and] fair opportunity to litigate his claim." Noriega v. Pastrana, No.
07-CV-22816, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7203, 2008 WL 331394, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2008).1
IV. CONCLUSION
1 Petitioner has committed to litigating his appeal as expeditiously as possible. (See Pet. Br. at 2; Gov. Opp. at 2 n.1.)
App. 39
2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 222067, *5
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner's motion for a stay of extradition pending his appeal of this Court's November
1, 2021 Order denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus is GRANTED. The Clerk of Court is respectfully
directed to terminate the pending motion, (ECF No. 18).
SO ORDERED.
Dated: November 16, 2021
White Plains, New York
/s/ Cathy Seibel
CATHY SEIBEL, U.S.D.J.
End of Document
App. 40
Case: 26-455, 03/02/2026, DktEntry: 15.1,
14.1, Page 1 of 1
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE
SECOND CIRCUIT
At a Stated Term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the
Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the
2nd day of March, two thousand twenty-six.
Before:
Sarah A. L. Merriam,
Circuit Judge.
________________________________
Masahide Kanayama,
ORDER
Petitioner - Appellant,
Docket No. 26-455
v.
Scott Kowal, Chief of U.S. Pre-Trial Services
SDNY,
Respondent - Appellee.
________________________________
Appellant moves for a stay of extradition and for bail pending appeal.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, to the extent that Appellant requests an administrative
stay of extradition and his immediate release, the motions are DENIED. The motions are
REFERRED to a three-Judge motions panel.
For the Court:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
Clerk of Court
App. 41
CERTIFIED COPY ISSUED ON 03/02/2026
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.