Reply Brief — Greg Abbott, et al., Applicants v. League of United Latin American Citizens, et al.

Supreme Court briefNov 25, 2025

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No. 25A608

In the Supreme Court of the United States

GREG ABBOTT,

IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF TEXAS, ET AL.,

Applicants,

LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS, ET AL.,

Respondents.

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF

EMERGENCY APPLICATION FOR STAY PENDING APPEAL

KEN PAXTON

Attorney General of Texas

WILLIAM R. PETERSON

Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

BRENT WEBSTER

First Assistant Attorney General

WILLIAM F. COLE

Principal Deputy Solicitor General

RYAN G. KERCHER

Chief, Special Litigation Division

BENJAMIN WALLACE MENDELSON

Assistant Solicitor General

ZACHARY L. RHINES

ALI M. THORBURN

Special Counsel

CHRISTOPHER J. PAVLINEC

MOHMED I. PATEL

Assistant Attorneys General

OFFICE OF THE TEXAS ATTORNEY GENERAL

P.O. Box 12548 (MC 059)

Austin, Texas 78711-2548

(512) 936-1700

William.Peterson@oag.texas.gov

Counsel for Applicants

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Authorities ...................................................................................................................... ii

Reply ...............................................................................................................................................1

A Stay Is Warranted Under Purcell. ..........................................................................2

II. A Stay Is Warranted Under the Traditional Stay Factors Because this

Court Is Likely to Reverse. ..........................................................................................8

This Court is likely to reverse the decision below as contrary to

Alexander. ..............................................................................................................8

The district court erred by excusing Plaintiffs’ failure to produce

an alternative map. ........................................................................................9

As in Alexander, the district court erred in inferring that the

map was drawn to satisfy a racial target. ..................................................11

Plaintiffs’ other evidence did not satisfy their “stringent”

evidentiary burden. ......................................................................................13

The DOJ letter does not demonstrate that race played a

role in the drawing of district lines. ...................................................14

Governor Abbott’s special session proclamation and press

statements do not demonstrate racial gerrymandering. .................15

Isolated statements from a handful of legislators do not

establish that race drove the drawing of district lines. ....................17

The drawing of CD37 and CD27 does not constitute

circumstantial evidence of racial gerrymandering. ..........................19

Plaintiffs’ defense of Dr. Duchin is unavailing. .................................21

The remaining Nken factors favor a stay..........................................................22

Conclusion.....................................................................................................................................23

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases:

Ala. Legis. Black Caucus v. Alabama,

575 U.S. 254 (2015) .................................................................................................................15

Alexander v. S.C. State Conf. of the NAACP,

602 U.S. 1 (2024).................................... 1, 2, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23

Allen v. Milligan,

599 U.S. 1 (2023) ....................................................................................................................22

Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Alviti,

14 F.4th 76 (1st Cir. 2021) .....................................................................................................15

Bogan v. Scott-Harris,

523 U.S. 44 (1998) ...................................................................................................................15

Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm.,

594 U.S. 647 (2021) ........................................................................................................... 16, 17

Burns v. Gadsden State Cmty. Coll.,

908 F.2d 1512 (11th Cir. 1990) ..............................................................................................13

Coghlan v. Am. Seafoods Co.,

413 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2005) ................................................................................................13

Cooper v. Harris,

581 U.S. 285 (2017) ................................................................................. 1, 8, 11, 12, 13, 15, 18

Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Wis. State Legislature,

141 S. Ct. 28 (2020)..................................................................................................... 3, 5, 6, 22

In re Hubbard,

803 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2015) ..............................................................................................15

Hunter v. Underwood,

471 U.S. 222 (1985) ........................................................................................................... 15, 16

Inwood Lab’ys, Inc. v. Ives Lab’ys, Inc.,

456 U.S. 844 (1982) ...................................................................................................................8

Jones v. Robinson Prop. Grp., L.P.,

427 F.3d 987 (5th Cir. 2002) ............................................................................................ 13, 14

League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry,

548 U.S. 399 (2006) ...................................................................................................................5

Lightbourn v. Cnty. of El Paso, Tex.,

118 F.3d 421 (5th Cir. 1997) ....................................................................................................3

Maryland v. King,

567 U.S. 1301 (2012) ...............................................................................................................22

Merrill v. Milligan,

142 S. Ct. 879 (2022)..................................................................................................... 3, 4, 5, 7

Miller v. Johnson,

515 U.S. 900 (1995) ................................................................................................................18

Purcell v. Gonzalez,

549 U.S. 1 (2006)............................................................................................... 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8

Raysor v. DeSantis,

140 S. Ct. 2600 (2020) ...............................................................................................................8

Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm.,

589 U.S. 423 (2020) ........................................................................................................... 3, 4, 6

Robinson v. Callais,

144 S. Ct. 1171 (2024) ...........................................................................................................3, 7

Trump v. CASA, Inc.,

606 U.S. 831 (2025) .................................................................................................................22

United States v. O’Brien,

391 U.S. 367 (1968) .................................................................................................................16

Upham v. Seamon,

456 U.S. 37 (1982) .....................................................................................................................6

Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp.,

429 U.S. 252 (1977) .................................................................................................................14

Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,

555 U.S. 7 (2008)................................................................................................................. 7, 10

Constitutional Provisions and Statutes:

Tex. Const. art. III, § 1 ...............................................................................................................15

Tex. Elec. Code § 172.023 .............................................................................................................2

Other Authorities:

Evidence, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) ...................................................................13

Primary Filing Information, Tex. GOP Univ.,

https://texasgop.org/primary-filing-information/ ................................................................4

Statewide Report of Registered Voters, Louisiana Secretary of State,

https://electionstatistics.sos.la.gov/Data/Registration_Statistics/statewid

e/2025_0101_sta_comb.pdf......................................................................................................3

Texas Has 18.6 Million Registered Voters, Texas Secretary of State,

https://www.sos.state.tx.us/about/newsreleases/2024/101924.shtml ..................................3

Turnout and Voter Registration Figures (1970-current), Texas Secretary of

State, https://www.sos.state.tx.us/elections/historical/70-92.shtml....................................3

Voter Registration Statistics – 2025, Alabama Secretary of State,

https://www.sos.alabama.gov/alabama-votes/voter/election-data ......................................3

iii

As a safeguard against litigants “repackag[ing] a partisan-gerrymandering claim as

a racial-gerrymandering claim,” this Court imposed an unambiguous requirement: provide

an alternative map disentangling race from politics and showing that the State could have

achieved its goals through other means. Alexander v. S.C. State Conf. of the NAACP, 602

U.S. 1, 21, 34 (2024). Courts must treat Plaintiffs’ failure to provide such a map as an

“implicit concession” that they “cannot draw a map that undermines the legislature’s

defense.” Id. at 35. Plaintiffs offered no such map below. The district court thus committed

“clear error” when it refused to apply the alternative-map rule and instead “overlook[ed]

this shortcoming.” Id. at 37. This error alone makes reversal likely and warrants a stay.

Repeating another error from Alexander, the district court presumed the Texas

Legislature set a racial target of just over 50% minority Citizen Voting Age Population

(CVAP), inferring such a target from the map’s racial demographics, just as the Alexander

district court erroneously inferred that the South Carolina Legislature set a racial target

of 17% BVAP. Id. at 21. The district court violated Alexander’s admonition not to “infe[r]

bad faith based on the racial effects of a political gerrymander.” Id. at 20-21.

Plaintiffs’ (and the district court’s) efforts to analogize this case to Cooper v. Harris

fail. In Cooper, direct evidence, including the mapmaker’s testimony, confirmed that

legislators instructed him to use race in redistricting. 581 U.S. 285, 314 (2017). In contrast

to Cooper—and as in Alexander—there is no expression of a racial target by a legislator or

mapdrawer. Legislators first noted the racial composition of districts only after the map

was drawn and submitted, and the isolated comments from only four legislators were

descriptive, not prescriptive. Such “awareness” of race is “unsurprising” and “nothing

nefarious.” Alexander, 602 U.S. at 37. This case bears the hallmarks of Alexander, not

Cooper, and the district court’s racial-target finding is as unsupported as the finding

rejected in Alexander, again underscoring that reversal is likely and a stay warranted.

Even apart from the strong likelihood that this Court will reverse, the district court’s

injunction comes too late in the day. See Senator Amicus Br. 2. Plaintiffs acknowledge that

the injunction was issued in the middle of the candidate filing period, which ends on

December 8. Tex. Elec. Code § 172.023(a). As amici confirm, the injunction caused

immediate disruption for election officials and candidates, some of whom have been

campaigning for months. See Election Official Amicus Br. 9-13; Candidate Amicus Br. 2.

Plaintiffs attempt to dismiss the difficulties in running an election, but elections in Texas

are unusually large and complex. Its decentralized system—in which the Secretary of State

advises and assists local officials—will conduct an election for 38 districts spread across 254

counties in the largest State in the contiguous United States. Changes to this system

necessarily require more preparation (and last-minute changes cause greater disruption)

than other States. The Purcell principle warrants a stay of the injunction.

Finally, this Court should question why Plaintiffs now seek to reinstate the repealed

2021 map, despite alleging for years that the 2021 map is likewise an illegal and

unconstitutional racial gerrymander. Only Plaintiffs’ preference for the politics of the 2021

map compared to the politics of the 2025 map explains that about-face. Plaintiffs’

preliminary injunction “transform[s] federal courts into weapons of political warfare that

will deliver victories that eluded [Plaintiffs] in the political arena.” Alexander, 602 U.S. at

11 (quotation marks omitted). For these reasons, this Court should stay the preliminary

injunction pending appeal.

A Stay Is Warranted Under Purcell.

The district court’s injunction fundamentally alters Texas’s congressional map—

indeed, the injunction changes 37 of Texas’s 38 districts—in the midst of elections

proceeding under it and on the eve of the rapidly approaching December 8 statutory

candidate filing deadline. See Stay Appl. 13–19; Tex. Elec. Code § 172.023(a). “[L]ower

federal courts should ordinarily not alter the election rules on the eve of an election.”

Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 589 U.S. 423, 424 (2020) (“RNC”)

(per curiam) (citing Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1 (2006) (per curiam)); see Senator Amicus

Br. 8.

The “rules of the road should be clear and settled” because of how

“complicated” it is to run an election. Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Wis. State Legislature,

141 S. Ct. 28, 31 (2020) (“DNC”) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). That goes double for Texas.

With 38 districts across 254 counties and more than 18 million registered voters,1 by any of

these metrics, Texas’s congressional election is twice the size as—and correspondingly

more complicated than—the Alabama election in Merrill and the Louisiana election in

Callais combined.2

Local officials run much of Texas’s decentralized election system. See Lightbourn v.

Cnty. of El Paso, Tex., 118 F.3d 421, 428 n.7 (5th Cir. 1997) (discussing “the decentralized

nature of the Texas election system,” including roles for “the state’s 3,000 or so political

subdivisions”); see also Stay Appl. 11, 15. County election officials have explained the

uncertainty caused by the injunction, including how and whether to comply with the

complex array of rules governing “re-precincting.” Election Official Amicus Br. 9.

The sheer size and complexity of Texas elections explains why the “December 8

candidate filing deadline” is “earlier than the deadlines in 47 other states” and undermines

Plaintiffs’ suggestion that extending election deadlines would not be “an undue burden.”

NAACP Resp. 29 n.3; cf. Gonzales Resp. 35 n.11. According to unrebutted testimony,

Turnout and Voter Registration Figures (1970-current), Texas Secretary of State,

https://www.sos.state.tx.us/elections/historical/70-92.shtml.

Texas Has 18.6 Million Registered Voters Texas, Secretary of State,

https://www.sos.state.tx.us/about/newsreleases/2024/101924.shtml; Statewide Report of

Registered Voters, Louisiana Secretary of State, https://electionstatistics.sos.la.gov/

Data/RegistrationStatistics/statewide/20250101stacob.pdf (under 3 million registered

voters); Voter Registration Statistics – 2025, Alabama Secretary of State,

https://www.sos.alabama.gov/alabama-votes/voter/election-data

(about

3.8

million

registered voters).

“shifting” the “candidate filing period” “shifts everything” and “ha[s] an effect on all of

those other dates,” potentially leading to “[c]hanging the primary date,” which could be

“catastrophically bad.” App. 561 (Adkins).

Candidates continue to rely on the 2025 map, filing for congressional races after the

entry of the administrative stay.3 Plaintiffs admit candidates are “campaigning under both

the 2021 and the 2025 maps,” reflecting “ongoing confusion among candidates.” Brooks

Resp. 44; see Stay Appl. 15–16. As amici confirm, the confusion the district court’s order

has injected into Texas’s congressional elections is real, not merely hypothetical. See

Candidate Amicus Br. 20 (explaining the “cascading disruptions for candidates and mass

confusion among voters”). “Candidates throughout Texas do not know where to knock on

doors this week,” and voters face “an entirely new cast of candidates.” Id. at 2–3.

Nor should Plaintiffs “get the benefit of the delay that they caused by breaking

quorum.” Stay Appl. 18 (quoting App. 181 (Smith, J., dissenting)). Plaintiff MALC’s

members broke quorum to delay the map’s passage and succeeded in doing so for weeks.

Stay Appl. 18. Allowing Plaintiffs to profit from their own delay would create the perverse

incentives of which Plaintiffs complain. See MALC Resp. 11; cf. Merrill v. Milligan, 142 S.

Ct. 879, 881 (2022) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (requiring the plaintiff to establish it “has

not unduly delayed bringing the complaint to court”).

Plaintiffs’ three remaining arguments would vitiate the Purcell principle.

Purcell applies whenever a lower court “alter[s] the election rules on the eve of an election.”

RNC, 589 U.S. at 424. That is why this Court has had to enforce it “repeatedly.” Id.

First, Plaintiffs would penalize Texas for engaging in mid-decade redistricting,

faulting the State for “cho[osing] to redistrict” when it “had no obligation to” do so. MALC

Primary Filing Information, Tex. GOP Univ., https://texasgop.org/primary-filinginformation/ (showing candidates filing for “United States Representative” in two separate

districts on November 22 and November 24).

Resp. 11; see Gonzales Resp. 37. Texas has the right to redistrict mid-decade, just as the

other States now pursuing redistricting do. And this Court has previously rejected the

suggestion that the voluntary nature of mid-decade redistricting should affect judicial

review. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 418–19 (2006).

A State’s legislative decision to change its election laws does not empower a court’s

even later injunctive change. See Merrill, 142 S. Ct. at 881 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“It

is one thing for a State on its own to toy with its election laws close to a State’s elections.

But it is quite another thing for a federal court to swoop in and re-do a State’s election laws

in the period close to an election.”); DNC, 141 S. Ct. at 31 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“It

is one thing for state legislatures to alter their own election rules in the late innings and to

bear the responsibility for any unintended consequences. It is quite another thing for a

federal district court to swoop in and alter carefully considered and democratically enacted

state election rules when an election is imminent.”); Senator Amicus Br. 10.

Second, Plaintiffs argue Purcell should not apply because the State can return to the

2021 map. E.g., Brooks Resp. 45. But the Legislature repealed the 2021 map. Stay Appl. 10.

Reverting to it reflects no deference to the Legislature’s priorities. The Legislature’s repeal

of the 2021 map represents an affirmative rejection of it. If anything, reimposing a repealed

map expressly repudiates the Legislature, akin to judicially reinstating a repealed law.

App. 255 (Smith, J., dissenting). This is no different than the error precipitating Purcell

itself, where a lower court barred enforcement of new voter identification requirements and

restored a previous legislative baseline. See, e.g., 549 U.S. at 4–6.

Moreover, the district court’s remedy—reinstating the 2021 map because it would

be “impracticable” for the Legislature to redraw the map, App. 158—only confirms the

Purcell issues.4 Although it found a likelihood of success on only 6 districts (out of 38), by

reimposing the 2021 map statewide, the district court changed boundaries across the entire

State, affecting 37 of 38 districts. But cf. Upham v. Seamon, 456 U.S. 37, 43 (1982) (stating

judicial “modifications of a state plan [should be] limited to those necessary to cure any

constitutional or statutory defect”). The district court entered this sweeping judicial order

because it concluded that there was no time for a proper, tailored remedy. But if there is no

time to act properly, Purcell directs that a court should not act at all.

Plaintiffs suggest that candidate confusion could “be remedied by a denial of the stay

just as effectively as” by a grant of the stay. Brooks Resp. 44. But “[c]orrecting an

erroneous lower court injunction of a state election rule cannot itself constitute a Purcell

problem.” DNC, 141 S. Ct. at 31-32 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). “To be sure, it would be

preferable if federal district courts did not contravene the Purcell principle by rewriting

state election laws close to an election. But when they do, appellate courts must step in.” Id.

at 32; see RNC, 589 U.S. at 425 (“[W]hen a lower court intervenes and alters the election

rules so close to the election date, our precedents indicate that this Court, as appropriate,

should correct that error.”).

Third, Plaintiffs focus on the election calendar to downplay the injunction’s harm on

voters and candidates. Gonzales Plaintiffs insist “[t]he only significant date on the 2026

election calendar that has passed is the opening of the candidate filing period on

November 8.” Gonzales Resp. 32; see Brooks Resp. 43. They omit the unrebutted evidence

of candidate, voter, and administrative reliance on the 2025 map preceding the candidatefiling period. See App. 568 (Adkins) (“I do believe candidates have already initiated that

application process or campaign process based on new maps.”); id. at 564–65 (Adkins)

Brooks Plaintiffs are incorrect to suggest that the State Defendants “agreed” that

the district court would reinstate the 2021 map. Brooks Resp. 41. In the cited transcript,

State Defendants were describing Plaintiffs’ requested relief. ECF 1145 at 32.

(testifying to “some level of voter confusion” even if the injunction had issued on October 9

instead of November 18 and that “the later we are in the process” the “harder on voters”);

id. at 564 (Adkins) (agreeing that “counties [were] already preparing to run the election

under the 2025 map”). Candidate Amici confirm that they “cannot be sure of the precise

boundaries of their districts going forward” and are “currently directing advocacy to voters

they are certain will not be in their ultimate district—but at this time, they do not know

which voters those voters are.” Candidate Amicus Br. 2. Plaintiffs are not correct that

Adkins testified that the State could easily implement the 2021 map. Compare MALC Resp.

10 with Stay Appl. 16–17 (discussing the district court’s misstatement regarding Adkins’

testimony).

Nor are the merits “entirely clearcut” in Plaintiffs’ favor. Merrill, 142 S. Ct. at 881

(Kavanaugh, J., concurring); see also Stay Appl. 13 n.5. For the reasons stated below, in the

application, the dissent, and numerous amicus briefs, the merits strongly favor State

Defendants. At a bare minimum, the 100-page dissent, the various amicus briefs supporting

the State Defendants, including a brief from the United States and a brief from 22 States,

and Plaintiffs filing six separate responses totaling 257 pages, confirms that the merits are,

at least, debatable.

At heart, Plaintiffs disagree with Purcell. Refusing to treat a preliminary injunction

as “an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right,” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council,

Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008), Plaintiffs reject the possibility that Purcell could bar an

injunction they believe is justified on the merits. That is why they suggest opinions granting

stays were wrong and those dissenting from stays are right. See Brooks Resp. 42

(suggesting Justice Kavanaugh’s Merrill concurrence incorrectly burdened plaintiffs). It is

why they rely on an opinion dissenting from a previous Purcell stay. See NAACP Resp. 29–

30 (citing Robinson v. Callais, 144 S. Ct. 1171, 1172 (2024) (Jackson, J., dissenting)). And it

is why their arguments appear to be drawn from other dissenting opinions. Compare

LULAC Resp. 2 (arguing a stay would disrupt “the status quo” established by the

injunction), with Raysor v. DeSantis, 140 S. Ct. 2600, 2603 (2020) (Sotomayor, J.,

dissenting) (objecting that “an appellate court stay . . . disrupts a legal status quo”).

Purcell requires judicial restraint when a State’s electoral machinery is already in

motion. The injunction below violated these principles, upset an election in progress, and

should be stayed pending resolution of the appeal.

II.

A Stay Is Warranted Under the Traditional Stay Factors Because this Court Is

Likely to Reverse.

This Court is likely to reverse the decision below as contrary to

Alexander.

This Court will likely reverse, as it reversed in Alexander. Plaintiffs’ call for

deference to the district court’s fact-finding is no different than the calls for deference in

Alexander. But a district court receives no deference when it applies the incorrect legal

principles. Alexander, 602 U.S. at 18-19 (citing Inwood Lab’ys, Inc. v. Ives Lab’ys, Inc., 456

U.S. 844, 855, n.15 (1982)). The district court did not hold Plaintiffs to their “especially

stringent” evidentiary burden, nor did it “draw the inference that cuts in the legislature’s

favor when confronted with evidence that could plausibly support multiple conclusions.” Id.

at 10-11.

Plaintiffs do not deny that Adam Kincaid’s detailed testimony provided “a specific,

legitimate, race-neutral explanation for every redistricting decision.” Stay Appl. 30. As the

United States explains, the testimony of the mapmaker is “among the most probative direct

evidence of racial gerrymandering.” U.S. Br. 19–20 (discussing Cooper, 581 U.S. at 299300); see also Alexander, 602 U.S. at 19 (noting that the map-drawer “testified that he used

only political data”). Even the majority conceded that Kincaid’s testimony was

“compelling.” App. 96;5 see also App. 203-04 (Smith, J., dissenting). The majority committed

Brooks Plaintiffs are wrong to suggest that the district court disbelieved Kincaid

because of his “demeanor.” Brooks Resp. 32. Brooks Plaintiffs also point to Kincaid’s and

the same error as in Alexander, rejecting his unrebutted testimony based on speculation

about racial targets, particularly in the absence of an alternative map. Stay. Appl. 29–30.

The district court erred by excusing Plaintiffs’ failure to produce

an alternative map.

Because Plaintiffs failed to submit an alternative map, the district court was

compelled to infer that they “cannot draw a map that undermines the legislature’s defense.”

Alexander, 602 U.S. at 35; Stay Appl. 21–22; see also U.S. Br. 9, 25; State Amicus Br. 6.

The district court correctly and unanimously found that Plaintiffs failed to present

an alternative map under Alexander. App. 132 n.488; App. 236–38 (Smith, J., dissent).

MALC Plaintiffs disagree, contending that Dr. Duchin’s computer simulations, which were

not introduced into evidence, constituted an alternative map. MALC Resp. 25–27; see also

NAACP Resp. 23–25 (admitting that they “did not introduce an alternative map into

evidence” but arguing that “computer code” satisfied their burden). Alexander’s

requirement is simplicity itself: produce a map, not testimony about maps, not statistics

about maps, and not computer code outside the record. Accepting these arguments would

be inconsistent with Alexander itself, in which the plaintiffs failed to satisfy the

requirement even though (as here) their experts simulated thousands of maps. 602 U.S. at

24.

Plaintiffs do not offer excuses for their failure to introduce a map. No Plaintiff

defends the district court’s inference that they “simply didn’t have the time” to prepare one.

App. 134. If their expert truly possessed tens of thousands of alternative maps, there is no

reason Plaintiffs could not have submitted one. In these circumstances, the failure can only

be strategic, and Alexander’s inference should be particularly strong.

Senator King’s differing memories regarding a brief conversation at a conference several

months before the hearing. Brooks Resp. 28–29. Any inconsistency is unrelated to why the

map lines were drawn.

Some Plaintiffs complain that they did not have the data necessary for an alternative

map, having first learned the precise criteria applied by Kincaid at the hearing. E.g., Brooks

Resp. 39 n.58. But it was Plaintiffs’ decision to forego discovery. Stay Appl. 10 & n.4. Nor

did Plaintiffs even produce an alternative map that made the same changes to the political

makeup of Texas’s congressional delegation as the 2025 map—the political goals for which

were broadcast across the country.

MALC attempts to defend the district court’s conclusion that Alexander does not

apply at the preliminary-injunction stage. MALC Resp. 24–25. But as the United States

and the State Amici explain, strict adherence to Alexander is only more critical in the

preliminary-injunction context, where courts must make important decisions on a limited

record, and a plaintiff must make a “clear showing” of entitlement to relief. U.S. Br. 24–25

(citing Winter, 555 U.S. at 7); State Amicus Br. 8–10. Such a map, which can be produced

easily and quickly, is equally available in the preliminary-injunction context, and given the

showing necessary to receive this extraordinary remedy, the failure should be viewed even

more severely.

Brooks Plaintiffs contend that Alexander’s requirement does not apply “when there

is no change to the affected district’s politics.” Brooks Resp. 37. Not even the district court

accepted that argument. There is no such thing as a single “affected district.” Redistricting

necessarily affects multiple districts. Although the politics of CD27 did not change, for

example, voters from its southwest corner were shifted into the adjacent CD34 (to change

its politics), requiring CD27 to add additional voters, changing its racial makeup. ECF 1419

at 155–157. And even when two adjacent districts share politics in one configuration,

alternative maps disentangle racial motives from traditional redistricting criteria, such as

compactness and natural boundaries. See ECF 1419 at 110–112 (Kincaid testimony that the

border between CD33 and CD30 follows natural boundaries).

Because Plaintiffs failed to submit an alternative map, the district court was

required to infer that they “cannot draw a map that undermines the legislature’s defense

that the districting lines were “‘based on a permissible, rather than a prohibited, ground.’”

602 U.S. at 35 (quoting Cooper, 581 U.S. at 317).

As in Alexander, the district court erred in inferring that the map

was drawn to satisfy a racial target.

The district court committed the same error as the district court in Alexander:

identify a racial statistic in the enacted map, then infer that the map must have been drawn

to meet that target. See id. at 20–21 (inferring a “17% BVAP” target). In this case, the

district declared, with no support other than its own ipse dixit, that drawing a map with

three districts “just barely 50%+ CVAP” was “extremely unlikely.” App. 96.

Plaintiffs’ failure to present an alternative map forbids this inference. On this record,

a factfinder must assume that Plaintiffs could not draw a map showing that a legislature

“driven only by its professed mapmaking criteria, could have produced a different map with

[different] racial balance.” 602 U.S. at 34. With no proffered alternative, a plaintiff cannot

“disentangle race and politics,” and a court must assume that any statistical oddities in the

map result from the Legislature’s partisan goals, in light of the correlation between race

and partisanship. See id. at 9 (explaining that “partisan and racial gerrymanders ‘are

capable of yielding similar oddities in a district’s boundaries’”). As in Alexander, Plaintiffs

“cannot point to even one map in the record that would have satisfied the legislature’s

political aim” without also yielding districts with just over 50% minority CVAP. Id. at 20.

A court cannot simply identify a statistic regarding a map’s racial demographics,

declare such a result “unlikely,” conclude that it constitutes a “target,” and infer that the

map was drawn to satisfy this target (all while rejecting the unrebutted testimony of the

mapmaker to the contrary). The erroneous analysis in this case tracks the erroneous

analysis in Alexander precisely. There, the district court noted that the map maintained a

17% BVAP, inferred that this statistic constituted a “target” that the map was drawn to

achieve, and discredited the mapmaker’s contrary testimony. See id. at 19. There, as here,

no direct evidence supported the district court’s conclusion, and the only direct evidence

was to the contrary. Id. Such speculation was insufficient “to support an inference that can

overcome the presumption of legislative good faith.” Id.

There is no evidence in support of the proposition that three districts with just over

50% minority CVAP was “extremely unlikely” among maps that would achieve the Texas

Legislature’s goals. Despite presenting six experts and days of testimony at trial, Plaintiffs

cite only the district court’s declaration, which as the United States explains, is nothing

more than a “layman’s conjecture.” U.S. Br. 17. Disentangling race and partisanship is a

complex endeavor, requiring serious analysis. Alexander, 602 U.S. at 19–33. Whether this

result was “unlikely” depends on how many districts one would expect a race-neutral,

partisan gerrymander to create with a minority CVAP percentage just over 50% minority

CVAP. Such a calculation would, in turn, require accounting for factors such as the

correlation between race and partisanship. See U.S. Br. 17–18; Alexander, 602 U.S. at 9

(noting that partisan and racial gerrymanders “are capable of yielding similar oddities in a

district’s boundaries”). This crucial finding—that the number of districts with a minority

CVAP of just over 50% are an “unlikely” result of a partisan gerrymander—required

evidence, not conjecture.

As the United States notes, the mapmaker provided a “detailed explanation of the

race-neutral line-drawing decisions that, in fact, happened to result in those racial

percentages.” U.S. Br. 17. These explanations went unrebutted, and “the mere fact that

Districts 9, 18, and 30 happened to wind up containing Hispanic or black CVAPs slightly

above 50% . . . is in no way inconsistent with a purely partisan gerrymander,” “given the

correlation between race and party.” U.S. Br. 17-18. Particularly in the absence of an

alternative map, the district court erred by “inferring bad faith based on the racial effects

of a political gerrymander in a jurisdiction in which race and partisan preference are very

closely correlated.” 602 U.S. at 20–21.

In contrast, in Cooper, the two legislators hired the mapmaker “to assist them in

redrawing district lines.” 581 U.S. at 295. The legislators did not merely comment on racial

statistics but instructed the mapmaker to change the racial composition of a district and

thus “‘draw a plan that would pass muster under the Voting Rights Act.’” Id. at 311 (citation

omitted). The legislators, not the mapmaker, decided to bring “the black community in

Guilford County into the” district. Id. at 312. And one of the legislators responsible for

drawing the map told a fellow officeholder that “his leadership had told him that he had to

ramp the minority percentage in [District 12] up to over 50 percent to comply with the

Voting Rights Law.” Id. at 311. And at his deposition, the mapmaker admitted that the

legislators “‘decided’ to shift African–American voters into District 12 ‘in order to’ ensure

preclearance under § 5.” Id. at 314. And the mapmaker was permitted “to use race . . . with

regard to Guilford County” in drawing the district. Id.

Cooper, in which direct evidence demonstrated that legislators instructed the

mapmaker to achieve a particular racial composition, id. at 300, is a far cry from this case

and from Alexander, in which district courts erroneously inferred the existence of racial

targets based on the demographics of enacted maps. 602 U.S. at 22.

Plaintiffs’ other evidence did not satisfy their “stringent”

evidentiary burden.

This Court has “never invalidated an electoral map in a case in which the plaintiff

failed to adduce any direct evidence” that “race played a role in the drawing of district

lines.” Id. at 8. The difference between “direct” and “circumstantial” evidence is crucial in

this context. Stay Appl. 24–27.

“Direct evidence” is evidence “that, if true, proves a fact without inference or

presumption.” Evidence, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024); accord Coghlan v. Am.

Seafoods Co., 413 F.3d 1090, 1095 (9th Cir. 2005) (O’Scannlain, J.) (same); Jones v. Robinson

Prop. Grp., L.P., 427 F.3d 987, 992 (5th Cir. 2002) (same); Burns v. Gadsden State Cmty.

Coll., 908 F.2d 1512, 1518 (11th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (same). Direct evidence, if credited,

“amounts to a confession of error.” Alexander, 602 U.S. at 8.

Plaintiffs have no direct evidence. Stay Appl. 27–29. And in the light of the

presumption of legislative good faith, which “directs district courts to draw the inference

that cuts in the legislature’s favor when confronted with evidence that could plausibly

support multiple conclusions,” Alexander, 602 U.S. at 10, it was error for the district court

to mischaracterize “circumstantial evidence” as “direct evidence” in determining whether

Plaintiffs satisfied their “stringent” burden.

The DOJ letter does not demonstrate that race played a role

in the drawing of district lines.

Plaintiffs argue that the DOJ letter is direct evidence of the Legislature’s intent with

respect to the drawing of district lines because Texas “chose to comply with DOJ’s

demand.” MALC Resp. 15. At the outset, this is not “direct evidence” because the

Legislature’s intent is being “infer[red] or presum[ed]” from its actions. Jones, 427 F.3d at

992. Nor is it correct. As the United States explains, the DOJ letter does not “urge any

particular course of action.” U.S. Br. 12; see also id. at 13 (“[A] State obviously can remedy

racial gerrymandering without engaging in more racial gerrymandering.”). And even under

the district court’s incorrect interpretation, “Texas ignored the [alleged] request as to one

district, acted on two by purportedly considering race (the very thing DOJ had complained

about), and created a potential coalition district in the fourth.” U.S. Br. 15.

Several Plaintiffs also argue that the DOJ letter is probative of legislative intent

because the allegedly suspicious “sequence of events” “establishes the context in which

Texas’s redistricting occurred.” MALC Resp. 15; id. at 19 (“course of conduct”); see Brooks

Resp. 29 (same); NAACP Resp. 1 (“a sequence of events”). But the “sequence of events

leading up to the challenged decision” is one of the traditional forms of circumstantial

evidence of “discriminatory purpose,” Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev.

Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267 (1977), not direct evidence. And there is nothing unusual about this

chain of events that could lead to an inference of racially discriminatory line drawing, given

that the Legislature did not follow the purported goals laid out in the DOJ letter, supra at

14, and no evidence supports the theory that the Legislature set racial targets for the

districts that were drawn, supra at 11–13.

Governor Abbott’s special session proclamation and press

statements do not demonstrate racial gerrymandering.

Departing from the district court’s reasoning, Brooks Plaintiffs and Gonzales

Plaintiffs contend that the Governor’s intent is “of singular importance” to ascertaining the

Legislature’s intent—so much so that the Court could “start and stop its analysis there”—

because he called the special session and wields a veto. Brooks Resp. 30; see Gonzales Resp.

15 (“The Court could stop there.”). But the relevant question is “the predominance of race

in the legislature’s line-drawing process.” Cooper, 581 U.S. at 321 (emphasis added);

Alexander, 602 U.S. at 8 (“drawing of district lines”); Ala. Legis. Black Caucus v. Alabama,

575 U.S. 254, 267 (2015) (“motivated the drawing of particular lines”) (emphasis added).

And while the Governor calls a special session, he does not exercise “Legislative power,”

Tex. Const. art. III, § 1, or draft legislation.6 It is undisputed that he played no “role in the

drawing of district lines.” Alexander, 602 U.S. at 8. For that reason, he is not a “relevant

state actor” for purposes of the racial-gerrymandering inquiry. Id.

Plaintiffs also develop a novel theory that, because the Governor called the special

session and could have vetoed the map, he is the “but for cause” of the map’s passage and

thus his (allegedly improper) intent could sustain a racial gerrymandering claim. Brooks

Resp. 26, 30–31; Gonzales Resp. 15; see also NAACP Resp. 19. Plaintiffs distill this singleactor-intent theory from Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985), but it offers no support.

NAACP Plaintiffs are wrong to argue (at 18) that the Governor’s invocation of the

legislative privilege rendered him a “relevant state actor” for a racial gerrymandering

claim. Executive-branch officials may claim the legislative privilege when they are

exercising legislative functions, but it is undisputed that the Governor did not participate in

the drawing of district lines. See Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Alviti, 14 F.4th 76, 87–88 (1st Cir.

2021); In re Hubbard, 803 F.3d 1298, 1308 (11th Cir. 2015); see also Bogan v. Scott-Harris,

523 U.S. 44, 55 (1998) (“We have recognized that officials outside the legislative branch are

entitled to legislative immunity when they perform legislative functions.”).

In Hunter, this Court considered the intent of the Alabama legislature as a whole by

consulting “the proceedings of the convention, several historical studies, and the testimony

of two expert historians.” Id. at 229. Nowhere does Hunter hold that a racialgerrymandering claim can be based on a single individual treated as the “but-for” cause of

a law’s passage. If anything, Hunter endorses the opposite proposition. See id. at 228–29

(citing United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383–84 (1968)); see also Brnovich v.

Democratic Nat’l Comm., 594 U.S. 647, 689 (2021).

Plaintiffs lastly point to press statements by Governor Abbott that purportedly

“reinforce” the Legislature’s racial motivations. MALC Resp. 16–17; Gonzales Resp. 1, 10,

13; LULAC Resp. 16. That such statements allegedly “reinforce” or “shed light” on the

Legislature’s motives is a concession that these statements are, at most, circumstantial

evidence. And in any event, they do not demonstrate that race drove the drawing of district

lines. Those statements instead “reflected the (correct) observation that minority voters in

Texas are “‘moving . . . towards the Republican Party.’” Stay Appl. 26 (quoting App. 512).

The Governor’s statement that Texas Republicans “wanted to remove those coalition

districts” was premised on the notion that they “trapped” Republicans “in a Democrat

congressional district.” App. 32. And when asked whether the goal was to add Republican

seats, the Governor ultimately explained that the redistricting sought to “give [the] ability”

to people in “districts where the electorate voted heavily for Trump” to “vote for a member

of Congress who is a Republican.” App. 32. In the process, the 2025 map “turned out to

provide more seats for Hispanics”—“[It] just coincides it’s going to be to Hispanic

Republicans elected to those seats.” App. 32.

Furthermore, the Governor’s press statements were made in August, long after the

map had been submitted to the Legislature. Stay Appl. 26 (citing App. 473). The most

plausible explanation, Judge Smith notes, is that the Governor “adjusted his rhetoric to

defend the map in a forward-facing capacity,” App. 215 (Smith, J., dissenting).7 And at least

where “evidence could plausibly support multiple conclusions,” the “presumption of

legislative good faith directs district courts to draw the inference that cuts in the

legislature’s favor.” Alexander, 602 U.S. at 10.

Isolated statements from a handful of legislators do not

establish that race drove the drawing of district lines.

Nor do various statements from Speaker Burrows, Representatives Toth and

Oliverson, and Chairman Hunter constitute direct evidence of racial intent. Stay Appl. 27–

29. In Plaintiff MALC’s own words (at 19), no statement amounts to an “explicit confession

that race predominated over all other considerations,” meaning no statement is direct

evidence. Alexander, 602 U.S. at 8 (direct evidence “amounts to a confession of error”). And

here, lawmakers’ mere awareness of the map’s racial demographics is not evidence—direct

or circumstantial—of racial purpose.

Nor can the “announcement[s]” and “characterization[s]” of “legislative leadership”

function as a proxy for the intent of the legislature as a whole. MALC Resp. 16. “[T]he

legislators who vote to adopt a bill are not the agents of the bill’s sponsor or proponents.”

Brnovich, 594 U.S. at 689. And where several key legislators—including Chairman Vasut

and Senator King, “legislative leadership” by any metric—disclaimed any racial motivation,

App. 79–90, it was clear error for the district court to rely on statements of only four

Republican members of the Texas House to the “exclus[ion of] over 80 other Republicans

in the House, [and] scores more in the Senate,” App. 213 (Smith, J., dissenting).

MALC Plaintiffs note (at 16–17) that the Governor’s July 9th call of the special session

was issued before the map was provided to the Legislature, but Kincaid testified he began

drawing the map well before and had already entered the “final phase.” App. 472–73. And

in any event, that proclamation produced no legislation at all. On August 15th, Governor

Abbott issued a second proclamation calling a new special session, adding one item, and

altering the language for three others. ECF 1373-16 at 2–3. It also omitted any reference

to the DOJ letter.

Brooks Plaintiffs note that Cooper “affirmed a finding of racial predominance based

primarily upon the statements of the two bill sponsors.” Brooks Resp. 33 (citing 581 U.S. at

299–300). But these sponsors worked with the mapmaker to draw district lines, Cooper, 581

U.S. at 295 (hired a mapmaker “to assist them”), and the “statements” were instructions to

the mapmaker to engage in racial gerrymandering, id. at 310–14. See also id. at 314 (noting

the instruction not to use race “except perhaps with regard to Guilford County”). No similar

evidence is present here.

Plaintiffs also devote significant attention to the floor statements of Chairman

Hunter discussing, in response to his colleagues’ colloquies, the racial makeup of certain

districts. LULAC Resp. 5–7, 10, 11–15; MALC Resp. 18; NAACP Resp. 8.

But

“[r]edistricting legislatures will . . . almost always be aware of racial demographics,” Miller

v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995), so there is “nothing nefarious” about Chairman

Hunter’s “aware[ness] of the racial makeup of the various districts,” Alexander, 602 U.S.

at 37.

And Chairman Hunter’s statements must be understood in the context of the

litigation over the 2021 maps, in which Plaintiffs levied charges of racial discrimination

based, in part, on the absence of Hispanic CVAP majority districts. See, e.g., ECF 985 at 6

(LULAC Plaintiffs) (“Defendants crafted a new map [the 2021 map] that reduced the

number of Hispanic CVAP majority congressional districts, and failed to create any new

Hispanic CVAP majority congressional districts.”). The most plausible explanation is that

“Chairman Hunter was publicly attacked in the 2021 redrawing . . . and felt motivated to

defend his reputation and that of the Texas house by expositing the racial statistics of the

new map.” App. 207 (Smith, J., dissenting). LULAC Plaintiffs suggest (at 21 n.6) that “there

is no evidence” that Chairman Hunter’s statements “were an attempt to seem nondiscriminatory after having received criticism in 2021,” but Plaintiffs’ filings are in the

record, and the attacks themselves provide context to the statements. See ECF 985 at 6;

App. 207 (Smith, J., dissenting).

Brooks Plaintiffs respond (at 33) that the district court made a factual finding

entitled to deference that Chairman Hunter’s comments reflected “value-laden” racial

motivation instead of mere awareness. Not only are “value-laden” discussions of racial

demographics no evidence of racial intent, Stay Appl. 28, but the fact that the district court

was drawing inferences or presumptions from “tone, expressions, and demeanor,” Brooks

Resp. 32, merely confirms that these ambiguous statements must be interpreted in the light

most favorable to the Legislature, as the presumption of legislative good faith requires. See

Alexander, 602 U.S. at 6.

the

The drawing of CD37 and CD27 does not constitute

circumstantial evidence of racial gerrymandering.

district

court,

some

Plaintiffs fault the Legislature for not

dismantling

CD37,

majority-white

highly-compact,

Democratic

district

comprising the City of Austin. Its borders

track partisan boundaries, with the blue

areas “less than 30 percent Trump” and red

areas “30 percent or more Trump in 2024.”

App. 504–05; ECF 1382-25 (CD 37 map).

No Plaintiff has offered any reason that the Legislature should have targeted CD37

rather than any other Democratic district, much less presented evidence that that doing so

would have served the Legislature’s partisan goals better than its actual map. The district

court—and Plaintiffs—simply declare that because CD37 is majority-White, its presence in

the 2025 map demonstrates racial intent. Such reasoning is facially untenable.

Plaintiffs (like the district court) fail to ask the obvious question: How many

plurality-White Democratic districts would a race-neutral gerrymander be expected to

eliminate?8 The answer reveals that contrary to Plaintiffs’ theory that the Legislature

targeted minority districts, Texas’s partisan redistricting affected different racial groups

within the Democratic party proportionally. The 2021 map includes three plurality-White

districts (CD7, CD32, and CD37) out of thirteen Democratic districts (23%). The 2025 map

includes two plurality-White districts out of eight Democratic districts (25%).

The district court’s reasoning—the Legislature leaving any plurality-White

Democratic district in place shows that “racial concerns predominated,” App. 107 n.403—

collapses under scrutiny.

The accusation that the Legislature “completely gutted majority-non-White CD9

and not majority-White CD37” is also wrong on its own terms. App. 106. CD9 was not

dismantled, it was renumbered as CD18, which retains 60-65% of the former CD9. ECF

1341 at 15 (only “35 or 40 percent” of the voters in CD9 “were not moved to [CD]18”); see

also ECF 1415 at 104 (testifying that “two-thirds” of former CD9 is in CD18). Kincaid

explained that “the core of Texas 9 is now in Texas 18.” ECF 1420 at 98. “Most of what was

the 9th District is now still together in the 18th District.” Id.; see also App. 225 n.157 (Smith,

J., dissenting) (“CD-9 substantially swapped locations with CD-18 measured by core

retention[.]”).

The district court also declared, with no explanation or citation, that “if the

Legislature’s aims were partisan rather than racial, one would expect the Legislature not

to make fundamental changes to the racial demographics of Republican districts,” such as

CD27. App. 107. None of the Plaintiffs defend this reasoning. As the dissent explains, not

only is the assumption unsupported, but it conflicts with common sense: a partisan

gerrymander necessarily requires moving both Republican and Democratic voters. App.

216 (Smith, J., dissenting). The 2025 map changes 37 out of the State’s 38 congressional

The district court’s opinion appears to assume that all three should have been

eliminated. App. 107 n.403 (criticizing the Legislature for not eliminating CD7 as well).

districts, and Republican voters from CD27 were shifted into adjacent CD34 to turn it into

a new Republican district. App. 506; ECF 1419 at 155–57.

Plaintiffs’ defense of Dr. Duchin is unavailing.

The district court erred by placing any reliance on Dr. Moon Duchin, whose analysis

in this case suffers from the same flaws as in previous cases. Stay Appl. 35–38. Dr. Duchin

was “just not aware of the principles used to create the enacted map,” so she “c[ould]n’t

simulate th[em].” App. 438. This concession should be fatal: her analysis cannot say

anything meaningful about the likelihood of the “enacted map” if she knew nothing about

the principles used to create it.

Plaintiffs do not deny this fact—they simply complain that Dr. Duchin “had no

access” to Kincaid’s data and criteria. Brooks Resp. 38. But that lack of access resulted from

their failure to conduct discovery. Stay Appl. 9–10. The related contention that Kincaid’s

mapdrawing criteria were shielded by privilege, NAACP Resp. 20–21, is belied by his

twelve hours of testimony and by the description of those criteria in the district court’s

published opinion, App. 92–93.

Plaintiffs also attempt to justify Dr. Duchin using the wrong criteria, asserting that

her maps were “at least as favorable to Republicans” as Kincaid’s. NAACP Resp. 15; see

also Brooks Resp. 37–38. This is incorrect—as the district court recognized, Dr. Duchin

applied a lower Republican-vote threshold than Kincaid. App. 125. Brooks Plaintiffs

suggest that the different threshold is irrelevant because Dr. Duchin’s “performance floor”

of 55% Trump 2024 districts would include the 60% districts Kincaid drew. Brooks Resp.

37–38. Not so—Dr. Duchin’s analysis tried to determine whether Kincaid’s maps were a

statistical outlier among the entire set of maps she generated. But by setting a lower

partisan threshold for her maps, Dr. Duchin made Kincaid’s map an outlier in the dataset

in partisanship and, as one would expect, in other ways as well. See Alexander, 602 U.S. at

9 (noting that “partisan and racial gerrymanders ‘are capable of yielding similar oddities in

a district’s boundaries’”).

Nor does any Plaintiff defend Dr. Duchin’s use of outdated incumbent data, App. 583–

85, or her failure to protect against paired Republican incumbents. Stay Appl. 37. These are

the same types of errors she made in Allen v. Milligan, 599 U.S. 1, 34 (2023), and Alexander,

602 U.S. at 33. And like the testimony of the flawed experts in Alexander, because she

“fail[ed] to track the considerations that governed the legislature’s redistricting decision,”

her testimony is “irrelevant.” 602 U.S. at 25.

The remaining Nken factors favor a stay.

The State will be irreparably injured absent a stay, and the public interest likewise

favors a stay. Stay Appl. 38–39. “[A]ny time a State is enjoined by a court from effectuating

statutes enacted by representatives of its people, it suffers a form of irreparable injury.”

Maryland v. King, 567 U.S. 1301, 1303 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., in chambers); see Trump v.

CASA, Inc., 606 U.S. 831, 861 (2025); Am. First Legal Amicus Br. 7-8. Likewise the public

interest in orderly and accurate elections is overwhelming: Avoiding voter confusion,

administering an orderly election, and giving citizens confidence in the fairness of their

election is always in the public interest. DNC, 141 S. Ct. at 31 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).

Plaintiffs argue that the State will suffer no irreparable harm because the State used

the 2021 maps in the past and can do so again. LULAC Resp. 28; Brooks Resp. 39; NAACP

Resp. 26–27; Gonzales Resp. 39. But, as various amici demonstrate, a reversion to the 2021

maps would cause disruption for local election administrators and candidates alike who have

been proceeding under the 2025 maps. See Election Official Amicus Br. 8–13; Candidate

Amicus Br. 2–20; Senator Amicus Br. 15–20. Brooks Plaintiffs separately suggest (at 40)

that Texas will not be irreparably harmed because permitting elections to proceed under

the 2025 map would vindicate an interest that is “incompatible with democratic principles.”

Brooks Resp. 40. But Plaintiffs cannot circumvent Rucho and render objections to partisan

gerrymandering justiciable through the Nken factors.

Finally, Plaintiffs fail to demonstrate that a stay would harm them. Plaintiffs

contend that allowing the election to be held under the 2025 map would cause them the

irreparable harm of being “forced to vote under a racially discriminatory map that violates

their constitutional rights.” NAACP Resp. 26; MALC Resp. 38–39; Gonzales Resp. 39–40;

LULAC Resp. 27; Brooks Resp. 41. But according to Plaintiffs, the preliminary injunction

would not prevent this harm because they allege that the 2021 map is also an

unconstitutional racial gerrymander: “[T]he Texas Legislature engaged in intentional

racial discrimination and racial gerrymandering in the drawing of [CD9, CD18, and CD30

in the 2021 map.]” ECF 983 at 1 (Plaintiff-Intervenors); see also ECF 981 at 4 (NAACP

Plaintiffs); ECF 985 at 7 (LULAC Plaintiffs); ECF 975 at 4 (MALC Plaintiffs).

Plaintiffs’ newfound embrace of the 2021 map, which they challenged for years of

litigation, is explained by their preference for the politics of the 2021 map compared to the

politics of the 2025 map. They seek “to transform federal courts into weapons of political

warfare that will deliver victories that eluded them in the political arena.” Alexander, 602

U.S. at 11 (quotation marks omitted).

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, this Court should enter a stay pending appeal.

Respectfully submitted,