Amicus Curiae Brief — Kristi Noem, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security, et al., Applicants v. National TPS Alliance, et al.

Supreme Court briefSep 29, 2025

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

No. 25A326

In the Supreme Court of the United States

KRISTI NOEM, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND

SECURITY, ET AL., Applicants,

NATIONAL TPS ALLIANCE, ET AL., Respondents.

ON APPLICATION TO STAY THE ORDER ISSUED BY THE UNITED STATES

DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRIEF OF MEMBERS OF CONGRESS AS AMICI CURIAE IN

SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS

STEPHEN J. VAN STEMPVOORT

AMANDA L. RAUH-BIERI

MILLER JOHNSON

45 Ottawa Avenue SW, Suite 1100

Grand Rapids, MI 49503

(616) 831-1700

vanstempvoorts@millerjohnson.com

rauhbieria@millerjohnson.com

ROSE CUISON-VILLAZOR

CENTER FOR IMMIGRANT JUSTICE

RUTGERS LAW SCHOOL

123 Washington Street

Newark, NJ 07102

(973) 353-3159

rose.villazor@law.rutgers.edu

ROBERT S. CHANG

Counsel of Record

SHALEEN SHANBHAG

FRED T. KOREMATSU CENTER FOR LAW

AND EQUALITY

UC IRVINE SCHOOL OF LAW

401 E. Peltason Drive

Irvine, CA 92697

(949) 824-3034

rchang@law.uci.edu

Counsel for Amici Curiae

September 29, 2025

Table of Contents

Page

Table of Authorities ...................................................................................................... ii

Interest of Amici Curiae ............................................................................................... 1

Introduction .................................................................................................................. 1

Argument ...................................................................................................................... 2

The Executive Branch’s erroneous claim of “inherent” power to assert

its novel TPS interpretation usurps Congressional authority. ........................ 3

II.

The Executive Branch intrudes further on congressional and judicial

power by contending, contrary to the TPS statute, that the Secretary’s

decision is unreviewable. ................................................................................... 5

III.

IV.

The plain language of Section 1254a(b)(5)(A) does not bar judicial

review of the Secretary’s vacatur. .......................................................... 7

Legislative history supports a narrow interpretation of the bar on

judicial review. ........................................................................................ 9

The TPS statute does not allow for vacatur. ................................................... 11

The plain language of the TPS statute does not authorize the

Secretary to vacate designations or extensions of designations.......... 11

Congress created the TPS statutory framework to limit the

Executive Branch from making arbitrary decisions and shield

TPS from domestic politics.................................................................... 15

Congress intended TPS status to fill gaps in immigration law

where asylum would not provide adequate protections. ..................... 17

Venezuela TPS has long enjoyed bipartisan congressional support. ............. 19

Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 23

Appendix: List of Amici Curiae ................................................................................ A-1

Table of Authorities

Page(s)

Cases

Abbott Labs. v. Gardner,

387 U.S. 136 (1967) ................................................................................................ 10

Azar v. Allina Health Servs.,

587 U.S. 566 (2019) .................................................................................................. 5

Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst.,

467 U.S. 340 (1984) .................................................................................................. 6

Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain,

503 U.S. 249 (2005) ................................................................................................ 12

Cuozzo Speed Techs. v. Com. for Intell. Prop.,

579 U.S. 261 (2016) ............................................................................................ 6, 11

Davis v. Michigan Dep’t of Treasury,

489 U.S. 803 (1989) .................................................................................................. 8

Dodd v. United States,

545 U.S. 353 (2005) ................................................................................................ 12

Groff v. DeJoy,

600 U.S. 447 (2023) ................................................................................................ 11

Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr,

589 U.S. 221 (2020) ................................................................................................ 10

Gundy v. United States,

588 U.S. 128 (2019) (Gorsuch, J. dissenting) .......................................................... 4

Hollingsworth v. Perry,

558 U.S. 183 (2010) .................................................................................................. 3

INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,

480 U.S. 421 (1987) ................................................................................................ 18

Ivy Sports Med., LLC v. Burwell,

767 F.3d 81 (D.C. Cir. 2014) .................................................................................. 12

Judge Rotenberg Educ. Ctr., Inc. v. FDA,

3 F.4th 390 (D.C. Cir. 2021) ................................................................................... 12

Kucana v. Holder,

558 U.S. 233 (2010) ................................................................................................ 10

Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intel. & Coordination Unit,

507 U.S. 163 (1993) ............................................................................................ 7, 15

Leocal v. Ashcroft,

543 U.S. 1 (2004) ...................................................................................................... 7

Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo,

603 U.S. 369 (2024) .................................................................................................. 6

McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc.,

498 U.S. 479 (1991) .................................................................................................. 9

Miller v. French,

530 U.S. 327 (2000) ................................................................................................ 11

Morrill v. Jones,

106 U.S. 466 (1883) .................................................................................................. 5

Nat’l Assn. of Mfrs. v. Dep’t of Def.,

583 U.S. 109 (2018) ................................................................................................ 11

Nat’l TPS All. v. Noem,

No. 25-5724, 2025 WL 2661556 (9th Cir. Sept. 17, 2025) ................................... 3, 5

Nat’l TPS All. v. Noem,

No. 25-CV-01766-EMC, 2025 WL 2617231 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 10,

2025)...................................................................................................................... 2, 5

Nixon v. Missouri Mun. League,

541 U.S. 125 (2004) .................................................................................................. 7

Nken v. Holder,

556 U.S. 418 (2009) .................................................................................................. 3

Ohio v. Env’t Prot. Agency,

603 U.S. 279 (2024) .................................................................................................. 3

Ramos v. Wolf,

975 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2020), vacated, 59 F.4th 1010 (9th Cir. 2023) .................... 9

Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc.,

509 U.S. 43 (1993) .................................................................................................... 9

Russello v. United States,

464 U.S. 16 (1983) .............................................................................................. 9, 15

iii

TRW Inc. v. Andrews,

534 U.S. 19 (2001) .................................................................................................... 8

United States v. Miller,

145 S. Ct. 839 (2025) ................................................................................................ 8

United States v. Williamson,

90 U.S. 411 (1874) .................................................................................................... 5

Utility Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA,

573 U.S. 302 (2014) .............................................................................................. 4, 5

Virginia Uranium, Inc. v. Warren,

587 U.S. 761 (2019) ................................................................................................ 12

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,

343 U.S. 579 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) ......................................................... 3

Statutes

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) ....................................................................................... 17, 18

8 U.S.C. § 1155 ............................................................................................................. 15

8 U.S.C. § 1160(e)(1) ...................................................................................................... 9

8 U.S.C. § 1254a .................................................... 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 18, 19

8 U.S.C. § 1255a(f) ......................................................................................................... 9

Other Authorities

133 Cong. Rec. (House) 21334 (1987) (statement of Rep. Mario Biaggi) ..................... 4

135 Cong. Rec. H7501 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1989) (statement of Rep. Bill

Richardson) ......................................................................................................... 4, 10

135 Cong. Rec. H7501 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1989) (statement of Rep.

Sander Levin) ......................................................................................................... 16

135 Cong. Rec. H7501 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1989) (statement of Rep.

Joseph Brennan) ..................................................................................................... 16

135 Cong. Rec. H7501 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1989) (statement of Rep.

Hamilton Fish) ....................................................................................................... 19

136 Cong. Rec. (House) 8686 (statement of Rep. Mary Rose Oakar) ........................ 15

136 Cong. Rec. (House) 8686 (statement of Rep. William H. Gray) .......................... 18

86 Fed. Reg. 6845 (Jan. 19, 2021) ............................................................................... 20

88 Fed. Reg. 68130, 68134 (Oct. 3, 2023) .................................................................... 17

Diamond, Peter C., Temporary Protected Status Under the

Immigration Act of 1990, 28 Willamette L. Rev. 857, 861 (1992) ........................ 18

Díaz-Balart, U.S. Rep. Mario, Press Release, Díaz-Balart, Giménez,

and Salazar Statement on SCOTUS Ruling on TPS for Venezuelans

(May 21, 2025), https://mariodiazbalart.house.gov/mediacenter/press-releases/diaz-balart-gimenez-and-salazar-statementscotus-ruling-tps-venezuelans ............................................................................... 22

Díaz-Balart, U.S. Rep. Mario, Press Release, English/Español: DíazBalart, Giménez, and Salazar Stand in Solidarity with the

Venezuelan People (Jan.29, 2925),

https://mariodiazbalart.house.gov/media-center/pressreleases/englishespanol-diaz-balart-gimenez-and-salazar-standsolidarity ................................................................................................................. 21

Durbin, U.S. Sen. Dick, Press Release, Durbin, Rubio, Menendez,

Schumer Lead 24 Senators in Pressing President Trump to

Designate Venezuela for TPS (Mar. 7, 2019),

https://www.durbin.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/durbinrubio-menendez-schumer-lead-24-senators-in-pressing-presidenttrump-to-designate-venezuela-for-tps ................................................................... 19

Giménez, U.S. Rep. Carlos A. (@RepCarlos), X Post (Jan. 31, 2025),

https://x.com/RepCarlos/status/1885381441803923809........................................ 22

Giménez, U.S. Rep. Carlos A. (@RepCarlos), X Post (Mar. 26, 2024),

https://x.com/RepCarlos/status/1907840313743265910........................................ 22

Giménez, U.S. Rep. Carlos A., Press Release, Congressman Carlos

Giménez Sends Letter on TPS (Jan. 31, 2025),

https://gimenez.house.gov/2025/1/congressman-carlos-gimenezsends-letter-on-tps .................................................................................................. 22

H.R. 549, 116th Cong. (2019) ...................................................................................... 19

H.R. Rep. No. 100-627, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988) ................................................. 18

H.R. Rep. No. 244, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1 (1989) ............................................... 18

Price, Matthew E., Persecution Complex: Justifying Asylum Law’s

Preference for Persecuted People, 47 Harv. Int’l L.J. 413, 427 (2006) .................. 18

Rodriguez, Sabrina, Biden Administration Grants Venezuelans

Temporary Protected Status, Politico (Mar. 8, 2021),

https://www.politico.com/news/2021/03/08/biden-venezuelanstemporary-protected-status-474424 ...................................................................... 20

Rubio, U.S. Sen. Marco and U.S. Sen. Robert Menedez, Letter to U.S.

Department of Homeland Security (Mar. 31, 2022),

https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/menendez-rubioletter-to-dhs-re-venezuela-tps-april12022.pdf ................................................ 20, 22

Salazar, U.S. Rep. María Elvira (@RepMariaSalazar), X Post (Apr. 3,

2025), https://x.com/RepMariaSalazar/status/1907799660489822402 ................ 21

Salazar, U.S. Rep. María Elvira (@RepMariaSalazar), X Post (Feb. 15,

2025),

https://x.com/maelvirasalazar/status/1890816800075505748?s=46&t

=gKSaOrBBWYDpYJUIuMRvrA .......................................................................... 21

Salazar, U.S. Rep. María Elvira, Press Release, Reps. Salazar, Soto,

and Wasserman Schultz Introduce Legislation to Designate TPS for

Venezuelans (May 9, 2025), https://salazar.house.gov/media/pressreleases/reps-salazar-soto-and-wasserman-schultz-introducelegislation-designate-tps .................................................................................. 21, 22

Soto, U.S. Rep. Darren, Venezuela TPS Act Passes U.S. House of

Representatives (July 25, 2019), https://soto.house.gov/media/pressreleases/venezuela-tps-act-passes-us-house-representatives ............................... 20

Venezuela Travel Advisory, U.S. Department of State (May 12, 2025),

https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/traveladvisories/traveladvi

sories/venezuela-travel-advisory.html................................................................... 22

Interest of Amici Curiae1

Amici are 137 members of the One Hundred Nineteenth Congress, whose full

names and titles are listed in Appendix A. Many of the amici have served in the House

and Senate through the implementation of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) under

Democratic and Republican Administrations.

As members of Congress, amici have a strong and unique interest in ensuring

that the Executive Branch faithfully executes the laws Congress enacts and does not

usurp Congressional or Judicial authority. Amici offer their perspectives and

expertise to assist this Court in resolving questions related to statutory construction

and the scope of what Congress delegated to the Executive Branch in the TPS statute.

Amici include senators and congresspeople in whose states and districts Venezuelan

TPS holders live and work. Amici have a special interest in ensuring that the TPS

statute is faithfully followed because of the severe and substantial economic and

social impacts that the unlawful revocation of TPS for hundreds of thousands of

people would have on their districts and the communities they represent in Congress.

Introduction

Amici, as members of Congress, are keenly aware of the critical role that

separation of powers plays in our constitutional democracy as a means to safeguard

against the concentration of power within a single government branch. Separation of

powers requires that the Executive Branch not usurp Congress’s power to make laws;

1 No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no party or counsel for a party

made a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief. No person

other than amici curiae or its counsel made a monetary contribution to its preparation or submission.

it mandates that the Executive Branch not override the Judiciary’s power to declare

what the law is; and it obligates the Judiciary to not shy from its duty to prevent

Executive Branch overreach that upsets the carefully calibrated role each co-equal

branch plays in our constitutional democracy.

The Northern District of California and the Ninth Circuit properly determined

that the plain text of the TPS statute does not support the Secretary’s argument that

her actions are unreviewable. Nor does it support the Secretary’s actions with respect

to Venezuelan TPS. Instead, the Executive Branch’s interpretation of the TPS statute

essentially rewrites the statute to claim a power that Congress did not delegate to

the Executive Branch.

The Secretary’s actions not only violate the TPS statute but also contradict the

bipartisan opposition to terminating Venezuela TPS. Members of Congress on both

sides of the aisle have long supported temporary protected status for Venezuelans

who fled dangerous conditions in their country—conditions that persist today.

Amici Members of Congress join Respondents in urging the Court to deny the

Secretary’s application for a stay.

Argument

On September 5, 2025, the United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted partial summary judgment to Plaintiffs, setting aside: (1)

Secretary Noem’s vacatur of Venezuela’s TPS extension, and (2) Secretary Noem’s

decision to terminate Venezuela’s TPS status. (N.D. Cal., Dkt. 279 at p. 69). Shortly

after, the district court denied the Secretary’s request for a stay. Nat’l TPS All. v.

Noem, No. 25-CV-01766-EMC, 2025 WL 2617231, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2025).

The Ninth Circuit likewise denied a stay, concluding that the Secretary was unlikely

to succeed on the merits on appeal and that the balance of the equities favored Plaintiffs. Nat’l TPS All. v. Noem, No. 25-5724, 2025 WL 2661556, at *2 (9th Cir. Sept. 17,

2025).

In deciding whether to issue a stay, this Court considers: “(1) whether the applicant is likely to succeed on the merits, (2) whether it will suffer irreparable injury

without a stay, (3) whether the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceedings, and (4) where the public interest lies.” Ohio v. Env’t Prot.

Agency, 603 U.S. 279, 291 (2024) (citing Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009));

see also Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183, 190 (2010) (describing standard for a

stay). Amici Members of Congress join Plaintiffs in asking this Court to deny the

Executive Branch’s stay application.

The Executive Branch’s erroneous claim of “inherent” power to assert

its novel TPS interpretation usurps Congressional authority.

Although the power to vacate a TPS extension is not mentioned in the statute,

the Secretary contends that she “has inherent authority to vacate an extension . . . .”

(Sec.’s Stay App. at 19–22). But this claim of “inherent” power must be assessed

against the will of Congress. When the action taken—here by the Secretary—is

“incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, . . . [the Executive

Branch’s] power is at its lowest ebb.” Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343

U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).

Instead of granting unfettered authority, Congress enacted the TPS statutory

framework to limit the Executive Branch’s discretion in making decisions related to

temporary protected status, aiming to “replac[e]. . . ad hoc, haphazard regulations

and procedures.” 135 Cong. Rec. H7501 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1989) (statement of Rep.

Bill Richardson). Congress wanted to ensure that migrants are not “subject to the

vagaries of our domestic politics,” id. (statement of Rep. Sander Levin), and that

factors “other than purely political ramifications be considered when granting this

status to a nation’s people,” 133 Cong. Rec. (House) 21334 (1987) (statement of Rep.

Mario Biaggi).

The Executive Branch incorrectly interprets the TPS statute to grant itself a

power that is neither authorized by Congress nor consistent with the regulatory

structure that Congress enacted. And “[w]hen the separation of powers is at stake,”

this Court does not “just throw up [its] hands.” Gundy v. United States, 588 U.S. 128,

168 (2019) (Gorsuch, J. dissenting). This Court must continue to guard against the

Executive Branch’s attempt to rewrite the TPS statute under the guise of “inherent

authority.”

Contrary to any claim of “inherent power,” the Executive Branch does not have

the “power to revise clear statutory terms that turn out not to work in practice.”

Utility Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 327 (2014). As discussed below, the TPS

statute is clear: if a foreign state’s designation is terminated, such termination “shall

not be effective earlier than 60 days after the date the notice is published or, if later,

the expiration of the most previous extension under subparagraph (C).” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1254a(b)(3)(B). The Secretary cannot avoid that statutory scheme by granting itself

a new power to vacate an extension. See infra Part II. And only the Secretary’s

“determination[s]” as to designations, terminations, or extensions are excluded from

judicial review, 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(5)(A), not the question of statutory interpretation

implicated by the Secretary’s novel reading of the TPS statute. See infra Part II.A.

Allowing the Secretary to rewrite the TPS statute to expand her powers beyond

those granted by Congress “would deal a severe blow to the Constitution’s separation

of powers[,]” Utility Air, 573 U.S. at 327, and upend precedent governing the

Congress-Executive relationship that pre-dates the Civil War, see Morrill v. Jones,

106 U.S. 466, 424–25 (1883) (“The secretary of the treasury cannot by his regulations

alter or amend a revenue law. All he can do is regulate the mode of proceeding to

carry into effect what congress has enacted.”); United States v. Williamson, 90 U.S.

411, 416 (1874) (“It is not in the power of the executive department, or any branch of

it, to reduce the pay of an officer of the army. The regulation of the

compensation . . . belongs to the legislative department of the government.”).

Even this Court cannot “rewrite clear statutes”—such as the TPS statute—to

address “policy concerns.” Azar v. Allina Health Servs., 587 U.S. 566, 581 (2019).

Rather than act unilaterally, the executive “must take its complaints” to Congress.

Azar, 587 U.S. at 581.

II.

The Executive Branch intrudes further on congressional and judicial

power by contending, contrary to the TPS statute, that the Secretary’s

decision is unreviewable.

The Executive Branch argues that 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(5)(A) bars judicial

review of the Secretary’s vacatur of Venezuelan TPS. But as the district court, Nat’l

TPS All., 2025 WL 2578045, at *1, and the Ninth Circuit, Nat’l TPS All., 2025 WL

2661556, at *2, correctly concluded, that is incorrect. Instead, the Executive Branch’s

position further violates the separation of powers because it claims an authority to

prevent judicial review that was never granted to it by Congress.

“Congress expects courts to handle technical statutory questions.” Loper Bright

Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 402 (2024). “Courts interpret statutes, no matter

the context, based on the traditional tools of statutory construction, not individual

policy preferences.” Id. at 403. This Court “recognize[s] a ‘strong presumption in favor

of judicial review” in interpreting statutes, “including statutes that may limit or

preclude review.” Cuozzo Speed Techs. v. Com. for Intell. Prop., 579 U.S. 261, 273

(2016). This presumption may be overcome only “by ‘clear and convincing indications,

drawn from ‘specific language,’ ‘specific legislative history,’ and ‘inferences of intent

drawn from the statutory scheme as a whole,’ that Congress intended to bar review.’”

Id. (quoting Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 349–50 (1984)).

The crux of the Executive Branch’s argument is that the Secretary’s vacatur is

encompassed in the determination of whether to extend a designation, such that

judicial review of its interpretation of the TPS statute is barred. But that tautology

presumes the answer to the question at hand: namely, does the TPS statute allow the

Secretary to vacate a previous determination to extend a designation? That

question—apart from any particular “determination” of a designation, termination,

or extension—is one of statutory construction. It therefore falls within the province

of judicial review. Proper analysis of a statute must defer to principles of statutory

construction, including legislative intent, not the self-serving interpretation of an

Executive Branch officer.

The plain language of Section 1254a(b)(5)(A) does not bar judicial

review of the Secretary’s vacatur.

Section 1254a(b)(5)(A) states, “There is no judicial review of any determination

of the [Secretary] with respect to the designation, or termination or extension of a

designation, of a foreign state.” 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(5)(A). The Executive Branch

argues that the statute unambiguously gives the Secretary unreviewable authority

such that her decision to vacate the 2023 Designation extension is unreviewable.

But Congress drafted the bar on judicial review narrowly. First, the word

“vacatur” was excluded from the types of determinations the Secretary makes,

indicating that the Secretary’s vacatur is outside of the scope of Section

1254a(b)(5)(A). Cf. Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intel. & Coordination Unit,

507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993) (applying the principle of expressio unius est exclusion

alterius or expression of one is the exclusion of the other).

Second, the Executive Branch has asserted that the word “any” has an

expansive meaning and captures “determinations of whatever kind.” This argument

ignores the principle that courts “must give effect to every word of a statute wherever

possible,” Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 12 (2004) (emphasis added), and ignores that

“any” will mean “different things depending on the setting,” Nixon v. Missouri Mun.

League, 541 U.S. 125, 132 (2004). Here, Congress expressly included a qualification:

“with

respect

designations,

terminations

extensions.”

U.S.C.

§ 1254a(b)(5)(A). These are categorical limitations—the statute does not extend to

“determinations of whatever kind,” but rather any determinations to designate,

terminate or extend TPS. Any other interpretation renders the remaining words of

Section 1254a(b)(5)(A) superfluous. See, e.g., TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31

(2001) (“[It is] a cardinal principle of statutory construction that a statute ought, upon

the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word

shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.”).

Third, the phrase “with respect to” does not have the “broadening effect” that

the Executive Branch asserts. “[T]he words of a statute must be read in their context

and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme,” Davis v. Michigan

Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989). Here, the subject of “with respect to” is

“any determination” of a “designation, or termination or extension of a designation.”

8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(5)(A). But the Executive Branch wants to extend the bar on

judicial review to whether the TPS statute includes the unenumerated action,

“vacate,” not to matters relating to the determination of designation, termination, or

extension. Accepting the Executive Branch’s interpretation of “with respect to” means

that Congress’s qualification of “any determination” would necessarily submit to the

whims of whatever the Executive Branch says is encompassed by the text of the

statute. Cf. United States v. Miller, 145 S. Ct. 839, 853 (2025) (rejecting a broad

reading of “with respect to” when doing so defied the principle “that sovereignimmunity waiver must be construed narrowly”).

Finally, a narrow reading of Section 1254a(b)(5)(A) to allow limited judicial

review is consistent with the understanding that “Congress acts intentionally and

purposely.” Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983). If Congress intended to

limit judicial review in all instances, Congress could “easily have used broader

statutory language.” McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479, 494 (1991)

(holding 8 U.S.C. § 1160(e)(1) barred judicial review only to “direct review of

individual denials of SAW status” and not collateral challenges to unconstitutional

practices); see also Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 53–56 (1993)

(finding 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(f) only barred judicial review of “the denial of an individual

application” while broader challenges not tied to such denials were not barred from

judicial review); cf. Ramos v. Wolf, 975 F.3d 872, 888–92 (9th Cir. 2020), aff’g, Ramos

v. Nielsen, 321 F. Supp. 3d 1083 (N.D. Cal. 2018), vacated, 59 F.4th 1010 (9th Cir.

2023) (agreeing with lower court that section 1254a(b)(5)(A) only barred judicial

review of inquiries “into the underlying considerations and reasoning employed by

the Secretary in reaching her country-specific TPS determinations” but challenges

to unconstitutional practices and policies considered collateral were reviewable).

Because the plain reading of Section 1254a(b)(5)(A) supports a narrow interpretation,

the Court is not barred from reviewing the Secretary’s vacatur of the 2023

Designation extension.

Legislative history supports a narrow interpretation of the bar

on judicial review.

Beyond the statutory text, a narrow interpretation of Section 1254a(b)(5)(A) is

supported by this Court’s “well-settled” and “strong presumption” favoring judicial

review of administrative actions. McNary, 498 U.S. at 496. This Court has long held

that “when a statutory provision is reasonably susceptible to divergent

interpretation, we adopt the reading that accords with traditional understandings

and basic principles: that executive determinations generally are subject to judicial

review.” Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 U.S. 221, 229 (2020) (citing Kucana v.

Holder, 558 U.S. 233, 251 (2010)) (internal quotations marks omitted). This

presumption can only be overcome by “clear and convincing evidence” of congressional

intent to preclude judicial review. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967).

Despite the Executive Branch’s argument that it has long exercised inherent

authority in this arena, Congress expressly enacted TPS to address prior concerns

about the lack of criteria guiding the Executive Branch and the lack of transparency

in the then-existing ad hoc process. Although Congress recognized the Executive

Branch’s unique role in matters of foreign policy, it understood that the Executive

Branch could not have unfettered discretion in TPS determinations. As

Representative Richardson explained in discussion over a predecessor safe haven bill

in 1989, the goal was to “establish an orderly, systematic procedure for providing

temporary protected status for nationals of countries undergoing civil war or extreme

tragedy, because we need to replace the current ad hoc, haphazard regulations and

procedures that exist today.” 135 Cong. Rec. H7501 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1989)

(statement of Rep. Bill Richardson). The Executive Branch’s position amounts to an

assertion that Congress created a detailed statutory scheme but then eliminated any

mechanism to ensure the process was followed.

That is not the best reading of either the text or the relevant history. Instead,

in Section 1254a(b)(5)(A) Congress preserved the Secretary’s authority in matters

uniquely within her purview while preserving judicial review on procedural issues

arising under the TPS statute. Section 1254a(b)(5)(A) only bars judicial review of the

Secretary’s specific “determination” to designate, extend, or terminate designation of

a particular foreign state based on the enumerated statutory framework. But

acknowledgment of Executive authority in one respect does not equal an abdication

of judicial authority in all.

Where “Congress has made its intent clear, the Court must give effect to that

intent.” Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 328 (2000). Barring judicial review of the

Secretary’s vacatur ignores the congressional intent behind creating the TPS statute

in the first place: to eliminate ad hoc designations and ensure the Executive follows

a statutorily prescribed procedure. Because there are no “‘clear and convincing

indications, drawn from ‘specific language,’ ‘specific legislative history,’ and

‘inferences of intent drawn from the statutory scheme as a whole,’ that Congress

intended to bar review,’” the presumption favoring judicial review controls. Cuozzo

Speed Techs., 579 U.S. at 273.

III.

The TPS statute does not allow for vacatur.

The plain language of the TPS statute does not authorize the

Secretary to vacate designations or extensions of designations.

“Statutory interpretation must ‘begi[n] with,’ and ultimately heed, what a

statute actually says.” Groff v. DeJoy, 600 U.S. 447, 468 (2023) (quoting Nat’l Assn.

of Mfrs. v. Dep’t of Def., 583 U.S. 109, 127 (2018)). This Court “must presume that

[the] legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says

there.” Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 357 (2005) (quoting Conn. Nat’l Bank v.

Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

“Federal agencies are creatures of statute. They possess only those powers that

Congress confers upon them.” Judge Rotenberg Educ. Ctr., Inc. v. FDA, 3 F.4th 390,

399 (D.C. Cir. 2021). Where, as here, there exists a question requiring statutory

interpretation, “as in any field of statutory interpretation, it is [the Court’s] duty to

respect not only what Congress wrote but, as importantly, what it didn’t write.”

Virginia Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 587 U.S. 761, 765 (2019) (emphasis added).

Here, the plain text and purpose of the TPS statute demonstrates that

Congress did not authorize the Secretary to vacate an already-granted TPS extension

or designation. The TPS statute describes a detailed process and time frame for the

Secretary to implement designations, extensions, and terminations. It says nothing,

however, about vacatur of extensions or designations that have already been granted.

Even though the statute says nothing of vacatur, the Executive Branch argues

that the Secretary has “inherent authority” to reconsider past decisions. Although it

is true that administrative agencies possess “some” inherent authority to revisit their

prior decisions, this argument oversimplifies the law and fails to recognize that “any

inherent reconsideration authority does not apply in cases where Congress has

spoken.” Ivy Sports Med., LLC v. Burwell, 767 F.3d 81, 86 (D.C. Cir. 2014).

Careful review of the Immigration and Nationality Act’s (“INA”) statutory

framework belies any argument that the TPS statute impliedly authorizes the

Secretary to vacate prior designations and extensions. The TPS statute meticulously

describes how the Secretary may designate, extend, and terminate temporary

protected status, when such determinations take effect, and provides specific time

periods that apply to each. For example, an initial designation “take[s] effect upon

the date of publication of the designation” and “shall remain in effect until the

effective date of the termination of the designation.” 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(2).

The TPS statute is similarly prescriptive with respect to extensions and

terminations. “At least 60 days before the end of the initial period of designation, and

any extended period of designation,” the Secretary “after consultation with

appropriate agencies of the Government, shall review the conditions in the foreign

state . . . and shall determine whether the conditions for such designation under this

subsection continue to be met.” 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(3)(A). The Secretary must

“provide on a timely basis for the publication of notice of such determination . . . in

the Federal Register.” Id. If the Secretary determines “that a foreign state . . . no

longer continues to meet the conditions for designation,” the Secretary “shall

terminate the designation by publishing a notice in the Federal Register.” Id.

§ 1254a(b)(3)(B). Without such a determination, the designation “is extended.” Id.

§ 1254a(b)(3)(A) & (C) (emphasis added). Extensions take effect immediately, and last

for the length of time specified in the notice, up to 18 months. Id.

In contrast, a termination “shall not be effective earlier than 60 days after the

date the notice is published or, if later, the expiration of the most recent

previous extension.” Id. § 1254a(b)(3)(B) (emphasis added). Against this backdrop,

the Executive Branch’s claim that Secretary Noem had inherent authority to vacate

the extension of the 2023 Designation is plainly at odds with this statutory

framework. As noted, the statute expressly provides that termination of the TPS

designation cannot occur earlier than the expiration of the “most recent previous

extension”—that is, the 18-month extension that former Secretary Mayorkas granted

on January 17, 2025.

Although the Executive Branch complains that former Secretary Mayorkas

extended the 2023 Designation before the statute required action, nothing in the TPS

statute requires the Secretary to wait until the last second to review and grant

extensions. Indeed, to the extent the Secretary seeks to extend an expiring

designation extension, the TPS statute requires the Secretary to act “[a]t least 60

days before end of the initial period of designation, and any extended period of

designation.” 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(3)(a) (emphasis added). That is, while the TPS

statute sets the minimum amount of time before the expiration of a designation or

extension to act (at least 60 days), it does not dictate how far in advance the Secretary

may act. Secretary Noem’s vacatur thus operates as an end-run around the statutory

framework adopted by Congress because it effectively terminates a designation before

its “most recent previous extension” in violation of the TPS statute.

The lack of implied or inherent authority to vacate TPS designations or

extensions is further confirmed by the language that Congress used to grant the

Secretary revocation authority elsewhere in the INA. “Where Congress includes

particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the

same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in

the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” Russello, 464 U.S. at 23 (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted); see also Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168.

Other sections of the INA demonstrate that Congress granted the Secretary

the authority to revisit and revoke prior approvals in more narrow circumstances.

Under 8 U.S.C. § 1155, the Secretary “may, at any time, for what he deems to be good

and sufficient cause, revoke the approval of any petition approved by him under

section 1154 of this title.” 8 U.S.C.A. § 1155. Congress could have, but did not, include

similar language in the TPS statute. Exclusion of similar language in the TPS statute

evinces Congress’s intent to limit the Secretary’s ability to revoke or vacate a prior

approval outside of the termination procedure prescribed by Section 1254a(b)(3)(B).

Congress created the TPS statutory framework to limit the

Executive Branch from making arbitrary decisions and shield

TPS from domestic politics.

The TPS statute’s prohibition against the type of ad hoc vacatur attempted by

Secretary Noem is further supported by the legislative history leading up to the TPS

statute’s passage. As discussed above, Congress’s rationale behind passing TPS was

to eliminate the Executive Branch’s prior practice of granting humanitarian

protection on an ad hoc basis through the practice of “extended voluntary departure.”

See supra (discussing statement of Rep. Bill Richardson); see also 136 Cong. Rec.

(House) 8686 (statement of Rep. Mary Rose Oakar) (“An orderly, systematic

procedure for providing temporary protected status for nationals of countries

undergoing war, civil war, or other extreme tragedy is needed to replace the current

ad hoc haphazard procedure.”). Specifically, Congress recognized the need to

regularize the process of awarding humanitarian protection based on enumerated

criteria to protect the decision from political pressures.

As is evident from the legislative history of the TPS statute, Congress

anticipated the current political situation, where the current Secretary seeks to

vacate TPS for a class of Venezuelan migrants even though the previous Secretary

found, following the statutory framework of the TPS statute, that extending the

designation of Venezuela was warranted. Venezuelans covered by the TPS extension

are thus subject to the changing political winds and arbitrary action by the Executive

Branch. This is precisely what Congress sought to avoid by passing the TPS statute.

For example, Representative Levin stated, “Perhaps the most important aspect

of this bill is that it will standardize the procedure for granting temporary stays of

deportation. Refugees, spawned by the sad and tragic forces of warfare, should not

be subject to the vagaries of our domestic politics as well. . . . Our recent

domestic political squabble over the relative merits of Salvadorans and Nicaraguans

as political refugees should never be repeated.” 135 Cong. Rec. H7501 (daily ed. Oct.

25, 1989) (statement of Rep. Sander Levin) (emphasis added). Similarly,

Representative Brennan warned that the prior process of “extended voluntary

departure” potentially sent migrants “mixed messages which result from a vague or

arbitrary policy.” 135 Cong. Rec. H7501 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1989) (statement of Rep.

Joseph Brennan).

These contemporaneous statements of various members of Congress reflect

clear legislative intent to constrain executive discretion and replace the prior practice

of providing nationality-based humanitarian protection on an ad hoc and opaque

basis. The Executive Branch asks this Court to defer to its judgment and allow it to

reinterpret the TPS statute in a way that will effectively negate it and return to the

pre-TPS era. In the Secretary’s view, the outcome of the last election justifies her

ability to vacate her predecessor’s extension decision, which if upheld, would result

in the immediate termination of TPS for the approximately 472,000 individuals

previously subject to the 2023 Designation. See 88 Fed. Reg. 68130, 68134 (Oct. 3,

2023). Overnight, these individuals’ lives would be completely upended. That is

precisely the kind of “haphazard” process the TPS statute was designed to prevent

from occurring to individuals deserving of humanitarian protection.

Congress intended TPS status to fill gaps in immigration law

where asylum would not provide adequate protections.

The Executive Branch also suggests respondents have not established

irreparable harm because they may apply for asylum if they are afraid to return to

Venezuela. This assertion also contravenes Congress’s intent in passing the TPS

statute. Congress specifically designed TPS to provide a statutory framework

allowing relief to individuals facing serious but generalized forms of harm as opposed

to the targeted persecution necessary to receive asylum.

The Refugee Act of 1980 allows asylum seekers to receive limited immigration

benefits on a case-by-case basis. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). Asylum applicants bear

the burden of showing that they meet the definition of “refugee” under the INA. Id.

§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii). The INA defines refugee as any person outside of their country of

origin “who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail

himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a wellfounded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a

particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).

To establish a well-founded fear of persecution, asylum applicants must

demonstrate that they face both a subjective and objective fear of returning to their

country of origin. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 430−31 (1987).

Analyzing persecution is highly fact-dependent and generally only includes

individuals who can demonstrate individualized and targeted persecution. See

generally Matthew E. Price, Persecution Complex: Justifying Asylum Law’s Preference

for Persecuted People, 47 Harv. Int’l L.J. 413, 427 (2006); Peter C. Diamond,

Temporary Protected Status Under the Immigration Act of 1990, 28 Willamette L.

Rev. 857, 861 (1992). Thus, individuals who face generalized forms of harm—no

matter how life-threatening—would not qualify for asylum. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No.

100-627, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. at 5 (1988).

In response, Congress created the TPS program to provide temporary

protection to individuals unable to return to their country of origin because of ongoing

armed conflict, natural disaster, or other extraordinary circumstances. 8 U.S.C.

§ 1254a. The drafters of the TPS statute recognized that “not everyone who needs

protection meets the strict standard of asylum.” See 136 Cong. Rec. (House) 8686

(statement of Rep. William H. Gray).

In fact, Congress noted that despite the severe conditions in El Salvador at the

time, the asylum approval rate for Salvadorans averaged less than five percent. H.R.

Rep. No. 244, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1, at 11 (1989). Congress therefore intended

the TPS statute to “fill[] an important gap in our immigration and refugee laws.” 135

Cong. Rec. H7501 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1989) (statement of Rep. Hamilton Fish).

The Secretary’s improper vacatur of Respondents’ TPS status causes them to

suffer irreparable harm despite the potential availability of asylum (or other relief)

that may be presented under the immigration laws. Vacatur of Respondents’ TPS

status defies both the letter and the well-established legislative intent behind Section

1254a. Asylum (or other relief) cannot negate the irreparable harm by the Secretary

reopening a “gap” in the immigration laws that Congress sought to fill.

IV.

Venezuela TPS has long enjoyed bipartisan congressional support.

Members on both sides of the Congressional aisle have long recognized the on-

going interest in maintaining the Venezuela TPS designation. On March 7, 2019, for

example, then-Senator Marco Rubio, alongside Senators Durbin, Menendez, and

Schumer, led a bipartisan group of 24 senators urging President Trump to designate

Venezuela for Temporary Protected Status, highlighting the country’s deteriorating

security and humanitarian conditions.2

Not long afterward, on July 25, 2019, the U.S. House of Representatives passed

H.R. 549, the Venezuela TPS Act of 2019. See H.R. 549, 116th Cong. (2019). Rep.

Mario Diaz-Balart commented, “Today, the House of Representatives was able to

gather the strong, bipartisan support needed to pass [the Act which would grant]

2 Press Release, U.S. Sen. Dick Durbin, Durbin, Rubio, Menendez, Schumer Lead 24 Senators in

Pressing President Trump to Designate Venezuela for TPS (Mar. 7, 2019), https://www.durbin.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/durbin-rubio-menendez-schumer-lead-24-senators-in-pressing-president-trump-to-designate-venezuela-for-tps.

temporary protected status in the United States until it is safe for them to return to

Venezuela.”3 Unfortunately, despite several efforts, the Senate was unable to pass

the Act, and it was left to President Trump on his last day in office to provide temporary legal status through a different pathway, the Deferred Enforced Departure program. Memorandum on Deferred Enforced Departure for Certain Venezuelans, 86

Fed. Reg. 6845 (Jan. 19, 2021).

In March 2021, the Department of Homeland Security granted TPS eligibility

to Venezuelans. This grant received bipartisan acclaim, including from then-Senator

Rubio, who underscored that it was President Trump who had first offered Venezuelans protection from deportation. Then-Senator Rubio further stated he was “glad the

Biden administration share[d] that commitment” to Venezuelans.4 Along with thenSenator Bob Menendez, in March 2022 then-Senator Rubio urged Secretary Mayorkas to “redesignate Venezuela for Temporary Protected Status,” explaining that

“[e]xtending this designation is absolutely essential for eligible Venezuelans currently in the United States who are unable to return to their homeland due to the

dire conditions in that country.”5

3 Press Release, U.S. Rep. Darren Soto, Venezuela TPS Act Passes U.S. House of Representatives

(July 25, 2019), https://soto.house.gov/media/press-releases/venezuela-tps-act-passes-us-house-representatives.

4 Sabrina Rodriguez, Biden Administration Grants Venezuelans Temporary Protected Status, Politico (Mar. 8, 2021), https://www.politico.com/news/2021/03/08/biden-venezuelans-temporary-protectedstatus-474424.

5 U.S. Sen. Marco Rubio and U.S. Sen. Robert Menedez, Letter to U.S. Department of Homeland

Security (Mar. 31, 2022), https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/menendez-rubio-letter-to-dhsre-venezuela-tps-april12022.pdf.

Since then, members of Congress from both sides of the aisle have continued

to support Venezuela TPS and the communities in this country where many Venezuelans have found temporary refuge.6 Shortly after President Trump took office in

January 2025, three Republican representatives from Florida, Representatives Mario

Díaz-Balart (FL-26), Carlos A. Giménez (FL-28), and María Elvira Salazar (FL-27),

released a joint statement in support of Venezuela TPS, observing that, as a result of

the TPS designation, “many Venezuelans have arrived in our country and have integrated into our communities, respecting our laws and contributing to the prosperity

of our great country.”7

That support has continued during this litigation. Following the Northern District of California’s March 31, 2025, order postponing Secretary Noem’s attempted

vacatur of Venezuela TPS, Representative Salazar posted about the Secretary’s preliminary loss on X: “GREAT NEWS! @DHSgov and @SecNoem will be extending TPS

status for Venezuelans for another 18 months. I’ve led the fight on this and been

asking for MONTHS! Thank you to the Administration for doing the right thing.”8

After this Court’s May 21, 2025, ruling on the Secretary’s first stay application,

Representatives Díaz-Balart, Giménez, and Salazar issued another joint statement

6 E.g., Press Release, U.S. Rep. María Elvira Salazar, Reps. Salazar, Soto, and Wasserman Schultz

Introduce Legislation to Designate TPS for Venezuelans (May 9, 2025), https://salazar.house.gov/media/press-releases/reps-salazar-soto-and-wasserman-schultz-introduce-legislation-designate-tps.

7 Press Release, U.S. Rep. Mario Díaz-Balart, English/Español: Díaz-Balart, Giménez, and Salazar

Stand in Solidarity with the Venezuelan People (Jan.29, 2925), https://mariodiazbalart.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/englishespanol-diaz-balart-gimenez-and-salazar-stand-solidarity.

8 U.S. Rep. María Elvira Salazar (@RepMariaSalazar), X Post (Apr. 3, 2025), https://x.com/RepMariaSalazar/status/1907799660489822402; see also U.S. Rep. María Elvira Salazar (@RepMariaSalazar),

X Post (Feb. 15, 2025), https://x.com/maelvirasalazar/status/1890816800075505748?s=46&t=gKSaOrBBWYDpYJUIuMRvrA.

in support of Venezuela TPS, emphasizing that they “will continue . . . working with

the Trump administration on a permanent solution.”9 Rep. Giménez has even written

directly to Secretary Noem “to address the urgent situation regarding the decision to

end the Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for roughly 600,000 Venezuelans living

here in the United States,” urging the Trump Administration to find a solution.10 And

in May 2025, a bipartisan group of members of the House of Representatives introduced the Venezuela TPS Act of 2025, which proposed to designate TPS for Venezuelans to “protect approximately 600,000 Venezuelans in the United States from deportation.”11

This bipartisan support is so strong because not much has changed in Venezuela since then-Senator Rubio wrote in March 2022, that extending Venezuela TPS

was “absolutely essential . . . due to the dire conditions” there.12 As of May 12, 2025,

the State Department’s Level 4: Do not Travel warning for Venezuela states: “Do not

travel to or remain in Venezuela due to the high risk of wrongful detention, torture

in detention, terrorism, kidnapping, arbitrary enforcement of local laws, crime, civil

unrest, and poor health infrastructure.”13

9 Press Release, U.S. Rep. Mario Díaz-Balart, Díaz-Balart, Giménez, and Salazar Statement on

SCOTUS Ruling on TPS for Venezuelans (May 21, 2025), https://mariodiazbalart.house.gov/mediacenter/press-releases/diaz-balart-gimenez-and-salazar-statement-scotus-ruling-tps-venezuelans.

10 Press Release, U.S. Rep. Carlos A. Giménez, Congressman Carlos Giménez Sends Letter on TPS

(Jan. 31, 2025), https://gimenez.house.gov/2025/1/congressman-carlos-gimenez-sends-letter-on-tps;

see also U.S. Rep. Carlos A. Giménez (@RepCarlos), X Post (Mar. 26, 2024), https://x.com/RepCarlos/status/1907840313743265910; U.S. Rep. Carlos A. Giménez (@RepCarlos), X Post (Jan. 31, 2025),

https://x.com/RepCarlos/status/1885381441803923809.

11 Salazar, supra n.6.

12 Rubio, supra at n.5.

13 Venezuela Travel Advisory, U.S. Department of State (May 12, 2025), https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/traveladvisories/traveladvisories/venezuela-travel-advisory.html.

Amici Members of Congress have a strong interest not only in preserving the

benefits that Venezuela TPS affords their constituents’ communities but also in protecting the designation and termination process that is enshrined in the TPS statute

and that guards against the type of arbitrary and political vacatur that took place

here. Amici urge this Court to deny the Secretary’s stay application.

Conclusion

Amici Members of Congress ask this Court to deny the Executive Branch’s

request for a stay.

September 29, 2025

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Robert S. Chang

Robert S. Chang

Counsel of Record

Shaleen Shanbhag

FRED T. KOREMATSU CENTER FOR LAW

AND EQUALITY

UC IRVINE SCHOOL OF LAW

401 E. Peltason Drive

Irvine, CA 92697

(949) 824-3034

rchang@law.uci.edu

Rose Cuison-Villazor

CENTER FOR IMMIGRANT JUSTICE

RUTGERS LAW SCHOOL

123 Washington Street

Newark, NJ 07102

(973) 353-3159

rose.villazor@law.rutgers.edu

Stephen J. van Stempvoort

Amanda L. Rauh-Bieri

MILLER JOHNSON

45 Ottawa Avenue SW, Suite 1100

Grand Rapids, MI 49503

(616) 831-1700

vanstempvoorts@millerjohnson.com

rauhbieria@millerjohnson.com

Counsel for Amici Curiae

Appendix: List of Amici Curiae

Debbie Wasserman Schultz

Representative of Florida

Chris Van Hollen

Senator for Maryland

Jamie Raskin

Representative of Maryland

Angela Alsobrooks

Senator for Maryland

Bennie G. Thompson

Representative of Mississippi

Cory Booker

Senator for New Jersey

Robert Garcia

Representative of California

Catherine Cortez Masto

Senator for Nevada

Gregory W. Meeks

Representative of New York

Tammy Duckworth

Senator for Illinois

Richard Neal

Representative of Massachusetts

Tim Kaine

Senator for Virginia

Maxine Waters

Representative of California

Edward J. Markey

Senator for Massachusetts

Frank Pallone Jr.

Representative of New Jersey

Alex Padilla

Senator for California

James P. McGovern

Representative of Massachusetts

Jack Reed

Senator for Rhode Island

Nydia M. Velázquez

Representative of New York

Jacky Rosen

Senator for Nevada

Jared Huffman

Representative of California

Jeanne Shaheen

Senator for New Hampshire

Zoe Lofgren

Representative of California

Mark R. Warner

Senator for Virginia

Mark Takano

Representative of California

Elizabeth Warren

Senator for Massachusetts

Yvette D. Clarke

Representative of New York

Ron Wyden

Senator for Oregon

Grace Meng

Representative of New York

Adriano Espaillat

Representative of New York

Greg Casar

Representative of Texas

Brad Schneider

Representative of Illinois

Kelly Morrison

Representative of Minnesota

Gabe Amo

Representative of Rhode Island

A-1

Yassamin Ansari

Representative of Arizona

Becca Balint

Representative of Vermont

Nanette Barragán

Representative of California

Wesley Bell

Representative of Missouri

Don Beyer

Representative of Virginia

Suzanne Bonamici

Representative of Oregon

Shontel M. Brown

Representative of Ohio

Julia Brownley

Representative of California

Janelle Bynum

Representative of Oregon

Andre’ Carson

Representative of Indiana

Troy A. Carter, Sr.

Representative of Louisiana

Sean Casten

Representative of Illinois

Kathy Castor

Representative of Florida

Joaquin Castro

Representative of Texas

Sheila Cherfilus-McCormick

Representative of Florida

Judy Chu

Representative of California

Emanuel Cleaver

Representative of Missouri

Steve Cohen

Representative of Tennessee

Herb Conaway

Representative of New Jersey

J. Luis Correa

Representative of California

Jasmine Crockett

Representative of Texas

Danny Davis

Representative of Illinois

Madeleine Dean

Representative of Pennsylvania

Diana DeGette

Representative of Colorado

Suzan DelBene

Representative of Washington

Mark DeSaulnier

Representative of California

Maxine Dexter

Representative of Oregon

Lloyd Doggett

Representative of Texas

Sarah Elfreth

Representative of Maryland

Veronica Escobar

Representative of Texas

Dwight Evans

Representative of Pennsylvania

Cleo Fields

Representative of Louisiana

Lizzie Fletcher

Representative of Texas

Lois Frankel

Representative of Florida

Laura Friedman

Representative of California

Maxwell Alejandro Frost

Representative of Florida

A-2

Jesús G. “Chuy” García

Representative of Illinois

Sylvia R. Garcia

Representative of Texas

Daniel S. Goldman

Representative of New York

Jimmy Gomez

Representative of California

Josh Gottheimer

Representative of New Jersey

Al Green

Representative of Texas

Jahana Hayes

Representative of Connecticut

Glenn Ivey

Representative of Maryland

Jonathan L. Jackson

Representative of Illinois

Sara Jacobs

Representative of California

Pramila Jayapal

Representative of Washington

Henry C. “Hank” Johnson, Jr.

Representative of Georgia

Julie Johnson

Representative of Texas

Sydney Kamlager-Dove

Representative of California

William Keating

Representative of Massachusetts

Robin L. Kelly

Representative of Illinois

Ro Khanna

Representative of California

Raja Krishnamoorthi

Representative of Illinois

Greg Landsman

Representative of Ohio

John B. Larson

Representative of Connecticut

Summer L. Lee

Representative of Pennsylvania

Susie Lee

Representative of Nevada

Sam Liccardo

Representative of California

Stephen F. Lynch

Representative of Massachusetts

Sarah McBride

Representative of Delaware

April McClain Delaney

Representative of Maryland

Jennifer L. McClellan

Representative of Virginia

Betty McCollum

Representative of Minnesota

Kristen McDonald Rivet

Representative of Michigan

LaMonica McIver

Representative of New Jersey

Rob Menendez

Representative of New Jersey

Kweisi Mfume

Representative of Maryland

Dave Min

Representative of California

Jared Moskowitz

Representative of Florida

Seth Moulton

Massachusetts

Jerrold Nadler

Representative of New York

A-3

Eleanor Holmes Norton

Representative of the District of Columbia

Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez

Representative of New York

Brittany Pettersen

Representative of Colorado

Chellie Pingree

Representative of Maine

Stacey E. Plaskett

Representative of the U.S. Virgin Islands

Nellie Pou

Representative of New Jersey

Mike Quigley

Representative of Illinois

Delia C. Ramirez

Representative of Illinois

Emily Randall

Representative of Washington

Luz Rivas

Representative of California

Raul Ruiz

Representative of California

Andrea Salinas

Representative of Oregon

Mary Gay Scanlon

Representative of Pennsylvania

Jan Schakowsky

Representative of Illinois

Terri A. Sewell

Representative of Alabama

Lateefah Simon

Representative of California

Darren Soto

Representative of Florida

Melanie Stansbury

Representative of New Mexico

Marilyn Strickland

Representative of Washington

Suhas Subramanyam

Representative of Virginia

Tom Suozzi

Representative of New York

Shri Thanedar

Representative of Michigan

Dina Titus

Representative of Nevada

Rashida Tlaib

Representative of Michigan

Paul Tonko

Representative of New York

Lori Trahan

Representative of Massachusetts

Juan Vargas

Representative of California

James Walkinshaw

Representative of Virginia

Bonnie Watson Coleman

Representative of New Jersey

Nikema Williams

Representative of Georgia

Frederica S. Wilson

Representative of Florida

A-4

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.