Amicus Curiae Brief — Wes Allen, Alabama Secretary of State, et al., Applicants v. Bobby Singleton, et al.

Nos. 25A1314, 25A1315, and 25A1316

In the Supreme Court of the United States

───────────

WES ALLEN, APPLICANT

v.

EVAN MILLIGAN, ET AL.

───────────

WES ALLEN, APPLICANT

v.

BOBBY SINGLETON, ET AL.

───────────

WES ALLEN, APPLICANT

v.

MARCUS CASTER, ET AL.

───────────

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES AS AMICUS CURIAE

IN SUPPORT OF APPLICANT

───────────

D. JOHN SAUER

Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530-0001

SupremeCtBriefs@usdoj.gov

(202) 514-2217

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Interest of the United States ......................................................................................... 1

Introduction and summary of argument ...................................................................... 2

Statement ....................................................................................................................... 5

Argument ..................................................................................................................... 11

A.

The district court flouted Callais in concluding that Alabama’s

decision to use the 2023 map was intentionally discriminatory .......... 12

1.

The district court failed to disentangle race and

partisanship ................................................................................. 14

2.

Even setting aside partisanship, the district court

improperly subordinated the State’s race-neutral

districting principles.................................................................... 17

B.

The district court’s Section 2 holding is irreconcilable with

Callais ..................................................................................................... 20

C.

The district court violated the Purcell principle ................................... 23

Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 27

(i)

In the Supreme Court of the United States

───────────

No. 25A1314

WES ALLEN, APPLICANT

v.

EVAN MILLIGAN, ET AL.

───────────

No. 25A1315

WES ALLEN, APPLICANT

v.

BOBBY SINGLETON, ET AL.

───────────

NO. 25A1316

WES ALLEN, APPLICANT

v.

MARCUS CASTER, ET AL.

───────────

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES AS AMICUS CURIAE

IN SUPPORT OF APPLICANT

───────────

INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES

The Solicitor General, on behalf of the United States, respectfully submits this

brief as amicus curiae in support of the applications for a stay of the May 26, 2026,

order of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama. On

May 11, 2026, this Court vacated the district court’s prior order enjoining Alabama’s

2023 congressional map and remanded for further consideration in light of Louisiana

(1)

2

v. Callais, 146 S. Ct. 1131 (2026). The district court promptly reinstated its preCallais injunction, holding that Alabama’s 2023 map reflects intentional discrimination and violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 52 U.S.C. 10301, despite

the legislature’s effective ratification of that map post-Callais. The United States has

a strong interest in protecting its citizens from court-ordered racial gerrymanders

and in ensuring that federal courts do not erroneously interfere with federal elections

or usurp the constitutional primacy of the States in drawing congressional districts.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

“[S]everal States have in recent months redrawn their congressional districts

in ways that are predicted to favor the State’s dominant political party.” Abbott v.

League of United Latin American Citizens, 146 S. Ct. 418, 419 (2025) (LULAC). But

Alabama was stuck on the sidelines because, in 2025, the district court enjoined Alabama’s 2023 congressional plan—which would have favored Republicans 6-1—and

ordered Alabama to use a court-drawn plan that added a second district favoring

black Democrats. See Singleton v. Allen, 782 F. Supp. 3d 1092 (N.D. Ala. 2025) (Singleton III ), vacated sub nom. Allen v. Caster, No. 25-243 (May 11, 2026); Milligan v.

Allen, No. 21-cv-1530, 2025 WL 2451498 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 7, 2025).

After this Court in Louisiana v. Callais, 146 S. Ct. 1131 (2026), corrected a

misinterpretation of Section 2 that had resulted in such judicial racial gerrymanders,

Alabama joined the fray by asking this Court to expedite its consideration of the

State’s pending request to vacate the district court’s injunction and by authorizing

the Governor to call a special primary election using the 2023 map if this Court

granted that request. This Court then vacated and remanded for further consideration in light of Callais, Allen v. Caster, No. 25-243 (May 11, 2026), and the Governor

called a special election for August 11 using the now-operative 2023 map.

3

On remand, however, the district court promptly reinstated its pre-Callais injunction largely based on its pre-Callais reasoning. The court held that Alabama had

engaged in intentional discrimination by declining to draw a second black opportunity

district that the court had earlier suggested was a required remedy for a Section 2

violation. And the court again held that Alabama had violated Section 2. Those holdings were wrong even before Callais and are indefensible after it.

With respect to intentional discrimination, the district court paid only lip service to its obligations to “disentangle race and politics” and to begin “with a presumption that the legislature acted in good faith.” Alexander v. South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP, 602 U.S. 1, 6 (2024). The court disregarded Alabama’s indisputably partisan aims when the 2026 legislature chose to use the 2023 map for the

upcoming midterms and when the 2023 legislature pursued incumbency protection.

The district court instead concluded that Alabama must have intended to discriminate because it declined to draw a second black opportunity district that the

district court had signaled Section 2 required. But a State’s insistence on pursuing

its partisan goals in the face of an earlier Section 2 holding does not somehow make

those partisan goals racially discriminatory. The district court’s contrary holding

flouts a central lesson of Callais: that the pre-Callais Section 2 standard improperly

condemned the refusal to create additional majority-minority districts in situations

that did not even support “a strong inference” of intentional discrimination. 146 S.

Ct. at 1157; see id. at 1157-1161. In any event, Alabama sought in good faith to

correct the disparate treatment of two communities of interest—the Gulf Coast and

the Black Belt—that was the premise of this Court’s pre-Callais holding in Allen v.

Milligan, 599 U.S. 1 (2023), that an earlier map violated Section 2. That legitimate

4

effort to comply with this Court’s decision cannot be reasonably construed as racial

discrimination, particularly in light of the presumption of good faith.

The district court’s decision to reinstate its Section 2 holding despite Callais

was tainted by the same errors. The court again failed to disentangle race and politics, ignored Alabama’s partisan goals, and deemed illegitimate the State’s effort to

preserve the Gulf Coast community. The court also failed to hold respondents to their

burden to control for party affiliation in analyzing racial voting patterns, relying on

a smattering of largely irrelevant pre-Callais findings. And the court used its flawed

intentional-discrimination analysis to conclude that the totality of circumstances

demonstrated likely intentional discrimination in violation of Section 2. Thus, as in

Callais, the court ordered a racial gerrymander, mandating a minority-opportunity

district that the State never would have created based on its race-neutral districting

principles and political goals. See 146 S. Ct. at 1161-1162; see also Malliotakis v.

Williams, 146 S. Ct. 809, 810 (2026) (Alito, J., concurring in the grant of stay).

Worse still, the district court issued its injunction deep into the election calendar—less than three months before the primary and after the candidate-qualifying

window had closed. The court excused that clear violation of Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549

U.S. 1 (2006) (per curiam), on the theory that Alabama had created the timing problem by deciding to use the 2023 map only after Callais, even though the State acted

as soon as it could once this Court vacated the prior injunction in light of Callais. But

state legislatures are democratically elected bodies that are competent to make the

policy judgments inherent in late election changes and are accountable to the voters

for any ill effects. Federal district courts do not have the same license to interfere

with election rules at the eleventh hour, particularly on such dubious merits theories.

5

In LULAC, this Court faced a similar district-court decision enjoining a State’s

congressional map by recasting an obvious partisan gerrymander as racial discrimination. 146 S. Ct. at 419. This Court stayed that decision and later summarily reversed, cautioning that the district court had “improperly inserted itself into an active

primary campaign, causing much confusion and upsetting the delicate federal-state

balance in elections.” Ibid.; see Abbott v. League of United Latin American Citizens,

No. 25-845 (Apr. 27, 2026). The same is true here, and a stay is equally warranted.

STATEMENT

1.

From 1992 to 2020, Alabama’s seven-district congressional map “re-

mained remarkably similar,” with one black-majority district. Allen, 599 U.S. at 14.

Beginning in 2012, Alabama sent six Republicans and one Democrat to Congress under that map. See United States Congressional Delegations from Alabama, Ballotpedia, https://perma.cc/5VTV-ETW2. In 2021, following the 2020 census, Alabama

adopted a new map that “largely resembled” its predecessors. Allen, 599 U.S. at 16.

Three sets of plaintiffs (respondents here) challenged that map in the United States

District Court for the Northern District of Alabama. Ibid. The Milligan and Singleton respondents brought claims under Section 2 and the Fourteenth Amendment, and

the Caster respondents brought a Section 2 claim only. Ibid. The district court issued

a preliminary injunction, finding that the 2021 map likely violated Section 2. Singleton v. Merrill, 582 F. Supp. 3d 924, 936 (N.D. Ala. 2022). The court directed Alabama

to draw a new map and expressed its view that “the appropriate remedy” would include a black-majority district or “something quite close to it.” Ibid.

This Court stayed the injunction pending appeal and noted probable jurisdiction. Merrill v. Milligan, 142 S. Ct. 879 (2022). The 2022 election was held under the

2021 map, with Alabamians again electing six Republicans and one Democrat. See

6

United States House of Representatives Elections in Alabama, 2022, Ballotpedia,

https://perma.cc/W7SN-7A8W.

In Allen, this Court affirmed the district court’s preliminary injunction, concluding that the district court had “correctly” found a Section 2 violation “under existing law.” 599 U.S. at 23. Among other things, the Court rejected Alabama’s argument that respondents had not met their burden to offer a “reasonably configured”

majority-minority district because their maps failed to keep together Alabama’s Gulf

Coast community of interest. Id. at 20. The Court expressed skepticism that Alabama’s trial evidence established that the Gulf Coast is a community of interest. Id.

at 21. Regardless, the Court concluded, because respondents’ maps “joined together

a different community of interest called the Black Belt,” the maps were sufficiently

equivalent to the State’s. Ibid. The Court went on to reject “Alabama’s attempt to

remake [the Court’s] § 2 jurisprudence anew” using a computer-generated “race-neutral benchmark.” Id. at 23.

2.

In 2023, Alabama adopted a new map that sought to address the Section

2 violation this Court found in Allen while respecting the State’s political and other

districting goals. See Singleton III, 782 F. Supp. 3d at 1132. The 2023 plan adhered

to Alabama’s desire to keep together the Gulf Coast, adding new legislative findings

detailing the region’s shared economy and history. Id. at 1134. But the 2023 plan

improved on the 2021 plan’s treatment of the Black Belt by joining that region together in as few districts as respondents’ maps. See id. at 1132. Unlike respondents,

however, the State drew only one black-majority district with a second district having

a black voting age population of 40 percent. Id. at 1134.

7

Respondents challenged the 2023 plan, and the district court issued a preliminary injunction.* Singleton v. Allen, 690 F. Supp. 3d 1226, 1238 (N.D. Ala. 2023).

This Court denied a stay, Allen v. Milligan, 144 S. Ct. 476 (2023), and the 2024 election took place under a court-drawn remedial plan, Singleton III, 782 F. Supp. 3d at

1145. That plan cost Republicans a seat in Congress and led to the election of Alabama’s second Democratic member of Congress in over a decade. See ibid.; p. 5, supra.

Following a trial, the district court issued a permanent injunction against the

2023 plan. Singleton III, 782 F. Supp. 3d at 1117. Applying the prevailing framework

for vote-dilution claims from Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986), the court concluded that Alabama’s new map violated Section 2. Singleton III, 782 F. Supp. 3d at

1259-1308. The court reasoned that respondents’ illustrative map only needed to be

“reasonable” and did not need to “outperform” the State’s on “any particular[] metric.”

Id. at 1264. The court disavowed any obligation to “fully disentangle party and race”

in assessing racially polarized voting. Id. at 1284; see id. at 1292 (recognizing “the

obvious truth[] that partisan affiliations drive voting patterns”). The court also concluded that Alabama had engaged in intentional vote dilution in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment by “refus[ing] to satisfy” the court’s demand that Alabama draw

a second black-majority district or something close to it. Id. at 1355. As a remedy,

the court ordered Alabama to use the court-drawn plan from the 2024 election

through the 2030 census. Milligan, 2025 WL 2451498, at *1.

*

In the preliminary-injunction proceedings, the United States filed a

statement of interest that took no position on the facts of this case or respondents’

constitutional claims but expressed the view that Section 2 required Alabama to draw

a second district in which “Black voters have a realistic opportunity to elect their

candidates of choice.” 21-cv-1291 D. Ct. Doc. 152, at 8 (July 28, 2023). Following the

change in Administration, the United States reconsidered its position on the proper

interpretation of Section 2, as it explained in Callais.

8

3.

Alabama appealed to this Court in Singleton, No. 25-273, and Milligan,

No. 25-274, and sought certiorari before judgment in Caster, No. 25-243. While Alabama’s jurisdictional statements and petition were pending, this Court decided Callais, which “update[d] the framework” for vote-dilution claims to “realign it with the

text of §2 and constitutional principles.” 146 S. Ct. at 1157, 1159. Because a State

may lawfully pursue political goals in districting, Section 2 plaintiffs must “disentangle race from the State’s race-neutral considerations, including politics.” Id. at 1157.

Plaintiffs must offer an illustrative map that “meet[s] all the State’s legitimate districting objectives, including traditional districting criteria and the State’s specified

political goals.” Id. at 1159. And plaintiffs must demonstrate politically cohesive

voting by the minority and racial bloc voting by the majority while “control[ ling] for

party affiliation.” Ibid. Given the Constitution’s focus on “intentional racial discrimination,” plaintiffs ultimately must demonstrate that the totality of circumstances

establishes “a strong inference” of such discrimination. Id. at 1155, 1157; see id. at

1160. In so holding, the Court did not “overrule[] Allen,” because that decision was

limited to rejecting Alabama’s “specific argument[s].” Id. at 1160, 1162. But the

Court made clear that it had “update[d]” the Section 2 framework by answering

“questions left open in Allen.” Id. at 1161.

Alabama moved swiftly to hold its 2026 election under a map consistent with

this Court’s decision. On April 30, 2026, the day after Callais issued, Alabama moved

this Court to expedite consideration of its pending jurisdictional statements and petition, so that Alabama could have “the same opportunity as other States to use a

lawfully enacted congressional map.” Mot. to Expedite 1, Allen v. Caster, No. 25-253

(Apr. 30, 2026). On May 11, this Court granted that motion over respondents’ opposition and three Justices’ dissent, vacating and remanding for further consideration

9

in light of Callais. Allen v. Caster, No. 25-243 (May 11, 2026). The Court’s order

reinstated the 2023 map that the district court had enjoined.

The primary for the 2026 congressional elections was set for May 19, 2026—

too soon for the State to implement its 2023 map. See Op. 2. So on May 8, the Alabama Legislature passed and Governor Ivey signed a law allowing the Governor to

void the results of the May 19 primary and call a special primary election if this Court

were to vacate the district court’s injunction barring the use of 2023 map (as this

Court did three days later). Ala. Act 2026-612, § 1(b). On May 12, the Governor

signed a proclamation setting a special primary election for August 11, 2026. Gov.

Kay Ivey, Proclamation (May 12, 2026) (Ivey Proclamation). Under the proclamation,

candidate qualifying closed on May 22, and the political parties were set to submit

their candidates to Alabama’s Secretary of State by May 26 at noon. Ibid.

4.

Meanwhile, respondents moved for a preliminary injunction in district

court. On May 26 at 7:58 AM—two weeks after the proclamation and just four hours

before the political parties were due to submit their certified lists of candidates under

the 2023 map—the court issued a new preliminary injunction, again barring Alabama’s use of the 2023 map and ordering it to hold the 2026 elections under the 2024

court-drawn map. Op. 77.

The district court first held that its intentional-discrimination holding was

“undisturbed by Callais.” Op. 29. The court concluded that Alabama had “doubled

down on racially discriminatory vote dilution” by not drawing a second black opportunity district. Op. 41. The court rejected Alabama’s political goal of keeping the

Gulf Coast together as “illegitimate” because it had been “used for an unconstitutional purpose” of diluting black votes. Op. 42. And the court rejected Alabama’s

argument that it had acted for partisan reasons, holding that there was insufficient

10

evidence of partisanship in 2023 and that the 2026 act had not “cure[d]” any discriminatory intent. Op. 47; see Op. 45-48.

The district court also reinstated its holding that respondents had made out a

likely Section 2 claim. Op. 48-70. The court recognized respondents’ obligation to

offer an illustrative map that “meet[s] all the State’s legitimate [re]districting objectives, including traditional [re]districting criteria and the state’s specified political

goals.” Op. 55 (quoting Callais, 146 S. Ct. at 1159). The court acknowledged that

respondents had not offered a map that satisfied the State’s objective of preserving

the Gulf Coast community of interest. Ibid. But the court deemed that objective

“[il]legitimate” and declined to consider it along with Alabama’s other partisan goals.

Ibid. The court also concluded that the pre-Callais record included sufficient evidence of racially polarized voting, even controlling for party. Op. 57-61. And it concluded that the totality of circumstances demonstrated likely intentional discrimination in light of the court’s intentional-discrimination holding. Op. 61-69.

The district court also determined that an injunction would be consistent with

the Purcell principle on the theory that, because the 2024 elections were held under

the court-drawn remedial plan, it would be simpler and less confusing to voters to

reinstate that plan. Op. 8-13. The court viewed this Court’s decision to grant Alabama’s request to vacate and remand the earlier injunction on an expedited basis as

reflecting this Court’s “expect[ation]” that the district court would “give these cases

further consideration in connection with the 2026 elections.” Op. 7.

11

ARGUMENT

This Court will stay a three-judge court’s injunction pending appeal when

there is a reasonable probability the Court will note probable jurisdiction, a fair prospect the Court will reverse, and a likelihood of irreparable harm absent a stay. Rostker v. Goldberg, 448 U.S. 1306, 1308 (1980) (Brennan, J., in chambers). In “a close

case,” the Court may also balance the equities and weigh the relative harms. Ibid.;

see Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183, 190 (2010) (per curiam).

A stay is manifestly warranted here. Once again, a district court has enjoined

a State’s duly enacted congressional map at the eleventh hour, thereby “improperly

insert[ing] itself into an active primary campaign, causing much confusion[,] and upsetting the delicate federal-state balance in elections.” Abbott v. League of United

Latin American Citizens, 146 S. Ct. 418, 419 (2025) (LULAC). This Court frequently

intervenes in redistricting cases on an interim basis, reflecting the high likelihood

that this Court will note probable jurisdiction or grant certiorari and the “clear[]”

irreparable harm when a State cannot “enforce its duly enacted plans.” Abbott v.

Perez, 585 U.S. 579, 602 n.17 (2018); see, e.g., LULAC, supra; Robinson v. Callais,

144 S. Ct. 1171 (2024); Ardoin v. Robinson, 142 S. Ct. 2892 (2022); Merrill v. Milligan,

142 S. Ct. 879 (2022); Rucho v. Common Cause, 138 S. Ct. 923 (2018).

Alabama is also highly likely to succeed on the merits. The district court’s

injunction flouts Louisiana v. Callais, 146 S. Ct. 1131 (2026), and Alexander v. South

Carolina State Conference of the NAACP, 602 U.S. 1 (2024), by inverting the presumption of good faith and failing to disentangle race and politics. The court treated

Alabama’s failure to draw a second black opportunity district as proof of intentional

racial discrimination, notwithstanding the obvious alternative explanations for Alabama’s actions: helping Republicans and protecting the Gulf Coast community of in-

12

terest. The whole point of Callais is that refusing to create a majority-minority district in such circumstances does not support even a strong inference of intentional

discrimination, much less prove intentional discrimination. The court also reinstated

a Section 2 finding that busts through the guardrails this Court just announced in

Callais. And the district court violated the principle of Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S.

1 (2006) (per curiam), by enjoining Alabama’s operative congressional map less than

three months before the primary and after candidate qualifying had already closed.

A.

The District Court Flouted Callais In Concluding That Alabama’s

Decision To Use The 2023 Map Was Intentionally Discriminatory

The district court concluded that Alabama engaged in intentional racial discrimination when adopting the 2023 map and choosing to reinstate that map in time

for the 2026 midterms. Op. 28-49. That conclusion was wrong before Callais and is

indefensible after it.

This Court has “repeatedly emphasized that federal courts must ‘exercise extraordinary caution in adjudicating claims that a State has drawn district lines on

the basis of race.’ ” Alexander, 602 U.S. at 7. “Such caution is necessary because

federal-court review of districting legislation represents a serious intrusion on the

most vital of local functions,” as “[r]edistricting constitutes a traditional domain of

state legislative authority.” Ibid. (brackets and quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, “a party challenging a map’s constitutionality must disentangle race and politics.” Id. at 6. And a court assessing such a claim must begin “with a presumption

that the legislature acted in good faith.” Ibid.

“[D]isentangl[ing] race from politics” requires a plaintiff to prove that race

“drove a district’s lines” and to “rul[e] out the competing explanation that political

considerations dominated the legislature’s redistricting efforts.” Alexander, 602 U.S.

13

at 9-10. “ If either race or politics could explain a district’s contours,” a court must

accept the latter explanation, because the “presumption of legislative good faith directs district courts to draw the inference that cuts in the [state] legislature’s favor

when confronted with evidence that could plausibly support multiple conclusions.”

Id. at 10; accord LULAC, 146 S. Ct. at 419 (issuing stay where district court “failed

to honor the presumption of legislative good faith by construing ambiguous direct and

circumstantial evidence against the legislature”).

The district court fundamentally erred in suggesting that Callais sheds no

light on “the standard for intentional discrimination.” Op. 29. This Court evidently

viewed Callais as relevant to respondents’ intentional-discrimination claim, because

it vacated and remanded the district court’s prior intentional-discrimination holding,

on an expedited basis, “for further consideration in light of ” Callais, Allen v. Caster,

No. 25-243 (May 11, 2026), slip op. 1, over the dissent’s objection that the “constitutional finding of intentional discrimination is independent of, and unaffected by, any

of the legal issues discussed in Callais,” id. at 2 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Indeed,

the relevance of Callais to the intentional-discrimination standard is clear: A central

teaching of that decision is that the pre-Callais standard wrongly condemned the

failure to create additional majority-minority districts as impermissible vote dilution

even in circumstances where there was not even a “strong inference” of intentional

discrimination, let alone sufficient proof of such discrimination. 146 S. Ct. at 1157;

see id. at 1157-1161. In particular, Callais instructed that the presumption of good

faith, and the concomitant duty to disentangle race from partisanship, apply not just

to racial-gerrymandering claims like in Alexander but to vote-dilution claims like in

Callais and this case. Id. at 1156-1157.

14

Although the district court paid lip service to the presumption of good faith,

e.g., Op. 31-32, it flouted that presumption by effectively putting the burden on Alabama to disprove that it acted for racially discriminatory reasons. In particular, the

court disregarded the State’s partisan motive and denigrated the State’s other legitimate districting principles.

1.

The district court failed to disentangle race and partisanship

The district court failed to hold respondents to their “special burden” to demonstrate that a map was drawn for racial reasons rather than partisan ones. Callais,

146 S. Ct. at 1156 (quotation marks omitted).

a.

The district court did not dispute that Alabama’s 2026 redistricting ef-

fort was nakedly partisan—a point that should be incontrovertible in light of the ongoing battle between States on both sides of the political aisle to “redraw[] their congressional districts in ways that are predicted to favor the State’s dominant political

party.” LULAC, 146 S. Ct. at 419; see 21-cv-1291 D. Ct. Doc. 360, at 63-66 (May 18,

2026) (collecting statements by Republican state legislators emphasizing that the districts were drawn “in a way that would benefit Republicans”). But the court dismissed the relevance of that evidence by claiming (1) that the 2026 law did not count

as districting legislation because it only changed the timing of the 2026 primary without adopting a new map, and (2) that a legislature cannot “cure the original discriminatory intent” of a previous law. Op. 47-48. That reasoning is flawed on both scores.

To begin, the 2026 law effectively ratified the 2023 map. After all, the entire

point of that law was to permit “the last legislatively enacted Congressional districts”

(i.e., the 2023 map) “to be used in the 2026 General Election” if the district court’s

injunction against that map was vacated—an injunction that barred the legislature

from itself reimposing that map immediately after Callais. See Ala. Act 2026-612,

15

§ 1(b). The 2026 Legislature had no need to contingently reenact the 2023 map if the

injunction were vacated, because its law altering the timing of the 2026 primary was

premised on the 2023 map springing back into effect upon vacatur of the injunction.

See Op. 27 (district court acknowledging that “the 2023 Plan became the legal status

quo ante” “[u]pon vacatur” of its prior injunction).

The district court also erred in reasoning that a legislature cannot cure the

discriminatory taint of a previous law. “[P]ast discrimination cannot, in the manner

of original sin, condemn governmental action that is not itself unlawful.” Perez, 585

U.S. at 603 (brackets in original). “ The ‘ultimate question remains whether a discriminatory intent has been proved in a given case.’ ” Ibid. Multiple courts of appeals

have therefore held that a legislature can cure the taint of a felon-disenfranchisement

law originally adopted with racial animus by readopting the same law for race-neutral reasons. See Harness v. Watson, 47 F.4th 296, 304-307 (5th Cir. 2022) (per curiam) (en banc) (collecting cases), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 2426 (2023).

Accordingly, the district court erred by treating the obvious partisan motives

for the 2026 law as categorically irrelevant. That is sufficient basis to grant a stay.

b.

Moreover, even looking at the 2023 law in isolation, the district court

failed to properly account for Alabama’s partisan motives. The court faulted the legislature for offering “zero evidence [that] the Legislature enacted the 2023 Plan for

partisan purposes.” Op. 45. But it is plaintiffs’ burden to overcome the presumption

of good faith and “rul[e] out the competing explanation that political considerations

dominated the legislature’s redistricting efforts.” Alexander, 602 U.S. at 9-10. That

is why Alexander and Callais require plaintiffs to offer an alternative map that accomplishes the State’s asserted partisan goals. Id. at 34; Callais, 146 S. Ct. at 1159.

If plaintiffs cannot offer such a map, they “fail to demonstrate that the State’s chosen

16

map was driven by racial considerations rather than permissible aims.” Callais, 146

S. Ct. at 1159. By treating the record’s supposed silence on partisanship as proof that

the legislature must have acted for racial reasons, the district court “constru[ed] ambiguous * * * circumstantial evidence against the legislature” and inverted the parties’ burdens under the presumption of good faith. LULAC, 146 S. Ct. at 419. While

perhaps forgotten in the current rash of redistricting, politicians often have electoral

motivations for not wanting to admit to partisan purposes until forced to do so in

litigation. A record that describes districting goals in euphemistic (or even pretextual) terms does not somehow prove a legislature’s discriminatory intent, absent

proof that race rather than party was the true motive.

Regardless, Alabama’s enacted legislative findings in 2023 do expressly address partisanship by directing the map drawers not to “pair incumbent members of

Congress within the same district.” Op. 88 (reproducing findings). This goal of protecting incumbents is the same partisan goal that Louisiana advanced in Callais and

that the challengers there failed to meet by ousting a Republican incumbent. See 146

S. Ct. at 1161. The district court here refused to equate incumbency protection with

partisanship because Alabama had one Democratic incumbent who would also be protected. Op. 46. But the same was true in Callais. See 146 S. Ct. at 1150. Alabama’s

Republican-led state legislature had an obvious partisan interest in maintaining its

6-1 Republican map even if it might have preferred a 7-0 map even more. By forcing

Alabama to instead use a 5-2 map that ousted a Republican incumbent in 2024, the

district court subordinated the State’s partisan goals.

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2.

Even setting aside partisanship, the district court improperly

subordinated the State’s race-neutral districting principles

Even on its own terms, the district court’s conclusion that Alabama engaged in

intentional racial discrimination disregarded the State’s race-neutral districting

principles. That decision contravenes both Callais and Allen.

a.

The crux of the district court’s intentional-discrimination finding was

that Alabama intentionally refused to draw a second black opportunity district that

the court had previously suggested was a necessary Section 2 remedy. See Op. 32,

35, 38-39, 41, 46-47. But that reasoning confuses awareness of a decision’s allegedly

discriminatory effects with proof that the decisionmaker intended those effects. To

bring an intentional-discrimination claim, respondents must establish that Alabama

“selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not

merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.” Personnel Adm’r

of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979); see City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S.

55, 66 (1980) (plurality opinion) (“A plaintiff must prove that the disputed plan was

conceived or operated as a purposeful device to further racial discrimination.”) (brackets, quotation marks, and alterations omitted). The district court short-circuited that

analysis, treating allegations that Alabama refused to adopt a particular pre-Callais

Section 2 remedy as proof that Alabama did so for racially discriminatory reasons.

Callais underscores the problem with the district court’s theory. As Callais

emphasized, States have wide latitude “to draw districts as they please.” 146 S. Ct.

at 1156. “[ I ]nterpreting § 2 of the Voting Rights Act to outlaw a map solely because

it fails to provide a sufficient number of majority-minority districts would create a

right that the [Constitution] does not protect.” Ibid. But that is exactly what the

district court did here directly under the Constitution. It treated evidence that Ala-

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bama had knowingly failed to provide what the court saw as the requisite number of

minority opportunity districts under Section 2 as proof that Alabama had engaged in

intentional vote dilution.

But the pre-Callais standard for Section 2 violations

wrongly imposed liability in circumstances where there was not even a strong inference of intentional discrimination. See id. at 1157-1161. And if a Section 2 violation

cannot properly be found under the Callais standard, then that necessarily means an

actual finding of intentional discrimination cannot be made.

b.

The district court’s other evidence of discriminatory intent is equally un-

compelling. This Court has “never invalidated an electoral map in a case in which

the plaintiff failed to adduce any direct evidence” of racial discrimination. Alexander,

602 U.S. at 8. This case should not be the first.

The district court placed significant emphasis on the legislative findings supporting the 2023 map, which the court characterized as a “severe departure[] from

the Alabama Legislature’s norm.” Op. 36. In particular, the court lambasted Alabama’s goal of keeping the Gulf Coast together, which the court took as proof that

Alabama was using “the majority-White community of interest in the Gulf Coast * * *

to entrench discrimination against Black voters in the majority-Black community of

interest in the Black Belt.” Op. 38. The district court therefore refused to require

respondents to offer an alternative map that preserved the Gulf Coast (something

they could not do) because the court thought the Gulf Coast criterion served an “unconstitutional, and therefore illegitimate, purpose.” Op. 42.

But Alabama’s emphasis on the Gulf Coast makes perfect sense in light of this

Court’s concern in Allen that Alabama had not adequately substantiated that community of interest at trial, even though Alabama’s congressional map has kept the

Gulf Coast together for over 50 years. See 599 U.S. at 21; id. at 57 (Thomas, J.,

19

dissenting). This Court thought Alabama had built a bad record, so Alabama went

back and built a better record. That is sensible lawyering, not proof of intentional

racial discrimination.

Moreover, this Court found a Section 2 violation in Allen in large part because

it viewed Alabama’s and respondents’ maps as equivalent in how they treated communities of interest—Alabama split the Black Belt while respondents split the Gulf

Coast. See 599 U.S. at 21. Alabama’s 2023 map addressed that concern too, by showing that respondents’ claim was based on a flawed factual premise. It is possible to

preserve both the Gulf Coast and the Black Belt, as Alabama’s 2023 map proved, even

if that does not create a second black-opportunity district. See Singleton v. Allen, 782

F. Supp. 3d 1092, 1132 (N.D. Ala. 2025), vacated sub nom. Allen v. Caster, No. 25-243

(May 11, 2026). Accordingly, even under Allen, respondents’ illustrative maps and

the district court’s remedial map were not “reasonably configured” because they did

not “comport” with the “districting criteri[on]” of preserving both “communit[ies] of

interest.” See 599 U.S. at 18, 20. Callais underscored that alternative maps “must

meet all the State’s legitimate districting objectives” and do so “just as well.” 146 S.

Ct. at 1159 (emphases added). The court erred in treating the State’s refusal to draw

an unreasonable map as unlawful vote dilution and doubly erred by bootstrapping

that dilution finding into an intentional-discrimination finding.

The district court also noted record statements discussing the black voting age

population (BVAP) of various districts. See Op. 39-40. But given the district court’s

fixation on compelling Alabama to draw a second black opportunity district, it should

hardly be surprising that Alabama legislators were concerned with whether their

plans had a high enough BVAP to satisfy the court. If anything, the cited comments

highlight that this Court’s pre-Callais Section 2 jurisprudence put States between a

20

rock and a hard place, faulting them both for considering race and not considering

race enough. Those comments do not support the district court’s uncharitable view

that Alabama was focused on “keeping the BVAP * * * low enough to foreclose the

election of a Black-preferred candidate.” Op. 40.

B.

The District Court’s Section 2 Holding Is Irreconcilable With Callais

The district court’s decision to reinstate its Section 2 holding less than a month

after Callais was infected by many of the same errors.

First Gingles precondition. Callais holds that, to “ ‘disentangle race’ from

politics and other constitutionally permissible considerations,” Section 2 plaintiffs

must offer an illustrative map that “meet[s] all the State’s legitimate districting objectives, including traditional districting criteria and the State’s specified political

goals.” 146 S. Ct. at 1159. It does not matter whether those goals are idiosyncratic

or bad public policy; they just must not be “prohibited by the Constitution.” Ibid.

There is no dispute that respondents failed to offer an illustrative map that

satisfied Alabama’s goal of keeping the Gulf Coast together. See Op. 55. The district

court dismissed that problem on the theory that the Gulf Coast criterion was “[il]legitimate” because it was the “linchpin” of a disguised effort to discriminate against

black voters. Ibid. But that just repeats the district court’s error of refusing to apply

the presumption of good faith to Alabama’s redistricting efforts. See pp. 18-19, supra.

It is also wholly circular. It treats Alabama’s focus on the Gulf Coast as proof of a

Section 2 violation while using that same Section 2 violation to prove that Alabama

could not have legitimately wanted to preserve the Gulf Coast. The better explanation—and the one the court was required to credit given the presumption of good

faith—is that Alabama was pursuing its lawful goal of keeping together a community

of interest that had existed for decades, unchallenged.

21

In addition, the district court’s analysis of the first Gingles precondition ignored the State’s partisan goals. The court noted that, before Callais, it had found

that “many of the Plaintiffs’ illustrative plans meet or beat the 2023 Plan on the legitimate goals expressed in the 2023 legislative findings” because, among other

things, they “protect[ed] all incumbents except one.” Op. 56-57. But protecting all

incumbents but one—i.e., ousting a Republican incumbent—is not “meeting all the

State’s legitimate districting objectives” “just as well.” Callais, 146 S. Ct. at 1159.

Indeed, the Section 2 decision that this Court rejected in Callais committed the same

error by accepting an illustrative map that “fail[ed] to meet the State’s political goals”

by placing one Republican incumbent “in a majority-Democratic district.” Id. at 1161.

Second and third Gingles preconditions. Callais also holds that Section

2 plaintiffs must “control[] for party affiliation” when demonstrating politically cohesive voting by the minority and racial bloc voting by the majority. 146 S. Ct. at 1159.

But the record in this case—which was developed before Callais—does not include

that statistical analysis.

The district court held otherwise, but much of the evidence it cited involved

“inter-party racial polarization,” which “proves nothing.” Callais, 146 S. Ct. at 1159.

For example, the court cited testimony that black voters favor Democrats because of

their position on “race-based issues” and that race rather than “religion and class” “is

the largest dividing line between the Republican and Democratic parties.” Op. 60

(emphasis omitted). The court also cited evidence about black and white voters’ views

on abortion, white legislators’ attendance at meetings regarding Medicaid expansion,

and the lack of black Republicans holding state elective office, Op. 59—data points

that do not involve voting patterns at all. To its credit, the court did cite a handful of

examples of intra-party racial disparities presented by one expert. Op. 58. But it is

22

unclear whether the court would have treated that limited evidence as dispositive.

In any event, those passing examples do not satisfy respondents’ obligation to “provide an analysis that controls for party-affiliation.” Callais, 146 S. Ct. at 1159.

Totality of the circumstances. Under Callais, courts must assess the “totality of circumstances” for “present-day intentional racial discrimination in voting.”

146 S. Ct. at 1160. The district court’s conclusion that the circumstances demonstrated such discrimination largely repeated its flawed conclusion that Alabama’s

2023 map was prompted by intentional racial discrimination. See Op. 69. The court

repeated its criticism of the 2023 legislative findings and Alabama’s effort to preserve

the Gulf Coast. Op. 68. It repeated its finding of racially polarized voting, this time

without making any effort to control for party. Op. 63. The court also cited some

district-court decisions finding racial discrimination in Alabama—many of them preCallais Section 2 decisions involving distinct jurisdictions. Op. 64-65. And for good

measure, the court threw in a smattering of social science about racial disparities in

education, employment, and health, like racial differences in vehicle ownership rates

and quality sewage systems, although it purported to assign that evidence less

weight. Op. 65-67. After Callais, that assorted evidence does not “c[o]me close to

showing an objective likelihood that the State’s challenged map was the result of intentional racial discrimination.” 146 S. Ct. at 1162.

*

*

*

*

*

Perhaps the best proof of the district court’s error is that, if Alabama had

adopted the second black opportunity district the district court wanted, it would have

subjected itself to racial-gerrymandering liability under Callais. While the district

court repeatedly extolled the court-drawn remedial plan as “race-blind” in the sense

that the map-drawer claimed not to consider race in drawing particular lines, Op. 2-

23

3, 6, 14, 18, 43, 53, 72-73, 76, race nevertheless clearly predominated in that map.

Because its “underlying goal was racial,” Callais, 146 S. Ct. at 1161, the “racial target” was “purposefully established,” Cooper v. Harris, 581 U.S. 285, 299 (2017), and

race “ ‘was the criterion that, in the [court’s] view, could not be compromised’ in the

drawing of district lines,” Alexander, 602 U.S. at 7.

In particular, the court directed the special master to propose maps that “include[d] either an additional majority-Black congressional district” or opportunity

district. 21-cv-1530 D. Ct. Doc. 273, at 7 (Sept. 5, 2023) (order to special master).

Notably, when a state court recently mandated the creation of a similar congressional

district favoring racial minorities as a purported remedy for vote dilution under state

law, this Court granted a stay before a remedial map had even been drawn, see Malliotakis v. Williams, 146 S. Ct. 809, 809 (2026), and Justice Alito concurred to explain

that any remedial map ultimately drawn would inevitably be “unadorned racial discrimination, an inherently ‘odious’ activity that violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s

Equal Protection Clause except in the ‘most extraordinary case,’ ” id. at 810. In sum,

while “[c]ompliance with § 2, as properly construed, can provide” a compelling interest

for race-predominant districting, Callais, 146 S. Ct. at 1143, the court’s decision reimposing a pre-Callais injunction, based on a pre-Callais record, less than a month

after Callais, fails to comply with Callais’ revised interpretation of Section 2 and cannot support such constitutionally suspect action.

C.

The District Court Violated The Purcell Principle

Under Purcell, “lower federal courts should ordinarily not alter the election

rules on the eve of an election.” LULAC, 146 S. Ct. at 419 (quoting RNC v. DNC, 589

U.S. 423, 424 (2020) (per curiam)). If they do, “this Court, as appropriate, should

correct that error.” RNC, 589 U.S. at 425. The district court clearly abused its dis-

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cretion in granting a preliminary injunction after Alabama’s candidate-qualifying period had closed and less than three months before the primary. This Court has often

stayed district-court injunctions against legislative maps even longer before an election and should do the same here. See, e.g., LULAC, 146 S. Ct. at 418 (three months

before primary); Robinson, 144 S. Ct. 1171 (six months before general election); Ardoin, 142 S. Ct. 2892 (five months before general election); Merrill, 142 S. Ct. 879

(four months before primary); Rucho, 138 S. Ct. 923 (four months before primary).

1.

This is a quintessential case for a stay based on Purcell. “ When an elec-

tion is close at hand, the rules of the road should be clear and settled.” DNC v. Wisconsin State Legislature, 141 S. Ct. 28, 30 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the

denial of application to vacate stay). Late-breaking changes by lower federal courts

risk “voter confusion and consequent incentive to remain away from the polls” that

can undermine the integrity of the election process. Purcell, 549 U.S. at 4-5. When

changes are no longer “feasible before the election without significant cost, confusion,

or hardship,” lower courts should be extremely reticent to interfere with a State’s

election process. Merrill, 142 S. Ct. at 881 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the grant of

applications for stays).

This case clearly presents those chaos and confusion concerns. Alabama’s rescheduled primary is less than three months away, on August 11, 2026. Candidate

qualifying using the 2023 map closed last Friday, May 22, and candidate lists were

set to be submitted to Alabama’s Secretary of State by noon on May 26, until the

district court’s injunction that morning halted the process. See Ivey Proclamation.

The district court’s injunction risks profound confusion for state officials who must

now figure out how to complete a new candidate-qualification process in time for the

August 11 primary with no guidance from the court. See Op. 77 (declining to address

25

this question). And the injunction whipsaws voters, who went to the polls on May 19

knowing that any votes in the affected congressional races would be void, but are now

being told that they need to go back to vote in the same districts for who knows which

candidates on August 11. As in LULAC, “[t]he District Court improperly inserted

itself into an active primary campaign, causing much confusion and upsetting the

delicate federal-state balance in elections.” 146 S. Ct. at 419.

At minimum, the timing should have required respondents to make an extremely strong showing of likelihood of success on the merits. Cf. Merrill, 142 S. Ct.

at 881 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the grant of applications for stays) (describing

Purcell as “probably best understood as a sensible refinement of ordinary stay principles for the election context” under which the merits must be “entirely clearcut in

favor of the plaintiff ”). But for the reasons above, respondents’ claims fail on the

merits. At minimum, the merits are hardly clearcut, especially given that this Court

just issued a decision that the dissenting Justices decried as “greenlight[ing] redistricting plans” like Alabama’s that allegedly dilute minority votes. Callais, 146 S. Ct.

at 1166 (Kagan, J., dissenting). By pressing forward with a dubious theory of liability

late in the election calendar, the court transgressed Purcell.

2.

In granting the injunction, the district court recognized that this Court’s

vacatur of its earlier injunction had made “the 2023 Plan * * * the legal status quo.”

Op. 7. But the court reasoned that the previous court-drawn map was “the practical

status quo,” so sticking with that plan would be “simpler” for Alabama and “avoid the

confusion and error risk attendant” to using the 2023 plan. Op. 7, 9-10. That rationale fundamentally confuses the respective roles of courts and legislatures.

“It is one thing for a State on its own to toy with its election laws close to a

State’s elections. But it is quite another thing for a federal court to swoop in and re-

26

do a State’s election laws in the period close to an election.” Merrill, 142 S. Ct. at 881

(Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the grant of applications for stays); see Wisconsin State

Legislature, 141 S. Ct. at 28 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the denial of application to

vacate stay) (noting the different rules that apply to “federal intrusion[s] on state

lawmaking processes” and state-court decisions). State legislatures are better situated to address the “host of difficult decisions” inherent in choosing “how best to structure and conduct [an] election.” Wisconsin State Legislature, 141 S. Ct. at 31 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the denial of application to vacate stay). They “enjoy far

greater resources for research and factfinding” and can “bring to bear the collective

wisdom of the whole people.” Id. at 29 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the denial of application to vacate stay). And they are “accountable by the people for the rules they

write or fail to write.” Ibid.

After Callais, Alabama’s democratically elected leaders faced a choice: Adopt

a new map consistent with this Court’s decision now or wait for a future election.

Alabama—like many of its sister States—chose the former course, accepting the costs

of a hurried process as the price of the State’s political goals. A State’s decision to

make that policy choice does not license a district court to make a different judgment

for itself. Cf. Wisconsin State Legislature, 141 S. Ct. at 32 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring

in the denial of application to vacate stay) (documenting similar problem in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic). District courts lack the institutional competence to

rejigger election procedures at the last moment or the democratic accountability that

comes from having to face voters unhappy with any disruptive changes.

In LULAC, the dissenters made the same claim that the court-ordered map

“was, in a real sense, the status quo,” and that the tight timing could only be blamed

on the state legislature. 146 S. Ct. at 428 (Kagan, J., dissenting from the grant of

27

application for stay). Yet a majority of this Court voted to grant a stay, holding that

the district court “violated” the Purcell principle by second-guessing the State’s choice

to adopt a new map.

Id. at 419. The decision below—which did not even cite

LULAC—made the same error.

The district court also misconstrued this Court’s decision to grant Alabama’s

motion to expedite and vacate and remand for further consideration of Callais as reflecting this Court’s “expect[ation]” that the district court would act before the 2026

election. See Op. 6-7. Alabama sought expedition expressly so that it could enjoy

“the same opportunity as other States to use a lawfully enacted congressional map

free of an injunction that cannot be reconciled with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act

‘as properly construed.’ ” Mot. to Expedite 1, Allen v. Caster, No. 25-253 (Apr. 30,

2026) (quoting Callais, 146 S. Ct. at 1143). And respondents opposed expedition,

warning that this Court’s vacatur of the district court’s previous injunction would

“enable a mid-election change of districts” by permitting Alabama to use the 2023

map. Opp. to Mot. to Expedite 2, Allen v. Caster, No. 25-253 (Apr. 30, 2026). This

Court’s decision to grant Alabama’s expedited request cannot plausibly be understood

as an invitation for the district court to inject itself into the 2026 midterms.

CONCLUSION

The applications for a stay should be granted.

Respectfully submitted.

D. JOHN SAUER

Solicitor General

MAY 2026