Amicus Curiae Brief — Don Scott, in His Official Capacity as Speaker of the Virginia House of Delegates, et al., Applicants v. Ryan T. McDougle, Virginia State Senator and Legislative Commissioner for the Virginia Redistricting Commission, et al.

Supreme Court briefMay 14, 2026

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No. 25A1240

In The Supreme Court of the United States

______________

DON SCOTT, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS

SPEAKER OF THE VIRGINIA HOUSE OF DELEGATES, ET AL.,

Applicants,

RYAN T. MCDOUGLE, VIRGINIA STATE SENATOR

AND LEGISLATIVE COMMISSIONER FOR THE

VIRGINIA REDISTRICTING COMMISSION, ET AL.,

Respondents.

On Application for a Stay

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE THE

AMERICAN CENTER FOR LAW AND JUSTICE

IN OPPOSITION TO A STAY

JAY ALAN SEKULOW

Counsel of Record

JORDAN A. SEKULOW

STUART J. ROTH

ANDREW J. EKONOMOU

WALTER M. WEBER

MATTHEW R. CLARK

NATHAN J. MOELKER

OLIVIA F. SUMMERS

AMERICAN CENTER

FOR LAW & JUSTICE

201 Maryland Ave., NE

Washington, DC 20002

(202) 546-8890

sekulow@aclj.org

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................................................... ii

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE ............................................................................... 1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ....................................................................................... 1

ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................. 3

I. Applicants do not identify any Federal Question appropriate for this Court’s

review ........................................................................................................................ 3

II. Even Setting Aside the Jurisdictional Bar, the Multiple Independent StateLaw Grounds Mitigate Heavily Against Intervention by this Court. .................... 7

A. The Virginia Supreme Court’s decision should not be stayed because there

was no intervening general election between HJR 6007 and HB 1384. .............. 8

B. The amendment is also subject to validation because it did not meet the

ninety-day submission requirement. ................................................................... 11

C. The language of the amendment is misleading ............................................ 15

CONCLUSION............................................................................................................. 18

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Armstrong v. Harris,

773 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 2000) .................................................................................... 16, 17

Bost v. Illinois State Board of Elections,

607 U.S. 71 (2026) .................................................................................................... 1

Breza v. Kiffmeyer,

723 N.W.2d 633 (Minn. 2006) ................................................................................ 16

Bush v. Gore,

531 U.S. 98 (2000) .................................................................................................... 1

Coleman v. Pross, 219 Va. 143 (1978) ......................................................... 3, 11, 12, 15

League of Women Voters v. Utah State Legislature,

559 P.3d 11 (Utah 2024)......................................................................................... 16

McConnell v. FEC,

540 U.S. 93 (2003) .................................................................................................... 1

Michigan v. Long,

463 U.S. 1032 (1983) ............................................................................................ 4, 6

Noem v. Perdomo,

146 S. Ct. 1 (2025) .................................................................................................... 7

Republican National Committee v. Genser,

145 S. Ct. 9 (2024) .................................................................................................... 1

Trump v. Anderson,

601 U.S. 100 (2024) .................................................................................................. 1

Trump v. United States,

603 U.S. 593 (2024) .................................................................................................. 1

United States v. Taylor,

596 U.S. 845 (2022) .................................................................................................. 3

Voting Integrity Project, Inc. v. Bomer,

199 F.3d 773 (5th Cir. 2000) .................................................................................. 11

iii

Voting Integrity Project, Inc. v. Keisling,

259 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2001) ................................................................................ 11

Whitlock v. Hawkins,

105 Va. 242 (1906) .................................................................................................... 3

Constitutional Provisions

Va. Const. art. XII.............................................................................................. 8, 13, 15

Statutes

Va. Code § 24.2-304.04 ................................................................................................ 17

Treatises

H.J. Res. 6007, 2024 Spec. Sess. I (Va. 2025) ............................................................. 16

Other Authorities

History, HJR 4, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2026), https://lis.virginia.gov/billdetails/20261/HJ4 ................................................................................................... 13

Unofficial Results, VA. DEPT. OF ELECTIONS (last

updated April 25, 2026), https://enr.elections.virginia.gov/results/public/virginia/

elections/2026-April-21-Special. ............................................................................ 14

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE

Amicus curiae American Center for Law & Justice (“ACLJ”) is an organization

dedicated to the defense of constitutional liberties secured by law. 1 ACLJ attorneys

have appeared often before this Court as counsel for parties, e.g. Trump v. Anderson,

601 U.S. 100 (2024); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003); or as amicus, e.g. Bost v.

Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 607 U.S. 71 (2026); Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Genser, 145

S. Ct. 9 (2024); Trump v. United States, 603 U.S. 593 (2024); and Bush v. Gore, 531

U.S. 98 (2000). The ACLJ has a fundamental interest in defending the constitutional

structure protecting elections and in promoting election security and confidence.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Applicants ask this Court to stay a decision by the Supreme Court of Virginia

interpreting Article XII, § 1 of the Virginia Constitution—a provision that has

governed constitutional amendments in the Commonwealth for over 150 years. That

is a question of Virginia constitutional law. A state court may consult federal

decisions for guidance, use them as persuasive authority, or discuss them to explain

why they do not compel a different result, all without converting a state-law judgment

into a federal question. The Virginia Supreme Court explicitly grounded its holding

in the text, history, and structure of the Virginia Constitution. That those grounds

happen to harmonize with—rather than conflict with—propositions articulated in

1 Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.6, amicus curiae states that no counsel for any party authored

this brief in whole or in part, and no entity or person, aside from amicus curiae, its members, and its

counsel, made any monetary contribution toward the preparation or submission of this brief.

some federal cases does not suddenly render them insufficient to support the

judgment.

The Virginia Supreme Court carried out its constitutional duty to say what the

law is and to defend constitutional requirements:

[I]f the whole legislature, an event to be deprecated, should attempt to

overleap the bounds, prescribed to them by the people, I, in

administering the public justice of the country, will meet the united

powers, at my seat in this tribunal; and, pointing to the constitution,

will say, to them, here is the limit of your authority; and, hither, shall

you go, but no further.

Scott v. McDougle, Record No. 260127, 6-7 (Va. May 8, 2026) (quoting Commonwealth

v. Caton, 8 Va. (4 Call) 5, 8 (1782) (opinion of Wythe, J)).

Moreover, there are other strong state constitutional arguments that would

provide alternative, independent, state-law grounds for the decision below. Amicus

flags those arguments, not for this Court to resolve (being matters of state law), but

rather to show that the equities weigh heavily against staying the decision below. If

there are multiple independent state law arguments for the result below, this would

make intervention by this Court all the more unwise.

Here, briefly, are the alternative state arguments in support of the judgment

below: First, the amendment was submitted to the voters less than two months after

HJR 6007’s final passage on January 16, 2026—well short of the ninety days that

Article XII, § 1 mandates before submission. The Virginia Supreme Court has

squarely held that “a standard of strict compliance with all specified prerequisites,

rather than a standard of substantial compliance, must be applied.” Coleman v. Pross,

219 Va. 143, 158 (1978) (emphasis added). The compressed timeline adopted by the

General Assembly does not come close to meeting that standard.

Second, the submission itself was fundamentally defective. The ballot’s

“restore fairness” framing misrepresents what the amendment does and is

inconsistent with the actual text of the amendment. Under the Virginia Supreme

Court’s settled precedent, the remedy for such a violation was not severance but

invalidation of “the entire act[.]” Whitlock v. Hawkins, 105 Va. 242, 247 (1906).

The amendment was improper on several independent state grounds. The

court below embraced one of them without reaching the others. This Court should not

stay the decision below, as that interference with state constitutional processes would

be an exercise in futility as well as a breach of federalism.

ARGUMENT

Applicants do not identify any Federal Question appropriate for

this Court’s review.

This Court’s jurisdiction over state court decisions is confined to questions of

federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a). It is a basic “principle that we will not review

judgments of state courts that rest on adequate and independent state grounds . . . .”

Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983). That limitation is not a technicality—

it reflects the foundational principle that state courts are as “the final arbiters of state

law in our federal system.” United States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. 845, 859 (2022). This

Court does not sit as a general court of errors to correct state courts’ alleged mistakes

in interpreting their own constitutions.

The decision of the Supreme Court of Virginia here is, from top to bottom, an

interpretation of the Virginia Constitution, focused above all on Article XII, § 1. The

court’s ruling depends entirely on the meaning of a state constitutional provision. This

Court has no warrant to disturb it.

“Respect for the independence of state courts, as well as avoidance of rendering

advisory opinions, have been the cornerstones of this Court’s refusal to decide cases

where there is an adequate and independent state ground.” Long, 463 U.S. at 1040.

Applicants evince creativity by arguing that the Virginia Supreme Court’s decision

was “interwoven” with federal law because it cites to some federal cases. But state

courts cite federal precedents every day while resolving purely state-law issues. Mere

occasional citation of federal decisions interpreting federal law does not transform

state constitutional interpretation into something else. 2 If that were so, state courts

would be free to invoke the reasoning from forty-nine other states, but any reference

to the reasoning of federal courts would bring with it an opening for overzealous

advocates to cry “federal error!” Federalism does not require state courts to be

severely allergic to federal court cases. Under this Court’s well-established doctrine,

where the state-law ground is independent and adequate to support the judgment,

this Court lacks jurisdiction to review it, full stop.

2 Applicants’ argument in this case is especially rich. The state supreme court cited to a dissent in one

of this Court’s decisions, see McDougle, Record No. 260127 at 1-2. Since a dissent is not federal law,

this citation perfectly illustrates how a state court can invoke reasoning from federal jurists without

lashing itself to a federal holding.

The Virginia Supreme Court’s majority opinion was structured as follows. It

began with the constitutional text, specifically the phrase “general election” in Article

XII, § 1. It then examined the historical meaning of that phrase across successive

Virginia constitutions. It consulted Virginia statutes—including the statute enacted

by the very first General Assembly sitting under the 1971 Constitution—defining

“general election.” It invoked the Governor’s proclamation ratifying that

Constitution. These are all state-law sources. After establishing this state-law

foundation, the court then cited some federal law—not to derive its definition of

“election” from federal sources, but to explain that its state-law interpretation did not

conflict with federal requirements. McDougle, et al., Record No. 260127, at 27-28.

That is a paradigmatically permissible use of federal authority. A Virginia

court interpreting a Virginia contract may cite federal decisions. A Virginia court

interpreting a Virginia civil rights statute may look to Title VII precedents by

analogy. A Virginia court interpreting constitutional language that mirrors federal

constitutional text may consult federal decisions as persuasive authority. None of

these citations converts the state-law judgment into a federal question over which

this Court has jurisdiction.

Applicants argue that the Virginia Supreme Court “based its ‘definition’ of

‘election’ on federal law.” App. 25A1240 12. That characterization misreads the

opinion. The Virginia Supreme Court cited Foster v. Love for the general proposition

that an “election” involves “the combined actions of voters and officials meant to make

a final selection of an officeholder.” McDougle, et al., Record No. 260127, at 19 (citing

522 U.S. at 71). But that proposition is unremarkable—it is simply a description of

what an election is. The court used it to frame its analysis, not to derive the critical

holding that “general election” in Article XII encompasses the early voting period.

That holding emerged from the court’s analysis of Virginia constitutional text,

Virginia history, and Virginia statutes.

The situation here is precisely the opposite of the scenario that Michigan v.

Long addressed. That case arose when a state court appeared to have applied federal

constitutional standards more broadly than this Court’s precedents required, and it

was unclear whether the state court would have reached the same result under state

law alone. 463 U.S. at 1037-38. The concern was that a state court had misread

federal law as requiring a particular result, and this Court needed to clarify what

federal law required. Id. at 1040-41. Here, by contrast, the Virginia Supreme Court’s

interpretation of the state constitution rests on state constitutional interpretation,

not federal law. There is no need for this Court to review a misreading of federal law,

because federal law was not what the lower court relied upon.

Article XII, § 1 of the Virginia Constitution is unique to Virginia. The Virginia

Supreme Court’s interpretation of it binds no other court in any other jurisdiction.

The Virginia Supreme Court did not purport to interpret federal law in a binding or

precedential way. It referenced federal authorities as part of its own interpretive

analysis of Virginia law. 3 This Court does not supervise state courts’ interpretations

of their own constitutions. But that is all the state supreme court did.

The Virginia Supreme Court decided a question of state constitutional law.

That court’s discussion of federal authorities in the course of reaching a state-law

result does not confer jurisdiction on this Court. The independent-and-adequatestate-ground doctrine bars review, and the stay standard is not satisfied.

II.

Even Setting Aside the Jurisdictional Bar, the Multiple

Independent State-Law Grounds Mitigate Heavily Against

Intervention by this Court.

The decision to grant or deny a stay entails, inter alia, considering the equities as

well as the likelihood of success. Noem v. Perdomo, 146 S. Ct. 1, 2 (2025). Here,

multiple, independent state law grounds exist – or at least are supported by strong

arguments on which the state supreme court would have the last word – to support

the judgment below. Hence, a stay by this Court would be very likely both futile and

inequitable. Even setting aside the jurisdictional bar entirely, applicants cannot

demonstrate the fair prospect of reversal that a stay requires. The Virginia Supreme

Court's judgment can rest on at least three independent and adequate state-law

grounds—the absence of an intervening election (the basis for the judgment below),

the violation of the ninety-day submission requirement (an argument which the state

supreme court did not yet need to reach), and the ballot's misleading description

3 Even if this Court were to disagree with how the Virginia Supreme Court portrayed Foster v. Love,

that disagreement would not affect any future application of the federal Election Day statute.

(likewise an argument which the court below did not yet reach)—each of which can

independently suffice void the amendment and each of which, as a state law

argument, is separately insulated from this Court's review. The sections that follow

address those grounds not to invite this Court to resolve these state-law questions,

which would be inappropriate, but to make plain that no realistic path to reversal

exists. Where every available route is blocked by an independent and adequate state

ground, the stay standard cannot be met.

A. The Virginia Supreme Court’s decision should not be stayed

because there was no intervening general election between HJR

6007 and HB 1384.

The Constitution of Virginia is clear on the requirements that must be met for

a Constitutional Amendment via referendum to be passed. An amendment

originating in one of the two legislative chambers must “be agreed to by a majority of

the members elected to each of the two houses, such proposed amendment or

amendments shall be . . . referred to the General Assembly at its first regular session

held after the next general election of members of the House of Delegates.” Va. Const.

art. XII, § 1 (emphasis added).

This means simply that an amendment need be proposed by either chamber,

find majority approval in both, then be ratified by a new General Assembly after an

intervening election of the members of the House of Delegates. This requirement was

not met by HJR 6007 and HB 1384, the two bills that resulted in the redistricting

measure in this case.

The Virginia Supreme Court correctly confirmed this conclusion. In its opinion,

the court held that because early voting for the 2025 general election had already

begun on September 19, 2025—more than a month before the General Assembly’s

first passage of HJR 6007 on October 31, 2025, there was no intervening general

election as required by Article XII, § 1. The court explained:

In this case, voting in the general election for the House of Delegates

began on September 19, 2025, and ended on Election Day, November 4,

2025. The General Assembly voted for the first time to propose the

constitutional amendment to the electorate on October 31, 2025. By that

date, over 1.3 million votes had been cast in the general election, which

was approximately 40% of the total vote for that election cycle.

McDougle, et al., Record No. 260127 at 12. It would be ludicrous to propose that an

election does not begin until the actual date of Election Day, when early voting has

rendered the whole process 40% complete. Indeed, under that rationale, the

legislature could have voted to propose the constitutional amendment on the very

same Election Day, so long as it did so before all the votes were cast.

Rejecting the Commonwealth’s narrow view that “election” means only

Election Day, the Virginia Supreme Court sensibly held that the term “election”

encompasses the full voting process, not just votes cast on a particular day. The court

emphasized that “‘the Constitution was written to be understood by the voters,’”

McDougle, et al., Record No. 260127 at 15 (quoting Old Dominion Comm. For Fair

Util. Rates v. State Corp. Comm’n, 294 Va. 168, 185 (2017)), and that the

Commonwealth’s

position

would

render

the

intervening-election

safeguard

meaningless for the 1.3 million-plus early voters. This constitutional violation, the

court concluded, “incurably taints the resulting referendum vote and nullifies its legal

efficacy.” McDougle, Record No. 260127 at 1. The Virginia Supreme Court’s thorough

analysis of the text, history, and purpose of Article XII, § 1 fully supports its

conclusion.

The Commonwealth’s interpretation of the Virginia Constitution attempts to

collapse “the general election” into a single calendar date while disregarding the

reality of how elections are conducted. No one contends that early voting replaces

Election Day. The question is whether the Constitution’s reference to “the general

election” encompasses the full, lawful voting process associated with that election.

Under Virginia law, voting in the general election begins well before Election Day,

and ballots cast during that period are no less part of the election itself.

Recognizing that fact does not elevate statute over the Constitution—it reflects

the ordinary way constitutional provisions are implemented. The Virginia Supreme

Court did not “redefine” a constitutional event; it acknowledged that the election, as

the Constitution uses that term, includes all valid votes cast in that election. The

proper analysis is to demarcate early voting as the start of the election and Election

Day as the consummation of the process.

This is consistent with how elections have been described at the federal level.

See Foster, 522 U.S. at 71 (holding that the word “election” in federal statues “plainly

refer[s] to the combined actions of voters and officials meant to make a final selection

of an officeholder” rather than simply Election Day); Voting Integrity Project, Inc. v.

Keisling, 259 F.3d 1169, 1176 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that “[a]lthough voting takes

place, perhaps most voting, prior to election day, the election is not ‘consummated’

before election day because voting still takes place on that day”); see Voting Integrity

Project, Inc. v. Bomer, 199 F.3d 773, 775-76 (5th Cir. 2000) (relying on Foster to justify

early voting because the term “election” is not limited to a single day).

The Virginia Supreme Court properly held that it is the most natural and most

rational interpretation to consider the 2025 election as having begun at the time of

early voting and concluded on Election Day. McDougle, et al., Record No. 260127; see

McDougle v. Nardo, 116 Va. Cir. 299, 302-303 (2026). Therefore, the constitutionally

required intervening election cannot be said to have occurred between the passage of

HJR 6007 and HB 1384, because the election had already begun before HJR 6007

was passed, and the Virginia Supreme Court accordingly held that

the definition of ‘general election’ in Article XII, Section 1 describes the

combined actions of voters casting ballots and officers of election

receiving those votes and closing the polls on the last day of the election.

The plain and ordinary meaning of the expression matches the historical

definition embraced by the courts and legal scholars.

McDougle, et al., Record No. 260127 at 22.

B. The amendment is also subject to invalidation because it did not

meet the ninety-day submission requirement.

The Virginia Supreme Court has made clear that when the Constitution or

governing law prescribes procedural requirements, strict compliance is required. In

Coleman, 219 Va. at 155, the court emphasized that constitutional procedures must

be followed with precision, rejecting any “flexible” or approximate standard. There, a

deviation in the amendment process was fatal because the Constitution demands

adherence to “the same” proposal across sessions. Id. at 159. The court underscored

that these procedural safeguards exist to ensure deliberation, transparency, and

legitimacy, and cannot be relaxed for convenience. See generally id. at 150-59.

The court was clear that “in determining whether proposed amendments to the

Constitution may properly be referred to the electorate, a standard of strict

compliance with all specified prerequisites, rather than a standard of substantial

compliance, must be applied.” Id. at 158 (emphasis added).

Although Coleman arose from a different procedural defect—the failure to

submit the identical proposal across both legislative sessions—its holding was not so

limited. The court’s reasoning rested on the broader principle that Article XII’s

requirements exist to protect deliberation, transparency, and legitimacy in the

amendment process. Id. at 154, 158. The court expressly held that strict compliance

is required with “all specified prerequisites,” not merely the identity requirement at

issue in that case. Id. at 158 (emphasis added).

Each of the requirements examined in this brief—the intervening election, the

ninety-day submission window, the prohibition on local or special laws, and the

accurate-submission obligation—is a “specified prerequisite[]” within the meaning of

Coleman. Id. None is exempt from the strict compliance standard.

Although the Virginia Supreme Court found the intervening-election defect

dispositive and did not need to reach the ninety-day issue, the lower court’s analysis

on strict compliance with Article XII, § 1 remains sound and consistent with Coleman

v. Pross.

For an amendment to the Virginia Constitution to be passed to the voters, the

Virginia Constitution mandates that “it shall be the duty of the General Assembly to

submit such proposed amendment or amendments to the voters qualified to vote in

elections by the people, in such manner as it shall prescribe and not sooner than

ninety days after final passage by the General Assembly.” Va. Const. art. XII § 1

(emphasis added). The ninety-day requirement is mandatory and should be strictly

construed under Coleman. Yet the timeline under which this mandate was enacted

here fails to satisfy the strict procedural requirements that govern election-related

lawmaking in Virginia. The amendment violates those requirements.

The amendment “finally passed” on January 16, 2026, as HB 1384. See History,

Gen.

Assemb.,

Reg.

Sess.

(Va.

2026),

https://lis.virginia.gov/bill-

details/20261/HJ4. But early voting began on March 6, 2026. Press Release, Va. Dep’t

of Elections, Early Voting for April 21 Referendum Begins March 6 (Mar. 6, 2026),

https://www.elections.virginia.gov/news-releases/early-voting-for-april-21referendum-begins-march-6-1.html. The amendment was submitted to the people for

voting less than two months after the bill’s final passage; a plain violation of Article

XII. However, the Virginia Constitution clearly requires the legislature to “submit

such proposed amendment or amendments to the voters qualified to vote . . . not

sooner than ninety days after final passage by the General Assembly.” Va. Const. art.

XII § 1. In this case, many voters had already voted before the ninety days had

passed 4 and were no longer qualified to vote again. The very purpose of the provision

of the Virginia Constitution to ensure that all voters, including early voters, have a

full ninety days to make an informed decision. For hundreds of thousands of voters

in this election, those constitutional protections were violated.

Further, the ninety-day mandate appears in Article XII, § 1 of the Virginia

Constitution itself—not in the Code. A legislative enactment that purports to waive

or shorten a constitutionally prescribed timeline does not amend the Constitution; it

violates it. The General Assembly cannot grant itself, by ordinary legislation, a

flexibility that the Constitution does not permit.

The General Assembly imposed a compressed and impracticable timeline that

effectively prevents localities from complying with existing statutory election

procedures. Rather than facilitating orderly administration, the statute forces local

officials into an untenable position—either disregard established procedural

safeguards or fail to meet the new mandate. This is precisely the type of procedural

breakdown the doctrine of strict compliance is designed to prevent. As the Virginia

Supreme Court cautioned in Coleman, procedural shortcuts risk undermining the

integrity of the democratic process itself. HB 1384 imposes a timeline incompatible

4 By the time the ninety-day requirement was met, early voting had only two days left. With over 1

million voters casting their votes early, it stands to reason that most of those votes occurred before the

final two days of early voting. See Unofficial Results, VA. DEPT. OF ELECTIONS (last

updated April 25, 2026), https://enr.elections.virginia.gov/results/public/virginia/elections/2026-April21-Special.

with legally required election procedures explicitly stated in Art. XII § 1 of the

Virginia Constitution and therefore is plainly invalid.

The appropriate disposition is not severance or cure—there is nothing to sever,

and the constitutional calendar cannot be retroactively rewound. The amendment

must be declared void from inception. Should the General Assembly wish to propose

the same or a similar amendment in the future, it retains full authority to do so,

provided it complies with the procedural requirements the Virginia Constitution

imposes. What it may not do is have this Court grant a permission slip to excuse its

disregard of the state constitution.

C. The language of the amendment is misleading

Article XII, § 1 makes it the “duty of the General Assembly to submit such

proposed amendment” to “the voters qualified to vote in elections by the people[.]” Va.

Const. art. XII, § 1 (emphasis added). Virginia voters are entitled to vote on proposed

amendments free of “[d]efects and errors” in submission. Coleman, 219 Va. at 158. A

ballot that presents a political slogan instead of a description of the amendment is

precisely the kind of defect Coleman contemplates. It does not merely omit

information; it substitutes biased opinion for information. A voter who reads “restore

fairness” and votes yes on that basis has not approved the amendment that HJR 6007

proposes.

Other state courts construing identical “submit” language have reached the

same conclusion. In Armstrong v. Harris, 773 So. 2d 7, 12 (Fla. 2000), the Florida

Supreme Court held that “[i]mplicit in this provision is the requirement that the

proposed amendment be accurately represented on the ballot; otherwise, voter

approval would be a nullity.” Minnesota requires that ballot language “not be so

unreasonable and misleading as to be a palpable evasion of the constitutional

requirement to submit the law to a popular vote.” Breza v. Kiffmeyer, 723 N.W.2d

633, 636 (Minn. 2006). And Utah demands that proposed amendments be “placed on

the ballot in such words and in such form that the voters are not confused thereby,”

so that “no reasonably intelligent voter would be misled as to what he was voting for

or against.” League of Women Voters v. Utah State Legislature, 559 P.3d 11, 29 (Utah

2024) (cleaned up). The amendment possesses no such clarity, and, indeed, the

amicus ACLJ received information from some of its supporters that they were

confused by the language and had no understanding of the true purpose of the

proposed amendment based on the description.

The actual amendment authorizes the General Assembly “to modify one or

more congressional districts at any point following the adoption of a decennial

reapportionment law, but prior to the next decennial census, in the event that any

State . . . conducts a redistricting” for reasons other than completing the decennial

cycle or complying with a court order. H.J. Res. 6007, 2024 Spec. Sess. I (Va. 2025).

That text says nothing about fairness. It is a procedural authorization tied to the

conduct of other States. Furthermore, the verb “restore” presupposes that Virginia’s

current districts are unfair. This premise is both legally indefensible—the current

map satisfies the statutory fairness criteria codified at Va. Code § 24.2-304.04(8)—

and factually wrong—the resulting delegations have closely tracked the statewide

popular vote.

The language also conceals the amendment’s most consequential features. The

amendment suspends the Virginia Redistricting Commission—a body the people of

Virginia themselves created by referendum and enshrined in Article II, § 6-A. A voter

reading only “restore fairness” has no way to know that a “yes” vote withdraws a

constitutional

safeguard

(against

political

gerrymandering)

the

electorate

resoundingly adopted just five years ago. When a proposed amendment “results in

the loss or restriction of an independent fundamental state right,” that consequence

must be disclosed on the ballot. Cf. Armstrong, 773 So. 2d at 17–18 (internal citation

omitted).

Equally misleading is “upcoming elections.” A Virginia voter in spring 2026

would reasonably understand that phrase to refer specifically the November 2026

midterms—yet the amendment authorizes the General Assembly to draw and redraw

districts governing the 2026, 2028, and 2030 elections alike. The ballot conceals both

the scope and the duration of the power it transfers. In short, it asks the voters a

different question than HJR 6007 actually poses—the precise vice the Submission

Clause prohibits.

***

The Virginia Supreme Court’s decision rests on independent and adequate

state-law grounds, and furthermore is supported by several other independent state

arguments, any one of which is fatal to the proposed amendment. No federal question

of sufficient substance supports this Court's exercise of jurisdiction. The integrity of

Virginia's constitutional order—and the votes of the more than one million Virginians

whose ballots were cast before the amendment lawfully could have been submitted—

counsel strongly against intervention.

CONCLUSION

This Court should deny the application for a stay.

Respectfully submitted,