Amicus Curiae Brief — Danco Laboratories, LLC, Applicant v. Louisiana, et al.
Supreme Court briefMay 4, 2026
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Nos. 25A1207, 25A1208
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
DANCO LABORATORIES, L.L.C., et al.
Applicant,
v.
STATE OF LOUISIANA, et al.,
Respondents.
GENBIOPRO, INC., et al.
Applicant,
v.
STATE OF LOUISIANA, et al.,
Respondents.
BRIEF FOR 259 MEMBERS OF CONGRESS AS AMICI CURIAE IN
SUPPORT OF APPLICATIONS BY DANCO AND GENBIOPRO TO STAY OR
VACATE THE FIFTH CIRCUIT’S STAY PENDING APPEAL
ABBY F. RUDZIN
Counsel of Record
CAMILA TUCKER
O’MELVENY & MYERS
LLP
1301 Avenue of the
Americas
New York, NY 10019
202-326-2061
arudzin@omm.com
NANCY L. SCHROEDER
O’MELVENY & MYERS
LLP
400 S. Hope Street
Los Angeles, CA 90071
213-430-6000
nschroeder@omm.com
SAMANTHA GALVÁN
O’MELVENY & MYERS
LLP
1625 Eye Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20006
202-383-5300
sgalvan@omm.com
MICHAEL MCMILLIN
HARMUKH SINGH
O’MELVENY & MYERS
LLP
401 West 4th Street
Austin, TX 78701
737-261-8600
mmcmillin@omm.com
KEITH OSENTOSKI
O’MELVENY & MYERS
LLP
1999 Avenue of the Stars
Los Angeles, CA 900767
310-553-6700
kosentoski@omm.com
Counsel for Lead Amici Curiae
A complete list of the 47 United States Senators and the 212 Members
of the United States House of Representatives participating as amici
curiae is provided as an appendix. The Lead Amici Curiae are:
Sen. Charles E. Schumer
Sen. Patty Murray
Sen. Richard J. Durbin
Sen. Ron Wyden
Rep. Hakeem Jeffries
Rep. Katherine Clark
Rep. Frank Pallone, Jr.
Rep. Jamie Raskin
Rep. Diana DeGette
Rep. Ayanna Pressley
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ................................................................................... 1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ....................................................................................... 2
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................. 4
I.
II.
III.
FDA’S DECISION TO ELIMINATE THE IN-PERSON
DISPENSING REQUIREMENT WAS BASED ON THE HIGHQUALITY SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE THE ACT REQUIRES. .............. 4
A.
Through the Act, Congress directed that FDA’s decisions
be science- and evidence-based. .................................................... 4
B.
FDA’s repeated determination that mifepristone is safe is
supported by peer-reviewed research and years of real
patient experience. ........................................................................ 7
C.
FDA’s decision to eliminate the in-person dispensing
requirement is supported by substantial evidence that
mifepristone remains safe when dispensed by mail or
pharmacy. ...................................................................................... 9
THE ACT REQUIRES THAT A REMS NOT UNDULY
BURDEN PATIENT ACCESS. .............................................................. 13
A.
In removing the in-person dispensing requirement, FDA
complied with its congressional mandate not to unduly
burden patient access. ................................................................. 13
B.
The in-person dispensing requirement unduly burdens
patient access to mifepristone. .................................................... 14
C.
This Court should not permit Louisiana to unduly burden
nationwide patient access to medication. ................................... 18
LOUISIANA’S CRITICISM OF FDA’S DECISION TO
ELIMINATE THE IN-PERSON DISPENSING REQUIREMENT
LACKS SCIENTIFIC MERIT AND IS THEREFORE
FORECLOSED BY THE ACT. .............................................................. 20
A.
The Act requires FDA to make decisions based on science,
not flawed, ideological publications. ........................................... 20
B.
FDA’s use of FAERS data was appropriate under the Act. ....... 21
C.
One state should not be able to hijack the science-based
REMS system Congress designed to force its policy
choices onto others. ...................................................................... 23
CONCLUSION............................................................................................................. 25
APPENDIX: List of Amici Curiae .............................................................................. 1a
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TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES
Cases
Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Kennedy,
2026 WL 733828 (D. Mass. Mar. 16, 2026) ............................................................. 13
Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. FDA,
472 F. Supp. 3d 183 (D. Md. 2020), order clarified sub nom.,
2020 WL 8167535 (D. Md. Aug. 19, 2020)................................................................. 9
Benisek v. Lamone,
585 U.S. 155 (2018) .................................................................................................. 19
Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org.,
597 U.S. 215 (2022) .............................................................................................. 3, 24
Farmland Dairies v. Barber,
65 N.Y.2d 51 (1985) .................................................................................................. 25
FCC v. Prometheus Radio Project,
592 U.S. 414 (2021) .................................................................................................. 22
Purcell v. Kennedy,
2025 WL 3101785 (D. Haw. Oct. 30, 2025) ....................................................... 13, 15
S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom,
590 U.S. 965 (2020) .................................................................................................. 20
Washington v. FDA,
108 F.4th 1163 (9th Cir. 2024) .......................................................................... 13, 14
Statutes
21 U.S.C. § 355(b) .......................................................................................................... 5
21 U.S.C. § 355(c) ........................................................................................................... 8
21 U.S.C. § 355(d) .................................................................................................. 5, 6, 8
21 U.S.C. § 355-1(a) ................................................................................................. 6, 24
21 U.S.C. § 355-1(b) ....................................................................................................... 6
21 U.S.C. § 355-1(f)(1).................................................................................................... 6
21 U.S.C. § 355-1(f)(2).......................................................................... 14, 15, 16, 17, 20
21 U.S.C. § 355-1(f)(5).................................................................................................. 14
21 U.S.C. § 355-1(g)(2) ................................................................................................... 7
21 U.S.C. § 355-1(g)(3) ................................................................................................... 7
21 U.S.C. § 355-1(g)(4) ............................................................................................. 7, 11
21 U.S.C. § 393(b) .......................................................................................................... 5
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Regulations
21 C.F.R. § 314.105 ........................................................................................................ 5
21 C.F.R. § 314.50 .......................................................................................................... 5
21 C.F.R. § 314.520 ........................................................................................................ 8
21 C.F.R. § 314.80 ........................................................................................................ 22
21 C.F.R. § 314.81 ........................................................................................................ 22
Other Authorities
2011 REMS for NDA 020687 Mifeprex (mifepristone) Tablets, 200 mg,
(June 2011) ................................................................................................................. 8
Alexa Delbosc & Rahman Shafi, What Do We Know About Immigrants’ Travel
Behaviour? A Systematic Literature Review and Proposed Conceptual
Framework, 43 Transport Revs. 914 (2023) ............................................................ 16
Am. College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Medication Abortion Up to 70
Days of Gestation, Practice Bulletin No. 225 (Oct. 2020) ....................................... 18
Analysis of Medication Abortion Risk and the FDA Report “Mifepristone US
Post-Marketing Adverse Events Summary Through 12/31/2024”,
Advancing New Standards in Reproductive Health (May 15, 2025) ....................... 9
Andrés Argüello & Andrea Ducas, The Big, ‘Beautiful’ Bill’s Health Care Cuts
Would Drive Up Uncompensated Care and Threaten Vulnerable Hospitals,
Center for American Progress, https://www.americanprogress.org/article/
the-big-beautiful-bills-health-care-cuts-would-drive-up-uncompensatedcare-and-threaten-vulnerable-hospitals/................................................................. 18
Ann P. Bartel et al., Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Access to and Use of
Paid Family and Medical Leave: Evidence from Four Nationally
Representative Datasets, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (Jan. 2019) .................. 17
Caitlin Myers et al., Abortion Access Dashboard,
https://experience.arcgis.com/experience/6e360741bfd84db79d5db774a1147
815 (last updated Mar. 16, 2026)............................................................................. 15
Citizen Petition from American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,
https://www.regulations.gov/document/FDA-2025-P-0377-0001 ............................. 9
Development & Approval Process: Drugs, FDA (Aug. 8, 2022),
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/development-approval-process-drugs ........................ 5, 7
FDA Adverse Event Monitoring System (AEMS), FDA (Mar. 11, 2026),
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/surveillance/fda-adverse-event-monitoringsystem-aems ............................................................................................................. 21
FDA Ctr. For Drug Eval. & Rsch., Application No. 020687Orig1s020
Summary Review (Jan. 3, 2023) .............................................................................. 11
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FDA Letter re: In-Person Dispensing Requirement in Mifepristone REMS
Program During the COVID-19 Public Health Emergency Reference:
NDA # 020687 (Apr. 12, 2021) ................................................................................. 10
FDA Letter regarding Citizen Petition Denial (Mar. 29, 2016) ................................. 11
FDA REMS Modification Rationale Review, NDA No. 020687 & ANDA
No. 91178 (Dec. 16, 2021) .................................................................................. 10, 11
FDA REMS Modification Review, NDA No. 020687/S-020 (Mar. 29, 2016) ........... 8, 9
Jason M. Lindo et al., How Far Is Too Far? New Evidence on Abortion Clinic
Closures, Access, and Abortions, 55 J. Human Resources 1137 (2020) ................. 15
Jillian McKoy, Travel Times to Abortion Facilities Have Increased Drastically
in Post-Roe Era, Bos. Univ. Sch. of Pub. Health (Nov. 23, 2022) ........................... 16
Laura Schummers et al., Abortion Safety and Use with Normally Prescribed
Mifepristone in Canada, 386 New Eng. J. Med. 57 (2022) ....................................... 9
Lauren J. Ralph et al., Comparison of No-Test Telehealth and In-Person
Medication Abortion, 332 JAMA 898 (2024) ........................................................... 12
Lauren Van Schilfgaarde et al., Tribal Nations and Abortion Access: A Path
Forward, 46 Harv. J.L. & Gender 1 (2023) ............................................................. 16
Leonardo Cely-Andrade et al., Telemedicine for the Provision of Medication
Abortion to Pregnant People at Up to Twelve Weeks of Pregnancy: A
Systematic Literature Review And Meta-Analysis, 21 Reproductive Health
136 (2024) ................................................................................................................. 12
Letter from Dr. Graham Chelius of The Society of Family Planning to FDA,
(Sept. 29, 2021) ......................................................................................................... 16
Liza Fuentes & Jenna Jerman, Distance Traveled for Abortion in the United
States and Reasons for Clinic Choice, 28 J. Women’s Health 1623 (2019) ............ 16
M. Antonia Biggs et al., Access to Reproductive Health Services Among People
with Disabilities, JAMA Network Open, Vol. 6, No. 11 (Nov. 29, 2023) ................ 15
Margot Sanger-Katz, et al., Who Gets Abortions in America?, New York Times
(Dec. 14, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/12/14/
upshot/who-gets-abortions-in-america.html ........................................................... 17
Mifepristone U.S. Post-Marketing Adverse Events Summary through
12/31/2024, FDA (2025), https://fda.gov/media/185245/download ................... 9, 11
Nat’l P’ship for Women & Families, Paid Sick Days Enhance Women’s
Abortion Access and Economic Security 3 (May 2019) ........................................... 17
New Drug Application (NDA), FDA (Jan. 21, 2022),
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/types-applications/new-drug-application-nda............... 5
- iv -
Office Memorandum to Population Council (Sept. 28, 2000), FDA,
https://wayback.archive-it.org/7993/20161024033545/http://www.fda.gov/
downloads/Drugs/DrugSafety/PostmarketDrugSafetyInformationforPatient
sandProviders/ucm111366.pdf................................................................................... 8
Questions and Answers on Mifepristone for Medical Termination of Pregnancy
Through Ten Weeks Gestation, FDA (Feb. 8, 2026), https://www.fda.gov/
drugs/postmarket-drug-safety-information-patients-andproviders/questions-and-answers-mifepristone-medical-terminationpregnancy-through-ten-weeks-gestation................................................................... 8
Reproductive Health Researches Comment Letter to FDA, UCLA Law (Aug.
27, 2025), https://law.ucla.edu/reproductive-health-researchers-commentletter-fda ................................................................................................................... 20
Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy (REMS) Single Shared System for
Mifepristone 200 mg, FDA (Jan. 2023), https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/
drugsatfda_docs/rems/Mifepristone_2023_01_03_REMS_Full.pdf ........................ 11
Selena Simmons-Duffin & Shelly Cheng, How Many Miles Do You Have to
Travel to Get Abortion Care? One Professor Maps It, NPR (June 21, 2023) .......... 15
U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., GAO-08-751, FDA Approval and Oversight of
the Drug Mifeprex (2008)....................................................................................... 7, 8
Ushma D. Upadhay, et al., Outcomes and Safety of History-Based Screening
for Medication Abortion A Retrospective Multicenter Cohort Study, 182
JAMA 482 (2022)........................................................................................................ 9
Ushma D. Upadhyay et al., Effectiveness and Safety of Telehealth Medication
Abortion in the United States, 30 Nature Med. 1191 (2024) .................................. 12
What is a Serious Adverse Event?, FDA (May 18, 2023),
https://www.fda.gov/safety/reporting-serious-problems-fda/what-seriousadverse-event ........................................................................................................... 22
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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
Amici curiae are 259 Members of Congress—47 United States Senators and
212 Members of the United States House of Representatives. 1 Amici have a special
interest in both upholding the Constitution’s separation of powers—including by
ensuring that federal administrative agencies faithfully exercise the authorities
Congress delegated to them in accordance with statutory limits—and protecting the
physical health and safety of their constituents.
Amici believe that this Court should grant an emergency stay of or vacate the
Fifth Circuit’s Order, which requires the nationwide reinstatement of the in-person
dispensing requirement for mifepristone that has not been enforced in more than five
years. The Fifth Circuit’s Order should be stayed because the relief it granted has no
basis in law, threatens the congressionally-mandated evidence-based process for
drug-regulatory decisions, and poses a serious health risk to pregnant individuals.
Mifepristone, which patients have used for more than 25 years as part of the most
common and recommended regimen for medication abortion, should not be made
more difficult to access across the entire country. The Fifth Circuit’s decision to do
so now—before the merits have even been litigated—is particularly egregious.
Accordingly, Amici respectfully urge this Court to grant an emergency stay of
or vacate the Fifth Circuit’s erroneous order.
1 The complete list of amici is located in the Appendix. Under Rule 37.6 of the Rules of this Court,
amici state that no counsel for a party wrote this brief in whole or in part. No party, party’s counsel,
or any person other than the amicus curiae, their members, or their counsel contributed money that
was intended to finance the preparation or submission of this brief.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The regulatory scheme Congress designed aims to ensure patient access to safe
and effective medications in the United States by requiring expert-led, evidencebased regulatory decisions. In 1938, Congress enacted the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act (the “Act”), which established the standards for the modern regulation
of our drug supply and designated the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”)
as the expert federal agency responsible for regulating access to new drugs. While
Congress permitted judicial review of FDA’s approval decisions, it did not invite
federal courts to short-circuit the statutorily mandated expert process, weigh
scientific evidence in the first instance, or impose sweeping burdens on access to FDAapproved medications, as the Fifth Circuit’s Order does.
FDA’s decision to eliminate the in-person dispensing requirement for
mifepristone complied with Congress’s mandate that any restrictions FDA imposes
on access to an approved medication must (a) be rooted in sound scientific evidence
and (b) not unduly burden patient access. For more than a quarter century, FDA has
repeatedly and consistently affirmed that mifepristone is safe. Over seven million
patients in the U.S. have safely used mifepristone. And as with other drugs, FDA
continues to monitor the post-marketing safety data on mifepristone—data
confirming that mifepristone is safe without regard to how it is dispensed.
FDA’s decision to lift the in-person dispensing requirement was an evidencebased exercise of its congressionally-mandated responsibility to avoid unnecessary
burdens on patient access to safe and effective drugs. Louisiana’s assertion that FDA
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was motivated by a desire to undermine state abortion restrictions after Dobbs v.
Jackson Women’s Health Organization, 597 U.S. 215 (2022), is baseless and belied by
the timeline: The in-person dispensing requirement was first suspended by court
order in 2020 in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. In April 2021, based on realworld evidence of mifepristone’s continued safe use during the injunction period, as
well as scientific literature further confirming the medication’s safety when
dispensed by mail, FDA suspended the in-person requirement for the duration of the
COVID-19 Public Health Emergency. In December 2021, based on its continued
monitoring of mifepristone’s safety under the COVID-19 nonenforcement policy, and
consistent with additional peer-reviewed studies, FDA determined that it would
permanently lift this unnecessary and burdensome requirement.
All of these
regulatory decisions occurred well before Dobbs came down—and were grounded in
the new body of evidence confirming mifepristone’s safety when dispensed by mail
that arose during the pandemic. Louisiana’s chronological error cannot justify its
attempt to reimpose an unnecessary burden on all of America, even in sovereign
states that protect abortion.
Decades after FDA’s initial approval of mifepristone and years after the inperson dispensing requirement was eliminated, the Fifth Circuit on an “emergency”
basis ordered FDA to re-impose this onerous nationwide restriction on all Americans.
Allowing that decision to remain in place undermines the science-based statutory
framework Congress commands and threatens patient access to reproductive health
care. As has been well publicized, many U.S. residents in states where abortion is
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legal live far from any reproductive health care provider. Reinstating an in-person
dispensing requirement for mifepristone exacerbates an already significant
reproductive health crisis by limiting access to the most common method of early
abortion.
Preserving evidence-based access to mifepristone, including when dispensed
by mail or retail pharmacy, is necessary to mitigate the imminent harm facing
members of the public. Women deserve access to mifepristone for reproductive health
care, and all Americans deserve integrity in the congressionally-mandated, evidencebased process for FDA’s drug regulatory decisions. Congress commanded that FDA’s
drug regulatory decisions be rooted in sound scientific evidence and prioritize patient
access to essential medications, and Amici call on this Court to give due weight to
Congress’s mandate.
ARGUMENT
I.
FDA’S DECISION TO ELIMINATE THE IN-PERSON DISPENSING
REQUIREMENT WAS BASED ON THE HIGH-QUALITY SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE THE ACT REQUIRES.
A.
Through the Act, Congress directed that FDA’s decisions be
science- and evidence-based.
Congress required FDA to review new drugs and regulate existing drugs in
accordance with established scientific principles. The centrality of sound science is
evident throughout the Act, including in FDA’s mission statement: To “promote the
public health by promptly and efficiently reviewing clinical research and taking
appropriate action on the marketing of regulated products” and ensuring that “drugs
-4-
are safe and effective.” 2 The Act directs FDA to carry out this mission by “consult[ing]
with experts in science, medicine, and public health” and collaborating with “sciencebased Federal agencies.” 3 In short, Congress designed the Act to ensure that drug
regulatory decisions are based on robust evidence.
The Act makes clear that science- and evidence-based determinations are
requisite elements of FDA’s complex drug approval and regulation processes. An
approval of a New Drug Application, for example, requires a team of FDA experts
with specialized scientific expertise—including physicians, statisticians, chemists,
pharmacologists, and other scientists—to review “full reports of investigations” and
determine that there is “substantial evidence” of safety and efficacy. 4 And Congress
defined “substantial evidence” as “evidence consisting of adequate and well-controlled
investigations, including clinical investigations, by experts qualified by scientific
training and experience to evaluate the effectiveness of the drug involved.” 5 When
science-based standards provide substantial evidence of a drug’s safety and efficacy,
2 21 U.S.C. §§ 393(b)(1)-(2).
3 21 U.S.C. §§ 393(b)(4), (c).
4 21 U.S.C. § 355(d); see also 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.50, 314.105(c); Development & Approval Process:
Drugs, FDA (Aug. 8, 2022), https://www.fda.gov/drugs/development-approval-process-drugs; New
Drug Application (NDA), FDA (Jan. 21, 2022), https://www.fda.gov/drugs/types-applications/newdrug-application-nda; 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(5)(A) (noting that all individuals who review new drug
applications should have “technical excellence, lack of bias and conflict of interest, and knowledge of
regulatory and scientific standards”).
5 21 U.S.C. § 355(d).
-5-
and none of the limited other grounds under the statute exist to refuse approval, FDA
“shall” approve it. 6
Congress requires that any decision by FDA to impose a Risk Evaluation and
Mitigation Strategy (“REMS”) must also follow the science. Congress authorized FDA
to impose REMS restrictions only after a determination that such restrictions are
“necessary to ensure that the benefits of the drug outweigh the risks of the drug,”
considering specified, evidence-based factors including the seriousness of the
condition to be treated, the expected benefit of the drug, and the seriousness of any
known or potential adverse events related to the drug. 7 A post-approval REMS is
authorized only if there is “new safety information” or a “signal of a serious risk,”
established by “scientific data,” such as “information derived from a clinical trial,” or
“peer-reviewed biomedical literature.” 8 And Congress limited FDA’s authority to
impose “elements to assure safe use,” the most onerous kind of REMS—such as the
in-person dispensing requirement (“IPDR”) at issue here—to only those drugs for
which it is so necessary that the drug’s approval must otherwise be “withdrawn.” 9
Even after a REMS has been imposed, FDA may—and in some circumstances
must—continually assess the REMS strategies and goals and modify the REMS if
The statute provides only seven narrow grounds for refusing approval: five focus on lack
of sufficient safety or efficacy evidence, one concerns patent information, and one concerns misleading
labeling.
6 See id.
7 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(a)(1) (describing initial approval REMS); 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(a)(2) (describing
post-approval REMS).
8 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(b)(3) (defining “new safety information”); 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(b)(6) (defining
what evidence is permissible to show a “signal of a serious risk”).
9 21 U.S.C. 355-1(f)(1)(A).
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necessary. 10 The statutory requirements include that, in assessing a REMS, FDA
must evaluate whether each REMS and each REMS element continues to meet its
goals. 11
The Act also specifically contemplates modification of a drug’s REMS,
including removal of specific elements such as an IPDR, in order to, among other
things, “minimize the burden on the health care delivery system of complying with
the strategy.” 12
In short, Congress has mandated a rigorous, science-based system for drug
approvals and regulation. Neither FDA nor the federal courts have authority to
impose restrictions that are not grounded in sound scientific evidence.
B.
FDA’s repeated determination that mifepristone is safe is
supported by peer-reviewed research and years of real patient
experience.
Substantial evidence establishes that mifepristone is a safe and effective drug.
FDA first approved mifepristone in September 2000, based on peer-reviewed research
and extensive clinical trials showing that mifepristone is safe and effective and that
its health benefits outweighed its risks. 13 That approval came after a four-year
review process with three separate clinical trials involving more than 4,000 patients
and a unanimous advisory committee vote in favor of approval. 14 As FDA put it, its
10 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(g)(2).
11 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(g)(3).
12 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(g)(4).
13 See 2000 FDA Approval Letter, Compl. Ex. 24, ECF No. 1-24; see also Development & Approval
Process: Drugs, FDA (Aug. 8, 2022), https://www.fda.gov/drugs/development-approval-process-drugs;
U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., GAO-08-751, FDA Approval and Oversight of the Drug Mifeprex at 15–
16, 26 (2008) [hereinafter, “GAO-08-751”].
14 See Office Memorandum to Population Council (Sept. 28, 2000), FDA, https://wayback.archive-
it.org/7993/20161024033545/http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DrugSafety/
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initial approval of mifepristone was “based on a thorough and comprehensive review
of the scientific evidence presented” that found mifepristone was “safe and effective
for its indicated use.” 15 FDA was required to approve it. 16
FDA initially approved mifepristone with certain restrictions. 17 After fifteen
years of data from millions of patient uses showing that serious adverse events are
“extremely
rare”
and additional
scientific evidence
further demonstrating
mifepristone’s safety, FDA began, consistent with the Act’s requirements, to
eliminate some unnecessary REMS restrictions. Specifically, in 2016, FDA modified
the REMS to permit qualified non-physician practitioners to become certified
prescribers and to remove a REMS requirement that prescribers report non-fatal
adverse events potentially associated with mifepristone. 18
In making these modifications, FDA’s scientific and medical reviewers
examined numerous articles “published widely in peer-reviewed medical journals,”
independent clinical studies on “well over 30,000 patients,” and adverse event
reporting across more than 2.5 million patient uses in the U.S. between 2000 and
PostmarketDrugSafetyInformationforPatientsandProviders/ucm111366.pdf; see also GAO-08-751 at
15–16, 26.
15 Questions and Answers on Mifepristone for Medical Termination of Pregnancy Through Ten
Weeks Gestation, FDA (Feb. 8, 2026), https://www.fda.gov/drugs/postmarket-drug-safety-informationpatients-and-providers/questions-and-answers-mifepristone-medical-termination-pregnancythrough-ten-weeks-gestation.
16 See 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(d) and 355(c)(1) (in the absence of a specified ground for denial, FDA
“shall” approve a drug application).
These restrictions, original adopted under Subpart H (21 C.F.R. § 314.520), were later
incorporated into FDA’s 2011 REMS. See 2011 REMS for NDA 020687 Mifeprex (mifepristone)
Tablets, 200 mg, (June 2011).
17
18 FDA REMS Modification Review, NDA No. 020687/S-020, at 6, 8, 88 (Mar. 29, 2016).
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2016. 19
FDA relied on mifepristone’s stable risk profile over fifteen years of
mandatory serious-adverse-event prescriber reporting to conclude that such
reporting was no longer necessary.
FDA explained that “the safety profile of
[mifepristone] is well-characterized,” “no new safety concerns” had arisen in recent
years, and “the known serious risks occur rarely.” 20 That decision was supported by
the weight of scientific evidence, as the Act requires. 21
C.
FDA’s decision to eliminate the in-person dispensing
requirement is supported by substantial evidence that
mifepristone remains safe when dispensed by mail or pharmacy.
The volumes of high-quality research and real-world data amassed over the
past 25 years establish that mifepristone is a safe treatment whether it is dispensed
in person or not. 22 Decades of reliable science and data confirming mifepristone’s
safety and efficacy supported FDA’s 2021 and 2023 decisions to first suspend and
then permanently eliminate the IPDR.
A federal court suspended enforcement of the IPDR from July 2020 through
19 Id. at 13, 62, 84.
20 Id. at 8.
See Citizen Petition from American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,
https://www.regulations.gov/document/FDA-2025-P-0377-0001 (explaining evidence demonstrating
safety of mifepristone).
21
22 See, e.g., NDA No. 020687 & ANDA No. 091178, Mifepristone U.S. Post-Marketing Adverse
Events Summary through 12/31/2024, FDA (2025), https://fda.gov/media/185245/download; Laura
Schummers et al., Abortion Safety and Use with Normally Prescribed Mifepristone in Canada, 386
New Eng. J. Med. 57, 57 (2022); Analysis of Medication Abortion Risk and the FDA Report
“Mifepristone US Post-Marketing Adverse Events Summary Through 12/31/2024”, Advancing New
Standards in Reproductive Health (May 15, 2025); Ushma D. Upadhay, et al., Outcomes and Safety of
History-Based Screening for Medication Abortion A Retrospective Multicenter Cohort Study, 182 JAMA
482, 487 (2022).
-9-
January 2021, due to the COVID-19 pandemic. 23 In April 2021, based in part on realworld experience of mifepristone’s continued safety while that injunction was in
place, and consistent with FDA’s obligation under the Act to consider burdens on
patient access, FDA announced that it would suspend enforcement of mifepristone’s
IPDR for the duration of the pandemic. 24 This decision was based on substantial
evidence, including adverse-event and clinical outcome data showing that
mifepristone remained safe without the IPDR. 25
In December 2021, after reviewing additional published literature, safety
information, and adverse-event data, FDA announced that it would permanently
remove the IPDR. 26
Consistent with the Act, this decision was based on large
amounts of high-quality scientific data, including REMS assessment data; data from
the FDA Adverse Event Reporting System (“FAERS”) during the non-enforcement
period, which showed no increase in adverse events; and numerous published studies
encompassing tens of thousands of patients that assessed safety outcomes with
23 Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. FDA, 472 F. Supp. 3d 183, 218 (D. Md. 2020), order
clarified sub nom., 2020 WL 8167535 (D. Md. Aug. 19, 2020) (relying on, inter alia, a “comprehensive
report on the safety of abortion by the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, an
independent, nonpartisan group, which found that there is no evidence that the dispensing or taking
of [medication abortion pills] requires the physical presence of a clinician.”) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
24 FDA Letter re: In-Person Dispensing Requirement in Mifepristone REMS Program During the
COVID-19 Public Health Emergency Reference: NDA # 020687 (Apr. 12, 2021), Ex. 1 to Brief of Former
and Acting Commissioners of the U.S. Food and Drug Admin. as Amici Curiae Opposing Plaintiffs’
Motion For Preliminary Injunction, ECF No. 208-1.
25 Id.
26 See FDA REMS Modification Rationale Review, NDA No. 020687 & ANDA No. 91178, at 4 (Dec.
16, 2021) (noting that FDA would remove the IPDR following FDA’s “comprehensive review” of
scientific data, including published literature, safety information collected during pandemic, one-year
REMS assessment report of the Mifepristone REMS Program, adverse event data, and information
provided by advocacy groups, individuals, and applicants).
- 10 -
different mifepristone distribution systems, including at pharmacies and by mail. 27
This body of scientific data “generally support[ed] a conclusion that dispensing by
mail is safe” and that “mifepristone will remain safe, and efficacy will be maintained
if the [IPDR] is removed.” 28
In January 2023, FDA amended the mifepristone REMS to formally remove
the IPDR and add a new pharmacy certification requirement. 29 Decades of data
continue to confirm mifepristone’s safety and the rarity of serious complications. A
recent FDA summary report, for example, found that among the patients who used
mifepristone in the United States between 2000 and 2024, only 0.008% experienced
blood loss requiring transfusions, 0.006% experienced an infection, and 0.001%
experienced a severe infection. 30
That same report shows that mifepristone-
associated deaths are incredibly low (0.00048%), and FDA has repeatedly made clear
that there is no evidence showing that mifepristone caused any of these deaths. 31
27 Id. at 10.
28 Id. at 23, 39.
29 FDA Ctr. For Drug Eval. & Rsch., Application No. 020687Orig1s020 Summary Review (Jan. 3,
2023), Compl. Ex. 50, ECF No. 1-50; see also Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy (REMS) Single
Shared System for Mifepristone 200 mg, FDA (Jan. 2023), https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/
drugsatfda_docs/rems/Mifepristone_2023_01_03_REMS_Full.pdf.
The January 2023 REMS
modifications followed additional statutorily-required consultation with the drug sponsors. See 21
U.S.C. § 355-1(g)(4)(B).
30 Mifepristone U.S. Post-Marketing Adverse Events Summary, supra n.22.
It is important to note
that this report does not purport to establish a causal link between the recorded deaths and
mifepristone, explaining that fatalities were included in the summary report “regardless of causal
attribution to mifepristone.” Id.
31 See, e.g., FDA Letter Regarding Citizen Petition Denial, at 25-26 n.69 (Mar. 29, 2016),
https://www.regulations.gov/document/FDA-2002-P-0364-0002 (FDA concluding that the “critical risk
factor” for certain rare serious infections after mifepristone use “[wa]s pregnancy itself,” not
mifepristone); Mifepristone 2023 Labeling and Medication Guide, at 1, 14, 16 (mifepristone label
noting that “serious and sometimes fatal infections or bleeding” can arise whenever the pregnant
uterus is evacuated, whether by “miscarriage, surgical abortion, medical abortion, or childbirth”).
- 11 -
Indeed, “[n]o causal relationship between [mifepristone] and misoprostol use and an
increased risk of infection or death has been established.” 32
Nor is there any evidence that serious adverse events have increased since
FDA eliminated the IPDR.
To the contrary, research published since the 2023
decision continues to demonstrate that mifepristone is safe and effective without the
IPDR, including when it is prescribed via telemedicine and dispensed by mail or
pharmacy. 33 One study demonstrated that the rate of serious adverse events for
patients who obtained mifepristone by mail after a telemedicine visit, rather than in
person, is comparable and, for either method of dispensing, extremely low. 34
Numerous other studies on telemedicine medication abortions have confirmed that
safety and effectiveness rates are similar whether mifepristone was dispensed in
person or by mail. 35
Evidence of mifepristone’s safety and efficacy is so well established that a
federal court recently found in Purcell v. Kennedy that FDA acted arbitrarily and
32 Mifepristone 2023 Labeling and Medication Guide, at 2, 5.
33 Ushma D. Upadhyay et al., Effectiveness and Safety of Telehealth Medication Abortion in the
United States, 30 Nature Med. 1191, 1191 (2024) (“[M]edication abortion [delivered through
telemedicine care] is effective, safe, and comparable to published rates of in-person medication
abortion care.”).
34 See, e.g., Lauren J. Ralph et al., Comparison of No-Test Telehealth and In-Person Medication
Abortion, 332 JAMA 898, 902 (2024) (finding that the rate of serious adverse events for patients who
used telehealth and were sent mifepristone by mail was 1.5%, compared to 1.4% for the group with inperson pickup).
35 Upadhay, supra n.22 at 482-91 (finding “similarly high effectiveness and safety rates comparing
patients who received medications in-person vs by mail” and concluding that “mifepristone can be
dispensed safely either in person or by mail”); Leonardo Cely-Andrade et al., Telemedicine for the
Provision of Medication Abortion to Pregnant People at Up to Twelve Weeks of Pregnancy: A Systematic
Literature Review And Meta-Analysis, 21 Reproductive Health 136, at 18 (2024) (analyzing nearly two
dozen published articles and concluding that there are no significant safety differences between
telehealth and in-person abortion care).
- 12 -
capriciously in deciding to maintain other REMS requirements for mifepristone in
2023, even after lifting the IPDR.
In other words, the court found that FDA
continues to subject mifepristone today to more stringent REMS restrictions
than are justified by the scientific evidence. 36 The court recognized that a wealth of
high-quality evidence demonstrates that mifepristone remains extremely safe when
regulated as other prescription drugs are (i.e., without special REMS restrictions).
The court highlighted “statements from preeminent medical societies urging
elimination of the mifepristone REMS” and “a Canadian study examining the effects
of [Canada’s] removal of REMS-like restrictions on mifepristone,” which found that
adverse events and complications did not increase when Canada eliminated its
special restrictions on mifepristone altogether. 37
II.
THE ACT REQUIRES THAT A REMS NOT UNDULY BURDEN
PATIENT ACCESS.
A.
In removing the in-person dispensing requirement, FDA
complied with its congressional mandate not to unduly burden
patient access.
Through the Act, Congress commanded that FDA cannot impose the most
burdensome restrictions (such as an IPDR requirement) unless that restriction is
“commensurate with the specific serious risk and [does] not unduly burden patient
36 Purcell v. Kennedy, 2025 WL 3101785, at *23–27 (D. Haw. Oct. 30, 2025).
Notably, another
federal court has also recently recognized that the Department of Health and Human Services must
adhere to evidence-based science in public health decision-making. See Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v.
Kennedy, 2026 WL 733828, at *1–2 (D. Mass. Mar. 16, 2026) (staying revisions to childhood
immunization schedule because the decision-maker had disregarded scientific methods).
37 Purcell, 2025 WL 3101785, at *23 (internal quotation marks omitted).
- 13 -
access.” 38
FDA must “consider[] in particular . . . patients who have difficulty
accessing health care (such as patients in rural or medically underserved areas); and
patients with functional limitations.” 39 Patient access is paramount: if FDA imposes
such restrictions, it must “periodically reevaluate them to ensure the restrictions are
well calibrated to balance safety, access, and the burden on the health care delivery
system.” 40
FDA’s consideration of patient burden when eliminating the IPDR was thus
mandatory, not discretionary. FDA would have violated its statutory obligation if it
had failed to consider the burdens the IPDR imposes on patient access and to modify
the REMS accordingly. Its decision to do so was appropriate.
B.
The in-person dispensing requirement unduly burdens patient
access to mifepristone.
Requiring a patient to obtain a medication at a hospital or medical office rather
than by mail or at a pharmacy significantly burdens access to that medication. The
Act therefore prohibits FDA from demanding it without substantial justification, and
here no such justification exists. The Fifth Circuit’s Order is untethered to any
legitimate safety concern and would impose onerous burdens on pregnant women
nationwide—the exact opposite of what Congress commands FDA to do.
Even within one’s own state, traveling to and from a provider to obtain
mifepristone requires time and imposes costs, such as gas or transportation fares,
38 Washington v. FDA, 108 F.4th 1163, 1169 (9th Cir. 2024) (internal quotation marks omitted);
21 U.S.C. § 355-1(f)(2).
39 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(f)(2)(C)(ii)-(iii).
40 Washington, 108 F.4th at 1169 (internal quotation marks omitted); 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(f)(5)(B).
- 14 -
childcare, and lost wages. This reality is true regardless of where the patient lives,
but the burden grows with distance—potentially requiring more expensive travel,
such as airfare or lodging to stay overnight.
Distance from an in-person provider is a significant barrier to accessing
abortion care. 41
Research shows that even moderate increases in distance to a
provider negatively impacts abortion access—e.g., traveling just 50-100 miles
decreases abortion rates by 16%, and rates declined further with greater distances
(28% at 100-150 miles, 38% at 150-200 miles, and 44% beyond 200 miles). 42 And as
of April 2023, one study had found that “the average American is 86 miles from a
provider.” 43 Another study found that 50.7% of people with disabilities experienced
logistical
barriers
to
accessing
reproductive
health
care,
which
included
transportation burdens, compared to 29.7% of people without disabilities. 44
Eliminating the IPDR minimizes serious burdens in accessing mifepristone and is
thus consistent with the Act’s statutory command that FDA consider “in
particular . . . patients who have difficulty accessing health care (such as patients in
rural or medically underserved areas)” and “patients with functional limitations.” 45,46
41 See Caitlin Myers et al., Abortion Access Dashboard, https://experience.arcgis.com/experience/
6e360741bfd84db79d5db774a1147815 (last updated Mar. 16, 2026).
42 Jason M. Lindo et al., How Far Is Too Far? New Evidence on Abortion Clinic Closures, Access,
and Abortions, 55 J. Human Resources 1137, 1152–53 (2020).
Selena Simmons-Duffin & Shelly Cheng, How Many Miles Do You Have to Travel to Get
Abortion Care? One Professor Maps It, NPR (June 21, 2023).
43
44 M. Antonia Biggs et al., Access to Reproductive Health Services Among People with Disabilities,
JAMA Network Open, Vol. 6, No. 11 at 6–7 (Nov. 29, 2023).
45 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(f)(2)(C)(ii)–(iii).
46 See Purcell, 2025 WL 3101785, at *18-19 (discussing need to address burdens of in-person
dispensing and related requirements).
- 15 -
Indeed, studies show that patients in rural areas are eight times more likely than
patients living in urban areas to have to travel more than 100 miles to access abortion
care (36% to 4%). 47 The Fifth Circuit’s nationwide order—a federal requirement that
every mifepristone patient in the country travel to a hospital or medical office just to
be handed a pill—imposes exactly the kind of burden on patients that Congress
prohibited, particularly for patients in rural or medically underserved areas. 48
Patients suffer from these financial burdens, but so does the health care
delivery system, which Congress also mandates FDA to consider in its burden
analysis. 49 The IPDR reduces the quantity of mifepristone providers, making it even
harder to find and reach one. This is because the IPDR imposes an “extremely
unusual” burden on providers “to serve as, in effect, both prescribers and
pharmacists” by stocking and dispensing mifepristone onsite at their health center,
rather than issuing a prescription to be filled at a pharmacy. 50 As FDA recognized,
these burdens significantly decreased the number of qualified providers offering
mifepristone, with evidence showing that provider volume would “potentially
doubl[e]” with elimination of the IPDR. 51 The IPDR also “burdens the health care
47 Liza Fuentes & Jenna Jerman, Distance Traveled for Abortion in the United States and Reasons
for Clinic Choice, 28 J. Women’s Health 1623, 1627 (2019).
48 See, e.g., Lauren Van Schilfgaarde et al., Tribal Nations and Abortion Access: A Path Forward,
46 Harv. J.L. & Gender 1 (2023); Jillian McKoy, Travel Times to Abortion Facilities Have Increased
Drastically in Post-Roe Era, Bos. Univ. Sch. of Pub. Health (Nov. 23, 2022); Alexa Delbosc & Rahman
Shafi, What Do We Know About Immigrants’ Travel Behaviour? A Systematic Literature Review and
Proposed Conceptual Framework, 43 Transport Revs. 914 (2023); Fuentes, supra n.47.
49 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(f)(2)(D).
50 Letter from Dr. Graham Chelius of The Society of Family Planning to FDA, at 4 (Sept. 29, 2021).
51 See id. (noting that “the proportion of medication abortion providers would likely double if
clinicians were permitted to prescribe mifepristone through a pharmacy”).
- 16 -
delivery system and severely reduces patient access because of the challenges of
obtaining institutional approval to dispense mifepristone onsite, and the complicated
logistics necessary to do so.” 52 Eliminating the IPDR is thus consistent with the Act’s
statutory command that FDA “minimize the burden on the health care delivery
system” and ensure that a REMS “not be unduly burdensome on patient access.” 53
The IPDR also imposes other real-world economic burdens. A majority of
women seeking abortion care already have children, meaning the IPDR forces them
to incur additional child care and family accommodation costs while traveling to
access mifepristone. 54 Additionally, many people seeking abortion care lack paid time
off, meaning the IPDR forces them to lose wages and employment opportunities to
access this care. 55 And the unduly burdensome consequences of the Fifth Circuit’s
Order will disproportionately burden people of color and low-income Americans.
Black and Hispanic employees, for example, are less likely to have paid parental leave
and paid sick leave benefits than white employees. 56 For people residing in states
that permit telemedicine abortion care, ensuring access to this safe, effective, and
52 Id. (noting that “fewer than 0.1% of FDA-approved drugs must be dispensed in a hospital,
medical office, or clinic”).
53 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(f)(2)(C)-(D).
54 Margot Sanger-Katz, et al., Who Gets Abortions in America?, New York Times (Dec. 14, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/12/14/upshot/who-gets-abortions-in-america.html.
55 See Nat’l P’ship for Women & Families, Paid Sick Days Enhance Women’s Abortion Access and
Economic Security 3, 5 (May 2019) (finding that “people without paid sick days are three times more
likely than people with paid sick days to delay or go without medical care for themselves” and that
women lacking paid sick days face “lost wages and possibly job loss”).
56 See Ann P. Bartel et al., Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Access to and Use of Paid Family and
Medical Leave: Evidence from Four Nationally Representative Datasets, U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics (Jan. 2019).
- 17 -
legal medication without requiring in-office dispensing alleviates these burdens.
These burdens are not just economic—they can make the difference in whether
a patient can access an abortion at all. Navigating travel-related costs and logistical
barriers can delay patients past the point in pregnancy when medication abortion is
available.
This might force them into a more invasive, resource-intensive, and
expensive procedure, which may itself only be available at a greater distance. 57 This
has dramatic consequences on the lives of everyday Americans seeking to make
important reproductive health care decisions for their families and dire consequences
on health care systems nationwide—both of which are already strained. 58
C.
This Court should not permit Louisiana to unduly burden
nationwide patient access to medication.
Reinstating the IPDR would needlessly force patients to travel farther and
spend more time and money to access a safe medication in person where telemedicine
abortion care is legally protected by state law. FDA carefully evaluated extensive
real-world evidence and determined that in-person dispensing of mifepristone does
not enhance patient safety, while removing the requirement reduces burdens on
patients and the health care system. This Court should stay the Fifth Circuit’s Order
57 See, e.g., Am. College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Medication Abortion Up to 70 Days of
Gestation, Practice Bulletin No. 225 (Oct. 2020).
58 See Andrés Argüello & Andrea Ducas, The Big, ‘Beautiful’ Bill’s Health Care Cuts Would Drive
Up Uncompensated Care and Threaten Vulnerable Hospitals, Center for American Progress,
https://www.americanprogress.org/article/the-big-beautiful-bills-health-care-cuts-would-drive-upuncompensated-care-and-threaten-vulnerable-hospitals/ (estimating that recent Republican policy
will result in 13.7 million Americans losing health insurance and providers to face an estimated $31
billion in uncompensated care costs).
- 18 -
because it undermines Congress’s mandate and unduly burdens patient access to this
medication all across America.
Reinstating the IPDR severely limits access to mifepristone and denies
medically appropriate care to patients far beyond Louisiana’s borders, exacerbating
existing inequities in maternal health for patients of color, patients with low income,
patients with disabilities, and patients living in rural areas—the populations most
likely to rely on telemedicine care. 59 Indeed, more than half of U.S. counties do not
have a hospital that provides obstetric care; 35% do not even have a single birthing
facility or obstetric clinician. 60
Mifepristone has been used as part of the most common and recommended
regimen for medication abortion for more than 25 years and has been available
without FDA’s IPDR for more than five years. Health care delivery systems have
adapted and created new infrastructure in reliance on that evidence-based decision.
Allowing Louisiana to force a nationwide rollback of this status quo would have a
“needlessly chaotic and disruptive effect.” 61 The impact would be acute in states with
legal protections for abortion under state law. Such an injunction would further
burden already taxed health care systems, harm residents of those States, and
undermine their sovereign policy choices. Many states and private providers have
59 See generally Ashely Stoneburner, et al., Nowhere to Go: Maternity Care Deserts Across the US,
March of Dimes (2024).
60 Id. at 8 (noting that approximately 6 in 10 of these counties are rural, less populated areas).
61 Benisek v. Lamone, 585 U.S. 155, 161 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted).
- 19 -
invested in infrastructure to deliver medication abortion via telemedicine—
investments that would be undermined by the reinstatement of in-person dispensing.
FDA’s decision to eliminate the IPDR complied with the Congressionallymandated requirement to minimize burdens, and Louisiana’s request would force
FDA to reimpose restrictions that violate the statute.
III.
LOUISIANA’S CRITICISM OF FDA’S DECISION TO ELIMINATE THE
IN-PERSON DISPENSING REQUIREMENT LACKS SCIENTIFIC
MERIT AND IS THEREFORE FORECLOSED BY THE ACT.
A.
The Act requires FDA to make decisions based on science, not
flawed, ideological publications.
Congress created FDA to ensure that subject-matter experts review the safety
of drugs and medical devices, relying on scientifically sound evidence. 62 As detailed
above, FDA eliminated the IPDR because the evidence showed that patient health
and safety will be protected while “assur[ing] access and minimiz[ing] burden” on “the
health care delivery system,” thus complying with Congress’s requirements. 63
Unlike the sound scientific evidence supporting FDA’s decision to remove the
IPDR, Respondents’ attacks on mifepristone’s safety are based on so-called studies
that lack scientific rigor and appear driven by a political agenda rather than science,
as has been amply explained by numerous expert researchers. 64
Congress tasked FDA with making evidence-based decisions about drug safety
62 S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 590 U.S. 965, 967 (2020) (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring).
63 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(f)(2).
64 See Reproductive Health Researches Comment Letter to FDA at 7-19, UCLA Law (Aug. 27,
2025), https://law.ucla.edu/reproductive-health-researchers-comment-letter-fda.
- 20 -
and ensuring that any restrictions, including limits on how drugs can be prescribed
and dispensed, are justified by the science and account for patients’ ability to access
necessary care. Decades of data confirming mifepristone’s safety supported FDA’s
decision to eliminate the IPDR. This Court should reject Respondents’ invitation to
use self-serving and flawed publications as an excuse to override sound, sciencebacked conclusions.
B.
FDA’s use of FAERS data was appropriate under the Act.
FDA appropriately considered FAERS data in making its determination to
eliminate the IPDR. Respondents’ claims otherwise are baseless and ignore that
FDA’s reliance on FAERS data is standard practice for FDA’s post-marketing
surveillance of all approved drugs. 65
When FDA was reviewing whether it could safely remove the IPDR for
mifepristone, it analyzed FAERS data for the period January 27, 2020, through
September 30, 2021; for more than half of that period, the IPDR was not enforced. 66
Over that nearly-two-year period, there were only eight adverse events reported in
FAERS for patients who had taken mifepristone, with no difference in safety outcome
See, e.g., FDA Adverse Event Monitoring System (AEMS), FDA (Mar. 11, 2026),
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/surveillance/fda-adverse-event-monitoring-system-aems (“The [FAERS]
database is designed to support the FDA’s post-marketing safety surveillance program for drug and
therapeutic biologic products.”); see also FDA Adverse Event Reporting System (FAERS) Public
Dashboard FAQs, FDA, https://fis.fda.gov/extensions/FPD-FAQ/FPD-FAQ.html#_Toc514144622
(“FAERS is a useful tool for FDA for activities such as looking for new safety concerns that might be
related to a marketed product, evaluating a manufacturer’s compliance to reporting regulations and
responding to outside requests for information.”).
65
66 FDA Letter to Am. Ass’n of Pro-Life Obstetricians & Gynecologist (Dec. 16, 2021), Compl. Ex.
10, ECF No. 1-10 at 27 [hereinafter “ECF No. 1-10”].
- 21 -
based on where the medication was dispensed. 67 The FAERS data provided strong
support for FDA’s conclusion that there had not been an uptick in the rate of adverse
events or other emerging safety trends when the IPDR was not being enforced. 68
Respondents have suggested that the FAERS data supporting removal of the
IPDR was unreliable because FDA does not require prescribing clinicians to report
all potentially associated adverse events in patients taking mifepristone. But again,
that is the case for nearly every drug—as a general practice, FDA requires
manufacturers, not individual physicians, to report any serious adverse events,
though prescribing physicians can still voluntarily report adverse events. 69 And
unlike nearly every other drug it regulates, FDA still requires prescribers to report
fatalities when a patient takes mifepristone—without any evidence of causation.
Respondents have also latched onto FDA’s previous acknowledgements that
FAERS data is not comprehensive or perfect to argue that such data cannot be used
to support safety determinations for regulated drugs. But FAERS data does not have
to be perfect to have value. 70 And while it is true that FAERS is not designed to
FDA defines “adverse event” as “any untoward medical occurrence associated with the use
of a drug in humans, whether or not considered drug related.” 21 C.F.R. § 312.32(a). That definition
makes clear that an adverse event need not necessarily be caused by the drug, but simply that the
event occurred. Id.
67 Id.
68 ECF No. 1-10 at 28.
69 See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.80 and 314.81 (requiring drug manufacturers collect and report to
FDA information about adverse drug experiences). An adverse event is considered serious if it results
in death, a substantial risk of death, a prolonged hospital stay, a congenital anomaly or birth defect,
or permanent impairment or damage, or requires medical intervention to prevent such damage. See
What is a Serious Adverse Event?, FDA (May 18, 2023), https://www.fda.gov/safety/reporting-seriousproblems-fda/what-serious-adverse-event.
70 See, e.g., FCC v. Prometheus Radio Project, 592 U.S. 414, 427 (2021) (explaining that agency
need not have perfect data to support its decisions).
- 22 -
capture every adverse event related to a drug, FDA takes that fact into account when
reviewing the data. Here, FDA corroborated the FAERS data by cross-referencing it
with adverse event summaries that were submitted by mifepristone’s manufacturers,
which included the same eight events that were reflected in FAERS. 71 FDA then
conducted a review of published medical literature to search for additional adverse
event reports across the relevant period and found none, confirming the
reasonableness of relying on the FAERS data. 72 This information, combined with
decades of data showing that mifepristone is a safe medication and that adverse
events are very rare, was sufficient to support FDA’s decision to remove the IPDR.
A finding that it is arbitrary and capricious for FDA to rely on FAERS data
would have far-reaching consequences on the agency’s practices for monitoring drug
safety beyond just mifepristone. FDA uses FAERS as the primary source of adverse
event reporting for virtually all drugs that it regulates. FDA has determined that
manufacturer-reporting generates sufficient data to keep the agency informed about
whether there have been changes to a drug’s safety profile. This Court should not
allow litigants to exploit alleged limitations of FAERS data as a path to challenging
FDA decisions and undermine the system Congress and FDA established.
C.
Louisiana should not be able to hijack the science-based REMS
system Congress designed to force its policy choices onto others.
The obvious flaws in Respondents’ criticism of the 2023 REMS reflect a larger
problem with its case: Louisiana sought—and the Fifth Circuit granted—an order
71 ECF No. 1-10 at 28.
72 Id. at 27.
- 23 -
that contradicts congressional mandates, overrides FDA’s well-reasoned, databacked decision to remove the IPDR, and imposes unnecessary barriers to essential
care—nationwide. But that is not up to Louisiana. The efforts of other states to
protect and expand access to abortion generally, and to medication abortion
specifically, within their borders are a result of the “constitutional processes of
democratic self-government.” 73 The Fifth Circuit’s Order would undermine those
processes by forcing FDA to reinstate—against scientific evidence and statutory
requirements—the IPDR for mifepristone.
Louisiana relies on Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization to argue
that FDA’s regulations cannot override state-level prohibitions on abortion. That
reliance is misplaced for several reasons. First, FDA’s REMS authority is limited to
assessing whether a restriction “is necessary to ensure that the benefits of the drug
outweigh the risks of the drug.” 74 FDA does not—and under the system Congress
designed, is not authorized to—consider the regulatory or enforcement priorities of
individual States when assessing whether to impose or modify a REMS.
Second, the timeline demonstrates that FDA did not remove the IPDR to
frustrate state abortion prohibitions. The requirement was first suspended by court
order in 2020 during the pandemic and then was subject to an April 2021 nonenforcement determination—both occurring well before Dobbs was handed down.
FDA likewise initiated its 2021 review of mifepristone’s REMS, and reached its
73 Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, 597 U.S. 215, 346 (2022)
concurring).
74 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(a)(1).
- 24 -
(Kavanaugh, J.,
evidence-based decision to permanently remove the IPDR, well before Dobbs was
decided. There is simply no evidence supporting Louisiana’s claims that the agency’s
scientific evaluation of the IPDR was motivated by state abortion bans.
Third, FDA’s decision to eliminate the IPDR does not prevent Louisiana or
similarly situated States from enforcing their own laws restricting abortion (though
the undersigned disagree with those laws). Respondents’ principal objection is that
other States have made different policy choices than Louisiana.
But “each
sovereignty is free to determine what conduct shall be proscribed within its
jurisdiction,” and the “wrong committed by violating such proscription” does not
automatically cross state lines. 75
This Court should not permit Louisiana to
weaponize its policy disagreements with sister States to force FDA to violate its
statutory obligation not to unduly burden patient access to medication nationwide.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Amici Members of Congress respectfully request
that this Court grant an emergency stay of the Fifth Circuit’s erroneous Order.
Dated: May 4, 2026
Respectfully submitted,
ABBY F. RUDZIN,
Counsel of Record
O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP
1301 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10019
arudzin@omm.com
Counsel for Lead Amici
75 Farmland Dairies v. Barber, 65 N.Y.2d 51, 56-57 (1985); see also Dobbs, 597 U.S. at 346
(Kavanaugh J. concurring).
- 25 -
APPENDIX
TABLE OF CONTENTS
List of Amici Curiae ..................................................................................................... 1a
-i-
LIST OF AMICI CURIAE 259 MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
47 United States Senators
Majority Leader Charles E. Schumer
Sen. Patty Murray
Sen. Richard J. Durbin
Sen. Ron Wyden
Sen. Angela D. Alsobrooks
Sen. Tammy Baldwin
Sen. Michael F. Bennet
Sen. Richard Blumenthal
Sen. Lisa Blunt Rochester
Sen. Cory A. Booker
Sen. Maria Cantwell
Sen. Christopher A. Coons
Sen. Catherine Cortez Masto
Sen. Tammy Duckworth
Sen. John Fetterman
Sen. Ruben Gallego
Sen. Kirsten Gillibrand
Sen. Margaret Wood Hassan
Sen. Martin Heinrich
Sen. John W. Hickenlooper
Sen. Mazie K. Hirono
- 1a -
Sen. Tim Kaine
Sen. Mark Kelly
Sen. Andy Kim
Sen. Angus S. King, Jr.
Sen. Amy Klobuchar
Sen. Ben Ray Luján
Sen. Edward J. Markey
Sen. Jeffrey A. Merkley
Sen. Christopher S. Murphy
Sen. Jon Ossoff
Sen. Alex Padilla
Sen. Gary C. Peters
Sen. Jack Reed
Sen. Jacky Rosen
Sen. Bernard Sanders
Sen. Brian Schatz
Sen. Adam B. Schiff
Sen. Jeanne Shaheen
Sen. Elissa Slotkin
Sen. Tina Smith
Sen. Chris Van Hollen
Sen. Mark Warner
- 2a -
Sen. Raphael Warnock
Sen. Elizabeth Warren
Sen. Peter Welch
Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse
- 3a -
212 Members of the United States House of Representatives
Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries
Rep. Katherine Clark
Rep. Frank Pallone, Jr.
Rep. Jamie Raskin
Rep. Diana DeGette
Rep. Ayanna Pressley
Rep. Alma S. Adams
Rep. Pete Aguilar
Rep. Gabe Amo
Rep. Yassamin Ansari
Rep. Jake Auchincloss
Rep. Becca Balint
Rep. Nanette Barragán
Rep. Joyce Beatty
Rep. Wesley Bell
Rep. Ami Bera, M.D.
Rep. Donald S. Beyer Jr.
Rep. Sanford D. Bishop, Jr.
Rep. Suzanne Bonamici
Rep. Brendan F. Boyle
Rep. Shontel Brown
Rep. Julia Brownley
Rep. Nikki Budzinski
- 4a -
Rep. Janelle S. Bynum
Rep. Salud Carbajal
Rep. André Carson
Rep. Troy A. Carter Sr.
Rep. Greg Casar
Rep. Ed Case
Rep. Sean Casten
Rep. Kathy Castor
Rep. Joaquin Castro
Rep. Judy Chu
Rep. Gilbert R. Cisneros, Jr.
Rep. Yvette D. Clarke
Rep. Emanuel Cleaver, II
Rep. James E. Clyburn
Rep. Steve Cohen
Rep. Dr. Herb Conaway
Rep. J. Luis Correa
Rep. Jim Costa
Rep. Joe Courtney
Rep. Angie Craig
Rep. Jasmine Crockett
Rep. Jason Crow
Rep. Sharice L. Davids
Rep. Danny K. Davis
- 5a -
Rep. Donald G. Davis
Rep. Madeleine Dean
Rep. Rosa L. DeLauro
Rep. Suzan K. DelBene
Rep. Chris Deluzio
Rep. Mark DeSaulnier
Rep. Dr. Maxine Dexter
Rep. Debbie Dingell
Rep. Lloyd Doggett
Rep. Sarah Elfreth
Rep. Veronica Escobar
Rep. Adriano Espaillat
Rep. Dwight Evans
Rep. Cleo Fields
Rep. Shomari C. Figures
Rep. Lizzie Fletcher
Rep. Bill Foster
Rep. Valerie P. Foushee
Rep. Lois Frankel
Rep. Laura Friedman
Rep. Maxwell Alejandro Frost
Rep. John Garamendi
Rep. Sylvia R. Garcia
Rep. Robert Garcia
- 6a -
Rep. Jesús “Chuy” García
Rep. Laura Gillen
Rep. Marie Gluesenkamp Perez
Rep. Jared Golden
Rep. Dan Goldman
Rep. Jimmy Gomez
Rep. Maggie Goodlander
Rep. Josh Gottheimer
Rep. Adam Gray
Rep. Al Green
Rep. Adelita S. Grijalva
Rep. Josh Harder
Rep. Jahana Hayes
Rep. Jim Himes
Rep. Eleanor Holmes Norton
Rep. Steven A. Horsford
Rep. Chrissy Houlahan
Rep. Steny H. Hoyer
Rep. Val Hoyle
Rep. Jared Huffman
Rep. Glenn F. Ivey
Rep. Jonathan L. Jackson
Rep. Sara Jacobs
Rep. Pramila Jayapal
- 7a -
Rep. Julie E. Johnson
Rep. Henry C. (“Hank”) Johnson, Jr.
Rep. Sydney Kamlager-Dove
Rep. Marcy Kaptur
Rep. William R. Keating
Rep. Robin L. Kelly
Rep. Timothy M. Kennedy
Rep. Ro Khanna
Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi
Rep. Greg Landsman
Rep. Rick Larsen
Rep. John B. Larson
Rep. George Latimer
Rep. Summer L. Lee
Rep. Susie Lee
Rep. Teresa Leger Fernández
Rep. Mike Levin
Rep. Sam T. Liccardo
Rep. Ted W. Lieu
Rep. Zoe Lofgren
Rep. Stephen F. Lynch
Rep. Seth Magaziner
Rep. John Mannion
Rep. Doris Matsui
- 8a -
Rep. Lucy McBath
Rep. Sarah McBride
Rep. April McClain Delaney
Rep. Jennifer McClellan
Rep. Betty McCollum
Rep. Kristen McDonald Rivet
Rep. Morgan McGarvey
Rep. James P. McGovern
Rep. LaMonica McIver
Rep. Gregory W. Meeks
Rep. Analilia Mejia
Rep. Christian Menefee
Rep. Rob Menendez
Rep. Grace Meng
Rep. Kweisi Mfume
Rep. Dave Min
Rep. Gwen Moore
Rep. Joseph D. Morelle
Rep. Kelly Morrison
Rep. Jared Moskowitz
Rep. Seth Moulton
Rep. Frank J. Mrvan
Rep. Kevin Mullin
Rep. Jerrold Nadler
- 9a -
Rep. Richard E. Neal
Rep. Joe Neguse
Rep. Donald Norcross
Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez
Rep. Johnny Olszewski
Rep. Ilhan Omar
Rep. Jimmy Panetta
Rep. Chris Pappas
Rep. Nancy Pelosi
Rep. Scott H. Peters
Rep. Brittany Pettersen
Rep. Chellie Pingree
Rep. Stacey E. Plaskett
Rep. Mark Pocan
Rep. Nellie Pou
Rep. Mike Quigley
Rep. Delia C. Ramirez
Rep. Emily Randall
Rep. Josh Riley
Rep. Luz Rivas
Rep. Deborah K. Ross
Rep. Raul Ruiz
Rep. Patrick Ryan
Rep. Andrea Salinas
- 10a -
Rep. Linda T. Sanchez
Rep. Mary Gay Scanlon
Rep. Jan Schakowsky
Rep. Bradley Scott Schneider
Rep. Hillary Scholten
Rep. Kim Schrier, M.D.
Rep. Robert C. “Bobby” Scott
Rep. Terri A. Sewell
Rep. Brad Sherman
Rep. Lateefah Simon
Rep. Adam Smith
Rep. Eric Sorensen
Rep. Darren Soto
Rep. Melanie Stansbury
Rep. Greg Stanton
Rep. Haley Stevens
Rep. Marilyn Strickland
Rep. Suhas Subramanyam
Rep. Thomas R. Suozzi
Rep. Emilia Sykes
Rep. Mark Takano
Rep. Shri Thanedar
Rep. Mike Thompson
Rep. Bennie G. Thompson
- 11a -
Rep. Dina Titus
Rep. Rashida Tlaib
Rep. Jill N. Tokuda
Rep. Paul Tonko
Rep. Norma J. Torres
Rep. Ritchie Torres
Rep. Lori Trahan
Rep. Derek Tran
Rep. Lauren Underwood
Rep. Juan Vargas
Rep. Gabe Vasquez
Rep. Marc A. Veasey
Rep. Nydia M. Velázquez
Rep. Eugene Simon Vindman
Rep. James R. Walkinshaw
Rep. Debbie Wasserman Schultz
Rep. Maxine Waters
Rep. Bonnie Watson Coleman
Rep. George Whitesides
Rep. Nikema Williams
Rep. Frederica S. Wilson
- 12a -
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.