Emergency Application — Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, et al., Applicants v. Mary Boyle, et al.

Supreme Court briefJul 2, 2025

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APPENDIX

District court memorandum opinion (June 13, 2025) ........................................... 1a

District court order granting summary judgment

(June 13, 2025) .............................................................................................. 32a

District court order denying stay (June 23, 2025) .............................................. 34a

Court of appeals order denying stay (July 1, 2025) ............................................ 42a

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

MARY BOYLE, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

Civ. No. MJM-25-1628

DONALD J. TRUMP, in his official

capacity as President of the United

States, et al.,

Defendants.

* * * * * * * * * *

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiffs Mary Boyle, Alexander Hoehn-Saric, and Richard Trumka Jr. (collectively,

“Plaintiffs”) were appointed to serve as members of the United States Consumer Product Safety

Commission (“CPSC”) for terms prescribed by statute, subject to removal only for neglect of duty

or malfeasance. On May 8 and 9, 2025, Plaintiffs received notifications sent on behalf of President

Donald J. Trump purporting to terminate them from their positions without cause. Thereafter,

Plaintiffs were denied access to facilities and resources necessary to fulfill their roles as CPSC

Commissioners, and members of Plaintiffs’ staff were discharged.

On May 21, 2025, Plaintiffs commenced this civil action for declaratory and injunctive

relief against President Trump; Scott Bessent, Secretary of the Treasury; Russell Vought, Director

of the Office of Management and Budget; and Peter A. Feldman, Acting Chairman of the CPSC

(collectively, “Defendants”). Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment that their terminations were

unlawful and an injunction against official action to effectuate their removal from office.

(1a)

Defendants contend that the statute requiring cause for Plaintiffs’ removal is inconsistent with the

President’s removal power under Article II of the U.S. Constitution and therefore invalid.

This matter is before the Court on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. On

June 6, 2025, following expedited briefing, the Court conducted a hearing on the motions and took

them under advisement. For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds no constitutional defect in

the statutory restriction on Plaintiffs’ removal and that Plaintiffs’ purported removal from office

was unlawful. The Court shall enter an Order granting Plaintiffs’ motion, denying Defendants’

motion, and providing declaratory and injunctive relief permitting Plaintiffs to resume their duties

as CPSC Commissioners.

BACKGROUND

A. Purpose, Functions, and Organization of the Consumer Product Safety

Commission

In 1972, Congress passed the Consumer Product Safety Act (“CPSA”), Pub. L. No. 92-

573, 86 Stat. 1207, and created the CPSC to advance the goals and purposes of the Act, 15 U.S.C.

§ 2053(a). The CPSA’s purposes include (1) “protect[ing] the public against unreasonable risks of

injury associated with consumer products;” (2) “assist[ing] consumers in evaluating the

comparative safety of consumer products;” (3) “develop[ing] uniform safety standards for

consumer products . . . ;” and (4) “promot[ing] research and investigation into the causes and

prevention of product-related deaths, illnesses, and injuries.” Id. § 2051(b). The CPSC consists of

five Commissioners nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. Id. § 2053(a). Each

Commissioner must hold “background and expertise in areas related to consumer products and

protection of the public from risks to safety.” Id. The CPSC has the statutory authority to

promulgate product-safety standards, id. § 2056(a); to conduct administrative proceedings and

investigations, with the power to issue and enforce subpoenas, id. §§ 2064, 2076(a), (b)(3), (c);

and to initiate civil and criminal actions in federal court to enforce consumer product safety laws,

see id. §§ 2069, 2070(a), 2071(a), 2076(b)(7); among other functions and powers.

Congress established the CPSC as an “independent regulatory commission,” id. § 2053(a),

to ensure that it remained an expert body “unfettered by political dictates, self-interested industry

pressure or blind consumer zeal,” 122 Cong. Rec. S15211 (daily ed. May 24, 1976). Specific

statutory guardrails were enacted to protect the Commission from political pressures, abrupt

changes in composition, and loss of agency expertise. First, Congress provided that the

Commissioners would serve staggered, seven-year terms, 15 U.S.C. § 2053(b)(1), and that any

Commissioner appointed to fill a vacancy created by the premature departure of a predecessor

would be appointed only for the remainder of the predecessor’s term, id. § 2053(b)(2). 1 Second,

Congress provided that “[n]ot more than three of the Commissioners shall be affiliated with the

same political party.” Id. § 2053(c). Third, and critical to the case here, Congress provided that the

Commissioners may be “removed by the President” before the expiration of their terms only “for

neglect of duty or malfeasance in office but for no other cause.” Id. § 2053(a).

B. Plaintiffs’ Purported Removal

The facts relevant to this case are uncontested. See ECF No. 21-2 (Defendants’ Statement

of Undisputed Material Facts, raising no dispute with Plaintiffs’ Statement of Undisputed Material

Facts, ECF No. 18-2). Each Plaintiff was nominated by President Joseph R. Biden and confirmed

by the U.S. Senate to serve as a Commissioner of the CPSC. ECF No. 18-2, ¶ 1. Plaintiff Boyle

was confirmed on June 2, 2022, to serve out the remainder of her predecessor’s term, set to expire

on October 27, 2025. Id. ¶ 2. Plaintiff Hoehn-Saric was confirmed on October 7, 2021, to serve

A Commissioner appointed to serve out their predecessor’s term may “continue to serve after the

expiration of this term until his successor has taken office” or up to a maximum of one year. 15 U.S.C. §

2053(b)(2).

out the remainder of his predecessor’s term, set to expire on October 27, 2027. Id. ¶ 3. Plaintiff

Trumka was confirmed on November 16, 2021, to serve a full seven-year term expiring on October

27, 2028. Id. ¶ 4. Each Plaintiff has a substantial professional background in the field of consumer

protection and the work of the CPSC. See ECF No. 6-2, ¶ 1; ECF No. 6-3, ¶ 1; ECF No. 6-4, ¶ 1.

Plaintiffs have performed ably in their roles and have never been accused of neglect of duty or

malfeasance in office by either President Trump or President Biden. ECF No. 18-2, ¶ 5.

Between May 8 and May 9, 2025, Plaintiffs were notified of their removal from their

positions as three of the CPSC’s five sitting Commissioners. On May 8, Plaintiffs Boyle and

Trumka each received an email from Trent Morse, the Deputy Director of Presidential Personnel,

which stated, in full: “On behalf of President Donald J. Trump, I am writing to inform you that

your position on the Consumer Product Safety Commission is terminated effective immediately.

Thank you for your service.” Id. ¶¶ 6–7. The following day, Plaintiff Hoehn-Saric and two of his

staff members attempted to access their offices at the CPSC headquarters 2 but were barred by

CPSC security. Id. ¶ 9. While waiting in the lobby, Plaintiff Hoehn-Saric received a phone call

from Acting Chairman Feldman, who informed him that President Trump had terminated him from

his role as a CPSC Commissioner. Id. ¶ 10.

Since May 9, Plaintiffs have been unable to enter their offices unescorted, log in to the

CPSC computer network, and access their CPSC email accounts and electronic files. Id. ¶ 13.

Plaintiffs were required to return their CPSC identification badges, keys, phones, credit cards, and

computer equipment. Id. ¶ 14. Plaintiffs’ staff members have also received termination notices that

cite Plaintiffs’ removal from office as the basis for termination. Id. Plaintiffs have received

CPSC headquarters is located in Bethesda, Maryland. ECF No. 1, ¶ 6.

“separation packages” and understand that they will no longer be receiving the pay and benefits to

which CPSC Commissioners are entitled. Id. ¶ 15.

C. Procedural History

On May 21, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief against

Defendants Trump, Bessent, Vought, and Feldman, in their official capacities. ECF No. 1. On the

same date, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) and Preliminary

Injunction pursuant to Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. ECF No. 6. This motion

seeks preliminary injunctive relief to prevent Defendants Bessent, Vought, and Feldman from

“taking any action to effectuate President Donald J. Trump’s purported termination of Plaintiffs

from their roles as Commissioners of the [CPSC.]” ECF No. 6-5. Defendants filed a response in

opposition to the motion on May 26, 2025. ECF No. 15.

On May 27, 2025, the Court conducted a hearing on Plaintiffs’ request for a TRO and

declined to issue temporary or preliminary injunctive relief. With the parties’ agreement, the Court

entered an Order setting a schedule for expedited briefing of Plaintiffs’ motion for summary

judgment. ECF No. 17. Thereafter, Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 18;

Defendants filed a cross-motion for summary judgment and response in opposition to Plaintiffs’

motion, ECF No. 21; and Plaintiffs filed a reply, ECF No. 22. On June 6, 2025, the Court conducted

a hearing on the motions and took them under advisement.

Plaintiffs’ central claim in this litigation is that Defendants acted ultra vires and in violation

of the CPSA by removing them as CPSC Commissioners without cause and taking action to

effectuate the purported terminations. ECF Nos. 18, 18-1 (Plaintiffs’ Motion and Memorandum).

Plaintiffs seek two forms of relief. First, Plaintiffs request a declaration that the “purported

termination of Plaintiffs from their roles as [CPSC] Commissioners” is unlawful and “without

legal effect.” ECF No. 18-6 (proposed order). Second, Plaintiffs seek to enjoin Defendants

Bessent, Vought, and Feldman from “taking any action to effectuate the unlawful terminations

. . . .” Id. In their cross-motion for summary judgment, Defendants primarily argue that the

statutory for-cause restriction on the removal of CPSC Commissioners is inconsistent with the

President’s Article II removal authority and therefore unconstitutional. ECF Nos. 21, 21-1

(Defendants’ Motion and Memorandum). Defendants also argue that relief in the form of

reinstatement is beyond the authority of this Court. Defs.’ Mem. at 1.

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A court may grant a party’s summary judgment motion under Rule 56 if “the movant shows

that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.

Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986); Cybernet, LLC v. David, 954 F.3d 162, 168 (4th Cir.

2020). A fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law[,]”

and a genuine issue of material fact exists “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106

S. Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986) (emphasis omitted); see also Raynor v. Pugh, 817 F.3d

123, 130 (4th Cir. 2016). A party can establish the absence or presence of a genuinely disputed

fact through “particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents,

electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for

purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(c)(1)(A). The court must view all the facts, including reasonable inferences to be drawn from

them, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986), but the court is not

permitted to weigh the evidence, make credibility determinations, or decide the truth of disputed

facts. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S. Ct. at 2510–11.

III.

RELEVANT CASE LAW

Article II of the U.S. Constitution vests “[t]he executive Power” in the President, who

“shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed[.]” The President’s “executive Power” under

Article II “generally includes the ability to remove executive officials, for it is ‘only the authority

that can remove’ such officials that they ‘must fear and, in the performance of [their] functions,

obey.’” Seila L. LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 591 U.S. 197, 213–14, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2197,

207 L. Ed. 2d 494 (2020) (quoting Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726, 106 S. Ct. 3181, 3188,

92 L. Ed. 2d 583 (1986)); see also Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S.

477, 513–14, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3164, 177 L. Ed. 2d 706 (2010) (“The Constitution that makes the

President accountable to the people for executing the laws also gives him the power to do so. That

power includes, as a general matter, the authority to remove those who assist him in carrying out

his duties.”); Collins v. Yellen, 594 U.S. 220, 252, 141 S. Ct. 1761, 1784, 210 L. Ed. 2d 432 (2021)

(“The removal power helps the President maintain a degree of control over the subordinates he

needs to carry out his duties as the head of the Executive Branch, and it works to ensure that these

subordinates serve the people effectively and in accordance with the policies that the people

presumably elected the President to promote.”). For Congress “to draw to itself . . . the power to

remove or the right to participate in the exercise of that power” would “infringe the constitutional

principle of the separation of governmental powers.” Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 161, 47

S. Ct. 21, 40, 71 L. Ed. 160 (1926).

But the President’s power of removal is not absolute. The U.S. Supreme Court has

recognized two exceptions that “represent what up to now have been the outermost constitutional

limits of permissible congressional restrictions on the President’s removal power.” Seila Law, 591

U.S. at 218, 140 S. Ct. at 2200 (quoting PHH Corp. v. CFPB, 881 F.3d 75, 196 (D.C. Cir. 2018)

(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting)). First, in Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 55 S.

Ct. 869, 79 L. Ed. 1611 (1935), and Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 78 S. Ct. 1275, 2 L.

Ed. 2d 1377 (1958), the Supreme Court upheld tenure protections for officers of “multimember

bodies with ‘quasi-judicial’ or ‘quasi-legislative’ functions[.]” Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 216–17, 140

S. Ct. at 2198–99. Second, in United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483, 6 S. Ct. 449, 29 L. Ed. 700

(1886), and Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 108 S. Ct. 2597, 101 L. Ed. 2d 569 (1988), the

Supreme Court upheld tenure protections for “inferior officers with limited duties and no

policymaking or administrative authority[.]” Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 217–18, 140 S. Ct. at 2199–

200. Only the exception first recognized in Humphrey’s Executor is at issue here.

A. Humphrey’s Executor and its progeny

In Humphrey’s Executor, the Supreme Court unanimously upheld a statutory provision

preventing the President from removing members of the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”)

except for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” 295 U.S. at 619, 55 S. Ct. at

870 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 41). “Whether the power of the President to remove an officer shall

prevail over the authority of Congress to condition the power by fixing a definite term and

precluding a removal except for cause will depend upon the character of the office[.]” Id. at 631,

55 S. Ct. at 875, quoted in Morrison, 487 U.S. at 687, 108 S. Ct. at 2617. Examining the features

of the FTC, the Court described this Commission as “an administrative body created by Congress

to carry into effect legislative policies embodied in the statute in accordance with the legislative

standard therein prescribed, and to perform other specified duties as a legislative or as a judicial

aid.” Humphrey’s Executor, 295 U.S. at 628, 55 S. Ct. at 874. “Such a body[,]” the Court stated,

“[could not] in any proper sense be characterized as an arm or an eye of the executive[,]” noting

that it performed its duties “without executive leave and, in the contemplation of the statute,

. . . free from executive control.” Id. The Commission was meant to be “nonpartisan” and “act with

entire impartiality.” Id. at 624, 55 S. Ct. at 872. The Court described the FTC’s duties as “neither

political nor executive,” but instead called for “the trained judgment of a body of experts”

“informed by experience.” Id.

Considering the powers and functions of the FTC, the Court described them as “quasi

legislative” in part and “quasi judicial” in part. Id. at 628, 55 U.S. at 874. The FTC acted “as a

legislative agency” in “making investigations and reports” to Congress and “as an agency of the

judiciary[]” in making recommendations to courts “as a master in chancery . . . .” Id., quoted in

Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 215, 140 S. Ct. at 2198. To the extent that the FTC exercised any “executive

function,” it was distinguishable from “executive power in the constitutional sense,” as the FTC

exercised executive functions “in the discharge and effectuation of its quasi legislative or quasi

judicial powers, or as an agency of the legislative or judicial departments of the government.” 3

Humphrey’s Executor, 295 U.S. at 628, 50 S. Ct. at 874.

The Court then concluded that the President does not possess an “illimitable” power to

remove officers like the members of the FTC, stating as follows:

The authority of Congress, in creating quasi legislative or quasi

judicial agencies, to require them to act in discharge of their duties

independently of executive control cannot well be doubted; and that

authority includes, as an appropriate incident, power to fix the

period during which they shall continue, and to forbid their removal

except for cause in the meantime. For it is quite evident that one who

holds his office only during the pleasure of another cannot be

In Morrison v. Olson, the Supreme Court called into doubt its conclusion in Humphrey’s Executor

that the FTC did not exercise executive power. 487 U.S. at 690 n.28, 108 S. Ct. at 2618 n.28, cited in Seila

Law, 591 U.S. at 216 n.2, 140 S. Ct. at 2198 n.2.

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depended upon to maintain an attitude of independence against the

latter’s will.

Id. at 629, 55 S. Ct. at 874.

Two decades later, in Wiener, the Supreme Court applied its holding in Humphrey’s

Executor to uphold a suit for backpay by a member of the War Claims Commission who claimed

that he was unlawfully discharged without cause. Wiener, 357 U.S. at 356, 78 S. Ct. at 1279. The

statute that created this Commission provided that its three members were to be “appointed by the

President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.” Id. at 350, 78 S Ct. at 1276. The

statute included “no provision for removal of a Commissioner[,]” but it prescribed that the

Commission would exist and conduct its work for a limited term. Id. While recognizing the

President’s general removal power announced in Myers, the Court in Wiener viewed Humphrey’s

Executor as “narrowly confin[ing] the scope of the Myers decision to include only ‘all purely

executive officers.’” Id. at 352, 78 S. Ct. at 1277 (quoting Humphrey’s Executor, 295 U.S. at 628,

55 S. Ct. at 874). Following the reasoning in Humphrey’s Executor, the Court examined the

character of the War Claims Commission and described it as “an adjudicatory body” intended to

be independent of executive control. Id. at 353–56, 78 S. Ct. at 1278–79. The Court ultimately

rejected “the claim that the President could remove a member of an adjudicatory body like the War

Claims Commission merely because he wanted his own appointees on such a Commission[.]” Id.

at 356, 78 S. Ct. at 1279. “[N]o such power is given to the President directly by the Constitution,

and none is impliedly conferred upon him by statute simply because Congress said nothing about

it.” Id.

At each opportunity since Wiener, the Supreme Court has declined to overturn Humphrey’s

Executor. See, e.g., Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 483–84, 130 S. Ct. at 3146–47 (reviewing

constitutional limits on the President’s removal power and stating, “The parties do not ask us to

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reexamine any of these precedents, and we do not do so.”); Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 228, 140 S. Ct.

at 2206 (“While we do not revisit Humphrey’s Executor or any other precedent today, we decline

to elevate it into a freestanding invitation for Congress to impose additional restrictions on the

President’s removal authority.”). The Court has, however, reconsidered and recast some views

articulated in Humphrey’s Executor and Wiener. In Morrison, for instance, the Court recognized

the “difficulty of defining” “executive” as a category and stated that “the determination of whether

the Constitution allows Congress to impose a ‘good cause’-type restriction on the President’s

power to remove an official cannot be made to turn on whether or not that official is classified as

‘purely executive.’” 487 U.S. at 689, 108 S. Ct. at 2618; see id. at 487 U.S. at 689 n.28, 108 S. Ct.

at 2618 n.28.

B. Seila Law

More recently, in Seila Law, the Supreme Court declined to extend the Humphrey’s

Executor exception to justify statutory tenure protection for the sole director of the Consumer

Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”). Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 220–32. 140 S. Ct. at 2201–07.

Unlike the multimember Commissions at issue in Humphrey’s Executor and Wiener, the CFPB

was structured, by statute, under the leadership of a single director appointed to serve a term of

five years and who could only be removed for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in

office.” 12 U.S.C. § 5491(c)(3). The Court held that this statutory protection against removal ran

afoul of the President’s Article II removal power. Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 213, 140 S. Ct. at 2197.

As relevant here, the Supreme Court in Seila Law first held that Humphrey’s Executor did

not resolve the question of whether the CFPB Director’s tenure protection was constitutional. Id.

at 218–20, 140 S. Ct. at 2199–201. Foremost, the Court noted structural differences between the

2020 CFPB and the 1935 FTC at issue in Humphrey’s Executor:

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Unlike the New Deal-era FTC upheld [in Humphrey’s Executor],

the CFPB is led by a single Director who cannot be described as a

“body of experts” and cannot be considered “non-partisan” in the

same sense as a group of officials drawn from both sides of the aisle.

295 U.S. at 624, 55 S. Ct. 869. Moreover, while the staggered terms

of the FTC Commissioners prevented complete turnovers in agency

leadership and guaranteed that there would always be some

Commissioners who had accrued significant expertise, the CFPB’s

single-Director structure and five-year term guarantee abrupt shifts

in agency leadership and with it the loss of accumulated expertise.

Id. at 218, 140 S. Ct. at 2200. The Court then considered the governmental powers entrusted to the

CFPB’s single Director, noting that this single office carried rulemaking authority to administer

19 federal statutes, as well as “unilateral[]” powers to “issue final decisions awarding legal and

equitable relief in administrative adjudications” and “to seek daunting monetary penalties against

private parties on behalf of the United States in federal court[.]” Id. at 218–19, 140 S. Ct. at 2200.

The Supreme Court ultimately declined to exempt the CFPB Director from the President’s

general removal power, concluding that “an independent agency led by a single Director and

vested with significant executive power . . . has no basis in history and no place in our

constitutional structure.” Id. at 220, 140 S. Ct. at 2201. Throughout its analysis, the Court

repeatedly emphasized the concentration of the CFPB’s “significant governmental power in the

hands of a single individual accountable to no one.” Id. at 224, 140 S. Ct. at 2203. The Court

suggested that “the most telling indication of [the CFPB’s] severe constitutional problem” was its

“almost wholly unprecedented” structure. Id. at 220, 140 S. Ct. at 2201. The Court noted that there

were only a few “isolated” examples of good-cause tenure protections for “principal officers who

wield power alone rather than as members of a board or commission.” Id. “In addition to being a

historical anomaly, the CFPB’s single-Director configuration is incompatible with our

constitutional structure. Aside from the sole exception of the Presidency, that structure

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scrupulously avoids concentrating power in the hands of any single individual.” Id. at 222–23, 140

S. Ct. at 2202.

Not only was the CFPB Director entrusted with an array of policymaking and enforcement

powers “[w]ith no colleagues to persuade, and no boss or electorate looking over her shoulder,”

but other unique statutory features of the agency further insulated the Director from the electorally

accountable President. Id. at 225, 140 S. Ct. at 2204. First, the Director’s five-year term would

leave some Presidents with no opportunity “to shape [the CFPB’s] leadership and thereby

influence its activities.” Id. And the single-Director leadership structure gave Presidents no

opportunity “to appoint any other leaders—such as a chair or fellow members of a Commission or

Board—who [could] serve as a check on the Director’s authority and help bring the agency in line

with the President’s preferred policies.” Id. Second, unlike most independent agencies, the CFPB

receives its funding outside of the normal appropriations process and therefore beyond the

President’s influence over appropriations. Id. at 226, 140 S. Ct. at 2204. Indeed, “the Director

receives [funds for the CFPB] from the Federal Reserve, which is itself funded outside of the

annual appropriations process” and beyond the control of the electorate. Id.

In consideration of the foregoing, the Court held that the CFPB Director’s statutory tenure

protection was unconstitutional. Id. at 220, 140 S. Ct. at 2201.

IV.

PLAINTIFFS’ REMOVAL FROM OFFICE

A. Violation of 15 U.S.C. § 2053(a)

No material facts are disputed in this case. See ECF Nos. 18-2, 21-2. 4 On May 8 and May

9, 2025, Plaintiffs received notifications on behalf of President Trump purporting to remove them

Plaintiffs’ Statement of Undisputed Facts, ECF No. 18-2, is supported by sworn declarations and

exhibits provided by each Plaintiff, ECF Nos. 6-2, 6-3, 6-4, 18-3, 18-4, 18-5. Defendants do not dispute

Plaintiffs’ Statement. See ECF No. 21-2.

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from their duly appointed positions as three of five sitting Commissioners of the CPSC. ECF No.

18-2, ¶¶ 6–7, 10. Since their purported terminations, Plaintiffs have been prevented from returning

to their offices at CPSC headquarters without an escort and accessing CPSC resources necessary

to perform their statutorily mandated duties. Id. ¶¶ 13–14. No Plaintiff has finished serving their

term. Id. ¶¶ 1–4; see also 15 U.S.C. § 2053(b) (prescribing CPSC Commissioners’ terms). By

statute, the President could only remove Plaintiffs from their positions as CPSC Commissioners

“for neglect of duty or malfeasance in office . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 2053(a). But no Plaintiff has

neglected their official duties, committed official malfeasance, or been accused of any neglect of

duty or malfeasance. ECF No. 18-2, ¶ 5. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ purported removals from office and

efforts to prevent them from fulfilling their statutory duties as CPSC Commissioners violated 15

U.S.C. § 2053(a).

Although this case presents no material factual disputes, the contested legal issue central

to this case is whether Plaintiffs’ statutory tenure protection in 15 U.S.C. § 2053(a) infringes upon

the President’s Article II removal power. This Court holds that § 2053(a) is not inconsistent with

Article II, agreeing with several other courts that statutory tenure protection for CPSC

Commissioners is constitutionally justified by the Humphrey’s Executor exception to the

President’s removal power. See Consumers’ Research v. CPSC, 91 F.4th 342, 351–56 (5th Cir.

2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 414, 220 L. Ed. 2d 170 (2024); Leachco, Inc. v. CPSC, 103 F.4th

748, 762–62 (10th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 104 (2025); United States v. SunSetter Prods.

LP, 2024 WL 1116062, at *2–4 (D. Mass. Mar. 14, 2024).

B. Constitutionality of the Statutory For-Cause Removal Protections in 15 U.S.C. §

2053(a)

“[W]hether Congress can ‘condition the [President’s power of removal] by fixing a definite

term and precluding a removal except for cause, will depend upon the character of the office.’”

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Morrison, 487 U.S. at 687, 108 S. Ct. at 2617 (quoting Humphrey’s Executor, 295 U.S. at 631, 55

S. Ct. at 875). “Because the Court limited its holding [in Humphrey’s Executor] ‘to officers of the

kind here under consideration,’ [295 U.S.] at 632, 55 S. Ct. 869, the contours of the Humphrey’s

Executor exception [to the President’s removal power] depend upon the characteristics of the

agency before the Court.” Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 215, 140 S. Ct. at 2198. Specifically,

“Humphrey’s Executor permitted Congress to give for-cause removal protections to a

multimember body of experts, balanced along partisan lines, that performed legislative and judicial

functions and was said not to exercise any executive power.” Id. at 216, 140 S. Ct. at 2199; but see

Morrison, 487 U.S. at 689, 108 S. Ct. at 2618 (“[T]he determination of whether the Constitution

allows Congress to impose a ‘good cause’-type restriction on the President’s power to remove an

official cannot be made to turn on whether or not that official is classified as ‘purely executive.’”).

Although Humphrey’s Executor’s characterization of the FTC in 1935 as non-executive

has not withstood the test of time, see id. at 690, 108 S. Ct. at 2619, n.28, “[t]he Court identified

several organizational features that helped explain [this] characterization[,]” Seila Law, 591 U.S.

at 216, 140 S. Ct. at 2198–99:

Composed of five members—no more than three from the same

political party—the Board was designed to be “non-partisan” and to

“act with entire impartiality.” [Humphrey’s Executor, 295 U.S.] at

624, 55 S. Ct. 869; see id., at 619–620, 55 S. Ct. 869. The FTC’s

duties were “neither political nor executive,” but instead called for

“the trained judgment of a body of experts” “informed by

experience.” Id., at 624, 55 S. Ct. 869 (internal quotation marks

omitted). And the Commissioners’ staggered, seven-year terms

enabled the agency to accumulate technical expertise and avoid a

“complete change” in leadership “at any one time.” Ibid.

Id. Humphrey’s Executor remains good law and is binding on this Court, and, for reasons explained

below, the Court finds that it applies to the CPSC.

16a

First, the organization of the CPSC mirrors that of the FTC. The CPSC is “a multimember

body of experts, balanced along partisan lines” and appointed to serve “staggered, seven-year

terms . . . .” Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. 2053(a) (providing that the CPSC shall “consist[] of five

Commissioners” who hold “background and expertise in areas related to consumer products and

protection of the public from risks to safety”); id. § 2053(b) (assigning staggered seven-year terms

to CPSC Commissioners, providing that “[a]ny Commissioner appointed to fill a vacancy

occurring prior to the expiration of the term for which his predecessor was appointed shall be

appointed only for the remainder of such term”); id. § 2053(c) (providing that “[n]ot more than

three of the [CPSC] Commissioners shall be affiliated with the same political party”). These

structural features the CPSC shares with the FTC help the agency perform its functions impartially,

ensures that it retains its expertise, and “avoid[s] a ‘complete change’ in leadership ‘at any one

time.’” Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 216, 140 S. Ct. at 2198–99 (quoting Humphrey’s Executor, 295

U.S. at 624, 55 S. Ct. at 872).

Like that of the FTC, the CPSC’s structure stands in stark contrast to the “anomalous”

single-Director organization of the CFPB that the Supreme Court deemed unconstitutional in Seila

Law. See Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 213–32, 140 S. Ct. at 2197–2207; Consumers’ Research, 91 F.4th

at 354 (describing “CFPB’s single-Director structure” as “the defining feature that the Supreme

Court in Seila Law relied on to hold the CFPB unconstitutional”). Unlike the CFPB’s singleDirector structure, the bipartisan, multimember structure of the CPSC and the FTC permits each

Commissioner’s authority to be checked by the others, encourages group deliberation and

consensus building, and prevents any one Commissioner from holding an outsized amount of

power. See Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 224–25, 140 S. Ct. at 2203–04 (noting that CFPB’s Director

has “no colleagues to persuade,” and the CFPB’s structure “vest[s] significant governmental power

17a

in the hands” of a sole Director and does not permit opportunities for the Director’s authority to

be checked by “a chair or fellow members of a Commission or Board”).

While sharing the FTC’s organizational features, the CPSC also performs functions similar

or identical to those of the FTC which, in 1935, Humphrey’s Executor described as “quasi

legislative and quasi judicial.” 5 Humphrey’s Executor, 295 U.S. at 629, 55 S. Ct. at 874. Both the

FTC and CPSC hold “wide powers of investigation in respect of” private parties within their

In Morrison, the Supreme Court explained that “the characterization of the agencies in

Humphrey’s Executor and Wiener as ‘quasi-legislative’ or ‘quasi-judicial’ in large part reflected our

judgment that it was not essential to the President’s proper execution of his Article II powers that these

agencies be headed up by individuals who were removable at will.” Morrison, 487 U.S. at 690–91, 108 S.

Ct. at 2619. The Supreme Court’s reasons for concluding in Humphrey’s Executor that the power to remove

FTC Commissioners at will was not essential to the President’s authority under Article II are fully

applicable to the CPSC Commissioners in the instant case.

The Morrison Court further stated, in a footnote, that Humphrey’s Executor’s and Wiener’s use of

the terms “quasi-legislative” and “quasi-judicial” may also “describe the circumstances in which Congress

might be more inclined to find that a degree of independence from the Executive, such as that afforded by

a ‘good cause’ removal standard, is necessary to the proper functioning of the agency or official.” Id. at 691

n.30, 108 S. Ct. at 2619 n.30; see also Humphrey’s Executor, 295 U.S. at 629, 55 S. Ct. at 874 (“The

authority of Congress, in creating quasi legislative or quasi judicial agencies, to require them to act in

discharge of their duties independently of executive control cannot well be doubted; and that authority

includes, as an appropriate incident, power to fix the period during which they shall continue, and to forbid

their removal except for cause in the meantime.” (emphasis added)).

Here, like the FTC in Humphrey’s Executor and the War Claims Commission in Wiener, Congress

constituted the CPSC to serve as an “independent regulatory commission,” 15 U.S.C. § 2053(a), to ensure

that it remained an expert body “unfettered by political dictates, self-interested industry pressure or blind

consumer zeal,” 122 Cong. Rec. S15211 (daily ed. May 24, 1976); see also Humphrey’s Executor, 295 U.S.

at 628, 55 S. Ct. at 874 (“[FTC’s] duties are performed without executive leave and, in the contemplation

of the statute, must be free from executive control.”); Wiener, 357 U.S. at 353–56, 78 S. Ct. at 1278–79

(emphasizing independence of War Claims Commission). The removal restriction for CPSC

Commissioners in 15 U.S.C. § 2053(a) reflects and serves Congress’s intent that this Commission—like

those at issue in Humphrey’s Executor and Wiener—maintain “a degree of independence from the

Executive” as “necessary to the proper functioning of the [Commission].” Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691 n.30,

108 S. Ct. at 2619 n.30. And, as explained herein, the Court concludes that 15 U.S.C. § 2053(a) serves the

legislative purpose of supporting the CPSC’s independence, expertise, and impartiality without obstructing

“the President’s proper execution of his Article II powers” and duties. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 689–90, 108

S. Ct. at 2618.

18a

regulatory ambit. Id. at 621, 55 S. Ct. at 871 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 46, prescribing authority of FTC

to conduct investigations of individuals and corporations); 15 U.S.C. § 2076 (granting CPSC

investigatory powers). And both Commissions have the authority to issue substantive rules and

regulations to carry out the objectives of the statutes within their purview. See Federal Trade

Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 63-203, § 6(g), 38 Stat. 717, 722 (1914), codified as amended at 15

U.S.C. § 46(g) (empowering FTC “to make rules and regulations for the purpose of carrying out

the provisions of this Act”); 15 U.S.C. § 2056(a) (empowering CPSC to promulgate “consumer

product safety standards”). 6 Both the FTC and the CPSC are authorized to enforce the statutes they

administer and conduct administrative adjudications as prescribed in those statutes. See

Humphrey’s Executor, 295 U.S. at 620–21, 55 S. Ct. at 870–71 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 45, authorizing

and directing FTC “to prevent” private parties “from using unfair methods of competition in

commerce” by issuing complaints alleging violations, conducting hearings, making factual

findings, issuing orders, and seeking any further relief in federal court); 15 U.S.C. §§ 2061,

2064(c)–(d) (authorizing the CPSC to file actions for seizure of “imminently hazardous consumer

product[s]” and to order remedial measures upon finding a substantial product hazard).

Defendants emphasize the CPSC’s authority to enforce the laws within its jurisdiction

through enforcement actions in federal court, which the Seila Law Court called “a quintessentially

executive power not considered in Humphrey’s Executor.” Defs.’ Mem. at 11–12 (quoting Seila

Law, 591 U.S. at 219, 140 S. Ct. at 2200). However, the CPSC’s authority to prosecute civil and

criminal enforcement actions in federal court is restricted by the consent and involvement of the

Defendants argue that Humphrey’s Executor did not mention the 1935 FTC’s authority to issue

substantive regulations, much less rely on this authority in its discussion of executive power. Defs.’ Mem.

at 12. However, the FTC’s rulemaking authority is plain on the face the Federal Trade Commission Act,

which is cited and heavily relied upon in Humphrey’s Executor.

19a

Attorney General, who is accountable to, and subject to at-will removal by, the President.

Specifically, the CPSC cannot prosecute or defend a civil case in federal court without written

notice to the Attorney General and the Attorney General’s election whether to represent the

Commission in that civil action. 15 U.S.C. § 2076(b)(7)(A). Although the CPSA prescribes a role

for the CPSC to play in criminal enforcement of consumer product safety laws, such criminal

actions must be prosecuted through, or with the concurrence of, the Attorney General. Id. §

2076(b)(7)(B).

Defendants argue that the Humphrey’s Executor exception does not apply to the CPSC

because its powers, including the aforementioned enforcement powers, exceed those of the 1935

FTC and constitute “substantial executive power.” Defs.’ Mem. at 8–15 (citing Seila Law, 591

U.S. at 219, 140 S. Ct. at 2200). To be sure, at one point, the Court in Seila Law described the

Humphrey’s Executor exception as applicable to “multimember expert agencies that do not wield

substantial executive power[.]” Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 218, 140 S. Ct. at 2199–200. At other points,

however, Seila Law describes the exception as applicable to “expert agencies led by a group of

principal officers[,]” id. at 204, 140 S. Ct. at 2192 (emphasis in original), and “multimember bodies

with ‘quasi-judicial’ or ‘quasi-legislative’ functions,” id. at 217, 140 S. Ct. at 2199, without

mention of any degree of “executive power.” In Morrison, the Court recognized “[t]he difficulty

of defining such categories of ‘executive’ or ‘quasi-legislative’ officials[,]” and noted that, by

modern standards, the 1935 FTC—the agency at issue in Humphrey’s Executor—would be

“considered ‘executive,’ at least to some degree.” 487 U.S. at 690 n.28, 108 S. Ct. at 2619 n.28.

Still, Humphrey’s Executor remains good law and is binding. But, as the Fifth Circuit concluded

in Consumers’ Research, the Supreme Court’s precedents leave unclear “how much” executive

power an agency must wield “before [it] loses protection under the Humphrey’s exception.” 91

20a

F.4th at 353. And this Court’s reading of the Supreme Court’s precedents suggests that the exercise

of powers described as “executive” in nature, by itself, is not dispositive of whether an agency is

disqualified from the Humphrey’s Executor exception.

First, in Morrison, the Supreme Court stated that assessing the constitutionality of a

removal restriction should not focus on “rigid” categorization of an official’s powers as “purely

executive,” “quasi-legislative,” and “quasi-judicial.” Morrison, 487 U.S. at 689–90, 108 S. Ct. at

2618. Instead, the Court’s removal analysis focuses on “ensur[ing] that Congress does not interfere

with the President’s exercise of the ‘executive power’ and his constitutionally appointed duty to

‘take care that the laws be faithfully executed’ under Article II.” Id.

Later, in Seila Law, the Court did not consider the “significant executive power” entrusted

to the CFPB in isolation, but instead considered it within the context of its historically anomalous

single-Director leadership structure. See 591 U.S. at 213–32, 140 S. Ct. at 2197–2207. The Court

invalidated the CFPB Director’s statutory removal restriction because the agency was both “led

by a single Director and vested with significant executive power.” Id. at 220, 140 S. Ct. at 2201

(emphasis added). Notwithstanding the “significant executive power” wielded by the CFPB, Chief

Justice Roberts suggested in Part IV of the Court’s opinion 7 that Congress could solve the

constitutional problem presented in the removal restriction by “converting the CFPB into a

multimember agency.” Id. at 237, 140 S. Ct. at 2211.

This part of the Chief Justice’s opinion was not joined by a majority of the Court, but it was joined

by two other Justices. And a separate group of four Justices joined an opinion dissenting from the majority’s

conclusion that the CFPB’s removal restriction was unconstitutional. Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 284–96, 140

S. Ct. at 2238–44 (Kagan, J., concurring in the judgment with respect to severability and dissenting in part).

The foregoing suggests that a majority of the Court at the time of Seila Law would have likely approved of

a statutory for-cause removal restriction for a multimember commission like the CPSC.

21a

Finally, in Collins, the Court clarified that “the nature and breadth of an agency’s authority

is not dispositive in determining whether Congress may limit the President’s power to remove its

head.” 594 U.S. at 251–52, 141 S. Ct. at 1784. “Courts are not well-suited to weigh the relative

importance of the regulatory and enforcement authority of disparate agencies,” and “the

constitutionality of removal restrictions” does not “hinge[] on such an inquiry.” Id. at 253, 141 S.

Ct. at 1785.

In accordance with Morrison and Collins, this Court declines Defendants’ invitation to

engage in categorizing the CPSC’s varied set of functions and powers as executive or nonexecutive. The degree to which the CPSC wields executive power (in the modern sense) alone

does not determine whether the removal restriction in 15 U.S.C. § 2053(a) “interfere[s] with the

President’s exercise” of Article II powers and duties. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 689–90, 108 S. Ct. at

2618. The Supreme Court’s reasoning in Seila Law demonstrates that the agency’s structure also

must be considered. In that case, the CFPB’s organization under a single Director with statutory

protection against removal, while serving a five-year term, impermissibly insulated the agency

from the President’s influence. Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 213–20, 140 S. Ct. at 2197–201. The CPSC,

in contrast, is not so insulated.

The CPSC’s five-member, staggered-term design would likely provide multiple

opportunities each presidential term for an electorally accountable President to appoint a new

Commissioner. 8 Such frequent opportunities for the elected President “to shape [the

Commission’s] leadership and thereby influence its activities[]” were not available under CFPB’s

Indeed, President Trump will have the opportunity to appoint Plaintiff Boyle’s successor when

her term expires no later than October 27 of this year and, at that point, possibly create a majority on the

Commission aligned with his political preferences. ECF No. 18-2, ¶ 2; 15 U.S.C. § 2053(a)–(c).

Opportunities to appoint Plaintiffs Hoehn-Saric’s and Trumka’s successors will follow on October 27,

2027, and October 27, 2028. ECF No. 18-2, ¶¶ 3–4.

22a

leadership structure, given the single Director’s five-year term and for-cause removal restriction.

Id. at 225, 140 S. Ct. at 2204. Thus, the leadership structure of the CPSC, even with statutory

tenure protection, permits presidential control and electoral accountability to a degree that was

foreclosed by the CFPB Director’s statutory tenure protection before it was invalidated in Seila

Law. See id. at 220–26, 140 S. Ct. at 2201–04; Consumers’ Research, 91 F.4th at 354 (“[CPSC]

Commissioners’ staggered appointment schedule means that each President does ‘have an[]

opportunity to shape [the Commission’s] leadership and thereby influence its activities.’” (quoting

Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 226, 140 S. Ct. at 2204)). Furthermore, like most independent agencies—

and unlike the CFPB—the CPSC is funded through the normal appropriations process, further

subjecting it to presidential influence and electoral accountability. See id. 591 U.S. at 226, 140 S.

Ct. at 2204 (describing how CFPB’s unique funding mechanism outside the appropriations process

further insulates that agency from the President’s influence and the control of the electorate);

Consumers’ Research, 91 F.4th at 355 (“[T]he President can ‘influence’ the [CPSC’s] activities

via the budgetary process.” (quoting Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 226, 140 S. Ct. at 2204)).

Thus, unlike tenure protection for the CFPB Director, tenure protection for traditional

multimember, staggered-term agencies like the CPSC and the 1935 FTC “does not interfere with”

the President’s Article II duties and powers, Morrison, 487 U.S. at 689–90, 108 S. Ct. at 2618, and

it is not “incompatible with our constitutional structure[,]” Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 222, 140 S. Ct.

at 2202.

Finally, and importantly—unlike the CFPB at issue in Seila Law—the structure and powers

Congress prescribed for the CPSC are well-established in the history and tradition of the federal

government. In Consumers’ Research, the Fifth Circuit held that the CPSC’s statutory removal

restriction was supported by “historical pedigree.” 91 F.4th at 354; see also Leachco, 103 F.4th at

23a

762–63 (Tenth Circuit analyzing and citing Consumers’ Research approvingly). This Court agrees.

In Seila Law, the Supreme Court drew a clear contrast between “a traditional independent agency

headed by a multimember board or commission,” like the CPSC, 591 U.S. at 207, 140 S. Ct. at

2193,

and

the

CFPB’s

“almost

wholly

unprecedented”

single-Director

leadership

structure, describing this “lack of historical precedent” as “[p]erhaps the most telling indication of

[a] severe constitutional problem . . . .” id. at 220, 140 S. Ct. at 2201 (quoting Free Enterprise

Fund, 561 U.S. at 505, 130 S. Ct. at 3159). The Court also recognized that statutory removal

restrictions were in place in “some two-dozen multimember independent agencies,” without giving

any indication of a constitutional defect among these provisions. Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 230, 140

S. Ct. at 2206. The historical precedent for statutory removal restrictions among traditional

multimember independent agencies gives strong indication that 15 U.S.C. § 2053(a) does not

violate Article II.

In sum, the CPSC closely resembles the 1935 FTC in both structure and function, and

therefore qualifies for the Humphrey’s Executor exception. The restriction against Plaintiffs’

removal under 15 U.S.C. § 2053(a) does not offend the President’s Article II removal power

because the CPSC is a traditional “multimember bod[y] with ‘quasi-judicial’ or ‘quasi-legislative’

functions,” akin to those of the FTC. Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 217, 140 S. Ct. at 2199 (quoting

Humphrey’s Executor, 295 U.S. at 632, 55 S. Ct. 869); see also Morrison, 487 U.S. at 689–90,

108 S. Ct. 2618–19 (explaining Supreme Court’s use of terms “quasi-judicial” or “quasilegislative”). Accordingly, the Court finds as a matter of law that the President’s purported removal

of Plaintiffs from their positions as CPSC Commissioners absent “neglect of duty or malfeasance

in office” was unlawful, 15 U.S.C. § 2053(a), and Plaintiffs are entitled to appropriate relief.

24a

REMEDIES

A. Declaratory Relief

The first form of relief Plaintiffs request is a declaratory judgment that “President Donald

J. Trump’s purported termination of Plaintiffs from their roles as Commissioners of the [CPSC] is

ultra vires, contrary to law, and without legal effect.” ECF No. 18-6.

The Declaratory Judgment Act authorizes a federal district court to “declare the rights and

other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief

is or could be sought.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit “has

long recognized the discretion afforded to district courts in determining whether to render

declaratory relief.” Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Ind–Com Elec. Co., 139 F.3d 419, 421 (4th Cir. 1998)

(per curiam). “A district court should issue a declaration when it will help in ‘clarifying and

settling’ legal relationships and will ‘terminate and afford relief from the uncertainty, insecurity,

and controversy’ driving the suit.” Reyazuddin v. Montgomery Cnty., Md., 754 F. App’x 186, 192–

93 (4th Cir. 2018) (quoting Aetna, 139 F.3d at 423).

The Court finds declaratory relief to be appropriate in this case. First, there is a live

controversy between the parties over whether the President has lawfully removed, or may lawfully

remove, Plaintiffs from their offices as CPSC Commissioners absent “neglect of duty or

malfeasance in office” under 15 U.S.C. § 2053(a). In seeking, last month, to remove Plaintiffs

from their positions permanently and without cause, the President’s legal interests are presently

adverse to Plaintiffs’. A declaration would serve to clarify and settle the parties’ legal relationships

and relieve the parties from “the uncertainty, insecurity, and controversy” driving this litigation.

Reyazuddin, 754 F. App’x at 192–93 (quoting Aetna, 139 F.3d at 423). Having found that

25a

Plaintiffs’ removal from their roles as CPSC Commissioners without cause is unlawful, the Court

will grant Plaintiffs a declaration consistent with this ruling.

B. Injunctive Relief

Second, Plaintiffs seek an Order from this Court enjoining Defendants Bessent, Vought,

and Feldman from “taking any action to effectuate [Plaintiffs’] purported terminations[.]” Pls.’

Mot. Defendants argue that the Court lacks the equitable power to order Plaintiffs’ reinstatement

and the only relief available to Plaintiffs is backpay. Defs.’ Mem. at 17–20. It is correct that “the

general availability of injunctive relief . . . depend[s] on traditional principles of equity

jurisdiction[,]” Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo S.A. v. All. Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 318–

19, 119 S. Ct. 1961, 1968, 144 L. Ed. 2d 319 (1999) (citation omitted), and “a court of equity has

no jurisdiction over the appointment and removal of public officers,” In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200,

212, 8 S. Ct. 482, 488, 31 L. Ed. 402 (1888). Defendants, however, misconstrue the equitable relief

Plaintiffs seek. Plaintiffs do not seek to enjoin the President to reappoint them. With the President’s

purported termination of each Plaintiff declared effectively invalid as a matter of law, Plaintiffs

seek only to enjoin the President’s subordinates from obstructing their performance of their duties

as CPSC Commissioners and their access to the resources necessary for such performance. This

Court is persuaded that the injunctive relief Plaintiffs seek is available in this case. See Severino v.

Biden, 71 F.4th 1038, 1042–43 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (court’s “jurisdiction does not depend on deciding

whether an injunction ordering a presidential appointment would be available or appropriate”

where the court “can enjoin ‘subordinate executive officials’ to reinstate a wrongly terminated

official ‘de facto,’ even without a formal presidential reappointment”) (citing Swan v. Clinton, 100

F.3d 973, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).

26a

After succeeding on the merits of its claim, a plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must

show: “(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as

monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance

of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the

public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.” EBay Inc. v. MercExchange,

L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391, 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1839, 164 L. Ed. 2d 641 (2006). When the government

is the defendant, the inquiry into the last two factors merge. Kravitz v. United States Dep’t of Com.,

366 F. Supp. 3d 681, 755 (D. Md. 2019) (citing Pursuing Am. Greatness v. Fed. Election Comm’n,

831 F.3d 500, 511 (D.C. Cir. 2016), and Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435, 129 S. Ct. 1749, 173

L. Ed. 2d 550 (2009)). “The decision to grant or deny permanent injunctive relief is an act of

equitable discretion by the district court[.]” EBay, 547 U.S. at 391, 126 S. Ct. at 1839.

Here, Plaintiffs have suffered irreparable harm in having been deprived of participation in

the affairs of the CPSC and access to the facilities and resources available and necessary to perform

their statutory duties as CPSC Commissioners for the past month. Plaintiffs are unlawfully barred

from participating in ongoing, consequential decisions of the CPSC that will substantially impact

Commission operations and its work on behalf of the public. ECF No. 18-2, ¶ 16. Specifically,

Plaintiffs are prevented from voting on Acting Chairman Feldman’s proposed plan for reductions

in force at the CPSC, which Plaintiffs believe will aggravate existing understaffing issues and

compromise the Commission’s ability to function. 9 Id. ¶ 17. In Plaintiffs’ absence, the Acting

Chairman will be able to implement his proposed plan without their input or opposition. Id. ¶¶ 17–

This Court takes no position on any differences of opinion between Plaintiffs and the Acting

Chairman respecting administration of the CPSC or any other matters of policy. Considering that each

Plaintiff has been duly appointed to serve on the CPSC, however, the Court does find harm in the bar

Defendants have unlawfully placed on their participation in the Commission’s deliberations on matters of

policy.

27a

19. In the time that the CPSC has been operating without Plaintiffs’ participation, the Commission

has stalled the progress of certain product-safety rules that Plaintiffs believe are necessary to

protect consumers, id. ¶¶ 23–24, 27–28; canceled budgetary and planning meetings that Plaintiffs

view as important, id. ¶ 29; and voted to withdraw a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for safety

standards that Plaintiffs had supported, id. ¶ 24. The foregoing irreparable harms are certain to

continue in the absence of injunctive relief, as the President has purported to discharge each

Plaintiff permanently from their office as a CPSC Commissioner. Without an injunction, Plaintiffs

would be prevented from serving out the remainder of their limited terms and therefore forever

lose the opportunity to fulfill the statutory duties assigned to them.

Plaintiffs’ injuries cannot be redressed adequately through money damages or through a

remedy at law (apart from the drastic, last-resort remedy of a writ of mandamus). 10 See Grundmann

v. Trump, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 782665, at *16–17 (D.D.C. Mar. 12, 2025) (“[a] check in

the mail does not address the gravamen” of losing the opportunity to “serve [one’s] country at the

highest possible level in [one’s] field”); Wilcox v. Trump, No. CV 25-334 (BAH), 2025 WL

720914 (D.D.C. Mar. 6, 2025), hearing in banc denied sub nom. Harris v. Bessent, No. 25-5037,

2025 WL 1033740 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 7, 2025) (being “deprived of the ability to carry out [one’s]

congressional mandate . . . cannot be retroactively cured by monetary damages”), appeal filed No.

25-5057 (D.C. Cir.). “[T]he loss of the ability to do what Congress specifically directed [Plaintiffs]

to do cannot be remediated with anything other than equitable relief.” Dellinger v. Bessent, 766 F.

As explained in Part III.C infra, the legal remedy of mandamus is available, see In re Sawyer,

124 U.S. 200, 212, 8 S. Ct. 482, 488, 31 L. Ed. 402 (1888), but the writ a “drastic” remedy to be granted

only when there are “no other adequate means to attain the relief” sought, Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Court for the

N. Dist. of Cal., 426 U.S. 394, 402–03, 96 S. Ct. 2119, 2123–24, 48 L. Ed. 2d 725 (1976). Here, the Court

finds that a writ of mandamus would be appropriate in the alternative to a permanent injunction.

28a

Supp. 3d 57, 70–71 (D.D.C. Feb. 12, 2025), appeal dismissed, 2025 WL 559669 (D.C. Cir. Feb.

15, 2025); see also, e.g., LeBlanc v. U.S. Privacy & Civil Liberties Oversight Bd., --- F. Supp. 3d

---, 2025 WL 1454010, at *28–32 (D.D.C. May 21, 2025) (unlawful termination of an independent

agency head “implicate[s] core separation of powers issues” and is “strikingly different

from . . . ‘routine’ employment circumstances”). And the Fourth Circuit has identified

reinstatement as an appropriate equitable remedy for wrongful discharge. See Hunter v. Town of

Mocksville, N. Carolina, 897 F.3d 538, 562 (4th Cir. 2018) (citing Duke v. Uniroyal Inc., 928 F.2d

1413, 1423 (4th Cir. 1991)).

Finally, a permanent injunction reinstating Plaintiffs to their positions as CPSC

Commissioners is favored by the balance of relevant hardships and does not run counter to the

public interest. The CPSC plays a vital, congressionally prescribed role in “protect[ing] the public

against unreasonable risks of injury associated with consumer products[,] . . . assist[ing]

consumers in evaluating the comparative safety of consumer products[,]” and “develop[ing]

uniform safety standards for consumer products[,]” among other purposes. 15 U.S.C. § 2051(b).

Depriving this five-member Commission of three of its sitting members threatens severe

impairment of its ability to fulfill its statutory mandates and advance the public’s interest in safe

consumer products. This hardship and threat to public safety significantly outweighs any hardship

Defendants might suffer from Plaintiffs’ participation on the CPSC. The Court notes again that

Plaintiff Boyle’s term ends in October of this year, at which point the President will have an

opportunity to appoint her successor and exert significant influence over the agency. Defendants

have identified no public interest in depriving this five-member Commission of three members.

29a

The Court finds it to be in the public interest to have the persons duly appointed to occupy these

key leadership positions resume their roles. 11

Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiffs’ requested injunctive relief appropriate and shall

grant it.

C. Mandamus

Even if de facto reinstatement is unavailable as a form of equitable relief, it is available

alternatively by a writ of mandamus. See In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. at 212, 8 S. Ct. at 488 (“The

jurisdiction to determine the title to a public office belongs exclusively to the courts of law, and is

exercised either by certiorari, error, or appeal, or by mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto, or

information in the nature of a writ of quo warranto, according to the circumstances of the case,

and the mode of procedure, established by the common law or by statute.”).

A federal district court has “original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus

to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty

owed to the plaintiff.” 28 U.S.C. § 1361. But “[m]andamus is a ‘drastic’ remedy that must be

reserved for ‘extraordinary situations’ involving the performance of official acts or

duties.” Cumberland Cnty. Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Burwell, 816 F.3d 48, 52 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting

Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Court for the N. Dist. of Cal., 426 U.S. 394, 402, 96 S. Ct. 2119, 2123, 48 L.

Ed.2d 725 (1976)).

In denying Plaintiffs’ request for preliminary injunctive relief, the Court found that the

preliminary record did not provide a clear showing that the balance of equities favored such relief. This

finding was supported by the emergency Order recently entered by the Supreme Court in Trump v. Wilcox,

145 S. Ct. 1415 (2025), where the Court determined that a stay of preliminary injunctive relief in that case

was “appropriate to avoid the disruptive effect of the repeated removal and reinstatement of officers during

the pendency of this litigation.” Disruption might have resulted in the instant case if Plaintiffs had been

reinstated while this case was in its preliminary posture, only to have the Court later deny relief in its final

judgment and subject Plaintiffs to removal again. The risk of such disruption is no longer a factor now that

the Court is granting permanent injunctive relief as a final judgment.

30a

[T]o establish the conditions necessary for issuance of a writ of

mandamus, the party seeking the writ must demonstrate that (1) he

has a clear and indisputable right to the relief sought; (2) the

responding party has a clear duty to do the specific act requested;

(3) the act requested is an official act or duty; (4) there are no other

adequate means to attain the relief he desires; and (5) the issuance

of the writ will effect right and justice in the circumstances.

U.S. ex rel. Rahman v. Oncology Assocs., P.C., 198 F.3d 502, 511 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Kerr, 426

U.S. at 403, 96 S. Ct. at 2124).

The Court finds that the wrongful removal of a presidentially appointed Commissioner of

an independent federal agency presents an “extraordinary” situation involving interference with

the performance of official duties and, therefore, is suited for mandamus relief. Cumberland Cnty.

Hosp. Sys., 816 F.3d at 52. Each Plaintiff, having been duly appointed to serve as a CPSC

Commissioner and not lawfully removed from that position, “has a clear and indisputable right to”

to their office, and Defendants have a “clear” and “official” duty to provide each Plaintiff access

to the resources necessary and available for each Plaintiff to perform their official duties. Rahman,

198 F.3d at 511. If equitable relief in the form of a permanent injunction is unavailable, then there

would be “no other adequate means to attain the relief” to which each Plaintiff is entitled. Id. And,

in these circumstances, issuance of a writ of mandamus would be right and just. Id.

31a

VI.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment is granted, and

Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Temporary

Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction is denied as moot. The Court shall issue a separate

declaratory judgment and permanent injunction consistent with this Memorandum Opinion.

Date

Matthew

atthhew J. Maddoxx

United States District Judge

32a

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

MARY BOYLE, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

Civ. No. MJM-25-1628

DONALD J. TRUMP, et al.,

Defendants.

* * * * * * * * * *

ORDER

WK day of June,

For the reasons stated in the foregoing Memorandum Opinion, it is this _____

2025, by the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, hereby ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 18) is GRANTED;

2. Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 21) is DENIED;

3. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction (ECF No.

6) is DENIED as moot;

4. It is DECLARED that President Donald J. Trump’s purported termination of Plaintiffs

Mary Boyle, Alexander Hoehn-Saric, and Richard Trumka Jr. from their roles as

Commissioners of the Consumer Product Safety Commission (“CPSC”) is ultra vires,

contrary to law, and without legal effect; and

5. Defendants Scott Bessent, Russell Vought, and Peter A. Feldman are ENJOINED from

taking any action to effectuate Plaintiffs’ unlawful terminations (until such time as

Plaintiffs’ terms expire pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 2053), including by:

33a

x Barring Plaintiffs’ access to agency resources (including, but not

limited to, Plaintiffs’ office spaces, CPSC telephone and

computer equipment, CPSC email accounts, and physical and

electronic files) to which Plaintiffs had access prior to May 8,

2025;

Giving effect to the purported termination of Plaintiffs’ staff

members; or

Withholding from Plaintiffs and their staff members the pay and

benefits that they were entitled to receive in connection with

their roles at the CPSC prior to May 8, 2025.

And it is further ORDERED Plaintiffs’ unopposed Motion for Leave to Waive

Requirement Under Local Rule 102.2(a) to Provide Addresses in Complaint Caption (ECF No. 2)

is GRANTED.

The Clerk shall CLOSE this case.

Matthew

w JJ. Maddox

United States District Judge

34a

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

MARY BOYLE, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

Civ. No. MJM-25-1628

DONALD J. TRUMP, et al.,

Defendants.

* * * * * * * * * *

MEMORANDUM ORDER

On June 13, 2025, the Court entered a Memorandum Opinion and Order granting Plaintiffs

Mary Boyle, Alexander Hoehn-Saric, and Richard Trumka Jr. (collectively, “Plaintiffs”)

declaratory and injunctive relief. ECF Nos. 24 & 25. The Order declares the purported removal of

Plaintiffs from their roles as Commissioners of the Consumer Product Safety Commission

(“CPSC”) without legal effect and enjoins official action that would effectuate Plaintiffs’ removal.

Id. On June 16, 2025, defendants Donald J. Trump, President of the United States; Scott Bessent,

Secretary of the Treasury; Russell Vought, Director of the Office of Management and Budget; and

Peter A. Feldman, Acting Chairman of the CPSC (collectively, “Defendants”) filed a Notice of

Appeal. ECF No. 26.

Currently pending before this Court are three motions filed by Defendants: a Motion to

Stay the Court’s Order Pending Appeal (“Motion to Stay”), ECF No. 27; a Motion for Leave to

File the Declaration of Tripp DeMoss (“Motion for Leave”), ECF No. 31; and a Motion to Seal,

35a

ECF No. 35. 1 Pursuant to Local Rule 105.11 (D. Md. 2023), the Court shall defer ruling on the

Motion to Seal until 14 days after its filing date. Plaintiffs filed responses to Defendants’ Motion

to Stay, ECF No. 29, and the Motion for Leave, ECF No. 32. Defendants filed a reply in support

of each motion, ECF Nos. 36 and 37, respectively. For reasons explained below, the Motion for

Leave is granted, and the Motion to Stay is denied.

Motion for Leave to File Declaration

In their Motion for Leave, Defendants request leave to file the declaration of Tripp

DeMoss, dated June 17, 2025, in support of their Motion to Stay. ECF No. 31. The declaration is

attached to the Motion for Leave, ECF No. 31-1, along with several exhibits, ECF Nos. 31-2

through 31-5. In their response, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants’ Motion for Leave is untimely

because it was filed one day after the Motion to Stay and after Plaintiffs filed their response to that

motion. ECF No. 32. Plaintiffs do not offer any substantive argument that the Court should deny

Defendants the opportunity to supplement the record in support of their Motion to Stay. The Court

notes that Defendants filed their Motion to Stay promptly—one business day after the Court

entered its Order granting Plaintiffs declaratory and injunctive relief. ECF No. 27. Defendants

explain that Mr. DeMoss’s declaration describes events that occurred after their Motion to Stay

was filed. ECF No. 36. The Court finds the timing of Defendants’ filings to be justified and, in its

Defendants also filed an emergency motion to stay in their appeal. Boyle v. Trump, Appeal No.

25-1687, Doc. 13 (4th Cir. June 17, 2025).

While the “filing of a notice of appeal” generally “divests the district court of its control over those

aspects of the case involved in the appeal[,]” City of Martinsville, Virginia v. Express Scripts, Inc., 128

F.4th 265, 269 (4th Cir. 2025) (quoting Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 103 S. Ct.

400, 74 L. Ed. 2d 225 (1982), and Coinbase, Inc. v. Bielski, 599 U.S. 736, 143 S. Ct. 1915, 216 L. Ed. 2d

671 (2023)), a district court may retain jurisdiction to stay an injunction granted in a final judgment,

pursuant to Rule 62(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See 11 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R.

Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 2904 (3d ed. 2025) (citing cases). Defendants’ Motion for Leave and Motion

to Seal are ancillary to their Motion to Stay. The Court finds that it has jurisdiction to decide the motions

Defendants filed in this matter, even while Defendants’ appeal is pending.

36a

discretion, will permit Defendants to supplement the record in support of their Motion to Stay. The

Motion for Leave is granted.

II.

Motion to Stay Pending Appeal

In their Motion to Stay, Defendants request a stay of the Court’s Order granting an

injunction against any action by Defendants Bessent, Vought, and Feldman to effectuate Plaintiffs’

purported removal from their offices as CPSC Commissioners. ECF No. 27. Plaintiffs oppose this

motion. ECF No. 29. Courts consider four factors in deciding whether to stay an injunction pending

appeal: “(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on

the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance

of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the

public interest lies.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 425–26, 129 S. Ct. 1749, 1756, 173 L. Ed. 2d

550 (2009) (quoting Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776, 107 S. Ct. 2113, 95 L. Ed. 2d 724

(1987)). The first two factors are “the most critical.” Id. at 434, 129 S. Ct. at 1761. Here, the Nken

factors do not warrant a stay.

First, Defendants fail to make “a strong showing that [they are] likely to succeed on the

merits” of their defense that the President’s without-cause removal of Plaintiffs from office was

justified by his removal power under Article II of the U.S. Constitution. Nken, 556 U.S. at 426,

129 S. Ct. at 1756. For the reasons explained in its Memorandum Opinion, this Court has found

that Plaintiffs’ removal from office was unlawful under 15 U.S.C. § 2053(a), which permits

removal only for “neglect of duty or malfeasance in office,” and that this statutory removal

protection is constitutionally justified by the Humphrey’s Executor exception to the President’s

unrestrained removal power under Article II.

37a

In Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 55 S. Ct. 869, 79 L. Ed. 1611

(1935), the Supreme Court “held that Congress could create expert agencies led by a group of

principal officers removable by the President only for good cause.” Seila L. LLC v. Consumer Fin.

Prot. Bureau, 591 U.S. 197, 204, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2192, 207 L. Ed. 2d 494 (2020). Humphrey’s

Executor provides an exception to the President’s “unrestrictable power . . . to remove purely

executive officers” for “multimember bodies with ‘quasi-judicial’ or ‘quasi-legislative’

functions[.]” Id. at 217, 140 S. Ct. at 2199 (quoting Humphrey’s Executor, 295 U.S. at 632, 55 S.

Ct. at 875). This Court has found that, like the agency at issue in Humphrey’s Executor, the CPSC

is “a multimember body of experts, balanced along partisan lines” and appointed to serve

“staggered, seven-year terms[,]” Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 216, 140 S. Ct. at 2198–99, that performs

functions the Supreme Court has described as “quasi legislative and quasi judicial[,]” Humphrey’s

Executor, 295 U.S. at 629, 55 S. Ct. at 874. See also ECF No. 24 (Mem. Op.) at 16–20; 15 U.S.C.

§ 2053(a)–(c) (listing qualifications and terms for CPSC Commissioners). As explained in the

Memorandum Opinion, the structure and funding of the CPSC permits the President to exert

influence over the CPSC, notwithstanding the removal restriction in 15 U.S.C. § 2053(a) and is

supported by historical precedent. ECF No. 24 (Mem. Op) at 21–23. Likewise, the U.S. Courts of

Appeals for the Fifth and Tenth Circuits have also concluded that the removal restriction in §

2053(a) is constitutional under Humphrey’s Executor. See Consumers’ Research v. CPSC, 91 F.4th

342, 351–56 (5th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 414, 220 L. Ed. 2d 170 (2024); Leachco, Inc.

v. CPSC, 103 F.4th 748, 762 (10th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 104 (2025); accord United

States v. SunSetter Prods. LP, 2024 WL 1116062, at *2–4 (D. Mass. Mar. 14, 2024).

Humphrey’s Executor remains good law. See Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 228, 140 S. Ct. at

2206; Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 483–84, 130 S. Ct. 3138,

38a

3146–47, 177 L. Ed. 2d 706 (2010). And this Court is bound to apply the Supreme Court’s

precedent where it is directly applicable, “even if [it] thinks the precedent is in tension with ‘some

other line of decisions.’” Mallory v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 600 U.S. 122, 136, 143 S. Ct. 2028, 2038,

216 L. Ed. 2d 815 (2023) (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490

U.S. 477, 484, 109 S. Ct. 1917, 1921, 104 L. Ed. 2d 526 (1989)).

Defendants offer no new evidence or argument to persuade the Court that it erred in its

ruling. As they argued in opposition to Plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion, Defendants contend

that Humphrey’s Executor does not apply to the CPSC because it exercises executive power. ECF

No. 27 at 3. But, as explained in the Memorandum Opinion, the performance of executive

functions alone is not dispositive of whether Humphrey’s Executor applies. See ECF No. 24 (Mem.

Op.) 20–23; Collins v. Yellen, 594 U.S. 220, 251–52, 141 S. Ct. 1761, 1784, 210 L. Ed. 2d 432

(2021) (“[T]he nature and breadth of an agency’s authority is not dispositive in determining

whether Congress may limit the President’s power to remove its head.”). Defendants rely

principally upon a stay order the Supreme Court entered in Trump v. Wilcox, 145 S. Ct. 1415

(2025). But the order in Wilcox confirms that an exception to the President’s removal power may

apply, notwithstanding a likelihood that the agencies subject to that order “exercise considerable

executive power[.]” 145 S. Ct. at 1415.

Second, Defendants fail to establish any irreparable injury absent a stay. It is important to

note that the injunction granted by this Court merely returned the composition of the CPSC to the

status quo that existed less than two months ago and had been in place before Defendants took

office. Defendants attempt to show irreparable injury by citing a generalized harm based on

Plaintiffs’ exercise of powers duly vested in them as CPSC Commissioners. ECF No. 27 at 3. The

only evidence of case-specific harm Defendants offer are descriptions of official actions Plaintiffs

39a

have taken since resuming their duties last week. ECF No. 36 at 2. Trent DeMoss, Senior Counsel

to Acting Chairman Feldman, asserts in his declaration that Plaintiffs conducted an “unauthorized

and invalid” meeting last week, ECF No. 31-1, ¶ 14, and that they are seeking to implement

policies in a way that circumvents governing provisions of the Consumer Product Safety Act,

describing such actions as “disruptive,” id. ¶ 17. The Court finds, however, that Mr. DeMoss’s

declaration describes, at best, differences of opinion he has with Plaintiffs over substantive and

procedural matters of policy internal to the CPSC. Policy differences of this nature preexisted this

litigation. See ECF Nos. 6-2 through 6-4 (Plaintiffs’ declarations describing events that preceded

notification of their removal). Differences in views over internal policy matters are to be expected

of a multimember adjudicatory body that is bipartisan by design, like the CPSC. See 15 U.S.C. §

2053(c). 2 Moreover, Defendants fail to establish that any injury to them caused by Plaintiffs’

participation in CPSC business cannot be repaired if they succeed in their appeal or when

Commissioner Boyle’s term expires in October of this year, even if Defendants’ appeal is

unsuccessful. See ECF No. 6-2, ¶ 2. Thus, Defendants’ fail to show any irreparable injury they

would suffer without a stay.

Third, the Court finds that a stay of its Order “will substantially injure the other parties

interested in the proceeding[,]” Nken, 556 U.S. at 426, 129 S. Ct. at 1756—specifically, Plaintiffs.

Each Plaintiff serves a term as Commissioner limited by statute, 15 U.S.C. § 2053(b); each

Plaintiff’s term expires on a date certain, ECF Nos. 6-2 through 6-4, ¶ 2. Accordingly, each day

Plaintiffs are deprived of the opportunity and resources necessary to perform the functions and

duties they were duly appointed to perform as CPSC Commissioners is time lost that they—and

To the extent that any Plaintiffs’ official actions amount to malfeasance, Defendants may find

relief in the removal statute they claim to be unconstitutional in this litigation. See 15 U.S.C. § 2053(a)

(permitting President to remove any CPSC Commissioner “for neglect of duty or malfeasance in office but

for no other cause”).

40a

the public—cannot regain, whether or not they prevail on appeal. See ECF No. 24 (Mem. Op.) at

26–28 (describing irreparable harms caused by Plaintiffs’ purported termination). Thus, while

Defendants fail to demonstrate any irreparable injury absent a stay, the irreparable harm to

Plaintiffs that would result from a stay is clear.

Fourth, the public interest does not favor a stay. See id. at 28–29 (finding that public interest

and balance of equities favor injunction). The CPSC serves the public’s interest in ensuring safety

among products in the marketplace in various ways detailed in the Memorandum Opinion, id., and

in Plaintiffs declarations, ECF Nos. 18-3 through 18-5. There is no dispute that each Plaintiff has

performed their duties as CPSC Commissioners ably and has brought to this role substantial

expertise in the field of consumer protection. ECF Nos. 6-2 through 6-4. Plaintiffs are three of the

CPSC’s five Commissioners—60% of the agency’s duly appointed leadership. A stay would only

deprive the CPSC of Plaintiffs’ abilities and expertise and, therefore, poses a danger to the vital

role the CPSC plays in ensuring the safety of consumer products on the market. See, e.g., ECF No.

18-3, ¶¶ 10–13 (describing certain “life-saving” regulations under consideration by the CPSC

pertaining to lithium-ion batteries and battery-operated toys, which Plaintiffs support but the

remaining two Commissioners have not supported); ECF Nos. 6-2 through 6-4 (each Plaintiff

stating, “I believe that my work has played an important role in protecting consumers across the

nation from injury and death.”). The Court finds the public’s interest in protection from hazardous

and unsafe consumer products to exceed the public interests presented in support of the injunctions

stayed by the Supreme Court’s order in Wilcox. See Wilcox v. Trump, No. CV 25-334 (BAH), 2025

WL 720914, at *17 (D.D.C. Mar. 6, 2025) (finding that public interest in “efficient and peaceful

resolution of labor conflicts” supports injunction reinstating member of National Labor Relations

Board); Harris v. Bessent, No. CV 25-412 (RC), 2025 WL 679303, at *14 (D.D.C. Mar. 4, 2025)

41a

(finding that public interest “in having governmental agencies abide by” federal law supports

injunction reinstating member of Merit Systems Protection Board).

Meanwhile, on the other side of the balance, the only specific harms Defendants claim

result from Plaintiffs’ participation in CPSC business are official actions and positions Plaintiffs

have taken concerning personnel matters internal to the CPSC. See ECF Nos. 31 & 36. Defendants

do not identify any way in which the public would be harmed or placed at risk by Plaintiffs’

performance of the duties they were duly appointed to perform. And Defendants offer no

information or evidence to dispute Plaintiffs’ sworn statements describing how their participation

as CPSC Commissioners serves the public’s interest in safe consumer products. Defendants make

no attempt to show that, in Plaintiffs’ absence from the CPSC, the public will be adequately

protected from hazards and risks presented in certain consumer products.

In sum, none of the four Nken factors supports a stay of the injunction. Accordingly,

Defendant’s Motion to Stay must be denied.

III.

Conclusion

23rd

For the reasons stated herein, it is this

day of June, 2025, by the United States

District Court for the District of Maryland, hereby

ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Leave to File the Declaration of Tripp DeMoss

(ECF No. 31) is GRANTED; and it is further

ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Stay the Court’s Order Pending Appeal (ECF No.

27) is DENIED.

Matthew

the

h w JJ.. Maddox

United States District Judge

42a

FILED: July 1, 2025

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

___________________

No. 25-1687

(8:25-cv-01628-MJM)

___________________

MARY BOYLE; ALEXANDER HOEHN–SARIC; RICHARD TRUMKA JR.,

Plaintiffs – Appellees,

DONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States; SCOTT

BESSENT, in his official capacity as Secretary of the Treasury; RUSSELL VOUGHT,

in his official capacity as Director of the Office of Management and Budget; PETER A.

FELDMAN, in his official capacity as Acting Chairman of the U.S. Consumer Product

Safety Commission,

Defendants – Appellants.

___________________

ORDER

___________________

The Court denies the motion for an administrative stay and a stay pending appeal

(ECF 13) in this case.

Entered at the direction of Judge Heytens with the concurrence of Judge Gregory

and Judge Wynn. Judge Wynn wrote a concurring opinion.

For the Court

/s/ Nwamaka Anowi, Clerk

43a

WYNN, Circuit Judge, concurring:

The Constitution permits Congress, in furtherance of its legislative functions, to

create independent agencies staffed by officers shielded from at-will removal—provided

that such limitations do not impede the President’s ability to faithfully execute the laws.

Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935). Congress exercised that

authority when it created the Consumer Products Safety Commission (“the Commission”)

as a bipartisan, multi-member independent regulatory commission tasked with protecting

the public against unreasonable risks of injury with consumer products. 15 U.S.C.

§ 2051(b).

In doing so, Congress expressly limited the President’s removal authority: a

commissioner may be removed only “for neglect of duty or malfeasance in office but for

no other cause.” Id. at § 2053(a).

Here Plaintiff-Commissioners Mary Boyle, Alexander Hoehn-Saric, and Richard

Trumka Jr. were, in accordance with statutory law, duly appointed for fixed terms by the

President after having been confirmed by the Senate. While serving within those terms, the

newly elected President purported to terminate them without finding—or even alleging—

any neglect or malfeasance. That action, plainly in conflict with the textual language of the

statutory removal protections, rendered the terminations legally ineffective. Thus, upon

correctly determining that the newly elected President’s actions were ultra vires, the district

court issued a permanent injunction and declaratory relief restoring the PlaintiffCommissioners to their offices.

44a

The issue on appeal is whether this Court should stay that injunction pending its

appeal. Under the governing law and legal standard, the answer is resoundingly no.

A stay pending appeal is “an exercise of judicial discretion,” the propriety of which

“is dependent upon the circumstances of the particular case.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S.

418, 433 (2009) (quoting Virginian Ry. Co. v. United States, 272 U.S. 658, 672–73 (1926)).

Our discretion is guided by four factors: “(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong

showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be

irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure

the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.” Id. at

434 (quoting Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987)). Of these factors, the first two

“are the most critical.” Id. Defendants cannot satisfy any of these factors, particularly not

the first.

The

Constitution

accommodates

removal

protections

for

multi-member

commissions exercising quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers. Humphrey’s

Executor, 295 U.S. at 629. Indeed, the Supreme Court recently distilled the import of

Humphrey’s Executor as “permitt[ing] Congress to give for-cause removal protections to

a multimember body of experts, balanced along partisan lines, that performed legislation

and judicial functions and was said not to exercise any executive power.” Seila L. LLC v.

Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 591 U.S. 197, 216 (2020).

Defendants argue that Seila Law implicitly abrogates, either entirely or in

substantial part, Humphrey’s Executor. But Seila Law did no such thing. To the contrary,

the Supreme Court in Seila Law expressly reaffirmed Humphrey’s Executor as good law

45a

by emphasizing the structural and functional differences between a single-director agency

wielding executive power and a multi-member commission with a balanced, bipartisan

design.

Here, the Commission, unlike the single-director entity—the Consumer Financial

Protection Bureau—at issue in Seila Law, is a multimember body. Nor are the other

structural factors that rendered the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau beyond

presidential control present with the Commission. And the Court made clear that it “d[id]

not revisit Humphrey’s Executor or any other precedent” in Seila Law. Id. at 228.

The only other circuit courts to have considered the constitutionality of the

Commission after Seila Law agree with this analysis. See Consumers’ Rsch. v. Consumer

Prod. Safety Comm’n, 91 F.4th 342, 352 (5th Cir.) (finding that “the Supreme Court, while

it has limited Humphrey’s, has not yet overruled it” and that “[t]he holding from

Humphrey’s controls[ and] authorizes the Commission’s structure”), cert denied, 145 S.

Ct. 414 (2024); Leachco, Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n, 103 F.4th 748, 762–63

(10th Cir. 2024) (observing that “Humphrey’s Executor remains good law” and finding

“clear precedential support for the CPSC Commissioners’ removal protections”), cert

denied, 145 S. Ct. 1047 (2025).

Defendants make overtures to the Supreme Court’s recent stay order in Trump v.

Wilcox, 145 S. Ct. 1415 (2025) (per curiam). But Wilcox does not alter the controlling

precedent because the “stay order” in Wilcox did “not make or signal any change to”

precedent and was “not a ruling on the merits.” Merrill v. Milligan, 142 S. Ct. 879, 879

(2022) (mem.) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in grant of application for stays). And “an

46a

applicant’s likelihood of success must be made under ‘existing law.’” NetChoice, LLC v.

Paxton, 142 S. Ct. 1715, 1716 (2022) (mem.) (Alito, J., dissenting from grant of application

to vacate stay) (quoting Merrill, 142 S. Ct. at 882 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting from grant of

application for stays)). Indeed, Wilcox itself explicitly stated that it “d[id] not ultimately

decide in this posture whether the NLRB or MSPB” were constitutionally required to

permit the President to remove their officers at his pleasure, because “that question [was]

better left for resolution after full briefing and argument.” 145 S. Ct. at 1415. So, the

distinguishable stay order in Wilcox is not enough to tilt the likelihood-of-success analysis

here.

As the district court thoroughly explained, the Commission’s statutory removal

protections remain constitutional under Humphrey’s Executor and its progeny. That

precedent remains binding on this Court unless and until the Supreme Court overrules it.

Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989). Because

Defendants’ likelihood of success on the merits has been so thoroughly foreclosed by

existing case law, the remaining factors can be handled with much more alacrity.

Defendants have also failed to establish irreparable injury absent a stay. The district

court’s order only restored the Commission to its status quo ante—the very state of affairs

that governed before May 8, 2025, and under which every administration has operated

As Defendants have not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits

regarding their claim that the removal protections for the commissioners violates the

Constitution, their secondary argument that the district court’s injunction amounted to an

improper, de facto reinstatement fails as well.

47a

since the Commission was established in 1972. Defendants’ contention of irreparable harm

by Plaintiff-Commissioners continuing to serve in their Senate-confirmed roles just

presupposes a likelihood of success on the merits. As Defendants have not established the

latter, they have not satisfied their burden of establishing the former.

By contrast, imposition of a stay would substantially injure both the PlaintiffCommissioners and the public. The Plaintiff-Commissioners were appointed to serve fixed

terms with statutory protections designed to preserve the Commission’s independence and

partisan balance. Permitting their unlawful removal would thwart that purpose and deprive

the public of the Commission’s full expertise and oversight. And because the attempted

removals were unlawful, the Plaintiff-Commissioners never ceased to lawfully occupy

their offices.

The public interest lies in upholding the rule of law and ensuring that federal officers

are removed only in accordance with the procedures that Congress lawfully enacted. That

interest outweighs the executive’s asserted need for immediate control, particularly when

the underlying legal question is governed by longstanding precedent that supports the

district court’s ruling.

To the extent Wilcox suggested otherwise, it did so only in reference to the unusual

disruption arising from repeated removals and reinstatements of officers during litigation.

That concern is not present here.

The Plaintiff-Commissioners served continuously until May 8, 2025, and have

resumed their duties since the district court’s June 13, 2025 order. See Third Decl. of

Richard Trumka Jr., ECF No. 29-1. There has been no further interruption in their work,

48a

and the district court has already issued a declaratory judgment and a permanent injunction.

So, here, the considerations of minimizing disruption and preserving the status quo favor

permitting the Plaintiff-Commissioners to continue to perform their statutory duties while

this appeal proceeds. Simply put, allowing the Plaintiff-Commissioners to continue in their

roles preserves, rather than disrupts, agency operations.

The Supreme Court also stated in Wilcox “that the Government faces greater risk of

harm from an order allowing a removed officer to continue exercising the executive power

than a wrongfully removed officer faces from being unable to perform her statutory duty.”

145 S. Ct. at 1415. But even assuming this statement would suggest that the equities favor

Defendants in this case, the Supreme Court could not have meant that this factor should be

weighed so significantly that it be allowed to permanently tip the scales in the executive’s

favor regardless of the underling merits of the removal and the other Nken factors. As with

Humphrey’s Executor, we are obliged to follow Nken unless the Supreme Court explicitly

overrules it.

In sum, the Constitution is not indifferent to structure. It entrusts Congress with the

power to design independent agencies that serves the public interest free from political

pressure—so long as they operate within constitutional bounds. Here, Congress lawfully

constrained the President’s removal authority, and no court has found that constraint

unconstitutional.

Accordingly, the district court correctly declined to permit a President—any

President—to disregard those limits.

For these reasons, I concur in the denial of the motion to stay.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.