Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Robert James McDonald, Petitioner v. Washington
Supreme Court briefSep 10, 2025
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APPENDIX
• Exhibit A — Order of Court of Appeals of the State
of Washington, Division One, denying Petitioner’s
Motion to Modify; April 8, 2025, is recited below
and a copy of original appended hereto.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF
WASHINGTON, DIVISION ONE
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
Respondent,
v.
ROBERT JAMES MCDONALD,
Petitioner
No. 87305-9-1
ORDER ON MOTION TO MODIFY
Petitioner Robert James McDonald moves to modify the
commissioner’s January 27, 2025 ruling denying
discretionary review of a September 23, 2024 trial court
decision to conduct an arraignment according to the
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Superior Court Criminal Rules (CrR). Respondent State
of Washington has not filed a response. We have
considered the motion under RAP 17.7 and have
determined that it should be denied.
Now, therefore it is hereby
ORDERED that the motion to modify is denied.
ZsZ
• Exhibit B — Order of the Supreme Court of the
State of Washington, denying Petitoner’s Motion
for Discretionary Review; July 29, 2025, is recited
below and a copy of original appended hereto.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF
WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON
Respondent,
v.
ROBERT JAMES MCDONALD,
Petitioner
-19-
No. 104267-1
Court of Appeals No, 87305-9-1
RULING DENYING REVIEW
Pro se petitioner Robert McDonald seeks
discretionary review of a decision by Division One of the
Court of Appeals denying petitioner’s motion for
discretionary review of a King County Superior Court
decision to arraign petitioner on a criminal information in
accordance with the Superior Court Criminal Rules (CrR).
The motion for discretionary review is denied for reasons
explained below.
The State charged petitioner with a single count of
first degree theft. At the arraignment hearing, the
superior court asked to confirm petitioner’s identity.
Petitioner responded that they were [rather, he u>as] “the
agent of record and the sole beneficiary for the Defendant.”
Ruling Denying Review, No. 87305-9-1 (Jan. 27, 2025) at 1.
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Petitioner further alleged that the State invoked the
superior court’s “emergency war powers military due
process [of] law jurisdiction” and asked the court to apply
“civilian due process of law.” Id. Petitioner cited their
[rather, his] declaration as “unrebutted evidence of
[their] [rather, his] identity and stated that they were
the “beneficiary holding equitable title by nature” and
“hereby merge[d] the legal and equitable titles to the
Defendant and collapse[d] this case.” [Petitioner is at a
loss as to the reason why the court refers to him with a
third person personal pronoun—“their”—unless the court
is presuming joinder of the man with the Defendant
“person. ” This presumption of the court was thoroughly
rebutted by petitioner’s “Release With Consideration”
(Exhibit 3) within his Declaration of Status in evidence
before the court.]
The superior court proceeded with arraignment,
offered petitioner the services of a public defender,
asked the assigned public defender to stand with
petitioner after petitioner gave equivocal answers
regarding waiver of their right to counsel asked the
prosecutor to arraign petitioner on the record, noted
-21-
that “this is the person charged for purposes of this case
as Robert J. McDonald” [as opposed to the name of the man,
Robert-James: McDonald in evidence before superior court]
noted that a copy of the information was delivered to
petitioner, entered a plea of not guilty on petitioner’s
behalf, and imposed conditions of release. Id. At 2.
Petitioner sought discretionary review in the Court
of Appeals, arguing that the superior court’s arraignment
proceeding violated their constitutional rights.
Commissioner Jennifer Koh concluded that petitioner
failed to establish that discretionary review was warranted
under RAP 2.3(b) and denied review. A panel of judges
denied petitioner’s motion to modify the commissioner’s
ruling RAP 17.7. Petitioner now seeks discretionary
review in this court. RAP 13.3(a)(2), (c), (e); RAP 13.5(a).
Appellant courts disfavor interlocutory review
generally, as they are reluctant to assert themselves into a
lower court’s ongoing proceedings. Minehart v. Morning
Star Boys Ranch, Inc. 156 Wn. App. 457, 462, 232 P.3d 591
(2010). In line with this restrictive policy, to obtain
discretionary review in this court, petitioner must
demonstrate that the Court of Appeals committed obvious
I
I
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error that renders further proceedings useless or
probable error that substantially alters the status
quo or that substantially Emits a party’s freedom to
act, or that the court departed so far from the accepted
and usual course of judicial proceedings that it is
necessary for this court to intervene.
RAP 13.5(h). Petitioner does not cite or discuss any of
these criteria and nothing in his bald assertions of
error shows that any of them applies. Petitioner merely
asserts the superior court erroneously arraigned
petitioner under military, not civilian, jurisdiction and
due process procedures. Petitioner cites no legal
authority, and I am not aware of any, supporting the
notion that the superior court acted under “emergency
war powers military due process of law” as
petitioner insists. Mot. For Disc. Rev. at 5.
To the contrary, it appears the superior court proceeded
in the usual manner of arraigning a criminal defendant
within the applicable court rules. See CrR. 4.1
(arraignment procedures). Petitioner does not show
otherwise.
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In sum, petitioner fails to show that the superior
court erred, either obviously or probably, within the
meaning of RAP 13.5(b)(l)-(2), or that the court
departed from the usual course of judicial
proceedings under RAP 13.5(b)(3). Discretionary
review is therefore not warranted.
The motion for discretionary review is denied.
/s/
COMMISSIONER
July 29, 2025
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APPENDIX
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Article VI, Section^:
“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every States shall
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”
Section 1, Fourteenth Amendment:
“All persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of
the United States and of the State wherein they reside.
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of
the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.”
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Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 at 74 (1906):
“The individual may stand upon his constitutional rights
as a citizen. He is entitled to carry on his private
business in his own way. His power to contract is
unlimited. .. . His rights are such as existed by the law
of the land long antecedent to the organization of the State,
and can only be taken from him by due process of law
and in accordance with the Constitution.”
Presidential Proclamation 2039 of March 6, 1933:
“Whereas there have been heavy and unwarranted
withdrawals of gold and currency from our banking
institutions for the purpose of hoarding: and . ..
“Whereas those conditions have created a national
emergency; and . . .
Presidential Proclamation 2040 of March 9, 1933:
“Whereas, under the Act of March 9, 1933 [Emergency
Banking Relief Act, 12 USC 95a-b], all Proclamations
heretofore or hereafter issued by the President pursuant
to the authority conferred by Section 5(b) of the Act of
October 6, 1917 [Trading With the Enemy Act], as
amended, are approved and confirmed: and
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“Whereas said national emergency still continues . ..
Now, Therefore, I, Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of
the United States of America, in view of such
continuing national emergency and by virtue of the
authority vested in me by Section 5(b) of the Act of
October 6, 1917 (40 Stat. L. 411 [Trading With the
Enemy Act], as amended by the Act of March 9, 1933
[Emergency Banking Relief Act], do hereby proclaim,
order, direct and declare that all the terms and
provisions of said Proclamation of March 6, 1933,
and the regulations and orders issued thereunder
are hereby continued in full force and effect until
further proclamation bv the President.”
Army Regulation 840-10, 2-3b and c(4):
“3b. “National flags listed below are for indoor display
and for use in ceremonies and parages. For these
purposes, the flag of the United States will be of rayon
banner cloth or heavyweight nylon, trimmed on three
sides with golden yellow fringe, 2 A inches wide.. . .
b. Authorization for indoor display. The flag of the
United States is authorized for indoor display for each—
(4) Military courtroom.”
-TlTREATIES
Article 23h of the international Hague Convention
(1907):
“In addition to the prohibitions provided by Special
Conventions, it is especially forbidden:.. .
(h) To declare abolished, suspended, or inadmissible
in a Court of law the rights and actions of the nationals
of the hostile party.”
18 USC Section 2441(c)(2):
"As used in this section the term “war crime” means
any conduct—
(2) prohibited by Article 23, 25, 27, or 28 of the Annex
to the Hague Convention IV, Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land, signed 18 October 1907.”
FILED
4/8/2025
Cdurf ofAppeals
Diyisidh I
Stdtd of Washington
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
No. 87305-9-1
Respondent,
ORDER ON MOTION
TO MODIFY
v.
ROBERT JAMES MCDONALD,
Petitioner.
Petitioner Robert James McDonald moves to modify the commissioner’s January
27, 2025 ruling denying discretionary review of a September 23, 2024 trial court
decision to conduct an arraignment according to the Superior Court Criminal Rules
(CrR). Respondent State of Washington has not filed a response. We have considered
the motion under RAP 17.7 and have determined that it should be denied.
Now,.therefore, it is hereby
ORDERED that the motion to modify is denied.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
Respondent,
v.
No. 1 0 4 2 6 7-1
Court of Appeals No. 87305-9-1
ROBERT JAMES MCDONALD,
RULING DENYING REVIEW
Petitioner.
Pro se petitioner Robert McDonald seeks discretionary review of a decision by
Division One of the Court of Appeals denying petitioner’s motion for discretionary
review of a King County Superior Court decision to arraign petitioner on a criminal
information in accordance with the Superior Court Criminal Rules (CrR). The motion
for discretionary review is denied for reasons explained below.
The State charged petitioner with a single count of first degree theft. At the
arraignment hearing, the superior court asked to confirm petitioner’s identity. Petitioner
responded that they were “the agent of record and the sole beneficiary for the
Defendant.” Ruling Denying Review, No. 87305-9-1 (Jan. 27, 2025) at 1. Petitioner
further alleged that the State invoked the superior court’s “emergency war powers
military due process law jurisdiction” and asked the court to apply “civilian due process
of law.” Id. Petitioner cited their declaration as “unrebutted evidence of [their] identity”
No. 104267-1
Page 2
and stated that they were the “beneficiary holding equitable title by nature” and “hereby
merge[d] the legal and equitable titles to the Defendant and collapse[d] this case.” Id.
The superior court proceeded with arraignment, offered petitioner the services of
a public defender, asked the assigned public defender to stand with petitioner after
petitioner gave equivocal answers regarding waiver of their right to counsel, asked the
prosecutor to arraign petitioner on the record, noted that “this is the person charged for
purposes of this case as Robert J. McDonald,” noted that a copy of the information was
delivered to petitioner, entered a plea of not guilty on petitioner’s behalf, and imposed
conditions of release. Id. at 2.
Petitioner sought discretionary review in the Court of Appeals, arguing that the
superior court’s arraignment proceeding violated their constitutional rights.
Commissioner Jennifer Koh concluded that petitioner failed to establish that
discretionary review was warranted under RAP 2.3(b) and denied review. A panel of
judges denied petitioner’s motion to modify the commissioner’s ruling. RAP 17.7.
Petitioner now seeks discretionary review in this court. RAP 13.3(a)(2), (c), (e);
RAP 13.5(a).
Appellate courts disfavor interlocutory review generally, as they are reluctant to
insert themselves into a lower-court’s ongoing proceedings. Minehart v. Morning Star
Boys Ranch, Inc., 156 Wn. App. 457, 462, 232 P.3d 591 (2010). In line with this
restrictive policy, to obtain discretionary review in this court, petitioner must
demonstrate that the Court of Appeals committed obvious error that renders further
proceedings useless or probable error that substantially alters the status quo or that
substantially limits a party’s freedom to act, or that the court departed so far from the
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings that it is necessary for this court to
intervene. RAP 13.5(b). Petitioner does not cite or discuss any of these criteria and
nothing in his bald assertions of error shows that any of them applies. Petitioner merely
NO. 104267-1
Page 3
asserts the superior court erroneously arraigned petitioner under military, not civilian,
jurisdiction and due process procedures. Petitioner cites no legal authority, and I am not
aware of any, supporting the notion that the superior court acted under “emergency war
powers military due process Of law” as petitioner insists. Mot. For Disc. Rev. at 5. To
the contrary, it appears the superior court proceeded in the usual manner of arraigning
a criminal defendant within the applicable court rules. See CrR 4.1 (arraignment
procedures). Petitioner does not show otherwise.
In sum, petitioner fails to show that the superior court erred, either obviously or
probably, within the meaning of RAP 13.5 (b)( 1 )-(2), or that the court departed from the
accepted and usual course ofjudicial proceedings under RAP 13.5(b)(3). Discretionary
review is therefore not warranted.
The motion for discretionary review is denied.
COMMISSIONER
July 29, 2025
SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX
NO.
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Robert-James: McDonald
Petitioner, Pro per
v.
STATE OF WASHINGTON
Respondent
On Petition For Writ of Certiorari
TO THE COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF WASHINGTON, Division I
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Robert-James: McDonald
c/o 2149 Cascade Avenue, Unit 441
Hood River, Oregon [97031]
Email: robertiamesmcdonald@nrotonmail.com
Phone: 509-423-1842
RECEIVED
FEB 1 7 2026
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
SUPREME COURT, U.S.
-2-
SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX
• Exhibit C — Trial Court Decision to Conduct
Arraignment according to the Superior Court
Criminal Rules (CrR). September 23, 2024,
and a copy of original appended hereto.
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
FOR KING COUNTY
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
Plaintiff,
v.
Robert J. McDonald,
Defendant
No. 23-1-04062-3 KNT
ORDER SETTING OMNIBUS AND TRIAL DATE
The following court dates are set based on a commence
ment date of: 9/23/24.
The Defendant appeared -x- in person; .. .
It is ordered that the omnibus hearing and trial date in this
matter will be:
Omnibus Hearing is set on 11/4/24 at 1:00 p.m. in
Courtroom GA.
-3-
Trial date is set on 12/16/24 at 8:30 AM. The parties will
be notified of assignment and standby status by e-mail or
telephone by 3:00 p.m. the court day prior to the trial date.
The expiration date is 12/23/24.
THE DEFENDANT MUST BE PRESENT IN PERSON
FOR ARRAIGNMENT, EVERY STAGE OF TRIAL,
IMPOSTION OF SENTENCE, AND FOR ANY OTHER
HERING FOR WHICH THE COURT HAS FOUND GOOD
CAUSE FOR THE DEFENDANT TO BE PHYSICALLY
PRESENT. FOR ALL OTHER HEARINGS,
A DEFENDANT MUST AEHTER APPEAR IN-PERSON,
REMOTELY, OR THROUGH COUNSEL.
[Further instructions and warnings are given to the
Defendant including a possible bench warrant for arrest.]
No sisnature given by Defendant
Defendant
Sisnature given by Willetts
E.M. Willetts
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, WSBA No. 42815
Dated this September 23, 2024
Signature given by Judge Bender
Judge Johanna Bender
-4-
• Exhibit D— Order of the Court of Appeals of the
State of Washington, Division One, Commissioner’s
Ruling Denying Discretionary Review is recited
below and a copy of original appended hereto.
FILED—1/27/2025, Court of Appeals
Division 1, State of Washington
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF
WASHINGTON, DIVISION ONE
STATE OF WASHINGTON
Respondent,
v.
ROBERT JAMES MCDONALD,
Petitioner.
No. 87305-9-1
COMMISSIONER’S RULING DENYING
DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
Robert McDonald seeks discretionary review of a
September 23, 2024 trial court decision to conduct an
arraignment according to the Superior Court Criminal
Rules (CrR). For the reasons below, the motion for
discretionary review is denied.
-5-
FACTS
At a hearing on September 23, 2024, the State
asked the trial court to arraign McDonald on a criminal
information charging first-degree theft. See CrR 4.1.
When the trial court sought to confirm McDonald’s
identity, McDonald answered that he was “the agent of
record and the sole beneficary for the Defendant.”
McDonald argued that the prosecutor invoked the trial
court’s “emergency war powers military due process [o/|
law jurisdiction” and asked the trial court to apply
“civilian due process of law.” McDonald pointed to his
declaration as “unrebutted evidence of [his] identity” and
stated that he was the “beneficiary holding equitable title
by nature” and “hereby merge [d] the legal and equitable
titles to the Defendant and collapse[d] this case.”
(Page) No. 87305-9-1/2
The trial court proceeded to arraignment, offered the
services of the public defender, asked the public defender
to stand with McDonald after he gave equivocal answers
regarding waiver of his right to counsel, asked the
prosecutor to arraign McDonald on the record, noted that
“this is the person charged for the purposes of this case as
Robert J. McDonald,” noted that a copy of the information
-6-
was delivered to McDonald, entered a plea of not guilty on
his behalf, and imposed conditions of release.
ANALYSIS
Without specifying a subsection, McDonald seeks
discretionary review under RAP 2.3(b). “Interlocutory
review is disfavored.” Minehart v. Morning Star Bovs
Ranch, Inc., 156 Wn. App. 457, 462, 232 P.3d 591 (2010)
(citing Mavburv v. City of Seattle, 53 Wn.2d 716, 721, 336
P.2d 878 (1959)). Appellate courts generally do not
“intervene in the ordinary process of litigation in the
superior courts prior to final judgment.” Mavburv, 53
Wn.2d at 720. Under RAP 2.3(b)(1), discretionary review
may be granted if the superior court commits obvious
error rendering further proceedings useless. If the
superior court commits probable error substantially
altering the status quo or substantially limiting the
freedom of a party to act, RPA 2.3(b)(2) provides a
discretionary basis for review. Based on a showing that
the superior court has so far departed form the accepted
and usual course of judicial proceedings as to call for
appellate review, this Court may grant discretionary
review under RAP 2.3(b)(3).
-7-
As to error, McDonald claims that the superior court
violated his constitutional rights by (1) failing to clarify the
due process basis for the proceedings as military or civilian;
(2) failing to recognize his private citizenship; (3)
presuming his legal name was property spelled in upper
case letters; (4) failing to recognize its lack or jurisdiction;
(Page) No. 87305-9-1/3
(5) improperly displayed a wartime, military flag rather
than a civilian flag; (6) breaching its oath of office; and (7)
violating its oath to uphold the rules of evidence.
A
McDonald points to the affidavit he filed in the trial court
before the hearing and the State’s failure to respond.
Although McDonald does not directly address the
effects prong of RAP 2.3(b)(1) or (2), he seeks a stay of trial
court proceedings pending his appeal and an order
directing the trial court to dismiss the case without
prejudice and direct the prosecutor to correct its errors and
re file the case.
A review of the transcript McDonald demonstrates
that the trial court repeatedly stated that McDonald would
have an opportunity to present his legal arguments. And,
given the relief he seeks, McDonald is apparently focused
on procedural remedies that may yet be addressed in
-8-
further proceedings in the trial court. Accordingly, it
appears that any potential error may yet be remedied to
his satisfaction. As for alteration of the status
quo/limitation on freedom to act, it appears that McDonald
is still free to litigate his legal arguments before the trial
court. Moreover, McDonald’s perception of error at the
September 23 arraignment hearing established any
departure from the usual course of judicial proceedings in
the context of criminal prosecution.
CONCLUSION
As McDonald has not met the criteria of RAP
2.3(b), his motion for discretionary review is hereby
denied.
Signature of Jennifer D, Hoh, Commissioner
{January 27, 2025\
End of Supplemental Appendix
EXHIBIT “C”
Page 1 of 2
FILED
KING Cnil,rr'
Z3
SUPERIOR COURT CLERK
BY Molly Simon
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON FOR KINQEeRMJWTY
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
Plaintiff,
No. 23-1-04062-3 KNT
vs.
ORDER SETTING OMNIBUS AND TRIAL DATE
Robert J Mcdonald,
Defendant,
Courtroom GA
(ORSOTD)
In custody
Out of custody
Clerk’s Action Required
Date of arraignment:,_
The following court dates are set based on a commencement date of:
q/u/iH
l/LO/U-i
The Defendant appeared jj/ln person; □ Through counsel; □ Remotely (use only if an in-court hearing took place)
It is ordered that the omnibus hearing and trial date in this matter will be:
Omnibus Hearing is set on
/
The Court
U/ H/zU
at 1:00 p.m. in Courtroom GA.
Defense Counsel requests that DAJD transport defendant to the next hearing.
Trial date Is set on______ It/ Ifr/LH
at 8:30 AM The parties will be notified of assignment and
standby status by e-mail or telephone by 3:00 p.m. the court day prior to the trial date.
Other:
I
The; expiration date is
i
it/23 Ah
the Defendant must be present in person for arraignment, every stage of trial, imposition of
SENTENCE, AND FOR ANY OTHER HEARING FOR WHICH THE COURT HAS FOUND GOOD CAUSE FOR THE
DEFENDANT TO BE PHYSICALLY PRESENT. FOR ALL OTHER HEARINGS, A DEFENDANT MUST EITHER APPEAR
IN-PERSON, REMOTELY, OR THROUGH COUNSEL. To appear through counsel, counsel must provide a waiver
signed by the Defendant OR counsel must affirm that the Defendant prefers to appear through counsel. Additionally,
the Defendant must maintain contact with counsel. If the Defendant does not appear in anv wav prescribed by CrR 3.4,
the court may order the clerk to issue a bench warrant for the Defendant's arrest^lfa Defendant appears through
counsel, notices provided to counsel are presumed to be provided to the Defendant
’ll
Defendant confirmed agreement to the below waiver and Defense Counsel explained the waiver to the
defendant. WAIVER: I understand that I have a right to a trial within 60 days of my arraignment if I remain in custody
on this case, or within 90 days of my arraignment if I am released on this case before tine expiration of 60 days,
ORDER SETTING OMNIBUS AND TRIAL DATE
Page 1 of 2
Revised 8/2022
EXHIBIT
Page 2 of 2
except for any excluded periods under CrR 3.3, or unless the commencement date Is reset. I voluntarily and
knowingly agree to reset the commencement date to the next court hearing (scheduled above). I agree that my new
time for trial expiration date is 60 days from that date if I remain in custody on this case, or 90 days from that date if I
am released on this case before the expiration of 60 days.
Defendant
(Signature required for waiver pursuant to CrR 3.3(c)(2)(i) or continuance pursuant to CrR 3.3(f)(1))
E.M. Willetts
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, WSBA No. 42815
Attorney for Defendant, WSBA No.
DATED this
ina Cor.dor
I am fluent in the
language, and I have translated this entire document for the Defendant from English into
that language. I certify under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Washington that the foregoing is true and correct.
Interpreter:
ORDER SETTING OMNIBUS AND TRIAL DATE
Page 2 of 2
Date:
Revised 8/2022
EXHIBIT “D”
Pagel of3
FILED
1/27/2025
Court of Appeals
r Division I
State of Washington
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
NO. 87305-9-I
Respondent,
COMMISSIONER'S RULING
DENYING DISCRETIONARY
REVIEW
v.
ROBERT JAMES MCDONALD,
Petitioner.
Robert McDonald seeks discretionary review of a September 23, 2024 trial court
decision to conduct an arraignment according to the Superior Court Criminal Rules
(CrR); For the reasons below, the motion fbr discretionary review is denied.
FACTS
At a hearing on September 23, 2024, the State asked the trial court to arraign
McDonald on a criminal information charging first-degree theft. See CrR 4.1. When the
trial court sought to confirm McDonald’s identity, McDonald answered that he was “the
agent of record and the sole beneficiary for the Defendant." McDonald argued that the
prosecutor invoked the trial court’s "emergency war powers military due process law
jurisdiction" and asked the trial court to apply "civilian due process of law." McDonald
pointed to his declaration as "unrebutted evidence of [his] identity" and stated that he
was the “beneficiary holding equitable title by nature” and “hereby merge[d] the legal
and equitable titles to the Defendant and collapsejdj this case."
No. 87305-9-1/2
EXHIBIT “D”
Page 2 of 3
The trial court proceeded to arraignment, offered the services of the public
defender, asked the public defender to stand with McDonald after he gave equivocal
answers regarding waiver of his right to counsel, asked the prosecutor to arraign
McDonald on the record, noted that "this is the person charged for purposes of this case
as Robert J. McDonald," noted that a copy of the information was delivered to
McDonald, entered a plea of not guilty on his behalf, and imposed conditions of release.
ANALYSIS
Without specifying a subsection, McDonald seeks discretionary review under
RAP 2.3(b). "Interlocutory review is disfavored." .MLnehart v,.Morning Star Bovs Ranch.
Inc., 156 Wn. App. 457, 462, 232 P.3d 591 (2010) (citing Mavburv v, City of Seattle. 53
Wn.2d 716, 721, 336 P.2d 878 (1959)). Appellate courts generally do not "interfere in
the ordinary process of litigation in the superior courts prior to final judgment." Mavburv.
53 Wn.2d at 720. Linder RAP 2.3(b)(1), discretionary review may be granted if the
superior court commits obvious error rendering further proceedings useless, If the
superior court commits probable error substantially altering the status quo or
substantially limiting the freedom of a party to act, RAP 2.3(b)(2) provides a
discretionary basis for review, Based on a showing that the superior court has so far
departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as to call for
appellate review, this Court may grant discretionary review under RAP 2.3(b)(3).
As to error, McDonald claims that the superior court violated his constitutional
rights by (1) failing to clarify the due process basis for the proceedings as military or
civilian; (2) failing to recognize his private citizenship; (3) presuming his legal name was
properly spelled in upper-case letters; (4) failing to recognize its lack of jurisdiction; (5)
-2-
No. 87305-9-1/3
EXHIBIT “D”
Page 3 of 3
improperly displayed a wartime, military flag rather than a civilian flag; (6) breaching its
oath of office; and (7) violating its oath to uphold the rules of evidence. McDonald
points to the affidavit he filed in the trial court before the hearing and the State's failure
to respond.
Although McDonald does not directly address the effects prong of RAP 2.3(b)(1)
or (2), he seeks a stay Of trial court proceedings pending his appeal and an order
directing the trial court to dismiss the case without prejudice and direct the prosecutor to
correct its errors and refile the case.
A review of the transcript McDonald demonstrates that the trial court repeatedly
stated that McDonald would have an opportunity to present his legal arguments. And,
given the relief he seeks, McDonald is apparently focused on procedural remedies that
may yet be addressed in further proceedings in the trial court. Accordingly, it appears
that any potential error may yet be remedied to his satisfaction. As for alteration of the
status quo/limitation on freedom to act, it appears that McDonald is still free to litigate
his legal arguments before the trial court. Moreover, McDonald’s perception of error at
the September 23 arraignment hearing establish any departure from the usual course of
judicial proceedings in the context of criminal prosecution.
CONCLUSION
As McDonald has not met the criteria of RAP 2.3(b), his motion for discretionary
review is hereby denied.
-3-
PROOF OF SERVICE
DECLARATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH 28 U.S.C, 1746(2)
Pursuant to Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States. Rule 29.5, I, Robert
James: McDonald, Petitioner, that on this date of February 10, 2026, I have served
three copies of the enclosed SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX on each party to the above
proceeding or that party’s counsel, by depositing an envelope containing the above
documents in the United States mail properly addressed to each of them and with
first-class postage prepaid. The names and addresses of those served are as follows:
Lessa Manion, Prosecuting Attorney
Mailings Regional Justice Center
Suite 2 A
401 4th Avenue North
Kent, Washington 98032
(206) 296-9000
Nick Brown, Attorney General
State of Washington
800 5th Avenue, 2000
Seattle, Washington 98104
(206 464-7744
I, Robert James: McDonald, declare under the penalty of perjury that the foregoing
is true and correct.
Eric Jon: Phelps, mailing agent for
Robert James: McDonald, Pro per
c/o 2149 Cascade Avenue, Unit 441
Hood River, Oregon [07052]
Email: robertiamesmcdonald@protonmail.com
Phone: 509-423-1842
DATE:
February 10, 2026
FROM:
Robert James: McDonald
1250 N. Wenatchee Avenue, Suite H-314
Wenatchee, WA 98801
IN RE:
Second Refiling of Petition for Writ of Certiorari
With Supplemental Appendix as directed by the Clerk of Court
Robert-James: McDonald v, State of Washington
Case Number not yet assigned
TO:
Emily Walker
Clerk of Court
Supreme Court of the United States
1 First Street., NE
Washington, DC 20543-0001
Dear Ms. Walker,
I am in receipt of your directive letter dated February 4, 2026. Therein you indicated
that my filing failed to comply with Rule 14(l)(i) of your Court. Your
instructions/corrections were as follows:
1. The September 23, 2024, order of the King County Trial Court must be filed
with the Court in booklet format required by Rule 14.1(i). (A copy of the
original Order on 8% by 11 inches is attached and referenced in the
petition as Exhibit C.)
2. The January 27,2025, order of the Washington Court of Appeals must be filed
with the Court in booklet format required by Rule 14.1(i). (A copy of the
original Order on 8% by 11 inches is attached and referenced in the
petition as Exhibit D.)
3. I have 60 days to submit the Supplemental Appendix from the date of your
letter (February 4, 2026) according to Rule 14.5. (The deadline is then
April 5, 2026.)
RECEIVED
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FEB 1 7 2026
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
SUPREME COURT, U.S.
4. Three copies of the Supplemental Appendix must be served on opposing
counsel according to Rule 29.3. (This will be done when the Supplemental
Appendix is signed and then sent to both opposing counsels.)
5. In addition to the Forty (40) copies of the booklet-format Supplemental
Appendix, one copy of the petition will be submitted on 8 % by 11-inch paper.
Rule 33.1(f). (Complied with and enclosed.)
I trust these are the final changes to the petition in complying with the Rules.
Sincerely,
Eric Jon: Phelps, mailing agent for
Robert-James: McDonald
Cell: (509) 423-1842
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