Amicus Curiae Brief — Daniel Grand, Petitioner v. City of University Heights, Ohio, et al.

No. 25-965

In the Supreme Court of the United States

DANIEL GRAND,

Petitioner,

v.

CITY OF UNIVERSITY HEIGHTS, OHIO, ET AL.,

Respondents.

On a Writ of Certiorari to the United States

Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE UNITED

STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC

BISHOPS AND THE ETHICS AND RELIGIOUS

LIBERTY COMMISSION IN SUPPORT OF

PETITIONER

ANDREW NUSSBAUM

Counsel of Record

FIRST & FOURTEENTH PLLC

2 N. Cascade Avenue,

Suite 1430

Colorado Springs, CO 80903

(719) 286-2475

andrew@first-fourteenth.com

JAMES COMPTON

FIRST & FOURTEENTH

PLLC

800 Connecticut

Avenue NW, Suite 300

Washington, DC

20006

(202) 998-1978

Attorneys for Amici

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page(s)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................ ii

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE.......................... 1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .............................. 3

ARGUMENT ......................................................... 5

I. Under Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus,

573 U.S. 149 (2014), Mr. Grand has

suffered a justiciable injury. ............................ 5

A. Susan B. Anthony List is the

framework for measuring whether

there is a justiciable controversy in this

case............................................................... 5

B. Standing under Susan B. Anthony List

cannot be overridden by Williamson

County’s prudential ripeness exception

to Article III. .............................................. 16

II. Unless the Court overturns the Sixth

Circuit, its doctrinal confusion will recur. ..... 20

A. There is a trend of state actors abusing

ripeness to burden religion. ...................... 20

B. The Court should clarify that the Sixth

Circuit’s finality rule is limited to the

takings context. ......................................... 28

CONCLUSION ................................................... 31

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

Anash, Inc. v. Borough of Kingston,

184 F.4th 214 (3d Cir. 2026) .......... 10, 11, 29, 30, 31

Arnett v. Kennedy,

416 U.S. 134 (1974) ................................................15

Babbitt v. Farm Workers,

442 U.S. 289 (1979) ..................................................8

Bostock v. Clayton Cnty.,

590 U.S. 644 (2020) ................................................19

Braidwood Mgmt. Inc. v. EEOC,

70 F.4th 914 (5th Cir. 2023) .....................................9

Cath. Benefits Ass’n v. Burrows,

732 F. Supp. 3d 1014 (D.N.D. 2024) .......... 10, 21, 22

Christian Emps. All. v. EEOC,

2022 WL 1573689

(D.N.D. May 16, 2022) ................................... 10, 24, 27

Dobbs v. Jackson Women‘s Health Org.,

597 U.S. 215 (2022) ..........................................26, 31

First Choice Women’s Res. Centers, Inc.

v. Davenport, 146 S. Ct. 1114 (2026) ............ 14, 15, 16

iii

Franciscan All., Inc. v. Becerra,

47 F.4th 368 (5th Cir. 2022) ................... 9, 11, 12, 13

Grand v. City of Univ. Heights, Ohio,

159 F.4th 507 (6th Cir. 2025) .........................8, 9, 28

Holt v. Hobbs,

574 U.S. 352 (2015) ................................................19

Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist.,

597 U.S. 507 (2022) ..................................................7

Louisiana v. EEOC,

705 F. Supp. 3d 643 (W.D. La. 2024) .....................27

Louisiana v. EEOC,

784 F. Supp. 3d 886 (W.D. La. 2025) .................9, 22

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,

504 U.S. 555 (1992) ..................................................6

MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo Cnty.,

477 U.S. 340 (1986) ................................................17

MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.,

549 U.S. 118 (2007) ..................................................7

N.L.R.B. v. Cath. Bishop of Chicago,

440 U.S. 490 (1979) ................................................29

Obria Group, Inc. v. Ferguson, No. 3:23-CV-06093TMC, 2025 WL 27691

(W.D. Wash. Jan. 3, 2025).........................................26

iv

Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon,

260 U.S. 393 (1922) ................................................18

Religious Sisters of Mercy v. Becerra,

55 F.4th 583

(8th Cir. 2022) ......................... 9, 11, 12, 13, 21, 23, 27

Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo,

592 U.S. 14 (2020) ............................................19, 29

Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus,

573 U.S. 149 (2014) ................................. 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8

Tandon v. Newsom,

593 U.S. 61 (2021) ....................................................7

Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n, Inc.,

484 U.S. 383 (1988) ..................................................9

Williamson County Regional Planning Commission

v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City,

473 U.S. 172 (1985) ...................................... 5, 16, 17

Statutes

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc .......................................................1

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(e) ..............................................19

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(g)........................................19, 29

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a) .................................................19

v

Regulations

29 C.F.R. § 1636.3(b) .................................................21

45 C.F.R. § 92.2 (2016) ..............................................23

45 C.F.R. § 92.3(c) .....................................................23

45 C.F.R. § 92.302 .....................................................24

81 Fed. Reg. 31,376 (May 18, 2016) ..........................23

88 Fed. Reg. 44,750 (Jul. 13, 2023) ...........................25

89 Fed. Reg. 29,183 (April 19, 2024).........................21

89 Fed. Reg. 37,522 (May 6, 2024) ............................23

Notice of Vacatur Regarding Certain Provisions of

the 2024 Nondiscrimination in Health Programs

and Activities Final Rule,

91 Fed. Reg. 32,887 (June 2, 2026) ........................23

1

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1

Amici are nonprofit organizations dedicated to

safeguarding religious liberty as a universal right.

They submit this brief to urge the Court to clarify the

pre-enforcement standing framework applicable to

claims arising under the Religious Land Use and

Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000cc et seq., and the First Amendment. The Sixth

Circuit’s decision, if left undisturbed, would hand

government actors a blueprint for simultaneously

burdening faith communities and insulating those

burdens from judicial review.

The United States Conference of Catholic

Bishops (USCCB) is a nonprofit corporation whose

members are the active Cardinals, Archbishops, and

Bishops of the United States and the U.S. Virgin

Islands. On behalf of the Christian faithful, the

USCCB advocates and promotes the pastoral teaching

of the Catholic Church in a broad range of areas, from

the free expression of ideas and the rights of religious

organizations and their adherents, to fair employment

and equal opportunity for the underprivileged,

protection of the rights of parents and children, the

value of human life from conception to natural death,

and care for immigrants and refugees. When lawsuits

touch upon important tenets of Catholic teaching, the

Conference has filed amicus curiae briefs to assert its

view, most often in this Court. In so doing, the

Conference seeks to further the common good for the

1 No party’s counsel authored this brief in whole or in part, and

no person or entity other than amici curiae, their counsel, or their

members made a monetary contribution intended to fund the

brief’s preparation or submission.

2

benefit of all. It has frequently participated as an

amicus in this Court to further its particular interest

in the right of individuals and communities to freely

practice their faith.

The

Ethics

and

Religious

Liberty

Commission (ERLC) is the moral concerns and

ethics entity of the Southern Baptist Convention

(SBC). The SBC is the nation’s largest Protestant

denomination, with approximately 13 million

members in more than 45,000 churches across the

U.S. The SBC charged the ERLC with addressing

moral, ethical, and cultural issues of importance to

Southern Baptists, such as religious freedom,

marriage and family, the sanctity of human life, and

human dignity. Specifically here, Southern Baptists

believe that the freedom to worship—whether in

houses of worship or in your own home—is a divinely

endowed right, enshrined in the First Amendment,

and must be protected from government interference.

3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Religious freedom is not a privilege to be rationed

by administrative gatekeepers. It is a constitutional

right that federal courts are obliged to protect as soon

as the government threatens to burden it. This case

presents the Court with an opportunity to reaffirm

that principle and to foreclose a growing practice by

which government actors simultaneously burden

religious exercise and attempt to insulate that burden

from judicial review.

Daniel Grand is a Jewish man who opened his

home for prayer. The City of University Heights

responded by ordering him to stop in a cease-anddesist letter. That cease-and-desist letter was not an

invitation to negotiate; it was a credible threat of

enforcement against constitutionally and statutorily

protected religious exercise. Yet the Sixth Circuit held

Mr. Grand’s claims were unripe because he had not

first applied to the City for permission to practice his

faith, permission the City had given itself the power

to grant or deny.

That holding rests on a foundational error. The

Sixth Circuit imported Williamson County Regional

Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank, a finality

doctrine developed for Fifth Amendment takings

claims, into a case arising under the Religious Land

Use and Institutionalized Persons Act and the First

Amendment. Williamson County is ill-suited for

RLUIPA and First Amendment cases. The doctrine

ensures that courts do not adjudicate the economic

impact of a regulation before the government’s final

position is known. RLUIPA and the First

Amendment, by contrast, are violated the moment a

4

credible governmental threat chills protected religious

exercise, regardless of whether an exemption process

remains available. Forcing a religious plaintiff to

exhaust an administrative process before vindicating

his rights does not prevent premature adjudication; it

imposes the very burden the Constitution forbids.

Amici are large religious bodies whose members

encounter land-use ordinances, federal agency rules,

and other regulatory regimes that restrict religious

exercise while offering individual exemption processes

designed to forestall judicial challenge. The Sixth

Circuit’s reasoning, if left undisturbed, would hand

government actors a template for burdening faith

communities while keeping the courthouse door

closed. The Court should reverse the Sixth Circuit and

clarify that Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, not

Williamson

County,

governs

pre-enforcement

standing in religious freedom cases, and that a

plaintiff’s failure to seek an optional exemption does

not extinguish a credible threat of enforcement.

5

ARGUMENT

I. Under Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus,

573 U.S. 149 (2014), Mr. Grand has suffered

a justiciable injury.

The Sixth Circuit erred by evaluating Mr. Grand’s

injury under the prudential ripeness exception to

standing from Williamson County Regional Planning

Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473

U.S. 172, 193 (1985). Williamson County is a Fifth

Amendment takings case that held a takings claim is

not ripe until the land-use “decisionmaker has arrived

at a definitive position on” whether the requested

land-use will be allowed. Id. Mr. Grand’s case, by

contrast, raises questions of religious speech and

religious exercise. That his claim challenges the City

of University Heights’s zoning code is of no moment,

because Mr. Grand does not contend the code has

affected his property value or infringed on any

property right. He contends the code burdens his right

to speech and the free exercise of religion.

Mr. Grand’s standing thus should not be judged

by case law interpreting the Takings Clause of the

Fifth Amendment. It should be judged by this Court’s

and the lower courts’ pre-enforcement precedents

arising from cases pressing First Amendment

arguments similar to Mr. Grand’s. Those precedents

demonstrate that Mr. Grand brings a justiciable preenforcement claim and has already suffered a

cognizable injury.

A. Susan B. Anthony List is the

framework for measuring whether

there is a justiciable controversy in

this case.

6

Mr. Grand’s suit is a pre-enforcement challenge to

the City of University Heights’s zoning ordinances to

the extent those ordinances prohibit use of his home

for Jewish prayer meetings. The City’s cease and

desist letter, threatening to prohibit those prayer

meetings, prevents or at least substantially chills Mr.

Grand from using his home to practice his Jewish

faith in violation of the Religious Land Use and

Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and the First

Amendment. In holding that Mr. Grand’s case was not

justiciable because he failed to exhaust an optional

City-established exception process, the Sixth Circuit

ignored pre-enforcement standing doctrine that

establishes Mr. Grand’s concrete constitutional

injury.

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 56061 (1992) stated the modern three-part test for

determining whether a plaintiff has standing to bring

a claim. The plaintiff must show (1) an “injury in fact,”

(2) “a causal connection between the injury and the

conduct complained of,” and (3) that his injury is

“likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the

injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.”

Whether a plaintiff has standing to challenge a law on

a pre-enforcement basis primarily concerns the

injury-in-fact requirement. As a general matter, an

injury in fact exists if the Plaintiff has a “personal

stake in the outcome of the controversy,” Susan B.

Anthony List, 573 U.S. at 158, and his claims are “not

conjectural or hypothetical,” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.

Pre-enforcement cases present a question of

timing: when does a threat of enforcement become

sufficiently imminent to give rise to an injury in fact

under Article III? On one hand, a plaintiff need not

7

wait for an actual enforcement action before his claim

is justiciable. Article III does “not require a plaintiff to

expose himself to liability before bringing suit to

challenge the basis for the threat.” Susan B. Anthony

List, 573 U.S. at 159 (quoting MedImmune, Inc. v.

Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 128–129 (2007)). On the

other hand, a plaintiff who presents a purely

hypothetical threat of enforcement cannot invoke the

jurisdiction of the federal courts. Id. at 158. To

determine when a threat is sufficiently imminent to

create a justiciable case under Article III, the Court

has articulated three factors. Each of those factors is

present in this case.

First, the plaintiff must allege “an intention to

engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a

constitutional interest.” Susan B. Anthony List, 573

U.S. at 160. Mr. Grand’s prayer services easily exceed

this threshold requirement. This Court has repeatedly

ruled that prayer is core First Amendment speech and

religious exercise. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch.

Dist., 597 U.S. 507, 525 (2022). At-home religious

services also are squarely protected First Amendment

religious exercise. In Tandon v. Newsom, the Court

enjoined California’s Covid-19 regulations to the

extent they prohibited in-home worship services. 593

U.S. 61 (2021).

Second, the plaintiff’s conduct must be “arguably

proscribed by the” law he challenges. Susan B.

Anthony List, 573 U.S. at 162 (cleaned up and

emphasis added). A statute or ordinance that “sweeps

broadly” such that its prohibition “covers the subject

matter of” the plaintiffs’ conduct satisfies this element

of pre-enforcement standing. Id. So does an official

interpretation of the law that would prohibit the

8

plaintiff’s conduct. Id. Here, the University Heights

Code of Ordinances § 1250.02 prohibits “[h]ouses of

worship” in the U-1 zone where Mr. Grand’s home is

located. After he began his prayer meetings, the City

informed Mr. Grand that he was operating his home

as a “place of religious assembly” in violation of the

City zoning code and ordered him to cease services.

Grand v. City of Univ. Heights, Ohio, 159 F.4th 507,

510 (6th Cir. 2025). That is all that is required under

Article III: Mr. Grand has been told by City officials

that his conduct violates the law. While the Sixth

Circuit’s analysis turned on the possibility that the

City would grant Mr. Grand an exception in the form

of a special use permit, this potentiality does not alter

the conclusion that the City’s Code arguably

proscribed Mr. Grand’s conduct. The threat of

enforcement from the City officials responsible for

enforcing the Code is sufficient to hold that Mr.

Grand’s prayer meetings arguably fall within the

Code’s prohibition as an un-zoned use.

Third, the plaintiff must allege a “credible threat

of enforcement.” Susan B. Anthony List, 573 U.S. at

159. This is a light burden once a plaintiff has

established that their conduct falls within a statute’s

prohibition; an actual threat of prosecution is not a

requirement. A statute that arguably proscribes the

plaintiff’s conduct and portends significant penalties

for its violation is sufficient to give rise to standing.

Id. Indeed, in Babbitt v. Farm Workers, 442 U.S. 289,

298 (1979), the State had taken no steps toward

prosecution, but this Court found a credible threat

because the State “had not disavowed” prosecuting

the law and plaintiffs had “some reason” to fear

prosecution. Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 302. In Virginia v.

9

American Booksellers Association, the Court found a

credible threat for the simple reason that “[t]he State

has not suggested that the newly enacted law will not

be enforced, and we see no reason to assume

otherwise.” Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n, Inc., 484

U.S. 383, 393 (1988). In this case, not only does Mr.

Grand’s conduct fall within the statute’s prohibition,

he received a cease-and-desist letter from the City—a

literal threat of enforcement. Grand, 159 F.4th at

509–10. That the threat came from the Mayor rather

than the Planning Board is of no moment because it

came from an official with enforcement authority.

Indeed, not only was Mr. Grand served with a ceaseand-desist letter, police units were ordered to drive by

his house to search for violations, a local prosecutor

began an investigation into him, and a city inspector

actually searched his home. See Grand, 159 F.4th at

511. If any person has ever been credibly threatened

with enforcement of a law, it is Daniel Grand.

1. Lower

courts

regularly

find

preenforcement standing in free exercise

cases.

There is an extensive body of lower-court

precedent finding completed, cognizable injury in preenforcement religious freedom cases analogous to Mr.

Grand’s.2 Three are particularly relevant here.

2 Some recent examples include: Braidwood Mgmt. Inc. v. EEOC,

70 F.4th 914, 929 & n.27 (5th Cir. 2023) (holding plaintiffs had

standing to bring pre-enforcement challenge where the EEOC

previously brought an enforcement action under similar

circumstances); Religious Sisters of Mercy v. Becerra, 55 F.4th

583 (8th Cir. 2022); Franciscan All., Inc. v. Becerra, 47 F.4th 368,

375 (5th Cir. 2022); Louisiana v. EEOC, 784 F. Supp. 3d 886, 903

10

First, in Anash, Inc. v. Borough of Kingston, 184

F.4th 214 (3d Cir. 2026), the Third Circuit held that

RLUIPA litigants suffer a cognizable injury sufficient

to state a claim from a municipality’s initial

interpretation of its land-use regulations—well before

any final administrative determination. Anash

concerned the application of a municipality’s zoning

ordinance to two buildings owned by a Jewish rabbi

and used for religious study, communal prayer, and

religious group living. The municipality issued ceaseand-desist letters citing zoning violations, and when

the rabbi did not comply, it obtained administrative

search warrants, inspected the properties, and

condemned them on the day before Rosh Hashanah.

See Anash, 184 F.4th at 227–30. The municipality

then refused to allow occupancy until the buildings

complied with both the building code and the zoning

ordinance, even while acknowledging there was “no

quick or easy way” to bring the properties into

compliance. Id. at 229. The municipality further

threatened daily fines of $500 for continued noncompliance. Id.

The Third Circuit held that the municipality’s

threats to fine the rabbi for violating the zoning

ordinance and its condemnation orders were more

than sufficient to establish a justiciable claim, even

(W.D. La. 2025) (USCCB has standing to challenge PWFA final

rule on pre-enforcement basis); Cath. Benefits Ass’n v. Burrows,

732 F. Supp. 3d 1014, 1022 (D.N.D. 2024) (holding Catholic

employers had standing to bring pre-enforcement challenge to

Pregnant Workers Act Final Rule on pre-enforcement basis);

Christian Emps. All. v. EEOC, 2022 WL 1573689, at *4 (D.N.D.

May 16, 2022) (group of Christian employers had standing to

challenge EEOC rule on pre-enforcement basis).

11

though the municipality had not made a final

determination regarding the application of its zoning

ordinances. See Anash, 184 F.4th at 245–46. The court

articulated three scenarios in which a land-use

regulation imposes a substantial burden on religious

exercise: (1) when it restricts access to real property

otherwise available for the proposed exercise of

religion; (2) when it limits the use of real property so

as to prevent the proposed religious exercise, even if

the regulation is one of general applicability; or (3)

when it has a significant adverse effect on real

property used or available for religious exercise, even

if it does not directly impede that exercise. Id. at 239–

40. Applying this framework, the court found that the

condemnation orders and threatened fines constituted

a substantial burden under all three categories. Id. at

240–41. And it reached this conclusion over a dissent

that invoked Williamson County finality doctrine,

arguing that the claim was not ripe because the

municipality had not issued a “final, definitive

position” on the zoning ordinances’ application. See

Anash, 184 F.4th at 253–54 (Restrepo, J., dissenting).

The majority rejected this takings-based approach,

holding that “RLUIPA’s substantial-burden provision

is not contingent upon the formality of a final land-use

determination.” Anash, 184 F.4th at 245. This holding

correctly interprets RLUIPA’s interaction with

standing doctrine and is consonant with this Court’s

recent decisions regarding justiciability of preenforcement First Amendment challenges.

The next two cases, Franciscan Alliance, Inc. v.

Becerra, 47 F.4th 368, 375 (5th Cir. 2022) and

Religious Sisters of Mercy v. Becerra, 55 F.4th 583 (8th

Cir. 2022), illustrate the relatively low bar a litigant

12

must clear to have pre-enforcement standing. Though

they were not decided in the context of land use

regulations, they demonstrate that litigants suffer

real injuries before final enforcement of agency action.

Both cases were pre-enforcement challenges to

final rules issued by the Department of Health and

Human Services in 2016 interpreting Section 1557 of

the Affordable Care Act and Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act to require coverage and provision of

gender-transition interventions for minors. In both

cases, Catholic employers and medical providers

challenged the 2016 Section 1557 rule shortly after its

promulgation, arguing that the rule violated the First

Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration

Act. Franciscan All., 47 F.4th at 372; Religious Sisters

of Mercy, 55 F.4th at 592. Shortly after filing suit,

however, presidential administrations changed, and

HHS issued a notice stating that it was reconsidering

the 2016 Section 1557 rule. Religious Sisters of Mercy,

55 F.4th at 592. In 2020, HHS substantially repealed

and replaced the 2016 rule. Id. at 594. The 2020 Rule

was then challenged by different plaintiffs arguing

that the 2016 rule properly interpreted Section 1557,

and district courts in New York and Massachusetts

issued injunctions of the 2020 Rule. Id. at 596.

In both cases, the government argued that the

repeal of the 2016 rule, and its replacement with the

2020 rule, made the plaintiffs’ claims non-justiciable.

In Franciscan Alliance, the government argued that

plaintiffs’ claims were made moot by the 2020 rule

because it repealed and replaced the 2016 rule.

Franciscan All., 47 F.4th at 374–76. In Religious

Sisters of Mercy, the government argued that there

was an insufficiently credible threat of enforcement of

13

the 2016 rule and thus plaintiffs lacked preenforcement standing to bring their claims. Religious

Sisters of Mercy, 55 F.4th at 602–03.

The government further argued that it “‘ha[d] not

to date evaluated’ whether it will enforce Section 1557

against [Catholic employers]” and thus the plaintiffs’

alleged injury was merely conjectural. Id. The

government also argued that its promise “to not

enforce the challenged policies” to the extent they

were contrary to the “Religious Freedom Restoration

Act” and the First Amendment meant plaintiffs could

not claim a credible threat of enforcement. Id.

The Fifth Circuit and Eighth Circuit rejected the

government’s arguments and held that the plaintiffs’

claims were justiciable. Most notably, both courts held

plaintiffs had pre-enforcement standing because the

government refused to categorically disavow

enforcement of the challenged interpretation of

Section 1557 against Catholic employers and

healthcare providers, including plaintiffs. Religious

Sisters of Mercy, 55 F.4th at 603 (citing Franciscan

Alliance, 47 F.4th at 376). In addressing the

government’s argument that it “had not…evaluated”

enforcement against religious employers, the courts

explained that “the government’s assertion that it ‘has

not to date evaluated’ whether it will enforce Section

1557 against the plaintiffs is actually a concession

that it may do so.” Religious Sisters of Mercy, 55 F.4th

at 605 (citing Franciscan Alliance, 47 F.4th at 376)

(cleaned up). The government’s refusal to disavow

enforcement coupled with its prior interpretation of

Section 1557 to require coverage of gender transition

interventions meant plaintiffs had standing. Id.

14

Franciscan Alliance and Religious Sisters of

Mercy are helpful guides here for several reasons.

First, they show that pre-enforcement standing is

appropriate in cases asserting free exercise claims

arising under statutes like RFRA and RLUIPA.

Second, both cases show that Article III’s standing

requirement is not hard to meet in the preenforcement context. A past unconstitutional

interpretation of a law coupled with a refusal to

categorically disavow enforcement is sufficient to give

rise to standing. And finally, as explained in Section

II below, both cases show that the possibility of an

exemption does not preclude standing.

2. This Court’s opinion in First Choice

supports standing in this case.

Not only is Mr. Grand’s case justiciable because of

his fear of enforcement, he has already suffered a

completed injury sufficient to sustain his claim. Last

term, this Court held that a cognizable injury can

occur “not just when a [government] demand is

enforced, but when it is made and for as long as it

remains outstanding.” First Choice Women’s Res.

Centers, Inc. v. Davenport, 146 S. Ct. 1114, 1125

(2026). The issues and arguments in this case strongly

echo those in First Choice, and the Court’s holding in

that case should control its analysis here.

The facts of First Choice closely parallel those

here. The Attorney General of New Jersey issued a

subpoena to First Choice seeking, among other things,

sensitive donor information—a demand that, like the

cease-and-desist order here, targeted the exercise of

constitutionally protected rights. First Choice

responded by filing a federal suit seeking an order

15

prohibiting enforcement of the subpoena. Both the

district court and the Third Circuit held that First

Choice had suffered no justiciable injury because no

state court had yet compelled compliance with the

subpoena. First Choice, 146 S. Ct. at 1121. In other

words, they held that because no final decision had

been made by the state tribunal, the plaintiff’s injury

was not yet ripe for judicial review.

The similarities between the two cases are

striking, down to the arguments advanced by the

government. In First Choice, the Attorney General

repeatedly invoked Takings Clause jurisprudence to

argue that First Choice had no standing because state

proceedings were not yet final. See Br. on the Merits

for Respondent 25, 36, 40, First Choice Women’s Res.

Centers, Inc. v. Davenport (2026) (No. 24-781); First

Choice, 146 S. Ct. at 1128. That is precisely the

argument University Heights advances here. And this

Court squarely rejected it.

This Court saw through these procedural

arguments and identified the concrete injury at the

heart of First Choice; it should do the same here. The

Court rejected the argument that no injury was

manifested until state procedures were complete.

That is because, the finality of the subpoena aside,

“[a]n objectively reasonable recipient of a demand like

that would be induced, as well, to trim its protected

advocacy knowing it now stands in the government’s

crosshairs.” First Choice, 146 S. Ct. at 1127. A

completed formal process is not necessary for a

cognizable First Amendment injury because “[t]he

value of a sword of Damocles is that it hangs—not that

it drops.” Id. (quoting Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134,

231 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting)). The chilling

16

effect on protected conduct is the injury; enforcement

merely compounds it.

What was true for associational rights in First

Choice is equally true for religious exercise rights

here. Mr. Grand does not need to proceed through

University Heights’s administrative process before he

is injured. The very existence of the looming

proceedings and the already-issued orders is sufficient

to harm his right to religious exercise. Indeed, Mr.

Grand’s injury is far more concrete than that in First

Choice. There, the petitioner had received only an

administrative subpoena, a demand for information

that had not yet been enforced through judicial

process. Here, Mr. Grand has received a direct order

to cease his religious exercise. He has been subjected

to inspections of his property. He has been threatened

with daily fines for continued religious observance. He

has, in short, been on the receiving end of an entire

enforcement campaign. If the mere issuance of New

Jersey’s subpoena was enough to satisfy Article III,

Mr. Grand’s injuries more than clear that threshold.

B. Standing under Susan B. Anthony List

cannot be overridden by Williamson

County’s

prudential

ripeness

exception to Article III.

The Sixth Circuit dismissed Mr. Grand’s RLUIPA

and First Amendment claims as unripe, relying on the

finality requirement drawn from Williamson County,

473 U.S. 172, 193. That error was foundational

because Williamson County’s finality rule is a doctrine

of prudential ripeness, not a constitutional mandate.

Rejecting a case for prudential, as opposed to

constitutional reasons, is in substantial tension with

17

the “virtually unflagging” “obligation” of “a federal

court[] . . . to hear and decide a case” within its

constitutional jurisdiction. Where a plaintiff

independently satisfies the Article III test for preenforcement standing provided by Susan B. Anthony

List, no prudential doctrine should close the

courthouse door to adjudication of plaintiff’s claims.

Mr. Grand satisfies Susan B. Anthony List on this

record and thus the Court should reverse the Sixth

Circuit’s decision.

The finality requirement of Williamson County

was designed to serve a specific and narrow purpose:

preventing federal courts from adjudicating takings

claims before local authorities have determined the

extent of the challenged regulation’s application to the

property at issue. As this Court explained, requiring

absolute finality is “compelled by the very nature of

the inquiry required by the Just Compensation

Clause.” 473 U.S. at 188–90. Specifically, whether a

taking occurs turns on numerous “factors,” including

“the economic impact of the challenged action and the

extent to which it interferes with reasonable

investment-backed expectations.” Id. at 191.

The rationale for finality in the takings context is

straightforward. Whether a regulation affects a

taking turns on the economic impact to the property

owner—a fact-specific inquiry that is genuinely

indeterminate until the regulatory agency has made

all decisions affecting the land. See MacDonald,

Sommer & Frates v. Yolo Cnty., 477 U.S. 340, 349

(1986) (“Until a property owner has obtained a final

decision regarding the application of the zoning

ordinance and subdivision regulations to its property,

it is impossible to tell whether the land retains any

18

reasonable beneficial use or whether existing

expectation interests have been destroyed.”). The

economic value of real property depends on

contingencies—the availability of variances, waivers,

and alternative uses—that may substantially alter

the ultimate regulatory footprint. Until those

contingencies are resolved, a court cannot know how

far the regulation goes, and thus cannot assess

whether it has “gone too far’” to affect a taking. Penn.

Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).

None of that logic applies here. Mr. Grand is not

claiming that the City has taken his property without

just compensation, and he does not ask this Court to

calculate the economic diminution in the value of his

land. The contingencies that make takings claims

unsuitable for pre-final-decision adjudication are

irrelevant to his claims. His claim turns on whether

the City may constitutionally condition his religious

exercise on that permit in the first place and whether

the order to cease and desist is a credible threat of

enforcement that chills his right to religious exercise.

Nothing about Mr. Grand’s injury is indeterminate

pending resolution of the administrative process. No

state action can return the value of lost religious

exercise to Mr. Grand or alter the value of his exercise

going forward. His rights are priceless and he has

already been prevented from praying and continues to

be prevented from praying. The deprivation is

complete and its scale is immediately knowable,

meaning there is no reason to apply Williamson

County.

Additionally, applying the prudential Williamson

County inquiry to RLUIPA claims undermines its

protection of religious exercise. RLUIPA, like RFRA,

19

is a super-statute that displaces the ordinary

operation of local ordinances in the service of robust

protection for religious exercise. See 42 U.S.C. §

2000cc-3(e); Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 590 U.S. 644,

682 (2020). The Act imposes a demanding standard. A

state actor that substantially burdens religious land

use must demonstrate that the burden is the least

restrictive means of advancing a compelling

governmental interest. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a). This

Court has emphasized that RLUIPA should “be

construed in favor of a broad protection of religious

exercise.” Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 358 (2015)

(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(g)). And it should be

considered at all stages of implementation of a landuse code, including, as here, responding to citizen

complaints about an allegedly improper land use.

Applying Williamson County’s finality rule to

RLUIPA claims inverts that command. It tells the

religious plaintiff: before you can vindicate your

statutory rights, you must complete a potentially

years-long administrative process and wait for a final

adverse decision even though the act of subjecting

your religious practice to that process is itself the

constitutional and statutory injury. The Sixth

Circuit’s rule actively increases the scope and scale of

harm to religious exercise by forcing plaintiffs to

suffer ongoing injury before they can seek the

statute’s protection. That result finds no support in

RLUIPA’s text, in this Court’s precedents, or in the

common understanding that the loss of religious

liberty, even briefly, is irreparable. See Roman Cath.

Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 592 U.S. 14, 19 (2020)

(“The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even

20

minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes

irreparable injury.”).

II. Unless the Court overturns the Sixth

Circuit, its doctrinal confusion will recur.

The Court should overturn the decision below to

clarify proper application of the finality doctrine and

prevent state actors from abusing doctrinal confusion

to burden religious freedom. Over recent decades,

federal agencies and state governments have realized

that they can manipulate ripeness doctrine by placing

a categorical burden on religious exercise but offer an

individualized accommodation process. Then, when

religious groups sue based on the burden, the agencies

invoke ripeness just like the City has done in this case.

This argument is based on a misunderstanding of the

federal courts’ jurisdiction, but it has proliferated in

recent years. The Court should stop it.

A. There is a trend of state actors abusing

ripeness to burden religion.

State actors who wish to deter robust religious

exercise have realized that they can potentially

manipulate the federal courts’ Article III jurisdiction

by enacting a general policy that on its face burdens

or prohibits religious exercise while allowing religious

individuals and entities to seek an exemption from the

policy on a case-by-case basis. Federal agencies, for

example, promised in the Religious Sisters of Mercy

and Franciscan Alliance litigation over the 2016

Section 1557 rule that they would determine whether

RFRA and the First Amendment require specific

exemptions on an individual basis. That individual

exemption process, the agencies argued, meant the

plaintiffs lacked Article III standing. And of course,

21

the City in this case has argued that notwithstanding

its blanket prohibition on houses of worship in Mr.

Grand’s zoning designation and its related cease-anddesist letter, Mr. Grand lacks standing because he has

failed to apply for an exemption. But a state actor’s

“reliance on [a] case-by-case standard” for religious

exemptions “constitutes ‘a concession that it may’ seek

enforcement.” Cath. Benefits Ass’n v. Burrows, 732 F.

Supp. 3d 1014, 1022 (D.N.D. 2024) (quoting Religious

Sisters of Mercy, 55 F.4th at 605).

Several examples illuminate the trend.

1. The 2024 rule implementing the Pregnant

Workers Fairness Act. A clear example of a policy

gerrymandered in an attempt to evade federal court

jurisdiction is EEOC’s 2024 final rule implementing

the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act. That rule

required employers to accommodate, among other

things, employee abortions and immoral fertility

treatments. See 89 Fed. Reg. 29,183 (April 19, 2024).

The EEOC expanded the definition of “pregnancy,

childbirth, or related medical conditions” to include

“termination of pregnancy, including . . . abortion” and

“fertility treatment.” Id. at 29,106, 29,183; 29 C.F.R. §

1636.3(b). “Fertility treatment” included fertility

treatments like in vitro fertilization (“IVF”) that are

contrary to many employers’ religious faith. Id. at

29,102, 29,190. Many religious employers, including

amicus USCCB, oppose accommodation of abortion

and certain forms of artificial reproductive

22

technology,3 and yet the PWFA rule applied to such

employers on its face.

To evade federal court review of this policy, EEOC

purported to adopt a “religious exemption” that EEOC

would commit to determine whether an employer was

entitled to a religious exemption through a “factsensitive, case-by-case analysis” conducted by the

agency. Id. at 29,148–49. The government argued that

this commitment—to consider a religious exemption

on a claim-by-claim basis—rendered those religious

employers who challenged the PWFA like amici

USCCB without standing. “For Plaintiffs’ or their

members’ injury to be credible, numerous

contingencies would all have to occur,” argued the

government, including that “EEOC must reject all of

the employer’s potential defenses, [such as] the

ministerial exception and RFRA.” Defendants’

Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for

Preliminary Injunction at 14, Catholic Benefits Ass’n

v. Burrows, No. 1:24-cv-00142-DMT-CRH (D.N.D.

Aug. 22, 2024), ECF No. 22. Put another way, the

EEOC enacted a rule that facially burdened religious

employers but claimed that the rule could not be

challenged in federal court unless and until the EEOC

determined whether a specific employer was entitled

to a religious exemption.

2. The 2016 and 2024 rules implementing

Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act. Another

3 USCCB challenged the PWFA final rule under RFRA on a pre-

enforcement basis and ultimately won vacatur of the rule to the

extent the Rule required USCCB to accommodate employee

abortions. Louisiana v. EEOC, 784 F. Supp. 3d 886, 911 (W.D.

La. 2025).

23

example of a religious “exemption” strategically

employed to evade federal court jurisdiction are

HHS’s 2024 and 2016 rules implementing Section

1557 of the Affordable Care Act. Both rules required

healthcare

providers,

insurers,

third-party

administrators, and employers to provide and cover

gender-transition interventions, including puberty

blockers,

cross-sex

hormones,

and

surgical

interventions. 81 Fed. Reg. 31,376, 31,376 (May 18,

2016); 89 Fed. Reg. 37,522, 37,699 (May 6, 2024).4 And

both rules announced a blanket policy for all covered

entities within its scope, including Catholic

healthcare providers, hospitals, and employers that

hold sincere religious beliefs contradicted by the

provision of gender transitions. Nor did the 2024 or

2016 Section 1557 rules contain a religious exemption

for such employers and others who objected to the

provision of gender transition interventions on

religious grounds. Religious Sisters of Mercy, 55 F.4th

at 590.

The 2024 Section 1557 rule instead stated,

“[i]nsofar

as

the

application

of

any

requirement…would violate applicable Federal

protections for religious freedom and conscience, such

application shall not be required.” 45 C.F.R. § 92.3(c);

see also 89 Fed. Reg. at 37,532. The 2016 rule

contained a similar statement. 45 C.F.R. § 92.2 (2016).

4 HHS has published notice that the U.S. District Court for

the Southern District of Mississippi vacated the gender-identity

provisions of the 2024 Section 1557 final rule, rendering those

provisions legally void and unenforceable while the remainder of

the rule stays in force. Notice of Vacatur Regarding Certain

Provisions of the 2024 Nondiscrimination in Health Programs

and Activities Final Rule, 91 Fed. Reg. 32,887 (June 2, 2026).

24

The 2024 Section 1557 rule also adopted a procedure

that allows a conscientiously objecting religious

employer to “seek assurance” from HHS that it is

exempt from one or more of the religiously

objectionable mandates identified in this brief. 45

C.F.R. § 92.302. In subsequent litigation over the 2024

rule, the government argued that these provisions

deprived aggrieved plaintiffs of standing. “The new

assurance process under § 92.302 adds to an already

attenuated chain of events that must occur before any

CBA member might be injured and weighs heavily

against finding that any future injury is sufficiently

imminent to give rise to Article III jurisdiction.”5 HHS

and EEOC made this argument even though they

were actively enforcing Section 1557 and Title VII to

require covered entities to provide and cover gendertransition interventions. See, e.g., Christian Emps.

All. v. EEOC, 2022 WL 1573689, at *5 (D.N.D. May

16, 2022) (noting that the government conceded that

“there have been complaints that have likely gone

through the conciliation process” concerning the

challenged interpretations of Section 1557 and Title

VII).

As with the PWFA rule, in the 2024 and 2016

Section 1557 rules HHS promulgated a blanket

mandate that uniformly burdened the religious beliefs

of thousands of healthcare providers and employers

5 Combined Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Partial Motion for Summary

Judgment and Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ CrossMotion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ RFRA Claims or, in the Alternative,

for Summary Judgment on Those Claims at 23, Catholic Benefits

Ass’n v. Becerra, No. 3:23-cv-00203-PDW-ARS (D.N.D. Sept. 11,

2024), ECF No. 57.

25

across the United States, while at the same time

arguing that those providers and employers could not

challenge the rule under RFRA or the First

Amendment until each one of them had gone through

the optional “assurance” process one-by-one over a

course of years.

3. The 2023 Health and Human Services

grant regulation. The Department of Health and

Human Services employed the same device in its 2023

grant regulation. 88 Fed. Reg. 44750 (Jul. 13, 2023).

That regulation governs grants across a wide swath of

HHS programs, including preventative health

services, health education, refugee assistance,

assistance to low-income housing, and a host of other

government programs.

The 2023 rule prohibited any recipient of HHS

grant funds from discriminating on the basis of sexual

orientation or gender identity. This interpretation

placed an enormous burden on religious recipients,

who would have been required to eliminate single-sex

bathrooms, place foster children with same-sex

couples, and begin addressing their employees by

their preferred pronouns. See United States

Conference of Catholic Bishops, comment on Health

and Human Services Grants Regulation at 6–7

(September 5, 2023).

The grant regulation borrowed the exemption

regime from HHS’s Section 1557 rules. Thus, once

again, HHS imposed a rule that facially burdened

religious exercise. If a religious grant recipient failed

to comply with the nondiscrimination requirements,

they violated the rule. But an individual grant

recipient could apply for its own religious exemption.

26

4. State agency administrative subpoenas.

Following this Court’s opinion in Dobbs v. Jackson

Women‘s Health Org., 597 U.S. 215, 228 (2022), state

attorneys general have begun leveraging ripeness

doctrine to insulate onerous subpoenas from judicial

review. The state officials will issue a subpoena to a

religious organization and, when the subpoena is

challenged in court, will argue that the challenge is

unripe because the religious organization has not yet

defied the subpoena and litigated its validity. This

creates functionally the same result as the rules

above: religious organizations cannot vindicate their

rights until they’ve once litigated their individual case

and lost.

Most notable of these cases is First Choice v.

Davenport. This Court corrected New Jersey’s error,

but other attorneys general have deployed the same

formula. In Obria Group, Inc. v. Ferguson, No. 3:23CV-06093-TMC, 2025 WL 27691, at *2 (W.D. Wash.

Jan. 3, 2025), the Washington Attorney General

issued a civil investigative demand to a network of

pro-life pregnancy resource centers, alleging

violations of the state’s Consumer Protection Act. The

Obria Group filed suit in federal court, arguing that

the subpoena violated its First Amendment rights to

free speech and free exercise of religion. Like the

Attorney General in First Choice, Washington argued

that the challenge was premature because the

organization had not yet defied the subpoena and

litigated its validity in state enforcement proceedings.

The district court rejected that argument, finding that

the mere issuance of the investigative demand created

a cognizable injury. See also Judge rules attorney

general cannot enforce subpoena against Seattle

27

Archdiocese, National Catholic Reporter (July 18,

2024),

https://www.ncronline.org/news/judge-rulesattorney-general-cannot-enforce-subpoena-againstseattle-archdiocese (reporting on a related case where

a court blocked the Washington Attorney General

from enforcing an administrative subpoena against

the Seattle Archdiocese). These cases illustrate a

broader pattern: state officials issuing administrative

demands to religious organizations and then invoking

ripeness doctrine to insulate those demands from

judicial review. While the ruling in First Choice

corrects the specific question at issue in that case, the

case was only one part of a larger pattern that this

Court’s intervention can help arrest.

The lower courts have largely seen through these

attempts to evade federal court review for what they

are. Such exemption processes are not a disavowal of

enforcement that deprives a plaintiff of standing. See

Religious Sisters, 55 F.4th at 606 (“Although the

government maintains that it ‘will comply’ with

RFRA, its promise is ‘so vague that the scope of

liability is both unknown by the government and

unknowable to the plaintiffs,’” (cleaned up)). And as

for the case-by-case approach, one lower court aptly

described the government’s position of forcing

religious organizations to “withstand a case-by-case

analysis . . . of their religious preferences” as

“[g]overnment harassment of religious organizations.”

Christian Emps. All. v. EEOC, 2022 WL 1573689, at

*5 (D.N.D. May 16, 2022). The burden of investigation

and possible litigation, at the very least, provides “a

substantial likelihood of added regulatory burden and

compliance costs.” Louisiana v. EEOC, 705 F. Supp.

3d 643, 664 (W.D. La. 2024).

28

B. The Court should clarify that the Sixth

Circuit’s finality rule is limited to the

takings context.

The decision of the Sixth Circuit below approves

the kind of jurisdictional skullduggery that has been

on the rise at federal agencies. On one hand, the City

of University Heights has promulgated a code that

proscribes Mr. Grand’s right to use his home for

prayer services and warned him to cease and desist

from doing so. Grand v. City of Univ. Heights, Ohio,

159 F.4th 507, 510 (6th Cir. 2025). On the other hand,

the City and the Sixth Circuit claim Mr. Grand’s claim

is not justiciable until he applies for and is denied a

special exemption from the rule. Id. The Sixth Circuit

couched this as a “finality requirement—a concrete

and final decision by the local authorities.” Id. at 512.

“This approach,” the Sixth Circuit argues “prevents

[courts] from swinging at a moving target.” Id.

If allowed to stand, the Sixth Circuit’s approach

would invite government actors to double down on

requiring religious objectors to jump through

administrative hoops before invoking the jurisdiction

of the federal courts. Religious plaintiffs will be

required to suffer an injury and then sit on their

hands while the very agency responsible for their

injury considers and rejects a request for religious

exemption. Only then will they be able to invoke the

jurisdiction of the federal courts.

This incentive structure is perverse. A

government actor wishing to burden religious practice

may do so freely, so long as it pairs the burden with a

discretionary

exemption

process.

The

more

cumbersome and uncertain that process, the more

29

effectively it deters religious exercise and the more it

also postpones judicial review. In the interim, the

believer must decide whether to submit to a

potentially costly and years-long administrative

process in hopes of obtaining permission to practice

their faith or abandon that practice to avoid

prosecution. Neither option is consistent with

RLUIPA’s command that religious exercise receive

broad protection at all stages of land use regulation.

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(g).

To be sure, the Sixth Circuit attempted to cabin

its reasoning to the land use context. But while a

finality requirement might make sense of a takings

claim, it makes no sense to apply it to First

Amendment freedoms. Those freedoms are violated

not just by absolute prohibitions on religious exercise,

but also by temporary burdens or processes that make

exercising those rights more difficult. See N.L.R.B. v.

Cath. Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 502 (1979) (“It

is not only the conclusions that may be reached by the

Board which may impinge on rights guaranteed by the

Religion Clauses, but also the very process of inquiry

leading to findings and conclusions.”). Indeed, this

Court has recognized that the loss of First

Amendment freedoms “for even minimal periods of

time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.”

Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 592 U.S.

14, 19 (2020). A finality rule that delays federal

jurisdiction by months or years is therefore not a

neutral timing mechanism. It is itself a constitutional

harm.

To see the mischief that can result from importing

Williamson County to First Amendment cases, the

Court need look no farther than the dissent in Anash

30

v. Kingston. As described above, Anash concerned a

Jewish rabbi, Shimon Hellinger, who owned two

properties in Kingston, Pennsylvania, one used for

religious group living for Orthodox Jewish young men

studying under his tutelage, and the other used as a

rabbinical office and yeshiva for prayer, religious

study, and religious instruction. Anash, 184 F.4th at

229.

Hellinger received cease-and-desist letters and

letters from the municipality threatening fines of $500

a day if he used his properties. When that did not stop

the

community’s

religious

gatherings,

the

municipality obtained search warrants for the

buildings. They executed those warrants the day

before Rosh Hashana, arriving at the first of

Hellinger’s buildings and threatening to break down

the door of the house of worship. Id. When Hellinger

admitted law enforcement, they inspected both

buildings and condemned them the same day. Id. at

227–30. After the condemnation order, it was against

the law for Hellinger or his congregation to even enter

the buildings.

After

all

this—cease-and-desist

orders,

threatened $500 daily fines, administrative search

warrants executed by police, and condemnation orders

timed to the eve of the High Holy Days—Judge

Restrepo invoked Williamson County finality doctrine

to argue that Rabbi Hellinger’s injury was not yet ripe.

See Anash, 184 F.4th at 253–54 (Restrepo, J.,

dissenting). The dissent would have held that,

although police arrived at Hellinger’s building,

threatened to break down the door, and then expelled

the congregation from their place of worship on the

eve of the High Holy Days, Hellinger needed to await

31

a “final, definitive position” from the municipality

before the judiciary could recognize that any religious

exercise had been substantially burdened. Id. at 254.

The majority rightly rejected this takings-based

approach, holding that “RLUIPA’s substantial-burden

provision is not contingent upon the formality of a

final land-use determination.” Id. at 245.

The Anash dissent’s analysis is untenable, but

under the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning in this case, it

might well be correct. If Williamson County applies to

RLUIPA and free exercise claims, a religious

congregation could suffer months of government

harassment, be threatened with ruinous daily fines,

have its property condemned on the eve of its holiest

days, and be expelled from its house of worship—all

without suffering a cognizable injury. That cannot be

the law.

The Court should reject that erroneous conclusion

and clarify that pre-enforcement standing does not

require a state actor to expressly reject an individual’s

request for religious exemption. Rather, a plaintiff has

standing as soon as a credible threat arises, when a

policy arguably proscribes the plaintiff’s conduct, and

the government threatens enforcement against him.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should

reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and

clarify that Susan B. Anthony List, not Williamson

County, governs pre-enforcement standing in

religious freedom cases, and that a credible threat is

not extinguished by an optional exemption process.

32

Respectfully submitted,

ANDREW NUSSBAUM

Counsel of Record

FIRST & FOURTEENTH,

PLLC

2 N. Cascade Avenue,

Suite 1430

Colorado Springs, CO

80903

(719) 286-2475

andrew@firstfourteenth.com

Attorneys for Amici

September 8, 2026

JAMES COMPTON

FIRST & FOURTEENTH,

PLLC

800 Connecticut Avenue

NW, Suite 300

Washington, DC 20006

(202) 998-1978