Amicus Curiae Brief — Daniel Grand, Petitioner v. City of University Heights, Ohio, et al.

No. 25-965

In the Supreme Court of the United States

DANIEL GRAND, PETITIONER,

v.

CITY OF UNIVERSITY HEIGHTS, OHIO, et al.,

RESPONDENTS.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM INSTITUTE,

AMERICAN HINDU COALITION, MUSLIM

POLITICAL AFFAIRS COUNCIL, MASJID

MUHAMMAD, NEW YORK YEARLY MEETING

OF THE RELIGIOUS SOCIETY OF FRIENDS,

INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR KRISHNA

CONSCIOUSNESS, INC., COALITION OF

VIRTUE, AND AMERICAN MUSLIM LEAGUE,

AS AMICI CURIAE SUPPORTING PETITIONER

SEAN T.H. DUTTON

Counsel of Record

KIENBAUM HARDY VIVIANO

PELTON & FORREST PLC

280 N. Old Woodward

Ave., Suite 400

Birmingham, MI 48009

(248) 645-0000

sdutton@khvpf.com

Attorneys for Amici Curiae

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................... ii

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ................................1

INTRODUCTION & SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT.. 7

ARGUMENT ...............................................................8

I. Reversal Is Needed To Protect The Ability

Of Citizens—Notably Those Who Practice

Minority Religions—To Engage In Free

Exercise Of Religion On Their Property.... 8

A. Government Entities Use Purportedly

Neutral Zoning Laws Inordinately

Against Minority Religious Groups, Like

Petitioner And Amici. ......................... 10

B. Such Discrimination Routinely Occurs

Without An Obvious Final Decision By

Governmental Decisionmakers, Who

Simply Delay Their Determinations

Instead Of Issuing A Formal Denial. . 12

II. Petitioner’s Claim Is Ripe Because RLUIPA

Does Not Require Specialized Exhaustion

Procedures This Court Has Applied In

Takings-Clause Cases. ............................. 18

CONCLUSION ..........................................................23

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Abbott Labs. v. Gardner,

387 U.S. 136 (1967) ....................................... 18, 19

Bartenwerfer v. Buckley,

598 U.S. 69 (2023) ............................................... 22

Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,

573 U.S. 682 (2014) ............................................. 21

Bushell’s Case,

124 E.R. 1006 (1670) ............................................. 3

Califano v. Sanders,

430 U.S. 99 (1977) ............................................... 19

Elrod v. Burns,

427 U.S. 347 (1976) ............................................. 19

Emp. Div., Dep’t of Hum. Res. of

Oregon v. Smith,

494 U.S. 872 (1990) ............................................... 9

Garden State Islamic Center v. City

of Vineland,

358 F. Supp. 3d 377 (D.N.J. 2018) ...................... 13

Horne v. Dep’t of Agric.,

569 U.S. 513 (2013) ....................................... 20, 21

Knick v. Twp. of Scott, Pa.,

588 U.S. 180 (2019) ............................................. 20

iii

Lee v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc.,

505 U.S. 830 (1992) (per curiam) ........................ 16

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,

504 U.S. 555 (1992) ............................................. 19

Nat’l Park Hospitality Ass’n v.

Dep’t of Interior,

538 U.S. 803 (2003) ............................................. 18

Pakdel v. City & Cnty. of San

Francisco, California,

594 U.S. 474 (2021) (per curiam) ....................... 21

Phila. Yearly Meeting of Religious Soc’y of

Friends v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,

No. 25-1512, 2026 WL 2409055 (4th Cir.

Aug. 18, 2026) ...................................................... 17

Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn

v. Cuomo,

592 U.S. 14 (2020) (per curiam) ......................... 19

Sherman v. Town of Chester,

752 F.3d 554 (2d Cir. 2014) ................................ 13

Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins,

578 U.S. 330 (2016) ............................................. 19

Trump v. New York,

592 U.S. 125 (2020) ............................................. 19

iv

United States v. County of Culpeper,

Virginia,

245 F. Supp. 3d 758 (W.D. Va. 2017) ............ 13, 14

Other Authorities

Amen Galinato, ‘We Never Gave Up

Hope.’ Bethpage Muslims Settle

Mosque Expansion Lawsuit, WSHU

(Dec. 17, 2025) ..................................................... 14

Douglas Laycock & Luke W. Goodrich,

RLUIPA: Necessary, Modest and

Under-Enforced, 39 Fordham Urb.

L.J. 1021 (2012) .................................................. 11

Drew Penner, Jewish Residents Rally

with Muslim Community for Los

Gatos Mosque Permit Modification,

Los Gatan (Apr. 1, 2026) ..................................... 15

H.R. Rep. No. 106-219 (1999) .................................. 11

Historical Soc’y of the N.Y. Courts, The Flushing

Remonstrance, 1657 ............................................ 17

ISKCON, A Global Family ....................................... 16

Laura Strickler & Carol E. Lee, Quaker Groups

File Suit Over the End of Policy Restricting ICE

Arrests in Houses of Worship, NBC News.com

(Jan. 27, 2025) ..................................................... 17

Quaker.org, How Do Quakers Worship?................... 17

v

Sunayana Prabhu, Holmdel Synagogue

Wins Planning Approval Amid

Community Concerns, The Two

River Times (Sept. 26, 2025) ............................... 16

U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Report on the

Twentieth Anniversary of the

Religious Land Use and

Institutionalized Persons Act

(Sept. 22, 2020) ................................................... 11

U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Update on the

Justice Department’s Enforcement

of the Religious Land Use and

Institutionalized Persons Act:

2010–2016 (July 2016) ........................................ 10

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1

The Religious Freedom Institute’s Islam and

Religious Freedom Action Team (“IRF”) represents

and amplifies Muslim voices on topics related to

religious freedom, seeks a deeper understanding of

the support for religious freedom from inside the

teachings of Islam, and protects the religious freedom

of Muslims across the country. IRF engages in

research, education, and advocacy on core issues like

freedom of religion, and the freedom to live out one’s

faith, particularly when, as here, those core natural

rights are threatened by government officials. IRF

explores and supports religious freedom by

translating resources by Muslims about religious

freedom, fostering inclusion of Muslims in religious

freedom work both in places where Muslims are a

majority and where they are a minority, and

partnering with the Institute’s other teams in

advocacy.

The American Hindu Coalition (“AHC”) is an

apolitical

national

advocacy

organization

representing Hindus, Buddhists, Jains, Sikhs, and

related members of minority religions that frequently

face discrimination and misunderstandings, as their

religious practices and beliefs are unfamiliar to

1 No counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or in

part. No person or entity other than Amici and their counsel

made a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation

or submission of this brief.

2

certain members of mainstream America. AHC

advocates for the full protection and support of First

Amendment religious liberties for all.

The Muslim Political Affairs Council (“MPAC”) is

a community-based public affairs nonprofit

organization working for the integration of Muslims

into American society. MPAC aims to increase the

public understanding of Islam and to improve policies

that affect American Muslims, by engaging with

government, media, and communities. MPAC’s view

is that America is enriched by the vital contributions

of American Muslims. MPAC works diligently to offer

the public a portrayal that goes beyond stereotypes

and shows that Muslims are part of a vibrant

American pluralism.

Masjid Muhammad, also known as The Nation’s

Mosque, is one of the oldest mosques in the United

States, and was founded in the mid-1930s by an

African American Muslim community. It was

established as the first community mosque to be built

from the ground up, by American citizens, in the

Nation’s Capital, and it is still the only mosque in

Washington, DC, built by its citizens and local

residents.

Today,

Masjid

Muhammad

is

representative of the oldest established Muslim

community in the Nation’s Capital and America.

Masjid Muhammad strongly believes that the

protection of religious liberty is a principle that must

apply equally to all people and all faith communities,

anchored in the very text of the Qur’an, which

3

recognizes the importance of protecting places where

God is worshipped, including monasteries, churches,

synagogues, and mosques. See Qur’an 22:40.

The New York Yearly Meeting of the Religious

Society of Friends (“NYYM”), the governing body for

65 Quaker meetings and churches in New York,

Connecticut, and New Jersey, has existed since 1695.

Quakers (also known as “Friends”) have worshiped in

private homes since the Society’s 1647 founding in

Great Britain, a practice that provoked persecution

culminating in William Penn’s prosecution for

unlawful public worship and the jury acquittal that

produced the first noted instance of jury nullification

in Bushell’s Case, 124 E.R. 1006 (1670). That

persecution

followed

Friends

to

America:

Massachusetts executed three Quakers, including

Mary Dyer, for insisting on the right to worship, and

New Netherland’s Governor Peter Stuyvesant banned

Quaker home meetings, provoking the 1657 Flushing

Remonstrance and the arrest and banishment of John

Bowne for hosting Quaker worship in his Flushing

home—a banishment the Dutch West India Company

reversed, ordering Stuyvesant to permit free religious

practice. NYYM meetings continue to worship in

members’ homes today without seeking governmental

permission, a practice that deepens community and

reduces costs for seekers of limited means. Thus,

NYYM strongly supports the ability of religious

adherents to practice their religion in their homes,

without the undue burdens of local governments

hampering their ability to do so.

4

The

International

Society

for

Krishna

Consciousness, Inc. (“ISKCON”) is a monotheistic, or

Vaishnava, tradition within the broad umbrella of

Hindu culture and faith. There are approximately

1000 ISKCON temples worldwide, including more

than 60 in the United States. In addition, because

ISKCON is a religious minority in the United States

that often relies on courts to protect its rights, it

broadly supports the rights of religious persons to

practice their faith in their homes with fellow

believers free from government intrusion. ISKCON

members regularly meet in the homes of fellow

congregants across America for social and religious

gatherings, or sangas. These meetings, usually held

in the evening after work, or on weekends, range in

size from a small group of ten to over one hundred

persons, including adults and children. Believers

sing, chant, share scriptural readings and

discussions, worship at their home altars, share

meals of sanctified foods, and observe other similar

forms of bhakti-yoga, or devotional service to God.

ISKCON believes these activities must remain

protected religious practices that every American

should be free to perform in their homes.

The Coalition of Virtue (“COV”) is a domestic

policy organization that advocates for the Muslim

community’s traditional family values in furtherance

of the common good. It holds that all human beings

are created by God with dignity, rights, and duties,

and that the virtues are the foundation of civilization.

COV promotes virtue in society, grounded in divine

5

guidance as embodied in the Islamic tradition, in

cooperation with those who share its moral vision. It

envisions an America where families have a say in

their children’s education, equal opportunities are

available to all, and the highest good is championed.

It advocates for policies that safeguard the rights of

parents, the integrity of marriage and the family, and

the life of the unborn.

The American Muslim League (“AML”) is a

patriotic

Muslim

civic

organization

that

policymakers, leaders, and interfaith partners can

engage with confidence to help mainstream American

Muslims and champion our country as a unique

beacon of liberty and opportunity. AML aims to

prevent American Muslim identity from being defined

around foreign conflict, sectarian divisions, and

victimhood grievances – instead championing proud

voices committed to freedom, innovation, and the

pursuit of happiness. AML conducts polling on

American Muslim realities, engages the media and

policymakers with constructive policy solutions,

mobilizes a vocal cohort of patriotic Muslims, and

extends a hand of collaboration to all fellow

Americans.

Given these longstanding institutional interests,

Amici maintain a significant interest in the Court’s

proper resolution of the question presented here.

Amici urge the Court to reverse the judgment of the

Sixth Circuit, thereby confirming that claims raised

under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized

6

Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) do not require the sort of

extensive exhaustion procedures mandated for

property claims brought under the Takings Clause. In

doing so, the Court will reinforce congressional intent

underlying RLUIPA, and provide much-needed

avenues for protection of plaintiffs who allege

violations of their constitutional rights to free exercise

of religion, even as local government zoning officials

delay consideration of a religiously based zoning

request.

7

INTRODUCTION & SUMMARY

OF ARGUMENT

Religious discrimination in land use rarely wears

a label. Local officials burden minority faiths not by

denying their applications outright, but by never

deciding them—through continuances, agenda pulls,

and endless “incompleteness”—government officials

can make a house of worship impossible while never

fully adopting a decision for any court to review. The

Sixth Circuit’s ripeness rule rewards exactly that

strategy, and because covert obstruction such as this

falls hardest on religious minorities, its consequences

will too. Amici, who represent Muslim, Hindu, and

Quaker minority faith communities with firsthand

experience of these tactics, urge the Court to reverse.

Purportedly

neutral

zoning

laws

are

disproportionately used against minority faiths, and

that discrimination is usually compounded because it

is so rarely delivered as a clean, appealable denial.

Governments instead rely on delay-as-denial tactics:

repeated continuances; shifting requirements; and

indefinite, non-final “reviews,” all while maintaining

that no terminal decision (and thus no ripe claim) yet

exists. Courts confronting this tactic, including in

cases involving mosques and other minority

congregations, have recognized that the obstruction

itself is the actionable harm, and examples from

around the country confirm that this pattern is

neither isolated nor incidental.

8

The Williamson County finality requirement—

originally developed by this Court for takings

claims—has no place in RLUIPA cases. Indeed, that

requirement only exists in that limited universe of

cases because a takings claim cannot be evaluated

until the government has taken a final position on

how a regulation applies to particular property.

RLUIPA imposes no comparable prerequisite;

liability turns on whether the government has

substantially burdened religious exercise without

adequate justification, an inquiry that discriminatory

delay can itself satisfy. Congress directed that

RLUIPA be construed broadly in favor of protecting

religious exercise and tied its standing rules to

ordinary Article III principles, not to an atextual

finality gloss borrowed from an unrelated

constitutional provision. The Sixth Circuit’s contrary

rule should be reversed.

ARGUMENT

I. Reversal Is Needed To Protect The Ability Of

Citizens—Notably Those Who Practice

Minority Religions—To Engage In Free

Exercise Of Religion On Their Property.

Reversal of the judgment below is necessary to

protect the significant First Amendment rights of

Amici and their members. The Sixth Circuit’s

erroneous decision effectively requires untold

numbers of Americans, like Petitioner, Amici, and

Amici’s members, to sit idly by, subject to the whims

9

and scheduling of local bureaucrats, while their

fundamental right to exercise their religion on their

own property withers on the vine. As history has

shown, these harms will fall excessively on

practitioners

of

minority

religions,

who

overwhelmingly face the biases of their neighbors for

practicing different faiths. To be sure, America has

generally been a welcoming home to religious

minorities, providing a model of religious pluralism

that deserves celebration. But at the margins there

have been unfortunate exceptions, including in the

land-use context. And where our elected leaders have

failed to live up to the values of our Founding and

Constitution, the government action that effectively

discriminates against these minority religious

practices is routinely done without overt

decisionmaking that would trigger the administrative

finality Williamson County requires. In fact, in a

country where religious pluralism is the dominant

model, covert discrimination is a bigger threat than

overt bigotry. “Indeed, few States would be so naive

as to enact a law directly prohibiting or burdening a

religious practice as such.” Emp. Div., Dep’t of Hum.

Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 894 (1990)

(O’Connor J., concurring in the judgment).

10

A. Government Entities Use Purportedly

Neutral

Zoning

Laws

Inordinately

Against Minority Religious Groups, Like

Petitioner And Amici.

RLUIPA’s important protections of religious land

use are inordinately necessary to protect minority

religious adherents. As the Department of Justice has

shown from its own RLUIPA enforcement data, “its

investigations since 2010 has reinforced the

conclusion that minority groups have faced a

disproportionate level of discrimination in zoning

matters.” U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Update on the Justice

Department’s Enforcement of the Religious Land Use

and Institutionalized Persons Act: 2010–2016, 4 (July

2016).2 Despite Muslims, Jews, Buddhists, and

Hindus comprising only 4.2% of the U.S. population

in 2015, they nevertheless represented over 55% of

the DOJ’s RLUIPA investigations between 2010 and

2016 under RLUIPA. Id. at 5–6. Indeed, “religious

groups often encounter[ ] overt and subtle forms of

discrimination when seeking zoning approval for

places of worship—most often impacting minority

faiths and newer, smaller, or unfamiliar

denominations.” U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Report on the

2 Available at https://www.justice.gov/crt/file/877931/dl.

11

Twentieth Anniversary of the Religious Land Use and

Institutionalized Persons Act 4 (Sept. 22, 2020).3

The harms against practicers of minority religions

are often coupled with other forms of bigotry, and

likely underreported. As the DOJ has explained in

analyzing data on RLUIPA enforcement actions, this

outsized mistreatment of minority faiths is

sometimes “coupled with racial and ethnic

discrimination,” all of which falls on top of the fact

that religious institutions, in general, “were often

treated worse in zoning decisions than comparable

secular institutions,” creating a snowball effect on

these minority religions. Id. (quoting H.R. Rep.

No. 106-219, at 24 (1999)). And even these numbers

likely fail to show the whole picture. Some analyses of

RLUIPA’s efficacy have concluded that this important

statutory regime “has, if anything, been under

enforced,” Douglas Laycock & Luke W. Goodrich,

RLUIPA: Necessary, Modest and Under-Enforced, 39

Fordham Urb. L.J. 1021, 1048 (2012), meaning it is

likely that there are untold cases of religious zoning

discrimination against minority religions that are

simply never brought to court.

3 Available at https://www.justice.gov/d9/press-releases/atta

chments/2020/09/22/report_on_the_twentieth_anniversary_of_r

luipa_-_september_22_2020_0.pdf.

12

B. Such Discrimination Routinely Occurs

Without An Obvious Final Decision By

Governmental

Decisionmakers,

Who

Simply Delay Their Determinations

Instead Of Issuing A Formal Denial.

There is ample precedent supporting the

conclusion that local government zoning officials have

delayed zoning decisions and otherwise chilled FirstAmendment- and RLUIPA-protected activity through

their regulatory oversight actions, without ever

outright denying a land use request.

Unfortunately, as shown in the facts of this very

case, government officials can impose their unlawful

religious-land-use discrimination without having to

announce themselves in a clean, appealable denial

vote that would provide the necessary finality

Williamson County requires. Instead, governmental

entities regularly burden religious minorities through

delay-as-denial tactics such as repeated continuances,

agenda pulls, “incomplete” loops, escalating review

costs, midstream rule changes, and last-step

obstruction that prevents worship or religious service

while preserving a litigation posture that no final

decision exists. The danger of rigid finality rules in

this context is obvious. If a local government can stall

and then argue that the stalled matter is unripe,

discrimination can become practically unreviewable.

Courts have recognized this concern in closely

analogous settings. For example, in Sherman v. Town

13

of Chester, 752 F.3d 554 (2d Cir. 2014), the Second

Circuit confronted a decade-long campaign of landuse obstruction, and held it would be “perverse” to let

the government use “extreme delay” to escape

accountability, explaining that “a final decision is not

necessary” where the obstruction itself is the

challenged governmental action. Id. at 563–69.

And in the RLUIPA context, courts likewise have

refused to treat continued and delayed government

processing as a talisman against review when the

claim is that the process is being used pretextually to

frustrate religious exercise. Unfortunately, as the

following cases demonstrate, these situations have

often involved the targeting of religious minorities.

RLUIPA protected the religious minorities from

discrimination in these cases, but it would no longer

do so if this Court were to adopt the ripeness

framework from the Sixth Circuit. For example, the

Court in Garden State Islamic Center v. City of

Vineland, 358 F. Supp. 3d 377 (D.N.J. 2018), held that

where “the issuance of a final decision [is] held in

abeyance,” that is “the very essence of the claim” that

the process was invoked to frustrate the

congregation’s existence and substantially burdened

the Islamic Center’s religious exercise. Id. at 385–87.

And in United States v. County of Culpeper, Virginia,

245 F. Supp. 3d 758 (W.D. Va. 2017), although the

town board refused to issue a final decision on the

Islamic Center of Culpeper (“ICC”)’s permit

application because that application was allegedly

“insufficient,” as well as claiming the application’s

14

deficiencies rendered it necessary for the ICC “to

resubmit an application (or explore some other

method) rather than sue,” the district court found that

the issue was ripe for adjudication because these delay

tactics “were pretexts for religious discrimination.” Id.

at 765.

Even beyond the caselaw, examples of delay-asdenial in these contexts abound. Following the

successful litigation of a mosque expansion on Long

Island—after seven years of litigation—a local news

outlet researched the widespread difficulties Muslim

communities faced in building mosques near their

homes. In researching “national mosque disputes”

from 2005–2025, the reporters uncovered more than 70

major disputes, 52 of which resulted in “municipal

pushback through the usage of zoning laws” against

these Muslim communities. Amen Galinato, ‘We Never

Gave Up Hope.’ Bethpage Muslims Settle Mosque

Expansion Lawsuit, WSHU (Dec. 17, 2025).4 As this

article explained, “zoning laws have been increasingly

employed to discriminate against religious groups, but

especially toward Muslim Americans,” routinely

through imposition of “administrative roadblocks in

the approval process,” such as a “years-long regulatory

review.” Id.

In another example, the West Valley Muslim

Association of Los Gatos, California, was forced to seek

4 Available at https://www.wshu.org/long-island-news/2025-

12-17/bethpage-muslims-mosque-expansion-lawsuit.

15

special permit changes just to hold pre-dawn, lateevening, and Ramadan prayers, with the City’s

administrative proceedings placing a significant

burden on the local Muslim community, particularly

because the hearing itself happened only after

Ramadan had already ended. Drew Penner, Jewish

Residents Rally with Muslim Community for Los Gatos

Mosque Permit Modification, Los Gatan (Apr. 1,

2026).5 Despite the fact that the WVMA received crossdenominational support from local Jewish leaders, the

Los Gatos Planning Commission voted to end the

meeting and continue public comment on another date,

further delaying the ability of the WVMA to hold its

crucial religious services. Id.

A local New Jersey planning board also recently

delayed its decision to approve a site plan for a

synagogue and Rabbi’s residence for months. In

Holmdel, New Jersey, the Chabad Jewish Center of

BCC, Inc., sought a site plan approval to develop a

single-story religious center with numerous amenities

for the local Jewish community, including “a 300-seat

sanctuary, a multipurpose room for celebrations and

holiday events, a youth lounge, a Hebrew school, a

library and space for community outreach programs.”

Sunayana Prabhu, Holmdel Synagogue Wins Planning

Approval Amid Community Concerns, The Two River

Available at https://losgatan.com/jewish-residents-rallywith-muslim-community-for-los-gatos-mosque-permit/.

5

16

Times (Sept. 26, 2025).6 Although the Chabad Jewish

Center first appeared for a hearing before the planning

board in December 2024, the board permitted

supposed concerns by residents to create “months of

debate and pushback” requiring numerous meetings,

delaying any decision by the board until September of

2025. Id. Here, too, local government officials were able

to significantly delay the applicants’ exercise of their

religious liberty, without any formal administrative

denial.

And other Amici are similarly at risk for these

types of government discrimination. For example,

ISKCON has a demonstrated history of facing

religious discrimination, defending its rights all the

way up to this Court. See Lee v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna

Consciousness, Inc., 505 U.S. 830 (1992) (per curiam).

And given that Bhakti-Vriksha, Nama Hatta, and

various other forms of “small-group gatherings for

spiritual association, study and practice” are core

aspects of ISKCON’s religious practices, see ISKCON,

A Global Family,7 and other forms of Hinduism also

emphasize home worship, both ISKCON members and

Hindu practitioners more generally also have a

significant risk of facing the same treatment by

bureaucrats that Petitioner challenged in this case.

6 Available at https://tworivertimes.com/holmdel-synagogue-

wins-planning-approval-amid-community-concerns/.

7 Available at https://iskcon.org/communities/.

17

No less so for NYYM and its members. Although

“Quakers can, and sometimes do, meet for worship just

about anywhere,” they are most “likely to come

together for worship at a meetinghouse.” Quaker.org,

How Do Quakers Worship?.8 These Quaker meeting

houses are typically unadorned and simple,

resembling residential homes or their surrounding

buildings. And Quakers have already turned to the

courts to combat instances of government overreach

and intrusion into their meeting house worship

sessions, see Laura Strickler & Carol E. Lee, Quaker

Groups File Suit Over the End of Policy Restricting ICE

Arrests in Houses of Worship, NBC News.com (Jan. 27,

2025);9 Phila. Yearly Meeting of Religious Soc’y of

Friends v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 25-1512,

2026 WL 2409055, at *1 (4th Cir. Aug. 18, 2026)

(affirming district court’s issuance of preliminary

injunction),

continuing Quakers’

longstanding

tradition of standing up to government interference

with their religious practices, see Historical Soc’y of the

N.Y. Courts, The Flushing Remonstrance, 1657.10

Thus, Quakers remain at risk of similar forms of

8 Available at https://quaker.org/how-do-quakers-worship/.

Available at https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/nationalsecurity/quaker-groups-file-suit-end-policy-restricting-ice-arres

ts-houses-wors-rcna189471.

9

10 Available at https://history.nycourts.gov/about_period/flus

hing-remonstrance/.

18

zoning discrimination,

bureaucrats.

at

the

whims

of

local

While these examples of the sorts of

administrative delays and run-arounds that impose

substantial hardships on religious exercise are legion,

RLUIPA and the Constitution do not require courts to

delay protecting religious exercise due to a form-overfunction analysis which ignores the very real burdens

imposed by bad-faith delay. Absent the protection of

RLUIPA, religious minorities have no guarantee that

such delays will ever come to an end. They may give

up and decide to move to a different community rather

than engaging in a Sisyphean process that seems

aimed at excluding them. Where delay or other forms

of administrative incompleteness are the mechanism

of exclusion, those very contentions can be the

actionable restraint under RLUIPA. See infra Part II.

II. Petitioner’s Claim Is Ripe Because RLUIPA

Does Not Require Specialized Exhaustion

Procedures This Court Has Applied In

Takings-Clause Cases.

A.1. “Ripeness is a justiciability doctrine designed

‘to prevent the courts, through avoidance of

premature adjudication, from entangling themselves

in abstract disagreements over administrative

policies.’” Nat’l Park Hospitality Ass’n v. Dep’t of

Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 807 (2003) (quoting Abbott

Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967), abrogated

on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99

19

(1977)). When considered in the context of

government decisionmaking, ripeness aims “to

protect the agencies from judicial interference until

an administrative decision has been formalized and

its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging

parties.” Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 148–49. In minerun cases, ripeness is determined by the resolution of

two generally straightforward inquiries: (1) whether

the dispute presents a claim that is fit to be “resolved

through the judicial process” and (2) whether the

court’s withholding of an adjudication of the issues

would create a hardship or “concrete harm” to the

parties. Trump v. New York, 592 U.S. 125, 131, 133–

34 (2020).

So long as a plaintiff has suffered an actual injury

or harm, “Congress has the power to define injuries

and articulate chains of causation that will give rise

to a case or controversy where none existed before.”

Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 341 (2016)

(quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,

580 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). And, as this

Court has well-noted, “[t]he loss of First Amendment

freedoms, for even minimal periods of time,

unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.”

Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 592 U.S.

14, 19 (2020) (per curiam) (quoting Elrod v. Burns,

427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (plurality op.)).

Alternatively, this Court has adopted and applied

several more strenuous tests for ripeness in certain

types of cases. As relevant here, when reviewing a

20

claim of regulatory taking of property under the Fifth

Amendment, the Court has held that claims

“regarding the application of [a] zoning ordinance . . .

to [a plaintiff’s] property” are “not ripe” until the

plaintiff “obtain[s] a final decision” from the

regulatory entity.” Williamson Cty., 473 U.S. at 186,

overruled in part on other grounds by Knick v. Twp. of

Scott, Pa., 588 U.S. 180, 189 (2019). In such cases,

ripeness occurs only once the government entity

“charged with implementing the regulations,” has

“reached a final decision regarding the application of

the regulations to the property at issue.” Id. at 186–

87. This is because a Fifth Amendment takings claim

requires proof “that the Government has both taken

property and denied just compensation.” Horne v.

Dep’t of Agric., 569 U.S. 513, 525–26 (2013). As this

Court has explained, requiring such finality “is

compelled by the very nature of the inquiry required

by the Just Compensation Clause,” because the

unique factors significant to that inquiry “cannot be

evaluated until the administrative agency has arrived

at a final, definitive position regarding how it will

apply the regulations at issue to the particular land

in question.” Williamson Cty., 473 U.S. at 190–91.

And even when the Williamson County finality

requirement applies, the “rationales for the finality

requirement underscore that nothing more than de

facto finality is necessary,” a “relatively modest”

showing that merely “ensures that a plaintiff has

actually ‘been injured by the Government’s action’

and is not prematurely suing over a hypothetical

harm.” Pakdel v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco,

21

California, 594 U.S. 474, 478–79 (2021) (per curiam)

(quoting Horne, 569 U.S. at 525).

2. Under RLUIPA, government entities are

prohibited from “impos[ing] or implement[ing] a land

use regulation in a manner that imposes a substantial

burden on the religious exercise of a person, including

a religious assembly or institution, unless the

government demonstrates that imposition of the

burden on that person, assembly, or institution—

(A) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental

interest; and (B) is the least restrictive means of

furthering that compelling governmental interest.” 42

U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1) (formatting altered). RLUIPA

defines “religious exercise” as “any exercise of

religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a

system of religious belief.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A).

Congress has made clear its intent to open the

courthouse doors for these sorts of claims. Congress

explicitly intended RLUIPA to “be construed in favor

of a broad protection of religious exercise, to the

maximum extent permitted by the terms of this

chapter and the Constitution.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc3(g); see also Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573

U.S. 682, 714 (2014). And RLUIPA further advised

how courts should consider justiciability arguments

regarding any claims or defenses raised under

RLUIPA—“[s]tanding to assert a claim or defense

under this section shall be governed by the general

rules of standing under article III of the

Constitution,” while also explaining that RLUIPA

22

claims adjudicated in non-federal forums “shall not be

entitled to full faith and credit in a Federal court

unless the claimant had a full and fair adjudication of

that claim in the non-Federal forum.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000cc-2(a), (c). Thus, at every available turn,

Congress spelled out its intent to make RLUIPA

claims available to those whose religious exercise was

substantially burdened by a government decision

relating to land use.

B. As Petitioner well explains, Opening Br.38–

Williamson County’s ripeness/finality requirement

does not apply to claims brought under RLUIPA.

Religious land-use claims do not uniformly

demand final administrative decisions before a

judicial remedy may be sought. Instead, Congress

chose a different path—an RLUIPA plaintiff must

show “a substantial burden on the religious exercise

of a person,” that is not saved by the government’s

showing of a “compelling governmental interest” that

“is the least restrictive means of furthering that

compelling governmental interest.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000cc(a)(1). Congress’ specific choice to require

only a substantial burden on religious exercise is

simply not compatible with Williamson County’s

significant administrative finality requirements.

Bartenwerfer v. Buckley, 598 U.S. 69, 80 (2023) (“This

Court generally assumes that, when Congress enacts

statutes, it is aware of this Court’s relevant

precedents.” (citation omitted)). Coupled with the fact

that Williamson County only required administrative

23

finality because of “the very nature of the inquiry

required by the Just Compensation Clause,” 473 U.S.

at 190–91, the finality requirement is simply a bad fit

for RLUIPA’s protective regime.

By adding this atextual judicial gloss on RLUIPA,

the lower courts have imposed unnecessary and

legally unsupported hurdles to the vindication of Free

Exercise rights that Congress intended when it

enacted this statutory regime. For these reasons, the

Court should reverse the Sixth Circuit’s ripeness

decision.

CONCLUSION

The Court should reverse the judgment of the

Court of Appeals.

Respectfully submitted,

SEAN T.H. DUTTON

Counsel of Record

KIENBAUM HARDY

VIVIANO PELTON &

FORREST PLC

280 N. Old Woodward

Ave., Suite 400

Birmingham, MI 48009

(248) 645-0000

sdutton@khvpf.com

September 8, 2026